Editor's note: Rhys was an intern at the T.M.C. Asser Institute. He now advises on investments and Notre acquisitions in sport (mainly football) via Lovelle Street Advisory. Following a career as a professional athlete, Rhys has spent much of his professional life as an international sports agent, predominantly operating in football. Rhys has a Bachelor of Laws (LL.B) and a Bachelor of Philosophy (B.Phil.) from the University of Dame, Sydney, Australia. He is currently completing an LL.M at the University of Zurich in International Business Law / International Sports Law.

Having looked at the different types of investors in football in part one of this two-part blog series, “A non-exhaustive Typology”, it is fitting to now consider the regulations that apply to investors who seek to build a portfolio of football clubs.

One way to measure the momentum of a particular practice and how serious it ought to be taken, might be when that practice earns its own initialism. Multi-club ownership or MCO as it is increasingly known today, is the name given to those entities that have an ownership stake in multiple clubs. Within the little research and writing that has been undertaken on the topic, some authors submit that investors with minority stakes in multiple clubs ought not to be captured by the MCO definition.  This position appears problematic given some of the regulations draw the line at influence rather than stake.

There are now approximately 50 MCO’s across the football world that own approximately 150 clubs.^[1] Given the way MCO is trending, one might consider it important that the regulations keep up with the developing MCO practice, so as to ensure the integrity of football competitions, and to regulate any other potentially questionable benefit an MCO might derive that would be contrary to football’s best interests.

In this blog, I focus on the variety of ways (and levels at which) this practice is being regulated.  I will move through the football pyramid from member associations (MA’s) to FIFA, laying the foundations to support a proposition that FIFA and only FIFA is positioned to regulate MCO.

i)               The Cases that Shaped the MCO Regulatory Landscape

The ENIC and Red Bull cases essentially shaped MCO regulations, at least for UEFA.  For a comprehensive analysis of the cases, I would encourage one look at both “Multi-Club Ownership in European Football – Part I: General Introduction and the ENIC Saga” and “Multi-Club Ownership in European Football – Part II: The Concept of Decisive Influence in the Red Bull Case” by Tomáš Grell.

ENIC CASE[2]

The ENIC case featuring proceedings before the Court of Arbitration for Sport and before the European Commission, made its way to such bodies because London Stock Exchange listed entity, ENIC (English National Investment Company), owned stakes in both AEK Athens and SK Slavia Prague, that were set to play in the same UEFA club competition. At that point in time, UEFA had adopted regulations that made entry to UEFA club competitions conditional upon a club having not (i) held or been dealing in the securities or shares; and refrained from (ii) being a member; (iii) being involved in any capacity whatsoever in the management, administration, and/or sporting performance; and (iv) having any power whatsoever in the management, administration and/or sporting performance - of any other club participating in the same UEFA club competition. Furthermore, an individual or entity was prohibited from exercising control over more than one club participating in the same UEFA club competition.

The Committee for the UEFA Club Competitions had initially ruled that only SK Slavia would take part in the 1998/99 UEFA Cup. Not satisfied with that ruling, on 15 June 1998, AEK Athens and SK Slavia Prague filed a request for arbitration with CAS and simultaneously sought interim relief which was given, allowing both clubs to compete in the 1998/99 UEFA Cup. On 20 August 1999 however, the CAS held that the Original Rule was valid and that UEFA could apply the rule moving forward. Given the blow this dealt to ENIC’s football business strategies, on 18 February 2000, ENIC lodged a complaint with the European Commission and argued anew that the UEFA rules were contrary to EU competition law. The Commission was satisfied that the Original Rule was valid in that it sought to protect the integrity of UEFA competitions, rather than to restrict competition, hence seeing no violation of the relevant EU competition laws.

RED BULL CASE[3]

The current rules encapsulated in Article 5 of the UCL Regulations are distinct from the Original Rule in that one of the standards that would render a club unable to participate in a UEFA competition is if an individual or entity is able to exercise by any means a “decisive influence” in the decision-making of more than one club in that competition.

In 2017, RB Salzburg and RB Leipzig had both secured places in the 2017/18 UCL. Not long after, the UEFA General Secretary expressed concern with the Club Financial Control Body (CFCB), and the Adjudicatory Chamber of that body agreed that the clubs had failed to satisfy the criteria set out in the rules. The substantial levels of sponsorship received by Red Bull and certain individuals linked to the decision making of both clubs inter alia, were flagged as reasons for breaching the threshold.

However, and following some quite deliberate and specific changes, the CFCB Adjudicatory Chamber accepted compliance reports that RB Salzburg had cut ties with certain individuals, reduced the amount of sponsorship money paid by Red Bull and were satisfied that a cooperation agreement between the two clubs had been terminated.  The CFCB Chief withdrew his objection and RB Salzburg and RB Leipzig were admitted to the 2017/18 UCL.

ii)              Member Associations and Motives

Whilst one could simply list the national association’s MCO regulations, the reality is that for the MA’s that have express regulations, they are largely of a similar flavour to that of their Confederation. One might find the varying motivations of MA’s in enacting MCO regulations of more interest. One key feature is that some of the MA’s regulate based on MCO within their own nations, and some concern themselves with MCO even outside of the nation in which the MA governs football. This is where an MA’s motivations are evident.

Scotland

Scotland for instance, regulates MCO via Article 13 of the Articles of Association of the Scottish Football Association and refers to the section as “Dual Interests in Clubs”.[4]  It is understood that Scotland have a high standard when it comes to MCO, so as to ensure that its competition does not become the reserve competition to the English Premier League or another larger league.  With that in mind, one can then understand why Mike Ashley’s attempt to increase an already 8.92% to 29.9% shareholding of Rangers FC was rejected. The Newcastle United owner was not given written permission as is required per Article 13, as he had signed an agreement that he would not own more than 10% of the club and would not exercise influence on the board.

"The Board, under Article 13 of the Scottish FA Articles of Association, is required to have due regard to the need to promote and safeguard the interests and public profile of association football, its players, spectators and others involved with the game. This test is set out in full in Article 13.6."

Italy

Not too long ago, one was free to own more than one club in Italy (i.e. Aurelio De Laurentiis’ ownership of S.S.C. Napoli and S.S.C. Bari), but in recent months MCO in the Italian context has been headline material, with U.S. Salernitana 1919 promoting to the Serie A, a club owned by Claudio Lotito who also owns S.S. Lazio. The newly enacted Article 16 bis of the NOIF FIGC provides that an individual or entity cannot own two or more clubs in Italy, in the same competition.  On Thursday 30 September 2021, the FIGC announced that ownership of more than one professional club would be prohibited, “for those companies that should rise to Lega Pro from the Serie D” (translated), and multi-club owners would need to sell their (other) clubs “by the beginning of the 2024/2025 season”.

The result of this is retroactive in effect and one can reasonably suspect that the legal teams for these wealthy multi-club owners will be instructed to explore all options for a favourable outcome in courtrooms and other relevant decision-making bodies. One can simultaneously hold a view that MCO ought to be regulated, and concede that, when these owners bought these clubs, they did so on the representation that it was legal and they were free to do so. A forced sale as opposed to a willing sale distorts the market and what a willing buyer and willing seller would have otherwise settled on for a purchase price.  Flowing from the above, club owners can expect well below market rate offers, as has been the case reportedly with Salernitana, given they must sell. 

iii)             The Confederations

Most of the MCO regulations of Confederations refer to the concern of jeopardisation of the integrity of a match or competition. The regulations largely capture the substance of Article 20(2) of the FIFA Statutes which will be expanded upon below. For instance, the OFC regulation found at Article 15 (3) of the OFC Statutes, states that  ‘Member Associations shall ensure that no natural or legal person (including holding companies and subsidiaries) exercise third-party control in any manner whatsoever (in particular through a majority shareholding, a majority of voting rights, a majority of seats on the board of directors or any other form of economic dependence or control etc.) over more than one club or group whenever the integrity of any match or competition could be jeopardised.’  One will find almost verbatim, the same provision at Article 12(3) of the CAF Statutes and at Article 17(3) of the CONCACAF Statutes.

There is a distinction to be made however at confederation level, between MCO regulations applying specifically to the MA’s that fall under the Confederations, or to competitions hosted by the Confederation. Given the noise both the ENIC and Red Bull cases made, the most renown MCO regulations are those that apply to UEFA competitions, but consider also how CONMEBOL prohibits multi-club ownership in its competitions. Article 7(f) of the CONMEBOL Statutes provides that natural or legal persons cannot control more than one club. Perhaps an extension, “CONMEBOL’s Club Licensing Regulations establish as a requirement that, to participate in CONMEBOL Libertadores and CONMEBOL Sudamericana tournaments, license applicant clubs must submit a legally valid declaration if one: Owns or trades titles or securities of any other club participating in the same competition; or, b) Owns the majority of the shareholder voting rights of any other club participating in the same competition; or, c) Has the right to appoint or dismiss most of board or management or department members of another participating club in the same competition; or, d) Is a shareholder and controls most of the shareholder voting rights of shareholders in any other club participating in the same competition in accordance with an agreement signed with other shareholders of the relevant club; or, e) Belongs to the leadership structure of any other club participating in the same competition; or, f) Is involved in any quality in the management, administration and/or sporting performance of any other club participating in its competition; or, g) Has any power in the management, administration and/or sporting performance of any other club participating in the same competition.” 

The AFC regulates at both confederation club competition level, and via its club licensing regulations. The Entry Manual of the AFC Club Competitions provides as a condition of entry, at section 9.12: To ensure the integrity of an AFC Club Competition: no participating club may, either directly or indirectly, hold or deal in the securities or shares of any other participating club; be a member of any other participating club; be involved in any capacity whatsoever in the management, administration and/or sporting performance.

Article 19 of the AFC’s Club Licensing Regulations provides that a Licence Applicant must submit a legally valid declaration outlining the ownership structure and control mechanism of the club. These regulations prohibit a natural or legal person involved in the management, administration and/or sporting performance of the club, either directly or indirectly: a) holds or deals in the securities or shares that allows such person to exercise Significant Influence in the activities of any other club participating in the same competition; b) holds a majority of the shareholders’ voting rights of any other club participating in the same competition; c) has the right to appoint or remove a majority of the members of the administrative, management or supervisory body of any other club participating in the same competition; d) is a shareholder and alone Controls a majority of the shareholders’ voting rights of any other club participating in the same competition pursuant to an agreement entered into with other shareholders of the club in question; e) is a member of any other club participating in the same competition; f) is involved in any capacity whatsoever in the management, administration and/or sporting performance of any other club participating in the same competition; and g) has any power whatsoever over the management, administration and/or sporting performance of any other club participating in the same club competition.

When it comes to UEFA, MCO regulation is found throughout the so-called “UEFA Regulatory Framework”.  This includes the UEFA Statutes (Edition 2020), the UEFA competitions regulations, in particular the Regulations of the UEFA Champions League 2018-21 Cycle (2020/21 season) and the Regulations of the UEFA Europa League 2018-21 Cycle (2020/21 season), and the UEFA Club Licensing and Financial Fair play Regulations (Edition 2018).

The UEFA Statutes capture both the objectives of UEFA and the obligations of its MA’s, with a strong emphasis on the frequently referred to concern with MCO - issues of integrity. Then, within The Regulations of the UEFA Champions League, sits at Article 5 - Integrity of the competition / multi-club ownership.  This covers integrity of competition again and sets a criterion in order for a team to be eligible for UEFA competition, much the same flavour of regulation seen throughout the rest of the Confederations regarding ownership and control, but with the all-important test at Art.5 – 5.01(c) (iv)  No individual or legal entity may have control or influence over more than one club participating in a UEFA club competition, such control or influence being defined in this context as: being able to exercise by any means a decisive influence in the decision-making of the club.. 

FIFA reported that as of 2018, just 33 % of MA’s had regulatory provisions for MCO’s. The percentage of MA’s within the Confederations that regulate MCO is as follows:

• Confederation of North, Central America and Caribbean Association Football (CONCACAF) – 19%
• Oceania Football Confederation (OFC) – 22%
  
• Confederation of African Football (CAF) – 22%
• Asian Football Confederation (AFC) – 33%
• South American Football Confederation (CONMEBOL) – 50%
• Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) – 50%

What these figures might uncover is a gap in how serious MCO ought to be taken, between the Confederations and the MA’s, and that the perceived threat MCO posed to the integrity of competitions at the time these MA regulations were enacted was minor. Confederations might want to take a firmer proactive rather than reactive approach with MA’s, given the speed at which the MCO phenomenon has gained momentum. That is if one concludes that MCO regulation ought to lie with the Confederations.

Whilst MCO might not give rise to an issue for many nations (yet), the MCO environment of countries like Mexico, (1/3 of the clubs in the Liga MX are part of a domestic MCO arrangement, to say nothing of those same owners stake and influence in Mexican media and broadcast) where there are regulations in place at both MA and Confederation level, flies in the face of both the Mexican FEMEXFUT regulations and CONCACAF regulations. Might this highlight that FIFA and only FIFA can regulate this practice?

iv)             FIFA & MCO Regulation

FIFA does not expressly regulate MCO, assumingly as clubs are not its direct remit. Though through some interpretative effort, FIFA imposes an obligation on its MA’s to regulate MCO. In the FIFA Statutes at Article 20 (2), “Status of clubs, leagues and other groups of clubs”, it reads:

Every member association shall ensure that its affiliated clubs can take all decisions on any matters regarding membership independently of any external body. This obligation applies regardless of an affiliated club’s corporate structure. In any case, the member association shall ensure that neither a natural nor a legal person (including holding companies and subsidiaries) exercises control in any manner whatsoever (in particular through a majority shareholding, a majority of voting rights, a majority of seats on the board of directors or any other form of economic dependence or control, etc.) over more than one club whenever the integrity of any match or competition could be jeopardised.

Another way of looking at how FIFA may regulate MCO, is an obligation it places on the confederations at Article 23 (g), “Confederations’ Statutes”, it reads: 

The confederations’ statutes must comply with the principles of good governance, and shall in particular contain, at a minimum, provisions relating to the following matters:

(g) regulation of matters relating to refereeing, the fight against doping, club licensing, the imposition of disciplinary measures, including for ethical misconduct, and measures required to protect the integrity of competitions.

As one will notice, the protection of the integrity of competitions does not quite warrant its own sub-section of Article 23, and instead is heaped in with matters such as refereeing and doping. Article 20 might have more clout, but given the influx of MCO and investment in football in modernity, one can reasonably wonder if the regulations suffice.  

Article 20(2) of the FIFA Statutes (formerly Article 18(2)) has been considered to a degree at the Court of Arbitration for Sport. Though where it has, for instance in CAS 2014/A/3523 Club de Fútbol Atlante S.A. de C.V. v. Federación Mexicana de Fútbol (FMF) & Club Atlas F.C., the findings uncover that Article 20(2) cannot be relied upon for clarity, in terms of the jeopardisation MCO poses to the integrity of football matches or competitions.

“The FIFA rule on multiple ownership is not absolute but is based on a case-by-case assessment of the jeopardy caused to the integrity of football matches or competitions. Whether or not the integrity of a match or competition is jeopardised is a very intricate assessment which necessarily must be based on profound knowledge of the match or competition in question.”[5]

Whilst the case is not exclusively about the relevant integrity of competitions article within the FIFA Statutes, the appellant was unable to successfully argue the point that two clubs in the same league belonging to the same owner poses a serious threat to the competition (via the then Article 18(2) of the FIFA Statutes and the identical Article 7(m) of the CONCACAF Statutes) as it was unable to convince the Panel that the integrity of the Liga MX was indeed actually jeopardised.

The CAS in this instance was merely making a decision per its reach, but one struggles to imagine that any football governing body would want to take the position and to regulate so as to suggest that MCO within competitions does not “necessarily” raise integrity issues. Perhaps an extreme analogy, but that would be like concluding that doping is not “necessarily” performance enhancing and a case-by-case intricate assessment is needed to determine whether an advantage was actually attained.  Some threats to integrity require the preventative approach be captured in the regulations and the above case highlights that the articles regarding MCO found in the FIFA Statutes are insufficient and have probably not kept pace with the MCO phenomenon. A further reasonable question one might ponder, is what the reaction to the above case might have been if the clubs were UEFA based?

v)               Concluding remarks and why FIFA must assume MCO Regulations

MCO is a transnational phenomenon with no clear integrated or uniform regulatory framework and rather, a fragmented landscape, as one might reasonably expect when MCO regulation is left to the many Confederations and MA’s.  MCO regulations as they stand may have sufficed in yesteryear when football was not the target of such investment for direct financial return, branding in the case of company investment, or the branding and soft power strategies of nations – evidently the prime motivations for establishing an MCO. 

FIFA regularly offsets the negative news stories it attracts, with reference to growing the game globally. If FIFA is to cash in on the growing the game globally narrative, it surely has an obligation to regulate when that global growth produces integrity issues to football, as is the case with MCO. If one accepts that MCO is a transnational phenomenon and in turn a global issue, and that it does raise concerns in regard to the integrity of football inter alia, then it is difficult to see what body other than FIFA is best positioned to deal with the MCO phenomenon.

There are other reasons of significance as to why this should lie with FIFA as well. For instance, the MCO phenomenon also affects FIFA’s training rewards systems that it has gone to considerable lengths to attempt to fine tune (i.e. the establishment of the Clearing House). With players moving between clubs within the same MCO for free, many transfers will not trigger the trickledown effect they may have otherwise had players transferred for market rates. Another concern for FIFA might be player trading within an MCO being used as accounting tactics to avoid triggering Financial Fair Play issues, rather than a transfer representing the market value of the player.

Player welfare issues also arise, as do employment law questions.  It is already the case that there are clauses in player contracts where a player cannot refuse to be transferred to another club within an MCO if so requested (or demanded), which is in effect an MCO contract, rather than a club contract. Even when clauses of this nature are not inserted within an MCO club player’s contract, there are concerns when players are groomed within an MCO ,given the clubs have considerable time with players and a unique dynamic exists within MCO given common ownership, where a club is incentivised to persuade the player to remain within the group, when the best move, career, financial or otherwise, may be elsewhere. This is an entirely different dynamic to a player weighing up his or her transfer options and seeking professional advice from an agent and/or lawyer.  There are also instances where an MCO has only allowed a move internally and refused a transfer to another club and potentially better option for the player, raising  the ever-recurring freedom of movement questions. These instances are of course rare (for now), but real implications that need attention from football’s global governing body.

The increased globalisation of the game through creations like the UEFA Conference League and FIFA also expanding the Club World Cup, significantly broadens the number of clubs that may face each other, which increasing the risks that MCO presents. The obligations FIFA imposes on its MA’s and Confederations are not observed across the board, and are consequently not sufficient to keep pace with the burgeoning MCO phenomenon. FIFA can no longer simultaneously celebrate the globalisation of football, and defer on definition and regulation downwards in the football pyramid, when it comes to a product of that globalisation; Multi Club Ownership.

[1] I have added to the approximate figure mentioned in the hyperlinked article, to account for some recent acquisitions.

[2] CAS 98/200 AEK Athens and SK Slavia Prague / UEFA & Case COMP/37 806: ENIC / UEFA [2002] Commission

[3] CFCB Adjudicatory Chamber AC-01/2017 RasenBallsport Leipzig GmbH and FC Red Bull Salzburg GmbH

[4] DUAL INTERESTS IN CLUBS 13.1 Except with the prior written consent of the Board:- (a) no club or nominee of a club; and (b) no person, whether absolutely or as a trustee, either alone or in conjunction with one or more associates or solely through an associate or associates (even where such person has no formal interest), who:- (i) is a member of a club; or (ii) is involved in any capacity whatsoever in the management or administration of a club; or (iii) has any power whatsoever to influence the management or administration of a club, may at the same time either directly or indirectly:- (a) be a member of another club; or (b) be involved in any capacity whatsoever in the management or administration of another club; or ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION 69 (c) have any power whatsoever to influence the management or administration of another club

[5] CAS 2014/A/3523 Club de Fútbol Atlante S.A. de C.V. v. Federación Mexicana de Fútbol (FMF) & Club Atlas F.C., at 88

On Monday 18 July 2016, Canadian lawyer Richard McLaren presented the Independent Person Report to the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), regarding the alleged Russian doping program surrounding the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics. The report was expected to seriously threaten the participation of Russian Athletes to the rapidly approaching Rio Games, starting on 5 August. In the weekend prior to the report’s publishing, Reuters obtained a leaked letter drafted by the CEO’s of the US and Canadian anti-doping agencies, which according to the New York Times was backed by “antidoping officials from at least 10 nations— including those in the United States, Germany, Spain, Japan, Switzerland and Canada — and 20 athlete groups”, urging the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to ban all Russian athletes from the upcoming Olympics.

Source: http://ww4.hdnux.com/photos/50/23/01/10563667/3/920x920.jpg

During the press conference, McLaren listed his main findings, which are shocking, interesting and peculiar at same time. First, “the Moscow Laboratory operated, for the protection of doped Russian athletes, within a State-dictated failsafe system”. Second, ���the Sochi Laboratory operated a unique sample swapping methodology to enable doped Russian athletes to compete at the Games”. Third, “the Ministry of Sport directed, controlled and oversaw the manipulation of athlete’s analytical results or sample swapping, with the active participation and assistance of the FSB (Russian federal security service), CSP (Centre of Sports Preparation in Russia), and both Moscow and Sochi Laboratories”.

Though the recent findings of the Independent Person Report should not be underestimated, yet it is only one piece of a complex jigsaw puzzle constituted by many reports and disciplinary decisions involving systemic doping in Russia over the last few years. One could compare it to a snowball rolling down the mountain continuously gaining speed and mass. The ball started rolling in December 2014 with an ARD broadcasted documentary titled Geheimsache Doping: Wie Russland seine Sieger macht (“Top Secret Doping: How Russia makes its Winners”). Less than two years later, Russian athletes might be excluded from participating at the Rio Olympic Games all together. The information now available on Russia’s systematic doping program would make an excellent movie script (one that has probably already been set in motion at a Hollywood studio). This blog, however, will more modestly provide a recap of the events leading up to the Independent Person Report, and assess its potential (short term) legal consequences. 

Episode 1: German investigative journalism and WADA’s response

As stated above, the unravelling of this doping story began in December 2014, with an ARD documentary, Geheimsache Doping: Wie Russland seine Sieger macht (“Top Secret Doping: How Russia makes its Winners”). Filmmaker Hajo Seppelt investigated rumors on widespread doping use by Russian athletes in preparation of and during the Winter Olympics held in Sochi. The film showed athletes, coaches and civil servants testifying, secret camera footage, audio recordings, and official documents, all pointing towards: systemic doping use within the All-Russia Athletics Federation (ARAF), corrupt practices regarding results management and the collection of samples. Implicated parties included athletes, coaches, trainers, doctors, the Russian State, the IAAF, the Moscow accredited laboratory and the Russian Anti-Doping Agency (RUSADA).

In response to the international stir, WADA, in December 2014, launched an Independent Commission to investigate the allegations made. The Commission consisted of former WADA chairman Richard Pound, Richard McLaren and WADA’s Chief Investigations Officer Jack Robertson. The first part of this commission’s findings was published on 9 November 2015.[1] In August 2015 the commission’s mandate was extended following the release of another Seppelt documentary “Doping – Top Secret: The Shadowy World of Athletics”. This resulted in a second report which was published on 14 January 2016.[2] Especially the former of the two “Pound Reports” is of particular interest.

First and foremost, it addresses the existence of “a deeply rooted culture of cheating”. The report insinuates that this culture of cheating existed since well before the Sochi Games. The coaches active in 2014 appear to be the crucial transferors of the knowledge they acquired at the time they were athletes themselves. Medical connections cultivated during their professional careers were passed on to the current generation of athletes. Athletes not wishing to be part of this system were likely to be “excommunicated” from top-level coaches and support.[3]

The second issue addressed is the exploitation of athletes. “Unethical behaviours and practices” by the people involved have become the norm. Coercion has been employed on athletes to make them participate in the doping program, for instance by informing them that “they would not be considered as part of the federation’s national team for competition”.[4]

The report’s third finding is a blatant unwillingness of Russian athletes to cooperate in the investigation. Nonetheless, the Pound Commission confirms a “consistent and systematic use of performance enhancing drugs by many Russian athletes”.[5]

Fourthly, it confirmed that, next to coaches, some Russian doctors and laboratory personnel equally acted as “enablers for systematic cheating”. It also pointed out “inadequate testing and poor compliance around testing standards”, as well as the malicious destruction of over 1400 samples, which were explicitly requested by WADA to be preserved.[6]

A fifth major discovery was the identification of corruption and bribery within the IAAF. The severity of the corruption allegations involving several highly placed members and officials of IAAF and the ARAF was such that this part of the investigation had to be transferred to the competent authorities for “potential criminal prosecutions”, i.e. Interpol (see the second Pound Report).[7]

The first Pound Report recommended provisional suspensions in respect of five athletes, four coaches and one medical doctor and identified some additional suspicious cases. It further asked WADA to declare both ARAF and RUSADA to be “code noncompliant” and to withdraw WADA’s accreditation of the Moscow laboratory, as well as to permanently remove the lab’s director from his position. The Report also recommended that the IAAF should suspend ARAF.[8]

A mere four days after the publication of the first Pound Report (13 November 2015) the IAAF provisionally suspended the Russian ARAF as an IAAF Member. As a result of this decision, athletes, and athlete support personnel from Russia could not compete in International Competitions expected, the Russian Olympic Committee (ROC) as well as its athletes did not take the decision lightly. In a request for arbitration filed at the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) on 3 July 2016, the ROC and the 68 Russian Athletes asked the CAS 1) to review specific legal issues surrounding IAAF’s decision to suspend ARAF, and 2) to order that any Russian athlete who was not currently the subject of any period of ineligibility for the commission of an anti-doping rule violation be declared eligible to participate at the 2016 Olympic Games in Rio.[9] The outcome of the appeal will be discussed further below. 

Episode 2: The Independent Person Report

Meanwhile, on 8 May 2016, new far-reaching allegations concerning Russia’s doping program were made by newsmagazine 60 Minutes, and subsequently on 12 May, by the New York Times.[10] The primary source behind these articles was whistle-blower Grigory Rodchenkov, the former director of the Moscow and Sochi doping control laboratories who found refuge in an undisclosed location in the USA. This time around, the allegations were not limited to athletics, but involved all Russian athletes that competed at the Sochi Olympics.[11] In response to these claims, WADA announced that it would immediately probe the new Russian doping allegations brought forward, once again, by the press, and appointed an Independent Person (i.e. Richard McLaren) supported by a multidisciplinary team to conduct an investigation of the allegations made by Dr. Rodchenkov.[12]

McLaren was presented with a five-point investigation mandate:

“1. Establish whether there has been manipulation of the doping control process during the Sochi Games, including but not limited to, acts of tampering with the samples within the Sochi Laboratory.

2. Identify the modus operandi and those involved in such manipulation.

3. Identify any athlete that might have benefited from those alleged manipulations to conceal positive doping tests.

4. Identify if this Modus Operandi was also happening within Moscow Laboratory outside the period of the Sochi Games.

5. Determine other evidence or information held by Grigory Rodchenkov.”[13]

The Report first mentions the time constraints faced in drafting it. It explains, in relation to the third paragraph of the mandate, that the “compressed timeline” of the investigation (57 days) “did not permit compilation of data to establish an antidoping rule violation”, consequently that third paragraph should be deemed of lesser importance. This shortage of time also resulted in the fact that McLaren had to be selective in examining the large amount of data and information available to it. In other words, it could “only skimmed the surface of the extensive data available”.[14] Be that as it may, McLaren considered the found evidence to be established “beyond a reasonable doubt”.[15]

With due respect to both its mandate and its investigative limitations, McLaren made three key findings[16]:

A) The Moscow Laboratory operated, for the protection of doped Russian athletes, within a State-dictated failsafe system, described in the report as the Disappearing Positive Methodology;

B) The Sochi Laboratory operated a unique sample swapping methodology to enable doped Russian athletes to compete at the Games;

C) The Ministry of Sport directed, controlled and oversaw the manipulation of athlete’s analytical results or sample swapping, with the active participation and assistance of the FSB, CSP, and both Moscow and Sochi Laboratories.

The Independent Person Report makes account of a systemic state directed doping program, incentivized by the “very abysmal” medal count of the Russian Olympic athletes participating in the 2010 Vancouver Olympic Winter Games. A system where, under direction and control of Yuri Nagornykh, Russia’s deputy minister of sport, the laboratory was forced to change any positive result into a negative analytical finding, a method named by the McLaren team the “disappearing positive”.[17]

Nagornykh was informed of every positive analytical finding arising in the Moscow laboratory from 2011 onwards, which in itself is a violation of the WADA International Standard for Laboratories. The deputy minister was the linchpin that decided which athlete would benefit from a cover up and thus be protected and which athlete would not. If ordered to do so, laboratory personnel were required to report the sample as being negative in WADA’s anti-doping management system. Next, the laboratory personnel had to falsify the screen result in the laboratory information management system to show a negative laboratory result.[18] Conclusion, the shielded athlete could continue to compete.

However, at international events independent observers would prevent Russian athletes from slipping through the net. That is why the FSB developed a method for covertly removing the caps of tamper evident sample bottles containing the urine (“without any evidence visible to the untrained eye”). This technique was used to replace positive dirty samples during the Sochi Olympic Games and in December 2014 to cover up some dirty samples out of the Moscow Laboratory, which WADA had aimed to confiscate.[19] The McLaren team subsequently found evidence that this sample swapping also occurred after the 2013 IAAF World Championships in respect of positive samples.

The coordinating role of Irina Rodionova in this sample swapping method is remarkable. She was a staff member of the Russian Olympic Committee during the Sochi Games. During the Games, she served as the head of the Monitoring and Management of Medical Anti-doping Programs Department and is currently deputy director of the “Center of Sports Preparation of National Teams of Russia, a subordinate organisation of the Russian Ministry of Sport”.[20] As the report shows, Rodionova would receive and freeze storage samples, which the athletes thought were “clean urine samples outside of the wash out periods for any PEDs they were using”. The investigation’s main informant, Grigory Rodchenkov would test the samples to make sure they were negative. These samples were then secretly transported to the FSB storage freezer, which coincidentally happened to be in the building located next to the Sochi Laboratory.[21]

The actual swapping occurred by passing the A and B bottles through the “mouse hole” located between the “aliquoting room” inside the Sochi Laboratory secure perimeter into an adjacent operations room, outside that secure perimeter. While an FSB officer would take the B bottles somewhere else, the athlete’s stored clean urine would be taken out of the FSB freezer and brought over to the operations room. The FSB officer would return with B sample bottle to the operations room. The B sample bottle’s cap would be removed. The dirty urine would be replaced by clean urine and put in the A and B bottles. Then, the stopper in the A bottle would be replaced and the B bottle cap screwed back on. Ultimately, the bottles would be brought back to the “aliquoting room” via the mouse hole.[22] Subsequently, Rodchenkov had to manipulate the substituted sample to as closely as possible match the “specific gravity” indicated on the original doping control form. He did this by “adding table salt to raise the clean urine SG or distilled water to dilute the clean urine sample so as to closely match the SG number on the DCF”. A laboratory analysis of the salt content of selected samples revealed that six had “salt contents higher than what should be found in urine of a healthy human”.[23] As the Independent Person Report elucidates: “The Sochi sample swapping methodology was a unique situation, required because of the presence of the international community in the Laboratory. It enabled Russian athletes to compete dirty while enjoying certainty that their antidoping samples would be reported clean”.[24]

The Report notes another incident following a WADA request giving notice to the Moscow laboratory of a forthcoming collection of samples stored in the laboratory for further analysis. This resulted in the laboratory quickly destroying thousands of dirty samples that had been collected and reported negative (use of the Disappearing Positive Methodology). Deputy minister Nagornykh then arranged the FSB to fix the problem of the samples collected between 10 September 2014 and 10 December 2014, which could not be destroyed (as a result of the minimal 90-day period of storage following the ISL). When the WADA investigators came to the laboratory, they found sample bottles without their caps and, moreover, that these samples all had negative findings recorded on WADA’s Anti-Doping Management System. Furthermore, forensic examination confirmed tampering and “a urine examination of 3 of the samples showed that the DNA was not that of the athlete involved”.[25] 

Episode 3: The ball is in the IOC’s corner…

In a statement released shortly after Richard McLaren’s press conference, WADA president Craig Reedie conveyed WADA executive committee’s vision on the Independent Person Report. First it condemned the “public speculation made by certain national anti-doping organizations as to the investigation’s outcome in the days leading up to the report’s publication”. More importantly however, it recommended the IOC (and the International Paralympic Committee, IPC) to decline entry for the 2016 Rio Olympic Games to all athletes wishing to compete under the Russian Olympic Committee banner. Moreover, he added that “any exceptional entry of a Russian athlete should be considered by the IOC and IPC for participation under a neutral flag and in accordance with very strict criteria”.

The IOC responded on 19 July by implementing some provisional measures. It decided amongst others: not to organise or give patronage to any sports event or meeting in Russia, not grant any accreditation to any official of the Russian Ministry of Sport or any person implicated in the Independent Person Report for the Rio Games, and “initiate a full inquiry into all Russian athletes who participated in the Olympic Winter Games Sochi 2014 and their coaches, officials and support staff”.

The key question, however, was whether the IOC would follow WADA’s recommendation and decline entries to all athletes under the Russian Olympic Committee banner to the Rio Games. Even though its president Thomas Bach stated that “the findings of the report show a shocking and unprecedented attack on the integrity of sport and on the Olympic Game” and that “the IOC will not hesitate to take the toughest sanctions available against any individual or organisation implicated”[26], it did not actually do so (yet). Instead, it announced that it would carefully evaluate the Independent Person Report and “explore the legal options” weighing a collective ban against the right to compete of individual athletes. Moreover, the IOC was adamant that it would “take the CAS decision of 21 July 2016 concerning the IAAF rules into consideration”.

Episode 4: Now the CAS has ball possession…

Hence, the IOC’s final decision regarding Russia’s participation at this summer’s Olympic Games depended on a large extent on the CAS decision regarding the ROC and 68 Russian athletes’ appeal against the IAAF ban. On 21 July, the CAS Panel confirmed the validity of the IAAF’s decision to suspend the ARAF from participating at the Games as well as the Russian athletes who do not satisfy the conditions set by IAAF Competition Rule 22.1(A).[27] Nonetheless, the CAS expressed its concern about “about the immediate application with retroactive effect of such Rule [IAAF Rule 22.1(A)], implemented by the IAAF on 17 June 2016, providing for exceptional criteria to grant eligibility to athletes whose national federation is suspended. Since such Rule involves criteria based on long-term prior activity, it left no possibility in practice, and as applied, for the Claimant Athletes to be able to try to comply with them.”

Yet, it clearly refused to weigh in directly on the IOC’s pending decision regarding all Russian athletes. Indeed, “since the IOC was not a party in the arbitrations, the CAS found that it had no jurisdiction to determine whether the IOC is entitled generally to accept or refuse the nomination by ROC of Russian track and field athletes to compete at the Rio 2016 Olympic Games”. In other words, the ball is neatly passed back to the IOC, who will now need to make a definite decision on whether Russian athletes, both for athletics and all the other sports, can compete at the upcoming Games or not. As the public pressure is mounting on the IOC, it is now doomed to decide whether to block the entry of all Russian athletes or to leave this decision to the International Federations on a case-by-case basis, like the IAAF has done in the case of athletics. A story to be continued…

Conclusion: Who is to blame for the systemic failures of the World Anti-Doping System?

Russian athletes are currently bearing the brunt of the blame for the State-sponsored doping system in place in Russia, they are being placated in the media and by the World Anti-Doping Agency as cheats, they are being excluded from the Rio Olympics (and potentially many more international competitions), and they are the ones suffering dire economic losses. Yet, are they truly the main responsible for their unenviable fate?

The first key culprit that comes to mind is obviously the Russian State and its political leaders, who have constructed a demonic system imposed on athletes in their young age to ensure that Russia shines on the global sporting scene. They have done so with the implicit (and in the case of the IAAF explicit) support of the international sports governing bodies, which preferred to look away rather than challenge the Russian political clout inside their executive bodies. One has to remember, for example, that Russia’s sports minister Vitaly Mutko, currently decrying the politicization of sport, is a member of FIFA Council (formerly the FIFA Executive Committee).

Furthermore, this is also the failure of WADA. It was supposed to be the independent global gendarme of the world anti-doping fight. Yet, it comes out of these episodes at best as a toothless paper tiger, at worse as a complacent window dresser. A recent piece in the New York Times highlights very well its passive complicity in maintaining the invisibility of the Russian state doping system. WADA is now front and centre in calling for the harshest sanctions on athletes, but for years it has been ignoring the warning signs and refusing to do its homework as far as the implementation of the WADA Code is concerned. It is only because of the public outrage over Hajo Seppelt’s documentary that WADA finally decided to act. What is the Code worth if its implementation at the local level, where it is supposed to apply on a day-to-day basis, is not closely monitored? Only the paper (or the computer code) on which it is written. The general hypocrisy of having a global set of rules, but very little biting enforcement mechanisms underlies the failure of the current world anti-doping system.  

[1] The Independent Commission Report #1, Final Report, 9 November 2015 (Pound report #1).

[2] The Independent Commission Report #2, 14 January, Amended 27 January 2016 .

[3] Pound report #1, p. 10.

[4] Ibid, p. 11.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Pound report #1, p. 12 and 124.

[8] Ibid, p. 9.

[9] Media Release of the CAS of 21 July 2016, Athletics – Olympic Games Rio 2016 - The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) rejects the claims/appeal of the Russian Olympic Committee (ROC)

and of 68 Russian athletes.

[10] Rebecca R. Ruiz and Michael Schwirtz, “Russian Insider Says State-Run Doping Fueled Olympic Gold”, New York Times, 12 May 2016 < http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/13/sports/russia-doping-sochi-olympics-2014.html > accessed 21 July 2016.

[11] In this regard, it is also worth mentioning that Russia ended first in the medal table with 33 medals, including 13 gold medals.

[12] The Independent Person Report, p. 2.

[13] Ibid, p. 3.

[14] Ibid, p. 4.

[15] Ibid, p. 6.

[16] Ibid, p. 1.

[17] Ibid, p. 10.

[18] Ibid, p. 11.

[19] Ibid, p. 12.

[20] Ibid, p. 13.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Ibid, p. 14.

[23] Ibid, p. 15.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid, p. 17.

[26] Statement of the executive board of the International Olympic Committee of 19 July 2016 on the WADA Independent Person Report.

[27] IAAF Competition Rule reads as follows: “Any athlete, athlete support personnel or other person shall be ineligible for competitions, whether held under these Rules or the rules of an Area or a Member, whose National Federation is currently suspended by the IAAF”.