Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

The International Partnership against Corruption in Sport (IPACS) and the quest for good governance: Of brave men and rotting fish - By Thomas Kruessmann

Editor's note: Prof. Thomas Kruessmann is key expert in the EU Technical Assistant Project "Strengthening Teaching and Research Capacity at ADA University" in Baku (Azerbaijan). At the same time, he is co-ordinator of the Jean-Monnet Network "Developing European Studies in the Caucasus" with Skytte Institute of Political Studies at the University of Tartu (Estonia).


The notion that “fish rots from the head down” is known to many cultures and serves as a practical reminder on what is at stake in the current wave of anti-corruption / integrity and good governance initiatives. The purpose of this blog post is to provide a short update on the recent founding of the International Partnership against Corruption in Sport (IPACS), intermittently known as the International Sports Integrity Partnership (IPAS), and to propose some critical perspectives from a legal scholar’s point of view.

During the past couple of years, the sports world has seen a never-ending wave of corruption allegations, often followed by revelations, incriminations and new allegation. There are ongoing investigations, most notably in the United States where the U.S. Department of Justice has just recently intensified its probe into corruption at the major sports governing bodies (SGBs). By all accounts, we are witnessing only the tip of the iceberg. And after ten years of debate and half-hearted reforms, there is the widespread notion, as expressed by the Council of Europe’s (CoE’s) Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) Resolution 2199/2018 that “the sports movement cannot be left to resolve its failures alone”.


What is IPACS and why has it been created? 

IPACS was founded under the authority of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) as “a cross-sectorial, multi-stakeholder platform to enable a pragmatic partnership allowing the development and implementation of programmes and initiatives by the various partners, to strengthen efforts promoting transparency, integrity and good governance in sports organisations, in particular through education and awareness-raising initiatives.” These words, taken from the Declaration of the Second International Forum for Sports Integrity (IFSI), held in Lausanne on 15 February 2017, provide a summary of the tasks IPACS was agreed to address. Interestingly, later on the official mission statement was significantly watered down: “To bring together international sports organisations, governments, inter-governmental organisations and other relevant stakeholders to strengthen and support efforts to eliminate corruption and promote a culture of good governance in and around sport.” This change mission statement betrays some of the controversies that lie behind the difficult quest for good governance and integrity.

One obvious question is why was it only in 2017 that IPACS was created? The short answer is that IFSI took up an idea that had been put forward at the UK Anti-Corruption Summit one year earlier. However, the real question is, why did this initiative emerge only in 2016/17 after corruption scandals had been hitting SGBs over the entire past decade and had become particularly acute with FIFA around 2010? The reason is that there is a major undercurrent in fighting corruption in SGBs: the doctrine of the autonomy of sports. For historical reasons, most major SGBs have been created as private entities, often associations or non-commercial entities, and are adamant at defending the notion of independence and autonomy of sports. While international anti-corruption conventions by the nature of international law address only states, SGBs are in the fortunate position to have to comply only with the criminal laws of their host state. And despite the fact that the commercialisation of sports has turned SGBs into multi-billion dollar ventures, since their inception their internal structures have resembled “gentlemen’s clubs”. It therefore comes as no surprise that even in the IFSI Declaration of February 2017, participants are eager to refer to the 69th United Nations General Assembly proclaiming the autonomy of sports and shifting the responsibility in fighting corruption primarily to governments.

This undercurrent explains why the original IPACS mission statement calls for a “pragmatic partnership” and emphasizes education and awareness-raising initiatives. The truth is that even by 2017, many stakeholders (“participants to the IFSI Declaration”) were fighting to protect the independence of SGBs teeth and claw. And that only now a consensus is emerging, as expressed in the CoE PACE Resolution 2199/2018, that “enough is enough” and that SGBs have actually failed in cleaning up their business. Earlier resolutions, e.g. by the 14th CoE Conference of Ministers responsible for Sport from 22 February 2017, have been more diplomatic in language. But it is clear that IPACS, despite all defensive battles from SGBs, is now representing a change in the tide of governments and anti-corruption related international organisations (such as CoE, OECD and UNODC) finally eager “to talk tough” with SGBs.


Is “talking tough” with SGBs credible? 

Now, even if we assume that the most recent investigations into corruption scandals were the straw that broke the camel’s back, will international anti-corruption organisations and governments be credible in fighting corruption by breaking up the doctrine of sports autonomy? Switzerland has been in the vanguard of national governments extending the offense of corruption in the private sector to NGOs and other non-commercial entities. This new offense (Arts 322octies – 322decies Swiss Criminal Code) is innovative because it does no longer require a distortion of the market. GRECO is reported to be preparing a “Typology Study on Private Sector Corruption” which will also cover the sports sector.

International anti-corruption organisations, by contrast, have a more careful line to tread. Arguably, there is a host of integrity-related problems in the world of sports that has been viewed for a long time in a reductionist way. Doping, match-rigging and other kinds of manipulation of sports events have ever too often been seen independently of the governance regimes of SGBs. Looking at them as individual wrongdoing at best supported the argument that SGBs may not have been vigilant enough. But this never came close to insisting that such kinds of wrongdoing are the logical consequence of structural governance defects in these bodies. As IPACS is now marking a shift in the consensus towards a more holistic and interventionist approach, what will this mean for international anti-corruption organisations? The problem is that during the past decade, many of them were only too happy to focus on singular problems while being co-opted by SGBs into “partnerships” to “address” governance issues. Analytically, this can be described as a horizontal legitimacy-building strategy by SGBs. By concluding memoranda of understanding, e.g. between the IOC and the UN or between FIFA and the CoE, SGBs, depending on their level of regional or universal activities, co-opted their potential critics and tried to acquire legitimacy by involving them into so-called reform processes.

Arguably, by being drawn into piecemeal reforms of SGBs over the last decade, international anti-corruption organisations have become part of the problem. The question is, how can they become part of the solution again? This is where IPACS presents an answer: it can be understood as a tacit dissolution of the prevailing partnerships and, depending on style and substance, offering a fresh start for a holistic and thus governance-related approach to establishing integrity. 


How is IPACS going about its work?

As mentioned before, IPACS was created in the wings of the Second IFSI, held on 15 February 2017 in Lausanne, and it will operate within the broader IFSI structure. By 2019 when the Third IFSI is scheduled, IFSI participants will therefore review a progress report on the activities realized which invariably includes any progress made by IPACS.

The work of IPACS itself is structured on three levels. There is a core group in which the most important anti-corruption international organisations are represented, a Working Group which is basically a tripartite structure representing the interests of SGBs, governments and inter-governmental organisations, and topical task forces. Core group members (CoE, IOC, OECD, UNODC and the UK Government) are in charge of preparing and co-ordinating the Working Group meetings. The first Working Group meeting took place at the CoE’s venue on 21 June 2017, the second Working Group meeting was held at the OECD on 14-15 December 2017. The third Working Group meeting is scheduled for June 2018 at the IOC’s headquarters in Lausanne.

So far, three task forces with experts from outside the Working Group have been established:

  • Task force 1 (TF1) on reducing the risk of corruption in public procurement;
  • Task force 2 (TF2) on ensuring transparency and integrity in the selection of major sport events, with an initial focus on managing conflicts of interest; and
  • Task force 3 (TF3) on optimising the processes of compliance with good governance principles to mitigate the risk of corruption.

The expected outputs from these task forces are as follows:

(1) TF1 to develop by the end of 2018 a general mapping of procurement standards to the specific context of sport, possibly complemented by illustrative case studies on how these standards could be applied in practice.

(2) TF2 to define conflict of interest in the specific sports context and undertake a stock-taking exercise of procedures and practices for managing conflict of interest in the specific context of the selection of major sporting events.

(3) TF3 “to aim to”

  • map relevant governance standards and their applicability to the sports context;
  • consider developing indicators to evaluate compliance with these standards;
  • consider means for building capacity to implement good governance standards.

From the wording it appears that from TF1 to TF3, the tasks get ever larger and the commitment ever more unspecific. While TF1 is given a precise task with a definitive deadline, TF3 is asked to “aim to” reach certain goals. But this specific wording is perhaps a correct reflection of the difference in the scope of the problem. Procurement standards can easily be adopted from the corporate world. There is no specific challenge in running procurement for SGBs. Conflicts of interest, in particular when selecting major sports events, are of a different magnitude. Very often, the traditional ways of addressing such conflicts in the corporate setting or in public administration are clear-cut and addressed in a number of regulations. In SGBs which have been traditionally considered as “gentlemen’s clubs”, conflicts of interest run through the entire fabric of the institution. Therefore, the magnitude is much larger. But the real issue is how shall the mandate of TF2 be distinguished from that of TF3? Conflicts of interest and bad governance are twin concepts, and both flourish in the same environment. So, let us now turn to the central question: what can be expected from the most crucial TF3 in the IPACS setting?


Do governance standards finally get applied? 

In its first set of assignments, TF3 is asked to look into “relevant” governance standards, map them and analyse their applicability to the sports context. What sounds like a logical sequence of steps is actually quite muddled. Judging what is relevant and what is not is certainly the task at hand, but if we assume that “relevant standards” have been found, why is it necessary in a second step to “analyse their applicability in the sports context”? Is not applicability in the sports context the key criterion for judging what is relevant and what is not? Or will there first be other criteria for judging relevance outside from applicability in the sports context?

The point here is not to ridicule the language of the task force assignment, but to point to a deeper problem. Over the entire past decade, there have been numerous projects seeking to identify relevant governance standards. Without going into this issue very deeply, let me name just the most important ones:

In addition, when it comes the second set of assignments to TF3, in particular “developing indicators to evaluate compliance with these standards”, the following benchmarking tools already exist:

So all things considered, a large amount of work has already been done to identify relevant standards for SGBs. Would it not simply be enough to take these project results seriously and start implementing them and evaluate their effects? Indeed, from an outside observer’s point of view, it looks as if this entire process is flawed. There is simply no need to go into another round of identifying standards, assessing their relevance and benchmarking them with indicators when all the work has already been done.

One argument to support the TF3 engagement is that there are simply too many different standards, and that, when it comes to governments intervening with SGBs and forcing them to adopt good governance standards, there should be one agreed-upon set of standards for all cases. Likewise, CoE PACE Resolution 2199 (2018) “strongly calls for the development and implementation of a solid set of harmonised good governance criteria” (italics not in the original). And in para 4 of the appendix to this Resolution, PACE even speaks of the necessity of identifying “core criteria” of good governance in sport. While such quest for harmonising and reducing to core elements may be intellectually stimulating, there is doubt whether the sports world can accept another round of soul-searching. The fish has already been rotting for a while, and the same “brave men” (aka experts) who had been dealing with the issue for a decade are now employed again in yet another attempt of the international community to clear up the mess of SGBs. We will eagerly await some results when the IPACS Working Group will convene for its next meeting in June 2018.

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Asser International Sports Law Blog | ‘The reform of football': Yes, but how? By Marco van der Harst

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

‘The reform of football': Yes, but how? By Marco van der Harst

'Can't fight corruption with con tricks
They use the law to commit crime
And I dread, dread to think what the future will bring
When we're living in gangster time'
The Specials - Gangsters


The pressing need for change 

The Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) of the Council of Europe (CoE), which is composed of 318 MPs chosen from the national parliaments of the 47 CoE member states, unanimously adopted a report entitled ‘the reform of football’ on January 27, 2015. A draft resolution on the report will be debated during the PACE April 2015 session and, interestingly, (only?) FIFA’s president Sepp Blatter has been sent an invitation

The PACE report highlights the pressing need of reforming the governance of football by FIFA and UEFA respectively. Accordingly, the report contains some interesting recommendations to improve FIFA’s (e.g., Qatargate[1]) and UEFA’s governance (e.g., gender representation). Unfortunately, it remains unclear how the report’s recommendations will actually be implemented and enforced. 

The report is a welcomed secondary effect of the recent Qatargate directly involving former FIFA officials such as Jack Warner, Chuck Blazer, and Mohamed Bin Hammam[2] and highlighting the dramatic failures of FIFA’s governance in putting its house in order. Thus, it is undeniably time to correct the governance of football by FIFA and its confederate member UEFA – nolens volens. The real question is how to do it.



            Photograph: Fabrice Coffrini/AFP/Getty Images                   Photograph: Octav Ganea/AP


The main recommendations of the report 

In order to successfully investigate and disciplinary sanction violations made by its members, the report calls on FIFA and UEFA to revamp their institutions. Issues like corruption, nepotism, cronyism, conflict of interests can only be solved if:

  • The rules and decisions are clear, transparent and accountable (i.e. sanctioned) at a central level (Congress)
  • The flow of money is clear, transparent and accountable (i.e. sanctioned) at a central level (Congress)

  • Those who are in charge could be held accountable in a judicial or democratic, transparent and clear way before Congress

  • The duration of the terms of office should be limited at all levels (President, Congress, Committees)
  • The rules and decisions made by independent FIFA/UEFA officials should be made ‘for the good of the game’ and not for personal gains

  • Possible conflicts of interests should be prevented

  • Gender equality with regard to democratic representation (Congress, Committees). 


The report’s lack of clarity on the role of Switzerland

In order to implement the report’s recommendations, it is necessary to fully appreciate the essential role Switzerland could play because, inter alia, FIFA and UEFA are both associations under Swiss law. While taking into account the upcoming implementation of Lex FIFA i.e. the criminalisation of corruption in sport in Switzerland, one needs also to analyse the potential role of Swiss private law to ensure a comprehensive implementation of the report’s recommendations on reforming the governance of football by FIFA and UEFA. 


Good governance, corporate governance or association governance?

‘Good governance’ should be distinguished from ‘corporate governance’. The main and essential difference between the two is that the former concerns the protection of the public interest and the latter the protection of the corporation concerned. Accordingly, the set of duties, responsibilities and competences of, e.g., public law authorities are different from those who serve in a commercial enterprise. Considering the public and private law context and the different demands with regard to using the available instruments thereof, it is important to discern the differences between good governance and corporate governance.[3]

According to the European Commission ‘[c]orporate governance defines relationships between a company’s management, its board … and its … stakeholders[4]. It determines the way companies are managed and controlled’[5] by those stakeholders for the former’s and the latter’s interest.

In principle, corporate governance is mainly the (social) responsibility of the respective corporation[6] whereby those stakeholders play a crucial role to ensure that certain standards[7] such as transparency and accountability – with regard to, e.g., FIFA’s and UEFA’s economic and rule-making activities – would be respected in accordance with mandatory rules of national and EU law[8].

All international sports governing bodies located in Switzerland such as FIFA and UEFA have been recognized as private law associations under Article 60 et seq. of the Swiss Civil Code (CC). Since 1981, Switzerland has also recognized the public law status of the International Olympic Committee (IOC).[9]

Under Swiss law, an association could be a profit-organization that may make turnovers or profits comparable to commercial enterprises.[10] Essentially, however, a corporation differs from an association, namely the former has to be financially accountable to its shareholders whereas the latter is required to be democratically and financially accountable to its members.[11] In order to ensure that those members make use of their membership rights, it is fundamental that the decision-making process with regard to anti-corruption compliance structures and democratic structures are strictly adhered in accordance with mandatory rules of law. Accordingly, it may also be a starting point for associations to act in accordance with the principles of ‘association governance’ if they were – indeed – implemented in mandatory law and applied correctly.[12] 


Constraints to association governance

As one of the state parties to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), Switzerland is inter alia bound by Article 11 of the ECHR i.e. the fundamental right to freedom of (assembly and) association, which is subject to restrictions that are in accordance with the law and necessary in a democratic society. Accordingly, those associations have a restricted competence[13] to set the rules, to apply and to enforce them uniformly to their members.[14]

According to Article 23 Federal Constitution (FC), a private law association with a non-economic objective (i.e. political, religious, scientific, cultural, social or non-profit) has the right of freedom of association i.e. the right to establish or dissolve, to voluntarily be (come) a member or to leave and to participate in the association’s activities, which is not subject to state approval or state supervision. [15] As profit associations are only protected by the right of economic freedom pursuant to Article 27 FC, it is of vital importance for non-profit associations not to aim for monetary or financial benefits for its members.[16]

FIFA’s intent to exist as a non-profit organization is apparent from their articles of association.[17] According to Article 2(a) FIFA statutes, its main objective is: ‘[…] to improve the game of football constantly and promote it globally in the light of its unifying, educational, cultural and humanitarian values, particularly through youth and development programmes’. UEFA has a corresponding objective pursuant to Article 2 UEFA statutes. As long as the surplus of revenues will be spent on its non-commercial objectives under those articles of association, the non-profit status of FIFA – and, mutatis mutandis, UEFA – would not be challenged by Switzerland[18]. However, as a legislator, a judicator and as a state party to the CoE, Switzerland should critically assess those associations’ non-profit objectives and the significant surplus from their economic activities plus the distributions thereof in view of the report’s recommendations on financial transparency and accountability in order to respect the – underlying – association governance principles.[19]

FIFA and UEFA[20] are both established and registered[21] as private law associations under Article 60 et seq. CC[22] and, moreover, bound to respect the Swiss mandatory rules of law under Article 63(2) CC. Thus, mandatory rules cannot be disregarded by the articles of association i.e the self-regulatory framework of FIFA and UEFA. If an association’s resolution were to breach mandatory rules, it would be either voidable (i.e. to be challenged within a month of the notification) or null and void (i.e. to be raised at any time) under Article 75 CC.[23]

In case the articles of association do not address a particular issue, the non-mandatory rules of law would apply.[24] In particular, it should be noted that Articles 64-69b CC mostly[25] refer to mandatory procedural rules with regard to the articles of association. For instance, an association is required to have two organs, namely the general meeting of members that has supremacy over all other organs (Article 64(1) CC) and a committee consisting of members – and non-members if not explicitly forbidden by the articles of association[26] – that are elected by the supreme governing body (Article 69 CC). Other organs may be established pursuant to the articles of association.[27]

In other words, it is up to the, e.g., FIFA articles of association to self-regulate the composition, the independence of the Ethics Committee’s members and the transparency of its work. It is therefore not clear how this particular recommendation (please consider p. 8 of the report) can actually be implemented and enforced by the Swiss authorities. A similar assessment could be made, mutatis mutandis, with regard to all the other recommendations of the report.


Civil liability

Apart from the aforesaid memberships’ rights deriving from the decision-making process with regard to anti-corruption compliance structures and democratic structures, associations could also be held liable by their members because a membership is a contractual agreement between two private parties. In other words, the extra-legal part of association governance may be corrected by the rules of civil liability (including tort).

In accordance with Article 1 in conjunction with Article 155(f) of the Private International Law Act (PILA), Articles 52-59 (‘legal entities’) and Articles 60-79 (‘associations’) CC are applicable to all members of both associations.[28] If a private person or legal entity decides to be(come) a member of a private law association, the respective articles of association, regulations or decisions are contractually binding. Apart from membership contracts, there are – of course – other forms of private law’ relationships available whereby one may contractually be bound (in[29])directly to the FIFA or UEFA rules or decisions like, e.g., labour contracts, commercial contracts, player’ licences or host city agreements (e.g., Qatargate).

In this regard, the mandatory rules of civil law include, in particular public policy, bona mores and the protection of personality rights.[30]

Given that the public policy restrictions have already been assessed in an earlier blog post[31], this blog will specifically focus on bona mores and the protection of personality rights. 

As regards to bona mores, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court ruled that in case an article of association contains a third party’s veto right regarding all decisions of the association’s general assembly, it would be null and void for violating bona mores and the right of autonomy of associations.[32]

In reference to the Swiss notion of personality rights (e.g., the right to professional fulfilment through sporting activities, or the right to economic freedom[33])[34], which must be regarded as the equivalent of human rights horizontally applied to private law’ relationships, Article 27 CC stipulates that ‘[n]o person can wholly or partially renounce its capacity to have rights and to effect legal transactions’.[35] Accordingly, if it cannot be established that the law, the athlete’s consent or the existence of an overriding public/private interest may justify an infringement to, e.g., an athlete’s right to economic freedom (i.e. restraint of trade), it must be regarded as null and void under Article 28 CC.[36] Hence, as legislator and as State party to the CoE, Switzerland should have the duty to critically assess whether FIFA or UEFA may infringe their members’ contractual rights as protected by mandatory rules of law, in particular public policy and the protection of personality rights (i.e. contractual freedoms) in the light of the report’s recommendations on financial and on democratic transparency in order to respect the – underlying – association governance principles. 


Criminal liability

As regards the impact of mandatory rules of criminal law on international sports federations based in Switzerland, the first package of Lex FIFA - that will enter into force in the first half of 2015 if uncontested (i.e. a referendum[37]) - defines their respective ‘presidents’ as ‘politically-exposed persons’ (PEPs) i.e. persons with a prominent public function[38]. As PEPs are in a position to potentially commit financial offences (money laundering or corruption), banks are required to closely monitor those accounts (and of their families!) for any suspicious financial transaction. If PEPs and/or their families were to receive cash payments greater than CHF100,000, the respective bank would be obliged to identify them, to keep a record of the transactions and to clarify the background thereof. In case there is any evidence of criminal activities, the bank must report the unusual transactions to the Swiss authorities.[39] However, and surprisingly, the first package of Lex FIFA does not cover UEFA because ‘it is technically a[n] European organisation’ according to the approved legislative proposal[40] and as interpreted by its initiator Roland Büchel MP.

As part of the future second package of Lex FIFA, Switzerland will implement legislation to make corruption in sport a criminal offence. Insofar, private bribery (i.e. passive/active bribery in the private sector) is only regarded as a criminal offence under Article 4a and Article 23 of the Swiss Federal Unfair Competition Law following a complaint.[41] 


Conclusions

The lofty goals of the Council of Europe’s report on reforming football’s governance are laudable in principle, however they lack a clear reflection on the legal means available to attain them. To this end, it is the main point of this blog post’s author to attract the attention of the reader on the particular responsibility of Switzerland in this regard. Due to FIFA and UEFA being legally seated in Switzerland, Swiss law is tasked with the tough mission, in light of recent events, to enforce via private law and criminal law association governance standards on both non-profit organizations. The future implementation of Lex FIFA with regard to the criminalisation of corruption in sport, is a first step in the right direction. What’s rather missing, however, is a private law perspective. A comprehensive implementation of the report’s recommendations can only be achieved if the interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Swiss Code were to be in line with the report’s recommendations. Indeed, as a prominent Council of Europe’ state party, Switzerland should be stricter when assessing the (un)justifiability of a possible infringement by FIFA or UEFA of a member’s rights under the Swiss notion of mandatory rules of law. In this regard, it should also take into consideration the PACE report’s recommendations on reforming the governance of football by FIFA and UEFA.



[1] E.g. Qatargate: la confession accablante, France Football No. 3582, 9 December 2014, p. 19 et seq.

[2] Connarty, The reform of football governance, PACE report, 27 January 2015, p. 17.

[3] Addink, Goed bestuur, Kluwer 2010, p. 6.

[4] ‘See OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, 2004, p. 11, accessible at

http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf. ‘The EU corporate governance framework includes legislation in areas such as corporate governance statements, transparency of listed companies, shareholders’ rights and takeover bids as well as ‘soft law’, namely recommendations on the role and on the remuneration of companies’ directors.’

[5] COM 2012(740) final, Action Plan: European company law and corporate governance - a modern legal framework for more engaged shareholders and sustainable companies, p. 2-3.

[6] E.g., Giesen, Alternatieve regelgeving and privaatrecht, Monografieën Privaatrecht, Kluwer 2007, p. 29.

[7] COM 2012(740) final, Action Plan: European company law and corporate governance - a modern legal framework for more engaged shareholders and sustainable companies, p. 3.

[8] COM 2012(740) final, Action Plan: European company law and corporate governance - a modern legal framework for more engaged shareholders and sustainable companies, p. 3.

[9] Valloni & Pachmann, Sports law in Switzerland, Wolters Kluwer 2011, p. 65.

[10] Handschin, Good governance: lessons for sports organizations?, in: Bernasconi, International sports law and jurisprudence of the CAS, 2014, p. 118. Notes ommitted.

[11] Handschin, Good governance: lessons for sports organizations?, in: Bernasconi, International sports law and jurisprudence of the CAS, 2014, p. 118. Notes ommitted.

[12] Handschin, Good governance: lessons for sports organizations?, in: Bernasconi, International sports law and jurisprudence of the CAS, 2014, p. 119. Notes ommitted.

[13] Please do take into account Weatherill’s statement on conditional autonomy of sports federations under EU law: Weatherill, Is the Pyramid Compatible with EC Law?, ISLJ 2005(3–4), p. 3–7, republished in: Weatherill, European Sports Law Collected Papers Second Edition 2014, available at: http://www.springer.com/law/international/book/978-90-6704-938-2.

[14] Valloni & Pachmann, Sports law in Switzerland, Wolters Kluwer 2011, p. 40-44.

[15] Jakob, Huber and Rauber, Nonprofit law in Switzerland, The Johns Hopkins comparative nonprofit sector project, Working Paper No. 47, March 2009, p. 3, 5.

[16] Jakob, Huber and Rauber, Nonprofit law in Switzerland, The Johns Hopkins comparative nonprofit sector project, Working Paper No. 47, March 2009, p. 5.

[17] Pieth, Governing FIFA – concept paper and report, 19 September 2011, p. 12. Tomlinson, FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association) : the men, the myths and the money, 2014, p. 28.

[18] Pieth, Governing FIFA – concept paper and report, 19 September 2011, p. 12.

[19] By the way, the EU-28 member states are obliged to act in accordance with the Court of Justice rulings in, inter alia, Walrave (Case 36-74, ECR 1974 1405), Bosman (Case C-415/93, ECR 1995 I-4921) and Meca Medina (Case C-519/04 P, ECR 2006 I-6991) with regard to the economic and rule-making activities of UEFA and FIFA. For more information please see Weatherill, European Sports Law Collected Papers Second Edition 2014, available at: http://www.springer.com/law/international/book/978-90-6704-938-2.

[20] Valloni & Pachmann, Sports law in Switzerland, Wolters Kluwer 2011, p. 67-69.

[21] Article 1 FIFA statutes; Article 1 UEFA statutes.

[22] Valloni & Pachmann, Sports law in Switzerland, Wolters Kluwer 2011, p. 19, 40.

[23] Handschin, Good governance: lessons for sports organizations?, in: Bernasconi, International sports law and jurisprudence of the CAS, 2014, p. 126-127. Notes ommitted.

[24] Jakob, Huber and Rauber, Nonprofit law in Switzerland, The Johns Hopkins comparative nonprofit sector project, Working Paper No. 47, March 2009, p. 6.

[25] With the notable exception of Article 75 CC.

[26] BGE 73 II 1.

[27] Jakob, Huber and Rauber, Nonprofit law in Switzerland, The Johns Hopkins comparative nonprofit sector project, Working Paper No. 47, March 2009, p. 6.

[28] Valloni & Pachmann, Sports law in Switzerland, Wolters Kluwer 2011, p. 19.

[29] E.g., a dynamic reference to accept the jurisdiction of the Court of Arbitration for Sports (CAS).

[30] Morgan, The relevance of Swiss law in doping disputes, in particular from the perspective of personality rights – a view from abroad, in: Revue de droit suisse, Band 132 (2013) I Heft 3, p. 344-345. Fenners, Der ausschluss der staatlichen gerichtsbarkeit in organisierten sport, Zurich 2006, paras. 111-113. Baddeley, L’Association sportive face au droit – Les limites de son autonomie, Basel 1994, p. 108.

[31] Marco van der Harst, Can (national or EU) public policy stop CAS awards?, 22 July 2014, available at: http://www.asser.nl/SportsLaw/Blog/post/can-national-or-eu-public-policy-stop-cas-awards-by-marco-van-der-harst-ll-m-phd-candidate-and-researcher-at-the-aislc.

[32] BGE 97 II 108 et seq. Valloni & Pachmann, Sports law in Switzerland, Wolters Kluwer 2011, p. 41.

[33] Let’s not forget that there are two sports law cases pending versus Switzerland at the European Court of Human Rights: Adrian Mutu (No. 40575/10) and Claudia Pechstein (No. 67474/10).

[34] Morgan, The relevance of Swiss law in doping disputes, in particualr from the perspective of personality rights – a view from abroad, in: Revue de droit suisse, Band 132 (2013) I Heft 3, p. 344, note 6: Decision 4A_558/2011 of 27 March 2012; ATF 134 III 193 (Further notes omitted).

[35] E.g., Morgan, The relevance of Swiss law in doping disputes, in particualr from the perspective of personality rights – a view from abroad, in: Revue de droit suisse, Band 132 (2013) I Heft 3, p. 344-345.

[36] E.g., Morgan, The relevance of Swiss law in doping disputes, in particualr from the perspective of personality rights – a view from abroad, in: Revue de droit suisse, Band 132 (2013) I Heft 3, p. 344-345.

[37] Deadline: April 2, 2015. Source: http://www.admin.ch/opc/de/federal-gazette/2014/9689.pdf.

[38] In order to prevent being blacklisted by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Switzerland had to implement the 2012 Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) with regard to combating money laundering and terrorist financing.

[39] Sources: http://www.sportsintegrityinitiative.com/swiss-law-requires-bank-account-monitoring-sports-federation-heads/ and http://www.rolandbuechel.ch/news_850_lex-fifa-interessiert-auch-die-russen-buechel-auf-den-russischen-sputnik-news.xhtml.

[40] Bundesgesetz zur Umsetzung der 2012 revidierten Empfehlungen der Groupe d’action financière, December 12, 2014, p. 9697-9698. Available at: http://www.admin.ch/opc/de/federal-gazette/2014/9689.pdf.

[41] Cassini, Corporate responsibility and compliance programs in Switzerland, in: Manacorda, Centonze and Forti (eds.), Preventing corporate corruption: the anti-bribery compliance model, Springer 2014, p. 493.


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