On 21 January 2015, the Court of arbitration for sport (CAS) rendered its award in the latest avatar of the Mutu case, aka THE sports law case that keeps on giving (this decision might still be appealed to the Swiss Federal tribunal and a complaint by Mutu is still pending in front of the European Court of Human Right). The decision was finally published on the CAS website on Tuesday. Basically, the core question focuses on the interpretation of Article 14. 3 of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players in its 2001 version. More precisely, whether, in case of a dismissal of a player (Mutu) due to a breach of the contract without just cause by the player, the new club (Juventus and/or Livorno) bears the duty to pay the compensation due by the player to his former club (Chelsea). Despite winning maybe the most high profile case in the history of the CAS, Chelsea has been desperately hunting for its money since the rendering of the award (as far as the US), but it is a daunting task. Thus, the English football club had the idea to turn against Mutu’s first employers after his dismissal in 2005, Juventus and Livorno, with success in front of the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC), but as we will see the CAS decided otherwise[1].

      I.         Facts and Procedure of the Mutu Case

The Mutu saga is probably one of the most well known sagas in the sports law world (with the unavoidable Bosman case and the up and coming Pechstein one). It cumulates the glamour drama of a star’s downfall due to a positive cocaine test and many important legal developments.

The saga started in July 2004 with a private drug test conducted by Chelsea on Mutu that turned out to be positive to cocaine. The club issued a fine and a warning. But, in October 2004, Mutu was again tested positive to cocaine, this time by the English FA. Upon this finding, and Mutu’s admission of having ingested cocaine, Chelsea decided to terminate his contract on 28 October 2004. On 29 January 2005 the player was registered at Livorno, before being transferred two days later to Juventus. Juventus had reached its quota of non-EU players it could recruit from outside Italy and used this strategy to circumvent the Italian rules applicable at that time.

Meanwhile, Mutu had challenged in front of the FA’s Appeals Committee (FAPLAC) the decision of Chelsea to terminate his employment contract. In April 2005, the FAPLAC decided that Mutu had committed a breach of his employment contract without just cause. Mutu appealed this decision to the CAS without success (CAS 2005/A/876). In May 2006, Chelsea launched a complaint before the DRC to obtain compensation against the player on the basis of the contractual breach without just cause. The DRC in its decision from 26 October 2006 (available here) held that it could not pronounce itself on the matter and that Chelsea had to turn to FAPLAC. Chelsea appealed the decision to the CAS, which enjoined the DRC to decide on the matter (CAS 2006/A/1192). Consequently, the DRC decided on 7 May 2008 to award €17, 173 990 in damages to Chelsea. Unsurprisingly, Mutu decided to appeal the decision to the CAS, he was especially contesting the amount of compensation awarded, which on 31 July 2009 endorsed the decision of the DRC (CAS 2008/A/1644). It even held that the damage claims of Chelsea were higher, but decided it could not go ultra petita and award a higher sum to the club. Mutu, which had unsuccessfully challenged the independence and impartiality of one of the arbitrators due to his previous participation in the first Mutu case (CAS 2005/A/876), went on to contest the validity of the award in front of the Swiss Federal Tribunal (SFT) mainly on this basis. In its decision (4A_458/2009), the SFT rejected Mutu’s claims regarding the lack of independence of the arbitrator, a decision that has attracted widespread criticisms in the literature.[2] Moreover, it also held that the amount of compensation awarded was not a restriction to free movement in the sense of the Bosman ruling and could not amount to an infringement of Mutu’s personality rights. Thereafter, Mutu decided to continue his fight in yet another forum: the European Court of Human Rights (40575/10).

Chelsea had the final award giving it the right to damages, but still needed to get hold on the money. To do so, it even asked (and obtained) for the recognition and the enforcement of the award in the US (see here), where Mutu was expected to have some property. Nevertheless, Mutu went on to play for smaller and smaller teams, thus earning less and less, and Chelsea’s hope of getting paid in full faded away. However, on 15 July 2010, five years after Mutu’s move to Italy’s Serie A in the first place, Chelsea decided to submit a petition to the FIFA DRC against Juventus and Livorno, asking the DRC to find them jointly liable for the awarded compensation. The claim was based on Article 14.3. of the RSTP 2001, stating that: "If a player is registered for a new club and has not paid a sum of compensation within the one month time limit referred to above, the new club shall be deemed jointly responsible for payment of the amount of compensation." The DRC, in an unpublished decision dated 25 April 2013 (see here and here), followed the interpretation of Article 14.3. RSTP suggested by Chelsea and found that “under the clear wording of Article 14.3, the Player's New Club was automatically jointly responsible for the payment of the Awarded Compensation due by the Player, should the latter fail to fulfil his obligations within a month of notification of the relevant decision”.[3] This provision would make “no distinction between the termination of the contract by a player without just cause and the termination of a contract by a club with just cause”.[4] It also held that "the registrations of the player with both [Appellants] were so closely connected that, given the exceptional circumstances of this specific matter, both Juventus and Livorno should be considered the player's new club in the sense of art. 14 of the Application Regulations”.[5]

Both Juventus and Livorno decided to appeal this decision to the CAS, which in its award decided to reject the DRC’s reasoning.

    II.         The Meaning of Article 14.3 FIFA RSTP

The whole case focuses on the interpretation of the wording of Article 14.3 of the RSTP 2001. Does it mean that every club, whatever the circumstances, must pay compensation when it hires a player that bears the responsibility of the breach of his contract? Or, does it restrict this duty to the cases where the breach can be reasonably imputed to the will of the player to leave his former club?

A. Contractual or statutory interpretation?

In order to determine the interpretative tools to be used to identify the meaning of article 14.3 RSTP, the Panel must first clarify the nature of Article 14.3 under Swiss law.[6] Basically, is the provision of a contractual or quasi-statutory nature? The Panel “does not consider that there is a contractual relationship between the Appellants and Chelsea”.[7] Indeed, “[i]f there is no contractual relationship between an indirect member (i.e. any of the Parties) and a sport federation (i.e. FIFA), the conclusion should be the same as regards the relationship between two indirect members of the same federation”.[8] Furthermore, the “[a]cceptance of general rules (such as FIFA Regulations) does not necessarily entail subjection to specific obligations when their scope must be determinable on the basis of minimum criteria”.[9] Thus, the question raised implies only the interpretation of the bylaw of a Swiss legal entity, FIFA.

The Panel highlights four methods of interpretation under Swiss law:

-  the literal interpretation ("interprétation littérale");

-  the systematic interpretation ("interprétation systématique");

-  the principle of purposive interpretation ("interprétation téléologique");

-  the principle of so-called "compliant interpretation" ("interprétation conforme").[10]

The “starting point” [11] is always the wording of the text. The Swiss Federal Tribunal recognizes that “[t]here is no reason to depart from the plain text, unless there are objective reasons to think that it does not reflect the core meaning of the provision under review”.[12] Moreover, when asked to interpret a law, the SFT “adopts a pragmatic approach and follows a plurality of methods, without assigning any priority to the various means of interpretation”.[13] However, the question is whether those interpretative methods should also apply to the (private) bylaws of a private association. The Panel notes that “[a]s regards the statutes of larger entities, it may be more appropriate to have recourse to the method of interpretation applicable to the law, whereas in the presence of smaller enterprises, the statutes may more legitimately be interpreted by reference to good faith”.[14] It finds that “FIFA's regulations have effects which are felt worldwide, and should therefore be subject to the more objective interpretation principles” applicable to Swiss laws.[15]

In short, the Panel is of the opinion that FIFA regulations, bylaws of an association under Swiss law, are to be interpreted analogously to national laws.

B. EU law as THE decisive contextual element to interpret the RSTP

The Panel first tries to interpret Article 14.3 on the basis of its wording. However, it is of the opinion that the wording is ambiguous and therefore “it is necessary to look beyond the wording of this provision”[16] and adopts what it calls a “contextual approach”.

In short, “the context surrounding the implementation of the RSTP 2001 is of crucial importance in interpreting Article 14.3”.[17] In the view of the Panel (and the appellants), this context is constituted by the application of EU law to sport and especially the Bosman case of the Court of Justice of the EU. Indeed, it is “[a]s part of the reform of the FIFA and UEFA rules following the Bosman decision, [that] FIFA adopted the RSTP 2001”.[18] Thus, the requirements set by the CJEU’s jurisprudence in sports matters are decisive to define the reach of the provisions included in the RSTP. Moreover, the rejection decision of the Commission regarding the complaint submitted against FIFA’s transfer regulations is also important.[19] Specifically, the Panel deduces from the Commission’s decision that it recognizes the need to sanction unilateral termination of contracts.[20]

In the present case, it is precisely the “contractual stability [that] is at the centre of the debate”.[21] In a nutshell, does the paramount objective of contractual stability justify that Juventus and Livorno be considered jointly liable for the breach of contract of Mutu leading to the termination by Chelsea of his contract?

In this regard, Chelsea considers that Article 14.3 “is designed to protect contractual stability by means of a deterrent, namely by ensuring that the parties who benefit from the player's breach – the player himself and his New Club – are not allowed to enjoy that benefit without paying compensation to the player's former club”.[22] While, Juventus and Livorno consider that “Article 14.3 – and FIFA regulations in general – are not meant to protect a club's bad investment”.[23] Which one of this two interpretations is EU law supporting? That is the question.

For the Panel “the Player was the author of his misfortune, but the Club was not required to terminate his employment if they still valued his services and preferred to hold him to his contract”. Indeed, “[t]he Club was entitled, not obliged, to dismiss him” and it “makes all the difference in terms of assessing the position of his subsequent employer(s) under the FIFA regulations, read in light of their object and purpose”.[24] As “Chelsea put an end to the Player's Employment Contract, no issue of contract stability, whose purpose was to safeguard the functioning and regularity of sporting competition, was at stake”.[25] Thus, “it strains logic for the club now to contend that the Appellants somehow enriched themselves by acquiring an asset (the player) which it chose to discard”.[26] Moreover, “the Panel finds it hard to understand how, in the name of contract stability, Chelsea's claim of € 17,173,990 against the Player is to be borne jointly and severally by the New Club, which has never expressed a specific agreement in this regard, had nothing to do with the Player's contractual breach, and was not even called to participate in the proceedings, which established the Awarded Compensation”.[27] Additionally, it seems “incongruous for Chelsea to try to seek an advantage from the fact that the New Club benefits from the Player’s services, whereas Chelsea was no longer interested in his service”.[28] Hence, “Chelsea's conduct appears to have had no other purpose than to increase its chances for greater financial compensation” and the Panel “does not see the connection between the damage being claimed and the interest of protecting legitimate contractual expectations”.[29] In other words, the interpretation of Article 14.3 RSTP supported by Chelsea does not fit the fundamental objective of this provision, as highlighted by its legislative context (mainly the Lethonen case of the CJEU and the Commission’s rejection decision in the competition law complaint against the FIFA transfer system) and cannot be followed.

Interestingly, the Panel also recognized that “[t]here must be a balance between the players’ fundamental right to free movement and the principle of stability of contracts, as supported by the legitimate objective of safeguarding the integrity of the sport and the stability of championships”.[30] In the present case, “[i]f the New Club had to pay compensation even if it is established that it bears no responsibility whatsoever in the breach of the Employment Contract, the player would be hindered from finding a new employer”.[31] Indeed, “it is not difficult to perceive that no New Club would be prepared to pay a multi-million compensation (or transfer fee), in particular for a player who was fired for gross misconduct, was banned for several months, and suffered drug problems”.[32] In short, “Chelsea's interpretation of Article 14.3 would bring the matter back into pre-Bosman times, when transfer fees obstructed the players' freedom of movement”.[33] This is unacceptable for the Panel. Had Chelsea’s interpretation been tolerated “the balance sought by the 2001 RSTP between the players' rights and an efficient transfer system, which responds to the specific needs of football and preserves the regularity and proper functioning of sporting competition would be upset”.[34] Consequently, this interpretation is deemed “incompatible with the fundamental principle of freedom to exercise a professional activity and is disproportionate to the protection of the old club's legitimate interests”.[35] Thus, the Panel concludes “that Article 14.3 does not apply in cases where it was the employer's decision to dismiss with immediate effect a player who, in turn, had no intention to leave the club in order to sign with another club and where the New Club has not committed any fault and/or was not involved in the termination of the employment relationship between the old club and the Player”.[36]

Conclusion

This award is of great interest, not so much for its solution - it is difficult to understand how the FIFA DRC could construct Article 14.3 RSTP as imposing a joint liability on Juventus and Livorno - as for the method used to reach it. The CAS had already in the past based its interpretation of the RSTP on its legislative history and especially on it being the result of a negotiation with the EU Commission in the aftermath of the Bosman ruling.[37] It is the first time, however, that it does so in such length and depth. This contextual reading of Article 14.3 tipped decisively the balance in favor of the appellants. Furthermore, it is a timely reminder for other CAS Panels that FIFA’s RSTP must be interpreted in conformity with EU law and especially the case law of the CJEU on the free movement of workers. If not, CAS awards will face problems at the enforcement stage, as highlighted by the recent SV Wilhelmshaven ruling of the OLG Bremen (see our comment here on the EU law dimension)[38]. This implies that the restrictions it imposes on the free movement of players must be justified by a legitimate objective recognized by the CJEU and be proportionate to attain this objective. In the present case, the interpretation of 14.3 promoted by the DRC runs counter to this requirement as it is not truly aimed at an acceptable legitimate objective and certainly not a proportionate mean to attain contractual stability. Nonetheless, this reasoning could also put into question previous interpretations of the FIFA RSTP. This is especially true for the case-law on the implementation of Article 17 RSTP. The Panel, conscious of the potential implication of the analysis used, is adamant that this case-law is compatible with an EU law conform interpretation. Yet, EU law scholars strongly oppose this view and it can be reasonably argued that the way damages are calculated in case of a breach of a contract under Article 17 is not compatible with the letter and spirit of EU law as applied to the transfer system in Bosman and after[39].

This case will set a resounding precedent for future CAS awards. Lawyers dealing with disputes involving the FIFA RSTP in front of the FIFA DRC and the CAS should take note of this development and introduce wider references to EU law in their briefs.

[1] For this article I have much profited from the outstanding research assistance of Thalia Diathesopoulou.

[2]G. Von Segesser, ‘Equality of Information and Impartiality of Arbitrators’, in P. Wautelet, T. Kruger, G. Coppens (eds), The Practice of Arbitration: Essays in Honour of Hans van Houtte

Hart, 2012, pp.45-51 and L. Beffa, ‘Challenge of International Arbitration Awards in Switzerland for Lack of Independence and/or Impartiality of an Arbitrator – Is it Time to Change the Approach?’ (2011) ASA Bulletin 598 et seq.

[3] CAS 2013/A/3365 & 3366, para 39.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid

[6]Ibid, para. 121-136

[7] Ibid, para. 131

[8] Ibid, para. 131

[9] Ibid, para. 131

[10] Ibid, para.137

[11] Ibid, para.138

[12] Ibid, para.139

[13]Ibid,  para.139

[14]Ibid, para.139

[15]Ibid, para.140

[16]Ibid, para.148

[17]Ibid, para.149

[18]Ibid, para.151

[19]Ibid, para.156

[20]Ibid, para.157

[21]Ibid, para.158

[22]Ibid, para.159

[23]Ibid, para.160

[24]Ibid, para. 161

[25]Ibid, para. 163

[26]Ibid, para. 163

[27]Ibid, para. 165

[28]Ibid, para. 166

[29]Ibid, para. 168

[30]Ibid, para. 169

[31]Ibid, para. 172

[32] Ibid

[33] Ibid, para.174

[34]Ibid, para.174

[35]Ibid, para.174

[36]Ibid,  para.177

[37] ‘It must be remembered that the FIFA Regulations have been issued to regulate the legal and economic aspects of the transfer of players in accordance with the principle of free movement of workers as established by the EC treaty and substantiated by the European Court of Justice in its ruling of 15 December 1995 (case C-415/93), thereby taking the specific needs of professional football into account. In this context, any provisions in the FIFA regulations affecting the player’s freedom of movement should be interpreted narrowly.’ CAS 2004/A/691 FC Barcelona SAD v. Manchester United FC, para. 38; ‘However, the principle behind Art. 5 para. 5 of the Application Regulations is clear: the free movement of workers within the EU/EEA must not be restricted by the imposition of a requirement for the payment of sums by way of compensation for training and education in respect of a player to whom the training club does not offer a contract. In such a case, the failure to offer a contract is an important factor in the assessment of compensation. The compensation payable should not be of such an amount as would impede the player’s ability to move to a new club.’ CAS 2006/A/1125 Hertha BSC Berlin v. Stade Lavallois Mayenne FC, award of 1 December 2006, para. 25; ‘Finally, because of the potentially high amounts of compensation involved, giving clubs a regulatory right to the market value of players and allowing lost profits to be claimed in such manner would in effect bring the system partially back to the pre-Bosman days when players’ freedom of movement was unduly hindered by transfer fees and their careers and well-being could be seriously affected by them becoming pawns in the hands of their clubs and a vector through which clubs could reap considerable benefits without sharing the profit or taking corresponding risks. In view of the text and the history of article 17 par. 1 of the FIFA Status Regulations, allowing any form of compensation that could have such an effect would clearly be anachronistic and legally unsound.’ CAS 2007/A/1298 Wigan Athletic FC v/ Heart of Midlothian & CAS 2007/A/1299 Heart of Midlothian v/ Webster & Wigan Athletic FC & CAS 2007/A/1300 Webster v/ Heart of Midlothian, para. 81.

[38] A. Duval, ‘The Court of Arbitration for Sport  and EU law: Chronicle of an Encounter’, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, forthcoming.

[39] See, R. Parrish, ‘Article 17 of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players: Compatibility with EU Law ‘Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, forthcoming. See also, Pearson, G. (2015), Sporting Justifications under EU Free Movement and Competition Law: The Case of the Football ‘Transfer System’. European Law Journal, 21: 220–238.

Editor’s note: Emilio García (emilio.garcia@uefa.ch)  is a doctor in law and head of disciplinary and integrity at UEFA. Before joining UEFA, he was the Spanish Football Federation’s legal director (2004–12) and an arbitrator at the CAS (2012–13).In this blog, Emilio García provides a brief review of a recent case before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS): Klubi Sportiv Skënderbeu v UEFA (CAS 2016/A/4650)[1], in which he acted as main counsel for UEFA. 

Sport and match-fixing – A quick overview

Match-fixing is now legally defined as “an intentional arrangement, act or omission aimed at an improper alteration of the result or the course of a sports competition in order to remove all or part of the unpredictable nature of the aforementioned sports competition with a view to obtaining an undue advantage for oneself or for others”.[2] It has been said that there has always been match-fixing in sport.[3] From the ancient Olympic Games to the most important global sports competitions of today, manipulation of results has always been an all-too-frequent occurrence.

We have seen a number of very prominent instances of this kind of issue over the years. One of the most remarkable examples, which was even the subject of a film,[4] was the match-fixing episode during the 1919 World Series, where several players from the Chicago White Sox were found guilty of accepting bribes and deliberately losing matches against the Cincinnati Reds.[5]

The situation has changed considerably since then. In particular, the globalisation of the sports betting industry has had a massive impact, with recent studies estimating that between €200bn and €500bn is betted on sport every year.[6] Match-fixing does not just affect football either;[7] it is also affecting other sports, most notably tennis.[8] 

In addition to these impressive figures, it is well recognised that match-fixing has become a global issue because it allows organised criminal gangs to expand their illegal and violent activities – which include murder, extortion and assault – worldwide. It also results in the loss of billions of dollars of tax revenue and public income every year. Indeed, match-fixing is now one of the most profitable forms of money laundering.[9]

In light of the growth of this phenomenon, both international sports federations and public authorities are now engaged in a continuous battle against this scourge. More and more sports federations are establishing specific programmes in this area, which is having a major impact at national level.[10] And as regards public authorities, various resolutions have been adopted by the European Union, several initiatives have been launched by INTERPOL and EUROPOL, and, in particular, excellent work has been done by the Council of Europe, which adopted the first ever international treaty aimed at combating the manipulation of sports competitions. These are all good examples of cooperation between public authorities and the world of sport, but we are still a long way from winning this particular battle.

UEFA’s rules and integrity-related cases

AC Milan: UEFA’s first modern-day integrity case

In May 2006, a match-fixing scandal – christened the ‘Calciopoli’ – was unearthed in Italian football. Investigations led by the Italian police revealed that a network of club managers, officials responsible for referees and other individuals had sought to influence the outcome of various matches in the Serie A. Several clubs were punished by the Italian Football Federation (FIGC). One of those clubs was AC Milan, which was given a 30-point penalty. However, despite the deduction of those points, AC Milan still managed to qualify for the 2006/07 UEFA Champions League.

Thus, the admissions process for the 2006/07 UEFA Champions League presented UEFA with a real legal conundrum: could UEFA allow a club that had been punished for its involvement in the Calciopoli to take part in a European competition? On 2 August 2006, the UEFA Emergency Panel decided to allow AC Milan to participate in UEFA’s flagship competition on the basis of the following considerations:

“The UEFA Emergency Panel, being competent to decide on the matter, came to the conclusion that it had no choice but to admit AC Milan for the UEFA club competitions 2006-07 for formal reasons because of an insufficient legal basis in the regulations which would allow not admitting AC Milan under specific circumstances.”[11]

This situation was highly frustrating for UEFA, which felt that it was unable to prevent AC Milan from participating in its competition, despite the club’s involvement in match-fixing. It should also be noted that AC Milan went on to win that competition, beating English side Liverpool FC in the final on 23 May 2007.

Evolution of the legal framework

UEFA’s response to the AC Milan case was a swift one. At the very next UEFA Congress, which took place in Dusseldorf on 25 and 26 January 2007, representatives of the various member associations approved a new paragraph 3 for Article 50 of the UEFA Statutes.[12]

That amendment, which remains in force today, established a two-stage process aimed at guaranteeing the integrity of UEFA’s competitions. The first stage involves an administrative measure, whereby the offending club is excluded from European competitions for one season. The second stage involves disciplinary measures, which may be imposed subsequent to the administrative measure and do not have a maximum duration.[13]

Article 50(3) of the UEFA Statutes reads as follows:

“The admission to a UEFA competition of a Member Association or club directly or indirectly involved in any activity aimed at arranging or influencing the outcome of a match at national or international level can be refused with immediate effect, without prejudice to any possible disciplinary measures.”

That provision has also been incorporated in the regulations governing the UEFA Champions League and the UEFA Europa League, which currently feature the following wording:

“If, on the basis of all the factual circumstances and information available to UEFA, UEFA concludes to its comfortable satisfaction that a club has been directly and/or indirectly involved, since the entry into force of Article 50(3) of the UEFA Statutes, i.e. 27 April 2007, in any activity aimed at arranging or influencing the outcome of a match at national or international level, UEFA will declare such club ineligible to participate in the competition. Such ineligibility is effective only for one football season. When taking its decision, UEFA can rely on, but is not bound by, a decision of a national or international sporting body, arbitral tribunal or state court.”[14]

Key CAS rulings (2008-15)

UEFA has been very active in applying this two-stage process to its European club competitions – particularly as regards the first stage. Since the introduction of this peculiar but successful process, more than ten clubs from all over Europe have been declared ineligible to participate in UEFA competitions. In some cases, those one-season bans have been accompanied by disciplinary measures.

Inevitably, many of those cases have resulted in proceedings before the CAS in Lausanne.[15] The CAS case law derived from those key cases can be summarised as follows:

• It is firmly in the interest of UEFA, as the organiser of sports competitions, for the integrity of its competitions to be ensured and perceived to be so by the public. It is undeniably in UEFA’s interest to show the public that it takes all necessary steps to safeguard the integrity of its competitions.[16]
• UEFA does not need to wait for a final decision at domestic level, particularly when it comes to criminal proceedings, since neither UEFA nor the CAS can be forced to defer their decisions when an effective fight to ensure the integrity of sport depends on prompt action. UEFA and the CAS are not subject to the same rules as the ordinary courts in terms of procedure, proof (types of evidence and standard of proof) and substance.[17]
• The essential aim of the administrative measure is not to punish the club, but to protect the values and objectives of UEFA’s competition, its reputation and its integrity. It seeks not only to prevent a club which has violated such values from taking part in UEFA’s competition (i.e. to protect the integrity of that competition), but also to dispel any doubts in the public domain regarding the integrity, values and fairness of its competition (i.e. to protect the reputation of that competition).[18]
  
• The administrative measure is not of a disciplinary nature. Consequently, the fundamental legal principles that could potentially be applicable to disciplinary matters are not relevant.[19]
  
• The question of whether the club has any degree of culpability as regards the prohibited activities is entirely irrelevant. The principle of nulla poena sine culpa does not apply to administrative measures adopted by sports associations.[20]
  
• The range of conduct resulting in the application of an administrative measure is broader and more generic than that resulting in a disciplinary measure, which is, in principle, more restrictive and specific.[21]
  
• The administrative measure is only applicable to a club, whereas disciplinary measures can be imposed on all persons bound by UEFA’s rules and regulations (i.e. member associations and their officials, clubs and their officials, match officials, players, etc.).[22]

The CAS ruling on KS Skënderbeu: Is betting analysis sufficient to declare a club in breach of UEFA’s integrity rules?

UEFA’s betting fraud detection system

UEFA’s betting fraud detection system (BFDS) was established in 2009 in response to the growing threat of match manipulation in both UEFA and domestic competitions.

The BFDS highlights irregular betting patterns, both before and during matches, in the core betting markets, monitoring all major European and Asian bookmakers. The core betting markets are: the Asian handicap market; the totals market (number of goals in a match); and the 1X2 market (home win, draw or away win). The BFDS covers all UEFA competition matches (approximately 2,000 per season) and all matches in member associations’ top two divisions and cup competitions (approximately 30,000 matches per season).

The BFDS uses sophisticated algorithms and mathematical models to compare calculated odds with actual bookmakers’ odds, in order to determine whether the odds at a specific point in time or over a specific period are irregular.[23]

If a match displays irregular betting patterns, the matter is escalated and a report is generated. These reports include detailed information on the betting operators being monitored, together with match-specific data – e.g. regarding the current form of the teams involved, on-field action, players, match officials and motivational factors (such as the potential for promotion, relegation or qualification for a UEFA competition). Reports contain textual analysis and expert assessments, as well as graphical representations of movements in the relevant betting market.[24]

UEFA’s primary BFDS partner and information provider is Swiss-based company Sportradar. Founded in 2001, this company employs a team of highly trained sports betting analysts dealing exclusively with European football.

The facts of the case

On the basis of analysis of BFDS reports, it was concluded that Albanian football club KS Skënderbeu had been involved in a very large number of matches with inexplicable betting patterns. These included matches in Albania’s domestic league, the Albanian Cup and UEFA competitions, as well as several friendlies against foreign clubs. On the basis of UEFA’s experience in the areas of betting and match-fixing, it was concluded that the activities relating to Skënderbeu were of a highly organised nature.

While the vast majority of clubs will never feature in BFDS reports, it should be noted that Skënderbeu has appeared in more than 50. If we look at all the clubs that have been the subject of BFDS reports since 2010, Skënderbeu has been flagged up far more times than any other club in Europe.

Proceedings before UEFA’s disciplinary bodies

Against this background, charges were brought against Skënderbeu before UEFA’s disciplinary bodies with a view to imposing an administrative measure preventing the club from taking part in the 2016/17 UEFA Champions League.[25] A hearing took place before the UEFA Appeals Body, which acted as the first and final instance in this case.[26] The Appeals Body upheld the charges against the club – i.e. it deemed that Skënderbeu had indeed been involved in domestic and international activities aimed at arranging or influencing the outcome of matches. Consequently, the club was declared ineligible to participate in the 2016/17 UEFA Champions League.

Skënderbeu then lodged an appeal against this decision before the CAS.

The CAS award

The dispute between UEFA and Skënderbeu before the CAS essentially revolved around the interpretation of the BFDS reports and the legal value that should be attributed to them. UEFA, for its part, relied on those betting reports in concluding that the Albanian club had been involved in activities aimed at arranging or influencing the outcome of matches at domestic and international level. Skënderbeu, on the other hand, maintained that the BFDS reports (i) were not sufficient to prove match-fixing, (ii) were not capable of attributing specific responsibility as regards involvement in match-fixing, and (iii) were simply objective alarm mechanisms, which needed to be supported by other external evidence pointing in the same direction.

The CAS limited itself to an analysis of four Skënderbeu matches in UEFA competitions (namely, the club’s matches against Crusaders FC on 21 July 2015, against GNK Dinamo Zagreb on 25 August 2015, against Sporting Clube de Portugal on 22 October 2015 and against FC Lokomotiv Moskva on 10 December 2015) and refrained from analysing domestic matches and other pieces of evidence submitted by UEFA. It did so in order to avoid prejudicing any disciplinary measures that UEFA might potentially impose on the club.[27]

The starting point for the legal analysis conducted by the CAS Panel tallied with UEFA’s approach to this case and the question of whether BFDS reports could be used as the sole piece of evidence when prosecuting cases of match-fixing. The CAS agreed with UEFA that there were potential analogies between athletes’ biological passports and BFDS reports: “The Panel notes the similarities between the procedures followed in respect of the BFDS and the athlete blood passport (the ‘ABP’) in doping matters. Both rely initially on analytical data which is subsequently interpreted by experts/analysts before conclusions are drawn as to whether a violation is presumed to be committed or not.”[28]

Using this analogy, the Panel explained how analytical information was processed within the BFDS, highlighting the fact that the BFDS – like the ABP – indicates the likelihood of a violation having occurred, rather than providing absolute proof one way or the other: “The BFDS analyses whether the analytical information regarding betting on football matches can be explained by ‘normal’ circumstances. The conclusion that the statistical information cannot be explained by ‘normal’ circumstances does not necessarily entail that it must hence be concluded that the results are to be explained by match-fixing.”[29] The Panel went on to say that “[i]n order to come to the conclusion that a match is fixed […] the analytical information needs to be supported by other, different and external elements pointing in the same direction”.[30] With this in mind, the Panel noted that “the final conclusions drawn are not only based on analytical data and the absence of any ‘normal’ explanation, but indeed take into account several external factors corroborating the theory that the abnormal betting behaviour was likely to be explained by match-fixing: suspicious actions of players that took place on the field of play, suspicions raised by an opponent after the match, the emergence of a betting pattern in respect of the Club whereby it would concede late goals when the tie was no longer competitive and the fact that the Hong Kong Jockey Club, a prominent Asian bookmaker, removed the Club from live markets before the end of a game”.[31]

The Panel also attributed considerable weight to the betting patterns surrounding the four European matches under examination: “The Panel particularly considers the emergence of a betting pattern […] to be convincing evidence that the Club is at least indirectly involved in match-fixing activities. This betting pattern consists of the fact that it was observed in four different matches of the Club in either the UEFA Champions League or the UEFA Europa League in the first half of the 2015/2016 sporting season, that the actual bookmakers’ odds started to divert considerably from the calculated odds at the end of the match when the tie was no longer competitive (i.e. when it was clear that the Club would lose the tie on the basis of the aggregate score or that it would win the tie).”[32]

All in all, the Panel concluded that the “analytical information derived from the BFDS is valuable evidence that, particularly if corroborated by further evidence, can be used in order to conclude that a club was directly or indirectly involved in match-fixing”.[33]

Conclusion

Over the last few years, I have heard many betting experts state that monitoring is not the answer to match-fixing in sport. I fully agree with all of them, particularly since they know far more about the betting market than I do. Perhaps as a consequence of my limited legal skills (since even bad lawyers are always trying to find solutions to a complex reality), I would prefer to say that monitoring is not the only answer to match-fixing.

What the CAS ruling on Skënderbeu shows is that action can be taken if you have a proper monitoring system. Again, monitoring is not the sole solution to this problem, but it represents an additional evidentiary tool and can play an important role in legal proceedings. We should remember that match-fixing is linked to corruption and that the parties involved will inevitably “seek to use evasive means to ensure that they will leave no trail of their wrongdoing”.[34] Importantly, the legal framework governing match-fixing is clearly different for ordinary courts, where “the applicable rules in terms of procedure, proof (types of evidence and standard of proof) and substance are not the same as those that apply before UEFA and the CAS”.[35] In this context, a monitoring system can play a key legal role in safeguarding the integrity of a competition.

[1] A copy of the CAS award is available at: http://www.uefa.org/disciplinary/casdecisions/index.html.

[2] Article 3(4) of the Council of Europe Convention on the Manipulation of Sports Competitions.

[3] See Hill, D. (2016). Why sport is losing the war to match-fixers. Global Corruption Report: Sport, Transparency International, p. 231.

[4] Eight Men Out, directed by John Sayles, which was released in 1988.

[5] See Carpenter, K. (2013). Global Match-Fixing and the United States’ Role in Upholding Sporting Integrity. Berkeley Journal of Entertainment and Sports Law, Vol. 2, Issue 1.

[6] See Sorbonne-ICSS (2014). Protecting the Integrity of Sport Competition: The Last Bet for Modern Sport.

[7] See FIFPro (2016). 2016 FIFPro Global Employment Report.

[8] See ESSA (2016). ESSA Q3 2016 Integrity Report.

[9] See Anderson, J. (2014). Match Fixing and Money Laundering. The International Sports Law Journal.

[10] Among others, the Tennis Integrity Unit (see http://www.tennisintegrityunit.com/) or the Cricket Anti-Corruption Unit (see http://www.icc-cricket.com/about/46/anti-corruption/overview).

[11] The full official UEFA statement is accessible at the following link: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/2342180/Milan-restored-to-Champions-League.html. 

[12] See http://www.uefa.org/documentlibrary/aboutuefa.

[13] CAS 2013/A/3256, Fenerbahçe SK v UEFA, para. 160 et seqq.

[14] Article 4.02 of both the Regulations of the UEFA Champions League 2016/17 and the Regulations of the UEFA Europa League 2016/17 (http://www.uefa.org/documentlibrary/regulations/index.html).

[15] The CAS has reviewed a total of six cases relating to the refusal of admission on grounds of integrity. See generally Deakes, N. (2014). Match-Fixing in football: The epistemology of the Court of Arbitration for Sport Jurisprudence. Australian and New Zealand Sports Law Journal

[16] TAS 2011/A/2528, Olympiacos Volou FC v UEFA, para. 141.

[17] Ibid., para. 136.

[18] CAS 2014/A/3625, Sivasspor Kulübü v UEFA, para. 123.

[19] Ibid., para. 128.

[20] CAS 2014/A/3628, Eskişehirspor Kulübü v UEFA, para. 136.

[21] Ibid., para. 105.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Calculated odds are a mathematical representation of the true probability of an occurrence, without the external effects of money and subjective opinions. In effect, they show what should be happening to the odds, instead of what is actually happening.

[24] See Forrest, D., & McHale, I. (2015). An evaluation of Sportradar’s fraud detection system.

[25] See García, E. (2015). UEFA’s Judicial Bodies. Football Legal, Issue 4.

[26] See Article 24(4) of the UEFA Disciplinary Regulations.

[27] See Article 4.03 of the Regulations of the UEFA Champions League 2016/17.

[28] CAS 2016/A/4650 Klubi Sportiv Skënderbeu v UEFA, para. 82.

[29] Ibid., para. 85.

[30] Ibid., para. 86.

[31] Ibid., para. 87.

[32] Ibid., para. 97.

[33] Ibid., para. 79.

[34] CAS 2010/A/2172, Mr Oleg Oriekhov v UEFA, para. 54.

[35] TAS 2011/A/2528, Olympiacos Volou FC v UEFA, para. 136.