The selling of media rights is currently a hot topic in European football. Last week, the English Premier League cashed in around 7 billion Euros for the sale of its live domestic media rights (2016 to 2019) – once again a 70 percent increase in comparison to the previous tender. This means that even the bottom club in the Premier League will receive approximately €130 million while the champions can expect well over €200 million per season.

The Premier League’s new deal has already led the President of the Spanish National Professional Football League (LNFP), Javier Tebas, to express his concerns that this could see La Liga lose its position as one of Europe’s leading leagues. He reiterated that establishing a centralised sales model in Spain is of utmost importance, if not long overdue.

Concrete plans to reintroduce a system of joint selling for the media rights of the Primera División, Segunda División A, and la Copa del Rey by means of a Royal Decree were already announced two years ago. The road has surely been long and bumpy. The draft Decree is finally on the table, but now it misses political approval. All the parties involved are blaming each other for the current failure: the LNFP blames the Sport Governmental Council for Sport (CSD) for not taking the lead; the Spanish Football Federation (RFEF) is arguing that the Federation and non-professional football entities should receive more money and that it should have a stronger say in the matter in accordance with the FIFA Statutes;  and there are widespread rumours that the two big earners, Real Madrid and FC Barcelona, are actively lobbying to prevent the Royal Decree of actually being adopted.

To keep the soap opera drama flowing,  on 30 December 2014, FASFE (an organisation consisting of groups of fans, club members, and minority shareholders of several Spanish professional football clubs) and the International Soccer Centre (a movement that aims to obtain more balanced and transparent football and basketball competitions in Spain) filed an antitrust complaint with the European Commission against the LNFP. They argue that the current system of individual selling of LNFP media rights, with unequal shares of revenue widening the gap between clubs, violates EU competition law.

Source:http://www.gopixpic.com/600/buscar%C3%A1n-el-amor-verdadero-nueva-novela-de-televisa/http:%7C%7Cassets*zocalo*com*mx%7Cuploads%7Carticles%7C5%7C134666912427*jpg/

The complaint will surely be frowned upon in Brussels. First, Spain is on the verge of introducing a joint selling arrangement. So what is the point of using competition law as an instrument to obtain … a joint selling arrangement? Second, the argument that a horizontal agreement, preventing LNFP clubs from individually competing in the sale of their media rights, is needed to ensure fair and effective competition seems, to put it mildly, counterintuitive. Third, who files an antitrust complaint on 30 December?

The complainants essentially target the polarization of revenues between the two top clubs (Real Madrid and FC Barcelona) and the other clubs. This is a well-known and long-standing feature of the LNFP, which is only in part attributable to disparities in the clubs’ media rights income. The complainants point out, however, that media coverage is also an important driver of other main revenue streams (e.g. value of sponsorship deals, ticket sales, and merchandising). 

Since the end of the 1990s, clubs have been selling the LNFP media rights individually. In a system of individual selling, a club’s bargaining power is evidently determined by the market potential of the matches of a specific club and not by the collective attractiveness of the competition as a whole. This has resulted in a pronounced imbalance between the two top clubs Real Madrid and FC Barcelona, who are able to extract supra-normal profits, and the other clubs.

For the 2010-2011 season, for example, the two Spanish giants both received around €125 million for their live media rights, leaving their domestic peers fighting over the scraps (i.e. the next biggest clubs earned around €40 million and the majority of the clubs sold their rights for about €15 million). In other words, Real Madrid and FC Barcelona generate ten times more revenue from their media rights as compared to the smaller clubs.

While it is easy to see why this situation may be considered unfair from the perspective of the majority of the clubs, it is less evident to find a competition law problem. 

A competition law perspective 

As stated above, the complaint is launched against the LNFP who, according to FASFE, by means of authorising the individual selling of TV rights system, is violating EU competition law.

First, the complainants argue that the system of individual selling strengthens the dominant positions of Real Madrid and FC Barcelona and, subsequently, undermines the competitive position of the other clubs. So far so good. But then they jump to the conclusion that Article 102 TFEU is being violated, not by the LNFP, but by Real Madrid and FC Barcelona. 

There they lost us – and presumably anyone remotely familiar with EU competition law. But let’s be a good sport and contemplate this line of reasoning a bit further.  

It might be argued that Real Madrid and FC Barcelona hold a (collective) dominant position on certain product markets in Spain and, by extension, in a substantial part of the internal market – even though the complaint fails to properly define those relevant markets. On the upstream market for the acquisition of media rights of La Liga, both clubs behave to a certain extent independently of their competitors. Spanish broadcasters first seek to acquire the media rights to their matches, which undercuts the bargaining position of the other clubs in the subsequent negotiations for the purchase of their rights. A more fundamental flaw is that the complainants contend that the possession or even strengthening of a dominant position by way of competition falls within the prohibition of Article 102 TFEU. The complaint does not put forward a single argument substantiating how both clubs engage in abusive conduct. 

Second, the complainants argue that the LNFP, according to Article 49 of its statutes, must look after the common interests of the competitions that it organises and of its members. In their view, the 1996 decision of the LFNP General Assembly to re-introduce a system of joint selling, which has negatively affected the majority of clubs and a large majority of fans, does not comply with this objective. 

While it can be argued that the LNFP’s decision constitutes a decision of an association of undertakings within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU, it is difficult to see how it has an anti-competitive object or effect. Quite on the contrary, the decision lifted the competitive constraints on the clubs’ independent decision-making that were in place up until the season 1997-1998. 

It should be noted that a system of joint selling of media rights does not necessarily bring about an equitable distribution of the revenues among the clubs. Albeit connected, the distribution mechanism is a separate measure, which is typically for the most part performance-based. Moreover, financial solidarity can also be implemented through other mechanisms, such as a taxation system or the redistribution of voluntary contributions. That said, it must be acknowledged that a system of joint selling does facilitate the sharing of revenues among clubs. The ability of sports organisers to impose alternative financial solidarity mechanisms might be constrained by the pressure of the larger clubs (which evidently wish to see a larger share of the revenues flow back to them because they are primarily responsible for generating these revenues). The clubs’ media rights income ratio in the other top European football leagues, where media rights are sold collectively, illustrates this point. In the season 2011-2012 the earnings ratio of the top to the bottom club was as follows: Premier League (1,55 to 1); Serie A (4,35 to 1); Bundesliga (2,3 to 1); and Ligue 1 (3,2 to 1).[1] 

Considering that joint selling only creates incentives for horizontal solidarity, the financial solidarity justification in itself could not outweigh the anti-competitive effects of a joint selling arrangement. The restrictions of competition are considerable. First, joint selling agreements prevent clubs from individually competing in the sale of their media rights. Access to the market can therefore be foreclosed to competing buyers. Second, joint selling leads to uniform prices and other trading conditions. Price-fixing is a hard-core restriction that is normally prohibited. Third, joint selling could lead to output restrictions when certain rights are withheld from the market. 

As the discussion of the competition law decisional practice below will demonstrate, it is even unclear whether the financial solidarity argument can be invoked as a partial legal defence against the prohibition of restrictive agreements. 

The financial solidarity conundrum

One of the key assumptions underlying the complaint is that the EU institutions advocate the joint selling of media rights. This is presumably one of the main reasons why they are turning to Brussels for help. While it is true that the European Council (e.g. in the 2001 Nice Declaration) and the European Parliament have always been supportive of the link between joint selling and the principle of financial solidarity, the same cannot be said about the European Commission. In policy documents, the Commission has refrained from making (strong) pronouncements on the solidarity benefits of joint selling vis-à-vis individual selling. In the Helsinki Report on Sport (1999) the Commission underscored the need to examine the precise link between the joint selling of media rights and financial solidarity between professional and amateur sport. In its White Paper on Sport (2007) the Commission acknowledged that joint selling “can be a tool for achieving greater solidarity within sports”, but immediately added that also a system of individual selling by clubs can be linked to a robust solidarity mechanism. Only in the Communication on Developing the European Dimension of Sport (2011) the Commission expressed some general support for a system of joint selling. Surely some of the Commission’s press releases coinciding its decisions in this area mention benefits for financial solidarity (see e.g. here). If the complainants had looked at the actual decisions, however, they would have realised that that rhetoric is inconsistent with the legal argumentation.

After the need to address competition issues in relation to joint selling arrangements for football media rights emerged in the 1990s, several National Competition Authorities (NCAs) found that the system was incompatible with the national competition rules. The NCAs were sceptical about the necessary link between joint selling and revenue distribution and, subsequently, did not consider it to be a pro-competitive benefit capable of offsetting the identified restrictive effects. Even though the NCAs spoke out uniformly against the joint selling of football media rights, in three Member States their decisions were either overruled by a national court (United Kingdom) or circumvented through legislative action (Germany) or executive orders (the Netherlands).[2] This created uncertainties regarding the circumstances under which joint selling could be considered compatible with EU and national competition law. 

In the UEFA Champions League decision (2003) the European Commission for the first time assessed the compatibility of the joint selling of football media rights with Article 101 TFEU. In two subsequent decisions, German Bundesliga (2005) and FA Premier League (2006), the Commission raised similar competition concerns and imposed similar remedies to address these concerns. 

In all three decisions, the Commission found that joint selling arrangements are caught by the prohibition of Article 101(1) TFEU, but may create substantial efficiency gains so that Article 101(3) TFEU could be invoked as a legal defence. It identified three main benefits: (1) the creation of a single point of sale (which creates efficiencies by reducing the transaction costs for sports organisers and media content operators); (2) branding of the output by one entity (which creates efficiencies as it helps the media products receive wider recognition and distribution); and (3) the creation of a league product focused on the competition as a whole rather than individual clubs. 

To ensure that the efficiency benefits outweigh the toxic cocktail of anti-competitive effects (i.e. price-fixing and considerable risks of market foreclosure and output restrictions), the Commission carefully prescribed the way in which the rights must be marketed by imposing a list of behavioural remedies. 

In all three of the Commission’s investigations, the parties put forward the financial solidarity argument as the main justification for an exemption of their joint selling arrangements under Article 101(3) TFEU.[3] Yet the Commission never substantially addressed that argument. Only in the UEFA Champions League decision, the point was briefly considered. The Commission simply noted that UEFA had failed to substantiate the indispensability of a joint selling agreement for the redistribution of revenue and, subsequently, for the organisation of the Champions League.[4] Since it could exempt the joint selling agreement on economic efficiency grounds, however, the Commission concluded that “it is not necessary for the purpose of this procedure to consider the solidarity argument any further”.[5] As such, the Commission conveniently got round the issue.

The national decisional practice subsequent to the Commission’s precedents equally refrained from addressing the issue. The NCAs started focusing their assessments exclusively on efficiency benefits, as instructed by the Commission.  

In short, in competition law proceedings related to joint selling arrangements, the financial solidarity defence has never been very compelling – it was either considered unsound (early national enforcement practice) or remained unaddressed. Of course, one may still argue that the elephant in the room was surreptitiously taken into account (bearing in mind that the acceptance of a similar price-fixing cartel in other sectors would be difficult to imagine).[6] 

Redistribution formulas for media rights income  

After the European Commission de facto legitimized the joint selling of football media rights, the system became the common practice for marketing such rights in Europe. Since Italy reintroduced the system of joint selling in 2010, Cyprus, Portugal, and Spain are now the last EU markets in which first division football clubs sell their rights individually. 

To put the distribution key foreseen in the pending Spanish Royal Decree into perspective, we will first summarize how the other four big European leagues redistribute the media rights income. 

England: Since 1992, the year in which the Premier League was formed, it was decided that 50% of the revenue is split equally between the 20 clubs, 25% is paid in Merit Payments (depending on where a club finishes in the final League table), and the final 25% is paid in Facility Fees (based on each time a club’s matches are broadcast in the UK). All international broadcast revenue, and central commercial revenue, is split equally amongst the 20 clubs. For the season 2013/2014, the ratio between the top (Liverpool at €132 million Euros) and the bottom earning club (Cardiff City at €84 million) was 1.57:1.

Germany: Within the German Bundesliga clubs, the criteria for the distribution of revenues will be determined by a 2:1 ratio between the top-ranked and the bottom-ranked teams in an ad hoc distribution ranking for the years 2013 – 2017. This means that the revenue sharing distribution will range from a maximum of 5.8% of the total amount for the first place team to at least 2.9% for the 18th place team. The Bundesliga’s international media rights income distribution, however, remains based on both international and domestic sport performance.

Italy: Italy’s Serie A joint selling system had an earnings ratio of the top to bottom club of 5.25:1 for the season 2013/2014. Juventus, the top earning club, had an income from TV rights of €94 million, whereas the bottom earning club, Sassuolo, of €17.9 million.[7] Out of the total amount distributed, 40% is distributed to all the clubs as a fixed amount. Furthermore, 30% is distributed on the basis of past results (15% on results during last five seasons, 10% on historical results[8], and 5% on last season’s final league position); and 25% according to club supporters base.  

The planned Royal Decree in Spain will have a distribution system that guarantees Real Madrid and FC Barcelona an amount that is very close to what they earn now. The income ratio of the clubs will start at 4:1 and diminishes as the total amount of income increases. From the total income, about 3% will be deducted for the Spanish FA and for non-professional sports. Additionally, 10% will be assigned to the Second Division. The remaining amount will be distributed as follows: 50% as fixed amount for all the clubs, 25% depending on sports results while taking into account historical results. The other 25% will be distributed in relation to public awareness similar the Italian system (calculated on the basis of TV audiences, city population, and number of fans of the club).  

Conclusion

It is safe to say that the competition complaint launched by FASFE will not lead to the European Commission opening a formal investigation. The complainants fail to demonstrate how the current Spanish individual selling system breaches, or even potentially breaches, Article 101 and/or 102 TFEU. In that regard, it should be noted that they already tried their luck with the national competition authority (CNC), alleging infringements of national competition law. On 8 January 2013, the CNC decided to reject the complaint because it only prescribed the results of the current media rights sales process without demonstrating violations of the national competition rules. 

Whether FASFE is aware of the same judicial inaccuracies in its Commission complaint is unknown. On the other hand, it is quite evident that invoking competition law to argue for the introduction of a cartel with significant anti-competitive effects is paradoxical. The ex post fairness (i.e. the outcome of market competition) that FASFE is looking for is quite different from the ex ante fairness in the market place that competition policy is concerned with. One can therefore interpret the complaint as an attempt to add pressure on the involved Spanish parties (the CSD, the LNFP, and the RFEF) to introduce the new Royal Decree once and for all. Although the Spanish public is provided daily episodes full of jabbering, backstabbing and other drama, as with all Telenovelas, the soap is dragging on and on and should have ended ages ago. 

Whether the switch to a joint selling arrangement will significantly improve the competitive balance in La Liga remains to be seen. Since FC Barcelona and Real Madrid are guaranteed an amount similar to what they receive now, this will ultimately depend on how much the total income from the sale of the media rights will increase. The inexorable rise in the value of the broadcasting deals in the UK, which is the unique result of a duopoly of two powerful deep-pocket players (i.e. the incumbent dominant pay-TV operator Sky and new market entrant BT) that emerged after the introduction of the “no single buyer” obligation, cannot be realistically expected – at least not in the short term. Yet it is relatively certain that the overall income from media rights will go up – ultimately to the benefit of all the clubs. A (minimum) earnings ratio of the top to bottom club of 4:1 is not overly ambitious, but surely is a welcome step towards remedying the current imbalance between the two top clubs and their less fortunate competitors.

[1] See T.M.C. Asser Institute and Institute for Information Law, “Study on Sports Organisers' Rights in the EU”, Commissioned by the European Commission, DG Education and Culture, February 2014.

[2] Idem.

[3] See e.g. Commission, “Case No IV/37.214 - DFB - Central marketing of TV and radio broadcasting rights for certain football competitions in Germany” (Notice) (1999) OJ C/610, para. 7; Commission, “Notice published pursuant to Article 19(3) of Council Regulation No 17 concerning case COMP/C.2/38.173 and 38.453 - joint selling of the media rights of the FA Premier League on an exclusive basis” (2004) OJ C 115/3, para. 10.

[4] UEFA Champions League (Case COMP/37.398) Commission decision 2003/778/EC (2003) OJ L291/25, para. 131.

[5] Idem, para. 167.

[6] See e.g. Giorgio Monti, “Article 81 EC and Public Policy” (2002) 39 CMLR 1057 (calling it a “sector-specific exemption”).

[7] FASFE Antitrust Complaint of 30 December 2014, page 11

[8] In other words, this revenue is determined by overall league placings since 1946. In this category, Juventus, AC Milan and Inter Milan are the top earning clubs. For more info see: http://www.financialfairplay.co.uk/latest-news/tv-revenue-distribution-%E2%80%93-comparing-italian-and-english-models.

Since last year, Doyen Sports, represented by Jean-Louis Dupont, embarked on a legal crusade against FIFA’s TPO ban. It has lodged a competition law complaint with the EU Commission and started court proceedings in France and Belgium. In a first decision on Doyen’s request for provisory measures, the Brussels Court of First Instance rejected the demands raised by Doyen and already refused to send a preliminary reference to the CJEU. Doyen, supported by the Belgium club Seraing, decided to appeal this decision to the Brussels Appeal Court, which rendered its final ruling on the question on 10 March 2016.[1] The decision (on file with us) is rather unspectacular and in line with the first instance judgment. This blog post will rehash the three interesting aspects of the case.

·      The jurisdiction of the Belgian courts

·      The admissibility of Doyen’s action

·      The conditions for awarding provisory measures

I.      The jurisdiction of the Belgian courts

Doyen was not the only party to the dispute dissatisfied with the first instance ruling; FIFA and UEFA also appealed the decision challenging the territorial competence of the Belgian Court to hear the claims raised against FIFA’s TPO ban. They consider that the Swiss courts are solely competent to deal with civil disputes involving its rules and decisions.

As in first instance, the thrust of the ruling on this question turns on the interpretation of the Lugano convention of 2007 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters. In principle, under Article 2(1) of the Convention: “Subject to the provisions of this Convention, persons domiciled in a State bound by this Convention shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of that State.” Thus, translated to the present dispute this would imply that FIFA and UEFA, which are Swiss Associations, are in principle to be sued in front of Swiss courts.

Moreover, to support their view that Swiss Courts have an exclusive jurisdiction, FIFA and UEFA also invoke Article 22(2) Lugano Convention stipulating that “proceedings which have as their object the validity of the constitution, the nullity or the dissolution of companies or other legal persons or associations of natural or legal persons, or of the validity of the decisions of their organs, the courts of the State bound by this Convention in which the company, legal person or association has its seat. In order to determine that seat, the court shall apply its rules of private international law”. Yet, the Appeal Court is of a different opinion and refers to the jurisprudence of the CJEU indicating that Article 22(2) should be interpreted as referring to disputes lodged based on company law or their statutes against decisions of a company or association.

The principle enshrined in Article 2 Lugano Convention is not absolute, many exceptions are provided in the Lugano Convention itself. In particular, Article 5(3) Lugano Convention foresees that in delictual matters the court of the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur is competent. This entails both the place were the harmful conduct was put in motion and the place where the harm was felt. In the present case, the Appeal Court argues that it is “difficult to contest that by hindering the appellant to execute their partnership agreement and enter in future TPO or TPI agreements over specific players, the attacked ban is producing harmful effects on the Belgian territory”.[2] Furthermore, the TPO agreement between Doyen Sports and the ASBL RFC Seraing is not deemed fictitious, as it has been invoked by FIFA to hand out disciplinary sanctions to the ASBL RFC Seraing.[3]

Additionally, the Court derives also its competence from Article 6(1) Lugano Convention. This article provides that a party can be sued “where he is one of a number of defendants, in the courts for the place where any one of them is domiciled, provided the claims are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings”. The key question is whether there is sufficient connectedness between the claims raised against l’URBSFA, FIFA and UEFA. The Court refers to the recent case law of the CJEU, which is relevant to the interpretation of the Lugano Convention, on the identical provision in the Brussels Regulation (notably the case C-352/13 at para. 20). It is of the view that “FIFA and URBSFA share a regulatory and disciplinary power that enables them both, acting jointly or separately, to adopt the contested ban, to enforce it and to adopt an individual decision susceptible to block, compromise and/or restrict the execution of the contract signed by the appellants”.[4] Thus, “the autonomous regulatory power of the URBSFA justifies its participation in this proceeding, alongside FIFA in order (i) to obtain that both be prevented to act; (ii) that each of them be deprived of the opportunity to contest the opposability of a decision to which they would not have been part and lastly (iii) to deny FIFA the possibility to circumvent an interdiction pronounced against it by having recourse to the regulatory power of the URBSFA”.[5] Finally, the Court argues “if the appellant were forced to lodge a claim against FIFA in front of the Swiss courts and against URBSFA in front of the Belgian Courts, this could potentially lead to irreconcilable solutions”.[6] As far as the claims against UEFA are concerned, which has not contrary to FIFA explicitly banned TPO, the Appeal Court is also convinced of their connectedness. It is so because UEFA “imposes to the clubs needing a license to participate in its competitions that they comply with the statutes and regulations of FIFA and, thus, with the disputed TPO ban “.[7]

This is again a powerful reminder that Sports Governing Bodies (SGBs) seated in Switzerland cannot evade the jurisdiction of the national courts of EU Member States when EU competition law is involved.[8] Under Article 5(3) Lugano Convention, EU Member States courts will be competent to deal with a civil liability claim based on EU competition law if the damage caused by the disputed measure/decision/regulation can be felt on the national territory of a Member State. Furthermore, if, as is usually the case for sports regulations, the rules have to be implemented by national sporting associations, the claims raised against the national SGBs will most likely be deemed connected to the original decisions/regulations of the international SGBs and justify the jurisdiction of the court of the domicile of the national SGB.[9]

II.    The admissibility of Doyen’s action

In this proceeding, as well as in the one initiated in front of the Paris court (FIFA’s legal submission in the Paris procedure has been published by football leaks), FIFA argues that Doyen’s action is not admissible due to the fact that the wrong administrator has initiated it. Indeed, under article 11.1 of Doyen’s own statutes the judicial representation is to be exercised by the local administrator designated by shareholder A acting in conjunction with the local administrator designated by shareholder B or by any other person designated by the general assembly. Yet, in practice Nelio Lucas, who fulfils none of the relevant criteria and was thus not authorized to act in Doyen’s name in judicial matters, lodged the action. However, Doyen could have under Belgium procedural rules ratified the judicial initiative taken by an incompetent organ. Doyen tried to do so but failed to organize the general assembly necessary to ratify Nelio Luca’s decision. Thus, the Court deems the action initiated by Doyen inadmissible. Luckily for Doyen it was not the sole party to the proceedings as the ASBL RFC Seraing joined the procedure. The Court believes the intervention of RFC Seraing in the proceedings is admissible and its interest to act is acknowledged. On this latter point, FIFA was arguing that RFC Seraing’s interest to act was inexistent due to the fact that the partnership agreement between Doyen and Seraing was contrary to the public order. However, in light of the divergent positions regarding the legality of TPO/TPI and of the on-going proceedings before various national courts and the European commission, the Belgium court is reluctant to admit that the interest of Seraing to act in this matter is illegitimate.

III.  Doyen’s (un)likelihood to prevail

Concerning the likelihood to prevail, however, the Court sided with the federations and refused to admit that the TPO/TPI ban was likely to restrict article 101(1) TFEU. On the one hand, as indices of the compatibility of the ban with EU law, it pointed out that the Commission was inclined to support the TPO ban, that FIFPro was clearly opposed to TPO and invokes fundamental values in support of the ban, and that the ban was adopted after a collective reflection involving many stakeholders and is aimed at tackling the negative externalities listed by the first instance court.[12] On the other hand, it refers to an academic article authored by Marmayou contesting the compatibility of TPO with EU law (this reference appears poorly chosen as the article is dedicated primarily to the FIFA regulations for intermediaries, for a stronger challenge to the compatibility of the TPO ban with EU law see Lindholm).[13] In any case, “it is obvious that a preliminary assessment cannot lead the Court to conclude, with sufficient certainty, that the ban would be contrary to EU competition rules”.[14] Finally, and this is the part of the ruling that seems to have been slightly misinterpreted by the press. The Court pointed out that Seraing and Doyen were asking in the main proceedings for a preliminary reference to the CJEU and that they were, therefore, conscious that they are not certain to prevail. However, the Appeal Court cannot, in the framework of a procedure involving provisory measures, ask a question to the CJEU, as it is unable to comply with the CJEU’s requirements for the admissibility of preliminary references (see the failed attempt in the UEFA FFP case). Hence, it is for the Commercial Court of Brussels, which is competent in the main proceeding, to decide whether it is necessary to do so. The Appeal Court (and the claimants as it cheekily points out) seems to believe that it could be needed, as it is not at all clear that the ban is contrary to EU competition law.

Conclusion

There are number of lessons that can be drawn from the judgment of the appeal court. Three stand out:

1. FIFA and UEFA cannot evade the jurisdiction of EU courts. Indeed, if an EU competition law violation of their rules is invoked they can be brought before the jurisdictions of the Member States
2. Doyen messed up in its original court filing by failing to abide by the procedure enshrined in its own statutes. This has no dire consequences in the Belgium proceedings due to presence of Seraing, but it might be a different story before the Paris court, where Doyen stands alone and the same procedural irregularity is invoked by FIFA.
3. To FIFA’s great satisfaction, the case against the TPO ban is not deemed strong enough to allow for the adoption of provisory measures blocking its implementation. As pointed out in our previous blog (and here) EU competition law is not a golden bullet that can be invoked easily to strike down FIFA or UEFA regulations. There is a high justificatory burden and the claimants will face an uphill battle to demonstrate that the ban is disproportionate (especially in light of the broad support for the ban amongst many key stakeholders).

This was only a small skirmish in a long legal war still before us. It will not be definitely over until the CJEU decides the matter (in 2018 at the earliest) or Doyen bows out of the game in the face of the high legal fees incurred. What is already certain is that the way EU law applies to sport is not straightforward and does not entail an economic/neoliberal logic blindly favourable to an unrestricted freedom to invest.

[1] Cour d’appel Bruxelles, Doyen Sports et ASBL RFC Seraing United c. URBSFA, FIFA et UEFA, 2015/KR/54, 10 mars 2016.

[2] “Il est difficilement contestable qu’en empêchant les appelantes de poursuivre l’exécution de leur convention de collaboration et la conclusion de nouvelles conventions « TPO » ou « TPI » spécifiques à des joueurs, l’interdiction litigieuse produit des effets dommageables sur le territoire belge.” Ibid, para.50.

[3] “C’est également en vain qu’il est soutenu que la convention de collaboration litigieuse ne serait qu’un artifice destiné à saisir les juridictions belges. En effet, elle a connu une exécution par des payements de sommes de Doyen Sports à l’ASBL RFC Seraing et surtout, son existence a été invoquée par la FIFA pour mener des poursuites disciplinaires contre le club dirigé par l’ASBL RFC Seraing et lui infliger une sanction.” Ibid.

[4] “L’URBSFA et la FIFA se partagent donc un pouvoir réglementaire et de contrainte qui leur permet, à l’une et à l’autre, agissant ensemble ou séparément, d’adopter l’interdiction litigieuse, de la mettre en œuvre et de prendre une mesure ou une décision à caractère individuel de nature à empêcher, compromettre et/ou entraver l’exécution du contrat conclu entre les appelantes.” Ibid, para.57

[5] “Le pouvoir règlementaire autonome de l’URBSFA et son pouvoir d’action propre justifient sa présence dans la procédure, en même temps que la FIFA afin (i) d’obtenir l’empêchement d’agir de l’une et de l’autre ; (ii) de priver chacune d’elles de la possibilité de contester l’opposabilité d’une décision judiciaire qui serait rendue dans une cause à laquelle elle serait demeurée étrangère et enfin (iii) d’empêcher la FIFA de contourner une interdiction qui serait prononcée à son encontre en recourant au pouvoir réglementaire de l’URBSFA.” Ibid.

[6] “Si les appelantes étaient dans l’obligation d’attraire la FIFA devant les juridictions suisses tout en citant l’URBSFA devant les juridictions belges, cette situation serait susceptible de conduire à des solutions inconciliables […]”, ibid. para.58.

[7] “En ce qui concerne l’UEFA, la connexité existe également. En effet, si elle n’est pas l’auteur des dispositions réglementaires et si elle n’est pas intervenue comme soutien dans l’exercice de poursuites disciplinaires menées contre le RFC SERAING, elle impose aux clubs qui doivent obtenir une licence pour participer aux compétitions qu’elle organise, de se plier aux statuts et aux règlements de la FIFA et à l’interdiction en cause.” Ibid., para.59.

[8] The same solution was adopted in 2012 by the French Cour de Cassation (Highest French Civil Court) in a dispute opposing the French agent Piau to FIFA. See Cour de cassation, civile, Chambre civile 1, 1 février 2012, publié au bulletin.

[9] This solution was also adopted by the OLG in the Pechstein ruling, see Oberlandesgericht München, 15 January 2015, Az. U 1110/14 Kart, para.A.I.1.a)aa) and bb).

[10] « L’urgence est établie. L’ASBL RFC Seraing est sous le coup d’une sanction disciplinaire dont seule l’exécution a été suspendue et elle est susceptible d’encourir de nouvelles poursuites et sanctions pour le cas où elle conclurait de nouvelles conventions TPO/TPI avec Doyen Sports ou toute autre société menant des activités de financement similaires.” Cour d’appel Bruxelles, Doyen Sports et ASBL RFC Seraing United c. URBSFA, FIFA et UEFA, 2015/KR/54, 10 mars 2016, para.78.

[11] « Ensuite, il n’est pas douteux que l’interdiction de poursuivre la convention de collaboration du 30 janvier 2015 et de conclure de nouvelles conventions TPO/TPI la prive d’une source de financement, sans qu’il soit démontré par les intimées qu’elle pourrait lui trouver un substitut adéquat par des emprunts classiques auprès de tiers.”Ibid.

[12] « D’un côté, il faut constater que :
- la Commission paraît s’être orientée vers la condamnation de la TPO;
- la FIPpro y est clairement opposée et invoque à cette fin des valeurs essentielles;
- l’interdiction est le résultat d’une réflexion collective à laquelle ont participé de nombreux interlocuteurs - et non pas seulement l’UEFA ou certains de ses membres - et elle est l’aboutissement de plusieurs constats que relève le premier juge dans son ordonnance : opacité, absence de contrôle des instances dirigeantes, importance du phénomène puisqu’il concerne le marché mondial, environnement ouvert à la corruption et aux pratiques frauduleuses, importance des sommes en jeu, etc...” Ibid, para.81.

[13] « De l’autre, de sérieuses réserves sont émises à propos de la légalité de l’interdiction de la TPO/TPI (voir ainsi l’article de J.M. MARMAYOU, « La compatibilité du nouveau règlement FIFA sur les intermédiaires avec le droit européen » Les cahiers de droit du sport, 2015, p. 15, pièce 38bis des appelantes).” Ibid.

[14] « Il est patent qu’un examen en apparence ne permet pas de conclure, avec la force nécessaire, que l’interdiction porte atteinte aux règles de la concurrence.” Ibid, para.82.