After Tuesday’s dismissal of Michael Garcia’s complaint against the now infamous Eckert statement synthetizing (misleadingly in his eyes) his Report on the bidding process for the World Cup 2018 and 2022, Garcia finally decided to resign from his position as FIFA Ethics Committee member. On his way out, he noted: “No independent governance committee, investigator, or arbitration panel can change the culture of an organization”. It took Garcia a while to understand this, although others faced similar disappointments before. One needs only to remember the forgotten reform proposals of the Independent Governance Committee led by Prof. Dr. Mark Pieth.

FIFA is the world’s government of football. It decides who should get to organize the World Cup every four years, but it also imposes the rules applying to international transfers of football players and redistributes a massive amount of money to the various layers of the football pyramid. Those are no mundane tasks. But, despite its relentless display of an entrenched culture of bad governance and corruption, the timidity of public authorities in confronting FIFA is striking. In fact, opacity and a dramatic lack of accountability characterize FIFA’s decision-making processes.

FIFA’s Opacity Culture

Transparency is one of the key requirements of “good governance”. Transparency implies that the public sphere can scrutinize the acts of government and criticize them in full knowledge of their contents. To the contrary, FIFA’s daily governmental work is marred in opacity. Disciplinary decisions, as the one handed out on Tuesday, are never released in full. Thus, it disables any critical checks on the way justice is rendered by FIFA’s disciplinary bodies. The two Garcia reports, the first on the ISL Corruption scandal and the second on the World Cup 2018 and 2022 bids were not publically released (Michael Garcia did not complain over the non-publication of his first report). In an ironical twist, FIFA regulations bar FIFA from releasing these reports supposed to restore credibility of FIFA in the eyes of the world. Hence, FIFA publically trumpets investigations into the most controversial and sensitive issues, while knowing that the findings will be buried forever. But beyond the Garcia reports, opacity is a pervasive feature of FIFA’s governance. For example, the two academic studies ordered by FIFA on the legality and desirability of third-party ownership were similarly kept in a drawer, despite the fact that they are to serve as a basis for upcoming legislation on the matter. In this way, FIFA is able to keep the public debate at bay. Maintaining the public uninformed on the substance of legislative or judicial decisions is the surest way to avoid any controversies and to distance the world government of football from its “citizens”. 

FIFA’s Accountability Deficit

Accountability is another keyword for anybody interested in Good Governance standards. In short, it implies that a decision-maker can be held responsible in front of a forum (legal or political) for the decisions she (or most likely he in the case of FIFA) is taking. FIFA has a huge accountability deficit for two reasons: internally no strong accountability mechanisms have been put in place; externally no societal accountability is imposed. Internally FIFA has been at pain to paint the emergence of its “independent” Ethics Committee as a revolution. However, the Garcia Report saga was prompt to display it as a farce. The Ethics Committee’s investigation as such seems to have been fundamentally flawed, suffice here to recall that the Russian Federation got away with a simple “computers destroyed”. If the Ethics Committee is incapable of inquiring seriously into those matters, it should simply be discarded as an instance of whitewashing. Moreover, despite Blatter being a finalist for this year’s edition of the world’s most hated human being, he will most likely be re-elected by FIFA’s member (the leaders of the national associations) at the upcoming congress in May 2015. Indeed, FIFA’s members are accountable to nobody as FIFA shields them from any national legal or political challenges on the pretext of protecting the autonomy of football.

As pointed out by Garcia, FIFA is incapable of reforming itself and until now it has been immune to the pressure of public outrage. All the expertise of the world would be incapable of changing this state of affairs, unless it is matched with hard legal constraints. This pressure has to come from the states, the first among those being the Swiss state. The Swiss public authorities have the duty to use all legal tools available (especially criminal law) to clean up this Swiss association seated in Zurich, they should collaborate with Europol, Interpol and the FBI in doing so (the new anti-corruption laws are a first step in that direction). In the end, the Swiss state is the sole capable of putting an end to FIFA’s corrupt politics. Would this be an inadmissible intrusion in the autonomy of sport? Even the IOC acknowledged, in the background paper to the Agenda 2020 recommendation, “autonomy has to be earned” and must be exercised “responsibly and in accordance with the basic standards of good governance”. There is no way FIFA can be seen as complying to any good governance standards. The time to clean-up FIFA has come.

Editor's note: Faraz Shahlaei is a JSD Candidate at Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. His research and teaching interests are public international law, international sports law, international human rights and dispute resolution.

The issue of international human rights was a central contention in Caster Semenya case ever since the start of her legal battle against the regulations of the IAAF. However, the human rights arguments were poorly considered in the two proceedings related to this case. To put it in perspective, it is like having a key player nailed to the bench throughout the whole game; no coach ever tried to give it a chance while it had the potential to be the game changer for all parties.

In 2019, the Human Rights Council, the inter-governmental human rights body of the UN, expressed concern over issues of discrimination in sports in particular regarding IAAF female classification regulations. In June 2020, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights submitted a report to the United Nations Human Rights Council on the “Intersection of Race and Gender Discrimination in Sport”. The report draws a detailed picture of how human rights in the Semenya case have been violated and also elaborates on the inherent problem of addressing human rights issues in alternative dispute resolution mechanisms favored by the sport governing bodies. However, despite an in-depth discussion of Caster Semenya’s case at both the CAS and then the SFT, the question of human rights, a key concern and a fundamental pillar of the case, hasn’t been adequately answered yet!

The following arguments are intended to discuss how international human rights law, has not been properly examined in Caster Semenya’s case:

1.     CAS arbitral panels are not primarily concerned with the application of international human rights law since sport arbitrations are conducted based on regulations of sport governing bodies, predominantly in the absence of a human rights clause within that framework (OHCHR, para 44). Even if they were, a proper consideration of human rights aspects in any dispute, including whether there is a necessary, proportional and legitimate exception to the human rights rule or whether there are more important rights worthy of protection, needs individuals that are knowledgeable about the international human rights system to carefully scrutinize the issues based on human rights norms. Even if the CAS includes human rights experts in its pool of arbitrators, there are still questions regarding the dependability and the weight of their interpretation of the human rights treaties considering their appointment process by private actors in compare with for example judges in the ICJ, ECtHR or members of the UN treaty bodies.

2.     The Semenya case is a suitable example of this gap. In fact, when it comes to the issue of discrimination and international human rights law, the panel finds the UN amicus curiae and other expert submissions useless (CAS, para 554). The panel argues that the submissions failed to address the three-prong spear of necessity, proportionality and legitimacy and therefore are not helpful for the task in front of the panel. Despite acknowledging the relevancy of some human rights arguments (CAS, para 554), the panel finds a more important value to protect, namely: fairness in sports; and builds up its analysis of necessity, proportionality and legitimacy based on this concept. Whether this assessment is in line with international human rights, remains a question since the issue has not been considered by a panel with adequate human rights expertise. The player is on the bench!

3.     Furthermore, the issue of female athletes’ eligibility is not related only to gender-based discrimination. As the report of the OHCHR makes clear it is also about the right to work and just and favorable working conditions; the right to highest attainable standards of physical and mental health; the right to sexual and reproductive health; prohibition of arbitrary interference with privacy; the right to bodily integrity and the right to human dignity (OHCHR, para 34). None of these rights have been considered in the CAS award and subsequently by the SFT within the international human rights law context.

4.     More importantly, the enforcement of DSD regulations raises questions regarding the prohibition of torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment (OHCHR, para 34(a)). The OHCHR report explains that enforcement of DSD regulations are “medically unnecessary, and potentially harmful” (para. 32), brings the targeted individuals with “shame and ridicule” (para. 33), inflicts physical and psychological harm (para 34(c)) and is a form of forced medical intervention (para 34 (c)) which triggers issues related to article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. This prohibition in most cases trumps any exception or justification. Therefore, Article 7 of the ICCPR on prohibition of torture, cruel, degrading and inhuman treatment, ratified by Monaco in 1997, can be a potentially bigger threat to DSD regulations rather than the issue of non-discrimination.

5.     Challenging an arbitral award in national jurisdictions, other than the public policy grounds, is limited to issues pertinent to procedural matters. Therefore, the scope of reviewing the issues at stake in the arbitral award is very limited and if any of the above rights have not been already scrutinized during the arbitration, they will fall outside the scope of the appeal. For example, the SFT finds that the contradiction of taking oral contraceptives with religious and moral values of the individual is an inadmissible claim since it hasn’t been raised in front of the CAS at the first place (para 10.6).

6.     A fundamental discordance between the human rights framework and the approach adopted by the SFT, emerges when the SFT argues that the non-discrimination principle based on the Swiss Constitution is restricted to the treatment of individuals by public entities not private bodies such as sport organizations (para 9.4). Nevertheless, the SFT observes that sport governing bodies possess a status similar to states (which is in itself an interesting finding and I will touch upon this later in this note) and then deals with public policy grounds. However, the legal protections in international human rights law are of a different nature. Positive obligations of the states in guaranteeing the enforcement of human rights norms within their jurisdiction is an indispensable part of the legal regime created by international human rights law. The UN Human Rights Committee is clear when it states “the positive obligations on States Parties to ensure Covenant rights will only be fully discharged if individuals are protected by the State, not just against violations of Covenant rights by its agents, but also against acts committed by private persons or entities that would impair the enjoyment of Covenant rights in so far as they are amenable to application between private persons or entities”. The practice of international courts and tribunals corroborates this view where in many cases public officials were held accountable for failing to do their due diligence in preventing human rights violations within their jurisdictions (See e.g. Fadeyeva v. Russia, paras 89-93; CCPR Concluding Observations on Germany, para 16).

7.     The SFT delves into the public policy issues and by relying on the findings of the CAS (para 9.8.2; 9.8.3.1) comes to the same conclusion as to the priority and legitimacy of the principle of fairness in sports (para 9.8.3.3, 9.8.3.4) and ultimately finds no breach of public policy (para 10.7). Based on paragraph 1 and 2 of this note, the analysis of the CAS, which the SFT relies upon it, is disputable from the human rights perspective.

8.     The SFT refers to the decision of the ECtHR in FNASS and others v. France and finds the analysis applicable to this case. This seems reasonable as both cases are justifying certain restrictions to protect the rights of third parties. However, the pivotal argument of the ECtHR in FNASS not only mentions the protection of public health (para 165) but also the risks of doping for physical and mental health of the doped athletes (paras 171-173); the SFT’s stance on this topic is in conflict with serious concerns asserted by the OHCHR on how DSD regulations pose a serious risk to the right to health of the individuals requiring them to undergo unnecessary and potentially harmful medical treatment (OHCHR para 32, 33, 34(a), 34(b), 34(c), 34(d)). Additionally, in FNASS the right to privacy is examined in the face of whereabout regulations plus being available for an hour each day for testing purposes; the ECtHR finds that the protection of health, which is the aim of the doping control system, is more important than revealing the whereabout information. However, in the present case reasonable concerns are over endangering the health and safety of individuals rather than disclosing the information about the place of residence. Article 3 of the Additional Protocol to the Oviedo Convention concerning biomedical research can be illuminating in this regard: “The interests and welfare of the human being participating in research shall prevail over the sole interest of society or science”.

9.     At times, the SFT finds itself relying on the notion of consent in relations between athletes and sport governing bodies and employs it as a justifying factor for example for the intrusive examination of athletes’ body that if they object, such examinations would not take place (para 10.2, 11.2). The SFT further points out that athletes’ defective consent to requirements set by the IAAF, justifies taking oral contraceptives and it is not a treatment imposed on an unwilling individual (para 10.2).

• First, the consent in this case is a flawed consent since it leaves “no real choice to the athlete, who has to choose between undergoing these intrusive medically unnecessary assessments and treatments with negative impacts on their health and wellbeing” (See here, p 5). This incomplete consent might survive when tested against imposing the arbitration clause on an athlete (Mutu & Pechestein case) but might fail when tested against more fundamental issues such as prohibition of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, non-discrimination, the right to health, bodily integrity and prohibition of medical intervention without free consent. Furthermore, consent should be considered in the light of the decision of the ECtHR in Chitos v. Greece in which a military staff resignation resulted in imposition of a financial penalty. In Chitos a new law was adopted after the applicant was recruited by the military, changing the conditions of the release of the personnel from the military service. The Court finds that the law pursues a legitimate aim and is proportionate, and it also takes account of the fact that “at the outset … the applicant cannot legitimately maintain that he was unaware of the rationale and scope of the obligations he had entered into” being aware of also the benefits that he would receive from this relation. The question in front of the Court was whether the applicant voluntarily offered himself since he had prior knowledge of rules and possible consequences. The Court maintains that the issue of mental constraint should be considered based on the situation at the time of the entry into force of the new law not at the time when the applicant was first recruited (para 97). Furthermore, in Van Der Mussele v. Belgium regarding the issue of prior consent and the existence of a threat the ECtHR maintains that: “This could be so in the case of a service required in order to gain access to a given profession, if the service imposed a burden which was so excessive or disproportionate to the advantages attached to the future exercise of that profession, [then] … the service could not be treated as having been voluntarily accepted beforehand” (para 37). As explained above an assessment of necessity, proportionality and legitimacy based on international human rights grounds can be different than the conclusions based on the principle of fairness in sports.

• Second, the OHCHR report calls attention to power imbalances in sports which hinges upon the notion of consent in relations between the athletes and sport governing bodies (para 34 (c)). The Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health emphasizes the need for particular measures to protect “vulnerability of certain individuals whose rights are compromised owing to deeply rooted power imbalances and structural inequalities” in particular in clinical practice and medical research. “In sport, such power imbalances are compounded by athletes’ dependency on the sports federations requiring such medical interventions and the frequent absence of adequate and holistic support during the decision-making process” (OHCHR, para 34(c)).

• Third, the issue of consent becomes significantly important with respect to medical intervention in human body. For any type of medical intervention, free and informed consent of the individual is required. Article 5 of the Oviedo Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine provides that any intervention in the health of individual should be conducted with free and informed consent including the consequences and risks involved. The OHCHR report calls attention to the “risk of unethical medical practice, particularly when the informed consent of the person concerned is not required” (OHCHR, para 34(c)). It is uncontested that human dignity and its health has priority over any type of scientific test or research even for the good of society. Article 3 of the Additional Protocol to the Oviedo Convention applies to this argument as well which provides: “The interests and welfare of the human being participating in research shall prevail over the sole interest of society or science”.

• Fourth, individuals have the right to refuse or withdraw consent at any time without being subject to any form of discrimination (Article 5, 16 of Oviedo Convention; Additional Protocol, article 13(3)).

• Fifth, the argument that the CAS is open to future findings of the adverse effects of such treatments which is supported by the SFT (para 9.8.3.5), is in contrast with requirements of medical and biological interventions of human body in international human rights law as it is encouraging unethical and potentially harmful medical experimentation and at the same time overlooks the notion of free and voluntary consent. Any type of medical intervention and research should come with careful consideration of ethical acceptability of such practices including protection of “dignity, rights, safety and well-being of research participants” (Additional protocol to the Oviedo Convention, article 9).

Notwithstanding the above arguments, one of the findings of the SFT can be an interesting line of thought for further research; that the vertical structure of sports and the dominance of sport governing bodies in their realm, puts them in a similar position as states (para 9.4). Traditionally only states and international governmental organizations are direct subjects of public international law and therefore bearers of responsibility under its rules and principles including the responsibility to enforce the human rights standards. The finding of the SFT adds more weight to the argument that sport governing bodies have replaced states in certain functions in a way that states are no longer responsible for those operations. This is one criterion recognized by public international law scholars for recognition of international legal personality. Therefore, it will be interesting to study whether sport governing bodies are in a position to be recognized as de facto states although without a geographical territory.

Finally, what I argued above does not mean that ultimately, once the award of the CAS in Semenya case is scrutinized by a human rights body it will fail. It may or may not; but as long as this evaluation has not been conducted by a competent human rights court, there will always remain questions about the credibility of a CAS award which disregarded most of the human rights concerns touched upon in this blog.

Therefore, a key player in this game is still on the bench!

The European Commission has published the “Study on Sports Organisers’ Rights in the EU”, which was carried out by the ASSER International Sports Law Centre (T.M.C. Asser Institute) and the Institute for Information Law (University of Amsterdam). 

The study critically examines the legal protection of rights to sports events (sports organisers’ rights) and various issues regarding their commercial exploitation in the field of media and sports betting, both from a national and EU law perspective.  

In a number of posts, we will highlight some of the key findings of the study. 

“It was Hyde, after all, and Hyde alone, that was guilty.” 

In recent years, numerous national and European sports organisers have called for the adoption of a specific right to consent to the organisation of bets (“right to consent to bets”), by virtue of which no betting operator could offer bets on a sports event without first entering into a contractual agreement with the organiser. 

A sports organisers’ right to consent to bets was first introduced in Victoria (Australia) in 2007. Yet it was the recognition of a similar right in France that created the true momentum for sports organisers to advocate its adoption at the EU or EU-wide national level. The argument is twofold. First, a right to consent to bets would entitle sports organisers to demand a “fair financial return” for the commercial exploitation of theirs sports events by betting operators. Second, it would establish a statutory obligation for betting operators to work in partnership with sports organisers to preserve the integrity of sports events. According to the contractual provisions agreed upon by the involved parties, mutual obligations (for e.g. fraud detection) and conditions of information exchange can be identified. 

A restriction to the freedom to provide services? 

From an EU internal market law perspective, it is important to note that the conditions implementing a right to consent to bets are capable of constituting a restriction of the free movement of services within the Union (within the meaning of Article 56 TFEU). Indeed, the requirement for betting operators to obtain consent for the organisation of sports bets could impede or render less attractive the free provision of gambling services.[1] 

The Court of Justice (CJ) has consistently held that restrictions on gambling activities are acceptable only if justified by an imperative requirement in the general interest and compliant with the principle of proportionality. The CJ has accepted the prevention of fraud as a legitimate objective justification. The financing of public interest activities through proceeds from gambling services, on the other hand, can only be accepted as a beneficial consequence that is incidental to the restrictive policy adopted.[2]  

It follows that a strict regulatory framework that genuinely reflects a concern to prevent the manipulation of sports events must accompany the introduction of a right to consent to bets. 

The origins of the French betting right 

With the enactment of a new gambling law in 2010, the French legislator, following case law precedent recognizing sports bets as a form of commercial exploitation of sports events, introduced a right to consent to bets in the French Sports Code. 

Interestingly, the concept of the right to consent to bets evolved considerably during the course of the legislative process.  

When the draft law opening up online gambling and betting to competition and regulation was introduced in the French parliament, the rationale of the right to consent to bets was solely expressed in terms of generating a “fair financial return” to sport. Under Chapter IX (“Provisions concerning the exploitation of sports events”) of the original draft law, the following addition to Article L.334-1 of the Sports Code was proposed: 

“The use, for commercial purposes, of any characteristic element of sporting events or competitions, notably names, calendars, data or results, requires the consent of the owners of the exploitation rights under conditions, in particular of a financial nature, defined by contract, subject to the provisions of articles L. 333-6 to L.333-9”.^[3]

On 5 March 2009, the French authorities notified the draft law to the European Commission, in accordance with the provisions of Directive 98/34/EC of 22 June 1988.[4] In its detailed opinion, the Commission stressed that several provisions of the draft law would infringe Article 56 TFEU if they were to be adopted without due consideration of the Commission’s objections. Amongst other things, the Commission rightly observed that the financing of sport through gambling revenues could not justify an obstacle to free movement, in this case the requirement to obtain consent from the sports organiser. The Commission further noted that the characteristic elements that are already in the possession of sports organisers, such as calendars, data or results, could not qualify for sui generis database right protection.  

It was only during the subsequent first reading of the draft law in the French National Assembly that the statutory recognition of the right to consent to bets was presented as a means of preserving sports integrity. On 21 July 2009, the French Minister for the Budget declared: 

“in reality, the interest of this right for sport is not financial but ethical, by requiring commercial agreements between gambling operators and the organisers of sports competitions, this right finally will give professional sport the means to make the operators share their concerns in matters of competition ethics”.^[5]

 Accordingly, the relevant provision was substantially amended to address the concerns about its compliance with the EU internal market rules. First, it no longer mentioned that the consent to the organisation of bets was related to the use of fixtures and schedules. Second, the title of Chapter IX was changed to “Provisions concerning the exploitation of sports events and the fight against fraud and cheating in the context of these events” (emphasis added). Third, multiple paragraphs were added, so as to stipulate that (1) the betting right contracts should impose obligations on betting operators concerning fraud detection and prevention and (2) the financial contribution is intended to compensate for costs incurred by sports organisers for anti-fraud mechanisms.^[6]

The proof of the pudding is in the eating  

On the basis of an in-depth assessment of the exploitation of the French right to consent to bets, the study concludes that the rationale of safeguarding the integrity of sports events did not really override its economic rationale. 

Decree No. 2010-614 requires the betting right marketing contracts to specify information and transparency obligations imposed on operators to detect fraud and prevent the risk of harm to the integrity of sports events.^[7] Contrary to the relatively strong language about the stipulation of “information and transparency obligations” imposed on the operators, Decree No. 2010-614 merely requires the holder of the right to consent to bets to specify in the contracts the measures it “intends” to introduce for preventing the risk for the integrity of the events in question. However, the law does not mandate the effective implementation of these integrity measures. Furthermore, although the compensation paid for the right to organise bets must take account “in particular the costs incurred in detecting and preventing fraud”, there is no guarantee that the income is allocated to fraud prevention and detection. 

If Member States would consider introducing a right to consent to bets, it appears critical from an EU law perspective that it is genuinely designed to protect a non-economic public interest objective in a proportional manner. The Victorian (Australia) regulatory regime is recommended as a best practice model. Here, the financial return is truly a compensation for the integrity assurances given by the sports bodies. Before a sports body is legally entitled to exercise the right to consent to bets, it must first invest time and resources into developing adequate integrity mechanisms. Furthermore, in case the sports body fails to fulfil its contractual obligations, the gambling regulator may revoke its ability to exercise the right to consent to bets. Indeed, the rights and obligations in the betting right agreements must work both ways: sports betting operators are also entitled to expect that the sports organisers truly implement the integrity policies.  

For a detailed exploration of the virtues of a right to consent to bets and the challenges of adopting such a mechanism from a legal, institutional, and practical perspective, check out the full study available at http://ec.europa.eu/sport/news/2014/study-on-sport-organisers-rights_en.htm.

[1] All measures that prohibit, impede or render less attractive the exercise of the fundamental freedoms must be regarded as restrictions, see e.g. C-439/99 Commission v Italy [2002] ECR I-305, para. 22; Case C-205/99 Analir and Others v Administratión General del Estado [2001] ECR I-271, para. 21.

[2] See e.g. Joined Cases C 316/07, C 358/07 to C 360/07, C 409/07 and C 410/07 Markus Stoß and Others v Wetteraukreis and Others [2010] ECR I-8069, para. 104; C-67/98 Questore di Verona v Diego Zenatti [1999] ECR I-7289, para. 36; Judgment of the EFTA Court in Case 3/06 (Ladbrokes) para. 63.

[3] Unofficial translation by the research team (“L’utilisation, à des fins commerciales, de tout élément caractéristique des manifestations ou compétitions sportives, notamment leur dénomination, leur calendrier, leurs données ou leurs résultats, ne peut être effectuée sans le consentement des propriétaires des droits d’exploitation, dans des conditions, notamment financières, définies par contact, sous réserve des dispositions des articles L. 333-6 à L. 333-9”).

[4] Directive 98/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations (1998) OJ L 204/37. This “Transparency Directive” requires Member States to notify their rules on information society services in draft form, and generally observe a standstill period of at least three months before formal adoption, in order to allow other Member States and the European Commission to raise concern about potential trade barriers within the EU.

[5] Assemblée Nationale, Audition de M. Éric Woerth, ministre du budget, des comptes publics, de la fonction publique et de la réforme de l'État au cours de la réunion du 21 Juillet 2009.

[6] In the context of the second reading of the draft law in the French Senate, the rapporteur of the Finance Committee welcomed this solution to accommodate the European Commission’s concerns regarding Article 52. Sénate, Rapport n° 209 (2009-2010) de M. François Trucy, fait au nom de la commission des finances, déposé le 19 janvier 2010.

[7] Décret no. 2010-614 du 7 Juin 2010 relatif aux conditions de commercialisation de droits portant sur l’organisation de paris en relation avec une manifestation ou compétition sportives, Article 2.