In the last five years, the Striani case has been the main sword of Damocles hanging over UEFA’s Financial Fair Play Regulations. At the very least, the only real judicial threat they have faced (apart from the relatively harmless challenge mounted in the Galatasaray case at the CAS). Indeed, a Belgian player agent, Daniele Striani, represented by Bosman’s former lawyer Jean-Louis Dupont, attempted, in various fora, to challenge the compatibility of UEFA’s CL&FFP Regulations with EU law. Striani lodged a complaint with the European Commission (which was quickly rejected in October 2014) and initiated a private action for damages before the Brussels Court of First Instance. The latter deemed itself not competent to decide on the matter, but nevertheless accepted to order a provisory stay of the enforcement of the UEFA FFP Regulations pending a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice of the EU (see Ben van Rompuy’s blog on the case here). The CJEU unsurprisingly rejected to enter into the matter, but UEFA and Striani decided to appeal the first instance ruling to the Court of Appeal, which rendered its decision on 11 April. It is unclear at this stage whether Striani will attempt to challenge it at the Belgian Cour de Cassation (Highest Civil Court), however this would entail considerable risks and costs and his lawyers to date have not indicated that they would do so (see here). 

While the ruling of the Court of Appeal does not touch upon the much-discussed question of the compatibility of UEFA’s FFP Regulations with EU law (see our many blogs on the question here, here and here), it remains an interesting decision to discuss broader questions related to the procedural ease in challenging regulatory decisions passed by sports governing bodies (SGBs) based in Switzerland. Competition law constitutes the main legal tool available to sports stakeholders looking to challenge existing regulatory arrangements from the outside (e.g. not going through the internal political systems of the SGBs or the CAS route). Recent cases, such as the ISU decision of the European Commission, the Pechstein case in front of the German courts or the Rule 40 decision of the German competition authority, have demonstrated the potency of competition law to question the legality of the rules and decisions of the SGBs.[1] In this regard, the decision of the Brussels Court of Appeal narrows the range of parties allowed to challenge in European courts the SGBs’ rules and decisions on the basis of competition law.

I.               A Strict Interpretation of Article 5(3) of the Lugano Convention 

Striani, supported by a number of fans based in France and the UK (presumably PSG and Manchester City supporters), was challenging the UEFA FFP rules for their indirect effects. In short, the core claim was that the FFP Regulations, by curtailing the ability of clubs to invest on the transfer market, had the effect of depriving Striani from the chance to earn more money for his services as an intermediary and the fans from a chance to see better players join their favorite team and therefore improve the quality of the team’s performance. Undoubtedly, these effects were not primary objectives of the FFP rules, which were aimed at constraining the ability of clubs to invest at a loss. Moreover, the rules were only constraining clubs qualified to the European competitions. The question from the point of view of private international law, was whether Striani and the fans could rely on Article 5(3) Lugano Convention to sue UEFA in front of the the Belgian courts.[2]

The Court of Appeal acknowledged that in this case it was dealing with an action in liability for a breach of competition law but sided with UEFA in considering that the hypothetical damage suffered by the claimants in Belgium was too indirect for it to be competent. It came to this conclusion after a journey through well-known European private international law judgments, such as Mines de Potasse d’Alsace, Dumez France or Shevill, and other less known (mainly French and Belgian) judgments in cases involving Swiss-based SGBs.[3] In the present case, it noted that « the challenged UEFA Regulation does not prohibit M. Striani and MAD Management […] from exercising the activity of an intermediary in Belgium or abroad, nor does it regulate the conditions in which this activity is to be exercised ».[4] Moreover, the targeted provisions « do not prohibit the relevant clubs from having recourse to agents […] nor do they limit this activity ».[5] In fact, the prejudice alleged by Striani and MAD Management « is only an indirect consequence of the adoption of the challenged UEFA Regulation », as « it is not related directly to the activity of the claimants and does not have direct consequences on this activity in Belgium or abroad ».[6] Thus, the Court decided that jurisdictions of the seat of UEFA (the Swiss courts) are sole competent to hear the matter.

This conclusion is not surprising. It was also the one reached by the first instance court, which however still decided quite surprisingly to send a preliminary reference to the CJEU and to order a stay in the enforcement of the UEFA FFP Regulations (the latter move was condemned by the Court of Appeal). Yet, it carries implications in the context of transnational sports regulation. Indeed, this is a domain in which the consumers (e.g. fans) are heavily impacted by decisions taken by international SGBs located mainly in Switzerland. The regulatory decisions of these bodies have undoubtedly structural effects on the way a particular sport is experienced by the fans. Moreover, due to the monopoly positions of the SGBs over their sports, these decisions are rarely challenged by competitors (such as the International Swimming League). They often bind the fans and determine the quality of the competitions they are watching and are doing so without providing them any type of say in the regulatory process. Sure, fans (or agents) will still be able to sue the SGBs in Swiss courts, but those have proven extremely ‘benevolent’ vis-à-vis the SGBs and are unlikely to apply EU competition law. In short, the Belgium court has consolidated the exclusion of actors indirectly affected by the decisions of the SGBs from European courts. What happens in Switzerland stays in Switzerland…

II.              The irresponsibility of the URBSFA for UEFA’s decisions

The second strategy used by Striani’s lawyers to anchor the dispute in Belgium was their attempt to involve the Belgium football federation, URBSFA, in the case. Indeed, as the URBSFA is seated in Belgium, there is no issue with regard to the competence of the Belgium courts in its regard. However, here the problem arises in connection to the URBSFA’s causal contribution to the adoption and enforcement of the challenged UEFA FFP Regulations. Indeed, the court held that « the fact that URBSFA is a member of UEFA does not turn it into a co-author of the regulations; the reasoning of the claimants ignores the separate legal personality of UEFA ».[7] The claimants were also alleging that the URBSFA was contributing to the enforcement of the FIFA rules, yet the court finds that they are « confusing the licensing role conferred to the national federations […] with the specific rules regarding the financial balance of clubs enshrined in Articles 57 to 63 of the attacked regulations ».[8] In fact, the « federal regulations of the URBSFA do not impose any constraints, or sanctions, with regard to the challenged break-even rules; these are of the sole competence of UEFA. »[9] Hence, the court concludes that no particular wrongful conduct can be attributed to the URBSFA linked to the harm alleged by the claimants.

By doing so, the Court of Appeal holds onto the formalist idea of the separate corporate personalities and brushes over the fact that national federations are at least politically co-responsible for the policies adopted, e.g. they hold the voting power inside the international federations. In this context, invoking the corporate veil might let national federations too easily off the hook, even though it is certainly true that a single national federation does not have a decisive voting power or influence inside an international SGB. Here, there is an interesting parallel with the functioning of the European Union itself, as it seems that decisions taken by UEFA (not unlike the EU’s) are not politically (or in this case legally) attributable to the individual member associations (the famous blame Brussels culture). The idea of a joint action between national and international federations leading to the exercise of collective power might be more suitable to capture the transnational regulatory dynamics at play in sports and could lead to some form of joint liability. In any event, this part of the decision highlights another difficulty in anchoring a case outside of Switzerland, as national federations will often be deemed an inadequate defendant due to their relatively passive role in the adoption and enforcement of the regulations of the international SGBs.

Conclusion

Striani’s crusade against UEFA’s FFP Regulations came to a strange end. While legal scholars and practitioners have been discussing at length whether FFP can be deemed compatible with EU law or not (I’ve spoken in favor of compatibility under certain circumstances, but many others have disputed it), the much-awaited ruling did not even touch upon this question. Indeed, the Brussels Court of Appeal simply denied its competence to hear the matter and sentenced the claimants to pay quite high legal fees to UEFA. By doing so, it did not simply put an end to a case that felt quite artificial and which might have been a pawn in a wider game between UEFA and some powerful clubs, it also closed the door on a variety of stakeholders willing to challenge the rules and decisions of SGBs outside of Switzerland. Indeed, if this interpretation of the Lugano Convention were to stand, it would for example exclude fans from being able to launch liability claims, on their home judicial turf, against international SGBs for the damage inflicted to their clubs.

Besides those directly impacted, in the case of FFP primarily the clubs (would the players be sufficiently directly affected? Maybe, maybe not), those that wish to challenge the rules and decisions of the SGBs are condemned to turn to the Swiss courts, which are rather well-known for their deference to the wide regulatory autonomy of international SGBs. In short, what happens in Switzerland (e.g. the adoption and enforcement of the SGBs’ regulations) is to stay judicially in Switzerland. This will be a reassuring news for the network of Swiss private associations that rule over international sports as it will reduce the risk of facing civil litigation outside of their well-chartered home turf. In fact, it is extremely rare for those directly affected (e.g. the clubs and athletes) to be ready to go to court to challenge them. As evidenced by the case of Bosman or Pechstein, the short-term costs in doing so are disproportionately high (boycott and career-end for the former, bankruptcy for the latter) while the chances of success remain quite limited. Similarly, a football club is unlikely to take the risk of going against UEFA or FIFA, unless it has nothing left to lose (e.g. like SV Wilhelmshaven). In sum, even if I believe UEFA’s FFP rules could be allowed to stand under EU law, this ruling sheltered UEFA from having to deal with this question, at least for the time being.

[1] In general, see B. Van Rompuy, The Role of EU Competition Law in Tackling Abuse of Regulatory Power by Sports Associations, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law (2015), vol. 22, nr. 2

[2] Article 5(3) Lugano Convention provides that: A person domiciled in a State bound by this Convention may, in another State bound by this Convention, be sued in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, in the courts for the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur.

[3] See the judgments cited in Cour d’appel Bruxelles, UEFA c. Striani & co, 11 avril 2019, 2015/AR/1282, paras 40 & 41.

[4] « En effet, le Règlement UEFA critiqué n'interdit pas à M. Striani et à MAD Management, qui se présentent comme agent de joueurs de football en Belgique (le premier comme personne physique et la seconde étant la société à travers laquelle le premier exerce son activité), d'exercer cette activité d'agent, en Belgique ou à l'étranger ni ne règle les conditions d'exercice de cette activité. » Ibid, para. 42.

[5] « Par ailleurs, ces dispositions ne font nullement interdiction aux clubs concernés de recourir aux services d'agents, tels les demandeurs originaires, ni ne limitent cette activité. Ibid.

[6] « ll découle de ce qui précède que, sans préjuger de la matérialité du dommage invoqué par M.Striani et MAD Management, ce dommage, à le supposer établi, n'est qu'une suite indirecte du l'adoption du Règlement UEFA querellé. Le Règlement querellé ne concerne pas directement l'activité des demandeurs originaires et n'a pas de conséquence directe sur cette activité, en Belgique ou ailleurs. » Ibid.

[7] « L’URBSFA n'est pas l'auteur des règles d'équilibre financier prévues au Règlement UEFA. Le seul fait que I'URBSFA soit membre de l'UEFA ne la rend pas co-auteur du Règlement; le raisonnement des intimés fait fi de la personnalité juridique distincte de l'UEFA. » Ibid, para. 48.

[8] « Ce faisant, les intimés entretiennent la confusion entre le rôle dévolu aux fédérations nationales pour l'octroi des licences, non critiqué en tant que tel, et les règles particulières concernant l'équilibre financier, prévues aux articles 57 à 63 du Règlement querellé. » Ibid.

[9] « Le Règlement fédéral de l'URBSFA ne comporte dès lors pas d'exigence, ni de sanction, concernant les règles d'équilibre financier querellée; celles-ci sont uniquement du ressort de l'UEFA. » Ibid.

Qatar’s successful bid to host the 2022 World Cup left many people thunderstruck: How can a country with a population of 2 million people and with absolutely no football tradition host the biggest football event in the world? Furthermore, how on earth can players and fans alike survive when the temperature is expected to exceed 50 °C during the month (June) the tournament is supposed to take place?

Other people were less surprised when FIFA’s President, Sepp Blatter, pulled the piece of paper with the word “Qatar” out of the envelope on 2 December 2010. This was just the latest move by a sporting body that was reinforcing a reputation of being over-conservative, corrupt, prone to conflict-of-interest and convinced of being above any Law, be it national or international.

Interestingly enough, by 2011, FIFA itself was increasingly becoming aware of its loss of popularity. After his (third) re-election, President Blatter began to promote the idea of a “Solutions Committee to help promote reforms within FIFA”. In August of that same year Prof. Dr. Mark Pieth, Chairman of the OECD Working Group on Bribery, was asked to analyse the existing governance structure and to make recommendations for its improvement. His review, published on 19 September 2011, recommended FIFA to e.g. introduce a conflict-of-interest regulation foreseeing the removal of FIFA officials in case of breach and to set term limits for FIFA officials such as the President. As a result of the review, President Blatter decided to appoint an Independent Governance Committee (IGC), to be led by Prof. Pieth.

The project called the ‘FIFA Governance Reform Project’ was to “oversee the creation and implementation of a framework of good governance and controls for FIFA to ensure the organization’s integrity with the ultimate goal of restoring confidence amongst FIFA stakeholders, including fans and the wider public”[1]. The IGC’s first report, published on 20 March 2012, contained a set of recommendations that were very similar to what Prof. Pieth had recommended in his previous review: FIFA had to become more transparent and independent judicial and financial/compliance oversight bodies had to be established.

Initially, FIFA followed the IGC’s proposals by establishing an Ethics Committee and an Audit & Compliance Committee. However, The IGC stated that the reform process was far from completed, highlighting that there is still an urgent need to update internal regulations on compliance, conflict-of-interest and the internal organization in general. To the IGC’s growing disappointment, it soon became clear that FIFA was proving very reluctant to modernize in accordance with good governance requirements.

On numerous occasion the IGC stressed the need to introduce further transparency and accountability throughout FIFA[2]. To achieve this, FIFA officials would have to undergo an integrity check performed by an independent body prior to their (re-) election, the President and the Members of the FIFA Executive Committee would have to be be subjected to limited terms in office and two independent Members would have to attend the meetings of the FIFA Executive Committee. A major setback for the IGC was the unanimous declaration  of all 53 Member Associations of UEFA of 24 January 2013. UEFA was of the opinion that no term limits for members of the FIFA Executive Committee and that integrity checks on candidates shall not be performed by FIFA but by the Confederations, such as UEFA. Quoting IGC’s own report, this was a signal that the reform agenda was likely to be high-jacked by rivalling interest groups within FIFA, supported by those fearing to lose their long-time privileges and networks[3]. The fact that on the eve of the FIFA Congress of 2013 UEFA demanded a decision to be taken on the limited terms proposal, knowing that the motion would fail to meet the ¾ majority vote, meant that it would do everything in its power to prevent the IGC’s recommendations of being implemented. Feeling frustrated, several members of the IGC decided to leave the Independent Governance Committee after it became clear to them that FIFA was not serious about the proposed changes[4].  

The remaining Members of the IGC, whose mandate terminated at the end of 2013, published their final report on 22 April 2014. The 15 page report specifies a detailed chronological summary of the IGC’s work, including why FIFA gave it the task to provide recommendations and what recommendations had been implemented. More importantly, however, the report also mentioned all the difficulties the IGC encountered while performing its mandate and it highlighted once again the recommendations, which had not been implemented by FIFA: term limits for FIFA officials, integrity checks for all members of FIFA standing committees performed by FIFA itself and improved reviews of key processes, such as the World Cups bidding process[5]. Not surprisingly, the IGC strongly advocates that these recommendations are implemented nonetheless. Furthermore, the IGC insisted that the new Ethics Committee should be able to investigate events that occurred before the Governance Reform Project was started, especially Qatar’s successful bid to host the 2022 World Cup.  

The next FIFA Congress will take place in Sao Paulo on 11 June 2014, one day before the World Cup kicks off. As the supreme and legislative body, the Congress has the right to vote on proposals for amendments to FIFA Statutes and Regulations and is therefore competent for implementing scores of the IGC’s recommendations. Taking into account UEFA’s position at last year’s Congress and FIFA’s overall reluctance to reform itself in accordance with good governance standards, chances of a significant change are very slim. But, with the whole world looking at FIFA due to the World Cup, this could well be a golden opportunity to push FIFA to endorse the IGC’s remaining recommendations and finally become the transparent and accountable sporting governing body that the football family deserves.

[1] Final Report by the Independent Governance Committee to the Executive Committee of FIFA, 22 April 2014

[2] See for example: Media releases of 8 February 2013  and 21 March 2013

[3] Final Report by the Independent Governance Committee to the Executive Committee of FIFA, page 10

[4] See for example: Media release of 24 April 2013

[5] Final Report by the Independent Governance Committee to the Executive Committee of FIFA, page 12-13

The rise of Dutee Chand, India’s 100 and 200-meter champion in the under 18-category, was astonishing. Her achievements were more than promising: after only two years, she broke the 100m and 200m national junior records, competed in the 100m final at the World Youth Athletics Championships in Donetsk and collected two gold medals in the Asian Junior Championships in Chinese Taipei. But, in July 2014, this steady rise was abruptly halted. Following a request from the Athletics Federation of India (AFI), the Sports Authority of India (SAI) conducted blood tests on the Indian sprinters. Dutee was detected with female hyperandrogenism, i.e a condition where the female body produces high levels of testosterone. As a result, a few days before the Commonwealth Games in Glasgow, the AFI declared Dutee ineligible to compete under the IAAF Regulations and prevented her from competing in future national and international events in the female category. Pursuant to the IAAF ‘Hyperandrogenism Policy’, the AFI would allow Dutee to return to competition only if she lowers her testosterone level beneath the male range by means of medical or surgical treatment.[1] On 25 September 2014, Dutee filed an appeal before the CAS, seeking to overturn the AFI’s decision and declare IAAF and IOC’s hyperandrogenism regulations null and void. She is defending her right to compete the way she actually is: a woman with high levels of testosterone. Interestingly enough, albeit a respondent, AFI supports her case.

IAAF and IOC rules set limits to female hyperandrogenism, which is deemed an unfair advantage that erodes female sports integrity. While these rules have been contested with regard to their scientific and ethical aspects, this is the first time that they will be debated in court. This appeal could have far-reaching ramifications for the sports world. It does not only seek to pave the way for a better ‘deal’ for female athletes with hyperandrogenism, who are coerced into hormonal treatment and even surgeries to ‘normalise’ themselves as women[2], but it rather brings the CAS, for the first time, before the thorny question:

How to strike a right balance between the core principle of ‘fair play’ and norms of non-discrimination, in cases where a determination of who qualifies as a ‘woman’ for the purposes of sport has to be made? 

‘Prove your gender!’

The separation between women and men in athletic competitions has been paradigmatic. Considering the sex-based physiological differences, which in case of a mixed competition would lead to virtually no women participation, the separation opened the door for women to compete at the highest levels. Nevertheless, the determination on the eligibility of women athletes to participate in the female category has become a source of controversies. So far, as decades of flawed IOC policies have demonstrated, it has not been clarified ‘who is woman’ for the purposes of sport.

The idea of ‘sex testing’ in sports dates back to 1960s and even preceded doping tests. The first gender test introduced by the IOC is nowadays laughable: nude parades of female competitors before a panel of judges in charge to verify the presence of female genitals and other sex characteristics.[3] Soon, this test was proven unworkable, since in intersex conditions, where people are born with both male and female genitalia, the outside did not match the inside.

The next test introduced was dubbed ‘chromosome testing’, which was based on the assumption that chromosomes are the key factor in determining sex, i.e. XY for male and XX for female. However, this test overlooked natural situations, where males have an extra X chromosome or females are missing one and was, therefore, soon abandoned. Thereafter, the SRY (i.e. the gene that triggers male sex determination) gene detection test was introduced, but the Olympics Games in Atlanta 1996 proved its deficiency:  eight women were tested positive for it and all were finally cleared for competition. Following this series of gender policies, which were deemed particularly discriminatory towards women with sexual development disorders, the IOC removed gender verification tests in June 1999.

It was not before 2009, in the wake of the Caster Semenya case, involving the South African 800m and 1500m runner and world champion, that an urgent need for reconsidering sex determination policies was brought into surface. Semenya’s masculine appearance, unusual muscle build and, foremost, her outstanding victory in the 2009 World Championships 800m race, fuelled a frenzy of suspicions on her gender. Following her victory, in an unprecedented breach of confidentiality and privacy rules, the IAAF leaked that Semenya had undergone tests to determine whether she had an unfair advantage as compared with other women. For three years, Semenya was not allowed to participate in events as her gender was still under investigation. In 2012, she was cleared by the gender testing committee and she began racing again. The story of Semenya, who suffered from humiliation and castigation by athletics officials and the media, unveiled IAAF’s incompetency in handling complex gender-related issues.

As a reply, in an attempt to establish an unambiguous, objective and scientifically based policy, IAAF and IOC, in 2011 and 2012 respectively, released new regulations. In that context, the focus shifted from sex testing to endogenous testosterone testing. The natural levels of testosterone have become the new golden rule: the purpose is not to determine ‘who is woman’, but rather ‘what makes a woman a woman’. Both policies are based on the assumption that testosterone is a key factor for men’s often superior strength and speed and, as a result, women with testosterone levels typical for males have an ‘unfair’ advantage. Therefore, according to the new regulations, if a female athlete has androgen levels higher than the normal male range, she is deemed ineligible to compete in women’s competition and will only be considered able to compete again if she lowers her testosterone level by means of medical or surgical treatment.

Despite IAAF’s protest to the contrary, this is the recent re-incarnation of ‘sex testing’.[4] The real import of these rules has been illustrated by the Dutee’s case. With Dutee’s appeal pending before the CAS, the legality of IAAF and IOC’s current gender policy needs to be scrutinized.

The unfair results of ‘fairness in sports’: The dark side of IAAF’s and IOC’s gender policy

Fair competition, which provides a fair opportunity to compete and prohibits athletes from competing with unfair advantages, has been widely accepted as a value integral to sports.[5] In this light, considering hyperandrogenism as an uncommon athletic capacity in relation to other female competitors, IAAF and IOC introduced the ineligibility of female athletes with hyperandrogenism in order to preserve the ‘sacrosanct’ competitive equality in the female category. However, it is our opinion that the current policy is on the borderline of what is fair for the following reasons: 

1. The ‘testosterone’ criterion as yardstick to determine eligibility?

According to the IAAF androgen policy, a general scientific consensus on naturally occurring testosterone as a relevant physical characteristic to separate athletes into different competition classes exists. The first problem is that this argument relies on the flawed assumption that a bright line between male and female can be drawn, not acknowledging situations of an ‘intersex’ status. As David Epstein, reporter and author of “The Sports Gene”, puts it clearly “neither body parts nor for the chromosome within them unequivocally differentiate male from female athletes”. Furthermore, while IAAF relies on a binary perception of biological sex in order to identify the gender of athletes, gender, in fact, is a social construction, which does not correspond to the complexities of biological sex. Secondly, it relies on the assumption that testosterone levels in the human body have limited variability within the sexes. Nevertheless, recent studies have found a complete overlap between testosterone levels in elite men and women, ripping apart testosterone levels as a reliable factor for separating between sexes.  The third problem is the lack of supporting scientific evidence that a competitive advantage can derive from high natural levels of testosterone.[6] Indeed, the scientific understanding of testosterone receptors is far from comprehensive. A recent research supported by the Swiss WADA laboratory added to the uncertainty: “Unfortunately, and to the best of our knowledge, there are neither available data on serum androgen levels nor reliable statistics on the so-called hyperandrogenism among a large and high-level female athletes’ population”.

IAAF policy, in overall, seems to create an absurd result: instead of introducing an objective criterion-if any- for separating between men and women, it rather suggests a classification of athletes between ‘high testosterone’ and ‘low testosterone’. However, ‘High-T’ and ‘Low-T’ categories of competition are not on the agenda.  

2. IAAF policy fosters discrimination

The current policy suggests a discriminatory treatment: it targets only women suspected for hyperandrogenism due to their physical appearance and high levels of performance. Women are asked to prove that they are female, while there is no such a requirement or restriction for men.

Furthermore, the fundament itself of the androgen policy is discriminatory against women who do not conform to traditional notions of femininity. Indeed, it lays on the physiological superiority of men in terms of endurance and strength as compared to women, perpetuating the long-established perception that an intrinsic link between manliness and sport exists, while femininity is associated with more gentle exercise.[7] In IAAF’s view, ‘too masculine women’ do not belong to the female category. It seems that under a scientifically based guise, IAAF seeks to impose a preference for certain social norms regarding what constitutes femininity in a woman’s appearance as criteria for participation.[8]

However, in order to perceive the level of discrimination, the most important question to be addressed is how you qualify an athlete. Hyperandrogenism is a rare biological characteristic and according to IAAF regulations and controversial scientific evidence, it gives female athletes a natural advantage that other female athletes do not have. Similarly, long limbs, broad wingspan for swimmers and height for basketball players are natural advantages.[9] Nevertheless, the later ones, but for hyperandrogenism, have never been considered as unfair. Indeed, the quintessence of elite sports lays on the participation of individuals with rare biological characteristics. In this light, the inevitable question arises: Why should female athletes like Dutee be obliged to reduce or eliminate an inherent advantage that they are born with? Why is then nobody asking a swimmer like Phelps to operate his double-jointed ankles? Or as SAI director-general Juji Thomson remarked: “ Just because Usain Bolt's height is to his advantage will the international authorities want his legs chopped off to ensure a level-playing field?” In other words, why hyperandrogenism has been viewed as different to other biological advantages broadly accepted in some elite athletes? The answer is simple: IAAF’s policy reflects the well-established public perception of femininity and female athletes who do not conform to this norm have to be excluded or ‘feminise’ themselves.

Thereby, IAAF and IOC policy exacerbate bullying and marginalization of women in sports putting their physical difference under unethical and humiliating scrutiny. Semenya had been intruded into the toilets by competitors seeking to check whether she really was a girl. While, after a race in Berlin, her competitor Mariya Savinova sneered “just look at her” when she was asked whether Semenya was a man. Similarly, the most talented female athletes, such as Serena Williams, Martina Navratilova, WNBA player Brittney Griner– and the catalogue is really long-, have been accused of not really being female. This play is up again with IAAF’s ‘are you woman enough to compete as female?’ policy seeking to confer legality to discrimination.

What should not be overlooked, finally, is the bitter truth that the current IAAF policy inevitably targets in priority women from developing countries. Athletes like Semenya or Dutee never perceived their difference, until they appeared on track field courts, where this difference has been flagged in the most humiliating way as abnormality. In sharp contrast to IOC’s declarations on eliminating any kind of discrimination in sports, IAAF and IOC gender policy achieves the most undesirable result: sex and social discrimination ‘all-in-one’. 

3. The disproportionate results of IAAF’s policy: To undergo treatment or not? This is not a question!

Female athletes with hyperandrogenism are faced with two choices: undergo medical treatment to fit the IAAF ‘Procrustean bed’ or abandon female competitions. The disproportionate and unfair consequences are evident.

As Katrina Karkazis, pioneer of Dutee’s motion against IAAF, remarks, the IAAF and IOC treat a physical difference as an illness, which requires a medical response. However, the necessity of such an invasive medical, or surgical, intervention is highly questionable. The suggested treatment does not stop at lowering female athletes’ testosterone level below IAAF’s limit of 10nmol/liter, but it rather aims to eliminate hyperandrogenism. In this sense, sharing IAAF’s assumption that testosterone is the key to performance, such treatment will render athletes like Dutee less competitive than other women who do not have hyperandrogenism or whose hyperandrogenism is below the cut-off. Thereby, IAAF policy, albeit mandating fairness in competition, puts a disproportionate burden on female athletes with hyperandrogenism.

Furthermore, concerns have been raised about the medical effects of the treatment suggested. In fact, it has been argued that long-term hormone therapy can have devastating results on female athletes’ health. Dutee’s denial to undergo this treatment is far from a ‘caprice’. A study published in 2013 revealed the cases of four female athletes identified as having hyperandrogenism, who were sent to a clinic in France. It was reported that those athletes also had medical procedures that had nothing to do with lowering their testosterone levels for sports: a reduction to the size of their clitorises, feminizing plastic surgery and oestrogen replacement therapy. It seems that the IAAF is pulling the trigger on female athletes’ head, who are ready to accept any treatment- even the most questionable ones- in order to keep competing.

On the other hand, the ineligibility sanction leads to a further disproportionate result: If Dutee is considered too masculine to compete in the female category, does she qualify for the male category? Can the mere presence of higher testosterone levels in a female athlete’s body presume that she can compete as a man? The answer has to be answered in negative, notwithstanding the ‘fair play’ issues that may arise. IAAF and IOC rules are cruelly disproportionate: athletes like Dutee who refuse to undergo this questionable treatment are effectively left without a forum to display their talent.

Do it like Pistorius

So far, the IAAF and IOC policy have been shown scientifically shaky, discriminatory and disproportionate. In parallel with these arguments, Dutee has also a very important precedent to rely upon: the CAS ruling in the Pistorius case.

In 2008, Oscar Pistorius, the South African double amputee runner, challenged IAAF rules that prohibited competitive running on ‘cheetah’ legs in international IAAF-sanctioned events alongside able-bodied athlete as being in breach of its commitment to non-discrimination. In that case, the fundamental rights of disabled athletes to be adequately accommodated and have genuinely equal opportunity to compete were at issue. Pistorius had to prove that he gained no advantage from using the prostheses. Reviewing scientific testing and analysis, the CAS concluded that ‘Cheetah’ legs did not give Pistorius an overall advantage.

Although the ‘tailor-made’ effect of the award could raise serious criticism[10], the Pistorius case has been landmark from a twofold point of view. Firstly, the CAS did not hesitate to challenge the indeterminacy of scientific analysis and developed the ‘net advantage’ approach, which stipulates that both the benefits and burdens have to be taken into consideration in determining whether a device provides an advantage to an athlete who uses it.[11] A similar approach has been adopted in the Veerpalu doping case, where the CAS questioned the scientific reliability of the limits applied for the WADA human growth hormone test (HGH).[12] Pistorius and Veerpalu cases have set an important threshold: international sports governing bodies, when it comes to enforce scientific- related sanctions, should rely on scientifically well-founded assessments.

Secondly, the CAS took an extraordinary step. It sent a clear message to international federations that they must address the eligibility criteria surrounding disabled athletes in a transparent and impartial manner.[13] There is no reason why the CAS in the Dutee case would do it differently. After all, sporting rules that seek to ensure fair competition and prevent a competitor from obtaining an unfair advantage have at least to be proportionate and non-discriminatory. 

Let Dutee Run?

The lines between male and female are blurring. As Fausto-Sterling has observed “the reason sports federations can’t get this right is because there is no right”.[14] Sports governing bodies may never be able to ensure fair competition without reaching absurd results.[15] In its daunting task to legally enforce controversial science related and ethical issues, CAS is facing a double challenge. It has the opportunity to set fair and accurate eligibility rules based on objective criteria, which will also preserve the essence of sports. Undoubtedly, sports governing bodies have the authority to establish their eligibility rules. However, self-regulation does not come without limits: sports federations’ rules have to comply with the non-discrimination clauses included in their statutes[16] and the IOC charter. The role of the CAS in monitoring the compliance of these regulations with non-discrimination norms is essential. Therefore, in some cases, CAS has to leave its ‘comfort-zone’: it has to deviate from its well-established practice to provide a significant degree of deference to sports governing bodies with regard to their authority to establish the eligibility rules and rather applies a ‘fairness’ requirement on a case-by-case basis, such as in the Pistorius case.

More importantly, CAS has the chance to finally flesh out the toothless IAAF and IOC commitments to gender equality. Dutee’s case is a fertile ground for an interpretation in the light and purpose of the recent UN resolution on sport and the proclaimed values underpinning the Olympic 2020 Agenda. After all, what is the point of trumpeting non-discrimination in sports, if, in 2014, a female athlete is deemed ‘not woman enough’ to compete with women?

Whatever the CAS decides, one thing remains certain: discrimination against women with sexual development specificities will not anymore be in the blind spot of the law. Dutee showed the way.

[1] IAAF Regulations Governing Eligibility of Females with Hyperandrogenism to Compete in Women’s Competition - In force as from 1st May 2011 ,  Article 6.8 <http://www.iaaf.org/about-iaaf/documents/medical >

[2] Dr Ben Koh, Daryl Adair and  Peter Sonksen OBE, ‘Testosterone, sex and gender differentiation in sport – where science and sports law meet’ (14 October 2014) <http://www.lawinsport.com/articles/item/testosterone-sex-and-gender-differentiation-in-sport-where-science-and-sports-law-meet>

[3]  J Ellison, ‘Caster Semenya And The IOC’s Olympics Gender Bender’ (26 July 2012) <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/07/26/caster-semenya-and-the-ioc-s-olympics-gender-bender.html>

[4] R Pielke, ‘Dutee Chand, science and the spirit of sport: why IAAF policy is deeply flawed’ (20 October 2014) <http://www.sportingintelligence.com/2014/10/20/dutee-chand-science-and-the-spirit-of-sport-why-iaaf-policy-is-deeply-flawed-201001/>

[5] P Zettler, ‘Is It Cheating to Use the Cheetahs? The Implications of Technologically Innovative Prostheses for Sports Values and Rules’ (2009) 27 Boston University International Law Journal, 389.

[6] M Naimark, ‘A New Study Supports Female Athletes Unfairly Excluded From Sport’ (12 September 2014) <http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2014/09/12/sex_verification_in_sports_a_new_study_supports_unfairly_excluded_female.html>

[7] Dr Ben Koh,Daryl Adair and  Peter Sonksen OBE (n 2)

[8] R Pielke (n 4)

[9] For a very interesting comparison of the physiques between athletes from a wide range of different sports and competitions, see Howard Schatz’s Athlete series.

[10] CAS 2008/A/1480 Pistorius v/ IAAF (16 May 2008), para 56.

[11] CAS 2008/A/1480 Pistorius v/ IAAF (16 May 2008), para 36.

[12] M Viret and E Wisnosky, ‘Sinkewitz v. Veerpalu: Struggling to fit anti-doping science into a legal framework’ (19 March 2014) < http://wadc-commentary.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/WADC_COMMENTARY_Sinkewitz-Blog.pdf>

[13] Cornelius, 236

[14] J Ellison (n 3).

[15] P Zettler (n 5), 394.

[16] For instance, IAAF Constitution 2011, Art 3: “The Objects of IAAF are (…) 4. To strive to ensure that no gender, race, religious, political or other kind of unfair discrimination exists, continues to exist, or is allowed to develop in Athletics in any form, and that all may participate in Athletics regardless of their gender, race, religious or political views or any other irrelevant factor.”