Editor’s note: N. Emre Bilginoglu[1] is a lawyer based in Istanbul. His book entitled “Arbitration on Football Contracts” was published in 2015.

Introduction

With a total market value of approximately 911 million EUR, the Turkish Super League ranks as one of the prominent football leagues in Europe. Five of the eighteen teams that make up half of the total market value are based in Istanbul, a busy megalopolis that hosts a population of fifteen million inhabitants.[2] As might be expected, the elevated market value brings forth a myriad of disputes, mainly between the clubs and the players. However, other crucial actors such as coaches and agents are also involved in some of the disputes. These actors of the football industry are of all countries, coming from various countries with different legal systems.

One corollary of rapid globalisation is the development of transnational law, which is quite visible in the lex sportiva.[3] Like foreign investors, foreign actors of the sports industry look for some legal security before signing a contract. FIFA does protect these foreign actors in some way, providing players and coaches legal remedies for employment-related disputes of an international dimension. But what if the legal system of the FIFA member association does not provide a reasonable legal remedy for its national actors?[4]

That is why lawyers who are involved in sports related disputes have to guide their law-makers in improving their legal systems after thoroughly examining the dispute resolution mechanisms of other countries. Arbitration is indeed growing exponentially as a method of dispute resolution.[5] The renowned alternative dispute resolution is especially preferred in disputes arising from sports contracts, where both a rapid and a confidential resolution is of the essence.[6]  However, some legal systems oblige the parties of a sports related dispute to resolution by arbitration whereas some legal systems do not. This article gives the reader an insight about resolution of disputes arising from football contracts in Turkey. 

Turkish Method of Dispute Resolution

In August 2015, the Turkish Football Federation made certain changes in its Statute and guidelines. Since those changes, disputes arising from contracts between football clubs, players, coaches and agents are resolved within the Turkish Football Federation Dispute Resolution Board (“UCK”).[7] Therefore, applying to State courts for these disputes (the previous way of resolving disputes) is now impossible, which is a substantial legal issue.

Article 59 of the Turkish Constitution states that disputes related to sports administration and disciplinary matters should be resolved by mandatory arbitration.[8] Decisions of these kinds cannot be appealed to any court of the judiciary. The scope of this article does not include employment related disputes. Article 9 of the Constitution declares that judicial power shall be exercised by independent courts. However, courts do not have jurisdiction to hear disputes arising from football contracts because of the regulations of the Turkish Football Federation. Kelsen’s hierarchy of laws is indeed upside down, alas, the current practice without a proper legal basis is the actual practice. It does not seem like a change is scheduled in the near future, given that many are grateful for the rapid resolution of disputes.

The UCK consists of a “Board of Presidents” and arbitrators. It carries out a simple arbitration process and it involves two arbitrators and a UCK official. The applicant is responsible for the application fee (3% of the disputed amount) and paying the arbitrators' fees, which are decided by UCK (between about 450 and 1500 Euros per arbitrator). The UCK decides within four months (they have the right to extend the time limit for a month based on justified grounds). The decision of the UCK may be appealed to the Turkish Football Federation Appeals Board. However, this appeal does not obstruct the enforcement of the award. Although the statute of the Turkish Football Federation recognizes the competence of CAS, it also declares that the decisions rendered by the Appeals Board cannot be reviewed by CAS.[9]

Decisions of the UCK are not published. Decisions of the Arbitral Tribunal are published without reasoning. Hence, it is impossible to know both the facts of the case and how the arbitral tribunal reached a verdict. This negatively impacts the predictability of the UCK and the Arbitral Tribunal.

The proper composition of the UCK is an important condition for fair and equitable proceedings.[10] Arbitrators are nominated by the Foundation of the Clubs, the Association of Football Players and the Association of Coaches. These three institutions may nominate up to 25 arbitrators each. However, the Turkish Football Federation board of directors appoints the arbitrators from the list of nominees, thus casting a shadow on the independence and the impartiality of the arbitral tribunal, which are crucially important for the right to a fair trial.[11] There are numerous links between the UCK, the Arbitral Tribunal and the Turkish Football Federation. The Federation finances the UCK and the Arbitral Tribunal, can modify the Statutes of the UCK and the Arbitral Tribunal and it appoints the arbitrators of the UCK and the members of the Arbitral Tribunal. The current formation of the UCK resembles CAS before Gundel reforms.

Sporting sanctions and training compensations are also within the scope of the UCK.[12] Decisions of the UCK may only be appealed to Arbitral Tribunal of the Turkish Football Federation. The lack of a judicial review for these decisions is disconcerting. I believe the involvement of the Swiss Federal Tribunal in the CAS process could serve as a good model. CAS decisions may be appealed to the Swiss Federal Tribunal but there is no court in Turkey to appeal to once the Arbitral Tribunal decides on the matter. A general court or the Turkish Court of Cassation must review the decisions of the Arbitral Tribunal regarding disputes on football contracts. Decisions of the Arbitral Tribunal related to sports administration and disciplinary matters are accurately not appealable, as stated by Article 59 of the Constitution. However, Article 59 of the Constitution does not include personal actions. Article 9 of the constitution declares that the judicial power shall be exercised by independent courts. The right to access to courts that is granted by the Constitution cannot be breached by an amendment of the Turkish Football Federation. Therefore, courts are wrong for denying jurisdiction for disputes arising from football contracts. 

Players

The rights and obligations between clubs and players are determined by an employment agreement.[13] In Turkey, labour courts have jurisdiction on disputes arising from employment agreements. However, the Turkish Labour Code does not apply to players, thus surprisingly excluding the jurisdiction of labour courts for disputes regarding them. Article 4 of the Labour Code states that the Code does not apply to athletes. The reason behind this exclusion is not to grant certain rights and benefits to athletes, such as severance payments. Before the amendments of August 2015 came into force, disputes regarding players were resolved in general courts, not labour courts. The debate whether general courts or labour courts have jurisdiction is now obsolete, as the players have to apply to the UCK for the disputes arising from football contracts.

The FIFA DRC adjudicates on cases regarding employment related disputes between a club and a player of an international dimension, therefore foreign players do not have to apply to the UCK. In a case of dual citizenship (the player was British/ Turkish), CAS awarded that someone who benefits from Turkish citizenship should also accept its possible burdens, thus refusing jurisdiction.[14]

Arbitration is indubitably more preferable compared to courts for players. The UCK decides within four months and the decision is enforced by the Turkish Football Federation right away. This promptitude surely provides an advantage for players. Nevertheless, arbitrators’ fees are a hefty burden for destitute amateur players or pro players of the third league. On the contrary, application fees that are three percent of the disputed amount is a supernumerary amount for high earning players. High arbitration cost is a concern, as it is strictly related to right of access to courts. Costs should not victimize the plaintiff. 

Coaches

The FIFA PSC adjudicates on disputes between a club and a coach of an international dimension. Turkish coaches working in Turkey do not have that option. Before the implementation of the mandatory arbitration, labour courts had jurisdiction over the disputes arising from employment agreements of coaches. As of August 2015, coaches may only apply to the UCK for disputes arising from their contracts.

The Turkish Super League clubs do not prefer stability with regard to their coaches, as only one team in the league started the 2016-2017 season with the same coach for the third consecutive year. Coaches seem content with the rapid resolution of their contractual disputes and the confidentiality provided by arbitration, however, arbitrators within UCK are seldom appointed by them.

Agents

The FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players state that the PSC has no jurisdiction to hear any contractual dispute involving intermediaries. Agents, foreign or not, have to apply to the UCK for disputes arising from their contracts. This is overall problematic for agents, because they do not have any say on the appointment of arbitrators. Therefore, the independence and the impartiality of the UCK is suspicious, especially for agents. It is highly recommended for foreign agents to work with Turkish lawyers doing business in Turkey. If not, they will have to hire one at some point.  

Conclusion

Arbitration does truly offer a structure that is football-oriented and more aware of the realities of modern football, as stated in the preamble of FIFA NDRC Standard Regulations. “National” arbitration of football related disputes is evolving. The fact that this is genuinely a developing method of dispute resolution should encourage practitioners to improve their national legal systems. Practitioners and those who are in the football business may quite easily benefit from such improvement because it would only influence the business positively. In the Turkish context I would advise the following:

First, decisions not regarding disputes related to sports administration and disciplinary matters of the Arbitral Tribunal should be appealable. This would provide the right to access to courts, as granted by the Constitution.

Second, the independence and the impartiality of the UCK is still a problematic issue that needs to be tackled. The UCK should not be within the structure of the Turkish Football Federation. The process of the appointment of arbitrators should be revised. Clubs, players, coaches and agents must have an equal say on the matter.

The current Turkish system is preferable compared to everlasting court process. Four months to receive an award and the assurance of the enforcement of the award by the Turkish Football Federation is quite encouraging. Mandatory arbitration of UCK is very recent and hopefully the novel system will evolve to fulfil the criteria of FIFA.

[1] Nurettin Emre Bilginoglu, LLM, Attorney-at-law

 Istanbul, Turkey

 e-mail: emre@caglayanyalcin.com

[2] http://www.transfermarkt.com/super-lig/startseite/wettbewerb/TR1

[3] Duval (2013) Lex Sportiva: a playground for transnational law. Eur Law J 19:822-842.

[4] Preamble of the FIFA National Dispute Resolution Chamber Standard Regulations points at this issue:

 “Currently, only a limited number of member associations have a national dispute resolution chamber or a body structured along similar lines that fulfils the criteria of article 22 paragraph b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players. This means that the vast majority of international employment-related disputes fall within the jurisdiction of the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber and that the majority of “national” cases may not find appropriate solutions.”

[5] See Ashford (2014) Handbook on International Commercial Arbitration. JurisNet LLC, New York and Karton (2013) The Culture of International Arbitration and the Evolution of Contract Law. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

[6] See Rigozzi (2005) L’arbitrage international en matière de sport. Helbing & Lichtenhahn, Basel.

[7] See Eksi N (2015) Spor Tahkim Hukuku. Beta, Istanbul and Bilginoglu N (2015) Resolution of Disputes Arising From Football Contracts. Beta, Istanbul.

[8] Artıcle 59- The State shall take measures to develop the physical and mental health of Turkish citizens of all ages, and encourage the spread of sports among the masses. The State shall protect successful athletes. (Paragraph added on March 17, 2011; Act No. 6214) The decisions of sport federations relating to administration and discipline of sportive activities may be challenged only through compulsory arbitration. The decisions of Board of Arbitration are final and shall not be appealed to any judicial authority.

[9] “…the TFF Statutes and the Turkish Football Law expressly exclude any appeal against national arbitral tribunals’ decisions, i.e. against such a decision like the Appealed Decision which is the object of the present case. The particular trumps the general. Therefore the argument of the Player that he has an express right of appeal to the CAS under the TFF Statutes must be rejected.” See CAS 2010/A/1996 Omer Riza v. Trabzonspor Kulübü Dernegi & Turkish Football Federation (TFF).

[10] CAS 2015/A/4172 Association of Unions of Football Players and Coaches v. Football Union of Russia.

[11] Although the formation of the arbitral tribunal was different, see CAS 2006/O/1055 Del Bosque, Grande, Miñano Espín & Jiménez v/ Besiktas. For European Court of Human Rights decisions, see Terra Woningen B.V. v. Netherlands, Application N:     20641/92, Date: 17/12/1996; Tsfayo v. UK, Application N: 60860/00, Date: 14/11/2006.

[12] See de Weger (2016) The Jurisprudence of the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber, T.M.C. Asser Press for extensive information on sporting sanctions and training compensations.

[13] De Weger (2016) p. 132; For the German practise, see Frodl C (2016) Neuer, Hummels, Muller, Gotze & Co: the legal framework governing industrial relations in German professional football, Int Sports Law J (2016) 16:3–21.

[14] CAS 2010/A/1996 Omer Riza v. Trabzonspor Kulübü Dernegi & Turkish Football Federation (TFF). 

In a recent judgment, the Brussels Court of First Instance confirmed the legality of a so-called surety undertaking, i.e. an agreement in which the parents of a minor playing football guarantee that their child will sign a professional contract with a football club as soon as the child reaches the legal age of majority.

This long-awaited ruling was hailed, on the one hand, by clubs as a much needed and eagerly anticipated confirmation of a long-standing practice in Belgian football[1] and, on the other hand, criticised by FIFPro, the international player’s trade union, in a scathing press release.

Background

Jason Eyenga-Lokilo (“Jason Lokilo”), born on 17 September 1998, joined the youth academy at Belgian top club, RSC Anderlecht (“Anderlecht”), in the spring of 2007. Anderlecht had set up a specific youth academy a couple of months earlier, which combined school education and football training for young football players.

As Jason Lokilo was one of the youth academy’s more promising prospects, Anderlecht and Lokilo’s parents entered into an agreement in which the parents, in exchange for a payment of 75,000 EUR (paid in instalments), guaranteed Anderlecht that their son was going to sign his first professional contract with the club upon turning 16, i.e. the minimum age in Belgium for signing a player contract. This same agreement stipulated that the parents were liable to pay Anderlecht a lump sum of 450,000 EUR in damages, if their son did not sign such a player contract.

When, in 2013, Aston Villa made a request to Anderlecht to give Jason Lokilo a trial when he was 15 years of age, Anderlecht refused, citing the player’s training obligations and the existing surety undertaking. Jason Lokilo’s father, a football agent, then told Anderlecht that he wanted to revise the terms of the surety undertaking, given the fact that a number of European football ‘powerhouses’ wanted to sign his son. Anderlecht refused his demand.

In June 2014, Jason Lokilo and his parents sent a letter to Anderlecht arguing that the surety undertaking was unlawful and hence null and void. Jason Lokilo alleged that unacceptable coercion had been put on him to sign his first contract with Anderlecht, which the player and his advisers considered was contrary to public policy. Anderlecht replied that it considered the surety undertaking to be perfectly valid since the surety did not prevent the player from signing his first professional contract with another club.

By the end of July of 2014, the gridlock between both parties ended with Jason Lokilo leaving Anderlecht and the latter club starting court proceedings against Jason Lokilo’s parents for a damages claim of 450,000 EUR.

Jason Lokilo eventually signed a contract with Crystal Palace in the summer of 2015.[2]

The Brussels Court of First Instance ruling

In its 22 November 2016 judgment, the Brussels Court of First Instance (“CFI”) confirmed the principle of this surety undertaking in the context of professional football.

The CFI referred to Article 1120 of the Belgian Civil Code that expressly allows the principle of a surety undertaking. A surety undertaking under Belgian civil law can be defined as an agreement in which one party promises another party regarding what a third party (who is either absent or legally not competent) will do, give or refrain from doing. The third party retains the freedom not to commit himself, since he, as a third party, is not bound by the agreement. However, the contracting party that made the promise will in that case be liable to pay the contractually foreseen damages if this third party eventually does not commit himself.

The main question the court had to decide was to determine whether the surety undertaking had a valid object and cause.

Jason Lokilo’s parents first argued that the contract was contrary to public policy legislation, considering the contract violated the freedom of association principle enshrined in the Convention on the Rights of the Child (“UNCRC”), the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) and the European Social Charter (“ESC”). The CFI did not follow this reasoning, simply stating that the surety undertaking did not bind Jason Lokilo and did not prevent him from signing a contract with another club.[3]

Lokilo’s parents also invoked an alleged violation of Belgian federal legislation, which prohibits player contracts below the minimum age requirement. This argument was cast aside by the court since at no point in time was a player contract signed below the legal minimum age of 16.

Furthermore, Lokilo’s parents argued that the contract breached a (regional) decree guaranteeing an amateur sportsperson the right to leave their club free-of-charge at the end of each sporting season. The CFI repeated that Lokilo was not bound by the surety undertaking and could still freely leave Anderlecht, stating that this outcome was, moreover, exactly what Lokilo did in 2014. An aggravating circumstance for the CFI was the fact that Lokilo’s father had indicated to Anderlecht that Aston Villa in 2013 was willing to cover the 450,000 EUR in damages, as a result of which the CFI considered these damages were ‘clearly not an obstacle for Jason Lokilo to leave Anderlecht’.

The argument invoked by Lokilo’s parents under EU law (free movement) was also dismissed by the CFI ‘for lack of a cross-border EU element’[4].

In the end, the CFI granted damages to Anderlecht but limited the amount payable by the parents, on the one hand, based on the grounds that Jason Lokilo’s mother was not an agent (and hence not professionally active in football) and, on the other hand, because 450,000 clearly exceeded the actual damages suffered by Anderlecht. The CFI set the damages ex aequo et bono at 140,000 EUR instead.

Some considerations

The Lokilo case echoes the Spanish Baena case,[5] although the latter concerned a slightly different situation and had a clearly different outcome.

Where the Spanish Supreme Court in its 5 February 2013 ruling considered a pre-contractual agreement concluded on behalf of a minor football player at odds with the minor’s best interests and therefore contrary to public policy, the CFI adopted a rather strict ‘pacta sunt servanda’ approach.

The CFI considered that the surety undertaking did not prevent Lokilo from signing a contract with a club other than Anderlecht. This finding may be correct from a strictly legal perspective, but ignores the reality that a child may not want to pursue his or her career at another club if he realises that, by doing so, his or her parents will be liable to pay damages. Moreover, under Belgian law, while a minor is indeed of legal age to sign his or her first professional contract when turning 16, the minor in principle still needs parental authorisation to do so until reaching 18 years of age. Parents might of course not be very inclined to agree to their child signing his or her first professional contract elsewhere, and therefore not provide the necessary parental authorisation, if doing so triggers important financial liabilities for them…

The surety undertaking seems also incompatible with regional decrees guaranteeing amateur sportsmen the right to leave their club free-of-charge at the end of each sporting season. These decrees are considered to have a public policy character by the case law, and disallow any hindrance, financial or otherwise, when moving to another sports club.[6] The fact that the surety undertaking related to a switch from an amateur to a professional contract,[7] did not alter the fact that the player was not free to leave for another amateur club when turning 16 either, since he was forced to sign a professional contract with Anderlecht when turning 16 or see his parents face the prospect of paying hefty compensation.

Arguments regarding the fundamental rights of the minor were either not invoked or not upheld by the CFI. The CFI stated that the matter concerned a contract between the parents and the club and not between the player and the club, as a result of which the minor’s fundamental rights were not jeopardised.

This argument is frankly unconvincing.

It should be noted that the UNCRC[8] recognises the right of a child to freedom of association[9] and the right to participate freely in cultural life.[10] The UNCRC furthermore protects children from economic exploitation.[11] The UNCRC provides also that “in all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.”

The UNCRC is often labeled as ‘soft’ law,[12] with Belgian case law even considering most of its provisions lacking a self-sufficient or self-executing character;[13] yet, the UNCRC remains a treaty with clear moral authority. Moreover, a number of its provisions do have direct effect, especially when read in combination with other international legal sources, such as the ECHR and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The obligation to consider the best interests of the child is expressly incorporated in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.[14] Even though the obligation to observe the child’s best interests is not expressly laid down under the ECHR, the ECtHR incorporates this obligation also in its case law.[15] One could further argue that the surety undertaking disproportionally affects the career development and perspectives of a player who is a minor, and so violates that player’s proprietary rights[16] and the right to family life that both the player and the player’s family enjoy.[17]

In addition, both the Belgian Constitution[18] and the Belgian Economic Code[19] protect the freedom for each individual to freely choose his or her occupation. This freedom can only be curtailed through or by law.[20] An agreement jeopardising one’s freedom to freely choose one’s occupation, has an unlawful causa and is null and void.[21]

The statement made by the CFI that the EU internal market law does not apply due to a lack of cross-border effect is at odds with the fact that Lokilo clearly intended to join a club outside Belgium, within the EEA (as shown by Aston Villa’s interest and his eventual signing with Crystal Palace), a fact that was not contested by Anderlecht. As Anderlecht is a Belgian football ‘powerhouse’, and clearly one of the top clubs in Belgium (if not the top club), a player aiming higher than Anderlecht would necessarily have to look at opportunities abroad.

If EU law is deemed to apply, then the guiding principles of the Bernard case must be observed. The CJEU, in its Bernard ruling,[22] recalled that an obstacle to the freedom of movement of workers can be accepted only if it pursues a legitimate aim and is justified by overriding reasons in the public interest. The CJEU clearly accepted recruitment and training of players as a legitimate aim. Even where that is so, that measure’s application still must be such as to ensure the objective’s achievement and not go beyond what is necessary for that purpose. In considering whether a system restricts the freedom of movement, the specific characteristics of sport, and of football in particular, their social and educational function, should be taken into account. One may even take into account the costs of training other players that do not succeed at establishing a professional career (the player factor).[23]

This being said, the surety undertaking mechanism in this case seems overly restrictive for the player. Although, again, a surety undertaking binds the parents and not the player, and damages can only be claimed from the parents, the surety undertaking obviously ultimately serves to discourage a player from exercising his or her right of free movement. Moreover, the player already suffers a restriction upon his or her free movement, following the training compensation mechanism in place under FIFA regulations, which is criticisable in its own right.[24] The surety undertaking constitutes an additional burden on the player’s free movement. In Bernard, although the CJEU seemed to accept the principle of training compensation, the CJEU dismissed the French arrangements governing young players (‘joueurs espoirs’) since they did not involve compensation for real training costs incurred, but rather were damages for breach of contractual obligations calculated with reference to the total loss suffered by the club. And taking into account the actual loss suffered by Anderlecht is exactly what the CFI has done. To the extent a surety undertaking goes beyond what is necessary to encourage the recruitment and training of minors (and funds those activities), a violation of the EU internal market law seems given.

Conclusion

In conclusion, based on the considerations set out above, it can certainly not be excluded that the ruling will be overturned on appeal. Such an appeal, which would bring the case before the Brussels Court of Appeal, is being considered by the player’s parents, but has not yet been lodged.

Apart from the doubt around their enforceability, it should be noted that payments under surety undertakings may in addition give rise to (social) tax issues, if they are not structured correctly.[25] [26]

The problem with the surety undertaking in the Lokilo case predominantly lies with the surety undertaking’s disproportionate character in the specific case at hand. Less restrictive solutions could, in the author’s view, be envisaged, although exploring such alternatives would exceed the scope of this article.

[1] Surety undertakings, together with money lending contracts (loan to parents pledging that their child will sign first professional contract, non-reimbursable if child effectively signs contract), are common practice with Belgian top level teams.

[2] Jason Lokilo is still a member of the Crystal Palace Academy. Crystal Palace offered Anderlecht compensation for an approximate amount of 45,000 EUR, which Anderlecht refused.

[3] “(…), la convention de porte-fort litigieuse n’engageait que les parents de Jason vis-à-vis du club et ne créait aucune obligation pour lui”

[4] “Or, contrairement à l’arrêt Bernard qu’ils invoquent (arrêt du 16 mars 2010 – pièce 3 de leur dossier), M. et Mme Lokilo ne démontrent pas, dans le cas present, l’existence d’un élément d’extranéité.”

[5] Sentencia de 5 de febrero de 2013. STS 229/2013. Tribunal Supremo. Sala de lo Civil. http://www.iurismuga.org/es/bases-de-datos/jurisprudencia/144-jurisprudencia-derecho-espanol/8153-sts-n-de-resolucion-26-2013-de-05-02-2013-sentencia-baena. The case was invoked by the parents before the CFI but considered irrelevant because, according to the CFI, the contract between Baena and Barcelona was entered into by (on behalf of) the minor player.

[6] Vred. Ghent 16 September 2013, role n° 130318.

[7] The relevant decrees apply to amateur sports, not professional sports.

[8] http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CRC.aspx

[9] Article 15 UNCRC

[10] Article 31 UNCRC

[11] Article 32 and 36 UNCRC. One may argue that, in the end, a child is used to generate money through (later) transfers and sponsorship deals.

[12] H. Stalford, Children and the European Union: Rights, Welfare and Accountability, Hart Publishing, [2012], 34.

[13] Belgian case law has been reluctant to grant direct effect to the UNCRC: cf. Cass. 11 June 2010, obs. S. Van Drooghenbroeck, Le droit international et européen des droits de l’homme devant le juge national, Larcier, [2014], 196 and following.

[14] Article 24 (2) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights

[15] Handbook on European law relating to the rights of the child, European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 75.

[16] Article 1 of ECHR First Protocol: “Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. (…)”.

[17] Article 8 ECHR

[18] Article 23 Constitution

[19] Article II.9 of the Economic Code. This is one of the oldest Belgian public policy principles, previously laid down in the famous Decree D'Allarde of 2 - 17 March 1791

[20] C.E. 12 July 1993, JLMB [1993], 1442, note J.F. NEURAY

[21] Cass. 29 September 2008, C.06.443.F, JTT [2008] 464.

[22] CJEU 16 March 2010, Olympique Lyonnais v Olivier Bernard and Newcastle United.

[23] i.e. the ratio of players who need to be trained to produce one professional player.

[24] S. Weatherill, European Sports Law, T.M.C. Asser Press [2014], 485 and following.

[25] The tax and social security authorities may e.g. argue that these payments relate to the (future) employment contract of the player.

[26] The surety undertaking’s ‘nephew’, the money lending contracts, in addition pose problems under Belgian finance law since clubs as a rule do not possess the necessary licences or authorisations.