Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

FIFA's Responsibility for Human Rights Abuses in Qatar – Part II: The Zurich Court's Ruling - By Tomáš Grell

Editor’s note: Tomáš Grell comes from Slovakia and is currently an LL.M. student in Public International Law at Leiden University. He contributes also to the work of the ASSER International Sports Law Centre as a part-time intern.

This is a follow-up contribution to my previous blog on FIFA's responsibility for human rights abuses in Qatar published last week. Whereas the previous part has examined the lawsuit filed with the Commercial Court of the Canton of Zurich ('Court') jointly by the Dutch trade union FNV, the Bangladeshi Free Trade Union Congress, the Bangladesh Building and Wood Workers Federation and the Bangladeshi citizen Nadim Shariful Alam ('Plaintiffs') against FIFA, this second part will focus on the Court's ruling dated 3 January 2017 ('Ruling').[1]  More...



FIFA's Responsibility for Human Rights Abuses in Qatar - Part I: The Claims Against FIFA - By Tomáš Grell

Editor’s note: Tomáš Grell comes from Slovakia and is currently an LL.M. student in Public International Law at Leiden University. He contributes also to the work of the ASSER International Sports Law Centre as a part-time intern.

On 2 December 2010, the FIFA Executive Committee elected Qatar as host of the 2022 FIFA World Cup ('World Cup'), thereby triggering a wave of controversies which underlined, for the most part, the country's modest size, lack of football history, local climate, disproportionate costs or corruption that accompanied the selection procedure. Furthermore, opponents of the decision to award the World Cup to the tiny oil-rich Gulf country also emphasized the country's negative human rights record.

More than six years later, on 3 January 2017, the Commercial Court of the Canton of Zurich ('Court') dismissed the lawsuit filed against FIFA[1] jointly by the Dutch trade union FNV, the Bangladeshi Free Trade Union Congress, the Bangladesh Building and Wood Workers Federation and the Bangladeshi citizen Nadim Shariful Alam ('Plaintiffs').[2] The Plaintiffs requested the Court to find FIFA responsible for alleged human rights violations of migrant workers in connection with the World Cup in Qatar. Had the Plaintiffs' claims been upheld by the Court, such decision would have had far-reaching consequences on the fate of thousands of migrants, mostly from India, Nepal and Bangladesh, who are currently working on the construction of sporting facilities and other infrastructure associated with organization of the World Cup. More...

Doyen vs. Sporting II: The Bitter End of Sporting’s Fight at the Swiss Federal Supreme Court. By Shervine Nafissi

Editor’s Note: Shervine Nafissi (@SNafissi) is a Phd Student in sports law and teaching assistant in corporate law at University of Lausanne (Switzerland), Faculty of Business and Economics (HEC).

 

Introduction

The factual background

The dispute concerns a TPO contract entitled “Economic Rights Participation Agreement” (hereinafter “ERPA”) concluded in 2012 between Sporting Lisbon and the investment fund Doyen Sports. The Argentine player was transferred in 2012 by Spartak Moscow to Sporting Lisbon for a transfer fee of €4 million. Actually, Sporting only paid €1 million of the fee while Doyen Sports financed the remaining €3 million. In return, the investment company became the owner of 75% of the economic rights of the player.[1] Thus, in this specific case, the Portuguese club was interested in recruiting Marcos Rojo but was unable to pay the transfer fee required by Spartak Moscow, so that they required the assistance of Doyen Sports. The latter provided them with the necessary funds to pay part of the transfer fee in exchange of an interest on the economic rights of the player.

Given that the facts and circumstances leading to the dispute, as well as the decision of the CAS, were fully described by Antoine Duval in last week’s blog of Doyen vs. Sporting, this blog will solely focus on the decision of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court (“FSC”) following Sporting’s appeal against the CAS award. As a preliminary point, the role of the FSC in the appeal against CAS awards should be clarified.More...

Doyen vs. Sporting I: Doyen’s Pyrrhic Victory at the CAS

At the end of December 2015, the CAS decided on a very public contractual dispute between Sporting Clube de Portugal Futebol SAD (Sporting) and Doyen Sports Investments Limited (Doyen). The club was claiming that Doyen’s Economic Rights Participation Agreement (ERPA) was invalid and refused to pay Doyen’s due share on the transfer of Marcos Rojo to Manchester United. The dispute made a lot of noise (see the excellent coverage by Tariq Panja from Bloomberg here, here and here) as it was the first TPO case heard by the CAS after FIFA’s ban. Yet, and it has to be clear from the outset, the case does not affect the legality of FIFA’s TPO ban; it concerned only the compatibility of Doyen’s ERPA with Swiss civil law. The hearing took place in June 2015, but the case was put under a new light by the football leaks revelations unveiled at the end of 2015 (see our blog from December 2015). Despite these revelations, the CAS award favoured Doyen, and was luckily for us quickly made available on the old football leaks website. This blog will provide a commentary of the CAS decision. It will be followed in the coming days by a commentary by Shervine Nafissi on the judgment, on appeal, by the Swiss Federal Tribunal. More...

UEFA’s Financial Fair Play Regulations and the Rise of Football’s 1%

On 12 January 2017 UEFA published its eighth club licensing benchmarking report on European football, concerning the financial year of 2015. In the press release that accompanied the report, UEFA proudly announced that Financial Fair Play (FFP) has had a huge positive impact on European football, creating a more stable financial environment. Important findings included a rise of aggregate operating profits of €1.5bn in the last two years, compared to losses of €700m in the two years immediately prior to the introduction of Financial Fair Play.



Source: UEFA’s eighth club licensing benchmarking report on European football, slide 107.


 Meanwhile the aggregate losses dropped by 81% from €1.7bn in 2011 to just over €300m in 2015.More...




International and European Sports Law – Monthly Report – January 2017. By Saverio Spera.

Editor’s note: This report compiles all relevant news, events and materials on International and European Sports Law based on the daily coverage provided on our twitter feed @Sportslaw_asser. You are invited to complete this survey via the comments section below, feel free to add links to important cases, documents and articles we might have overlooked. 


The Headlines

The Diarra ruling of the Tribunal of Charleroi

On 19 January 2017, the Hainaut Commercial Tribunal – Charleroi rendered its decision on the lawsuit filed by the football player Lassana Diarra against FIFA and the Belgian FA (URBSFA) for damages caused by not being able to exercise the status of a professional football player during the entire 2014/2015 season. The lawsuit is linked to the decision, rendered by the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC) on April 2015, to support Lokomotiv’s decision to terminate the player’s contract and to order Diarra to pay Lokomotiv the amount of EUR 10,500,000 for having breached his contract. According to the plaintiff, Diarra’s opportunity to be recruited by Sporting Charleroi was denied due to the club being potentially considered jointly liable for Diarra’s compensation pursuant to Article 17 (2) RSTP. The Belgian court held strongly that “when the contract is terminated by the club, the player must have the possibility to sign a new contract with a new employer, without restrictions to his free movement”. This case highlighted, once again, the need to read the RSTP in the light of EU law. Moreover, the decision is laying further ground for broader challenges to the RSTP on the basis of EU law (for a deeper insight into the Diarra ruling, see the recent blog written by our senior researcher Antoine Duval) More...


Introducing the new legal challenges of E-Sports. By N. Emre Bilginoglu

Editor’s Note: Emre Bilginoglu[1] is an attorney in Istanbul and the co-founder of the Turkish E-Sports Players Association, a non-profit based in Istanbul that aims to provide assistance to professional gamers and to work on the relevant laws affecting them. 


The world is witnessing the rise of a new sport that is growing at an incredible speed: E-Sports. We are only starting to understand its legal implications and challenges.

In recent years, E-Sports has managed to attract thousands of fans to arenas to see a group of people play a video game. These people are literally professional gamers (cyber athletes)[2] who make money by competing in tournaments. Not all video games have tournaments in which professional players compete against each other.

The most played games in E-Sports competitions are League of Legends (LoL), Defense of the Ancients 2 (DotA 2) and Counter-Strike: Global Offensive (CS:GO). LoL and DotA are both Multiplayer online battle arena (MOBA) games, a genre of strategy video games in which the player controls a single character in one of two teams. The goal of the game is to destroy the opponent’s main structure. CS:GO is a first-person shooter (FPS) game, a genre of video games where the player engages combat through a first-person perspective. The main objective in CS:GO is to eliminate the opposing team or to terrorize or counter-terrorize, planting bombs or rescuing hostages. Other games that have (popular) E-Sports competitions include Starcraft II (real time strategy), Hearthstone (collectible card video game), Call of Duty (FPS) and FIFA (football).

The gaming requires cooperation between team players, a high level of concentration, rapid reactions and some seriously fast clicking. E-Sports is a groovy term to describe organized competitive computer gaming. The E-Sports industry is exponentially growing, amounting to values expressed in billions of dollars. According to Newzoo, a website dedicated to the collection of E-Sports data, there are some 250 million occasional viewers of E-Sports with Asia-Pacific accounting for half of the total amount. The growth of the industry is indubitably supported by online streaming media platforms. This article aims to explain what E-Sports is and to give the readers an insight on the key legal questions raised by it. More...


Time for Transparency at the Court of Arbitration for Sport. By Saverio Spera

Editor’s Note: Saverio Spera is an Italian lawyer and LL.M. graduate in International Business Law from King’s College London. He is currently an intern at the ASSER International Sports Law Centre.


The time is ripe to take a closer look at the CAS and its transparency, as this is one of the ways to ensure its public accountability and its legitimacy. From 1986 to 2013, the number of arbitrations submitted to the CAS has grown from 2 to more than 400 a year. More specifically, the number of appeals submitted almost doubled in less than ten years (from 175 in 2006, to 349 in 2013[1]). Therefore, the Court can be considered the judicial apex of an emerging transnational sports law (or lex sportiva).[2] In turn, the increased authority and power of this institution calls for increased transparency, in order to ensure its legitimacy.[3]

More...


UEFA’s betting fraud detection system: How does the CAS regard this monitoring tool? By Emilio García.

Editor’s note: Emilio García (emilio.garcia@uefa.ch)  is a doctor in law and head of disciplinary and integrity at UEFA. Before joining UEFA, he was the Spanish Football Federation’s legal director (2004–12) and an arbitrator at the CAS (2012–13).In this blog, Emilio García provides a brief review of a recent case before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS): Klubi Sportiv Skënderbeu v UEFA (CAS 2016/A/4650)[1], in which he acted as main counsel for UEFA. 


Sport and match-fixing – A quick overview

Match-fixing is now legally defined as “an intentional arrangement, act or omission aimed at an improper alteration of the result or the course of a sports competition in order to remove all or part of the unpredictable nature of the aforementioned sports competition with a view to obtaining an undue advantage for oneself or for others”.[2] It has been said that there has always been match-fixing in sport.[3] From the ancient Olympic Games to the most important global sports competitions of today, manipulation of results has always been an all-too-frequent occurrence.

We have seen a number of very prominent instances of this kind of issue over the years. One of the most remarkable examples, which was even the subject of a film,[4] was the match-fixing episode during the 1919 World Series, where several players from the Chicago White Sox were found guilty of accepting bribes and deliberately losing matches against the Cincinnati Reds.[5]

The situation has changed considerably since then. In particular, the globalisation of the sports betting industry has had a massive impact, with recent studies estimating that between €200bn and €500bn is betted on sport every year.[6] Match-fixing does not just affect football either;[7] it is also affecting other sports, most notably tennis.[8] More...


Asser International Sports Law Blog | UEFA Financial Fair Play Regulations Put PSG and Manchester City on a Transfer Diet

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

UEFA Financial Fair Play Regulations Put PSG and Manchester City on a Transfer Diet

The main lesson of this year’s transfer window is that UEFA’s Financial Fair Play (FFP) rules have a true bite (no pun intended). Surely, the transfer fees have reached usual highs with Suarez’s move to FC Barcelona and Rodriguez’s transfer from AS Monaco to Real Madrid and overall spending are roughly equal to 2013 (or go beyond as in the UK). But clubs sanctioned under the FFP rules (prominently PSG and Manchester City) have seemingly complied with the settlements reached with UEFA capping their transfer spending and wages.

 

FFP's Transfer Diet

PSG’s summer of impuissance

It was widely expected, and trumpeted, that PSG and Manchester City would disregard the transfer restrictions imposed on them. Besides all the talking and the costly recruitment of David Luiz for nearly 50M€ earlier this summer, PSG’s transfer activity was limited to Serge Aurier’s arrival on loan from modest Toulouse. Moreover, the talks over Di Maria’s move to PSG faltered over the inability of the French club to pay a transfer fee due to the FFP constraints. Thus, PSG was forced into relative thrift by the FFP rules, a remarkable achievement in itself. This has recently triggered widespread critique against UEFA and FFP by PSG officials.

 

Manchester City overtaken by Manchester United

Even though Manchester City has largely dominated the transfer contest against its arch-rival over the latest years, this balance has dramatically tilted during this summer. United was able to attract a number of high-ranked and expensive players, most notably Di Maria for the total sum of 66M€ (more than City’s total spending). In a final transfer twist, United was even able to snap away Falcao from City apparently due to FFP concerns.  City did not engage in the usual frenzy spending spree of the previous years. It did spend around 60 M€ (and racked in 25M€ in transfer fees), but this number pales in regard to the 116M€ spent in 2013. Here again, despite talks to the contrary and vouching to disregard UEFA’s FFP rules, one cannot ignore the toll taken by them on the capacity of Manchester City to outrageously dominate the UK transfer market.

  

 

 

The general timidity of FFP culprits

This is not an isolated development. Other clubs concerned by FFP settlements have followed a similar path (see graph below). In general, clubs sanctioned under FFP rules have reduced their transfer spending in comparison to previous years. More surprisingly, big players like PSG and Manchester City have complied with the net transfer limit of 49M€ imposed on them in the settlement. This points at an apparent success of the FFP regulations, which have not materialised, as many feared, as a public relations exercised in the guise of a toothless regulation. The rules have a real-world impact, and in spite of the high profiles of certain clubs concerned those have felt the urge to internalize them reinforcing UEFA’s claim that FFP is a serious regulation. As will be shown below, however, this also supports the claims that FFP regulations constitute a restriction on competition in need of adequate justification.


 


New strategies to bypass FFP rules 

This development has also led clubs to devise bypassing strategies to the FFP rules. The first strategy is to use loans as temporary or differed transfers by including a mandatory transfer clause in the contract. This is the solution adopted by PSG in the transfer of Serge Aurier from Toulouse. In a way there is no reason why this should not be considered as a new liability for accounting purposes, as it is akin to a delayed payment but not to a delayed transfer. Finally, there is the possibility of using affiliated clubs to store the long-term liabilities (wages and fees), while getting a player on short-term loans. This is likely the strategy used by Manchester City in the now infamous recruitment of Frank Lampard from its sister club New York City FC. Hence, one should not underestimate the ability of clubs to sidestep the FFP rules, albeit a way more difficult and protracted transfer game as before.

 

FFP’s compatibility with EU competition law still a threat

Does this real-world efficacy change anything to the assessment of FFP’s compatibility with EU competition law? Not really. On the one hand, it is all the more evident that the FFP rules have a restraining effect on free competition; certain economic actors are undoubtedly not free to invest their money, as they would see fit. On the other hand, the real test for evaluating the FFP’s compatibility with EU law is the Wouters/Meca-Medina proportionality test developed by the EU Court. First of all UEFA will have to identify the legitimate objective it intends to pursue with these regulations. This is likely to be good corporate governance, as one cannot consider that FFP rules improve the competitive balance by reducing the inequality between clubs in the absence of any redistributive effects. Actually, FFP will most likely sclerotize the pre-existing hierarchies. If good corporate governance in football is deemed a worthy objective (it probably will), the next question will be: are these regulations a proportionate mean to achieve it? At this stage UEFA will need to explain why the existing national bankruptcy frameworks are inadequate for this purpose (due, for example, to the political influence of clubs like in Spain, or to the particular feature of football competition that cannot tolerate the vagaries of a normal bankruptcy process), but also why the existing debt stock is not taken into account by the rules. Here, the brunt of the socio-political debate on the need of FFP will unfold.

 

As UEFA’s FFP rules strengthen their grip over clubs, they will be more and more incentivized to contest the rules in front of the EU Commission (PSG and Manchester City fans have recently submitted a complaint) or national tribunals. Thus, these questions will not remain hypothetical and will have to be met by UEFA with hard facts and convincing arguments. If not the FFP rules will be remembered as an ephemeral, though remarkable, interlude of the summer 2014.

 

Clubs

Amount spend on transfers in 2010 (in millions)

2011

2012

2013

2014

Manchester City

€182.45

€96.05

€61.95

€116.0

€65.5

PSG

€9.0

€107.1

€149.45

€135.9

€49.5

Galatasaray

€29.5

€23.6

€30.05

€41.84

€15.75

Trabzonspor

€7.9

€24.45

€8.06

€4.7

€29.11

Bursaspor

€1.38

€10.2

€3.66

€2.33

€1.8

FC Zenit

€43.0

€16.2

€103.76

€32.8

€22.8

Rubin Kazan

€43.6

€23.35

€29.0

€25.1

€8.0

FC Anzhi

€31.2

€84.5

€67.9

€59.4

€0

Levski Sofia

€0.8

€0.95

€1.25

€0.59

€0.05

 Data from transfermarkt.com






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