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The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

The Semenya Decision of the Swiss Federal Tribunal: Human Rights on the Bench - By Faraz Shahlaei

Editor's note: Faraz Shahlaei is a JSD Candidate at Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. His research and teaching interests are public international law, international sports law, international human rights and dispute resolution.

 

The issue of international human rights was a central contention in Caster Semenya case ever since the start of her legal battle against the regulations of the IAAF. However, the human rights arguments were poorly considered in the two proceedings related to this case. To put it in perspective, it is like having a key player nailed to the bench throughout the whole game; no coach ever tried to give it a chance while it had the potential to be the game changer for all parties.

In 2019, the Human Rights Council, the inter-governmental human rights body of the UN, expressed concern over issues of discrimination in sports in particular regarding IAAF female classification regulations. In June 2020, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights submitted a report to the United Nations Human Rights Council on the “Intersection of Race and Gender Discrimination in Sport”. The report draws a detailed picture of how human rights in the Semenya case have been violated and also elaborates on the inherent problem of addressing human rights issues in alternative dispute resolution mechanisms favored by the sport governing bodies. However, despite an in-depth discussion of Caster Semenya’s case at both the CAS and then the SFT, the question of human rights, a key concern and a fundamental pillar of the case, hasn’t been adequately answered yet!

The following arguments are intended to discuss how international human rights law, has not been properly examined in Caster Semenya’s case:

1.     CAS arbitral panels are not primarily concerned with the application of international human rights law since sport arbitrations are conducted based on regulations of sport governing bodies, predominantly in the absence of a human rights clause within that framework (OHCHR, para 44). Even if they were, a proper consideration of human rights aspects in any dispute, including whether there is a necessary, proportional and legitimate exception to the human rights rule or whether there are more important rights worthy of protection, needs individuals that are knowledgeable about the international human rights system to carefully scrutinize the issues based on human rights norms. Even if the CAS includes human rights experts in its pool of arbitrators, there are still questions regarding the dependability and the weight of their interpretation of the human rights treaties considering their appointment process by private actors in compare with for example judges in the ICJ, ECtHR or members of the UN treaty bodies.

2.     The Semenya case is a suitable example of this gap. In fact, when it comes to the issue of discrimination and international human rights law, the panel finds the UN amicus curiae and other expert submissions useless (CAS, para 554). The panel argues that the submissions failed to address the three-prong spear of necessity, proportionality and legitimacy and therefore are not helpful for the task in front of the panel. Despite acknowledging the relevancy of some human rights arguments (CAS, para 554), the panel finds a more important value to protect, namely: fairness in sports; and builds up its analysis of necessity, proportionality and legitimacy based on this concept. Whether this assessment is in line with international human rights, remains a question since the issue has not been considered by a panel with adequate human rights expertise. The player is on the bench!

3.     Furthermore, the issue of female athletes’ eligibility is not related only to gender-based discrimination. As the report of the OHCHR makes clear it is also about the right to work and just and favorable working conditions; the right to highest attainable standards of physical and mental health; the right to sexual and reproductive health; prohibition of arbitrary interference with privacy; the right to bodily integrity and the right to human dignity (OHCHR, para 34). None of these rights have been considered in the CAS award and subsequently by the SFT within the international human rights law context.

4.     More importantly, the enforcement of DSD regulations raises questions regarding the prohibition of torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment (OHCHR, para 34(a)). The OHCHR report explains that enforcement of DSD regulations are “medically unnecessary, and potentially harmful” (para. 32), brings the targeted individuals with “shame and ridicule” (para. 33), inflicts physical and psychological harm (para 34(c)) and is a form of forced medical intervention (para 34 (c)) which triggers issues related to article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. This prohibition in most cases trumps any exception or justification. Therefore, Article 7 of the ICCPR on prohibition of torture, cruel, degrading and inhuman treatment, ratified by Monaco in 1997, can be a potentially bigger threat to DSD regulations rather than the issue of non-discrimination.

5.     Challenging an arbitral award in national jurisdictions, other than the public policy grounds, is limited to issues pertinent to procedural matters. Therefore, the scope of reviewing the issues at stake in the arbitral award is very limited and if any of the above rights have not been already scrutinized during the arbitration, they will fall outside the scope of the appeal. For example, the SFT finds that the contradiction of taking oral contraceptives with religious and moral values of the individual is an inadmissible claim since it hasn’t been raised in front of the CAS at the first place (para 10.6).

6.     A fundamental discordance between the human rights framework and the approach adopted by the SFT, emerges when the SFT argues that the non-discrimination principle based on the Swiss Constitution is restricted to the treatment of individuals by public entities not private bodies such as sport organizations (para 9.4). Nevertheless, the SFT observes that sport governing bodies possess a status similar to states (which is in itself an interesting finding and I will touch upon this later in this note) and then deals with public policy grounds. However, the legal protections in international human rights law are of a different nature. Positive obligations of the states in guaranteeing the enforcement of human rights norms within their jurisdiction is an indispensable part of the legal regime created by international human rights law. The UN Human Rights Committee is clear when it states “the positive obligations on States Parties to ensure Covenant rights will only be fully discharged if individuals are protected by the State, not just against violations of Covenant rights by its agents, but also against acts committed by private persons or entities that would impair the enjoyment of Covenant rights in so far as they are amenable to application between private persons or entities”. The practice of international courts and tribunals corroborates this view where in many cases public officials were held accountable for failing to do their due diligence in preventing human rights violations within their jurisdictions (See e.g. Fadeyeva v. Russia, paras 89-93; CCPR Concluding Observations on Germany, para 16).

7.     The SFT delves into the public policy issues and by relying on the findings of the CAS (para 9.8.2; 9.8.3.1) comes to the same conclusion as to the priority and legitimacy of the principle of fairness in sports (para 9.8.3.3, 9.8.3.4) and ultimately finds no breach of public policy (para 10.7). Based on paragraph 1 and 2 of this note, the analysis of the CAS, which the SFT relies upon it, is disputable from the human rights perspective.

8.     The SFT refers to the decision of the ECtHR in FNASS and others v. France and finds the analysis applicable to this case. This seems reasonable as both cases are justifying certain restrictions to protect the rights of third parties. However, the pivotal argument of the ECtHR in FNASS not only mentions the protection of public health (para 165) but also the risks of doping for physical and mental health of the doped athletes (paras 171-173); the SFT’s stance on this topic is in conflict with serious concerns asserted by the OHCHR on how DSD regulations pose a serious risk to the right to health of the individuals requiring them to undergo unnecessary and potentially harmful medical treatment (OHCHR para 32, 33, 34(a), 34(b), 34(c), 34(d)). Additionally, in FNASS the right to privacy is examined in the face of whereabout regulations plus being available for an hour each day for testing purposes; the ECtHR finds that the protection of health, which is the aim of the doping control system, is more important than revealing the whereabout information. However, in the present case reasonable concerns are over endangering the health and safety of individuals rather than disclosing the information about the place of residence. Article 3 of the Additional Protocol to the Oviedo Convention concerning biomedical research can be illuminating in this regard: “The interests and welfare of the human being participating in research shall prevail over the sole interest of society or science”.

9.     At times, the SFT finds itself relying on the notion of consent in relations between athletes and sport governing bodies and employs it as a justifying factor for example for the intrusive examination of athletes’ body that if they object, such examinations would not take place (para 10.2, 11.2). The SFT further points out that athletes’ defective consent to requirements set by the IAAF, justifies taking oral contraceptives and it is not a treatment imposed on an unwilling individual (para 10.2).

  • First, the consent in this case is a flawed consent since it leaves “no real choice to the athlete, who has to choose between undergoing these intrusive medically unnecessary assessments and treatments with negative impacts on their health and wellbeing” (See here, p 5). This incomplete consent might survive when tested against imposing the arbitration clause on an athlete (Mutu & Pechestein case) but might fail when tested against more fundamental issues such as prohibition of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, non-discrimination, the right to health, bodily integrity and prohibition of medical intervention without free consent. Furthermore, consent should be considered in the light of the decision of the ECtHR in Chitos v. Greece in which a military staff resignation resulted in imposition of a financial penalty. In Chitos a new law was adopted after the applicant was recruited by the military, changing the conditions of the release of the personnel from the military service. The Court finds that the law pursues a legitimate aim and is proportionate, and it also takes account of the fact that “at the outset … the applicant cannot legitimately maintain that he was unaware of the rationale and scope of the obligations he had entered into” being aware of also the benefits that he would receive from this relation. The question in front of the Court was whether the applicant voluntarily offered himself since he had prior knowledge of rules and possible consequences. The Court maintains that the issue of mental constraint should be considered based on the situation at the time of the entry into force of the new law not at the time when the applicant was first recruited (para 97). Furthermore, in Van Der Mussele v. Belgium regarding the issue of prior consent and the existence of a threat the ECtHR maintains that: “This could be so in the case of a service required in order to gain access to a given profession, if the service imposed a burden which was so excessive or disproportionate to the advantages attached to the future exercise of that profession, [then] … the service could not be treated as having been voluntarily accepted beforehand” (para 37). As explained above an assessment of necessity, proportionality and legitimacy based on international human rights grounds can be different than the conclusions based on the principle of fairness in sports.
  • Second, the OHCHR report calls attention to power imbalances in sports which hinges upon the notion of consent in relations between the athletes and sport governing bodies (para 34 (c)). The Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health emphasizes the need for particular measures to protect “vulnerability of certain individuals whose rights are compromised owing to deeply rooted power imbalances and structural inequalities” in particular in clinical practice and medical research. “In sport, such power imbalances are compounded by athletes’ dependency on the sports federations requiring such medical interventions and the frequent absence of adequate and holistic support during the decision-making process” (OHCHR, para 34(c)).
  • Third, the issue of consent becomes significantly important with respect to medical intervention in human body. For any type of medical intervention, free and informed consent of the individual is required. Article 5 of the Oviedo Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine provides that any intervention in the health of individual should be conducted with free and informed consent including the consequences and risks involved. The OHCHR report calls attention to the “risk of unethical medical practice, particularly when the informed consent of the person concerned is not required” (OHCHR, para 34(c)). It is uncontested that human dignity and its health has priority over any type of scientific test or research even for the good of society. Article 3 of the Additional Protocol to the Oviedo Convention applies to this argument as well which provides: “The interests and welfare of the human being participating in research shall prevail over the sole interest of society or science”.
  • Fourth, individuals have the right to refuse or withdraw consent at any time without being subject to any form of discrimination (Article 5, 16 of Oviedo Convention; Additional Protocol, article 13(3)).
  • Fifth, the argument that the CAS is open to future findings of the adverse effects of such treatments which is supported by the SFT (para 9.8.3.5), is in contrast with requirements of medical and biological interventions of human body in international human rights law as it is encouraging unethical and potentially harmful medical experimentation and at the same time overlooks the notion of free and voluntary consent. Any type of medical intervention and research should come with careful consideration of ethical acceptability of such practices including protection of “dignity, rights, safety and well-being of research participants” (Additional protocol to the Oviedo Convention, article 9).

Notwithstanding the above arguments, one of the findings of the SFT can be an interesting line of thought for further research; that the vertical structure of sports and the dominance of sport governing bodies in their realm, puts them in a similar position as states (para 9.4). Traditionally only states and international governmental organizations are direct subjects of public international law and therefore bearers of responsibility under its rules and principles including the responsibility to enforce the human rights standards. The finding of the SFT adds more weight to the argument that sport governing bodies have replaced states in certain functions in a way that states are no longer responsible for those operations. This is one criterion recognized by public international law scholars for recognition of international legal personality. Therefore, it will be interesting to study whether sport governing bodies are in a position to be recognized as de facto states although without a geographical territory.

Finally, what I argued above does not mean that ultimately, once the award of the CAS in Semenya case is scrutinized by a human rights body it will fail. It may or may not; but as long as this evaluation has not been conducted by a competent human rights court, there will always remain questions about the credibility of a CAS award which disregarded most of the human rights concerns touched upon in this blog.

Therefore, a key player in this game is still on the bench!

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Asser International Sports Law Blog | UEFA’s tax-free Euro 2016 in France: State aid or no State aid?

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

UEFA’s tax-free Euro 2016 in France: State aid or no State aid?

Last week, the French newspaper Les Echos broke the story that UEFA (or better said its subsidiary) will be exempted from paying taxes in France on revenues derived from Euro 2016. At a time when International Sporting Federations, most notably FIFA, are facing heavy criticisms for their bidding procedures and the special treatment enjoyed by their officials, this tax exemption was not likely to go unnoticed. The French minister for sport, confronted with an angry public opinion, responded by stating that tax exemptions are common practice regarding international sporting events. The former French government agreed to this exemption. In fact, he stressed that without it “France would never have hosted the competition and the Euro 2016 would have gone elsewhere”.

This is not the first time that UEFA is exempted from paying taxes in a host country. For example, for the Euro 2012, UEFA was not subject to direct taxation in Poland.[1] Similar conditions were also part of the application procedures for Euro 2004 and Euro 2008, but is up to the host country to decide how it fulfils the tax exemption requirement of UEFA.

On 12 November 2014 the French council of ministers approved a draft legislation that would provide a fiscally advantageous solution for organisers of international sporting events. The law still needs to be approved by the parliament where it is facing strong political opposition. The organisers of the 2015 European basketball Championships, the 2018 Ryder Cup (golf), and of the football Euro 2016 would be fully exempted from paying direct taxes. However, it is unlikely that the French organisers of the yearly held Tour de France (cycling) and Roland Garros (tennis) will enjoy the same privilege. Even though the legislation is not specific to the Euro 2016, many critics hold that the main reason for introducing this legislation was to satisfy UEFA’s demands.

Regarding the Euro 2016, a special joint-stock company has been created called Euro 2016 SAS. 95% of the shares of this company are owned by UEFA, the remaining 5% by the French Football Federation (FFF). Euro 2016 SAS is responsible for organising the competition itself, related events, and the promotion of the events.[2] The board includes UEFA officials, FFF officials, and French government officials. According to the French minister, Euro 2016 SAS will be exempted from direct and related taxes (corporate tax, income tax, payroll tax, etc.). VAT, however, must still be paid. Allowing Euro 2016 SAS to be exempted from paying direct taxes comes at a time when most EU Member States, including France, are forced to introduce austerity measures. Interestingly, it also comes at a time when the European Commission is becoming increasingly active in dealing with matters related to State aid and taxation. In February 2014, former taxation and customs union Commissioner, Algirdas Šemeta, stated that competition policy in general and State aid law in particular could “greatly reinforce our tax policy work.” He also said that pursuing cases under competition rules could make a real difference as they can be enforced directly on the basis of the EU Treaty. Since this statement, the Commission has opened numerous investigations into alleged State aid received through tax schemes.[3] These cases include alleged aid provided by Ireland to Apple, aid provided by the Netherlands to Starbucks and aid provided by Luxembourg to Amazon. Last week’s LuxLeaks scandal, concerning specific tax deals offered to multinationals by the Luxembourg State, has put State aid and tax policy high on the political agenda. Our analysis is embedded into this broader context, which is decisive in understanding the potential readiness of the Commission to tackle selective fiscal State aid measures. In the following paragraphs we will engage in a substantial analysis of a hypothetical State aid investigation by the EU Commission into the suggested tax exemption offered to UEFA by the French State.

In order for a measure to be considered unlawful State aid it has to fulfil the criteria stipulated in Article 107 (1) TFEU.[4] However, with respect to tax measures, the key question will generally be whether the tax measure is selective.[5] In this regard, when considering whether a measure is selective, and consequently constitutes State aid, the effects on the market are taken into account and not the causes or aim of that measure.[6]

According to settled case-law, the material selectivity of tax measures should normally be assessed by following a three-step analysis.[7] Firstly, the system of reference has to be identified. The system of reference constitutes the framework against which the selectivity of a measure is assessed. It is a consistent set of rules generally applicable to all undertakings falling within its scope as defined by its guiding principle.[8] Secondly, it should be determined whether the given measure constitutes a derogation from the system of reference insofar as it differentiates between economic operators who, in light of the objective intrinsic to that system, are in a comparable factual and legal situation. In the case at hand one can think of other sporting or cultural events held in France. If the measure in question indeed derogates, it still needs to be verified in the last step of the test whether the derogatory measure is justified by the nature or the general scheme of the system.[9] If a prima facie selective measure is justified by the nature or the general scheme of the system, it will not be considered selective and thus fall outside the scope of Article 107(1) TFEU.[10]  


1. System of reference

The French corporate tax (impôt sur les sociétiés) is a standard tax with a rate of approximately 33% that applies to all resident companies in France and that affects all profits made in France by the resident companies. The guiding principle of the corporate tax system would consist in levying taxes on all undertakings generating profit in France.  


2. Is the measure a derogation from the system of reference?

In principle, all undertakings based in France that make a profit are liable to pay the French corporate tax. Similarly, workers and employers based in France are liable to pay the French payroll tax. The sole fact that a new legislation would allow undertakings such as Euro 2016 SAS to be exempted from paying corporate tax and payroll tax derogates from the abovementioned system of reference. Even if one were to assume that international sporting events are subject to a specific system of reference, exonerating their organisers from all direct taxes, this would still be at odds with the fact that undertakings such as Amaury Sport Organisation (the French organiser of the Tour de France) would not be exempted from paying taxes.  In short, at this stage, the measure seems to be prima facie selective.  


3. Is the measure justifiable by the nature or the general scheme of the reference system?

 A prima facie selective aid measure can still be found justified in light of the logic of the system of reference.[11] It has to be borne in mind that a Member State is free to shape the fundamental aspects of its tax system by determining the taxable situations, the tax rate and tax base. Art. 107 (1) TFEU does not prevent the Member State from introducing, reducing or abolishing a tax in order to further its economic aims.[12] It is, however, for the Member State, which has introduced a prima facie selective measure, to show that it is actually justified by the nature and general scheme of the system in question.[13]

It is likely that the French authorities will argue that the measure was introduced to facilitate the organisation of international sporting events to be held on French territory. Organisations responsible for the choice of the host of an international sporting event, such as UEFA or the IOC, need incentives to select France as a host nation. Yet it is doubtful that this could constitute an acceptable justification for the whole scheme. It would imply accepting targeted fiscal dumping as a viable strategy to raise competitiveness, opening the door to a ‘beggar thy neighbour’ policy. Moreover, this tax policy is not aimed at targeting all sports events, i.e. to encourage the practice of sport or any other objective of general interest. Therefore, the Commission is unlikely to accept that it fits into the nature and general scheme of the reference system.


Nonetheless, the French government still believes that the measure is justifiable for a number of reasons. The former French minister for sport, Jean-François Lamour, admitted that hosting mega sporting events always cost more than they generate, and that those who say the opposite are mistaken. However, he also stated that hosting Euro 2016 would serve as an “economic accelerator that can boost the French economy.”[14] “This tax exemption may shock”, admits another former minister for sport, David Douillet, “but it should be considered as an investment, since nearly 3 million visitors are to be expected”. Moreover, “hosting the tournament creates about 20.000 jobs in the construction sector alone. The measure will allow France to host major international tournaments and ensures that they are not organised only in countries that have the means to afford them. In the case of Euro 2016, UEFA will donate €20 million to the host cities, pay €23 million rental money for stadiums and will participate for an amount of €20 million in shares of the French Football Federation regarding amateur football”[15], says the French minister for sport Patrick Kanner. Lastly, as stated in the introduction, Mr. Kanner also held that “France would never have hosted the competition and the Euro 2016 would have gone elsewhere”, had it not agreed to the conditions set by UEFA. Justifications, such as the ones listed here, may be compatible with EU law if it facilitates the development of certain economic activities where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to common interest. Furthermore, the measures must have a clear objective of common interest in order for them to be justified.

According to the French newspaper Le Monde, France has already invested nearly €1.6 billion in the construction and renovation of stadiums and has spent €400 million in access and transport infrastructures for Euro 2016.[16] In Commission Decision SA.35501 Financement de la construction et de la rénovation des stades pour l’Euro 2016, the Commission assessed the public money spent on infrastructure and declared the spending compatible with EU law under Article 107 (3)c) TFEU.[17] The Commission took into account Article 165 TFEU and concluded that the public spending was aimed at a well-defined objective of common interest. It also accepted that there was a public need for the modernisation and enlargement of the stadiums, and that this would not occur without State intervention.

It is important to note, however, that the case at hand describes a different State intervention, namely a specific tax exemption for Euro 2016 SAS. Can arguments raised to justify public spending on infrastructure (i.e. job creation, promotion of France, market failure, cultural, and recreational considerations, etc.) be used analogically to justify a tax exemption? Indeed, there is a direct link between the State’s decision to spend public money in constructing infrastructure and the creation of 20.000 jobs in the construction sector, but not between the legislation allowing tax exemptions and the same job creation. The foregone tax money is not going to be directly re-invested in France, not even in the EU, but is ultimately going to go to a Swiss association: UEFA. The link between the need for the tax exemption and the benefits derived from the EURO2016 can only be made relying on the need to bow to UEFA’s illegitimate blackmail: ‘you’ll get the EURO (and the jobs and exposure hereto tied) only against a fiscal gift’. It is therefore unlikely that the measure at hand fulfils an objective of common interest and would be compatible with Article 107 (3)c) TFEU. 


Usually a negative state aid decision is seen as a backlash for a Member State. However, in UEFA’s tax exemption case, it might be a benediction. It would have positive effects not only for France, but also for all EU Member States, putting a definitive end to UEFA’s blackmailing. A clear precedent would be set and all the organisers of international sporting events taking place in the EU, whether FIFA World Cups, Olympic Games or else, would finally have to comply with tax laws just like anyone else.



[1] Karolina Tetlak and Dick Molenaar, “Tax Exemptions for Euro 2012 in Poland and Ukraine”, European Taxation, June 2012, page 328

[2] The French government and local authorities, on the other hand, are to provide the sites, infrastructure, public services and transportation. They are also responsible for public safety, and for promoting the country and host cities

[3] Timothy Lyons, “The modernisation of EU state aid law and taxation”, British Tax Review, 2014, 2, pages 113-114

[4] (1) The measure has to be selective; (2) granted through State resources; (3) it has to confer an economic advantage upon the recipient; and; (4) it must distort or threaten to distort competition and must have the potential to affect trade between Member States.

[5]  OJ C 384 of 10 December 1998, Commission Notice on the Application of the State Aid Rules to Measures relating to Direct Business Taxation, para. 3

[6] Case C-279/08 P, para. 51; Commission Decision SA.34914, para. 29

[7] See e.g. Joined Cases C-78/08 to C-80/08, Paint Graphos and others [2011], para. 49; Commission Decision SA.34914 - Alleged aid granted to offshore companies – Gibraltar Income Tax Act 2010, para. 28

[8] Commission Decision SA.34914, para. 31

[9] See e.g. Case C-279/08 P, Commission v Netherlands (NOx) [2011], para.62

[10] Joined Cases C-106/09 P and C-107/09 P, Commission and Spain v Government of Gibraltar and United Kingdom [2011], para. 36

[11] Commission Decision SA.29769, State aid to certain Spanish football clubs, para. 15

[12] Conor Quigley, “The notion of State aid in the EEC” [1988] European Law Review, pages 242 and 245

[13] Case T-211/05, Italy v Commisison, para.125

[14] Euro 2016: pourquoi offrir un cadeau fiscal à l’UEFA? Le Monde, 5 November 2014

[15] La France n’aurait pas eu l’Euro 2016 si elle n’avait pas défiscalisé l’UEFA, Le Monde, 5 November 2014

[16] Ibid

[17] Article 107 (3)c):Aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain economic areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest may be considered to be compatible with the internal market.

Comments (1) -

  • The Complainant

    11/20/2014 12:21:59 PM |

    Great article and analysis. Vestager has just answered a question on this issue during her first press conference. No position yet but she is likely to be looking into it. Let's see whether the previous Commission's cosy relationship with UEFA will continue or come to an end. If it continues, the European Commission will be walking on very thing ice and could have a nasty legal surprise.  

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