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The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

Doyen vs. Sporting II: The Bitter End of Sporting’s Fight at the Swiss Federal Supreme Court. By Shervine Nafissi

Editor’s Note: Shervine Nafissi (@SNafissi) is a Phd Student in sports law and teaching assistant in corporate law at University of Lausanne (Switzerland), Faculty of Business and Economics (HEC).

 

Introduction

The factual background

The dispute concerns a TPO contract entitled “Economic Rights Participation Agreement” (hereinafter “ERPA”) concluded in 2012 between Sporting Lisbon and the investment fund Doyen Sports. The Argentine player was transferred in 2012 by Spartak Moscow to Sporting Lisbon for a transfer fee of €4 million. Actually, Sporting only paid €1 million of the fee while Doyen Sports financed the remaining €3 million. In return, the investment company became the owner of 75% of the economic rights of the player.[1] Thus, in this specific case, the Portuguese club was interested in recruiting Marcos Rojo but was unable to pay the transfer fee required by Spartak Moscow, so that they required the assistance of Doyen Sports. The latter provided them with the necessary funds to pay part of the transfer fee in exchange of an interest on the economic rights of the player.

Given that the facts and circumstances leading to the dispute, as well as the decision of the CAS, were fully described by Antoine Duval in last week’s blog of Doyen vs. Sporting, this blog will solely focus on the decision of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court (“FSC”) following Sporting’s appeal against the CAS award. As a preliminary point, the role of the FSC in the appeal against CAS awards should be clarified.

 

Scope of the Federal Supreme Court’s review as for the international arbitral awards

Since the CAS has its seat in Lausanne, Switzerland, it has adopted its procedural rules in accordance with the 12th chapter of the Swiss Private International Law Act[2], which provides a general legal framework for international arbitration in Switzerland. Under the relevant provisions of the Swiss PILA, arbitral awards are final upon their notification and can only be challenged before the Swiss Federal Supreme Court on a very limited number of grounds in order to prevent the parties to arbitrate again the dispute before a state Court.[3] Besides, in Swiss law, there is only one level of appeal against an international arbitration award before the Federal Supreme Court.[4] Thus, the FSC “ensures a uniformity in the review of arbitral awards and the development of a consistent court practice” be being the only one instance for appeals.[5] In this way, “arbitral awards are always reviewed by the same State court, ensuring consistency”.[6]

Setting aside the award may only be possible where the sole arbitrator has been improperly appointed or where the arbitral tribunal has been improperly constituted, where the arbitral tribunal has wrongly accepted or denied jurisdiction, where the arbitral tribunal has ruled beyond the claims submitted to it, or failed to decide one of the claims, where the principle of equal treatment of the parties or their right to be heard in an adversary procedure has not been observed, where the award is incompatible with public policy.[7] In casu, the examination of Sporting Lisbon's claims is based on the incompatibility of the award with public policy within the meaning of Art. 190 para. 2 let. e PILA.

As a reminder, an award is inconsistent with public policy if it disregards those essential and broadly recognized values which, according to the prevailing values in Switzerland, should be the founding stones of any legal order.[8] “An award is contrary to substantive public policy when it violates some fundamental principles of the law applicable to the merits to such an extent that it is no longer consistent with the notions of justice and system of values; among such principles are, in particular, the sanctity of contracts, compliance with the rules of good faith, the prohibition of abuse of rights, the prohibition of discriminatory and confiscatory measures, as well as the protection of incapable persons. (…). If it is not easy to define substantive public policy positively and to set its boundaries with precision, it is easier to exclude one item or another from it. The entire process of interpreting a contract and the legal consequences logically drawn therefrom are excluded; so is the interpretation of the statutory provisions of a private law body by an arbitral tribunal. Furthermore, it is not sufficient to show incompatibility with public policy – a concept more restrictive than arbitrariness – by showing that the evidence was wrongly assessed, a factual finding manifestly wrong, or a rule of law clearly violated”.[9]

Thus, the examination of this international arbitral award by the FSC is limited to the question of the compatibility of the said award with public policy, a notion more restrictive than arbitrariness.

 

The judgement of the Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland - the merits

Sporting Lisbon’s defence

First, the Portuguese club tried to demonstrate that the CAS award violated material public policy by giving effect to one-sided and usurious contracts including excessive restriction.[10]

The claim is based on figures from the ERPA contract. Considering that Doyen Sports invested €3 million at the beginning, the company managed in all cases with 12.36% of minimum return insofar as it activated the Put Option, or 40% if the company requested payment of the Minimum Interest Fee. These two scenarios did not take into account the possibility that the player concerned by the ERPA be transferred with a capital gain, thus enabling Doyen Sports to get an investment return of about 400%, as was the case for the transfer of Marcos Rojo to Manchester United.

Sporting Lisbon compared this investment return to its own, as it would only be left with €1 million, i.e. the 5% of the transfer fee once the 75% for Doyen Sports’s share and the 20% for Spartak Moscow’s share deducted. Therefore, according to the Portuguese club, the ERPA, which it describes as a partiary loan[11], infringes the provisions on usury, would be a one-sided contract and, accordingly, would be null and void under Swiss law.[12]

Secondly, Sporting Lisbon explained that it gave up its freedom of action in an unacceptable manner under and art. 27 of the Swiss Civil Code (protection of one’s legal personality against excessive restrictions).[13] Indeed, some clauses of the ERPAs required Sporting Lisbon to accept a transfer offer deemed sufficiently high, if not Sporting would be forced to pay Doyen Sports 75% of the proposed transfer fee without receiving any fee, precisely because of the absence of any transfer.[14] According to the Portuguese club, Doyen Sports was not only in a position to ask Sporting Lisbon to transfer Marcos Rojo even if the club preferred to keep the player in its squad for purely sporting reasons, but also to require the club to make its best efforts to transfer the player before the end of his employment contract. Sporting Lisbon further underlined that the ERPA is made up of clauses stipulating that the club, conscious of the harshness and the severity of the consequences of certain clauses, takes the commitment to consider these clauses as fair and a necessary condition to Doyen’s interest in the player’s economic rights.

Thirdly, the club considers that the award of the CAS violates material public policy because it gives effect to contracts that seriously disregard the personality rights and the fundamental rights of the players. ERPA contracts would seriously undermine the players by putting pressure on the club by various clauses, including a clause obliging it to pay to Doyen Sports a minimum amount of €4.2 million (the Minimum Interest Fee) in the event that Marcos Rojo is not transferred to another club before the end of his employment contract. Such a clause would force Sporting to do everything possible to encourage the player to leave the club before the expiration of the employment contract. Thus, the player, even though he is not a party to the contract, would see his right to free economic development restricted, if not annihilated, in particular his ability to take the appropriate decisions for his sporting career and to freely choose the club for which he intends to play.[15] As regards fundamental rights, Sporting Lisbon argues that the ERPA-mechanism allows a third party to indirectly decide whether the player concerned by the ERPA must continue to play for his club or whether he must accept the conclusion of a contract with another club. Such a situation would violate the prohibition of forced labor set out in Art. 4 para. 2 ECHR and, more generally, human dignity.[16]

Finally, according to Sporting Lisbon, there should be a shared conception of moral standards in the field of sport in general and football in particular. These standards should not only prevent players from becoming an object of speculation, but also prevent investors to take advantage of the financial difficulties of the clubs. By taking advantage of clubs in financial difficulty, investors make indecent profits, while the clubs lose control of the situation from the sporting point of view. The standards would help to strengthen contractual stability, which is a cardinal principle of the transfer system.

 

The FSC’s Decision

The FSC first considered the figures provided by Sporting Lisbon with regard to the calculation of the minimum return of 12.36% (insofar as the Put Option is activated) and 40% (in case Doyen requests payment of the Minimum Interest Fee), and found that these figures were based on a calculation over three and five years respectively. Consequently, if the calculation of the investment return was made over one year, this would have given interest rates lower than 15%, which would be lawful under Swiss law. In addition, the arguments based on Doyen Sports’ investment return of about 400% with the transfer of Rojo were considered as irrelevant. These figures cannot be qualified as interests, but only as a kind of remuneration of the lender, which depends on the amount of the transfer fee, thus being similar to a partiary loan paid by giving a share to the lender on the profit realized by the borrower in a subsequent transfer operation.[17] Therefore, assuming that the relationship between the two parties is a lender-borrower relationship, the fact that Doyen Sports could acquire 75% of the future transfer fee of the player for whom it had initially financed the transfer at Sporting Lisbon for an equivalent share (i.e. €3 million out of €4 million), is not an usurious, one-sided contract, nor immoral.

Finally, the particular aspect of this type of contract relates to the enormous capital gains that can be made with the transfer operation, in casu about 400%. Nevertheless, the FSC considers that this capital gain depends on predominantly random elements.[18] The fact that Marcos Rojo played well at the 2014 World Cup, and that the Argentine selection reached the final of this competition, could not be foreseen. Thus, the sudden increase in his value on the transfer market is totally uncertain and cannot be invoked as a claim against Doyen Sports.[19] Moreover, the FSC recalled that the opposite situation was also possible, i.e. a drastic loss of the value of the player based on his performance in selection and club. These elements can therefore not be objectively taken into account by the parties. At the end of its reasoning on this issue, the FSC took the liberty to criticize Sporting Lisbon by saying that the club would not have been offended by such capital gain if it had been the sole beneficiary of the transfer fee.[20]

Secondly, the FSC analyzed the argument put forward by Sporting Lisbon that the ERPA contract would seriously undermine its freedom under Art. 27 CC. It should be kept in mind that, according to case-law, a breach of that provision does not necessarily mean a violation of public policy. Such a violation is instead conceivable only in case of a blatant and grievous violation of a fundamental right.[21] It must be considered in this respect that a contractual limitation of economic freedom is disproportionate within the meaning of Art. 27 (2) CC only when the debtor submits to someone else’s arbitrariness, gives up his economic freedom or restricts it in such a way that the foundation of his economic existence is jeopardized.[22] In casu, the FSC recalls that Sporting Lisbon is not inexperienced in the sharing of economic rights insofar as Marcos Rojo was not the only Sporting player affected by this type of contract.[23] It was the club that took the initiative to contact Doyen Sports to request its financial assistance. The conclusion of the contract was also preceded by lengthy negotiations during which the club was assisted by experts and lawyers. Finally, the dispute with Doyen Sports concerning Marcos Rojo was not in itself able to deteriorate the club’s financial situation, and thus preventing it from pursuing its economic activities.

Thirdly, the FSC examined the claim concerning the personality and fundamental rights of the players concerned by an ERPA.[24] The judges considered that the club limited itself to purely theoretical reflections without, however, demonstrating in concrete terms how the ERPA contract would seriously undermine the aforementioned rights. To the extent that the FSC has limited power to review international arbitral awards, it is hardly theoretical arguments that will demonstrate that a CAS award violates public policy according to Art. 190 para. 2 let. e PIL. Moreover, Sporting Lisbon’s argument concerning the personality and fundamental rights of Marcos Rojo is incompatible with the fact that the club has used the TPO mechanism for several other players. Again, the FSC questioned the sincerity of this argument had Sporting Lisbon received the full amount of the transfer fee. Furthermore, although the FSC recognizes the quality of the club to report a violation of the player’s personality rights[25], it is not established by the judges that the players themselves have complained of any such violation. On the contrary, when he signed for Manchester United, Marcos Rojo would have welcomed the fact of joining one of the best clubs in the world. Marcos Rojo, who was earning the equivalent of €1.14 million in Sporting Lisbon, currently earns about €4 million per year at the English club. Therefore, it is somewhat bold on the part of Sporting Lisbon, according to the FSC, to put forward the prohibition of forced labor or the violation of human dignity in such circumstances.

Finally, The FSC did not want to admit a notion of moral standards in the field of sport in general, and football in particular, in relation to the definition of the concept of material public policy.[26] Apart from the fact that it seems difficult to determine what is a moral standard in football, to adapt the concept of material public policy in relation to a particular activity and, more importantly, to a particular branch of the activity concerned - in this case, sport or football - would in some way soften the force and reduce the scope of the concept by leaving to FIFA the task of defining the notion of morality proper to football. The result would be a dilution of the notion of material public policy and, consequently, an increased difficulty in defining the contours of this concept, not to mention the formation of a casuistry that is not favorable to the predictability of the law.

In conclusion, the FSC recalls that the high mobility of professional footballers and their frequent transfers are caused by FIFA regulations, in particular the rules relating to the maximum duration of an employment contract binding a Player to a football club and the conditions of a subsequent transfer of that same player to another club, but also by the manner in which the transfer system is applied.[27]

For all these reasons, the Federal Supreme Court rejected Sporting Lisbon’s appeal against the CAS award of 21 December 2015.

 

Conclusion

Following the award of the CAS, the FSC confirmed the validity of the ERPA contracts under Swiss law. The mechanisms that make up the agreements signed by Doyen Sports and other companies that invest in the player transfer market are based on traditional legal instruments, including the assignment of future receivables. Thus, from a Swiss legal point of view, TPO agreements do not undergo the same moral reprimand administered by the highest football bodies, such as FIFA, UEFA or FIFPro.

Consequently, the legal battle that resulted in a victory for the “pro-TPOs” and the model proposed by the third parties, challenges the legitimacy of FIFA regulations and, more specifically, Art. 18ter RSTP. The arguments used by Sporting Lisbon to justify the early termination of the ERPA contract are very similar, or even identical, to those presented by FIFA to justify the formal ban of the TPO in May 2015.

Nevertheless, the fact that Swiss contract law is quite liberal does not exclude the invalidation of an ERPA for material public policy reasons. As we have seen with Football Leaks, the TPO mechanism can constitute a definite threat to the financial situation of clubs, such as FC Twente. It all depends on the case brought before the courts. Indeed, the case of Sporting Lisbon was not necessarily the best opportunity to challenge the validity of the contract, as the action of Art. 21 CO was time-barred (as mentioned in the previous blog on the initial CAS award) and the player joined, voluntarily, one of the best clubs in the world.

I believe that Art. 21 of the Swiss Code of Obligations (unfair advantage) as well as Art. 27 CC and 28ss CC (personality rights) may, depending on the case before the CAS, be a legal basis for the invalidation of the contract. To the extent that a dispute arises between an inexperienced club and an investment company, the application of Art. 21 CO is not totally excluded. In addition, if a player whose economic rights have been assigned to a third party is obliged to leave the club against his will or even join a club for whom he does not wish to play, the provisions on personality rights may find an echo at the CAS.

All eyes are on other courts where ‘TPO-cases’ are pending. Most importantly, the CAS should soon issue an award in the Doyen Sports and FC Seraing United v. FIFA case. As a reminder, in January 2015, the Belgian club and Doyen Sports concluded an ERPA contract despite the FIFA ban being enacted in December 2014. As a result, the FIFA Disciplinary Committee sanctioned the Belgian club with a transfer ban (for four complete and consecutive registration periods) and a fine of CHF 150.000 for breaches relating to the third-party ownership and third-party influence. The CAS is therefore seized of an appeal against a disciplinary sanction imposed by FIFA and will be obliged to take Art. 18ter RSTP into consideration and to judge whether the sanction is justified. It remains to be seen whether the arguments based on EU law by Doyen Sports and FC Seraing United will be taken into consideration. Indeed, both parties also filed a complaint, based on EU law, before the Belgian Courts to challenge the TPO ban.[28] For now, all these procedures have failed. It will be interesting to see how the CAS will judge the Seraing case that relates to the same mechanism although the two cases are fundamentally different. The Rojo case dealt with a contractual dispute before the ban, while the Belgian club and Doyen Sports challenged a sanction issued by FIFA and the ban as such.

 

In any event, TPO deals have rarely been so much under the public spotlight since their ban, and the legal suspense goes on…

 


[1]     Economic rights are the rights to future transfer fees from the transfer of the player to another club, and, unlike federative rights, economic rights can be divided between multiple parties. See, among others, W. Tyler Hall, After the Ban: The Financial Landscape of International Soccer After Third-Party Ownership, Oregon Law Review, Vol. 94, 2015, pp. 179 – 221.

[2]     Hereinafter “PILA”.

[3]     Mavromati, Despina, The Role of the Swiss Federal Tribunal and Its Impact on the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), 29 September 2016.

[4]     Antonio Rigozzi, L'arbitrage international en matière de sport, Bâle, (Helbing & Lichtenhahn), 2ème édition, 2005.

[5]     Niederer Kraft & Frey, Swiss Arbitration – Practical Aspects and New Developments, Publication 19, 2015, p. 28.

[6]     Ibidem.

[7]     Art. 190 para. 2 PILA.

[8]     ATF 132 III 389 consid. 2.2.3.

[9]     Judgment of the FSC, 4A_116/2016, December 13rd 2016, par. 4.1. The English translation is based on the Judgment of the FSC, 4A_304/2013, March 3rd 2014, par. 5.1.1 made by http://www.swissarbitrationdecisions.com (emphasis added).

[10]    Judgment of the FSC, 4A_116/2016, December 13rd 2016, par. 4.2.1.

[11]    Under Swiss law, the “partiary” loan is a form of loan in which the remuneration of the lender consists in a share of the borrower’s earnings. The “partiary” loan has a random element: the remuneration of the lender depends on the success of a specific business or transaction of the borrower. In casu, the ERPA can be qualified as a “partiary” loan insofar as the transaction depends on the profit made by Sporting in case of a transfer of Marcos Rojo and provides for a share of Doyen in Sporting’s success. See, Bovet / Richa, CO 312 N 6 in : Commentaire romand Code des obligations I, Pierre Tercier / Marc Amstutz (édit.), 2ème édition, Bâle, 2012 ; Pierre Tercier / Laurent Bieri / Pascal G. Favre, Les contrats spéciaux, 5ème édition, Genève Zürich Bâle (Schulthess) 2016, N 2539.

[12]    Judgment of the FSC, 4A_116/2016, December 13rd 2016, par. 4.2.1.

[13]    Hereinafter “CC”.

[14]    Judgment of the FSC, 4A_116/2016, December 13rd 2016, par. 4.2.1.

[15]    Judgment of the FSC, 4A_116/2016, December 13rd 2016, par. 4.3.1.

[16]    Ibidem.

[17]    Judgment of the FSC, 4A_116/2016, December 13rd 2016, par. 4.2.3.

[18]    Ibidem.

[19]    Ibidem.

[20]   Judgment of the FSC, 4A_116/2016, December 13rd 2016, par. 4.3.3.

[21]    Judgment of the FSC, 4P.12/2000, June 14th 2000, par. 5b. aa.

[22]    Ibidem.

[23]    In March 2013, 35 to 40 players' economic rights were shared with various investment funds. See CAS 2014/0/3781, par. 217.

[24]   Judgment of the FSC, 4A_116/2016, December 13rd 2016, par. 4.3.3.

[25]    According to the exceptio de jure tertii principle, see Judgment of the FSC, 4A_304/2013, March 3rd 2014, par. 3.

[26]   Judgment of the FSC, 4A_116/2016, December 13rd 2016, par. 4.2.3.

[27]    Judgment of the FSC, 4A_116/2016, December 13rd 2016, par. 4.3.3.

[28]   Patricia Moyersoen, La décision du TAS du 21 décembre 2015 à propos des contrats de TPO passés entre le Sporting Club du Portugal et la société Doyen Sports Investments, http://www.droitdusport.com/; http://www.rfc-seraing.be/audience-au-tas-de-lausanne/.

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Asser International Sports Law Blog | UEFA’s betting fraud detection system: How does the CAS regard this monitoring tool? By Emilio García.

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

UEFA’s betting fraud detection system: How does the CAS regard this monitoring tool? By Emilio García.

Editor’s note: Emilio García (emilio.garcia@uefa.ch)  is a doctor in law and head of disciplinary and integrity at UEFA. Before joining UEFA, he was the Spanish Football Federation’s legal director (2004–12) and an arbitrator at the CAS (2012–13).In this blog, Emilio García provides a brief review of a recent case before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS): Klubi Sportiv Skënderbeu v UEFA (CAS 2016/A/4650)[1], in which he acted as main counsel for UEFA. 


Sport and match-fixing – A quick overview

Match-fixing is now legally defined as “an intentional arrangement, act or omission aimed at an improper alteration of the result or the course of a sports competition in order to remove all or part of the unpredictable nature of the aforementioned sports competition with a view to obtaining an undue advantage for oneself or for others”.[2] It has been said that there has always been match-fixing in sport.[3] From the ancient Olympic Games to the most important global sports competitions of today, manipulation of results has always been an all-too-frequent occurrence.

We have seen a number of very prominent instances of this kind of issue over the years. One of the most remarkable examples, which was even the subject of a film,[4] was the match-fixing episode during the 1919 World Series, where several players from the Chicago White Sox were found guilty of accepting bribes and deliberately losing matches against the Cincinnati Reds.[5]

The situation has changed considerably since then. In particular, the globalisation of the sports betting industry has had a massive impact, with recent studies estimating that between €200bn and €500bn is betted on sport every year.[6] Match-fixing does not just affect football either;[7] it is also affecting other sports, most notably tennis.[8] 

In addition to these impressive figures, it is well recognised that match-fixing has become a global issue because it allows organised criminal gangs to expand their illegal and violent activities – which include murder, extortion and assault – worldwide. It also results in the loss of billions of dollars of tax revenue and public income every year. Indeed, match-fixing is now one of the most profitable forms of money laundering.[9]

In light of the growth of this phenomenon, both international sports federations and public authorities are now engaged in a continuous battle against this scourge. More and more sports federations are establishing specific programmes in this area, which is having a major impact at national level.[10] And as regards public authorities, various resolutions have been adopted by the European Union, several initiatives have been launched by INTERPOL and EUROPOL, and, in particular, excellent work has been done by the Council of Europe, which adopted the first ever international treaty aimed at combating the manipulation of sports competitions. These are all good examples of cooperation between public authorities and the world of sport, but we are still a long way from winning this particular battle.


UEFA’s rules and integrity-related cases

AC Milan: UEFA’s first modern-day integrity case

In May 2006, a match-fixing scandal – christened the ‘Calciopoli’ – was unearthed in Italian football. Investigations led by the Italian police revealed that a network of club managers, officials responsible for referees and other individuals had sought to influence the outcome of various matches in the Serie A. Several clubs were punished by the Italian Football Federation (FIGC). One of those clubs was AC Milan, which was given a 30-point penalty. However, despite the deduction of those points, AC Milan still managed to qualify for the 2006/07 UEFA Champions League.

Thus, the admissions process for the 2006/07 UEFA Champions League presented UEFA with a real legal conundrum: could UEFA allow a club that had been punished for its involvement in the Calciopoli to take part in a European competition? On 2 August 2006, the UEFA Emergency Panel decided to allow AC Milan to participate in UEFA’s flagship competition on the basis of the following considerations:

“The UEFA Emergency Panel, being competent to decide on the matter, came to the conclusion that it had no choice but to admit AC Milan for the UEFA club competitions 2006-07 for formal reasons because of an insufficient legal basis in the regulations which would allow not admitting AC Milan under specific circumstances.”[11]

This situation was highly frustrating for UEFA, which felt that it was unable to prevent AC Milan from participating in its competition, despite the club’s involvement in match-fixing. It should also be noted that AC Milan went on to win that competition, beating English side Liverpool FC in the final on 23 May 2007.


Evolution of the legal framework

UEFA’s response to the AC Milan case was a swift one. At the very next UEFA Congress, which took place in Dusseldorf on 25 and 26 January 2007, representatives of the various member associations approved a new paragraph 3 for Article 50 of the UEFA Statutes.[12]

That amendment, which remains in force today, established a two-stage process aimed at guaranteeing the integrity of UEFA’s competitions. The first stage involves an administrative measure, whereby the offending club is excluded from European competitions for one season. The second stage involves disciplinary measures, which may be imposed subsequent to the administrative measure and do not have a maximum duration.[13]

Article 50(3) of the UEFA Statutes reads as follows:

“The admission to a UEFA competition of a Member Association or club directly or indirectly involved in any activity aimed at arranging or influencing the outcome of a match at national or international level can be refused with immediate effect, without prejudice to any possible disciplinary measures.”

That provision has also been incorporated in the regulations governing the UEFA Champions League and the UEFA Europa League, which currently feature the following wording:

“If, on the basis of all the factual circumstances and information available to UEFA, UEFA concludes to its comfortable satisfaction that a club has been directly and/or indirectly involved, since the entry into force of Article 50(3) of the UEFA Statutes, i.e. 27 April 2007, in any activity aimed at arranging or influencing the outcome of a match at national or international level, UEFA will declare such club ineligible to participate in the competition. Such ineligibility is effective only for one football season. When taking its decision, UEFA can rely on, but is not bound by, a decision of a national or international sporting body, arbitral tribunal or state court.”[14]


Key CAS rulings (2008-15)

UEFA has been very active in applying this two-stage process to its European club competitions – particularly as regards the first stage. Since the introduction of this peculiar but successful process, more than ten clubs from all over Europe have been declared ineligible to participate in UEFA competitions. In some cases, those one-season bans have been accompanied by disciplinary measures.

Inevitably, many of those cases have resulted in proceedings before the CAS in Lausanne.[15] The CAS case law derived from those key cases can be summarised as follows:

  • It is firmly in the interest of UEFA, as the organiser of sports competitions, for the integrity of its competitions to be ensured and perceived to be so by the public. It is undeniably in UEFA’s interest to show the public that it takes all necessary steps to safeguard the integrity of its competitions.[16]
  • UEFA does not need to wait for a final decision at domestic level, particularly when it comes to criminal proceedings, since neither UEFA nor the CAS can be forced to defer their decisions when an effective fight to ensure the integrity of sport depends on prompt action. UEFA and the CAS are not subject to the same rules as the ordinary courts in terms of procedure, proof (types of evidence and standard of proof) and substance.[17]
  • The essential aim of the administrative measure is not to punish the club, but to protect the values and objectives of UEFA’s competition, its reputation and its integrity. It seeks not only to prevent a club which has violated such values from taking part in UEFA’s competition (i.e. to protect the integrity of that competition), but also to dispel any doubts in the public domain regarding the integrity, values and fairness of its competition (i.e. to protect the reputation of that competition).[18]
  • The administrative measure is not of a disciplinary nature. Consequently, the fundamental legal principles that could potentially be applicable to disciplinary matters are not relevant.[19]
  • The question of whether the club has any degree of culpability as regards the prohibited activities is entirely irrelevant. The principle of nulla poena sine culpa does not apply to administrative measures adopted by sports associations.[20]
  • The range of conduct resulting in the application of an administrative measure is broader and more generic than that resulting in a disciplinary measure, which is, in principle, more restrictive and specific.[21]
  • The administrative measure is only applicable to a club, whereas disciplinary measures can be imposed on all persons bound by UEFA’s rules and regulations (i.e. member associations and their officials, clubs and their officials, match officials, players, etc.).[22]


The CAS ruling on KS Skënderbeu: Is betting analysis sufficient to declare a club in breach of UEFA’s integrity rules?

UEFA’s betting fraud detection system

UEFA’s betting fraud detection system (BFDS) was established in 2009 in response to the growing threat of match manipulation in both UEFA and domestic competitions.

The BFDS highlights irregular betting patterns, both before and during matches, in the core betting markets, monitoring all major European and Asian bookmakers. The core betting markets are: the Asian handicap market; the totals market (number of goals in a match); and the 1X2 market (home win, draw or away win). The BFDS covers all UEFA competition matches (approximately 2,000 per season) and all matches in member associations’ top two divisions and cup competitions (approximately 30,000 matches per season).

The BFDS uses sophisticated algorithms and mathematical models to compare calculated odds with actual bookmakers’ odds, in order to determine whether the odds at a specific point in time or over a specific period are irregular.[23]

If a match displays irregular betting patterns, the matter is escalated and a report is generated. These reports include detailed information on the betting operators being monitored, together with match-specific data – e.g. regarding the current form of the teams involved, on-field action, players, match officials and motivational factors (such as the potential for promotion, relegation or qualification for a UEFA competition). Reports contain textual analysis and expert assessments, as well as graphical representations of movements in the relevant betting market.[24]

UEFA’s primary BFDS partner and information provider is Swiss-based company Sportradar. Founded in 2001, this company employs a team of highly trained sports betting analysts dealing exclusively with European football.


The facts of the case

On the basis of analysis of BFDS reports, it was concluded that Albanian football club KS Skënderbeu had been involved in a very large number of matches with inexplicable betting patterns. These included matches in Albania’s domestic league, the Albanian Cup and UEFA competitions, as well as several friendlies against foreign clubs. On the basis of UEFA’s experience in the areas of betting and match-fixing, it was concluded that the activities relating to Skënderbeu were of a highly organised nature.

While the vast majority of clubs will never feature in BFDS reports, it should be noted that Skënderbeu has appeared in more than 50. If we look at all the clubs that have been the subject of BFDS reports since 2010, Skënderbeu has been flagged up far more times than any other club in Europe.


Proceedings before UEFA’s disciplinary bodies

Against this background, charges were brought against Skënderbeu before UEFA’s disciplinary bodies with a view to imposing an administrative measure preventing the club from taking part in the 2016/17 UEFA Champions League.[25] A hearing took place before the UEFA Appeals Body, which acted as the first and final instance in this case.[26] The Appeals Body upheld the charges against the club – i.e. it deemed that Skënderbeu had indeed been involved in domestic and international activities aimed at arranging or influencing the outcome of matches. Consequently, the club was declared ineligible to participate in the 2016/17 UEFA Champions League.

Skënderbeu then lodged an appeal against this decision before the CAS.


The CAS award

The dispute between UEFA and Skënderbeu before the CAS essentially revolved around the interpretation of the BFDS reports and the legal value that should be attributed to them. UEFA, for its part, relied on those betting reports in concluding that the Albanian club had been involved in activities aimed at arranging or influencing the outcome of matches at domestic and international level. Skënderbeu, on the other hand, maintained that the BFDS reports (i) were not sufficient to prove match-fixing, (ii) were not capable of attributing specific responsibility as regards involvement in match-fixing, and (iii) were simply objective alarm mechanisms, which needed to be supported by other external evidence pointing in the same direction.

The CAS limited itself to an analysis of four Skënderbeu matches in UEFA competitions (namely, the club’s matches against Crusaders FC on 21 July 2015, against GNK Dinamo Zagreb on 25 August 2015, against Sporting Clube de Portugal on 22 October 2015 and against FC Lokomotiv Moskva on 10 December 2015) and refrained from analysing domestic matches and other pieces of evidence submitted by UEFA. It did so in order to avoid prejudicing any disciplinary measures that UEFA might potentially impose on the club.[27]

The starting point for the legal analysis conducted by the CAS Panel tallied with UEFA’s approach to this case and the question of whether BFDS reports could be used as the sole piece of evidence when prosecuting cases of match-fixing. The CAS agreed with UEFA that there were potential analogies between athletes’ biological passports and BFDS reports: “The Panel notes the similarities between the procedures followed in respect of the BFDS and the athlete blood passport (the ‘ABP’) in doping matters. Both rely initially on analytical data which is subsequently interpreted by experts/analysts before conclusions are drawn as to whether a violation is presumed to be committed or not.”[28]

Using this analogy, the Panel explained how analytical information was processed within the BFDS, highlighting the fact that the BFDS – like the ABP – indicates the likelihood of a violation having occurred, rather than providing absolute proof one way or the other: “The BFDS analyses whether the analytical information regarding betting on football matches can be explained by ‘normal’ circumstances. The conclusion that the statistical information cannot be explained by ‘normal’ circumstances does not necessarily entail that it must hence be concluded that the results are to be explained by match-fixing.”[29] The Panel went on to say that “[i]n order to come to the conclusion that a match is fixed […] the analytical information needs to be supported by other, different and external elements pointing in the same direction”.[30] With this in mind, the Panel noted that “the final conclusions drawn are not only based on analytical data and the absence of any ‘normal’ explanation, but indeed take into account several external factors corroborating the theory that the abnormal betting behaviour was likely to be explained by match-fixing: suspicious actions of players that took place on the field of play, suspicions raised by an opponent after the match, the emergence of a betting pattern in respect of the Club whereby it would concede late goals when the tie was no longer competitive and the fact that the Hong Kong Jockey Club, a prominent Asian bookmaker, removed the Club from live markets before the end of a game”.[31]

The Panel also attributed considerable weight to the betting patterns surrounding the four European matches under examination: “The Panel particularly considers the emergence of a betting pattern […] to be convincing evidence that the Club is at least indirectly involved in match-fixing activities. This betting pattern consists of the fact that it was observed in four different matches of the Club in either the UEFA Champions League or the UEFA Europa League in the first half of the 2015/2016 sporting season, that the actual bookmakers’ odds started to divert considerably from the calculated odds at the end of the match when the tie was no longer competitive (i.e. when it was clear that the Club would lose the tie on the basis of the aggregate score or that it would win the tie).”[32]

All in all, the Panel concluded that the “analytical information derived from the BFDS is valuable evidence that, particularly if corroborated by further evidence, can be used in order to conclude that a club was directly or indirectly involved in match-fixing”.[33]


Conclusion

Over the last few years, I have heard many betting experts state that monitoring is not the answer to match-fixing in sport. I fully agree with all of them, particularly since they know far more about the betting market than I do. Perhaps as a consequence of my limited legal skills (since even bad lawyers are always trying to find solutions to a complex reality), I would prefer to say that monitoring is not the only answer to match-fixing.

What the CAS ruling on Skënderbeu shows is that action can be taken if you have a proper monitoring system. Again, monitoring is not the sole solution to this problem, but it represents an additional evidentiary tool and can play an important role in legal proceedings. We should remember that match-fixing is linked to corruption and that the parties involved will inevitably “seek to use evasive means to ensure that they will leave no trail of their wrongdoing”.[34] Importantly, the legal framework governing match-fixing is clearly different for ordinary courts, where “the applicable rules in terms of procedure, proof (types of evidence and standard of proof) and substance are not the same as those that apply before UEFA and the CAS”.[35] In this context, a monitoring system can play a key legal role in safeguarding the integrity of a competition.



[1] A copy of the CAS award is available at: http://www.uefa.org/disciplinary/casdecisions/index.html.

[2] Article 3(4) of the Council of Europe Convention on the Manipulation of Sports Competitions.

[3] See Hill, D. (2016). Why sport is losing the war to match-fixers. Global Corruption Report: Sport, Transparency International, p. 231.

[4] Eight Men Out, directed by John Sayles, which was released in 1988.

[5] See Carpenter, K. (2013). Global Match-Fixing and the United States’ Role in Upholding Sporting Integrity. Berkeley Journal of Entertainment and Sports Law, Vol. 2, Issue 1.

[6] See Sorbonne-ICSS (2014). Protecting the Integrity of Sport Competition: The Last Bet for Modern Sport.

[7] See FIFPro (2016). 2016 FIFPro Global Employment Report.

[8] See ESSA (2016). ESSA Q3 2016 Integrity Report.

[9] See Anderson, J. (2014). Match Fixing and Money Laundering. The International Sports Law Journal.

[10] Among others, the Tennis Integrity Unit (see http://www.tennisintegrityunit.com/) or the Cricket Anti-Corruption Unit (see http://www.icc-cricket.com/about/46/anti-corruption/overview).

[11] The full official UEFA statement is accessible at the following link: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/2342180/Milan-restored-to-Champions-League.html

[12] See http://www.uefa.org/documentlibrary/aboutuefa.

[13] CAS 2013/A/3256, Fenerbahçe SK v UEFA, para. 160 et seqq.

[14] Article 4.02 of both the Regulations of the UEFA Champions League 2016/17 and the Regulations of the UEFA Europa League 2016/17 (http://www.uefa.org/documentlibrary/regulations/index.html).

[15] The CAS has reviewed a total of six cases relating to the refusal of admission on grounds of integrity. See generally Deakes, N. (2014). Match-Fixing in football: The epistemology of the Court of Arbitration for Sport Jurisprudence. Australian and New Zealand Sports Law Journal

[16] TAS 2011/A/2528, Olympiacos Volou FC v UEFA, para. 141.

[17] Ibid., para. 136.

[18] CAS 2014/A/3625, Sivasspor Kulübü v UEFA, para. 123.

[19] Ibid., para. 128.

[20] CAS 2014/A/3628, Eskişehirspor Kulübü v UEFA, para. 136.

[21] Ibid., para. 105.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Calculated odds are a mathematical representation of the true probability of an occurrence, without the external effects of money and subjective opinions. In effect, they show what should be happening to the odds, instead of what is actually happening.

[24] See Forrest, D., & McHale, I. (2015). An evaluation of Sportradar’s fraud detection system.

[25] See García, E. (2015). UEFA’s Judicial Bodies. Football Legal, Issue 4.

[26] See Article 24(4) of the UEFA Disciplinary Regulations.

[27] See Article 4.03 of the Regulations of the UEFA Champions League 2016/17.

[28] CAS 2016/A/4650 Klubi Sportiv Skënderbeu v UEFA, para. 82.

[29] Ibid., para. 85.

[30] Ibid., para. 86.

[31] Ibid., para. 87.

[32] Ibid., para. 97.

[33] Ibid., para. 79.

[34] CAS 2010/A/2172, Mr Oleg Oriekhov v UEFA, para. 54.

[35] TAS 2011/A/2528, Olympiacos Volou FC v UEFA, para. 136.

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