Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

[Call for Papers] - International Sports Law Journal - Annual Conference - Asser Institute, The Hague - 24-25 October 2024 - Reminder!

The Editors of the International Sports Law Journal (ISLJ) invite you to submit abstracts for the next edition of the ISLJ Conference on International Sports Law, which will take place on 24 and 25 October 2024 at the Asser Institute in The Hague. The ISLJ, published by Springer and TMC Asser Press, is the leading academic publication in the field of international sports law and the conference is a unique occasion to discuss the main legal issues affecting international sports and its governance with renowned academic experts.

We welcome abstracts from academics and practitioners on all issues related to international and transnational sports law and their impact on the governance of sport. We also welcome panel proposals (including a minimum of three presenters) on specific issues of interest to the Journal and its readers. For this year’s edition, we specifically invite submissions on the following themes and subthemes:


Reformism in transnational sports governance: Drivers and impacts

  • Legal and social drivers of reforms in transnational sports governance   
  • The role of strategic litigation (before the EU/ECtHR/National courts) as a driver of reform;
  • The role of public/fan pressure groups on clubs, competition organisers and governments as a driver of change.
  • The impact of internal reforms in transnational sports governance: Cosmetic or real change? (e.g. IOC Agenda 2020+5, FIFA governance reforms, CAS post-Pechstein changes, WADA sfter the Russian doping scandal)
  • Emerging alternatives to private sports governance – the UK’s Independent Football Regulator.


The organization and regulation of mega sporting events: Current and future challenges 

  • Mega-sporting events as legalized sites of digital surveillance 
  • Greening mega-sporting events (e.g. carbon neutral pledges, environmental footprints of events, the impact of multiple hosting sites)
  • Mega-sporting events and the protection of human rights and labour rights (e.g. Paris 2024 Social Charter, Euro 2024 human rights commitments)
  • The Olympic Games and athletes’ economic rights (remuneration/advertisement)
  • Reviews of the legal issues raised at Euro 2024 in Germany and the Paris 2024 Olympic Games
  • Previews of the legal issues likely to have an impact on the FIFA 2026 World Cup and the Milano-Cortina 2026 Winter Olympic Games


Please send your abstract of 300 words and CV no later than 15 July 2024 to a.duval@asser.nl. Selected speakers will be informed by 30 July.

The selected participants will be expected to submit a draft of their paper by 1 October 2024. Papers accepted and presented at the conference are eligible for publication in a special issue of the ISLJ, subject to peer-review. 

The Asser Institute will provide a limited number of travel & accommodation grants (max. 300€). If you wish to be considered for a grant, please explain why in your submission.


[New Event] Feminist theory and sport governance: exploring sports as sites of cultural transformation - 9 July -15:00-17:00 - Asser Institute


This seminar is part of the Asser International Sports Law Centre's event series on the intersection between transnational sports law and governance and gender. Dr Pavlidis will present her take on feminist theories and sport governance by exploring sports and in particular Australian rules football and roller derby as sites of cultural transformation.

Register HERE

Australian rules football is Australia's most popular spectator sport and for most of its history it has been a men's-only sport, including in its governance and leadership. This is slowly changing. Roller derby on the other hand has been reinvented with an explicitly DIY (Do It Yourself) governance structure that resists formal incorporation by 'outsiders'. This paper provides an overview of sport governance in the Australian context before focusing in on these two seemingly disparate sport contexts to explore the challenges of gender inclusive governance in sport.

Dr Adele Pavlidis is an Associate Professor in Sociology with the School of Humanities, Languages and Social Science at Griffith University in Australia. She has published widely on a range of sociocultural issues in sport and leisure, with a focus on gender and power relations. Theoretically her work traverses contemporary scholarship on affect, power and organisations, and she is deeply interested in social, cultural and personal transformation and the entanglements between people, organisations, and wellbeing.

We look forward to hearing Dr Pavlidis present on this topic, followed by reflections and comments by Dr Åsa Ekvall from the Erasmus Center for Sport Integrity & Transition, and Dr Antoine Duval from the T.M.C. Asser Institute. There will also be a Q&A with the audience.

Download the latest programme here 

Register HERE


[Call for papers] - International Sports Law Journal - Annual Conference - Asser Institute, The Hague - 24-25 October 2024

The Editors of the International Sports Law Journal (ISLJ) invite you to submit abstracts for the next edition of the ISLJ Conference on International Sports Law, which will take place on 24 and 25 October 2024 at the Asser Institute in The Hague. The ISLJ, published by Springer and TMC Asser Press, is the leading academic publication in the field of international sports law and the conference is a unique occasion to discuss the main legal issues affecting international sports and its governance with renowned academic experts.

We welcome abstracts from academics and practitioners on all issues related to international and transnational sports law and their impact on the governance of sport. We also welcome panel proposals (including a minimum of three presenters) on specific issues of interest to the Journal and its readers. For this year’s edition, we specifically invite submissions on the following themes and subthemes:


Reformism in transnational sports governance: Drivers and impacts

  • Legal and social drivers of reforms in transnational sports governance   
  • The role of strategic litigation (before the EU/ECtHR/National courts) as a driver of reform;
  • The role of public/fan pressure groups on clubs, competition organisers and governments as a driver of change.
  • The impact of internal reforms in transnational sports governance: Cosmetic or real change? (e.g. IOC Agenda 2020+5, FIFA governance reforms, CAS post-Pechstein changes, WADA sfter the Russian doping scandal)
  • Emerging alternatives to private sports governance – the UK’s Independent Football Regulator.


The organization and regulation of mega sporting events: Current and future challenges 

  • Mega-sporting events as legalized sites of digital surveillance 
  • Greening mega-sporting events (e.g. carbon neutral pledges, environmental footprints of events, the impact of multiple hosting sites)
  • Mega-sporting events and the protection of human rights and labour rights (e.g. Paris 2024 Social Charter, Euro 2024 human rights commitments)
  • The Olympic Games and athletes’ economic rights (remuneration/advertisement)
  • Reviews of the legal issues raised at Euro 2024 in Germany and the Paris 2024 Olympic Games
  • Previews of the legal issues likely to have an impact on the FIFA 2026 World Cup and the Milano-Cortina 2026 Winter Olympic Games


Please send your abstract of 300 words and CV no later than 15 July 2024 to a.duval@asser.nl. Selected speakers will be informed by 30 July.

The selected participants will be expected to submit a draft of their paper by 1 October 2024. Papers accepted and presented at the conference are eligible for publication in a special issue of the ISLJ, subject to peer-review. 

The Asser Institute will provide a limited number of travel & accommodation grants (max. 300€). If you wish to be considered for a grant, please explain why in your submission.


[Online Summer Programme] - International sports and human rights - 22 - 29 May 2024 - Last spots!

Join us for the first online version of our unique training programme on ‘Sport and human rights’ jointly organised by the Centre for Sport and Human Rights and the Asser Institute taking place on May 22-24 & May 27-29.

After the success of the first editions in 2022 and 2023 the programme returns, focusing on the link between the sport and human rights and zooming in on a number of topics, such as the UN Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights and their application in sports. We will also adopt a human rights lens to sport governance and address freedom of speech, the rights of athletes, and access to remedy.

Tackling contemporary human rights challenges in sport

The programme brings together the latest in academic research with practical experiences from working in the field in an interactive package, fostering productive exchanges between the speakers and participants. Theoretical knowledge will be complemented by exposure to hands-on know-how.

Participants will have the opportunity to learn from experts from the Asser Institute, the Centre for Sport and Human Rights, and high-profile external speakers from both academia and practice.

What will you gain?

  • An extensive introduction to the emergence of the sport and human rights movement
  • A greater understanding of the normative framework for human rights standards in sport
  • A comprehensive overview of the latest developments in the interplay between gender and sports
  • Practical know-how to govern  human rights in the context of sporting organisations
  • Practical know-how to address  human rights risks in the context of day-to-day sports, including safeguarding
  • Practical know-how to access remedy in human rights disputes
  • The opportunity to engage in discussions and network with leading academics and professionals

Topics addressed in this summer programme include:

  • The emergence of the sport and human rights discussion/movement
  • The integration of human rights in the governance of sport
  • The protection of athletes’ rights
  • Access to remedy for sport-related human rights harms


Read the full programme.

Register HERE


In partnership with:

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[Call for Papers] Through Challenges and Disruptions: Evolution of the Lex Olympica - 20 September 2024 - Inland School of Business and Social Sciences

Editor's note: This is a call for papers for a workshop inviting sports lawyers and historians to reflect on how the lex olympica developed within the last 128 years through the prism of challenges and disruptions to the Olympic Games and the sharp and incremental changes they provoked.


Background

The lex olympica are legal rules the International Olympic Committee created to govern the Olympic Movement. Since the revival of the Olympic Games in 1896, the lex olympica, with the Olympic Charter taking its central place, has undergone tremendous changes. It has increased not only in volume but also in complexity and reach.

While some changes were designed to give further detail to the Olympic values, others seem to serve as responses to numerous disruptions and challenges that the Olympic Games experienced on their way. History shows that the Olympic Games faced boycotts, apartheid, armed conflicts, wars, propelled commercialisation, corruption, critique based on human rights and sustainability, pandemics, and many other obstacles.

One can see triggers for changes in specific incidents, broader societal changes, external political interests, long-term internal processes, etc., or further differentiate them according to relevant stakeholders impacting the change, such as IOC, NOCs, IFs, NFs, athletes, commercial partners, television, activist groups, NGOs, governments, host countries, etc. Regardless of their taxonomies, all these challenges met different reactions and affected the Olympic regulation in various ways. The IOC chose to distance the Olympic Games from some challenges and fully embrace others.


Keynote speakers

  • Jörg Krieger, Associate Professor, Department of Public Health and Sport Science, Aarhus University; co-leader of the Lillehammer Olympic and Paralympic Studies Center; Associate Professor II Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences.
  • Mark James,  Professor of Sports Law and Director of Research in the Manchester Law School at Manchester Metropolitan University, Editor-in-Chief of the International Sports Law Journal.


Deadline for abstract submission: 15 June 2024

Confirmation of participation: 30 June 2024

Publication: Selected contributions will be considered for a special issue at International Sports Law Journal


Contact information

Yuliya Chernykh (Associate Professor)

yuliya.chernykh@inn.no


Organizer

Lillehammer Olympic and Paralympic Studies Center (LOSC), Inland School of Business and Social Sciences and Legal development research group at INN University


[New Publication] - The European Roots of the Lex Sportiva: How Europe Rules Global Sport - Antoine Duval , Alexander Krüger and Johan Lindholm (eds) - Open Access

Dear readers, 


I have the pleasure to inform you that our (with Prof. Johan Lindholm and Alexander Kruger from Umeå University) edited volume entitled 'The European Roots of the Lex Sportiva: How Europe Rules Global Sport' has been published Open Access by Hart Publishing. 



You can freely access the volume at: https://www.bloomsburycollections.com/monograph?docid=b-9781509971473


Abstract

This open access book explores the complexity of the lex sportiva, the transnational legal regime governing international sports. Pioneering in its approach, it maps out the many entanglements of the transnational governance of sports with European legal processes and norms. The contributors trace the embeddedness of the lex sportiva within national law, European Union law and the European Convention on Human Rights. While the volume emphasizes the capacity of sports governing bodies to leverage the resources of national law to spread the lex sportiva globally, it also points at the fact that European legal processes are central when challenging the status quo as illustrated recently in the Semenya and Superleague cases. Ultimately, the book is also a vantage point to start critically investigating the Eurocentricity and the complex materiality underpinning the lex sportiva.


Table of contents

1. Made in Europe: Lex Sportiva as Embedded Transnational Law - 1–14 - Antoine Duval , Alexander Krüger and Johan Lindholm

I. The European Roots of Lex Sportiva

2. Embedded Lex Sportiva: The Swiss Roots of Transnational Sports Law and Governance - 17–40 - Antoine Duval

3. Putting the Lex into Lex Sportiva: The Principle of Legality in Sports - 41–68 - Johan Lindholm

4. Europeanisation of the Olympic Host (City) Contracts - 69–92 - Yuliya Chernykh

5. The Influence of European Legal Culture on the Evolution of Lex Olympica and Olympic Law - 93–118 - Mark James and Guy Osborn

6. Who Regulates the Regulators? How European Union Regulation and Regulatory Institutions May Shape the Regulation of the Football Industry Globally - 119–152 - Christopher A Flanagan

7. The Europeanisation of Clean Sport: How the Council of Europe and the European Union Shape the Proportionality of Ineligibility in the World Anti-Doping Code - 153–188 - Jan Exner

II. The Integration of European Checks into the Lex Sportiva

8. False Friends: Proportionality and Good Governance in Sports Regulation - 191–210 - Mislav Mataija

9. Sport Beyond the Market? Sport, Law and Society in the European Union - 211–228 - Aurélie Villanueva

10. EU Competition Law and Sport: Checks and Balances ‘à l’européenne’ - 229–256 - Rusa Agafonova

11. Is the Lex Sportiva on Track for Intersex Person’s Rights? The World Athletics’ Regulations Concerning Female Athletes with Differences of Sex Development in the Light of the ECHR - 257–282 - Audrey Boisgontier

III. Engaging Critically with a Eurocentric Lex Sportiva 

12. Lex Sportiva and New Materialism: Towards Investigations into Sports Law’s Dark Materials? 285–308 - Alexander Krüger


[Advanced professional training] Responding to human rights abuse in sport: Safe, effective & appropriate investigation - 5-6 March

Register now for the second edition of our advanced professional training and learn how to respond in a safe, appropriate, and effective way to cases of human rights abuse in sport. 

In recent years, the world of sport has seen a rise in reports of cases of emotional, psychological, physical, and sexual abuse. Sport has often struggled to respond in a safe, effective and appropriate way to these cases.  This has, at best, led to missed opportunities to improve and strengthen prevention mechanisms.  At worst, it has caused retraumatisation and additional harm to those affected. 

This professional training uses real life challenges from past investigations to provide insight into how (not) to respond to reports and allegations of sport-related cases of abuse. It will provide you with tools and knowledge on how to deal with abuse cases while protecting those affected, complying with human rights, and upholding the integrity of sport.

Register HERE

Widespread abuse in sports
The last five years have seen a huge uptick in reports of cases of emotional psychological, physical and sexual abuse in sport. All over the world, across different sports, non-recent and recent cases have come to light: abuse allegations in Dutch gymnastics and US gymnastics, the abuse of female basketball players in Mali, systematic abuse of child athletes in Japan, the abuse of young boys within the English football, or children in other grass-roots sport in Germany, the sexual abuse ofwomen’s football national teams in Afghanistan and Haiti, or the recent sexual assault against a player of the Spanish women’s national football team, to mention but a few.

Ineffective response
Responses from the relevant entities like sport organisations and governments have often fallen short of both the expectations of those impacted, and internationally recognised human rights standards. Some organisations have failed to initiate any investigation whatsoever, while others have commissioned or led inadequate responses. This has resulted in strong  criticism from affected persons, their representatives, and other civil society organisations. However, until now sport has not benefited from  any real  clarity or consistency around good practice on how to respond in a safe, adequate and effective way to allegations of abuse. This course seeks to address that.

Register HERE

Good practice based on research and experience
The Centre for Sport and Human Rights (CSHR) has conducted a study, in conjunction with victims, survivors, and whistleblowers of abuse across continents and sporting disciplines, and based on the learnings developed and published a guidance on how to conduct safe, appropriate and effective investigations into abuse cases in sport.  In this professional training, the Asser Institute partners with CSHR to connect practical research-based guidelines with relevant legal norms and procedures to address human rights abuses in sport. 

What will you learn? 

  •   How (not) to respond to reports and allegations of sport-related cases of abuse 

  •   Knowledge and experience in responding to such cases in a way that protects the affected person from further harm and complies with human rights 

  •    The role that investigations play in access to remedy more broadly 

Download the full programme

Speakers:

  • Kat Craig (CSHR)
  • Dr Daniela Heerdt (Asser Institute)
  • Joanna Maranhão (4x Olympians and Survivor Network Coordinator)
  • Loïc Alves (Senior Legal Counsel at FIFPRO)
  • Peter Nicholson (Head of Investigations and Intelligence Athletics Integrity Unit and Ethics Officer ICC)

Register HERE

Sport is sailing rudderless into geopolitical storms - Russia and Israel responses show how absence of rules makes FIFA and the IOC tools of the global north - By Nick McGeehan

Editor's note: Nicholas McGeehan is co-director of human rights research and advocacy group FairSquare, which works among other things on the nexus between sport and authoritarianism. He is a former senior researcher at Human Rights Watch and holds a PhD in international law from the European University Institute in Florence.


Boycotts, divestments and sanctions are each controversial and contentious in their own right, but when combined under the right conditions, they have explosive potential. BBC football presenter Gary Lineker found this out to his cost when he retweeted a call from Palestine’s BDS movement to suspend Israel from FIFA and the International Olympic Committee (IOC)  until such time the Israeli state ends what they called “the crime of genocide it is perpetrating in Gaza” and its occupation of Palestinian territory. Lineker quickly deleted his retweet but not before the UK’s most popular right-wing tabloid newspaper, The Daily Mail, spotted it and renewed their fulminating campaign against Lineker’s support for political causes that run contrary to the Mail’s editorial positions. The Daily Mail does not oppose sporting boycotts, in fact judging from an article by its football columnist, Martin Samuel, it was an ardent supporter of Russia’s ejection from European football in the aftermath of its invasion of Ukraine. “Why should Russian football get to be part of the continent in which it has murdered innocents?,” asked Samuel  and in that regard he was not alone and was echoing views heard across the political divide in the west at the time. 

The west continues to boycott Russia, its companies have divested from Russia, and its governments are sanctioning Russia. This includes in the sporting arena where nobody batted an eyelid when Russian football teams were excluded from FIFA and UEFA competition, and its athletes excluded from IOC competition.  So it seems obvious that it  is not so much BDS tactics that offend people in certain quarters, but rather their target. Russia can be BDS’d until the cows come home, but BDS’ing Israel is beyond the pale. You can see how it might be hard to explain to a child.

Through an examination of the widely divergent responses to Russia’s actions in Ukraine and Israel’s actions in Gaza, this piece argues that FIFA and the IOC have aligned themselves with the political positions of the countries of the global north. With reference to previous sporting boycotts, it demonstrates how an absence of rules has left FIFA and the IOC sailing rudderless into stormy geopolitical waters and argues that they need to institute rules to guide their responses to events of this gravity and magnitude. Dispensing once and for all with the canard that sport and politics can be kept apart would enable sport’s governing bodies to appropriately leverage their political power and not merely act as puppets of the global north. More...


[Online Event] The aftermath of the Women's World Cup final: FIFA's and UEFA's responsibility in the Jenni Hermoso case

Join us on 14 December at 12:00 CET for an online discussion on FIFA and UEFA’s responsibility in responding to the incident that overshadowed Spains’ victory of the Women's World Cup, when Spanish national team player Jennifer Hermoso experienced a violation of her bodily integrity and physical autonomy due to a forced kiss given to her by Luis Rubiales, then the Spanish FA's president. 


During the 2023/2024 academic year, the Asser International Sports Law Centre dedicates special attention to the intersection between transnational sports law and governance and gender. This online discussion is the second in a series of (online and offline) events, which explore the way in which international sports governing bodies define the gender divide in international sports, police gender-based abuses, and secure gender-specific rights to athletes. You can watch the recording of our first virtual discussion on the Semenya judgment of the ECtHR on our Youtube Channel.  


Just minutes after the Spanish women's national team had won the FIFA Women's World Cup, Rubiales congratulated the players on the podium and grabbed Hermoso's head and kissed her on the lips. This act not only shocked the players and the audience but also caused immediate international uproar and calls for resignation. Rubiales first defended his act, claiming that Hermoso had agreed to it. However, her statements right after it happened, as well as her official statement published just a few days after the event forcefully denied the consensual nature of the kiss. Hermoso felt “vulnerable and a victim of aggression, an impulsive act, sexist, out of place and without any type of consent". Three months later, Rubiales has been suspended by FIFA for three years, resigned as president of the Spanish FA, and is facing criminal prosecution for the crimes of sexual assault and coercion in Spanish national courts. 


As extreme as this case sounds, it is not. In fact, it is a reflection of structural issues that exist in the world of women's football and women's sport more generally. Furthermore, this incident raises the question of the rights of the players subjected to such behaviour and the responsibility of sports governing bodies, and FIFA and UEFA in particular, insanctioning those who are engaging in such actions. How should SGBs respond to such incidents? What type of rules and procedures should they have in place? What are the measures that should be introduced to prevent similar actions in the future? What is the role of states (the Spanish state in the present instance) in investigating and prosecuting these cases?  


We look forward to discussing these issues (and many others) with our three speakers, who have followed the case closely: 

  • Kat Craig, human rights lawyer, founder and CEO of Athlead, Senior Adviser to the Centre for Sport and Human Rights; 

  • Alexandra Gómez Bruinewoud, is a Senior Legal Counsel at FIFPRO and a judge at the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber; 

  • Borja Garcia is Reader in Sport Policy and Governance at School of Sport, Exercise and Health Sciences in Loughborough University


The online discussion will be introduced and moderated by Dr Antoine Duval and Dr Daniela Heerdt, and will include short presentations by the speakers and a Q&A with the audience. 


This is a free event, you can register for it HERE

[Conference] International Sports Law Journal Annual Conference - Asser Institute - 26-27 October

On 26 and 27 October 2023, the Asser Institute in The Hague will host the 2023 edition of the International Sports Law Journal (ISLJ) Conference. The ISLJ is the leading academic journal in transnational sports law and governance and is proud to provide a platform for transnational scholarly exchanges on the state of the field. The conference will address a number of complex issues and disputes at the top of the transnational sports law agenda. In particular, we will zoom in on three main topics:

 

How football governance is (re)shaped by EU law

Since the Bosman ruling of the European Court of Justice (CJEU) in 1995, it has been obvious to football fans around the world that the European Union (EU) has a considerable influence on the governance and regulation of professional football. This year, 2023, provides us a striking reminder of this fact with (at least) two fundamental judgments of the Grand Chamber of the CJEU expected in the Superleague case and the UEFA’s home-grown players rule. Additionally, two further cases, which are challenging FIFA’s transfer system and its agent regulations, remain pending before the Luxembourg court. We will be looking closely at this relationship between EU law and the governance football through two panels (featuring senior and junior researchers) and a keynote lecture delivered by one of the finest observers of this encounter: Prof. Stephen Weatherill (Oxford University).

 

Autonomy and neutrality in the transnational governance of sports 

The invasion of Ukraine by Russia has postponed (once again) the end of history and revived within the Olympic Movement fundamental debates dating back to the Cold War and South-African Apartheid. Can the Olympic Movement stay neutral in the face of a clear violation of international law by Russia and of war crimes being committed by its armed forces? What should the consequences be in terms of the participation of Russian athletes and teams in international sporting competitions? If they are allowed to participate, under what conditions should they be competing? All these questions are ultimately connected to the definition and practice of the autonomy and neutrality of sport vis-a-vis international law and politics and will be at the heart of the another set of presentations at the ISLJ conference and a digital bridge with the Symposium on Sport & Neutrality organised in Lillehammer by the Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences.

 

The transnational regulation of gender by sports governing bodies

Our third focus area for this year’s conference will be the regulation and governance of gender boundaries by SGBs. The recent and ground-breaking decision of the European Court of Human Rights in the Semenya case crystallises the contemporary importance of questions related to the division between genders in the context of international sports. Furthermore, the ongoing and heated debates on the participation of transgender athletes in female competitions are also highlighting the importance of the decisions taken by SGBs in this regard. We will be hosting a specific Panel tackling these issues and will be welcoming Prof. Silvia Camporesi (University of Vienna and King’s College London) for a keynote lecture connecting the legal debates with ethical and philosophical considerations.

 

More information and registration HERE

 

Download the full programme

 

Online participation available

Following the success of last year's webinar option, we are once again allowing online participation to the conference at an affordable price. Thus, we hope to internationalise and diversify our audience and to reach people who are not in a position to travel to The Hague.

We look forward to welcoming you in person in The Hague or digitally to this new iteration of the ISLJ conference.

Asser International Sports Law Blog | Unpacking Doyen’s TPO Deals: In defence of the compatibility of FIFA’s TPO ban with EU law

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

Unpacking Doyen’s TPO Deals: In defence of the compatibility of FIFA’s TPO ban with EU law

FIFA’s Third-Party Ownership (TPO) ban entered into force on the 1 May 2015[1]. Since then, an academic and practitioner’s debate is raging over its compatibility with EU law, and in particular the EU Free Movement rights and competition rules. 

The European Commission, national courts (and probably in the end the Court of Justice of the EU) and the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) will soon have to propose their interpretations of the impact of EU law on FIFA’s TPO ban. Advised by the world-famous Bosman lawyer, Jean-Louis Dupont, Doyen has decided to wage through a proxy (the Belgian club FC Seraing) a legal war against the ban. The first skirmishes have already taken place in front of the Brussels Court of first instance, which denied in July Seraing’s request for provisional measures. For its part, FIFA has already sanctioned the club for closing a TPO deal with Doyen, thus opening the way to an ultimate appeal to the CAS. In parallel, the Spanish and Portuguese leagues have lodged a complaint with the European Commission arguing that the FIFA ban is contrary to EU competition law. One academic has already published an assessment of the compatibility of the ban with EU law, and many practitioners have offered their take (see here and here for example). It is undeniable that the FIFA ban is per se restrictive of the economic freedoms of investors and can easily be constructed as a restriction on free competition. Yet, the key and core question under an EU law analysis, is not whether the ban is restrictive (any regulation inherently is), but whether it is proportionate, in other words justified.

I will first present the key arguments of the opponents of the ban, before offering my own assessment. As the reader might know, I am no friends of FIFA and a staunch critic of its bad governance syndrome. Although I am convinced that FIFA’s governance deserves a ground-up rebuilt, I also believe that FIFA’s TPO ban is justified.

 

I.               Antithesis: FIFA’s TPO ban is contrary to EU law 

The legal waters are very much chartered insofar as the question of the application of EU law to FIFA’s TPO ban is concerned.[2] The key legacy of the CJEU’s jurisprudence on sport, starting with the Bosman ruling, is that FIFA’s regulations do not escape the reach of EU law and that they must be subjected to a proportionality control of the restrictions they impose on economic freedoms. The fundamental question with respect to the TPO ban is then whether it will be deemed justified and proportionate by the national courts, the CAS, the European Commission and ultimately the CJEU.

The opponents of the FIFA ban consider first and foremost that the practice of TPO (they usually prefer to refer to as Third-Party Investments or Third-Party Entitlements) is a legitimate financial investment practice, which is needed to sustain and raise the competitiveness of certain clubs. Basically if banks are reluctant to finance those clubs, then less risk-averse investors have to step in. Thus, they support investment in the training capacity of the clubs (especially in South America) and their capacity to take their chances in the most prestigious competitions (for example FC Porto or Atlético Madrid). Hence, TPO can be seen as a legitimate investment practice and its regulation left to the contractual freedom of the parties. Such a radical libertarian view is not often supported nowadays,[3] as the potential integrity risks of TPO are widely acknowledged.[4]

Instead, if the risks connected to TPO are to be tackled, it is argued that TPO should be properly regulated. In EU law jargon, this is labelled a less restrictive alternative.[5] The existence of a less restrictive alternative would point at the disproportionate nature of the FIFA ban. For example, a bundle of regulatory measures are suggested by the Spanish league (La Liga):

·      Prohibition of certain transactions based on the player's age;

·      Maximum percentage of participation in the "economic rights";

·      Quantitative limitations on the maximum number of players per club;

·      Maximum remuneration for the investor;

·      Prohibition of certain clauses that may limit the independence and autonomy of the clubs; and

·      Prohibition of transactions depending on the investor's particular status or business (or participation in the same) such as shareholders, directors and managers of the clubs.

The proposed regulatory changes would undeniably be an improvement with regard to the current situation. However, I do not believe they are sufficiently credible to undermine the legality of FIFA’s TPO ban.

 

II.             Thesis: FIFA’s TPO ban is compatible with EU law

A.    The necessity to tackle the integrity risks generated by TPO

First, we need to come back to the function and functioning of TPO deals. There is a reason why banks refuse to offer loans to certain clubs. They are often in difficult financial situations, their revenues do not add up with their expenses. Investment funds fill this gap, they replace banks in financially supporting these clubs. In return, they expect a modern version of the “pound of flesh”, a share of the transfer fee attached to a specific player. For a club, the TPO investments will only be fruitful while it is successful on the pitch and lucky in picking the players it recruits. It is a very risky bet on the future. In good times everybody wins, but in bad times the club is in deep trouble (see FC Twente’s fate). The TPO system works as a devil’s circle, the club is drawn into more and more TPO deals to stay financially viable.

Furthermore, TPO deals are not unlike the complex financial instruments that led to the terrible financial crisis of 2008. They give way to similar conflicts of interest. Where banks were selling derivatives based on subprime mortgages to their clients while betting against them at the same time, TPO funds might push their clients to recruit (thanks to loans they have generously provided for high interests) a mediocre player in which they already have a stake. Another option would be for a TPO fund, which is often (if not always) also acting as an agent, to force the departure of a player by triggering an offer which the club cannot refuse (or it would have to buy back the rights which is impossible due to its financial situation). The many hat(s) of TPO investment funds are extremely worrying in terms of conflicts of interest.[6] The most dangerous, though in my view less likely (but see the Tampere case), risk being that TPO investors would use their broad networks of influence to fix games. FIFA’s objective of curbing those risks is clearly a legitimate one.

The heart of the trade of TPO funds is to leverage the hubris of football clubs, to corner them into making a bad financial deal in return for a credible shot at winning a title. But once the high is over, the low starts and the awakening is rather uncomfortable. The high financial risks saddled to the club are sustainable only so long as it is a winner. As soon as its fate on the pitch turns, the bad news accumulates and not unlike a bank run the club crashes, while the investors have more often than not managed to escape before the fall. In short, unless you truly believe in the superpowers of the invisible hand of the market, this practice, as well as the financial practices that led to the financial crisis, deserves either a thorough regulation or an outright ban.

B.    Is there a realistic regulatory alternative to the ban?

The key question for the assessment of the TPO ban under EU law is whether the many negative externalities triggered by the use of TPO could be tackled by the way of a less restrictive encroachment on the economic freedoms of the investors/clubs than the FIFA ban. Critics of the ban have very much insisted on the existence of less restrictive regulatory alternatives and put forward some proposals. Yet, I am of the opinion that these alternatives are generally unworkable in the present context. The main reason being that FIFA is incapable to properly regulate and control the TPO investment market. This is due to the fact that FIFA does not dispose of the legal competence needed to force investment funds to disclose information. To do so, it must be empowered by governments to be able to cease the information wanted, which is unlikely. Some would object, that this could be done via the FIFA TMS system put in place to supervise international transfers. But it would be extremely difficult for FIFA to verify any complex set of contractual information entered into the TMS. The destiny of former article 18 bis of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfers of Players (see the 2014 version here) is there to prove this point. Under article 4.2 of Annexe 3 of the FIFA RSTP 2014, Clubs were already supposed to provide a “Declaration on third-party payments and influence”. Nonetheless, in previous years, FIFA was unable to charge any club (except for Tampere in a match-fixing context and due to a local police investigation) on the ground that an investor was exercising undue influence, mainly because it lacked the knowledge needed to do so. This is exemplified in the case of the ERPA signed by Doyen and FC Twente, which was only partially disclosed to the Dutch Football Association.

If FIFA is powerless, how is it supposed to enforce the ban? Well here lies the crucial difference between a ban and complex regulation. A ban is simpler to enforce, as it is merely a black-or-white matter. FIFA will be able to rely on investigative journalists unearthing investment contracts linked to transfers. The mere existence of a TPO contract will lead to a dissuasive sanction, without the need to get into the nitty-gritty details of each case. It thus makes it easier for FIFA to control the use of TPO and to force investment funds to come out in the open and take charge of the management of a club if they wish to stay active on the transfer market. The higher probability of being caught linked to the use of TPO will most likely work as a strong deterrent for clubs to engage in such a financing practice. This is undeniably a blunt instrument, and in an ideal world a true regulation of the TPO market would be put in place and enforced, but this ideal world is not compatible with the pluralist and complex transnational legal setting in which the transfer system operates. The complex regulatory schemes proposed as substitute to the ban are very well intended, but they do not take into account the extreme difficulty (and costs) linked to their implementation. The fiasco of the old FIFA Players’ Agents Regulations illustrates the practical constraints that burden any regulation of the football transfer market.

C.    TPO is not compatible with the 2001 agreement between the European Commission and FIFA

There is a final argument in favour of the compatibility of the TPO ban with EU law, which is grounded in the 2001 agreement between FIFA, UEFA and the European Commission. As should be obvious by now, the existence of TPO is dependent on the existence of the FIFA transfer system. Such a transfer system is unknown in other industries (though one could very well imagine a transfer system for academics for example). In turn, the FIFA transfer system restricts the economic freedom of both clubs and players. The European Commission highlighted these restrictions during its investigation of the FIFA transfer system in the early 2000s. However, the Commission signed an agreement with FIFA and UEFA signalizing its support for a new (the current) FIFA transfer system in 2001 and put an end to its investigation. This support was conditioned on the idea that a form of transfer system was needed to maintain the contractual stability necessary to the existence of stable and successful teams.[7] This is the fundamental assumption that underlies the compatibility with EU law of the FIFA transfer system, and therefore the sheer existence of TPO. Yet, TPO as a practice is per se promoting contractual instability. Players have to change clubs for TPO investors to cash in on their investments. It is perfectly logical for TPO contracts to include various clauses strongly incentivizing clubs to sell their players. If not, they will have to bear the costs, for example, of paying a fee (usually the invested amount plus a healthy interest) in case the player leaves the club on a free transfer, or forcing the club to buy back at market rate the investors’ shares in the economic right of a player in case of an offer above a minimum price. For a cash-strapped club, e.g. a club that lost access to the banking system and has to turn to TPO investors, this is usually impossible and means that it will be forced to sell-on the player. In a way, TPO is a radical perversion of the deal stroke by FIFA/UEFA and the Commission. The transfer system was meant to ensure that contractual stability is secured in football, not to enhance contractual instability. This contradiction between TPO and the rationale conditioning the legality under EU law of the FIFA transfer system will necessarily bear on the EU Commission’s analysis of FIFA’s TPO ban.

 

Conclusion: TPO is a symptom, the transfer system is the problem

20 years of the Bosman case oblige, the case has been back in the news cycle this week (see here, here, and here). It is widely credited, or rather blamed, for having changed football for bad, turning it into some kind of commercial monster. I very much doubt this storytelling is right. It is based on a collective misreading of the case. Bosman took stock of a contemporary development in football at that time: the eagerness of the “football family” to commercialize its activities by primarily selling TV rights in a monopoly position. What Bosman is about, then, it is the regulation of this economic activity. Central questions are: How should the proceeds be distributed and especially who should bear the costs of ensuring competitive balance amongst the teams? Until Bosman the players were the main losers, they could not move freely across Europe and in some countries they could not transfer for free even after the end of their contracts. This situation was deemed an unjustified restriction on the player’s freedom by the Court. Nevertheless, and this is widely forgotten, Bosman is not about dogmatically ensuring that economic freedoms and a deregulated market always prevail. In fact, Advocate General Lenz was advocating as an alternative to the transfer system that the economic revenues derived from TV rights be shared more equally to ensure competitive balance.[8] This is obviously an important restriction on the economic freedom of clubs and leagues, yet the Court endorsed it as viable alternative.[9] Since then, the Court has repeatedly approved various type of sporting regulations restricting the economic freedoms of athletes or clubs.[10] After Bosman, FIFA and UEFA (supported by many clubs) insisted on maintaining a transfer system instead of the alternative suggested by Lenz and the Court. Despite the Commission’s aforementioned challenge of the legality of the FIFA transfer system, FIFA and UEFA were able to marshal the political support of the most influential Member States (France, Germany and the UK) in their bid to save the transfer system.[11] This led to the 2001 agreement and to the survival of the transfer system in its current form.

It is certainly ironical that the transfer system is based on the same legal principles denounced by UEFA and FIFA officials when they talk of slavery regarding TPO. This hypocrisy, rightly pointed out by the critics of the ban,[12] does not entail that the TPO ban is contrary to EU law, as they in turn seem to assume. However, it does imply that TPO as a practice is just the tip of the iceberg. In fact, it is a symptom, as well as the murky world of agents, of a global transfer market gone rogue. This is due mainly to the insistence of FIFA in transforming players into moveable assets included on the balance sheets of clubs. The transfer system is certainly not about contractual stability or the financing of training facilities. Indeed, FIFA is trumpeting the growing number of transfers each year (see this year’s celebratory press release here) and is very much dragging its feet as far as enforcing training compensations and solidarity payments is concerned.[13] Undoubtedly, there is some doublespeak going on. If clubs are forced to turn to TPO investors it is mainly because FIFA and UEFA (and the big clubs) have refused to put in place the necessary redistributive mechanisms to ensure a minimum of competitive balance as was advocated by the CJEU in the Bosman ruling 20 years ago (and by the EU Commission recently). Instead, they have put their faith into a transfer system that is neither correcting competitive imbalances nor guaranteeing contractual stability (a view supported by Stefan Szymanski on behalf of FIFPro). FIFA has lost control over its Frankenstein-like transfer system and it is desperately trying to rein its negative externalities with regulatory patches (e.g. UEFA’s Financial Fair-play Rules or FIFA’s TPO ban). In this regard, the TPO ban is unlikely to contravene EU law, but it is also unlikely to be a solution to the many problems caused by FIFA and UEFA’s handling of the post-Bosman football era.


[1] See FIFA Circular no. 1464 announcing the ban.

[2] This is well done by Johan Lindholm in his article: Can I please have a slice of Ronaldo? The legality of FIFA’s ban on third-party ownership under European union law.

[3] The Spanish Competition Authority comes close to such a view in its advisory opinion criticizing FIFA’s TPO ban. It states at page 6 (in Spanish): “Se ha de partir del hecho de que si el mercado ha facilitado la aparición de estas operaciones es porque una multitud de agentes (tanto clubs como jugadores), actuando de manera descentralizada, han considerado que es lo mejor para sus intereses. Por tanto, la prohibición del TPO resulta en una limitación de la capacidad de obrar y de la libertad de empresa, restringiendo el uso de una conducta que en principio es maximizadora de beneficios (o minimizadora de pérdidas).”

[4] Even though very reluctantly by the Spanish Competition Authority, see p.9-10.

[5] This is also the view of Johan Lindholm, he considers that “regulation is likely a legally more successful response to the perceived ills of TPO”.

[6] This is also true for other types of third party funding, for example in arbitration.

[7] This is in essence the meaning of paragraph 57 of the EU Commission’s rejection decision in the Affaire IV/36 583-SETCA-FGTB/FIFA. The paragraph states : « La protection des contrats pendant une période de durée limitée qui se traduit par des sanctions correspondant notamment à la suspension du joueur pendant une période de 4 mois à 6 mois (dans des cas de récidives) semble indispensable pour garantir la construction d’une équipe. Un club a besoin d’un temps minimum pour construire son équipe. Si un joueur pouvait rompre unilatéralement son contrat dès la première année et être transféré à la fin de la saison vers un autre club, sans aucune sanction autre que la compensation financière, son club d’origine n’aurait pas de possibilité de construire convenablement son équipe. Les sanctions visent donc à démotiver les joueurs de rompre unilatéralement leurs contrats pendant les deux premières années pour permettre l’existence d’équipes stables. En raison des spécificités du secteur en cause la durée de la période protégée et des sanctions semble être proportionnée aux objectifs légitimes quelles visent à atteindre. »

[8] See in particular paragraphs 218-234 of his Opinion.

[9] See para. 110 of the Bosman ruling.

[10] For example: Selection rules in Deliège; Transfer windows in Lehtonen; FIFA’s agent regulation in Piau; Doping sanctions in Meca-Medina; Training compensations in Bernard. The European Commission also recognised the legality of UEFA’s rule limiting the multiple ownership of clubs in ENIC.

[11] On this episode see Borja Garcia’s article, ‘The 2001 informal agreement on the international transfer system’.

[12] In his article Johan Lindholm criticizes this moral posture taken by FIFA and UEFA. He rightly points at its hypocrisy: “[…] a third party owning fifty percent of the economic rights to a player is the very height of moral corruption, but a club owning one hundred percent of the same right is not only perfectly acceptable but also applauded”.

[13] A recent study commissioned by the European Clubs Association (ECA) on the transfer market, shows (at page 88) that the solidarity payments are way below the 5% threshold imposed by the FIFA RSTP (reaching instead only 1,15% of the transfer fees).

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