Editor’s note: Kester Mekenkamp is an LL.M. student in European Law at Leiden University and an intern at the ASSER International Sports Law Centre. This blog is, to a great extent, an excerpt of his forthcoming thesis, which he shall submit in order to complete his master’s degree.

This final blog aims to provide some broader perspective, by sketching first the grander scheme in which Article 19 RSTP – FIFA's provision on the protection of minors – operates. Thereafter, the focus will shift towards testing Article 19 RSTP, thereby keeping in mind the previous blogs (Part 1: The Early Years and Part 2: The 2009 reform and its aftermath), against EU free movement law.  

Putting Article 19 RSTP into perspective: The bigger picture

After having investigated the nuts and bolts of FIFA’s provision on the protection of minors in the first two parts of this blog, it might be useful to address its bigger picture.

Article 19 RSTP and its accompanying provisions regulate only a small share of the targeted activity. There is, unfortunately, also an illegal world. Circumvention of the prohibition is allegedly commonplace.[1] Visas and passports can be falsified.[2] Work permits can be obtained on the basis of jobs arranged by clubs.[3]

In any event, a larger dynamic constituted out of a multitude of intertwined forces is at play. Globalization and professionalization are important factors contributing to stardom in football. Football idols, especially those originating from non-European countries, like Messi, Neymar, Suarez, Drogba and Eto’o, symbolised a world of opportunity for millions of children in the developing world eager to follow that same path to global fame.[4] In many parts of South America and Central and West-Africa, where families are driven by the impetus to improve their daily lives and clubs eager to cash FIFA’s training compensation money, an entire training industry emerged with the sole objective of exporting young talents to European clubs.[5] A horrifying example of the (ultimate) consequences this process can generate was seen in 2007: A fishing trawler washed up on a Tenerife beach carrying 130 young African men, of which 15 were made to believe that they would attend trials at Olympique Marseille and Real Madrid.[6] Add to the mix a group of agents focused almost exclusively on harvesting young boys for the international football market, and one can easily understand the extreme difficulty faced by FIFA to rein these practices.[7]

It is evident that the case of minors wanting to transfer internationally is closely related to a broader set of socio-economic difficulties faced by an extremely unequal world. Wars, famine, drought, corruption and the severe economic disparity[8] between the developing and developed world are determinants that can simply not be ignored. National laws applicable to asylum, migration and trade are also part of the equation. The subject of this blog hence opens up a doorway to global complexity. A true protection of minors will therefore undoubtedly require a broader approach than solely measures concerning the world of football. Yet, FIFA’s article 19 could potentially contribute to improving the fate of some minors in the developing world. The question is, does it in practice?  

Arguments supporting the prohibition of international transfers of minors

Former FIFA and UEFA presidents, Blatter, Platini, and Johansson, have all promoted an absolute forbiddance of international transfers of minors.[9] Although such a total ban was never introduced, the 2001 “Commission-condoned” FIFA transfer rules for the first time included a section dedicated to the enhancement of the protection of minors.[10] An accompanying FIFA circular stipulated that the new transfer rules imposed strict conditions “in order to provide a stable environment for the training and education of players”.[11] Moreover, it stated that the abuses, which were frequent in the past, had to be curbed. [12] Crucial in this is “protecting the appropriate and stable development of a minor as a whole”, which includes the training and education of these players.[13]

Another argument supporting Article 19 is its objective to tackle human trafficking. By strictly limiting the possibility for international transfers of minors, it takes the wind out of the traffickers’ sails. The significance of this aim was acknowledged by the European Parliament and the Commission.[14]

The thought behind the prohibition, being open to exception only in specific cases, is that minors are vulnerable, especially when moving to foreign countries. It tries to prevent football from breaking up families and “allows [minor football players] to remain within their country of origin and family networks for longer and hence reduces the psychological and cultural problems associated with adjusting to foreign climes”.[15] FIFA hereby acknowledges that “[w]hile international transfers might, in specific cases, be favourable to a young player’s sporting career, they are likely to be contrary to the best interests of the vast majority of players as minors”.[16] Poli came to a similar conclusion (concerning migration of football players in general) by stating that “the few examples of upward career paths mask the many cases of failure and are sufficient to convince young people and their families that it is worth giving oneself body and soul to football, often to the detriment of school training or an apprenticeship”.[17] 

Arguments against the prohibition of international transfers of minors

There is an opposite narrative that calls Article 19 RSTP’s rationale partially into question.[18] It can be argued that for certain countries (keeping in mind the abovementioned), with respect to the aim of protecting young football players against potential abuse and exploitation through the appropriate and stable development in training and education, minors are in reality not served by staying in their home State.[19] Furthermore, it can be contended that migration by young football players from a developing country to a developed one can be a “viable livelihood strategy to lift an individual and therefore vicariously their family out of poverty”.[20] Paradoxically a measure “with the aim of protecting minors … may, in fact, reduce opportunities for youth living in developing countries”.[21] Moreover, one must beware of an ethnocentric judgement. The argument has been raised that even in cases where third world immigrants had failed with respect to their sporting careers, they considered themselves to have succeeded, “thanks to football”, since they could come to Europe and stay.[22] It becomes a positive “escape”, which stands in contradiction with the whole idea underlying Article 19 RSTP.[23] As we will see in the coming sections, this discussion is key to the evaluation of the compatibility of FIFA’s rule with EU law. 

The Compatibility of Article 19 RSTP with EU free movement law

Applicability

For the purpose of this blog it is assumed that EU free movement law is applicable to Article 19 RSTP in relation to minor football players with an EU nationality. EU minors below the age of 16 might be able to rely on the EU citizenship rights and the free movement right of their parents. Furthermore, it can be reasonably argued that, by referring to inter alia Lawrie Blum[24], EU minor football players of 16 and above can be deemed workers in the sense of the free movement of workers. 

Free movement law aspects

A few aspects that could be deemed restrictive of EU Free movement rights deserve some attention. These are separated into situations concerning either the rights of the minor football player itself, or the rights of their parents.

Article 19(2)(b), the “EU and EEA-rule”, is explicitly created in order for the provision as a whole to meet the requirements of EU free movement law.[25] Yet, the free movement of minors is restricted by the fact that they can only transfer to a club within another Member State once additional criteria concerning football training, education and living arrangements are complied with.[26] These extra criteria, intrinsically, make it harder for minor football players to move to a foreign club. Furthermore, EU minors below the age of 16 are unable to rely on this exception. As already mentioned at the beginning of the blog, this particular age group is unlikely to perform economic services against remuneration in the sense of a “worker” under Article 45 TFEU. Nonetheless, one could envisage that under-16 EU minors could be able to rely on their citizenship rights enshrined in Article 21 TFEU (together with Art. 34(2) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights) as non-economically active EU migrants.

Moreover, under-16 EU minors might be able to rely on the free movement rights of their parents. In short, the reason why an EU national decides to move to another Member State and take up work there is irrelevant under EU free movement law. To the contrary, Article 19 RSTP puts an emphasis on the underlying reason, as the “parents-rule” of Article 19(2)(a) RSTP can only be invoked where the player’s parents move to the country in which the new club is located “for reasons not linked to football”. The CAS has hereby clarified that the family’s move must be entirely disconnected from the transfer of the minor in a new football club. Under the FIFA rule, it is for example insufficient to establish that the move is partially connected to their child’s football activities, although not being the primary aim.[27] Hence, if (a) parent(s) would want to move to another Member State to take up work there for the, sole or partial, reason that their child can play for a club in that country, Article 19 RSTP will deter them from doing so. As such, the contested rule may thus amount to a provision that precludes or deters the parents from leaving their country of origin in order to exercise their right to free movement as workers. 

Is Article 19 RSTP a proportionate measure under EU law?

The previous sections demonstrated that there is some room to argue that Article 19 RSTP could run counter EU Internal Market law, which could form a basis for future challenge to the provision. Regardless of whether this will ultimately be the case, the provision might benefit from some amendments. It goes without saying that the aim is on its face value laudable. Protecting minors against abuses connected to the transfer market must remain a priority. The manner in which this objective has been given practical effect has not been without criticism.

By encouraging minor football players to remain in their home country, the measure is certainly likely to contribute to them enjoying an appropriate and stable development in training and education. Furthermore, by introducing a strict regulatory regime, it lessens the chance of human traffickers using international football transfers as a cover for trafficking purposes. Therefore, it can be argued that the measure is suitable to attain its aim of protecting minors.

It then still has to be assessed whether it passes the test of necessity. As concluded at the time of its inception, an absolute ban on international transfers of minors was deemed too pervasive. The exceptions assured the overall appropriateness and reasonableness of the measure. This test raises in particular the question of existence of less intrusive alternatives. I would argue that there is indeed a less intrusive alternative to the current rule available. It involves a slight amendment of the “parents-rule” and would still attain the aim underlying the overall provision. This is achieved by firstly, omitting the requirement for the parents’ move “not to be linked to football”, and secondly, extending the mandatory obligations of clubs regarding the education and wellbeing of foreign minors, laid down in Article 19(2)(b), to the “parents-rule”. 

Proposed amendment to the “parents-rule”

Article 19(2)(a) RSTP, the “parents-rule”, has shown to be controversial. It has, to give but an example, been stated that this exemption has “effectively made the [entire] rule worthless”. [28] As discussed in the previous blogs, the case law is marred with disputes arising with respect to this exception, wherein the judicial bodies have advocated a strict application of the rule. In brief, the minor must follow its parents and not vice versa. Yet, circumvention of the rule appears to be quite simple.[29] Without implying that this is a sufficient reason for changing the measure, it nevertheless does show that its current form is rather impractical (or hypocritical).

It can be reasonably argued that permitting an international transfer only if the parents move based on “reasons not linked to football” is too stern. There are examples of outcomes being adverse to the interests of the minors concerned, for instance the Acuña case.[30] Even stronger is the appeal by families who have decided to move together to another country in order for the children to pursue their dream of becoming a professional footballer.[31] In the words of the father of a 15-year-old player who was denied to play for FC Barcelona (after they, as a family, had moved from the US to Spain with that particular aim): “Why should FIFA be able to tell our family where it has to live if we want our kid to play [football]?”[32] Indeed, why should families not be able to move out of their own accord, provided that they meet the general criteria for residence within the new country? If for instance a family has enough financial resources to not become a burden on the social welfare systems or both parents find employment within the new country, they obtain the required residence permits, and as a result their child can play for the club of his choosing, it is hard to argue that this is contradictory to the aim of Article 19 RSTP. The CAS has been receptive to this type of arguments in the previously discussed case concerning Atlético Madrid, in which a minor (USA) was allowed to register with the club amongst others because his family was wealthy and its basic financial maintenance was not dependent on the parents’ work.[33] One could rightly contend that less affluent families should equally have the possibility to move together with their child to the country of a new club. Such a move, in particularly when considering a transfer from a club in a developing country to a European club, could be in line with the aim of Article 19 RSTP. Furthermore, the comparison with other sports, i.e. volleyball, hockey, tennis, rugby and athletics, shows that in those sports minors are not explicitly prohibited from moving, together with their parents, to another country in pursuit of their sporting dream.[34] The same can be said, when the children pursue a career in music or dance and the family moves to the place where he or she can learn from the best mentors.

It is no coincidence that the “parents-rule” is the most debated exception of Article 19 RSTP. One can easily agree that it is beneficial (in a vast majority of cases) for minors to keep living with their parents as it enhances their chances of having a stable development. However, does this also have to entail in which country that might be? This author does not believe so and would favour a situation where parents are allowed to move together with their child to another country, whether that is for reasons linked to football or not.

It can be tentatively pleaded that this can be realized, while still reaching the aims of Article 19 RSTP. As abovementioned, this can be achieved by, firstly, omitting the requirement for the parents’ move “not to be linked to football”, and secondly, by extending the mandatory obligations of clubs regarding the education and wellbeing of foreign minors as laid down in the “EU and EEA-rule” (Article 19(2)(b) RSTP), to the “parents-rule”. This alternative measure would warrant the objective of “appropriate and stable development in training and education”, given that the minor and his parents remain a united family and the clubs are additionally made responsible for ensuring that their sporting and academic education is guaranteed. To also attain the anti-human-trafficking aim, this proposed alternative should be safeguarded from abuse by way of legal guardianship (e.g. situations where human traffickers are able to obtain the status of legal guardian of a minor). Therefore the meaning of parents, within the reading of this exception, should constitute solely the biological parents at first. Perhaps it is possible for the PSC subcommittee to devise a suitable test, based on the minor’s best interest, for judging whether anyone other than the biological parents could equally be deemed eligible under this exception.

In an attempt to contribute to the debate on the protection of minors in football, this blog has proposed a modest reform of Article 19 RSTP. It is believed that such a change would tackle some of the problems withnessed in the past years, without loosing sight of the objectives of FIFA's provision on the protection of minors in football.  

[1] J. Señík and T. Gábris, Minors in Sport. Position Paper on Legal Aspects of Minors in Sports in the Slovak Republic, (2010) International Sports Law Journal, p. 69.

[2] Ed Hawkins, The Lost Boys. Inside Football’s Slave Trade. Bloomsbury (2015), inter alia pp. 135, 162 and 229.

[3] S. Van den Bogaert, Practical Regulation of the Mobility of Sportsmen in the EU post Bosman, Kluwer (2005), p. 240; Supra at 2, p. 165.

[4] Supra at 2, pp. 115-116.

[5] J. Schokkaert, Football clubs’ recruitment strategies and international player migration: evidence from Senegal and South Africa, 17 Soccer & Society (2016), p. 121; The Guardian, “The scandal of Africa's trafficked players”, 6 January 2008,; Supra at 2, pp. 117-129.

[6] The Telegraph, “The dark side of football transfers”, 31 December 2014; Supra at 2, p. 132.

[7] R. Poli, African migrants in Asian and European football: hopes and realities, 13 Sport in Society (2010), p. 1008. For more on player’s agents, see A. Duval and K. Mekenkamp, “De- or Re-regulating the middlemen? The DFB’s regulation of intermediaries under EU law scrutiny at the OLG Frankfurt”, Asser International Sports Law Blog.

[8] J. Schokaert showed, supra at 5, p. 132, in comparison, that an economically higher developed country, such as South Africa as opposed to Senegal, which attracts more money to domestic football and higher wages for football players, resulting in more players to stay in their home country. 

[9] Supra at 1, p. 68.

[10] Art. 12 FIFA RSTP 2001.

[11] FIFA Circular no. 769, 24 August 2001.

[12] N. St. Cyr Clarke, The beauty and the beast: Taming the ugly side of the people’s game, 2011 Columbia Journal of European Law, p. 627.

[13] See Blog 1; Commentary on the Status and Transfer of Players, p. 58.

[14] European Parliament, Report on the future of professional football in Europe (2006/2130(INI)), paras. 33-34; The White Paper on Sport, COM(2007) 391 final, p. 16.

[15] P. Darby, “Out of Africa: The exodus of elite African football talent to Europe”, JLS 2007, p. 453.

[16] FIFA, September 2016, “FAQ Protection of Minors”, 

[17] Supra at 7, p. 1008.

[18] J. Esson, Better Off at Home? Rethinking Responses to Trafficked West African Footballers in Europe, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 2015, pp. 526-527.

[19] M. LoPiccolo, You don't have to go home, but you can't stay here: Problems arising when SIJS meets international adoption, Wisconsin International Law Journal 2015, pp. 200-201.

[20] Supra at 18, p. 521.

[21] M. Mauro, Inclusive sport or institutional discrimination? New FIFA regulations, organized football and migrant youth in Italy, Sport in Society 2016, p. 2.

[22] R. Poli, African migrants in Asian and European football: hopes and realities, 13 Sport in Society (2010), p. 1009.

[23] P. Darby and E. Solberg, Differing Trajectories: Football Development and Patterns of Player Migration in South Africa and Ghana, 11 Soccer and Society (2009), pp. 118–130.

[24] Case 66/85, Lawrie Blum v Land Baden-Württemberg, [1986] ECR 2135, para. 17: the crucial elements are that, for a certain period of time, a person performs services for and under the direction of another person in return for which he receives remuneration.

[25] See blog 1.

[26] Art. 19(2)(b) RSTP: Hereby, it is important to indicate that the CAS in Vada II (TAS 2012/A/2862) has established a workable account for the particular case of players with the nationality of a EU or EEA Member State residing in a non-EU/EEA country, by allowing them to invoke this exception.

[27] TAS 2011/A/2494, FC Girondins de Bordeaux c. Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), sentence du 22 décembre 2011 (Vada I), paras. 31-38; CAS 2013/A/3140, A. v. Club Atlético de Madrid SAD & Real Federación Española de Fútbol (RFEF) & Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), award of 10 October 2013 (A. v. Club Atlético de Madrid), para. 8.25.

[28] Supra at 2, p. 246.

[29] KEA, CDES and EOSE, Study on Sports Agents in the Eurropean Union, November 2009, p. 128; Supra at 3, p. 240.

[30] See blog 2.

[31] The New York Times, “An American Boy Wonder in Barcelona”, 7 November 2013.

[32] The New York Times, “Strict Enforcement of FIFA Rules Sidelines Young Players Abroad”, 31 Augustus 2015.

[33] See blog 2; A. v. Club Atlético de Madrid, Supra at  28, para. 8.31.

[34] Supra at 30, pp. 127-129.

Editor’s Note: Saverio Spera is an Italian lawyer and LL.M. graduate in International Business Law from King’s College London. He is currently an intern at the ASSER International Sports Law Centre.

The time is ripe to take a closer look at the CAS and its transparency, as this is one of the ways to ensure its public accountability and its legitimacy. From 1986 to 2013, the number of arbitrations submitted to the CAS has grown from 2 to more than 400 a year. More specifically, the number of appeals submitted almost doubled in less than ten years (from 175 in 2006, to 349 in 2013[1]). Therefore, the Court can be considered the judicial apex of an emerging transnational sports law (or lex sportiva).[2] In turn, the increased authority and power of this institution calls for increased transparency, in order to ensure its legitimacy.[3]

One might ask why focusing on the level of transparency of an arbitral institution is so important, given the traditional aura of confidentiality that has always accompanied arbitral proceedings. The answer is multifaceted. Firstly, a cursory look at the developments of international commercial arbitration and, more significantly, international investment arbitration shows that confidentiality is not anymore the untouchable hallmark that it once was.[4] Secondly, and most importantly, the peculiarities of the CAS Appeal Procedure make this body look like an arbitral institution but function in a way that is more akin to an international court. Furthermore, it is well known that one of the foundations of domestic and international arbitration is party autonomy. Parties freely opt to defer their dispute to an arbitral panel rather than a court for a variety of reasons, one of which can actually be the confidential nature of arbitration. That said, it is hard to ground the CAS Appeal Procedure on party autonomy. According to the CAS Code (Art. R47), in order for the CAS to have the necessary jurisdiction to hear an appeal, either the parties have expressly agreed to it, or an arbitration clause is contained in the statutes or regulations of the governing body issuing the decision under appeal. In practice, the regulations of the Sports-Governing Body often contain an arbitration clause in favour of the CAS, or these bodies require athletes to sign a specific arbitration agreement as a precondition for participating in an event or competition.[5] An example of the former practice is given by the FIFA Statutes, which – at Art. 59 expressly require that national federations insert an arbitration clause in favour of the CAS in their regulations, and – at Art. 58 imposes that “(a)ppeals against final decisions passed by FIFA’s legal bodies and against decisions passed by confederations, members associations or leagues shall be lodged with CAS”. An example of the latter is given by Bye-law 6 to Rule 44 of the Olympic Charter, which obliges athletes entering the Olympic Games to sign a form containing a clause which devolves the CAS exclusive jurisdiction over any dispute arising in connection with the participation to the Games.

In such a framework, athletes face the alternative between not competing at all and accepting to resort to the CAS in case of a dispute. The post-consensual foundation of the system is a feature that stands in irreconcilable conflict with the logic of international commercial arbitration, based on party autonomy. If the free will of the parties in choosing to arbitrate rather than litigate justifies, to a limited extent, a limitation of transparency in favour of confidentiality in international commercial arbitration, what justifies a low level of transparency at the CAS?

In this regard, for example, the level of transparency of international investment arbitration has been subjected to intense scrutiny. Transparency should then, a fortiori, be scrutinized in the realm of sports arbitration, and in particular at the CAS, whose central position in the lex sportiva is widely acknowledged.

This blog will focus on the two key issues related to the CAS’ transparency. Firstly, the availability of information about arbitrators on the CAS website. Secondly, and most importantly, the publication and ready availability of CAS awards. Furthermore, as the CAS ordinary procedure resembles traditional commercial arbitration, the blog will be only concerned with awards stemming from the Appeal procedure. 

Lack of transparency concerning the arbitrators

Articles R33 to R36 of the CAS Code deal with independence and impartiality of CAS Arbitrators as a conditio sine qua non of the arbitration proceedings.[6] Moreover, these provisions provide for mechanisms to guarantee this independence together with measures at disposal of the parties that want to challenge the independence or impartiality of an arbitrator. Yet to diligently exercise their right, and ensure the independence of arbitrators, parties need full access to information on the arbitrators.

Analysed through the lens of transparency, the problems arise from the fact that it is difficult to assess the inclinations and history of arbitrators prior to initiating proceedings before the CAS. In other words, given the limited information on arbitrators found on the CAS website[7], parties are not equipped with the necessary tools to make a fully informed choice. There is always a risk for conflicts of interest that parties to CAS arbitration should be able to assess on a level playing field, i.e. through a simple visit to the CAS website. Thus, more transparency with regards to the information provided about arbitrators would help reduce the prevailing information asymmetry between the one-shotters (mainly the athletes and their lawyers) and the repeat players (mainly the SGBs and their lawyers/legal counsels) at the CAS. Not only should the section ‘List of Arbitrators’ give access to each arbitrator’s jurisprudential record and relevant past or present contractual relationships. It should also list publications or comments arbitrators have released in the past, as some of them might have already formed a view on a certain type of cases. Although this is not always an indicator of bias, it would permit the parties to make a better-informed choice. Furthermore, and more importantly, in order to level the playing field between the parties, the information about arbitrators should also include a reference to who nominated them in past CAS arbitrations. Additionally, the fact that dissenting opinions are not recognised nor notified by CAS^[8] adds another layer to a feeling of opacity surrounding the arbitrators’ profiles and views.

Finally, according to Art. R33 CAS Code, ICAS draws up the list of arbitrators. From the point of view of securing the CAS’ transparency and accountability, it would be necessary that the nomination process be publicly scrutinized. Thus, ICAS should publish the name of the institutions putting forward each new arbitrator, as well as the reasons why they were considered adequate candidates.  

Lack of transparency in the publication of awards

The lack of transparency of the CAS is further illustrated by the process followed for the publication of its awards (and in particular awards of the Appeal Division).

The CAS Code provides rules for the publication of awards in the Ordinary Procedure (Art. R43) and the Appeal Procedure (Art. R59). For the Ordinary Procedure the default rule is confidentiality ‘unless all parties agree or the Division President so decides’. The rule favours a presumption of confidentiality because the CAS Ordinary Procedure is mainly used for commercial disputes based on the clear consensual agreement of the parties to submit to CAS arbitration. However, it is interesting to note that even in the similar realm of international commercial arbitration confidentiality is not an unchallenged hallmark anymore. International commercial arbitration awards are being voluntarily published with increased frequency[9] and some authors even advocate the adoption of a presumption of openness of the awards.[10] In fact, although the need for transparency in commercial arbitration is less compelling than in investment arbitration due to the private interests at stake, the general public may still be affected in a variety of ways and therefore needs to have access to the decisions. [11]

Conversely, the default rule for the CAS Appeal Procedure is publicity. Art. R 59(7) provides that “(t)he award, a summary and/or a press release setting forth the results of the proceedings shall be made public by CAS, unless both parties agree that they should remain confidential. In any event, the other elements of the case record shall remain confidential”. The rationale for a different treatment between the Ordinary Procedure and the Appeal Procedure lies in the consideration that, unlike the more commercially-oriented disputes destined to the Ordinary Procedure, appeals concern disciplinary decisions issued by international federations that are of interest to the public and that, in any case, might have already been disclosed.[12]

From a comparative point of view, it is noteworthy that the public interests at stake are one of the reasons why international investment arbitration, as opposed to – or at least more rapidly than – commercial arbitration, has shifted from a presumption of confidentiality to a presumption of openness.[13] In oversimplified terms, investment arbitration disputes involve States, which – for instance – have to resort to the national budget to pay in case of adverse awards. Also, governments’ public policies are often challenged before investment arbitral tribunals by foreign investors. All these matters are of evident public interest and were a key factor in pushing for more transparency. In the field of international investment law this process was initially triggered by NAFTA Chapter 11 and its interpretation by the Free Trade Commission (FTC), followed by the 2006 amendment to the ICSID Arbitration Rules. The development of the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, which also provide for amicus curiae submissions and open hearings, made another important stride in that direction.

Turning the attention back to the CAS, all the awards published are released on the CAS website. Although it could be argued that, at least for the Appeal Procedure, the default rule should go further down the road of transparency following the trend in treaty investment arbitration, a transparency-weary commentator could potentially be satisfied with the existing framework of the CAS Code, if only the CAS would implement it consistently. Instead, the CAS administration seems to follow a rather opaque and discretionary publication policy that gives rise to major transparency issues, the main one being the fact that, as we will see, only a limited number of awards are published on the CAS website. 

The CAS statistics include the number of Appeals submitted to the CAS (until 2013) and it is easy to determine the number of awards published per year in the CAS Database between the entry into force of the Code (22 November 1994) and the end of 2013. We compared the two figures and obtained the percentage of awards published each year in relation to the number of appeals submitted.[14]

A quick glimpse at the table suffices to notice an unfortunate trend in the publication policy of the CAS. If we exclude the first couple of years, in which the number of appeals submitted were extremely limited, the percentage of awards published is constantly below 30% (with the sole exceptions of 2001, 2002 and 2008, and – in any case –substantially below the still hardly acceptable threshold of 50%). The figures get even more striking as the workload of the CAS increased. From 2009 onwards, the average percentage of appeal awards published stands at a disappointing 17.5%!

This state of affairs significantly hampers predictability and coherence of the CAS jurisprudence, as well as threatens the objective of providing legal certainty to the sporting world at large, which is at the heart of the appeal procedure at the CAS. Indeed, the CAS jurisprudence has acquired throughout the years a law-making role that, in turn, calls for full transparency of its awards. If we read through the CAS case law we can find that arbitrators often refer, and demonstrate a consistent deference, to CAS jurisprudence.[15] To this end, transparency becomes a central issue, as it prevents inconsistency by subjecting the CAS panels to the critical scrutiny of their peers. After all, the need for coherence has been stressed by the CAS itself when it has recognised that, in spite of the lack of stare decisis at the CAS, arbitrators are disposed to “follow the reasoning of a previous Tribunal […] both of a sense of comity and because of the desirability of consistent decision of the CAS, unless there were a compelling reason, in the interest of justice, not to do so”.^[16] From the point of view of the potential parties to CAS arbitration this is of particular importance. If awards are systematically published, lawyers (and in fine the parties) are better able to determine before initiating the arbitration whether their case is likely to succeed. Furthermore, the availability of awards on the CAS website would put repeat players and one-shotters on an equal playing field, eliminating – at least in this regard – the edge that the former gain on the latter.

The need for predictability requires not only awards to be published, but also to be promptly published after they are rendered. The potential disputing parties might have an interest in having previous awards available quickly. In this regard the above-mentioned role of precedents in CAS jurisprudence plays again a significant role. It has been noticed how some decisions are based on solutions adopted in previous awards that have not yet been published.[17] Having the award readily at disposal is necessary for the parties’ legal argumentation. This way the party’s counsel can, respectively, either use the award as a valid leg to bolster her arguments or criticise the position recently adopted by a panel on the same issue.[18] Additionally, a more systematic publication of recent awards online would significantly contribute to increase the level of transparency at the CAS, as the web represents a great opportunity for the public in terms of speed and accessibility. On the CAS website it is possible to find a section specifically dedicated to ‘recent decisions’. This section, though, does not seem to be organised as systematically as it could be. The CAS’ policy regarding the recent decision section of its website is extremely confusing. It includes some awards from 2016 and 2015, but not all the awards from these years available in the CAS database, as well as older awards from 2012 and 2011, which can hardly count as ‘recent decisions’. Apart from the consideration that “these awards disappear from the website after a few weeks and it is not possible to find them anymore”[19], a more systematic publication of the recent awards would be desirable. A valid model to follow has been identified in the websites of the Italian Camera di conciliazione e di arbitrato per lo sport (CCAS) and the Canadian Centre for Ethics in Sports (CCES), where the decisions taken are systematically published without excessive delay.[20]

Conclusion

There is a clear, widespread and apparently unstoppable demand for transparency in contemporary international law. This demand has been voiced by civil-society, governments and international institutions with increased frequency. Thus, more room for transparency has been made within international institutions in the last few years.[21] We have seen very briefly how even in the confidentiality-savvy field of international arbitration transparency has made its way up on the ladder of priorities. In sports arbitration, where the jurisdiction is often not exercised over the parties on the basis of their consent[22], the judicial activity of the CAS must be a fortiori open to scrutiny not only by the parties but by the public at large. There are many ways to evaluate the legitimacy of a court. One of these is the persuasion among the public that an international court has the right to exercise authority in a given domain. To be persuaded, it is essential that the public has a possibility to assess how the CAS carries out its activities and, therefore, be allowed the broadest access possible to CAS awards to be able to evaluate (and criticize) their rationality. A greater transparency at the CAS would allow for greater participation of those that might be affected by its activity.

This call for greater accountability of international courts and tribunals, though, does not seem to resonate much at the CAS. If one looks, as we have done in this blog, at the reality of transparency at the CAS, one cannot help feeling disappointed. Information about arbitrators is scarce and it is hard to find any consistency in the publication of CAS awards.

Yet the CAS could intervene on these two key aspects. To this end, we propose a few brief recommendations for the CAS administration to follow.

Firstly, the section of the CAS website ‘List of Arbitrators’ should be enriched with all the relevant information concerning arbitrators. Therefore:

First recommendation: The CAS should include in the ‘List of Arbitrators’ section of the website a downloadable individualized PDF comprising: jurisprudential records, past or present relevant contractual relationships, publications or comments arbitrators have released in the past and a summary indicating who nominated them in past CAS arbitrations.

Secondly, the CAS should make sure that all its appeal awards are promptly available to the public. Therefore:

Second recommendation: The CAS should simply remove the phrase ‘unless both parties agree’ from the provision of Art. R59. Thereafter, parties would be in principle deprived of the authority to veto the publication of a sentence.

Even if one believes that – notwithstanding its peculiarities – the Court operates as a traditional arbitral institution, a systematic reform of the publication policy of the CAS would be urgently needed. The CAS website (and database) need to be modernized to facilitate a swift and easy access of the public to the awards. Therefore:

Third recommendation: The ‘recent decisions’ section should contain (for a short timeframe, maximum three months) all the recently decided awards and the database should provide all the awards rendered and not only less than a fifth as is currently the case.

There is much to do, but with a bit of will the CAS can become a world-wide leader in terms of arbitral transparency and greatly strengthen its legitimacy and standing in the eyes of its users and of the public at large.

[1] The statistics used for this article are taken from the CAS website, the available data stops on 31 December 2013.

[2] Lorenzo Casini, The Making of a Lex Sportiva by The Court of Arbitration for Sport  (2012). German Law Journal, Vol. 12 n. 5, 452, Antoine Duval, Lex Sportiva: A playground for transnational law (2013). European Law Journal, Vol. 19 Issue 6, 822-842.

[3] Anne Peters, Towards Transparency as a Global Norm in Andrea Bianchi and Anne Peters, Transparency in International Law, Cambridge University Press 2013, 557.

[4] See Cindy G. Buys, The tensions between confidentiality and transparency in international arbitration, The American Review of International Arbitration (2003), Catherine A. Rogers, Transparency in International Commercial Arbitration  (2006) and Stephan W. Schill, Five times transparency in international investment law (2014), The Journal of World Investment and Trade, Volume 15, Issue 3-4.

[5] Rigozzi/Hassler, Sports Arbitration under the CAS Rules, Chapter 5 in Arbitration in Switzerland, Kluwer Law International (2013), 988.

[6] Despina Mavromati & Matthieu Reeb, The Code of the Court of Arbitration for Sport, Commentary, Cases and Materials, Kluwer Law International (2015), 134.

[7] In some cases information is limited to a couple of lines, e.g. “Juris doctor; Professor of International Law at […] University School of Law; practicing lawyer; international arbitrator”. See http://www.tas-cas.org/en/arbitration/list-of-arbitrators-general-list.html, accessed 19 January 2017.

[8] The last part of Art. R 59(2), inserted with the 2010 revision of the CAS Code, reads as follows: “Dissenting opinions are not recognized by CAS and are not notified”.

[9] Catherine A. Rogers, Transparency in International Commercial Arbitration, (2006). Penn State Law, 23.

[10] See, among others, Cindy G. Buys, The tensions between confidentiality and transparency in international arbitration, The American Review of International Arbitration (2003), 121.

[11] Cindy G. Buys, Ibid, 135.

[12] Despina Mavromati & Matthieu Reeb, The Code of the Court of Arbitration for Sport, Commentary, Cases and Materials, Kluwer Law International (2015), 588.

[13] Stephan W. Schill, Five times transparency in international investment law (2014), The Journal of World Investment and Trade, Volume 15, Issue 3-4, 369.

[14] The accuracy of the findings is limited by the lack of precision of the CAS’ statistics. Namely, in the statistics section of the website it is possible to retrieve only data referring to the Appeals submitted every year but not to the appeal awards rendered. Therefore, our yearly comparison cannot take fully into account the temporal shift between the submission of the case and the rendering of the decision (as well as the limited number of cases which were withdrawn). In other words, in reality, the share of awards published is probably slightly higher than indicated in the table.

[15] Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Arbitral Precedent: Dream, Necessity or Excuse? (2006). Arbitration International, 365.

[16] CAS 96/149, A. C[ullwick] v. FINA, p. 251, 258 – 259, cited in Antonio Rigozzi, l’Arbitrage internationale en matiére de sport, (2005), 638.

[17] Antonio Rigozzi, l’Arbitrage internationale en matiére de sport, (2005), 640.

[18] Going back with the memory to a few years ago, it has be noted how Pavle Jovanovic’s counsel would have had great benefit in having the possibility to read the award rendered in the case that saw the French judoka Djamel Bouras opposing the International Judo Federation in a doping case, which was not yet published when the Jovanovic case was submitted. Had the award been promptly published he would have had the chance to invoke the solution contained therein (See Antonio Rigozzi, l’Arbitrage internationale en matiére de sport, (2005), 639).

[19] Antonio Rigozzi, ibid, 641.

[20] Antonio Rigozzi, ibid, 642.

[21] Anne Peters, The Transparency Turn of International Law (2015), The Chinese Journal of Global Governance, 3.

[22] For a wider discussion on the lack of consent in sports arbitration, see A. Rigozzi & F. Robert-Tissot, “Consent” in Sports Arbitration: Its Multiple Aspects’, in E. Geisinger & E. Trabaldo de Mestral (eds.), Sports Arbitration: A Coach for other players? (2015), 59 -60; A. M. Steingruber, Sports Arbitration: how the structure and other features of competitive sports affect consent as it relates to waiving judicial control, 20 American Review of International Arbitration (2009), 59, 73; M.A. Weston, Doping Control, Mandatory Arbitration, and Process Dangers for Accused Athletes in International Sports, 10 Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal (2009), 5, 8; and D. H. Yi, Turning Medals into Metal: Evaluating the Court of Arbitration of sport as an international tribunal, 6 Asper Review of International Business and Trade Law (2006), 289, 312.