Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

Right to Privacy 1:0 Whereabouts Requirement - A Case Note on a Recent Decision by the Spanish Audiencia Nacional

On the 24th June 2014 the Spanish Audiencia Nacional issued its ruling on a hotly debated sports law topic: The whereabouts requirements imposed to athletes in the fight against doping. This blog aims to go beyond the existing commentaries (here and here) of the case, by putting it in the wider context of a discussion on the legality of the whereabouts requirements.                                                                          


I.              The Facts

In 2013, the Spanish High Council for Sports (Consejo Superior de Deportes) adopted resolution 1648/2013 providing two forms (Annex I and Annex II) for athletes to complete in order to fulfil their whereabouts requirements, in the view of implementing the existing Spanish laws against doping.[1]

The key legal provisions underlying this resolution read as follows (translation ASSER[2]):

Article  5 of Ley Orgánica 7/2006, de 21 de noviembre, de protección de la salud y de lucha contra el dopaje en el deporte.

3. In the view of conducting the controls referred to in the first paragraph with the greatest efficiency possible, the athletes, the teams, trainers (coaches) and managers should facilitate, in accordance with the established regulations, the gathering of the data necessary for the localisation of the habitual whereabouts of the athletes, in a way that permits to carry out the doping tests. 

Article 43 of 641/2009 Real Decreto 641/2009, de 17 de abril, por el que se regulan los procesos de control de dopaje y los laboratorios de análisis autorizados, y por el que se establecen medidas complementarias de prevención del dopaje y de protección de la salud en el deporte.

1. The athletes with a licence enabling them to participate in official competition on national level should, in accordance with the following paragraphs, facilitate the transmission of the data that permit the localisation of the habitual whereabouts of the athletes through completion of the specific form established by Resolution of el Presidente del Consejo Superior de Deportes.

3. The athletes subjected to the Individualized Plan have a specific duty to complete the form established by Resolution of el Presidente del Consejo Superior de Deportes.

Article 45 of 641/2009 Real Decreto

1. The athletes subjected to the Individualized Plan have to provide trimestral information on their habitual whereabouts, to this end they should complete the form approved by Resolution of el Presidente del Consejo Superior de Deportes, including in any case the following minimum information:

a) A postal address where the athlete can receive correspondence for notification purposes related to doping tests.

b) A clause signed by the athlete, by which he agrees to communicate the data provided to other anti-doping organizations, pursuant to article 36 de la Ley Orgánica 7/2006.

c) For each trimester, in case of an absence longer than 3 days from the habitual residence, the athlete must provide the full address of his residence or whereabouts.

d) The details, including the name and address, of the training locations of the athlete, as well as his training calendar for the trimester, and the minimum schedule of availability necessary for conducting the doping controls.

e) The trimestral competition calendar, specifying the locations, dates and types of competitions in which he is due to compete.

Spanish athletes are thus divided into two categories: those subjected to an individualized plan under article 45 of the Real decreto and those not subjected to an individualized plan. Accordingly, the Council’s resolution provides two types of obligatory forms, one for athletes not included in the individualized plan covering only the usual place(s) of training (Annex I) and one for athletes included in the individualized plan covering the usual place(s) of training but also the unusual places of training (Annex II). Those forms must be completed and communicated to the national anti-doping agency before the beginning of each trimester.

It is the legality of this resolution, which was challenged by the Spanish Association of Professional Cyclists in front of the Audiencia Nacional , that lead to the ruling adopted 24 June 2014.  


II.            The Ruling

As a preamble, the judges recognized that “the efficiency of the fight against doping would be seriously impeded if no adequate mechanism existed to monitor effectively the whereabouts obligation of the athletes”. However, the Court also considered that both legal texts refer to the habitual localization of the athlete in order to enable the testing”. Annex I does not go beyond what is necessary to assert this usual localization. Annex II, reserved for athletes subjected to an individualized plan, however, “besides indicating the location of the habitual training whereabouts, also include the request to provide information that should facilitate the ‘occasional localization’… which means that the athletes subject to this annex are (also) subject to a permanent localization obligation”.

The judges considered that this “permanent localization duty” is “submitting the athlete to a permanent control during all the days and hours of the year, thereby exceeding what can be considered “habitual or frequent”. The measure is disproportionate and contrary to the right to privacy, and is not mandated by law, even when considering the special duties that an athlete bears as holder of a sporting licence. It is especially so when subjected to a differentiated plan, since it could be analogized to a measure of penal character requiring a permanent localization that can only be imposed as a consequence of a criminal offence. Therefore, such a permanent localization duty entails an interference that is contrary to the essence of the right to privacy”. 

Thus, the Court considered that the resolution was contrary to the right to privacy and was going beyond the wording enshrined in article 5.3 of the Ley Orgánica. Hence, it is to be considered null and void and a new resolution needs to be devised.


III.           Whereabouts Requirements in the World Anti-Doping Code

So, is this just a Spanish case, relevant only to the national context, or does it reveal a wider problem with the whereabouts requirements imposed by the World anti-doping Code?

Surely, this is first and foremost a national case. However, the laws at stake were all adopted to transpose the World Anti-Doping Code at the national level and to conform to the UNESCO Convention on Doping.[3] Consequently, grasping the scope of the requirements imposed in this regard by the WADA Code is crucial to assessing the potential wider impact of this decision.  


Article 2.4 of the WADA Code 2009 foresees that the following constitutes an anti-doping rule violation:

2.4 Violation of applicable requirements regarding Athlete availability for Out-of-Competition Testing, including failure to file required whereabouts information and missed tests which are declared based on rules which comply with the International Standard for Testing. Any combination of three missed tests and/or filing failures within an eighteen-month period as determined by Anti-Doping Organizations with jurisdiction over the Athlete shall constitute an anti-doping rule violation.  

To this end article 5.1.1 of the WADA Code 2009 provides that each Anti-Doping Organization shall:

5.1.1 Plan and conduct an effective number of In- Competition and Out-of-Competition tests on Athletes over whom they have jurisdiction, including but not limited to Athletes in their respective Registered Testing Pools. Each International Federation shall establish a Registered Testing Pool for International-Level Athletes in its sport, and each National Anti- Doping Organization shall establish a national Registered Testing Pool for Athletes who are present in that National Anti-Doping Organization’s country or who are nationals, residents, license-holders or members of sport organizations of that country. In accordance with Article 14.3, any Athlete included in a Registered Testing Pool shall be subject to the whereabouts requirements set out in the International Standard for Testing.

Finally article 14.3. of the WADA Code 2009 indicates that:

14.3 Athlete Whereabouts Information

As further provided in the International Standard for Testing, Athletes who have been identified by their International Federation or National Anti-Doping Organization for inclusion in a Registered Testing Pool shall provide accurate, current location information. The International Federations and National Anti- Doping Organizations shall coordinate the identification of Athletes and the collecting of current location information and shall submit these to WADA. This information will be accessible, through ADAMS where reasonably feasible, to other Anti-Doping Organizations having jurisdiction to test the Athlete as provided in Article 15. This information shall be maintained in strict confidence at all times; shall be used exclusively for purposes of planning, coordinating or conducting Testing; and shall be destroyed after it is no longer relevant for these purposes. 

These whereabouts requirements are further fleshed out in the International Standard for Testing 2012. Article 11.3 of the Standard deals with the Whereabouts Filing Requirements and foresees that: 

11.3.1 On a date specified by the Responsible ADO that is prior to the first day of each quarter (i.e. 1 January, 1 April, 1 July and 1 October, respectively), an Athlete in a Registered Testing Pool must file a Whereabouts Filing with his/her IF (if the Athlete has been included in its international Registered Testing Pool) or his/her NADO (if the Athlete has been included in its national Registered Testing Pool) that contains at least the following information:

a. complete mailing address where correspondence may be sent to the Athlete for formal notice purposes. Any notice or other item mailed to that address will be deemed to have been received by the Athlete five working days after it was deposited in the mail;

[…]

d. for each day during the following quarter, the full address of the place
where the Athlete will be residing (e.g. home, temporary lodgings, hotel, etc);

e. for each day during the following quarter, the name and address of each location where the Athlete will train, work or conduct any other regular
activity (e.g. school), as well as the usual time-frames for such regular activities; and

f. the Athlete’s competition schedule for the following quarter, including the name and address of each location where the Athlete is scheduled to compete during the quarter and the date(s) on which he/she is scheduled to compete at such location(s).

11.3.2 The Whereabouts Filing must also include, for each day during the following quarter, one specific 60-minute time slot between 6 a.m. and 11 p.m. each day where the Athlete will be available and accessible for Testing at a specific location. 

The question whether a specific type of information is to be included in the Whereabouts Filing is key to the Spanish ruling. The WADA Standard mentions only the “the name and address of each location where the Athlete will train, work or conduct any other regular activity (e.g. school), as well as the usual time-frames for such regular activities”. This is further broken down in the comment to article 11.3.1(e) of the Standard, where it is specified that “[T]his requirement applies only to regular activities, i.e. activities that are part of the Athlete’s regular routine. Furthermore, the WADA Guidelines for implementing an effective athlete whereabouts program provide at article 3.5 (p.19) that “an activity is only ‘regular’ if it is done as part of a standard schedule/in accordance with a routine pattern or practice”.

One can deduce from the above review of the WADA provisions that the Spanish system was even going beyond what WADA requires in terms of information to be communicated in the framework of the whereabouts requirements. Accordingly, the Court considered that the incriminated Annex II goes beyond what is necessary to fulfil the objective of the anti-doping fight, if the global anti-doping watchdog is not confident that such information is needed. It would be a stretch, therefore, to interpret this judgment as an immediate threat for the WADA Code. Its wording seems rather to be in line with the Code’s own provisions.  


IV.          The Controversy Over Whereabouts Requirements

Anyhow, this case fuels the on-going controversy over the conciliation of whereabouts requirements with the right to privacy of athletes. The Court’s view that submitting an athlete to a permanent control of his whereabouts is contrary to her right to privacy might speak against a requirement to provide “for each day during the following quarter, the full address of the place where the Athlete will be residing (e.g. home, temporary lodgings, hotel, etc)” or “for each day during the following quarter, the name and address of each location where the Athlete will train, work or conduct any other regular
activity (e.g. school)”. The proportionality of such, little less intruding, requirements could be put to the test as well. In fact, in its second opinion on the WADA Code, Article 29 Data Protection working party of the EU, specified that “the information to be provided concerning the whereabouts and the time slots for controls should be clearly determined by taking into account the requirements of the principles of necessity and proportionality with respect to the purposes of out of competition testing, and avoiding the collection of information that might lead to undue interference in athletes’ private lives or reveal sensitive data on athletes and/or third parties”. In this regard, it “considers it to be proportionate to require personal data regards to the specific 60-minute time slot and to require filling in the name and address of each location where the athlete will train, work or conduct any other regular activity”. But, it called onto WADA to “reconsider requesting that the residence on each day of the following quarter (even temporary lodging) should be filled in (article 11.3.1 under d. of the International Standard for Testing) as this would appear to be questionable”.[4]

This controversy also has a philosophical flavor as scores of legal and social science scholars have been discussing the issue over the years. Some laments the “lack of concern given to athletes’ privacy”[5], the fact that “athletes are now just as likely to be punished for taking prohibited substances as they are for being bad at paperwork”[6], or “a State of Exception”[7] for elite athletes. Leading them to wonder: “[W]ith respect to the ‘whereabouts’ policy we must ask whether human rights are genuinely violated?”[8]

Undeniably, WADA’s Athlete Committee is supporting staunchly the whereabouts requirements[9], but its members do not represent in any democratic, nor legitimate, way the affected athlete population. However, in the face of the impossible task of enforcing a harmonized global surveillance of the implementation of the whereabouts requirements[10], recent social-science surveys have shown that athletes doubt the necessity, proportionality and efficacy of such controls.[11]

The case at hand is a great opportunity to reflect on the foucauldian turn of the anti-doping fight. In practice it is looking more and more like a panopticon, devised to optimize the surveillance of athletes, while irremediably failing to do so.[12] In turn, each new failure triggers calls for a reinforcement of the surveillance’s means and scope, thus, overlooking the deeper socio-economic roots of doping. In this context, the judgement of the Spanish High Court is reaffirming a healthy, and reasonable, limit to a potential disciplinary overreach. An overreach, which, in many eyes, raises a more fundamental question: “is it worth the cost?”[13]



[1] Especially the Ley Orgánica 7/2006, de 21 de noviembre, de protección de la salud y de lucha contra el dopaje en el deporte and the Real Decreto 641/2009, de 17 de abril, por el que se regulan los procesos de control de dopaje

[2] I thank Oskar Van Maren for his translating skills.

[3] Here one should look specifically at the preamble of the Ley Organica 7/2006 and of Real Decreto 641/2009, 1462/2009 and 1744/2011

[4] This provision is still included in the new 2015 version of the International Standard for testing and investigations at I.3.1.(d), p.88

[5] Sarah Teetzel (2007) Respecting privacy in detecting illegitimate enhancements in athletes, Sport, Ethics and Philosophy, 1:2, 159-170

[6] Niall Trainor, The 2009 WADA Code : A more proportionate deal for athletes ?, Entertainment and Sports law journal, June 2010, §65

[7] Lev Kreft (2009) The Elite Athlete – In a State of Exception?, Sport, Ethics and Philosophy, 3:1, 3-18

[8] Lev Kreft (2009) The Elite Athlete – In a State of Exception?, Sport, Ethics and Philosophy, 3:1, 3-18 p.12

[9] One example amongst many WADA Athlete Committee Meeting April 3–4, 2008, p.2

[10] See the Report to WADA Executive Committee on Lack of effectiveness of Testing Programs, 18 may 2012; Dag Vidar Hanstad , Eivind Å. Skille & Sigmund Loland (2010) Harmonization of anti-doping work: myth or reality?, Sport in Society: Cultures, Commerce, Media, Politics, 13:3, 418-430; Dikic N, Samardzic Markovic S, Mc Namee M, On the efficacy of WADA’s Whereabouts policy: between filing failures and missed tests Deutsche Zeitschrift für Sportmedizin ‘Jahrgang 62, nr. 10 (2011), 324-328

[11] Dag Vidar Hanstad , Eivind Å. Skille & Sigmund Loland (2010) Harmonization of anti-doping work: myth or reality?, Sport in Society: Cultures, Commerce, Media, Politics, 13:3, 418-430, p.420; Diane Valkenburga, Olivier de Honb, Ivo van Hilvoordea, Doping control, providing whereabouts and the importance of privacy for elite athletes’, International Journal of Drug Policy xxx (2014) xxx–xxx

[12] This logic of surveillance is highlighted by  I. Waddington (2010), Surveillance and control in sport: A sociologist looks at the WADA whereabouts system. International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics 2: 255–74. And Hanstad, D.V., and S. Loland. ‘Elite Level Athletes’ Duty to Provide Information on their Whereabouts: Justifiable Anti-doping Work or an Indefensible Surveillance Regime?’ European Journal for Sport Sciences 9 (2009): 3–10.

[13] I. Waddington (2010), Surveillance and control in sport: A sociologist looks at the WADA whereabouts system. International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics 2: 255–74

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Asser International Sports Law Blog | Policing the (in)dependence of National Federations through the prism of the FIFA Statutes. By Tine Misic

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

Policing the (in)dependence of National Federations through the prism of the FIFA Statutes. By Tine Misic

…and everything under the sun is in tune,

but the sun is eclipsed by the moon…[1] 


The issue

Ruffling a few feathers, on 30 May 2015 the FIFA Executive Committee rather unsurprisingly, considering the previous warnings,[2] adopted a decision to suspend with immediate effect the Indonesian Football Federation (PSSI) until such time as PSSI is able to comply with its obligations under Articles 13 and 17 of the FIFA Statutes.[3] Stripping PSSI of its membership rights, the decision results in a prohibition of all Indonesian teams (national or club) from having any international sporting contact. In other words, the decision precludes all Indonesian teams from participating in any competition organised by either FIFA or the Asian Football Confederation (AFC). In addition, the suspension of rights also precludes all PSSI members and officials from benefits of any FIFA or AFC development programme, course or training during the term of suspension. This decision coincides with a very recent award by the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) in this ambit, which shall be discussed further below.[4]

The former decision, substantiated upon the alleged governmental infringement of the independence of PSSI, is the latest in a line of similar decisions adopted by FIFA in recent years. It succeeds inter alia the suspension of the Nigerian Football Federation and subsequent non-recognition of its General Assembly decisions,[5] and the suspensions of the Cameroonian Football Association[6], the Football Federation of Belize,[7] the Kenya Football Federation,[8] and the Islamic Republic of Iran Football Federation.[9]

The common denominator of all these decisions is the alleged impediment of third parties, usually governments or their related bodies, in the affairs of national football associations. In the Indonesian case, the trigger was the imposition of additional licensing criteria for football clubs by BOPI, an agency of the Indonesian Ministry of Youth and Sports, which resulted in two clubs (Arema and Persebaya) being precluded from competing in the Indonesian Super League (ISL) and subsequent measures adopted by the ministry aimed at relieving PSSI of all of its responsibilities.[10] While in the Nigerian case, an initial High Court injunction prevented the elected Executive Committee from taking office, and a later intervention from the Nigerian Department of State Security Service (SSS), resulted in the suspension of the Nigerian Football Federation[11] and subsequently in the non-recognition of its General Assembly decisions,[12] the other cited cases include violations in the form of, among others, “blatant government interference”,[13] non-provision of security services from government forces,[14] and violation of the independence of the decision-making process of the national football governing body.[15] 


Grounds for intervention by FIFA

The normative basis for the aforementioned interventions lies primarily within Articles 13, 14 and 17 of the FIFA Statutes.[16] The Members’ obligation of an independent management of their affairs is embedded in Article 13(1)(i), which states that: ”Members have the following obligations... to manage their affairs independently and ensure that their own affairs are not influenced by any third parties...” Strengthening that notion, Article 17(1) provides that: “Each Member shall manage its affairs independently and with no influence from third parties.” Furthermore, the second paragraph of Article 17 explicitly points out that all the bodies need to be elected or appointed within each respective Member, which prima facie appears even more stringent than Article 7 bis of the UEFA Statutes, that constitutes:”...their executive body is freely elected and that their other bodies are elected or appointed in a completely independent way.”[17]

Enjoying full discretion that stems from its Statutes, FIFA acts upon information received about the alleged violations, usually from the Members themselves. Prior to the adoption of a decision, a “prevention” phase takes place, during which FIFA, through means of correspondence with respective Members or/and third parties involved, addresses the alleged infringements and usually allows for a deference period for compliance with specific conditions. Members and/or third parties are warned that non-compliance may result in possible sanctions. Article 13(2) of the Statutes expressly provides that: “Violation of the above-mentioned obligations by any Member may lead to sanctions provided for in these Statutes.”

One of the most daunting repercussions FIFA may avail itself of is the suspension of a Member. In accordance with Article 14(1) of the Statutes, the primary responsibility for suspending a Member lies with the Congress. However, and as seen in the cases cited above, when violations are deemed to be so serious to require prompt attention, the Executive Committee or even the Emergency Committee may step in and adopt the relevant decision.[18] If not lifted beforehand, such a decision must be confirmed by a three-quarter majority at the next Congress, otherwise it is automatically lifted. A suspension leads to a loss of all membership rights, which effectively prevents other Members from entertaining any sporting contact with the suspended Member. Moreover, the suspension does not preclude the Disciplinary Committee from imposing further sanctions (e.g. fines, return of awards, deduction of points, etc.).[19]

Another measure for addressing an eventual non-compliance with the obligation of independent management of affairs is the non-recognition of wrongfully elected bodies or decisions passed by such bodies in accordance with Article 17(2) of the Statutes. In other words, FIFA has the authority not to recognize an election of a body of one of its Members, if such an election lacks uncompromised independence vis-à-vis third parties, as was the case with the Nigerian Football Federation.

Lastly, it is also worth mentioning that sanctions may be imposed regardless of the grounds and fault for interference of third parties since Article 13(3) of the Statutes, by going beyond the actual interference, provides that: “Violations of par. 1(i) may also lead to sanctions even if the third-party influence was not the fault of the Member concerned.” This basically means that FIFA shall not entertain explanations of third party interventions that may possibly even be justified under the provisions of national law. 


To comply, or not to comply – the CAS escape route

Since a suspension decision virtually ostracises and isolates a Member, a valid point to raise is, whether apart from yielding and fulfilling the imposed conditions, other means remain available to the disgraced Member to challenge such a decision. The same could be said for the situation pertaining to the non-recognition of elected bodies of particular Members.

In accordance with Article 66 of the Statutes any dispute arising between FIFA and its Members shall be resolved by CAS applying the relevant FIFA regulations and subsidiarily Swiss law. The exclusive jurisdiction of CAS is further strengthened in Article 67 of the Statutes which also outlines the procedural requirements for an appeal against a final decision passed by one of the FIFA bodies. Moreover, the Members explicitly agree not to avail themselves of recourse to ordinary courts of law, which significantly narrows their options down.[20]

Given that jurisprudence in named cases is relatively scarce, it is worth having a closer look at the above mentioned award rendered by CAS in the joined cases brought before it by the Nigerian Football Federation.[21] Notwithstanding the previous FIFA decision to suspend the appellant, which was later lifted, the form of relief sought with the appeal was the annulment of two decisions in the form of letters, addressed at the appellant by FIFA. Considering the Court’s conclusion, stemming from the relevant CAS jurisprudence,[22] to dismiss the appeal against the second letter because it did not constitute an appealable decision since it did not contain a ruling affecting the rights of the appellant, hence lacking the animus decidendi,[23] the onus of the award was on the first challenged letter.

In its preliminary remarks the Panel narrowed down the subjective and the objective scope of the review saying that it:”...may only assess de novo, putting itself in FIFA’s place, whether FIFA had sufficient factual and legal grounds, in terms of Article 17 of its Statutes, to adopt the decisions allegedly set forth in the letters challenged by the Appellant.[24] By abstaining from assessing the eventual legality of the third party infringement, and despite harbouring some doubts about the (non)compliance of the elections with the national law, it further stated that:”...this Panel may not assess the validity of the various NFF elections on the basis of the NFF rules or of Nigerian law, because such appraisal falls outside the scope of FIFA’s authority under Article 17 of its Statutes and, thus, falls outside of the Panel’s scope of review.[25]

By observing that none of the parties challenged the Court’s jurisdiction, applying the FIFA regulations and additionally Swiss law pursuant to Article R58 of the CAS Code, and by dismissing the Respondent’s arguments pertaining to the admissibility and the Appellant’s active standing, the Panel addressed the legitimacy of FIFA’s non-recognition of the elections pursuant to Article 17 of the Statutes in the merits of the award.[26]

As per the legal grounds of the decision, the Panel stressed that: “The purpose of Article 17 is to grant FIFA the power to not recognize an election where the member association’s electoral process does not guarantee the complete independence of the election.[27] It went further saying: “...the Panel is of the view that the requirement of “complete independence” found in para. 2 must be understood in the light of para. 1 of Article 17, forbidding “influence from third parties”. Accordingly, an electoral process does not guarantee such complete independence where the election is not managed in a totally independent manner and, in particular, where it is influenced by third parties of any kind (e.g. government officials or bodies).[28]

Having established FIFA’s authority, the Panel subsequently assessed the relevant evidence submitted by the parties. After determining the relevant factual circumstances, the Panel noted that the intervention from the State Security Services (SSS) influenced the unfolding of the election and consequently of the General Assembly itself, constituting a manifest insufficiency of the independence of the election from the influence of third parties pursuant to Article 17 of the Statutes.[29] The appeal was thus duly dismissed on merits as well.

By dismissing the appeal, and in spite of recognizing the connection of the dispute with “a longstanding struggle occurring in Nigerian football between different personalities and factions fighting for leadership within the NFF”,[30] the Court, by setting a precedent to a certain extent, distanced itself from assessing the compliance of the interference with national law, hence virtually affirming FIFA’s discretion in the evaluation of the circumstances leading to its intervention, which appears to leave an eventual appeal by the Indonesian Football Federation with very slim chances of success. 


Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?[31]

When it comes to independence and third party influence issue, the Members are subject to instant scrutiny from FIFA and are swiftly held accountable, even when they hold no responsibility for a third party intervention, as may be seen in the above cited cases. The same cannot be said when the situation is reversed. FIFA is often not submitted to the same levels of accountability checks as those who are affected by its decisions.[32]

While in some instances FIFA’s prompt intervention appears well-grounded, since interference from a third party is manifestly ill-founded, as may be seen in the case of the Nigerian Football Federation (interventions from State Security Forces and unidentified armed individuals seem to go way beyond the borders of necessity, and can hence hardly be justified), other cases, namely the latest suspension of the PSSI, show that FIFA may have been slightly too quick when pulling the trigger. All the more so, given the circumstantial background of the case (e.g. pressing issues related inter alia to financial, tax and ownership issues of the clubs participating in national leagues which the PSSI, despite previous warnings, was unable or unwilling to cope with, and which in some extreme cases resulted in players losing their lives due to lack of medical care owed to arrears of health care contributions by the clubs), and the government’s intervention could arguably to a certain extent be seen as necessary.[33]

However, as seen above, under the existing rules FIFA is not inclined to look beyond the mere interference of third parties and verify whether such actions might be justified, thus possibly breaching the principle of proportionality which is recognized as a general principle by CAS.[34] Since such discretion seems to have been condoned by the latest CAS decision,[35] one may wonder whether there is actually any room for a more thorough and systematic factual assessment of the background of such interferences in the light of a possible justification, which inevitably raises questions of the eventual (over)restrictive nature of the relevant Statutes provisions themselves. Furthermore, the fact that any government intervention, regardless of the eventual acceptability and consideration of local specificities of each respective Member, is to be seen as a punishable infringement, puts the issue within the frame of the perpetual conundrum of the legitimate boundaries of the lex sportiva.

Since FIFA is virtually accountable to no-one from the hierarchical point of view, and given that governments, with the exception of the Swiss government, have no supervisory powers over it (some would argue that FIFA may itself be seen as a government),[36] the only plausible route for the assessment of the proportionality of the Statutes would seem to be through the legal accountability channel, using EU law, especially its provisions on competition and internal market.[37] In fact, given the precedents (e.g. Charleroi)[38] and the recent legal challenge of FIFA’s decision to ban Third-Party Ownership,[39] these rules appear to have become an increasingly important tool to hold the organization accountable, regardless of the latest developments regarding the prosecution of its officials.[40] A further analysis as to whether such a route remains available to potential appellants from outside of the European Union would, however, go beyond the scope of this paper. 


Conclusion

As presented throughout this brief overview, FIFA has seemingly developed a zero-tolerance policy for any governmental interference regarding the affairs of its Members, thus arguably safeguarding their independence. It has consistently availed itself of one of the most stringent corrective measures for alleged violations envisaged by its Statutes, suspending the non-compliant Members, hence often provoking strong emotional response within the pertinent countries.[41] Whereby such sanctions might be deemed necessary in certain cases, non-consideration of factual background and eventual justifications in others has led to accusations of double standards,[42] and raised questions of proportionality of the relevant Statutes provisions and the borders of the rules governing “purely sporting issues”.

The outcome of the deadlock in the latest case of PSSI remains to be seen, with the government’s intention to thoroughly reform the Indonesian football suggesting that a swift solution might not quite lie around the corner.[43] Given that compliance with the imposed conditions appears to be the route that will be taken in this case, and as long as provisions of the Statutes are not submitted to scrutiny of a competent judicial body, arguably in the form of the European Court of Justice, any future third party interferences shall most likely continue to be dealt with strictly by FIFA and the non-compliant Members will keep finding themselves “on the dark side of the moon”.[44]



[1] Pink Floyd, Eclipse (Dark Side of the Moon, EMI, 1973).

[2] Letter of FIFA to the Republic of Indonesia Minister of Youth and Sports, written in Zurich and sent on 10 April 2015.

[3] Decision of the FIFA Executive Committee: Suspension of the Indonesian Football Federation (PSSI), adopted in Zurich on 30 May 2015.

[4] Joined cases CAS 2014/A/3744 and CAS 2014/A/3766 Nigerian Football Federation v. FIFA, award of 18 May 2015.

[5] Decision of the FIFA Emergency Committee: Suspension of the Nigerian Football Federation (NFF), adopted in Zurich on 9 July 2014.

[6] Decision of the FIFA Emergency Committee: Suspension of the Cameroonian Football Association, adopted in Zurich on 4 July 2013 (FIFA Circular no. 1367, Zurich, 4 July 2013).

[7] Decision of the FIFA Emergency Committee: Suspension of the Football Federation of Belize, adopted in Zurich on 17 June 2011.

[8] Decision of the FIFA Emergency Committee: Suspension of the Kenya Football Federation, adopted in Zurich on 2 June 2004.

[9] Decision of the FIFA Emergency Committee: Suspension of the Islamic Republic of Iran Football Federation (IRIFF), adopted in Zurich on 23 November 2006.

[10] FIFA Decision of 30 May 2015, cited supra note 3.

[11] FIFA Decision of 9 July 2014, cited supra note 5.

[12] Letter of FIFA to Nigerian Football Federation (NFF), written in Zurich and sent on 29 August 2014.

[13] FIFA Decision of 2 June 2004, cited supra note 8.

[14] FIFA Decision of 17 June 2011, cited supra note 7.

[15] FIFA Decision of 23 November 2006, cited supra note 9.

[16] FIFA Statutes (Regulations Governing the Application of the Statutes, Standing Orders of the Congress), adopted in São Paulo on 11 June 2014.

[17] UEFA Statutes (Rules of Procedure of the UEFA, Congress Regulations governing the Implementation of the UEFA Statutes), adopted in Astana on 24 March 2014.

[18] FIFA Statutes, cited supra note 16, Art. 33.

[19] Ibid., Arts. 63, 65.

[20] Ibid., Art. 68.

[21] Nigerian Football Federation v. FIFA, cited supra note 4.

[22] Case CAS 2005/A/899 FC Aris Thessaloniki v. FIFA & New Panionios N.F.C., award of 15 July 2005, para. 12; Case CAS 2004/A/659 Galatasaray SK v. Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) & Club Regatas Vasco da Gama & F. J., award of 17 March 2005, paras. 23-25.

[23] Nigerian Football Federation v. FIFA, cited supra note 4, paras. 192,196.

[24] Ibid., para. 160.

[25] Ibid., para 160.

[26] Ibid., paras. 160-182.

[27] Ibid., para. 200.

[28] Ibid., para. 200.

[29] Ibid., paras. 203-211.

[30] Ibid., para. 213.

[31]Who guards the guardians?” (translation mine); Juvenal, Satires, (Book II, Satire VI, 1st and early 2nd centuries AD), lines 347–8.

[32] R. Pielke Jr., How can FIFA be held accountable? (Sport Management Review, Issue 16, 2013), pp. 258.

[33] FIFPro, Death of Mendieta must be the turning point for Indonesia, http://www.fifpro.org/en/news/death-of-mendieta-must-be-turning-point-for-indonesia (last visited 28 June 2015).

[34] See inter alia Cases CAS Arbitration CAS 2005/A/830 S. v. FINA, award of 15 July 2005, CAS 2009/A/2012 Doping Authority Netherlands v. N., award of 11 June 2010, CAS 2012/A/2740 Marcelo Carracedo v. Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), award of 18 April 2013.

[35] Nigerian Football Fedration v. FIFA, cited supra note 4.

[36]S. Bradley, FIFA reforms face resistance – and huge support (swissinfo.ch, 5 December 2012), http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/football-scandals_fifa-reforms-face-resistance---and-huge-support/34067104 (last visited 28 June 2015).

[37] R. Pielke, cited supra note 32, pp. 259-262.

[38] Case A/05/03843, SA Sporting du Pays de Charleroi ao v FIFA, Tribunal de Commerce de Charleroi, 15 May 2006 (Case was referred to the European Court of Justice, but did not reach a judgment since the parties reached a settlement out of court),

[39] A. Duff, Portugal, Spain Said to Complain to EU on Soccer Finance Rules (BloombergBusiness, 4 February 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-04/portugal-spain-said-to-complain-to-eu-on-soccer-finance-ban (last visited 28 June 2015).

[40] BBC News, Fifa corruption inquiries: Officials arrested in Zurich (bbc.com, 27 May 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32895048 (last visited 28 June 2015).

[41] ESPN, Iranian Federation suspended by FIFA (espn.com, 23 November 2006), http://www.espnfc.com/story/393454/iranian-federation-suspended-by-fifa (last visited 28 June 2015).

[42] M. Zandi, Is FIFA's Decision in the Best Interest of Football (Association Internationale De La Presse Sportive),http://www.aipsmedia.com/index.php?cod=551&page=news&tp=n#.VZAhwRuqqko (last visited 28 June 2015).

[43] Reuters, Indonesia government takes responsibility for ban (uk.reuters.com, 31 May 2015), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/05/31/uk-soccer-fifa-indonesia-idUKKBN0OG03920150531 (last visited 28 June 2015).

[44] Pink Floyd, Brain Damage (Dark Side of the Moon, EMI, 1973).

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