Editor’s note
Wil is working as a lawyer since 1980. He started his legal career at Rechtshulp Rotterdam. Later on he worked for the Dutch national trade union FNV and law firm Varrolaan Advocaten. Currently he is participating in the Labour Law Section of lawfirm MHZ-advocaten in Schiedam in the Netherlands. He is also a member of a joint committee advising the government in labour issues.

Since 1991 he is dealing with the labour issues of the trade union for professional football players VVCS and cyclists’ union VVBW. Since 2002, he works for FIFPro, the worldwide union for professional football players based in Hoofddorp in the Netherlands. He is involved in many international football cases and provides legal support for FIFPro members all over the world. Wil was also involved in the FIFPro Black Book campaign on match fixing and corruption in Eastern Europe.

On the 2001 agreement between FIFA, UEFA and the European Commission:

What was FIFPro’s role in the negotiations leading to the 2001 agreement with the EU Commission on which the current FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfers of Players (RSTP) are based?

First the negotiations started between the Commission and FIFA/UEFA. Later on FIFPro joined as the Commission found it necessary to involve the players. From then on FIFPro was at the table and able to have influence. It proved not to be the level of influence we hoped to have.

To what extent was FIFPro (dis)satisfied with the agreement at that time?

The outcome of the negotiations was a compromise but to a certain extent acceptable for FIFPro as it was to improve in principle the situation of players. At that time, it seemed that free movement was accessible for them. Yet, the fact that the Commission did not subsequently evaluate the system - as agreed in 2001 - was disappointing.

On the current complaint: 

Why is FIFPro challenging the FIFA RSTP under EU Competition law? What has changed?

After a short while since 2001 we concluded that the way the informal agreement with the Commission was formulated in the RSTP was not consistent with what had been agreed. The clearest example is the repetition of the protected period after a contract was extended.

The parties agreed on a single protected period after a player signed his first contract with a club in order to preserve the stability of club squads and to allow them to amortize the investments made on acquiring these players. After this period the relation between a club and a player was intended to be a regular labour relation.

On several occasions the Commission confirmed that after the protected period the compensation to be paid in case of premature termination would be calculated based on the residual value of the contract. As the protected period re-starts in case of contract renewal, players never reach this situation. Players who refuse to sign a new contract are regularly side-lined by their clubs in order to force them to sign a prolongation. This is limiting the freedom of movement of players significantly and has substantial anti-competitive effects.

More precisely, are you challenging specific articles of the FIFA RSTP? If so, why do you deem those provisions in particular to have an anti-competitive effect or object?

When evaluating the RSTP internally, FIFPro identified twenty-three key issues on which the transfer system was failing the players. As we decided to lodge a complaint on an EU competition law basis, we picked out the strongest arguments for the purpose of substantiating our complaint. The repetition in the protected period is an example[1].

Could these alleged anti-competitive effects not be justified along the lines of the Wouters test[2] as being inherent to the achievement of legitimate objectives such as competitive balance or contractual stability?

It is important to notice that there is no transfer system in other sports and they seem to work fine. This means that a transfer system is not a necessity as such. The abuses we witness nowadays, especially non-payment of players is a direct consequence of the way the system works. We strongly believe that the restrictive effects are not inherent in the pursuit of any objectives. They certainly are not proportionate to them. FIFPro is convinced that the restrictive aspects of the system do not pass the Wouters test.

What is the rationale for going to the EU Commission and not, for example, to the national courts (or national competition authorities for that matter)?

First of all it was the Commission that initiated the process towards the new regulations in 2001. Now that we see the system failing it seems logical to approach the Commission first. As we are looking at a pan-European problem this forum would be more effective than national proceedings. But in case the complaint does not provide an appropriate result the way to national courts and national competition authorities is still open.

Did you envisage some non-confrontational strategies to change the FIFA RSTP through negotiations? What about using the European social dialogue committee for example?

The initial Social Dialogue meetings started eleven years ago. Although we concluded an autonomous agreement in 2012 we must conclude that the most serious problems for our players have not been solved through this mechanism nor have they been successfully tackled through our participation in the working groups and committees of FIFA and UEFA.

The problem of overdue payables is more serious than ever before. FIFPro feels that more pressure is needed to move things forward. The fact that we lodged the complaint does not mean that we stop negotiating. On the contrary, if our counterparts in the social dialogue are willing to solve the issues we put on the table we would prefer this over a long-lasting legal struggle.

Finally, don’t you think that this complaint could lead to a form of European imperialism? In other words, European institutions, clubs and players dictating the transfer system applied worldwide? Should (and could) FIFA (or UEFA) aim for a different European transfer system instead?

Although we are a global organization we cannot deny the fact that the center of gravity of professional football is in Europe. Moreover, after the Bosman ruling it was obvious that the new FIFA regulations had to be in full compliance with EU-law principles. As these rules apply worldwide this means that EU-principles must be respected around the world. As EU law provides generally more protection to workers than a lot of other legal systems in the world the players benefit from this extraterritorial application. FIFPro does not consider this as imperialism. In fact, we believe that a single system is preferable because of the global character of professional football.

[1] Editor’s note: For more examples see FIFPro’s Executive Summary of the complaint.

[2] Editor’s note: The Wouters test is used for the assessment of the alleged anti-competitive nature of a measure, agreement or concerted practice under Article 101(1) TFEU. According to this test, account must be taken of the overall context of the FIFA RSTP and how it produces its effects. More particularly, account must be taken of its potential legitimate objectives. One must then evaluate whether the restrictive effects on competition are inherent in the pursuit of those objectives and proportionate.

After the success of this year’s World Cup in Brazil, FIFA President Sepp Blatter can start concentrating on his Presidential campaign for next June’s FIFA elections. Even though the 78-year old Swiss is not officially a candidate yet, he is still very popular in large parts of the world, and therefore the favourite to win the race. Nonetheless, even for the highly experienced Mr. Blatter these elections will be different. All candidates will have to respect the newly introduced Electoral Regulations for the FIFA Presidency. 

The Electoral Regulations are the latest addition to the reform process FIFA initiated more than two years ago following the controversial awarding of the 2018 and 2022 World Cups to Russia and Qatar. The stated aim of the Regulation is to make the elections more transparent, democratic and to prevent possible corruption accusations.[1] Its legal basis is found in Article 24(4) of the 2013 FIFA Statutes and reads as follows:

“The conditions to be observed during a candidature for the office of President are stipulated in the Electoral Regulations for the FIFA Presidency. These regulations shall be issued by the Executive Committee.”

Earlier editions of the FIFA Statutes did not include a reference to electoral regulations. In comparing the 2013 Statutes with the 2010 Statutes used for the previous elections one can witness the extent of this dramatic change. Pursuant to Article 24 of the 2010 edition, “only the Members[2] may propose candidatures for the office of FIFA President. Members shall notify the FIFA general secretariat in writing in the name of a candidate for the FIFA presidency at least two months before the date of the Congress.” Furthermore, “the general secretariat shall notify the Members of the names of proposed candidates at least one month before the date of the Congress.” Other criteria regarding the eligibility of candidates were not included.

The first fundamental change to take place at the 2015 election will be the setting up of an Ad-hoc electoral Committee pursuant to Article 7(1) Electoral Regulations. The Ad-hoc Electoral Committee shall be composed of the chairman of the FIFA Disciplinary Committee, the chairman of the FIFA Appeal Committee and the chairman of the FIFA Audit and Compliance Committee[3] and shall assess whether a candidate meets the profile specifications provided for by the eligibility criteria stipulated in Article 13 of the Electoral Regulations and Article 24 of the FIFA Statutes.[4]

The second fundamental change is that, in accordance with article 13(1), Candidates for the office of President must meet the following requirements:

1. The candidate shall have played an active role in association football (as a board member, committee member, referee and assistant referee, coach, trainer and any other person responsible for technical, medical or administrative matters in FIFA, a Confederation, Association, League or Club or as a player) for two of the last five years before being proposed as a candidate (cf. art. 24 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes).

2. The candidate shall have been proposed by a member association in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes.

3.  The candidate shall present declarations of support from at least five member associations (cf. art. 24 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes). Being proposed as a candidate by a member association shall be understood as a declaration of support. Each member may only present a declaration of support for one person. If a member association presents declarations of support for more than one person, all its declarations shall become invalid.

The flowchart below summarises the key procedural steps set out in the Electoral Regulations:

Has the Presidential campaign already begun?

The Presidential campaign has already started due to the fact that one person has declared himself a candidate. This person is neither Mr. Blatter nor “Europe’s favourite” Michel Platini, but former FIFA official Jérôme Champagne. Mr. Champagne, who is personally funding his own campaign, has stated that he has received the support of at least five Member Associations and that the FIFA general secretariat has been notified of his candidature. Details on which Member Associations support the Frenchman remain undisclosed.

During the last FIFA Congress that took place in Sao Paulo in June this year, the Ad-Hoc Electoral Committee was also set up consisting of Mr. Domenico Scala (ltaly), chairman of the FIFA Audit and Compliance Committee, Mr. Claudio Sulser (Switzerland), chairman of the FIFA Disciplinary Committee, and Mr. Larry Mussenden (Bermuda), chairman of the FIFA Appeal Committee. The next step would be for the Ad-hoc Electoral Committee to forward the proposed candidature of Jérôme Champagne to the Ethics Committee pursuant Article 15(10) of the Electoral Regulations.

As stated above, Sepp Blatter is not yet a candidate, but it is expected that he will run for a fifth consecutive term in office. Interestingly enough, in accordance with Article 2(2) of the Electoral Regulations, “if a person engages in campaign or similar activities that give the appearance that he is a candidate, the Ad-hoc Electoral Committee or, if the Ad-hoc Electoral Committee has not yet been constituted, the FIFA Secretary general, shall give him a deadline of ten days to formally state his intention of becoming a candidate. This shall also apply for the incumbent FIFA President. Blatter hinted several times this year that he is thinking about running for President again. Nonetheless, it appears that the rule stipulated in Article 2(2) has not been applied to him (yet). With regard to the possible third candidate, Michel Platini has said that he is considering becoming a candidate and promised to make a decision by the draw for the Champions League on 28 August. 

Could the new Election Regulations jeopardise Mr. Blatter’s possible re-election ambitions?

Given that Blatter still enjoys widespread support in the “football family”, he should have no problem securing the declarations of support from five different Members. As regards the integrity check, it is worth noting that Sepp Blatter has never been personally accused of corruption. True, there has been a lot of controversies at FIFA under his watch (Qatar2022 is the latest and most acute one) and questions can be raised whether an 80-year old is the ideal candidate to run one of the world’s most important Sporting Governing Bodies for the next four years.  

Conclusion

Whether the new Election Regulations will make next year’s election more transparent and democratic will mostly depend on how they will be applied during the unfolding campaign and elections. Will Blatter’s double game as a candidate and FIFA President be closely scrutinized? On what basis and to which extent will the Ethics Committee review the candidatures? Even if the electoral regulations appear to have some teeth in practice, further reforms will still be necessary to improve FIFA’s legitimacy. One can, and Jérôme Champagne has in fact suggested it, imagine public debates between the candidates to be broadcasted worldwide. Furthermore, one should envisage that the vote must be held publically and that the number of terms as FIFA president must be restricted. There is a lot to do before FIFA could be considered, as far as it is even possible, a “democratic” organisation, but the sheer fact of having electoral regulations is already a step in the right direction.

P.S. At the beginning of July Jérôme Champagne visited the Asser institute and presented his program for the upcoming FIFA Presidential elections 2015. The video is available at:

[1] http://www.insideworldfootball.com/fifa/15040-fifa-lays-out-rules-of-engagement-in-the-battle-for-the-presidency.

[2] Member: an Association which is responsible for organising and supervising football in all of its forms in its Country that has been admitted into membership of FIFA by the Congress.

[3] Electoral Regulations for the FIFA Presidency, Article 7(2)

[4] Electoral Regulations for the FIFA Presidency, Article 8(1)d)