Editor's Note: Christopher is an editor of the Asser International Sports Law Blog. His research interests cover a spectrum of sports law topics, with a focus on financial regulatory disputes, particularly in professional football, a topic on which he has regularly lectured at the University of the West of England.

It is five years since the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) formally introduced ‘Financial Fair Play’ (FFP) into European football through its Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play Regulations, Edition 2012. With FFP having now been in place for a number of years, we are in a position to analyse its effect, its legality, and how the rules have altered over the last half decade in response to legal challenges and changing policy priorities. This article is split into three parts: The first will look at the background, context and law applicable to FFP; Part Two will look at the legal challenges FFP has faced; and Part Three will look at how FFP has iteratively changed, considering its normative impact, and the future of the rules.

Background

Certain aspects of FFP were incredibly controversial from the outset. To a neutral observer, this might seem confusing: FFP is, ostensibly, a set of rules designed to make sure clubs pay their bills on time, stay solvent, and do not need to look to external benefactors to cover their losses. Leading sports economist Stefan Szymanski described insolvency as “a chronic problem in the world of professional Association football”, so, superficially at least, a regulatory response to this would seem natural and appropriate. Where the market fails, it is the regulator’s duty to respond.

UEFA’s President at the time, Michel Platini, said “You, we, the fans and football lovers, have no interest in seeing clubs, the real heritage of European football, disappear due to risky management”. This is a sentiment with which most fans would agree.

Accordingly, UEFA incorporated FFP into its existing licensing requirements, meaning any club that wished to compete in a UEFA competition would be required to meet the financial standards set by FFP. These standards would be overseen and enforced by a new body within UEFA’s administration called the ‘Club Financial Control Body’. The Club Financial Control Body would be further segregated into an Investigatory Chamber and an Adjudicatory Chamber.

So, why the controversy? The contentious aspect of FFP was its ‘break even’ requirement. The ‘break even’ requirement is a de facto soft salary cap, tying the maximum amount a club can spend (with defined exceptions) to its revenue generation. An overview of the break even requirement as originally conceived can be found here. In essence, “The break-even result for a reporting period is calculated as relevant income less relevant expenses’’.^[1] “Income” includes receipts such as gate receipts, sponsorship, broadcasting rights, commercial activities and player sales; “expenses” includes wages, the cost of purchasing players and the cost of finance.^[2]

Crucially, when FFP was first introduced, losses could not be met or offset by equity participants (i.e. owners). This was pertinent to the prevailing financial climate in football, in which certain clubs across Europe were spending unprecedented sums with the support of wealth benefactors, who would cover the clubs’ losses. Such spending was seen at clubs such as Chelsea, Manchester City, Paris Saint Germain, Monaco, Malaga and Anzhi Makhachkala, with mixed results on and off the pitch.

Thus FFP was accused of calcifying football’s competitive hierarchy^[3] and foreclosing smaller clubs from sporting and consequent business success. This debate has been played out over the last five years in the academic literature^[4] and in various legal fora. The rules and the mechanisms for enforcing the rules have become increasingly sophisticated as the years have passed. UEFA, perhaps in response to these challenges, has made gradual, iterative changes to FFP that have seen the rules soften to accommodate exogenous equity input in defined permissible circumstances. These changes will be looked at in greater depth in Part Three.

The challenge of EU law

FFP has been described ‘legally fragile’, which is an apt description. This is because the rules cannot be said to be unquestionably permissible under European Union (EU) law; nor can they be said to be categorically in breach of EU law. The rules exist in a regulatory ‘grey’ area – FFP, in its particularly in its original, more restrictive, guise, may or may not have been illegal. This is a question for a competent (judicial) authority to decide; however, as will be discussed in more detail in Part Two, the route to such a decision has been far from straight forward, and in the intervening years, FFP has changed substantially.

The essential legal questions to determine the legality of FFP are:

1. Does FFP breach EU competition law?
2. Does FFP breach EU free movement law?
3. Is there a sanctuary for any breach of EU law under the doctrine of the specificity of sport?

EU competition law

Article 101 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) prohibits agreements that have as their object or effect “prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market”.^[5] This puts regulatory associations such as UEFA in a difficult position. It is the very nature of regulation that competition is restricted or distorted; indeed, it is the very purpose of regulatory rules that participants subject to those rules alter their behaviour accordingly, which has an inevitable consequence on the competitive landscape.

Consideration should also be given to Article 102 TFEU, which prohibits undertakings (and in some circumstances collections of undertakings, i.e. oligopolies) that are in a dominant position from abusing their market dominance.

In view of this friction, the European courts have developed, through the case of Wouters, the concept of regulatory ancillarity.^[6] This is the doctrine under which, subject to a test of proportionality, reasonability and necessity, even in circumstances where there is a prima facie breach of competition law by a regulatory body (in that particular case by the Dutch Bar Association), this may be permissible under EU competition law where the regulatory body in question “could reasonably have considered that that regulation, despite the effects restrictive of competition that are inherent in it, is necessary for the proper practice of the [relevant profession]”.

The applicability of Wouters to a sporting regulatory context is confirmed and clarified in the landmark Meca-Medina case. In considering whether a regulatory rule breaches competition law, the European courts must determine: 

1. Whether the rules are necessary for the proper conduct of the sport;
2. Whether the penalties are inherent to the restrictions in questions; and
3. Whether the effects of the rules are proportionate to the aims pursued.

Should UEFA be unable to meet the test under the regulatory ancillarity doctrine, there is an alternative exemption with a lower threshold to which it could look. Within Article 101(3) TFEU, there is an exemption for agreements which promote “technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit” as long as such restrictions do not (a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives; or (b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question.

It is open to UEFA to argue that FFP dampens inflation in football in a way that is for the improvement of the game and passes a benefit to ‘consumers’ (i.e. fans) by, for example, reducing the need for ticket price increases to sustain escalating players’ wages. This would perhaps be difficult for UEFA to establish, but the economics of FFP are complicated and second order effects should be borne in mind.

EU free movement – workers, services and/or capital 

The EU is built upon certain deeply enshrined freedoms. These include the free movement of workers (Article 45 TFEU), the free movement of services (Article 56 TFEU), and the free movement of capital. Any agreement that acts as an impediment to these freedoms is susceptible to a finding of illegality.

In order to be permissible under EU law, any rule or agreement that restricts any fundamental freedom must be:

1. Justified by a necessary objective in the general interest;
2. Suitable for achieving that objective; and
3. Proportionate.

In the case of sporting rules, the European courts have determined that the rule in question must not “go beyond what is necessary for achieving the aim pursued”,^[7] which is to reiterate that it must be proportionate – a recurrent theme in considering the legality of rules made by the governing bodies of sport, such as UEFA.

The criteria to be met by UEFA in establishing that FFP does not breach EU fundamental freedoms is in line with the threshold to be met in establishing compliance with EU competition law: FFP must be necessary, suitable and proportionate.

However, in the case of free movement law, it is far from obvious that FFP will have a substantive impact on fundamental freedoms. In previous writing on the subject, I have made the following analogy:

The restriction does not emanate from the rule per se, rather by the size of the club’s turnover; players are no more restricted from moving between clubs by FFP than this author is denied a Ferrari by his credit rating.^[8]

The specificity of sport under EU law

In the event that a competent adjudicative authority makes a prima facie finding that FFP is in breach of EU competition law or EU free movement law, there is still a possibility of an overall finding that FFP is not illegal under the doctrine of the specificity of sport; however, this would require the adjudicative body in question to row back considerably from the current position, and general trajectory, of the level of latitude granted to the governing bodies of sport by the European courts.

The concept of specificity will be familiar to all those with an interest in sports law and policy. It is the hypothesis under which, at its starkest interpretation, suggests governing bodies, not courts (or governments or other legislative bodies), are best placed to determine how sport should be run. Sports, it is argued, should have rule making autonomy. A more moderate view on specificity holds that due regard should be paid to the idiosyncrasies of the sports sector and the legitimate governance function played by governing bodies. 

The role of sports governing bodies, whose rules, as was the case with FFP, are often enacted in a broadly consensual way, with engagement, input and consent from key stakeholders, should be acknowledged and some due reverence should be paid to governing bodies' ability to regulate the sporting aspects under their aegis.

Indeed, the European Union had no express competence to in respect of sport until the introduction of Article 165 TFEU, a soft competency, which states that, “The Union shall contribute to the promotion of European sporting issues, while taking account of the specific nature of sport, its structures based on voluntary activity and its social and educational function.”

However, the distinction between elite football as being ‘purely sport’ and elite football as a business has become blurred in to the point of being indistinguishable; and the EU clearly has express competence to deal with business.

The general trend in decisions of the European courts has been to circumscribe self-determination by the governing bodies of sport. Through cases such as Bosman,^[9] Meca-Medina, and Bernard,^[10] the European courts have made it clear that sport cannot avoid or cherry-pick the applicability of EU law. This is acutely relevant in the case of FFP, which, after all, deals with how football clubs are run financially. There are obvious sporting consequences to this, but it is difficult to characterise FFP as anything other than a rule restrictive of the business of sport.

UEFA’s position on Article 165 is that “while sport is not ‘above the law’, there is now a provision in the Treaty itself recognising that sport cannot simply be treated as another ‘business’, without reference to its specific characteristics”. This is not an unreasonable position; sport is a unique industry in which, unlike other industries, the survival of competitors is important for any given club to flourish. Perhaps the courts could be persuaded that a carve-out based on specificity should be applicable to FFP – but this would require a seismic change of direction.

So it is incredibly unlikely that specificity as a discrete sui generis doctrine would give sanctuary to FFP were the rules deemed to be otherwise in breach of EU law. However, facts peculiar to the football industry (i.e. its specificity) should be considered as part of an assessment as to whether FFP is a proportionate mechanism to pursue UEFA’s objectives. As noted above, proportionality is a limb of the tests for derogations to EU competition and fundamental freedom law.

I have previously commented that: 

For football clubs, there is a strong correlational link between spending money and playing success. This has encouraged clubs to risk financial vulnerability in pursuit of improved match results, despite the mathematical impossibility of all clubs being able to improve their fortunes on the field. This innate instability has resulted in persistent insolvencies despite the remarkable growth in turnover seen in the professional game. Regrettably, when balance sheets weaken, the risk of insolvency increases; and once a club becomes insolvent, its survival is subject to the predilections of its creditors. The game’s governing bodies should aim to militate against…this volatility.

UEFA would doubtless argue that, given the specific nature of the industry it regulates, instituting a soft salary cap such as that implemented by FFP is a proportionate response. In that sense at least, the specificity of sport might be of consideration in the legality of FFP.

Conclusion 

It is difficult to say with any degree of conclusiveness whether FFP is legal or not. There are strong arguments either way. The marginal nature of the legal position has been problematic for UEFA and has undoubtedly led to the legal challenges to FFP over the last five years, which are discussed in greater depth in Part Two of this series.

The uncertain legal position, and the challenges generated by that lack of clarity has also, in all likelihood, shaped UEFA’s policy decisions as FFP has evolved in the years since its inception. These are discussed in Part Three of this series.

FFP has certainly been fertile ground for debate, and will likely continue to be so until such a time as there has been a determinative, binding view of its legality. When or whether this will happen remains to be seen.

^[1] Annex X, Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play Regulations, Edition 2012.

^[2] Ibid.

^[3] Thomas Peeters and Stefan Szymanski , 'Financial Fair Play in European Football ' [2014] 29(78) Economic Policy 343-390

^[4] See, for example, Serby, T. (2016) The state of EU sports law: lessons from UEFA’s ‘Financial Fair Play’ regulations, International Sports Law Journal 16(1–2):37–51; Flanagan, C (2013) A tricky European fixture: an assessment of UEFA’s Financial Fair Play regulations and their compatibility with EU law, International Sports Law Journal 13(1):148; Lindholm, J (2010) The Problem with Salary Caps Under European Union Law: The Case Against Financial Fair Play, Texas Review of Entertainment and Sports Law, Vol. 12.2, pp. 189-213

^[5] Noting that UEFA certainly constitute an association of undertakings in the relevant legal sense, see for example Case T-193/02 Piau (2005) ECR I-209, (2005) 5 CMLR 42 or EU Commission decision 2003/778/EC, 23 July 2003, Case COMP C.2-37.398 - Joint selling of the commercial rights of the UEFA Champions League §§ 106-107

^[6] As identified and defined by Whish and Bailey in Competition Law (OUP, 8th)

^[7] Case C-176/96, Jyri Lehtonen and Castors Canada Dry Namur- Braine ASBL v Fédération Royale Belge des Sociétés de Basketball ASBL (FRBSB) ECR (2000) I-2681

^[8] Flanagan, C (2013) A tricky European fixture: an assessment of UEFA’s Financial Fair Play regulations and their compatibility with EU law, International Sports Law Journal 13(1).

^[9] Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Socie ́te ́s de Football Association ASBL v Jean-Marc Bosman (1995) ECR I-4921.

^[10] C-325/08 Olympique Lyonnais v Olivier Bernard and Newcastle United FC (2010) ECLI:EU:C:2010:143.

Class actions are among the most powerful legal tools available in the US to enforce competition rules. With more than 75 years of experience, the American system offers valuable lessons about the benefits and drawbacks of class actions for private enforcement in competition law. Once believed of as only a US phenomenon, class actions are slowly becoming reality in the EU. After the adoption of the Directive on damages actions in November 2014, the legislative initiative in collective redress (which could prescribe a form of class actions) is expected in 2017.[1] Some pro-active Member States have already taken steps to introduce class actions in some fashion, like, for example, Germany.

What is a class action? It is a lawsuit that allows many similar legal claims with a common interest to be bundled into a single court action. Class actions facilitate access to justice for potential claimants, strengthen the negotiating power and contribute to the efficient administration of justice. This legal mechanism ensures a possibility to claim cessation of illegal behavior (injunctive relief) or to claim compensation for damage suffered (compensatory relief).   

Class actions in antitrust and the sport sector

Throughout the years, US class actions have become an important tool to strengthen good governance in the sports sector. Due to alleged antitrust infringements, US sports organizations have been hit with a series of class action lawsuits.  The most recent and the most prominent example is the antitrust class action lawsuit O'Bannon v. NCAA. On 8 August 2014, the US District Court ruled in favour of former UCLA basketball player O'Bannon and 19 others, declaring that the National Collegiate Athletic Associations’ (NCAA) longstanding refusal to compensate athletes for the use of their name, image and likenesses (NILs) violates US antitrust laws. Previously, the college sports governing body required student-athletes  to sign ‘Form 08-3a’  in which they authorize the NCAA to use their “name or picture to generally promote NCAA championships or other NCAA events, activities or programs”, without receiving compensation. If the NCAA loses the appeal, it must allow schools to give athletes some of the money they bring in by licensing their NIL. For further discussion on the O’Bannon case, see my previous blog.

In the EU, however, antitrust class actions remain an underrated remedial option in EU competition policy and the sports sector (the same is true for competition law in general). As is well known, sports federations often have practical monopolies within certain markets. In particular, due to the substantial economic revenues of these markets, sports federations have the tendency to abuse their dominant position in contradiction with Article 102 TFEU. It is not unthinkable that the positive experiences with class actions in the US may serve as an inspiration for victims in the EU to go against powerful sports organizations. Here, useful insights may be derived from the German Handball case, which can be used as an example to explore the potential of class actions as a remedy. On 15 May 2014, German Bundesliga teams (30 of them) won the antitrust case against the International Handball Federation (IHF) and the German Handball Federation (DHB) at the regional court of Dortmund (Landgericht). For further discussion on the 2014 Dortmund judgment, see here.  

The 2014 Dortmund judgment: A comparative analysis with the O’Bannon case

The Court in Dortmund held that an obligatory release system of players for activities of their respective national teams without compensation constitutes an abuse of a dominant position prohibited by German competition law (§ 19 Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, GWB) and Article 102 TFEU, while it also breaches the principle of good faith in contractual performance.[2] Until the judgment, German Bundesliga clubs had no other way but to release their players if they were invited to join their national team within the international calendar. According to the IHF Player Eligibility Code, “a club having a foreign player under contract is obliged to release such player to his National Federation if he is called up to take part in activities of that federation's national team” (Article 7.1.2). Furthermore, a club releasing a national player was not entitled to receive any kind of compensation and in the event of personal injury the insurance coverage was not provided (Articles 7.2-7.3). After the judgment, the IHF and the DHB should pay a fair compensation for the time of the release of the player.  

On the one hand, both cases have striking similarities. The judgments concern antitrust infringements by powerful sports federations, the IHF (also the DHB) and the NCAA respectively. Professional clubs / student athletes in both cases are not entitled to compensation due to the rules that have been set by sports organizations. The German case concerns the obligation for professional clubs to release players to national team events without receiving compensation, while the US case concerns the prohibition for student athletes to receive compensation from NIL.

On the other hand, although both cases concern antitrust infringements by the sports organizations, they also have vital differences. Most importantly, the O'Bannon case is an antitrust class action lawsuit filed against the NCAA. This class action proved to be a powerful instrument that managed to jeopardize the long-standing fundamental principle of amateurism on which the whole economic and social system of the NCAA lies. Until now, however, the 2014 Dortmund judgment has been an ordinary litigation according to German law. However, it does share some similarities with O’bannon that may justify a class action in the form of an injunctive relief (at least, in the first instance), subject to some exceptions.  

Indirect class action for an injunction

What is injunctive relief in class action cases? According to the European Commission, the courts should treat claims for injunctive orders requiring cessation of or prohibiting a violation of rights granted under EU law in order to prevent any or further harm causing damages.[3] According to the German law, in case of danger of recurrence, the infringer has to refrain from his conduct.[4] Perhaps surprisingly, the 2014 Dortmund judgment already fulfils the conditions for an indirect class action for an injunction.

First, a group of claimants (a total of 30 Bundesliga clubs) sued the IHF and the DHB before the regional court of Dortmund. They argued (together) that mandatory release of players to the national team constitutes an abuse of a dominant position prohibited by EU and German competition law. The Dortmund court ruled in favour of the handball clubs. It seems that handball clubs only seek the cessation of the unlawful practice, yet they have not claimed the compensatory relief, aimed at obtaining compensation for damage suffered.  

Second, the claim has been initiated by victims of antitrust infringement. Under the GWB, victims are allowed to bring private actions for injunctive relief in 101 and 102 TFEU infringement cases (Sec. 33).

Third, the Forum Club Handball (FCH) financially supported the court case. This may appear as third-party financing since the financial support was provided by a private third party who is not a party to the proceedings.[5] 

Although the handball clubs dropped a quiet collective bombshell, the action cannot be considered as a real class action. Simply, there was no intention to pursue a class action. Another point is that the legal standing to bring the representative action has been limited to a law firm. In Germany, collective antitrust action can be brought by a body, which has a legal standing and to whom the claims of victims of a cartel have been assigned (Sec. 33 (2) GWB). Similarly, under Sec. 8 of the German Unfair Competition Act (UWG), the claims can be sought by: a) competitor; b) qualified entities listed with the Federal Office of Justice or, in case of foreign entities, with the European Commission; and (c) by Chambers of Industry and Commerce or Craft Chambers. For these reasons, the action brought by the clubs cannot be classified as a class action, because they have chosen to be represented by an attorney. It is not unthinkable that eventually the case will appear before the court as a follow-on compensatory class action, if the IHF and the DHB lose the appeal (if necessary, the proceedings before the Court of Justice).   

Compensatory class action: why it could be a big deal?

If the handball clubs achieve an injunction in the final Court decision, the follow-on representative action for damages may be brought against the IHF and the DHB. Some provisions in German law facilitate the incentives to bring damages claims for antitrust infringements. According to Sec. 33(4) GWB, antitrust class actions should be brought after a final decision of a public authority finding there has been a violation of competition law. Furthermore, the 8th Amendment of GWB broadens the scope of the legal standing in such a way that all associations of undertakings that are affected by an infringement, as well as consumer associations, are in principle able to claim the enforcement of German competition law in courts (including by demanding damages). Yet it appears that the UWG provisions are not applicable in this case. Under Sec. 8 available remedies allow to pursue only injunctive relief. Under Sec. 9 damages are claimed by competitors (only). Sec. 10 aims at skimming off profits (paid to the Treasury), but not at compensating victims. Due to the fact that illegal profits go to the Treasury in successful cases, the handball clubs would potentially not be happy with the expected outcome.

If the IHF and the DHB lose the appeal, the handball clubs can to a significant extent rely on the final decision. Considering that an indirect form of collective action has already been pursued by the handball clubs in the first instance, a common consent of the parties involved in the case (the major condition for class action) can be easily achieved. Still, the major concern is to solve the issue of legal standing. An actual example of class action that goes with the grain of the German law and is the Cement Cartel Case, in which 28 damaged companies purchased the cartel-related claim to Cartel Damage Claims group (CDC).[6] It is a Brussels based professional litigation that turns burdensome claims into valuable assets, taking the hassle of quantification and subsequent enforcement. The substantiation of the claim is based on evidence gathered from the cartel proceedings and the damaged companies.  In the context of the German handball case, CDC could commence the acquisition of damages claims from handball clubs and then file the collective antitrust damages action against the IHF and the DHB. This is in line with the Sec. 33 GWB under which CDC has legal standing and to whom the claims under Art. 101 and 102 TFEU have been assigned. An action brought by CDC is attractive to the handball clubs because it would strengthen the negotiating power and would reduce litigation costs, as the claim is led (or even purchased) by CDC.  

If the conditions for the admissibility of class action are fulfilled, the IHF and the DHB should fear potential damages. In particular as a result of the inconsistent application of the Player Eligibility Code, the claimants are in a favourable position. Despite the fact that the Code states that “a club releasing a national player shall not have any claim to compensation”, the IHF agreed to pay compensation to the clubs for the release of their players to the national team during the 2011 and 2013 World Championships. To make matters even worse, the IHF provided insurance for the players’ salaries in case of personal injury (contrary to the Article 7.3.2).[7] This suggests that in principle a compensation and insurance coverage are compatible with the Eligibility Code and thereby the interests of the IHF are not jeopardized. The perceived inconsistency provides more clout to the claimants, suggesting that the harm has already been presumed. If the plaintiffs achieve an injunction in Court, they potentially may claim broad compensation, including other undisputed World Championships[8], the Olympic Games, continental championships as well as the qualification matches and tournaments for these events. However, it is even not the worst potential outcome for the IHF. Indeed, due to the Court of Justice (CJEU) decision in Case C-302/13 flyLAL-Lithuanian Airlines, potentially all handball clubs from EU Member States can claim damages from the IHF, if they are part of the federation. In that case, the Latvian Supreme Court sent a request for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU, asking whether a Lithuanian court judgment ordering provisional measures in a damages case can be recognized and enforced in Latvia. The CJEU ruled that actions brought by undertakings seeking redress or compensation for damage resulting from alleged infringements of EU competition law, can be qualified as a ‘civil and commercial matter’, within the meaning of Article 1(1) of Regulation No 44/2001, and enforceable in Latvia under the provisions of the said regulation. Thus, the CJEU opened a wealth of opportunities for handball clubs (if the final decision in Germany is successful) to claim damages wherever they are based on the EU’s territory. Given that follow-on damages claims have a high success rate, the winning chances are high. Hence, since the common legal and factual features of each individual claim are observed, the class action would be an effective instrument to obtain redress, also adding to the deterrence goals.

Compensatory class actions: a powerful instrument to ensure better governance in sport (federations)?

If the German handball clubs bring a compensatory class action, it has the potential to become an important precedent for many other sports. One successful case may open a Pandora’s Box that would put a lot of pressure on the sports federations’ regulations.  

By forming the group, claimants (such as handball clubs) are able to bundle individual claims and thus trigger efficiency gains by tackling common legal, factual and economic issues collectively.[9] As such, the defendants can handle the risks attached to private litigation and the probability of winning the case increases since multiple plaintiffs have larger financial means. Therefore, a group of claimants having larger financial means can employ more qualified lawyers and economic experts for antitrust cases. A package of collected claims from victims are easier introduced and defended before the court, meaning that damages are proved with sufficiently high probability and thus the chance of receiving compensation is high. When focussing on sanctions, class actions appear to deter abusive conduct, therefore strengthening good governance in sport. If all victims can sue a sports federation, the group will force the infringer to internalize the negative effects of the damage caused as close as possible to the full-compensation principle that is embedded in the EU reform on private enforcement.[10] Sport entities, knowing that class actions may be used against them and anticipating that the expected cost of the infringement may increase significantly, would think twice before violating the competition rules. The achievement of better governance would solve, or at least diminish, the problem of under-enforcement of EU competition rules in the sports sector. Even if the handball case does not result in an antitrust class action, victims from other sports should pay particular attention to such a fruitful litigation model.

[1] It was adopted Commission Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on common principles for collective redress mechanisms in the Member States for injunctions against and claims on damages caused by violations of EU rights, COM (2013) 3539/3, 11.6.2013 (‘Recommendation’).

[2] German Civil Code, Section 242 (“An obligor has a duty to perform according to the requirements of good faith, taking customary practice into consideration”).

[3] Recommendation COM (2013) 3539/3, sec. 19. In the area of injunctive relief, the European Parliament and the Council have already adopted Directive [2009/22/EC OJ L 110, 1.05.2009]  on injunctions for the protection of consumers' interests

[4] GWB, sec. 33.

[5] Recommendation COM (2013) 3539/3, Sec 14-16.

[6] http://www.carteldamageclaims.com/portfolios/cdc-german-cement-cartel/. On 17 December 2013 the Regional Court of Düsseldorf dismissed the action in its entirety [Case No. 37 O 200/09]. CDC has appealed the judgment to the Higher Regional Court in Düsseldorf.

[7]See http://www.forumclubhandball.com/?p=707 and http://www.forumclubhandball.com/?p=707. The outcome had been reached after the negotiations with the FCH in 2010-2011.

[8] The IHF decided to pay compensation for the release of players to the 2011 and 2013 World Championships.

[9] Z. Juska, ‘Obstacles in European Competition Law Enforcement: A Potential Solution from Collective Redress’ (2014) 7 EJLS, 149.

[10] Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union’ COM (2013) 404 final, 11.6.2013