The first part of our “Unpacking Doyen’s TPO deals” blog series concerns the agreements signed between Doyen Sports and the Dutch football club FC Twente. In particular we focus on the so-called Economic Rights Participation Agreement (ERPA) of 25 February 2014. Based on the ERPA we will be able to better assess how TPO works in practice. To do so, however, it is necessary to explore FC Twente’s rationale behind recourse to third-party funding. Thus, we will first provide a short introduction to the recent history of the club and its precarious financial situation. 

I. FC Twente 2004-2015

When local millionaire Joop Munsterman took over FC Twente in December 2003, the club was on the verge of bankruptcy. Munsterman certainly did not lack ambition and wanted to turn FC Twente into the best club of the Netherlands. With help of external investors, he quickly managed to reinforce the team with quality players such as the Swiss international Blaise N’kufo, the man who would later become FC Twente’s all-time top scorer. A few years later, in 2010, FC Twente won the Dutch League (Eredivisie), thereby defying the decade long dominance of Ajax, PSV and Feyenoord. By now the club was considered an example for a modern, innovative and successful football governance, and an inspiration for other smaller clubs. Through “excellent scouting” it managed to attract players from all over the world capable of winning the league and securing a spot in Europe’s most important and lucrative club competition, the UEFA Champions League. Moreover, Twente’s success on the field also led to financial success off the field. For example, Costa Rican international Bryan Ruiz was signed from KAA Gent in 2009 for €5 million and sold to Fulham in 2011 for €12.5 million, which makes for a healthy profit of €7.5 million.

The taste of the 2010 success and the additional earnings for participating in the Champions League created hunger for more. The club started spending large amounts of money on the transfer market, including the signings of Leroy Fer in 2011 for €5.5 million and Dusan Tadic in 2012 for €7.7 million. Furthermore, with the ambition of playing the Champions League consistently, the club decided to renovate and expand its stadium. Although FC Twente is the owner of the stadium, it did not have the means to finance the renovation. Therefore, it had recourse to external investors, including the municipality of Enschede, who provided a loan of €20 million.

Fast-forwarding to 2015, little is left of that over-ambitious FC Twente. The club currently finds itself in the lower ranks of the league table and is fearing relegation to the second league. Much-needed revenue from Champions League participation did not materialize since the club was not able to qualify after 2011 and many of the recent signings did not lead to transfer profits. In May 2014 the Dutch FA, KNVB, placed FC Twente into the so-called “Category 1”, a category dedicated to clubs in financial difficulties, which could face disciplinary sanctions if the financial situation is not improved swiftly.[1] In early 2014, FC Twente had probably taken on way too much financial risk and was in dire need of fresh money. In this context, the ERPA with Doyen was dearly needed to repay outstanding short-term debts. 

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II. The ERPA dissected

The ERPA between FC Twente and Doyen Sports is dated from 25 February 2014. The ERPA consists of two separate agreements: a first general agreement signed on 27 December 2013; and a second agreement added on 25 February 2014. By means of the ERPA, Doyen purchased part of the economic rights of seven players who at the time were all registered and playing for FC Twente, namely Castaignos, Promes, Ould Chikh, Mokhtar, Eghan, Ebecilio and Tadic. In return, Doyen provided FC Twente a fee for each of the players for a total amount of €5 million.

As stated, Doyen did not obtain all of the economic rights of the players, but only a share. The share acquired by Doyen varied from player to player and fluctuated between 10% (for Tadic) and 50% (for Castaignos). At first glance, the mechanism seems relatively straightforward: once a player is sold to another football club Doyen receives an amount equal to its share of the economic rights attached to the player. However, the story is a bit more complex. The ERPA provides for a minimum fee per player that is superior to the amount Doyen invested in that player. In other words, regardless of the transfer fee paid, Doyen will always make a profit. The bank always wins! Doyen’s minimum fee for each player has been set at a basic amount equivalent to the fee granted to FC Twente plus a fixed 10% to be increased at an annual rate of 10% elapsed as from 15 November 2013.  

The ERPA further sets out different scenarios which are described below.

A. Scenario 1&2: The Transfer offer

The first eventuality, and most likely the mutually desired one, is the transfer of the player. Under the first agreement (this part was central to its amendment), in case of a transfer offer for one of the players concerned by the agreement, FC Twente could choose to accept or reject the offer. If it accepted the offer, Doyen was entitled to the agreed share of the proceeds of the transfer. If this amount was inferior to Doyen’s minimum fee, then Twente had to pay the fee. In case Twente would refuse the offer, no further contractual consequences were foreseen. (Scenario 1). It appears from the latest release of footballleaks (available here) that the first agreement actually entailed a different scenario, which was later deleted from the ERPA and inserted in an additional agreement. This second agreement, added later to the ERPA and not communicated to the KNVB, radically changed the transfer scenario (Scenario 2). 

Under the second agreement, in case of a transfer offer equal or superior to the minimum market value of the player is received and rejected by the club, FC Twente is obliged to compensate Doyen by an amount equivalent to Doyen’s share of the proposed transfer fee. By way of illustration, say a given football club offers FC Twente €10 million for Castaignos, while his minimum market value is €8 million (see table 1). Should FC Twente reject this transfer offer it will be obliged to compensate Doyen for an amount of €5 million (50% of the proposed transfer fee of €10 million). Similarly, if the proposed transfer fee is equal or above 50% of the minimum market value and FC Twente rejects it, it could also be obliged to compensate Doyen. Using Castaignos again as an example, say the proposed transfer fee was not €10 million but €4 million. This amount is exactly 50% of Castaignos’ minimum market value. Should FC Twente decide to reject this offer and Doyen decides to make a written request to be compensated, Doyen could claim €2 million from FC Twente. 

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B. Scenario 3: Exchange of players

If Twente decides to exchange a player covered by the ERPA against another player, to which an additional fee might be added, the agreement foresees that Doyen will have three different options. First, Doyen can, in case of a partial exchange involving a complementary fee, decide to keep the same share of the economic rights attached to the new player and get the agreed share of the fee received by the club. If a one-to-one exchange takes place, Doyen can only keep the same share of the economic rights attached to the new player. Finally, in both types of exchanges, Doyen has the option to demand that FC Twente pays the minimum fee for the player.

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C. Scenario 4: A loan

In the third scenario, the player is loaned out to another club. If the loan fee received is higher than the wage bill of the player at FC Twente, the club makes a profit on the loan. Consequently, Doyen is entitled to receive a percentage of the loan fee. Doyen’s share of the loan fee is calculated on the basis of its share in the economic rights of the player concerned. If Castaignos were to be loaned out to another club and FC Twente receives a loan fee higher than its salary, Doyen would receive 50% of the profit on the loan fee.

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D. Scenario 5: Renewal of the player contract by Twente

The fourth scenario is also modified by the additional agreement signed on 25 February 2014. Under the original agreement, if the player renews his contract with FC Twente, Doyen simply keeps the same share of the economic rights for the total length of the new contract. However, Doyen does have the right to choose a new put option date or, importantly, simply stick to the old put option date (on the put option date see below scenario 6). Under the additional agreement, Doyen also has the possibility to request that the minimum fee be paid by FC Twente. 

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E. Scenario 6: The Put Option

In the ERPA, Doyen and FC Twente have agreed a put option, this alternative is covered in Scenario 5. A put option is a right given to Doyen to sell back its share of the economic rights linked to a player at FC Twente, at a given date and for a given price. The put option date was set at 31 August 2015 for all seven players of Twente(see table 1). To use a concrete example, Ebecilio was not sold before 31 August 2015. In fact, he currently still plays for FC Twente. In accordance with the particular conditions of the ERPA, Doyen had the right to sell to FC Twente its share of the economic rights of Ebecilio, and FC Twente would have the obligation to buy back those rights, for a fixed put option fee. According to Table 1, the put option fee for Ebecilio is €780.000. Whether Doyen actually exercised this option in the Ebecilio case is not clear, but it would have guaranteed the investment company a profit of €180.000. 

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F. Scenario 7: The player is unable to remain a professional football player

Point 8 of the ERPA foresees that FC Twente shall enter into a policy with an insurance company insuring the risk of the player’s death and the risk of the player suffering an incapacitating injury or any injury which may patently reduce the player’s ability as a professional football player. In the case of such events, Doyen will receive an amount equal to the put option fee, irrespective of whether the insurance policy claims are lower or higher than the put option fee.

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G. Scenario 8: The player becomes a free agent

Point 9.1 of the ERPA stipulates that FC Twente “shall use its best endeavors to prevent the Player from becoming a free agent and acknowledges that such endeavors are considered normal and ordinary business practice for professional football clubs”. The notion of “best endeavors” remains undefined and mysterious. Nonetheless, in the case a player’s contract expires and he becomes a free agent, FC Twente will be obliged to pay Doyen the minimum fee agreed in the particular conditions (see table 1). 

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H. Scenario 9: The economic rights are assigned to a third-party

After the signature of the ERPA, it is still possible to trade the economic rights attached to the same players with third parties. However, if Doyen wishes to sell the economic rights of one of the seven players, it would firstly have to offer those rights back to FC Twente on the same conditions as those that would be offered to third parties. Moreover, Doyen may not assign any share of the players’ economic rights to any Dutch club or to any other third party which is not suitable to hold them. In turn, should FC Twente wish to sell (part of) the remaining economic rights of a player, it would firstly have to offer these rights to Doyen before offering them to another assignee. 

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I. Scenario 10: Termination of the contract by the player without just cause

Final scenario, if the player terminates his contract without just cause (see Article 17 FIFA RSTP), the ERPA foresees that FC Twente shall pursue a claim for unlawful termination of the employment contract against the player before any competent judicial institution.^[2] If the relevant judicial body grants compensation to FC Twente, Doyen will get a share of the compensation equivalent to its share of the economic rights of the player. In the event the share of the compensation awarded to Doyen is less than the minimum fee, FC Twente will have to match the minimum fee. 

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III. The aftermath of the ERPA

On 26 November 2015, FC Twente told the Dutch press that it had bought off the TPO contract with Doyen. On that same day, footballleaks published a Settlement Agreement between Doyen and FC Twente. According to this settlement, the parties agreed to terminate the ERPA on the condition that Twente would pay to Doyen a compensation of €3.344.519. Whether the settlement agreement was signed by the two parties remains unknown since it does not include a date nor any signatures.

What is known is what happened to the seven players whose economic rights were partly sold to Doyen. Based on the information provided by the German website http://www.transfermarkt.de/, we made the following table summarizing the situation:

Since the signing of the ERPA (27 December 2013), five players have been transferred to other football clubs and two (Eghan and Ebecilio) are still under contract at FC Twente. Two players, Tadic and Promes, were sold for a relatively high fee (€13 million and €11.4 million respectively). For Tadic’s transfer, it is known that Doyen received a 10% of the transfer, since the fee was higher than the minimum fee. In fact, footballleaks provides a document called “Liquidation of Economic Rights Participation - Tadic”, holding that Doyen received €1.091.250 from Tadic’s €13 million transfer to English side Southampton. Doyen’s interest in Tadic was 10%. In principle this would mean that Doyen would receive 10% of €13 million, i.e. €1.3 million. However, based on article 7.2. of the ERPA, agent fees, solidarity contributions and the claim of another club (Groningen) were deducted to arrive at the final figure. The same process will have applied to the transfer of Promes.

Castaignos, Chikh and Mokhtar were sold for relatively low transfer fees (€2.5 million, €1.5 million and €1 million respectively). It is now possible to predict what truly happened to Doyen’s share of Castaignos’ economic rights. As Doyen’s share of the economic rights attached to Castaignos was 50% (see table 1), it should get €1.25 million (50% of €2.5 million). However, the particular conditions also stipulate that in such a case Doyen would be awarded the minimum fee, on 1 July 2015 it amounted to €1.8 million. Because Doyen’s share of Castaignos’ transfer fee (€1.25 million) is lower than the minimum fee (€1.8 million), it probably received the latter.

As to Ebecilio and Eghan, both remained at FC Twente after the put option date passed (31 August 2015), whether Doyen exercised its put option or not remains unknown. If Doyen has exercised this option, it would have received €780.000 for Ebecilio and €650.000 for Eghan.

Typically, these fees are not paid immediately at the date of the transfer. Instead the payment is divided in separate instalments. It is possible (even likely in light of its price tag), but we lack definite information on this point, that the settlement agreement between Doyen and FC Twente covers all outstanding instalments regarding previous transfers.  

IV. Is the ERPA in breach of KNVB and FIFA Regulations?

The Dutch media is full of rumours about the terrible things that are about to happen to FC Twente. Is the club going to go bankrupt? Or, will it be “only” losing more points in an already difficult battle to save its place in the Eredivisie? Until now, with few exceptions, very little substantial legal analysis has been provided. The KNVB and FIFA are the two main private regulators susceptible of going after FC Twente, though UEFA has also been mentioned in the press, but we are unable to identify under which legal basis it could get involved in the matter. One thing is certain, entering an ERPA with Doyen is a losing bet for a club. It takes huge financial risks and is the only actor facing disciplinary sanctions as Doyen escapes the jurisdiction of the football associations.

A. Has FC Twente breached the rules of the KNVB?

Pursuant to Article 57(1) of the KNVB Regulations, it is prohibited for clubs to reach any agreement that allows a third party to influence the club’s independence regarding the transfers of players. This provision is a mandatory transposition by the Dutch FA, as provided by article 1.3 of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (RSTP), of article 18bis RSTP (See below). The KNVB has stated that it was aware of the existence of the ERPA between FC Twente and Doyen and that it even intervened to prevent unauthorized influence by Doyen. However, the Dutch FA was apparently not informed of the existence of the additional agreement signed between Doyen and FC Twente and a KNVB insider was quoted saying that those provisions “appear to show that Doyen does exert influence on FC Twente”. Yet, at the time of writing, it remains unclear whether FC Twente is subjected to a formal investigation by the KNVB.

In fact, the difference between the original agreement and the additional agreement is flagrant and crucial. In the former case FC Twente was entirely free to refuse a transfer offer whatever its amount, while, in the latter, if an offer reached a minimum amount, the club was forced to sell the player or to pay out Doyen’s share on the offer. At this point in time, all parties must have been perfectly conscious that FC Twente was unable to disburse any cent to buy back the economic rights owned by Doyen. Hence, its transfer policy was entirely at the goodwill of the investment fund and the potential buyers. The fact that FC Twente did not disclose the additional agreement to the KNVB obviously vindicates this assessment. Moreover, the latest release by footballleaks shows that the original ERPA signed in December 2013 included some of the most controversial provisions regarding transfers. These were later redacted out of the agreement and inserted in the additional agreement, probably to circumvent the control of the KNVB. It will be extremely difficult for the KNVB to deny that Doyen exercised a substantial influence on FC Twente’s transfer decisions regarding the players subjected to the ERPA. The potential sanctions are listed in Article 11 of the License Regulations (page 78-90 of the KNVB Regulations) and include a fine, a points deduction or withdrawal of the license. Having in mind the severe financial situation FC Twente finds itself in, this could lead to the full-blown bankruptcy of the club. 

B. Has FC Twente breached the FIFA Regulations?

FC Twente might be facing a FIFA sanction as well. As everybody knows by now, the FIFA ban on TPO entered into force on 1 May 2015.[3] However, the ERPA between FC Twente and Doyen is not falling under the ban, as it is not applicable retroactively. Hence, its conformity to FIFA regulations can only be assessed in relation to the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (RSTP) in force at the signature of the ERPA. Back then article 18bis of the RSTP on third-party influence on clubs provided that: 

1.      No club shall enter into a contract which enables any other party to that contract or any third party to acquire the ability to influence in employment and transfer-related matters its independence, its policies or the performance of its teams.

2.     The FIFA Disciplinary Committee may impose disciplinary measures on clubs that do not observe the obligations set out in this article.

The whole legal debate will hinge, as for KNVB proceedings, on whether Doyen had the ability to influence the policy of FC Twente in employment and transfer-related matters. As we have argued above, the agreement points a loaded financial gun at FC Twente’s head each time a transfer offer of a certain amount is made, or when the club wishes to renew the contract of a player subjected to the ERPA. There is very little doubt that the transfer policy of a club in financial difficulties will be directly influenced by an investor, which can financially pull the plug on the club at virtually any time if it refuses to sell a player for a certain fee. The problem now for FIFA (and KNVB) will be to find an appropriate sanction for the club. It is the only party facing disciplinary proceedings (Doyen is out of FIFA or KNVB’s disciplinary reach). In the end, the supporters and players are the victims of a gross mismanagement of the club’s affairs due to the hubris of an irresponsible president. FIFA will also have to decide whether the many other ERPAs signed by Doyen (you can find a probably incomplete list of Doyen’s investment in players here), which include similar provisions (see Doyen’s model ERPA here) are also in breach of article 18bis. If yes, and we think there is no reason to decide otherwise, then a number of clubs (think Atletico, Sporting or Porto) might face  FIFA (or national FA) sanctions in the near future. This case is not ending with FC Twente, it is about all the clubs that have signed an ERPA with Doyen Sport in the past.

Additionally, it is also possible that FC Twente be found in breach of Annexe 3 of the FIFA RSTP, which regulates the use of the FIFA ‘Transfer Matching System’ (TMS) in the case of a transfer. The TMS is an online system that intends to make international transfers of players between clubs quicker, smoother and more transparent. Under article 4.4 of Annexe 3, in case FC Twente transfers a player (five of the players concerned by the ERPA have been transferred), it must introduce in the FIFA TMS a ‘Declaration on third-party payments and influence’. It is thinkable that FC Twente did not include the full ERPA in the TMS system and might also, therefore, face the FIFA sanctions provided in article 9.4 of the Annexe.

In a nutshell, FC Twente is now in deep(er) trouble because it decided to play Maltese roulette with a ruthless investor.

[1] In fact, the KNVB has already deducted six points from FC Twente in the 2014/15 season for financial mismanagement.

[2] Point 9.4 of the ERPA.

[3] More information on the TPO ban can be found in our previous Bogs, such as “Blog Symposium: FIFA’s TPO ban and its compatibility with EU competition law – Introduction”.

Editor’s note: Stefano Bastianon is Associate Professor in EU Law and EU sports law at the University of Bergamo and lawyer admitted to the Busto Arsizio bar.*

1. Introduction.

The so-called specificity of sport represents one of the most debated, if not the most debated, but still undefined issue under European Union (EU) law. A noteworthy peculiarity is that the specificity of sport is frequently mentioned in several legislative and political documents issued by EU institutions, however it is not expressly referred to in any judgment by the European Court of Justice (ECJ).Conversely, the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) case-law on Art. 17 of FIFA Regulations on status and transfer of players (RSTP) has repeatedly and expressly referred to the specificity of sport.[1] Apparently, the concept of specificity of sport has different meanings and purposes in the ECJ and CAS jurisprudence. In this blog (divided in two parts), I will try to analyse those two different meanings and to what extent the CAS case-law is consistent with the concept of specificity of sport as elaborated under EU law.

2. The specificity of sport under EU law.

The concept of the specificity of sport is mentioned in several documents issued by the EU institutions. In the Helsinki Report on Sport (1999), it is affirmed that ‘the application of the Treaty's competition rules to the sporting sector must take account of the specific characteristics of sport, especially the interdependence between sporting activity and the economic activity that it generates, the principle of equal opportunities and the uncertainty of the result’. According to the Declaration of Nice, (2000) ‘even though not having any direct powers in this area, the Community must, in its action under the various Treaty provisions, take account of the social, educational and cultural functions inherent in sport and making it special, in order that the code of ethics and the solidarity essential to the preservation of its social role may be respected and nurtured’.

However, neither the Nice Declaration nor the Helsinki Report contains a clear definition of the specificity of sport: the Helsinki Report simply lists some specific characteristics of sports activities that are particularly important in the field of antitrust law, whereas the Nice Declaration identifies the specificity of sport with the social, educational and cultural functions inherent in sport. The same applies to the White Paper on Sport (2007), where it is stated that ‘sport has certain specific characteristics, which are often referred to as the “specificity of sport”’. According to the White Paper, the specificity of sport can be approached through two prisms: ‘the specificity of sporting activities and of sporting rules, such as separate competitions for men and women, limitations on the number of participants in competitions, or the need to ensure uncertainty concerning outcomes and to preserve a competitive balance between clubs taking part in the same competitions; the specificity of the sport structure, including the autonomy and diversity of sport organisations, a pyramid structure of competitions from grassroots to elite level and organised solidarity mechanisms between the different levels and operators, the organisation of sport on a national basis, and the principle of a single federation per sport’.

Axiomatically, the White Paper tried to draw a distinction between the specificity of sporting rules  and the specificity of sporting structure The Commission’s effort is certainly commendable, except for two aspects:

a) on the one hand, the Commission does not offer a clear definition of the specificity of sport and instead has just highlighted some features of the specificity of sport in the EU context;

b) on the other hand, some of these features are rather questionable and deserve to be discussed in more detail. For example, separate competitions for men and women. What is the EU legal basis for not allowing Serena Williams to play the final of Wimbledon against Novak Djokovic? Similarly, as regards the competitive balance argument, we can all agree that it is good, but no one can truly define a ‘balanced’ competition. So, if we do not know how much competitive balance is needed, how can we say that it is always good?

More recently, Art. 165 TFEU states that ‘the Union shall contribute to the promotion of European sporting issues, while taking account of the specific nature of sport’. Again, the specificity of sport is only mentioned, but not defined. Lastly, the report Mapping the specificity of sport by the European Commission – Directorate-General for Education and Culture (2016) says that ‘the specificity of sport refers to the inherent characteristics of sport which set it apart from other economic and social activities’.

It follows from the foregoing that under EU sports policy, all the institutions agree on the fact that sport is special, in the sense that it is different from any other activity because of its social and educational dimension. That said, if one tries to translate this concept into a definition to be applied in concrete cases it is impossible to find a common benchmark.

3. The specificity of sport in the case law of the ECJ

In terms of EU case-law, the situation is even more difficult, given the ECJ has never defined the notion of specificity of sport. Rather, the Court of Justice has always indirectly dealt with the specificity of sport in terms of a general rule and its (even more general and not defined) exceptions. Since the Walrave ruling, the ECJ has always stated that ‘the practice of sport is subject to Community [now European] law only in so far as it constitutes an economic activity’ (the rule); however at the same time is has also stated that the prohibition of any discrimination based on nationality ‘does not affect the composition of sport teams, in particular national teams, the formation of which is a question of purely sporting interest and as such has nothing to do with economic activity’ (the exception). The Walrave judgment (and subsequent ECJ case-law) shows that from the very beginning the common idea had been that sporting rules relating to purely sporting issues were as such, not subject to EU law and were known as purely sporting rules.

From a legal point of view, the notion of purely sporting rules is unclear. Through case law however, the ECJ managed to translate the concept of purely sporting rules into a workable tool to distinguish which rules are subject to EU law and which were not. In this context, it was possible to say that the purely sporting rules and the specificity of sport were two sides of the same coin. In other words, sport was not special because it was subject to EU law, but at the same time, it was special because some sporting rules were outside the scope of the Treaty.

This situation totally changed after the Meca Medina judgment by the ECJ. In order to contextualise the relevance of the Meca Medina case, it is worth recalling that the case was about the allegedly anticompetitive nature of the antidoping rules of the International Olympic Committee (IOC).

During the first round before the General Court, the judges stated that purely sporting rules may have nothing to do with economic activity, such that they do not fall within the scope of provisions on the free movement of people. Consequently, they have nothing to do with the economic relationships of competition, with the result that they also do not fall within the scope of Arts. 81 and 82 EC [now Arts. 101 and 102 TFEU]. Since the prohibition of doping is based on purely sporting considerations, it follows that it has nothing to do with any economic considerations. Thus, antidoping rules cannot come within the scope of the Treaty provisions on the economic freedoms and, in particular, of provisions on the free movement of people and competition.

Though according to the ECJ, the reasoning of the General Court amounted to a mistake in law. In its judgement, the ECJ underlined that ‘the mere fact that a rule is purely sporting in nature does not have the effect of removing from the scope of the Treaty the person engaging in the activity governed by that rule or the body which has laid it down. If the sporting activity in question falls within the scope of the Treaty, the conditions for engaging in it are then subject to all the obligations which result from the various provisions of the Treaty. It follows that the rules which govern that activity must satisfy the requirements of those provisions, which, in particular, seek to ensure freedom of movement for workers, freedom of establishment, freedom to provide services, or competition. Therefore, even if those rules do not constitute restrictions on freedom of movement because they concern questions of purely sporting interest and, as such, have nothing to do with economic activity, that fact means neither that the sporting activity in question necessarily falls outside the scope of Articles 81 EC and 82 EC nor that the rules do not satisfy the specific requirements of those articles. In such a context, account must first of all be taken of the overall context in which the decision of the association of undertakings was taken or produces its effects and, more specifically, of its objectives. It has then to be considered whether the consequential effects restrictive of competition are inherent in the pursuit of those objectives and are proportionate to them’.

Though not explicitly stated in the ruling, the traditional approach based on the distinction between purely sporting rules and economic rules was openly denied by the ECJ and the notion of purely sporting rules expelled from EU law. Moreover, the new solution adopted by the ECJ does not simply amount to a terminological change; Consequently, any sporting rule is now subject to EU law per the Meca Medina judgment. Further, in cases where a sporting rule is challenged based on competition law, we must apply the Wouters test to assess the compatibility of the rule with EU law.Then in cases where a sporting rule is challenged on the basis of free movement principles, we must apply the Gebhard test to assess the compatibility of the rule with EU law. Although slightly different, these two tests require assessing the overall context of the rule, the objectives of the rule, if and to what extent the rule is able to attain each objective, and the proportionality of the rule.

The Meca Medina jurisprudence was later also endorsed by the Commission: in the White Paper on Sport, it stated that ‘in respect of the regulatory aspects of sport, the assessment whether a certain sporting rule is compatible with EU competition law can only be made on a case-by-case basis, as recently confirmed by the European Court of Justice in its Meca-Medina ruling. The Court provided a clarification regarding the impact of EU law on sporting rules. It dismissed the notion of “purely sporting rules” as irrelevant for the question of the applicability of EU competition rules to the sport sector. The Court recognised that the specificity of sport has to be taken into consideration in the sense that restrictive effects on competition that are inherent in the organisation and proper conduct of competitive sport are not in breach of EU competition rules, provided that these effects are proportionate to the legitimate genuine sporting interest pursued. The necessity of a proportionality test implies the need to take into account the individual features of each case. It does not allow for the formulation of general guidelines on the application of competition law to the sport sector.’

The new approach raises two fundamental problems:

a) the Wouters test as well as the Gebhard test apply to all sectors of the economy: they apply to goods as well as to services, to lawyers as well to sportspeople. Consequently, if the specificity of sport is taken into account based on the same rules and the same exceptions provided for any other type of economic activity, it follows that sport is no less special under EU law than one may think. Sport is deemed to be special, but sports matters are governed by the same legal tests applied in other economic sectors.

b) according to the Meca Medina judgment, the Court of Justice has the right to assess the proportionate character of any sporting rule allegedly in contrast with EU law. For example, rules relating to penalties in doping cases, rules of the game and rules relating to nationality requirements to be selected for national teams. Undoubtedly, in such cases the ECJ will state that the objectives of these rules are legitimate.

Unfortunately, the same is not true for whether these rules are proportionate. In other words, the simple idea that the ECJ has the right to assess the proportionality of a rule fixing the number of players on the field of play means that sport is no longer special under EU law.  It is important to  remember that in the Meca Medina case, the ECJ ruled that the anti-doping rules at issue were not disproportionate only because the plaintiffs did not plead that the penalties were excessive. What may have happened if the plaintiffs had contested the proportionality of these penalties? Can one be certain that the ECJ has the competence to  decide whether a two-year penalty for doping is/is not proportionate? Does the specificity of sport really require this?

* Associate Professor of EU law and EU sports law, University of Bergamo (Italy); Attorney-at-law; CAS arbitrator. The views, thoughts, and opinions expressed in the text belong solely to the author.

[1] See M. Colucci, The specificity of sport and the employment relationship of athletes, R. Blanpain, F. Hendrickx (eds.), Labour Law between Change and Tradition: Liber Amicorum Antoine Jacobs, 2011, Kluwer Law International BV, The Netherlands.