Introduction: The new WADA Code 2015
Day 1: The impact of the revised World Anti-Doping Code on the work of National Anti-Doping Agencies
Day 2: The “Athlete Patient” and the 2015 World Anti-Doping Code: Competing Under Medical Treatment
Day 4: Ensuring proportionate sanctions under the 2015 World Anti-Doping Code

Editor's note

Howard Jacobs is solo practitioner in the Los Angeles suburb of Westlake Village, California. Mr. Jacobs has been identified by various national newspapers and publications as one of the leading sports lawyers in the world. His law practice focuses on the representation of athletes in all types of disputes, with a particular focus on the defense of athletes charged with doping offenses.Mr. Jacobs has represented numerous professional athletes, Olympic athletes, world record holders,  and amateur athletes in disputes involving doping, endorsements, unauthorized use of name and likeness, salary issues, team selection issues, and other matters.  He is at the forefront of many cutting edge legal issues that affect athletes, winning cases that have set precedents that have benefited the athlete community. More information is available at www.athleteslawyer.com.

Introduction

Historically, under the anti-doping rules of most organizations (including the World Anti-Doping Code), the concept of “strict liability” has meant that the proof of intent (or lack thereof) was irrelevant to the issue of whether or not the athlete has violated the anti-doping rules. However, so long as the rules provide for sanction ranges instead of a set sanction for all offenses, the issue of intent to dope has always been somewhat relevant to the issue of sanction length. The 2015 World Anti-Doping Code, with its potential four-year sanctions for a first violation based on whether or not the anti-doping rule violation was intentional, will make the question of intent an important issue in virtually every anti-doping case. This article analyzes these new rules allowing for four-year sanctions for a first violation, in the context of how intent (or lack of intent) will be proven.

I.         Why Intent Matters under the 2015 World Anti-Doping Code

It should be remembered that under the 2015 World Anti-Doping Code (“WADC”). intent is still irrelevant to the issue of whether or not an athlete has committed an anti-doping rule violation.  This is clear from the Comment to Article 2.1.1: “An anti-doping rule violation is committed under this Article without regard to
an Athlete’s Fault. This rule has been referred to in various CAS decisions as “Strict Liability”. An Athlete’s Fault is taken into consideration in determining the Consequences of this anti-doping rule violation under Article 10. This principle has consistently been upheld by CAS.”

Article 10 of the WADC – dealing with length of sanction, has always taken “intent” into account in determining whether or not a sanction should be reduced[1]. In other words, a sanction that would ordinarily be 2 years could be reduced to no sanction where the athlete had no fault or negligence whatsoever, or could be reduced to some degree if the athlete was not significantly at fault or negligent. In this way, intent is indirectly relevant to the issue of how much, if at all, an otherwise applicable sanction (sometimes referred to as the “default sanction”) could be eliminated or reduced. This is because an athlete who can prove that he or she did not intend to violate the anti-doping rules would be much more likely to establish a lack of significant fault or negligence in committing the violation in the first place.

Now, however, the 2015 WADC makes the issue of intent directly relevant to the first issue of the length of the default sanction itself. Therefore, intent is now not only relevant to the issue of reducing the default sanction, but is also relevant to the threshold issue of what the default sanction is in the first place.

Specifically, Art. 10.2.1 of the 2015 WADC provides: 

“The period of Ineligibility shall be four years where:

10.2.1.1 The anti-doping rule violation does not involve a Specified Substance, unless the athlete or other Person can establish that the anti-doping rule violation was not intentional.

10.2.1.2 The anti-doping rule violation involves a Specified Substance and the anti-doping organization can establish that the anti- doping rule violation was intentional.”

Art. 10.2.2 of the 2015 WADC goes on to state that “if Article 10.2.1 does not apply, the period of Ineligibility shall be two years.” Therefore, under the 2015 WADC, the default sanction is determined as follows: 

1.        where the violation does not involve a “Specified Substance,” the default sanction is four years unless the athlete can prove that the violation was “not intentional;” if the athlete meets this burden of proving “lack of intent,” then the default sanction is two years.

2.        where the violation involves a “Specified Substance,” the default sanction is two years unless the National Anti-Doping Organization (“NADO”) or the International Federation (“IF”) can prove that the violation was “intentional;” if the NADO or IF meets this burden of proving “intent,” then the default sanction is four years.

In either case, “intent” is now directly relevant to the length of the default sanction; the only difference is who bears the burden of proving “intent” or “lack of intent,” depending on whether or not the substance involved is a Specified Substance.

II.        How will the NADO / IF prove “intent” in cases involving “Specified Substances”?

Many older CAS cases have discussed the difficulty that a NADO or IF faces in proving that an athlete “intended” to use a prohibited substance, in their discussions of the justification of the “strict liability” rule.[2]

While this difficulty in proving that an athlete “intended” to use a prohibited substance to enhance their sport performance has not changed in theory, it has changed in practice with the definitions that WADA provided for proving “intent” within the meaning of Art. 10.2.1 of the 2015 WADC.  Specifically, Art. 10.2.3 now provides the following definition of “intent:” 

“As used in Articles 10.2 and 10.3, the term “intentional” is meant to identify those athletes who cheat. The term, therefore, requires that the athlete or other Person engaged in conduct which he or she knew constituted an anti-doping rule violation or knew that there was a significant risk that the conduct might constitute or result in an anti-doping rule violation and manifestly disregarded that risk. An anti-doping rule violation resulting from an adverse analytical finding for a substance which is only prohibited In-Competition shall be rebuttably presumed to be not “intentional” if the substance is a Specified Substance and the athlete can establish that the Prohibited Substance was used out-of-Competition. An anti-doping rule violation resulting from an adverse analytical finding for a substance which is only prohibited In-Competition shall not be considered “intentional” if the substance is not a Specified Substance and the athlete can establish that the Prohibited Substance was used out-of-Competition in a context unrelated to sport performance.”

Therefore, for the purpose of proving “intent” within the meaning of WADC Art. 10.2.1, in the case of Specified Substances, the NADO / IF can meet its burden by proving simply that the athlete engaged in conduct where the athlete “knew that there was a significant risk that the conduct might constitute or result in an anti-doping rule violation and manifestly disregarded that risk.” However, practical realities of this “proof” must be considered against the following questions:

(i)             How will this definition of “intent” contained in WADC Art. 10.2.3 be read in connection with the seemingly contradictory comment to 2015 WADC Art. 4.2.2 that specified substances are “substances which are more likely to have been consumed by an Athlete for a purpose other than the enhancement of sport performance”?

(ii)           How will an athlete who knowingly takes a “risky supplement” without knowing that the supplement contained a banned “Specified Substance” be viewed in connection with this definition of “intent” contained in WADC Art. 10.2.3?

Furthermore, in cases where an athlete intentionally used a supplement, but the athlete did not know that the supplement contained a prohibited substance (and where the lack of knowledge was reasonable, such as in cases involving misleading ingredient lists), what will the NADO /IF be required to prove? Will the burden be to prove that the athlete knew or should have known that the supplement contained a prohibited substance, or will it be sufficient to prove that the type of supplement or the supplement manufacturer itself could be viewed as risky, such that the athlete’s use of the supplement could be considered as a manifest disregard of a significant risk, for which the athlete should receive a four-year sanction? The manner in which CAS tribunals resolve this use could dramatically impact the applicable “default sanction” in cases involving nutritional supplements.

III.       How does the athlete prove “no intent” in cases not involving “Specified Substances”?

In cases that do not involve “Specified Substances,” the athlete carries the burden of proving “no intent” to avoid the application of a four-year default sanction. In many cases, therefore, this burden of proof will mean the difference between a career-ending sanction and one from which an athlete could potentially return. Therefore, the manner in which this burden of proof is applied by the arbitral tribunals will be critical.

As mentioned above, Art. 10.2.3 of the 2015 WADC provides that “an anti-doping rule violation resulting from an adverse analytical finding for a substance which is only prohibited In-Competition shall not be considered “intentional” if the substance is not a Specified Substance and the athlete can establish that the Prohibited Substance was used out-of-Competition in a context unrelated to sport performance.” Therefore, in cases involving non-specified stimulants, an athlete can avoid a “default sanction” of four years by proving that the stimulant was used out-of-Competition in a context unrelated to sport performance. This raises a number of important issues:

            a)         will arbitral tribunals accept a low concentration level of the prohibited stimulant in the anti-doping test, which low levels would be inconsistent with the purposeful use of the stimulant “in Competition,” as sufficient proof of out-of-Competition use?

            b)        will arbitral tribunals accept a polygraph finding that the athlete was truthful in stating that he did not use the prohibited substance at issue on the day of the competition at issue as sufficient proof of out-of-Competition use ? [3]

            c)         how will arbitral tribunals analyze the issue of whether the out-of-Competition use of the stimulant was “in a context unrelated to sport performance?”  As has been seen in past cases, arguments can be made that virtually any substance that an athlete consumes, including food, is done in a context related to sport performance.  Therefore, in order to avoid an analysis that renders this phrase meaningless, arbitral tribunals must apply a common-sense and realistic meaning to the issue of when something is consumed in a context that is actually related to sport performance, as opposed (for example) to consuming a product for general health purposes.

For substances that are banned at all times, such as anabolic agents, the analysis of “in-competition” vs. “out-of-Competition’ use will be unnecessary. In these cases, in order to avoid a “default sanction” of four years, the athlete will be required to prove that he or she did not take the substance intentionally. It is therefore critical to consider what will happen to the athlete who has no idea what caused his or her positive test, and who, despite investigation, is unable to prove the source of the prohibited substance. For these athletes, how will arbitral tribunals analyze this issue, which could mean the difference between a career-ending four-year sanction and a “default sanction” of two years?  Some important questions arise:

            a)         Will the athlete’s failure to prove how the prohibited substance entered his or her system (within the meaning of 2015 WADC Art. 10.4 and Art. 10.5.2) automatically result in a 4-year default sanction? Arbitral tribunals should recognize the difference between (i) proving the source of the prohibited substance as a pre-condition to receiving a reduction in the “default sanction,” and (ii) the requirement of proving “no intent” in order to avoid the application of a “default sanction” of four years. An athlete should be able to prove “no intent” without proving the source of the prohibited substance, at least in the abstract.

            b)        Assuming that the failure to prove how the prohibited substance entered the athlete’s system is not automatically equated with intent to use the prohibited substance, how will the athlete who cannot prove the source of the prohibited substance prove lack of intent? Will it be sufficient, for example, for an athlete to submit a polygraph finding that the he was truthful in stating that he did not knowingly use the prohibited substance at issue, as sufficient proof of lack of intent, such that the applicable “default sanction” is two years instead of four? Or, even in the absence of a polygraph exam, could an athlete establish “no intent” within the meaning of 2015 WADC Art. 10.2.1.1 solely through her own credible testimony that she did not knowingly ingest the prohibited substance at issue? These will be important evidentiary issues for arbitral tribunals to consider, and the manner in which they are determined will have a significant impact on the sanction length for many athletes under the 2015 WADC.

IV.       Conclusion

The concept of giving longer sanctions to athletes who intend to cheat, and shorter sanctions to those athletes who do not have such an intent, is certainly laudable, and the 2015 WADC has introduced a number of new legal and evidentiary issues in an effort to further differentiate between intentional and non-intentional “dopers.” However, as is often the case, the 2015 WADC has provided very broad concepts, which the arbitral tribunals will have to interpret and apply to real-world situations. How these general concepts are applied in reality will – for many athletes – mean the difference between a two-year sanction that is “merely” devastating and a four-year sanction that is career ending. In those cases where an athlete has no idea where the prohibited substance came from, the arbitral tribunals must be very careful in how they apply these new concepts.

 These new concepts related to “intent” will change the manner in which arbitral tribunals address the preliminary issue of the applicable “default sanction”. They will not materially affect the manner in which these tribunals address the issues related to the reduction in the “default sanction.” However, because of the limitations in how much the “default sanction can be reduced (in cases of no significant fault, the maximum reduction in the “default sanction” is 50 percent), the determination of this new “intent” issue as related to the “default sanction” will be doubly important in cases where the older “exceptional circumstances” rules are being asserted as a basis for sanction reduction.

[1] See, e.g., 2015 WADC Art. 10.4: “if an athlete or other Person establishes in an individual case that he or she bears no fault or negligence, then the otherwise applicable period of Ineligibility shall be eliminated”; and Art. 10.5 on the Reduction of the Period of Ineligibility based on No Significant Fault or Negligence.

[2] See, e.g., C. v. FINA (CAS 95/141) Digest of CAS Awards, Vol. 1, at p. 220, par. 13: “Indeed, if for each case the sports federations had to prove the intentional nature of the act (desire to dope to enhance one’s performance) in order to be able to give it the force of an offence, the fight against doping would become practically impossible”.

[3] Prior arbitral tribunals have already accepted that polygraph test results are admissible in anti-doping proceedings. See, e.g., UCI v. Contador (CAS 2011/A//2384).

The 40 recommendations of the Olympic Agenda 2020 are out! First thought: one should not underplay the 40 recommendations, they constitute (on paper at least) a potential leap forward for the IOC. The media will focus on the hot stuff: the Olympic channel, the pluri-localisation of the Games, or their dynamic format. More importantly, and to some extent surprisingly to us, however, the IOC has also fully embraced sustainability and good governance. Nonetheless, the long-term legacy of the Olympic Agenda 2020 will hinge on the IOC’s determination to be true to these fundamental commitments. Indeed, the devil is always in the implementation, and the laudable intents of some recommendations will depend on future political choices by Olympic bureaucrats. 

For those interested in human rights and democracy at (and around) the Olympics, two aspects are crucial: the IOC’s confession that the autonomy of sport is intimately linked to the quality of its governance standards and the central role the concept of sustainability is to play in the bidding process and the host city contract.  

Good Governance = Autonomy

“Good governance and autonomy are strongly linked; they are two sides of the same coin”

This statement is to be found in the only document that really matters to understand the depth of the reforms envisaged: The context and background report. It is a confession; there is no autonomy of sport, unless this autonomy is in the hands of irreproachable institutions. The IOC is prone to consider itself as abiding to such standard, but it is not for itself to judge. The global public will be the sole arbiter of this pledge to good governance, as the IOC recognises: “Autonomy has to be earned”. 

In this regard, the IOC’s Agenda 2020 proposes a certain number of institutional and “good governance” reforms:

Recommendation 27 Comply with basic principles of good governance

The Agenda 2020 foresees that “all organisations belonging to the Olympic Movement [are] to accept and comply with the Basic universal Principles of Good Governance of the Olympic and Sports movements”. To this end, the organisations will be monitored and mentored and self-evaluation tests (probably similar to WADA’s compliance test) will be introduced. Furthermore, the IOC will update the principles of good governance with the help of a working group composed of “experts”. Obviously, the impact of this recommendation depends very much on the stringency of the monitoring and of the nature of the good governance requirements imposed. 

Recommendation 29: Increase Transparency

The IOC vows to publish financial statements according to the International Financial Reporting Standards and to produce an annual activity and financial report, including the allowance policy for IOC members. This is an important step, since it enables external observers to better scrutinise the financial flows in the Olympic movement and to have a full picture of the allowances received by each individual member of the IOC. It will be easier to follow where the IOC’s money is going and it will make money laundering harder. However, external revenues received by IOC members will stay undeclared, leaving the door open for suspicions.  

Recommendation 30: Strengthen the IOC Ethics Commission independence

This recommendation aims at securing the IOC’s ethics commission independence by proposing to elect its chair and its members via a secret ballot of the Session (the IOC’s parliament, assembling all IOC members). This seems quite an obvious thing in a democratic society, but for an institution versed in nepotism, it is a big step. Once implemented, the nomination process of the members of the Commission will be more difficult to control, and, thus, reinforce the independence of the sole potential counter-power (to the executive board) inside the IOC’s institutional structure. Again, this is no cure-all, and the Ethics Commission has yet to prove itself as an effective control mechanism, but it is a first step towards a more balanced institutional game.

 
Recommendation 32: Strengthen ethics

Here it is suggested to revise the Code of ethics, so that it “be fully aligned with the Olympic Agenda 2020’s drive for more transparency, good governance and accountability”. This is a vague, but potentially important, commitment to rethink the IOC’s Code of Ethics. Only time will tell if this revision will lead to better and accountable governance. In any event, only heightened public scrutiny can force the IOC to adopt governance standard ensuring full transparency and accountability. 

Recommendation 37: Address IOC membership age limit

The IOC is recommending a complex system to allow members over 70 to go beyond the official age limit entrenched in Article 16 of the Olympic Charter. In practice, the Session will be able to vote on allowing each member the right to stay on for maximum four years more than the age limit. This is a (minimal) concession to the IOC members strongly opposed to the age limit.  

Recommendation 38: Implement a targeted recruitment process

Recommendation 38 concerns the selection process of new IOC members. The IOC is no democratic institution. The “citizens” of the Olympic family do not elect their representatives. In fact, the IOC members are not necessarily part of the “Olympic family”. Historically, its selection process has been marred by nepotism (e.g. the Samaranch dynasty) as it is based on co-optation. The Agenda 2020 does not do away with this fundamentally oligarchic procedure, but it is slightly correcting it by empowering (and constraining) the nominations Commission, which is in charge of proposing candidates. The choice of the Commission is to be constrained by specific selection criteria, the most prominent being: gender balance; geographical balance; and the existence of an athletes’ commission within the organisation for representatives of Ifs/NOCs. As from now on, the press and the public will be able to blame the IOC if it does not follow its self-imposed requirements (gender balance being the one to watch closely) in the future. 

Some changes are also on the books concerning the Scope and Composition of IOC Commissions (Recommendation 40). Unfortunately, they are of unclear nature and magnitude.

These institutional innovations, if implemented, are positive steps forward to constrain power inside the IOC and to open it to outside scrutiny. The most remarkable outcome of the Olympic Agenda 2020 remains the crystal clear acknowledgment by IOC that the autonomy of sport is necessarily tied to the quality of the governing processes in place. This essentially means that the Agenda 2020 can only be the beginning of a dynamic institutional reform process that must lead the IOC to be more inclusive of the many constituencies of the sporting world. This is not enough, however; the IOC must also be receptive to the needs of society as a whole.  

Sustainability and Human rights in the bidding process

The bidding process should be at the centre of all critical attention. It is clear that it is the bidding process that entrusts the IOC with real political leverage. At this point, it takes fundamental decisions that will impact the life of millions (if not billions) of citizens Therefore, the brunt of the substantial (in contrast with the institutional measures discussed above) reforms was expected to impact on the bidding procedure (see the joint paper by the Swiss, German, Austrian and Swedish NOCs). It is also on the bidding process that the IOC received the most contributions in the framework of the Agenda 2020 (more than 90). In this regard, Sochi was a wake-up call, due to the abuses recorded on the human rights and anti-discrimination front, and the environmental sustainability side. The IOC Agenda 2020 is not shy of tackling these issues and, with caveats discussed below, should be praised for doing so. First, and this is a fundamental point, the Host City Contract will from now on be made publicly available (for now we only have leaked draft documents as for the 2022 contract). This is a necessary move for an institution claiming to follow good governance principles. Indeed, it will ease the work of critics and commentators scrutinising the contract and the public as a whole will have access to the official document itself.  

Recommendation 1: Shape the bidding process as an invitation

This first recommendation contains a variety of proposals. The spirit of which is “to invite potential candidate cities to present an Olympic project that best matches their sports, economic, social and environmental long-term planning needs”. Thus, for “reasons of sustainability”, the IOC will tolerate that events do not take place in the Host-city but in another nearby city or country (modification of article 34 of the Olympic Charter). The Host City Contract will include a provision banning discriminations, as was previously announced and celebrated by Human Rights Watch. In addition to this, article 21 of the 2022 Host City Contract will impose sustainability requirements on the Host city. Yet, the transformative quality of these provisions is still to be demonstrated. The main point remains that new regulations for the bidding procedure will be drafted. These will be key to set in stone the sustainability and Human rights turn of the Olympic family and will be the place to look at in order to assess whether the IOC is really serious about the changes put forward in the Olympic Agenda 2020.

Recommendation 2: Evaluate bid cities by assessing key opportunities and risks

The evaluation of the bids is key to the IOC’s impact on sustainability or human rights aspects (and not only to ensure that its commercial interests are safeguarded). Hence, it is good news that the IOC is to consider as positive aspects of a bid: “the maximum use of existing facilities and the use of temporary and demountable venues where no long-term venue legacy need exists or can be justified”. Furthermore, the Evaluation Commission is “to benefit from third-party, independent advice in such areas as social, economic and political conditions, with a special focus on sustainability and legacy”. In fact, the final reports by the Evaluation Commission are to include “an assessment of the opportunities and risks of each candidature, as well as of sustainability and legacy” (modification of bye-law to rule 33) and third-party independent risk-assessments are to be conducted. This will be a powerful tool in the hands of NGOs to decisively influence the selection process by providing in depth (and public) assessments of the sustainability of the different bids. It will also, and perhaps mainly, offer critical ammunitions in case the IOC is inclined to disregard the sustainability assessment provided by the Evaluation Commission. There is no rock solid guarantee that the IOC will in the end take into account the sustainability of a bid to allocate the Games. Yet, a full-blown neglect of this assessment would give way to damaging public criticism.  

Recommendation 4: Include sustainability in all aspects of the Olympic Games

This recommendation is aimed at ensuring that sustainability “is included in all aspects of the planning and staging of the Olympic Games”. Sustainability is to be achieved via “a sustainability strategy to enable potential and actual Olympic Games organisers to integrate and implement sustainability measures”. The IOC wants to assist the Organising Committees “to establish the best possible governance for the integration of sustainability throughout the organisation”. To this end, the “[n]ext Host City Contract [is] to reflect, through a number of additional obligations” these policy goals. Moreover, the IOC considers signing a “MoU with the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) for possible independent assessment of OCOG sustainability performances”. Again, depending on the extent to which the Host City Contract will be modified, these changes are substantial. However, the UNEP might need concrete commitments to be convinced to deepen its existing collaboration with the IOC, especially after the disaster of the Sochi Games. The Host City Contract is certainly an important lever to impose obligations on the Host City, but to effectively do so it needs to be accompanied by clear and potent procedures ensuring its enforcement.  

Recommendation 5: Include sustainability within the Olympic Movement’s daily operations

The IOC’s administration in its day-to-day operations is to follow sustainability standards. Most notably, it aims to “introduce sustainable sourcing policies in tendering processes, sponsorship, licensing and supplier agreements for renewals or new contracts”. This is an instance of IOC greening its own administrative operations to improve its image. 

Recommendation 14: Strengthen the 6^th Fundamental Principle of Olympism

In a symbolic gesture, the 6^th fundamental principle of Olympism, which forbids all types of discrimination, is to be re-written into a hybrid text of Article 14 of the European Convention of Human Rights and Article 2 of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  This is a tricky move and guessing the way the new principle will be interpreted in the future is an impossible deed. On one side, it seems that the principle is now completely in line with anti-discrimination standards widely recognised under international law. On the other, one has the impression that the new wording narrows its scope of application. Indeed, discrimination is not “incompatible with belonging to the Olympic Movement” anymore, it is merely inadmissible when exercising the rights and freedom granted by the Olympic charter. In general, this is a symbolic provision, the wording of the Host City Contract or the bidding requirements have way more practical relevance, but this development is not necessarily a sign of a more stringent action from the part of the IOC against discriminations. 

Conclusion: The Devil is in the implementation/interpretation

This leads us to a final, and crucial, caveat. Law is very much about the interpretation of the meaning of words. In our case, the IOC will be the main responsible to give a practical meaning to the sweet words enshrined in the Agenda 2020’s recommendations. Starting with the IOC Session on the 8 and 9 December in Monaco, which will decide on the modifications to the Olympic Charter or its byelaws. The legal meaning of transnational concepts such as sustainability, good governance and discrimination is more or less shared around the globe. The IOC cannot afford to betray it; there is no space for the use of newspeak, or for any other word games leading to a practical disregard of the essential gist of those concepts. The IOC and its president have raised high expectations with this set of recommendations indicating a willingness to change from the side of the Olympic movement. Such expectations cannot be disappointed over and over again; it would certainly be suicidal for the Olympic movement to betray its grand promises. Now comes the time to deliver!