Asser International Sports Law Blog

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Summer Programme - Sports and Human Rights - 27-30 June - Join us!

Join us for our unique training programme on ‘Sport and human rights’ jointly organised by the Centre for Sport and Human Rights and the Asser Institute  and hosted by FIFPRO. After the success of the first edition in 2022 the programme returns, focusing on the link between the sport and human rights and zooming in on a number of challenges underlying this link, such as the human rights impacts of day-to-day sports, the normative framework and applicability of the UNGPs in the sporting context,  the rights of athletes, gender and sports, remedies for sport-related human rights harms, and more. 


If you wish to join, register HERE.


Tackling contemporary human rights challenges in sport
The programme brings together the latest in academic research with practical experiences from working in the field in an interactive package, fostering productive exchanges between the speakers and participants. Theoretical knowledge will be complemented by exposure to hands-on know-how and exercises.

Participants will have the opportunity to learn from experts from the Asser Institute, the Centre for Sport and Human Rights, and FIFPRO, as well as high-profile external speakers from both academia and practice. 

Latest version of the full 4-day programme

What will you gain?

  • An extensive introduction to the emergence of the sport and human rights movement

  • A greater understanding of the normative framework for human rights standards in sport

  • A comprehensive overview of the latest developments in the interplay between gender and sports

  • Practical know-how to govern  human rights in the context of sporting organisations

  • Practical know-how to address  human rights risks in the context of day-to-day sports, including safeguarding

  • Practical know-how to access remedy in human rights disputes

  • The opportunity to engage in discussions and network with leading academics and professionals 

Topics addressed in this summer programme include:

  • The emergence of the sport and human rights discussion/movement

  • The integration of human rights in the governance of sport

  • The protection of athletes’ rights

  • Gender and sports

  • Access to remedy for sport-related human rights harms


If you wish to join, register HERE.


Scholarships

The Centre for Sport and Human Rights is funding a scholarship for an outstanding master student, PhD candidate, or civil society representative from an underrepresented group, including those from the global South, to participate in the Asser Institute’s summer programme ‘Sport and Human Rights’. More information is available on their website.

Interested candidates should apply by 31 March 2023, 20:00 CET through the CSHR website.


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Asser International Sports Law Blog | WISLaw Blog Symposium - Rule 40 of the Olympic Charter: the wind of changes or a new commercial race - By Rusa Agafonova

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

WISLaw Blog Symposium - Rule 40 of the Olympic Charter: the wind of changes or a new commercial race - By Rusa Agafonova

Editor's note: Rusa Agafonova is a PhD Candidate at the University of Zurich, Switzerland   

The Olympic Games are the cornerstone event of the Olympic Movement as a socio-cultural phenomenon as well as the engine of its economic model. Having worldwide exposure,[1] the Olympic Games guarantee the International Olympic Committee (IOC) exclusive nine-digit sponsorship deals. The revenue generated by the Games is later redistributed by the IOC down the sports pyramid to the International Federations (IFs), National Olympic Committees (NOCs) and other participants of the Olympic Movement through a so-called "solidarity mechanism". In other words, the Games constitute a vital source of financing for the Olympic Movement.

Because of the money involved, the IOC is protective when it comes to staging the Olympics. This is notably so with respect to ambush marketing which can have detrimental economic impact for sports governing bodies (SGBs) running mega-events. The IOC's definition of ambush marketing covers any intentional and non-intentional use of intellectual property associated with the Olympic Games as well as the misappropriation of images associated with them without authorisation from the IOC and the organising committee.[2] This definition is broad as are the IOC's anti-ambush rules.

Rule 40 of the Olympic Charter

The famous Rule 40[3] of the Olympic Charter was introduced in 1991 prohibiting competitors[4] from any use of name, image or sports performances for advertising purposes during the Olympic Games and since then has been critised for its disproportionality.

The blanket ban covered all types of advertising during the "blackout" ("frozen") period of almost a month, starting nine days before the Opening Ceremony and ending three days after the Closing of the Games. Any Olympic-related terms varying from quite specific "Olympia" and "games" to more generic "medal", "gold", "pedestal" and to very questionable "summer", "challenge" and "victory" were banned from use in an advertising context. These restrictions are even more drastic knowing that violation of the Olympic Charter can entail temporary or permanent ineligibility or exclusion from the Olympic Games.[5]

Legal challenges

While companies still managed to find loopholes in the regulations,[6] a legal challenge was expected on both sides of the Atlantic. In the US, the antitrust lawsuit against the USA Track and Field and the US Olympic Committee (USOC) brought to the U.S. District Court by a runner Nick Symmonds[7] was dismissed on the basis of the 1978 Amateur Sports Act, which granted an implied antitrust immunity to the USOC.

In Europe, however, the complaint filed with the German Competition Authority (Bundeskartellamt) by the German Athlete Commission and the Federal Association of the German Sports Goods Industry was successful and resulted in a series of commitments undertaken by the German NOC (DOSB) and the IOC, but only German athletes could benefit from it.

Bundeskartellamt refers to the ISU and Kristoffersen cases admitting the protection of the solidarity mechanism as a potential justification for a measure restricting competition, but only "if the financial support granted by the system is sufficiently transparent for the participants who contributed their performance", i.e. when they are "in a position to understand and assess the volume of income generated" and "whether this income, or at least most of it, has in fact been spent to the benefit of those athletes who are disadvantaged in terms of opportunities to participate in the Olympic Games". The Olympic solidarity plan does not attain this high standard of "sufficient transparency".[8] Hence, Rule 40 and its German analogue were preliminarily assessed as violating Art. 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (abuse of dominant position) and Sections 18 and 19 GWB (German Competition Act).

The German decision gave the green light to advertising campaigns by non-Olympic sponsors during the frozen period and replaced the authorisation procedure by the requirement to notify the NOC of the intended campaigns. The list of protected terms was narrowed down, and only sanctions of economic nature, i.e. contractual damages and/or penalties, became admissible.

Reconsidering Rule 40

In summer 2019, the IOC amended Rule 40 for the first time in many years. Its new wording was akin to a 180-degree turn and allowed competitors, team officials and other team personnel to use their person, name, picture, and sports performances for advertising purposes during the Olympic Games as far as the principles determined by the IOC Executive Board were respected.  

NOCs should concretise the rule for their Olympic team in accordance with the Key Principles on the application of by-law 3 to Rule 40 of the Olympic Charter (Tokyo 2020 Key Principles) which give the NOCs some guidance but also leave them a considerable leeway.

In terms of substance, non-Olympic sponsors can now undertake "generic advertising", i.e., campaigns launched at least 90 days before the Event, which create association with the Olympic Games only through an athlete's image, and which should avoid any unusual activity during the Games. What is considered unusual is to be determined on a case-by-case basis.

Regarding the procedure, non-Olympic partners must now only notify in advance the IOC or the respective NOCs of their advertising plans. The NOCs are free to decide on the form and modalities of this notification. It can be a simple notice, such as in Switzerland, a two-step notification (i.e. a pre-registration and a further notification) as in South Africa, or a more complex legal structure consisting of a notification accompanied by a personal sponsor commitment agreement (PSC) concluded by and between an athlete's sponsor and the NOC, as is the case in the USA or in Ireland. In the latter case, the NOC obtains additional contractual guarantees in case of a violation of the Rule 40.[9]

All these discrepancies put athletes on an unequal footing. The commercial rights of those sportspeople who already struggle to find sponsors due to the limited exposure of their sports disciplines might be curtailed even further by the non-attractiveness of their NOCs' regimes in respect to Olympic sponsorship.

Finally, the IOC recommends that NOCs adopt monetary rather than sporting measures to sanction violations.[10] But recommendations are non-binding, while it seems that such a crucial issue as sanctions should be covered by a uniform rule more than anything else.

Conclusion

Athletes have, at times in history, been precluded from fully monetising their economic potential during the most important - and the most marketable - moments  of their careers, which themselves are relatively short. The amended Rule 40 has been welcomed as a big achievement and fits well with the overall trend for athletes' growing engagement in policy-making processes and the increasing role of competition law in shaping sports governance. However, it seems that Rule 40 is not yet at its final destination. To get there, it should find the balance between the individual athlete’s right to generate income in relation to their sporting career and the collective interest in protecting the solidarity model. It is indeed important to remember that there are many athletes, including those at the grassroots level, who are supported by the solidarity mechanism rather than by sponsors' financial backing.

Conversely, while the concept of the Olympics has not been distorted by allowing professionals to compete in the Games, why would it be inadvisable to reconsider the idea of commercialisation of sport? The outbreak of COVID-19 and the postponement of the 2020 Tokyo Olympic Games drew attention to the insecurity of athletes in many senses, and the relationship between an athlete and a sponsor acquired a deeper significance: despite the uncertainties of the sports calendars, epidemiologic regimes, and impossibility of long-term planning, the parties - or rather the partners - maintained mutual support and shared common values. 

All regulatory instruments should be adjusted accordingly. Rule 40 as it existed before 2019 appeared archaic. When it entered into force, neither the internet nor social media existed. As of today, Twitter and especially Instagram have shaped a new paradigm of hashtags, likes, reposts, and followers.[11] 

Rule 40, as it exists in 2021, leaves a risk of unequal implementation due to the fact that NOCs and athletes' associations have different degrees of bargaining power across the globe and, in the absence of a uniform clause imposed by the international regulator, give divergent interpretations to the scope of the rule. The country-to-country approach can sometimes allow for necessary flexibility in order to ensure optimal implementation of the regulations, in particular, regarding compliance with the national legislation of each state. However, some issues, such as the sanctioning regimes, should be handled in a centralised and harmonised way.

The German example has set the trend, but many NOCs may be reluctant to follow it. In this respect, the European Commission may play an important role in reconciling athletes' economic interests and the SGBs' interests with due consideration to the specificity of sport. It remains to be seen how the situation will be resolved outside the European Union. Meanwhile, during the period from 13 July to 10 August 2021, we will most likely witness a dramatic change in advertising as the new Rule 40 will be applied. It is possible that the focus on sports competitions will be slightly diluted by additional commercial ads, but even this scenario seems appealing after the silence of quarantine. 


[1] The geographic market for the organisation and exploitation of the Olympic Games has been defined as worldwide. See Bundeskartellamt, Decision pursuant to Section 32b GWB Public version, B-226/17 (25 February 2019), para. 56. The version in English is available at https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidung/EN/Entscheidungen/Missbrauchsaufsicht/2019/B2-26-17.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2. Accessed on 30 May 2021.

[2] Brand Protection Guidelines, Tokyo Organising Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games, Version 5.0. February 2020, Pt. 6. Ambush Marketing.

[3] Here and hereafter: Rule 40 refers to Bye-law 3 to Rule 40 of the Olympic Charter.

[4] In 2003, the rule was expanded to coaches and officials.

[5] Olympic Charter, Rule 59 (2.1).

[6] For example, in the pre-London-2012 campaign “Find Your Greatness”, Nike shows athletes from the towns named London situated in the US, Canada, Jamaica, and Nigeria and never mentions London in the UK. 

[7] Gold Medal LLC v. USA Track & Field, 187 F. Supp. 3d 1219, 1222 (D. Or. 2016).

[8] Bundeskartellamt, Decision pursuant to Section 32b GWB Public version, B-226/17, 25 February 2019, para. 103.

[9] McKelvey Steve, Grady John, Moorman Anita M., Ambush Marketing and Rule 40 for Tokyo 2020: A Shifting Landscape for Olympic Athletes and Their Sponsors, Journal of Legal Aspects of Sport, 2021, 31, pp. 94 – 122.

[10] Commercial Opportunities for Athletes. Rescheduled Olympic Games Tokyo 2020 (in 2021), p. 14. Frequently Asked Questions for Athletes.

[11] It is, for example, the key tool for fans' engagement. See Ennis Sean (2020) Understanding Fans and Their Consumption of Sport. In: Sports Marketing. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, pp 75-100.

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Asser International Sports Law Blog | From Lord of the Rings to Lord of the Drinks – A legal take on the downfall of Yuri van Gelder at the Rio Olympics. By Guido Hahn (Erasmus University Rotterdam)

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

From Lord of the Rings to Lord of the Drinks – A legal take on the downfall of Yuri van Gelder at the Rio Olympics. By Guido Hahn (Erasmus University Rotterdam)

Editor’s note: Guido graduated cum laude from the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. He teaches law at the Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam. He specializes in sports law and provides legal advice for the professional sports sector.


Introduction

This blog is a commentary on a recent case that hit like a bombshell in the Netherlands (and beyond) during the recent Olympic Games in Rio. The case concerns a Dutch athlete, Yuri van Gelder, who reached the Olympic finals in his sport, got sent home by ‘his’ NOC (NOC*NSF) after a night out in Rio and launched legal proceedings in front of a Dutch court to claim back his place in the finals. This commentary will attempt to explain the Dutch ruling and evaluate whether a different legal route would have been possible and preferable.

Yuri van Gelder is a Dutch gymnast, who is specialized in the rings. He became internationally known as ‘The Lord of the Rings’ after winning the gold medal at the World Championship in Melbourne in November 2005. After some setbacks in his career, he was not able to qualify for the 2008 Beijing Olympics. In 2009, during the Dutch Championships he was tested positive on the use of cocaine. He admitted that he had a drug problem and had been using cocaine for some years. He was suspended for a year by the Dutch Gymnastics Federation (KNGU), excluded from the 2012 London Olympics under the regulations of the IOC and even lost his job in the military. After winning the gold medal at a World league game in Gent on his comeback in 2010, he was taken off the team for the World Championships by the KNGU, claiming that he had used cocaine again.

In October 2011 the CAS found the IOC-rule that excluded athletes, who had been suspended for six months or longer, from future Olympic Games to be invalid and unenforceable. Van Gelder was therefore allowed to participate at the 2012 London Olympics, but again was not able to qualify, after failing to meet the required score at the World Championship in Tokyo at the end of 2011. From that moment on, the athlete decided to fully focus on the 2016 Rio Olympics, for which he eventually qualified. Like all other Dutch athletes who qualified and had been selected for the 2016 Rio Olympics, Van Gelder had to sign a so called ‘Athlete Agreement’ with NOC*NSF, which encapsulates the period of preparation before as well as the duration of the Games. At 33 years of age, these Olympics were his last chance to finally win that Olympic medal he so anxiously craved for.


Sent home from the Olympics

On Saturday 6 August in Rio, Van Gelder qualified for the individual finals on the rings, which were to take place nine days later, on 15 August. That same Saturday night he left the Olympic village and came back somewhere around 5 am. On Sunday he stayed in bed until approximately 3 pm, thereby missing a scheduled training session with the team. On Monday 8 August, the NOC*NSF, after hearing Van Gelder, disqualified him from further participation in the Games. That same day, an NOC*NSF employee was sent with the athlete to escort him to the airport from where he was flown back to the Netherlands. The NOC*NSF then removed Van Gelder from the finals through the International Gymnastics Federation (FIG), which appointed a replacement. A short press release by NOC*NSF stated that, in consultation with the KNGU, Van Gelder was sent home after the Federation had informed the NOC that he had come back to the village early in the morning, in spite of the team rules. It further stated that the athlete had admitted to the use of alcohol. This fueled speculation in the media, considering Van Gelder’s past. However, there was also criticism regarding the NOC*NSF’s decision, as many felt that it was disproportionate to disqualify an athlete, who had worked so hard to reach the finals, for celebrating one night out with still more than a week to go to those finals.

Van Gelder, now back in the Netherlands, took a lawyer and decided to start proceedings in front of the Dutch interlocutory judge of the Court of Gelderland (the Van Gelder Case). The oral proceedings, broadcasted live on Dutch television, took place on Friday 12 August, three days before the Olympic finals.


The ruling of the interlocutory Judge of Gelderland

Van Gelder’s lawyer requested from the court to order NOC*NSF to do everything in its power to make sure Van Gelder could participate in the individual finals on the rings on 15 August, including starting proceedings before the CAS Ad Hoc Division in Rio, or that NOC*NSF assist Van Gelder in starting proceedings for the CAS Ad Hoc Division and grant him a fee in advance for the costs.[1]

The court had to determine on which grounds the decision(s) to disqualify Van Gelder from participating in the Games had been taken and whether the severity of the measure(s) was proportionate in relation to the noncompliance with the obligations laid down in the Athlete Agreement. In doing so, the interlocutory judge applies a ‘marginal test’, which means he will keep certain deference towards the challenged decision and will consider only whether the decision ‘could reasonably have been made’.

The Athlete Agreement states that the athlete is expected to make every effort to ensure that he is capable of the maximum athletic performance, in preparation for and during the Olympics, and thereto devotes himself to the ‘Program’ completely and with optimal athletic effort.[2] Furthermore, the athlete is expected to behave as a good member of ‘TeamNL Rio 2016’ both during competition and elsewhere, having in mind the rules of the IOC Code of Ethics but not only.[3] If the athlete is not complying with the obligations as laid down in the Agreement, the NOC*NSF can decide to exclude the athlete from participating in the Games and/or impose a loss of (the right to) a medal bonus.[4] Before taking such a decision the athlete always needs to be heard/questioned.[5]

The court held for a fact that Van Gelder was told by his trainer through ‘WhatsApp’ not to stay out too late, that he should not drink and that he had to train the next day with the team.[6] However, the court was not convinced of Van Gelder’s noncompliance with the ‘behavioral rules’ enshrined in article 6, paragraph 4 of the Athlete Agreement. The Athlete Agreement or the IOC Code of Ethics do not define or specify clearly what these ‘behavioral rules’ stand for, even though the measures the NOC can take can severely affect the athlete. The court considers that these kind of behavioral rules should be drafted more precisely and should be communicated more clearly to the athletes. Thus, merely leaving the Olympic village without permission, drinking, and coming back early in the morning cannot be seen as violating article 6, paragraph 4 of the Agreement with the NOC.[7]

However, the fact that Van Gelder was warned and still went out drinking, came home early in the morning and missed a scheduled training, is undoubtedly coming short of the obligation laid down in article 6, paragraph 3 of the Athlete Agreement. This behavior is contrary to his duty to commit to the training and competition schedule.[8] Furthermore, the court continued, the athlete’s behavior undermined the team’s efforts and, considering Van Gelder’s past, this has resulted in a breach of trust with his trainer and with the NOC*NSF. Although it is possible that, based on this behavior, another NOC would have taken a different decision than kicking the athlete out of the Olympics, the court considers this irrelevant as it only applies a marginal test.[9] In addition, Van Gelder was questioned and heard twice before the decision was made. The decision therefore cannot be considered to have been made in haste or without proper deliberation.[10] In the end, the court determined that the NOC*NSF could reasonably decide that Van Gelder has committed a serious breach of his contractual duties under the Athlete Agreement. The same applied to the decision to disqualify Van Gelder from further participation in the Games.


A different legal route: The CAS Ad Hoc Division in Rio

Could Van Gelder, instead of going to the Dutch court, have taken a different strategic approach in this case? In the author’s opinion this would have been possible, as the CAS has (since the 1996 Atlanta Olympics) set up an Ad Hoc Division with the purpose of providing for arbitration of disputes, insofar as they arise during the Games, within 24 hours.[11] In the case of a request for arbitration against a decision by an NOC, the claimant must, before filing such a request, have exhausted all the internal remedies available to him pursuant to the statutes or regulations of the sports body concerned, unless the time needed to exhaust the internal remedies would make the appeal to the CAS Ad Hoc Division ineffective.[12] In this case, the internal remedy can be found in the Athlete Agreement, which states that when a dispute arises between the parties during the Games concerning or related to the compliance of the Agreement, the concerned party informs the so-called ‘Chef de Mission’. If the Chef de Mission is incapable of resolving the dispute, it will be send to a committee of binding advisors.[13] This committee has jurisdiction in case of urgency and where the athlete and NOC*NSF both choose an advisor, both advisors in turn choose an independent chairman, after which the committee gives a binding decision to end the dispute.[14]

Why Van Gelder had not chosen to apply the internal dispute resolution procedure of article 22, paragraph 3 and 4 of the Athlete Agreement is not clear from the facts of the case. In that regard, the events of 8 August, when Van Gelder was questioned or heard, become (even more) important. The Dutch courts stated that Van Gelder was questioned twice by the NOC*NSF, but did not clarify what was discussed. The only sure thing is that directly after the decision by the NOC*NSF, Van Gelder was escorted to the airport and flew back to the Netherlands. Would he still have left the country if he had been informed that the Agreement provided for an internal procedure within NOC*NSF, aimed at resolving disputes during the Games, in which he had the right to appoint one of the binding advisors? If such a procedure would have taken place and Van Gelder would have lost, an appeal in front of CAS would still have been possible. Furthermore, would he have chosen to fly back, if he had been advised that the CAS Ad Hoc Division had jurisdiction in cases of urgency or if the NOC was unwilling or unable to trigger its internal procedure? Would he have made the same choices had he known that it would help his case before the CAS Ad Hoc Division if he had attended any hearing in person?

What is clear is that Van Gelder got legal representation when he was back in the Netherlands. At that point a flight back to Rio was rather costly for the athlete. An internal procedure with the NOC*NSF might have been impractical to carry out with eight days remaining to the final, but informing the NOC*NSF in writing that there was a dispute and requesting an internal procedure could have (regardless of the NOC’s reaction) helped to establish the jurisdiction of the CAS Ad Hoc Division if needed. This CAS Ad Hoc Division procedure could also have been started from the Netherlands.


Conclusion

The remaining unknown is whether the CAS Ad Hoc Division would have ruled in favor of Van Gelder and/or have granted him access to the finals. As the Dutch court stated, the Athlete Agreement is rather unclear with respect to the obligation of an athlete to act as a good team member. The CAS Ad Hoc Division might have taken this vagueness into consideration. Furthermore, the CAS Ad Hoc Division would not have applied the same level of deference as the Dutch court. It could have also taken into account the fact that the consequences of the decision of the NOC*NSF were very severe for the athlete, especially since this would be his last Games. Against all this, the fact would have remained that the behavior of the athlete did breach article 6, paragraph 3 of the Athlete Agreement and that a replacement for Van Gelder in the finals was already appointed. Yet, even if the CAS had invalidated the decision by the NOC without granting Van Gelder a place in the finals, he would have been in a good position to claim damages.

The conclusion that can be drawn from this episode is that Van Gelder could have followed a different legal route. This might have provided the athlete a better chance at winning his legal challenge and get back into the Olympics. The Dutch court has made it clear that it wants the ‘behavioral rules’ drafted by the NOC*NSF, or other sports bodies for that matter, to be more precise and better communicated to the athletes, especially when the measures at the disposal of the NOC can severely affect the rights of an athlete. Besides not drinking, going to bed on time, and never missing training a week before the most important finals of your life, there is another lesson to be learned from the case. As an athlete, when facing sanctions from a Federation, NOC or other SGBs, it is wise to get legal representation immediately. This might increase your chances of successfully challenging the decision and taking part in the Olympic Games or any other competition.



[1] Van Gelder Case, point 3.1.

[2] Article 6, paragraph 3, Athlete agreement. The Program is defined in the agreement as: The training and competition schedule for the Athlete, approved by the Federation after consultation with NOC*NSF, with the goal of qualifying for and participating in the Olympic Games.

[3] Article 6, paragraph 4, Athlete agreement. TeamNL Rio 2016 is defined in the agreement as: The group of both athletes and their trainers/coaches, that is participating in the Olympic Games (and with whom NOC*NSF has a written agreement for the Olympic Games Rio 2016) and that has asked for accreditation by OCOG through NOC*NSF.

[4] Article 20, paragraph 1, sub a and b, Athlete Agreement.

[5] Article 20, paragraph 2, Athlete Agreement.

[6] Van Gelder Case, point 4.3.

[7] Ibid, point 4.6.

[8] Ibid, point 4.7.

[9] Ibid, point 4.9.

[10] Ibid, point 4.10.

[11] See on the CAS Ad Hoc Division for example: C. Keidel and A. Engelhard,’The Legal Framework of the CAS Ad Hoc Division at the Rio Olympic Games’, LawInSport August 4 2016, via: http://www.lawinsport.com/articles/item/the-legal-framework-of-the-cas-ad-hoc-division-at-the-rio-olympic-games, viewed on the 24th of August 2016. And from the same authors: ‘Key Ad Hoc Division Cases handed down at the Olympic Games, LawInSport August 4 2016, via: http://www.lawinsport.com/articles/item/key-cas-ad-hoc-division-cases-handed-down-at-the-olympic-games, viewed on the 24th of August 2016.

[12] See Article 1 of the Arbitration Rules applicable to the CAS ad hoc division for the Olympic Games.

[13] Athlete agreement, Article 22, paragraph 4.

[14] Ibid, Article 22, paragraph 3.

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