Over the last twenty years, professional cycling has developed the reputation of one of the “most drug soaked sports in the world”.[1] This should not come as a surprise. The sport’s integrity has plummeted down due to an unprecedented succession of doping scandals. La crème de la crème of professional cyclists has been involved in doping incidents including Tyler Hamilton, Floyd Landis, Alejandro Valverde and Lance Armstrong. The once prestigious Tour de France has been stigmatized as a race of “pharmacological feat, not a physical one”.[2]

In view of these overwhelming shadows, in 2008, the International Cycling Union (UCI), in cooperation with the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) took a leap in the fight against doping. It became the first International Sports Federation to implement a radical new anti-doping program known as the Athlete Biological Passport (ABP).^[3] The ABP signalled a paradigm shift in drug testing with its reliance upon tracking biological variables in a cyclist’s blood and urine which are considered to indirectly reveal the effects of doping and particularly of the so called blood doping rather than directly detecting a prohibited substance or method in a cyclist’s system.[4] It constitutes an indirect method for the detection of an anti-doping rule violation[5] which triggers the imposition of doping sanctions under Article 2.2 World Anti-doping Code (WADC) based solely on the longitudinal profiling of the athlete’s sample.

Albeit a “monumental step for cycling”[6], the seven years of application of ABP have sparked a vigorous debate in the cycling community from a legal and scientific standpoint. The Kreuziger case is the most recent incarnation of the legal uncertainty surrounding the legitimacy of finding cyclists guilty of doping based on the ABP alone. In August 2014, Roman Kreuziger, a professional Czech cyclist and member of the Tinkoff Saxo professional cycling team, was provisionally suspended after anomalies detected in his ABP dating back to 2011 and 2012. The UCI’s decision was confirmed by the CAS who dismissed the athlete’s appeal against his provisional suspension. In September 2014, he was cleared of doping by the Czech Olympic Committee’s arbitral panel which decided on the merits of the case pursuant to Chapter IX UCI ADR. With the appeal of the UCI and WADA  pending before the CAS and Kreuziger, if found guilty, being under the sword of Damocles of a four-year ban, we grasp the opportunity to offer a thorough reading of the Czech Olympic Committee’s arbitral award which seems to distil the most pertinent legal issues dealing with the ABP: (1) the ABP’s reliability as indirect means of evidence in proving a doping violation and (2) the latent tension between the national federations, which on one side, clear the cyclists from doping violations  and the UCI and WADA, on other side, appealing these awards before the CAS, based on its readiness to accept indirect biological-passport evidence in finding cyclists guilty of doping, adding thereby to the legal uncertainty. 

The starting point: Kreuziger’s ABP abnormalities in a nutshell

While this blogpost does not intend to delve into the obvious complexities of the blood profiling methods, the assessment of the factual background of the Kreuziger case requires an elementary examination of how the ABP functions.

The ABP is an individual electronic record for professional athletes, where biological markers of doping have been profiled and results collated over a period of time.[7] Its novelty lies in the development of an individualized baseline for each athlete, whose individual longitudinal profile becomes the point of reference itself.[8] In fact, the individual blood sample is compared to the athlete’s historical parameters with the application of a statistical model that uses Bayesian inference techniques. The current operational component of the ABP is the haematological profile, which monitors blood markers and aims to detect blood manipulation by either transfusion or erythropoiesis stimulating agents like recombinant erythropoietin (rhEPO). Among the blood markers used in the haematological profile are haemoglobin and reticulocytes. Haemoglobin is a protein located on red blood cells that is responsible for binding oxygen so it can be transported through the bloodstream.[9] During a stage race, athletes are expected to show a consistent decrease in the haemoglobin concentration due to plasma volume expansion.[10] Reticulocytes are immature red blood cells. When blood is withdrawn from the body or in case of rhEPO injections, the bone marrow is stimulated to produce these immature blood cells. As a result, rhEPO injections can be a possible explanation for high reticulocyte levels.[11] On the other hand, when the blood is re-infused into the body, the body recognizes the subsequent increase in red blood cells and decreases the production of reticulocytes. In this sense, decreased reticulocyte levels can be indicators of a recent blood transfusion or previous treatment of erythropoiesis stimulating agents.[12]

In the case at hand, the Kreuziger ABP abnormalities consisted of the detection of raised haemoglobin level during the 2012 Giro d’Italia and raised reticulocyte level in the period from March to August 2011 and from April 2012 to the end of the 2012 Giro d’Italia, according to the UCI Expert Panel report dated 14 June 2012. It is noticeable that the mentioned indicators did not go beyond the baseline values. However, as the UCI Expert panel remarked, it was not the haemoglobin values themselves but the actual trend of increasing haemoglobin levels during a race that was problematic.[13] As a result, the UCI concluded that it is very likely that these abnormalities were a result of blood doping and consequently initiated disciplinary proceedings against Kreuziger on the grounds of violating Article 21.2 of the UCI ADR for using a prohibited substance or a prohibited method. 

The Czech Olympic Committee’s arbitral panel decision on the Kreuziger case

- Questioning the fair trial guarantees under the UCI ADR

The first issue raised by Kreuziger is the breach of his right to fair trial due to the short deadlines in the proceedings provided under the UCI ADR. In fact, the athlete claims that he did not have sufficient time to properly prepare and respond to the statements submitted by the UCI and requests that this evidence is not taken into consideration. On the other hand, the UCI claims it did not have enough time to reply to the additional statements submitted by the Athlete and asks the panel not to take into account the new evidence. [14]

In view of these objections, the panel decides to accept all evidence adduced by the parties in order to assess the case in the fairest manner possible. The panel also seized the opportunity to voice a strong criticism with regard to the short duration of the proceedings provided under the UCI ADR. The panel does not only express its concerns that the UCI procedural terms cannot guarantee a fair trial due to the “excessively short deadlines for rendering the decision, entirely absent basic procedures and unilateral preference for UCI’s procedural position” but it goes a step further by characterizing the process of the UCI ADR as “a caricature of fair trial”.[15] In the same vein, the panel notes that UCI’s concern to conduct disciplinary proceedings according to the principles of fair trial “appeared rather hypocritical”.

-Reconciling conflicting evidence

Before evaluating the evidence, the panel acknowledges that it is faced with a conflict of expert evidence and that, due to its lack of expertise in the area under examination, it has to be cautious. Indeed, the reports of the UCI expert panel suggest that it is highly likely that the Athlete had used a prohibited substance or method, while the three expert reports presented by the Athlete question the UCI’s expert panel conclusions and provide various explanations of the detected ABP abnormalities.[16] By reference to the Roman law principle iudex peritus peritorun (‘the judge is the expert of the experts’), the panel assumes its role to determine whether the experts’ reports are plausible based on the factual elements available.[17] However, coming back to its severe criticism towards the short deadlines of the UCI ADR proceedings, the panel remarks that it would normally appoint an impartial, and unprejudiced by the course of the dispute, expert to provide a “review expert report” evaluating the conflicting conclusions drawn from the evidence available.

In cases related to the application of the ABP the federation which aims to establish an ADR violation committed by the athlete should bring the violation to the comfortable satisfaction of the arbitral panel.[18] As a first step, the panel notes that Kreuziger’s ABP haemoglobin and reticulocytes indicators did not go beyond the baseline values and, as a result, the assumption that the likelihood of violation of an anti-doping rule by Kreuziger is 99,9% cannot be considered as proven to the panel’s “comfortable satisfaction”. Therefore, the panel concludes that it cannot find an anti-doping rule violation based solely on Kreuziger’s ABP, but that it rather needs to further examine the expert reports and statements.[19]

With regard to the raised haemoglobin levels, the panel finds guidance in Dr Hampton’s expert statement. Although he acknowledges the general trend of decreased haemoglobin levels for riders during long stage races supported by the UCI expert panel he provides evidence, i.e. the Corsetti paper, that individual deviations are possible and particularly that the haemoglobin levels rose in some riders during the second half of the race. Furthermore, he remarks that increased haemoglobin levels during races were detected in the athlete’s ABP not only during the alleged period (i.e., 2012 Giro d’ Italia) but also during the 2011 Tour de France. This reinforces his argument that Kreuziger’s ABP should be considered as falling within the possible deviations from the general trend in haemoglobin levels. In view of this evidence, the panel considers that it was not proven to its “comfortable satisfaction” that the increased haemoglobin levels had been a consequence of the use of a prohibited substance or method.[20]

As far as the raised reticulocyte levels are concerned, the panel once again notes that it has to evaluate conflicting expert reports, whose assessment should “preferably the subject of a review expert report”. On one hand, the expert report presented by the athlete suggests that there is clear evidence –i.e. the report of Kim et al.- that the athlete’s overt hypothyroidism and the treatment by thyroxin justifies the substantial increase in the value of reticulocytes, while the UCI expert panel states that this evidence should not be taken into consideration, since the said study did not examine athletes. Furthermore, in evaluating the witness examination, the panel remarks that the UCI expert panel was not aware of Kreuziger’s proven severe overt hypothyroidism and, as a result, it did not take into consideration this factor when evaluating his raised reticulocyte levels. In view of this evidence, the panel concludes that it was not proven to its “comfortable satisfaction” that the elevated reticulocyte levels are the result of the use of a prohibited substance or method, since the athlete’s overt hypothyroidism was a crucial element in explaining this increase. In view of these findings, the panel cleared Kreuziger to race. 

The ABP’s controversial aspects through the lens of the Kreuziger case

The Czech Olympic Committee’s arbitral award on the Kreuziger case, although not questioning the ABP as a method capable of proving doping as such, adds to the concerns raised with regard to the validity of using biological-passport evidence as the sole basis for doping violations. It suggests that the evaluation of the ABP results requires that many factors pertaining both to the given sport and to the specific functioning of the athlete’s body should be taken into consideration. Two interesting remarks can be derived from this award: 

1)        The role of the panel in evaluating expert evidence in ABP cases

The use of the ABP as a reliable means of evidence to establish a doping violation requires that the analysis and results management of the ABP be thoroughly understood and evaluated.[21] The procedure is more technical and complicated than in other doping-detection techniques since the ABP results have to be analysed by a panel of experts.[22] This is further complicated by the fact that it is very likely that contradictory expert reports and testimonies are brought before the arbitral panel. The role of panels, therefore, in evaluating expert evidence is crucial.

The Kreuziger case is illustrative of the arbitral panel’s daunting task of understanding, evaluating and legally enforcing complex scientific issues. In this respect, following the well-established CAS jurisprudence[23], the Kreuziger panel assumed its duty to weigh differing expert opinions on Kreuziger’s ABP abnormalities and assess the plausibility of their conclusions, while keeping in mind the limits of its own scientific knowledge and the “comfortable satisfaction” standard of proof. More importantly, the Kreuziger panel pointed out the need for an unprejudiced review expert report which would evaluate the validity of the different conclusions reached. In ABP cases, therefore, where experts and arbitral panels go hand in hand, it is crucial that ABP results be made more comprehensible, and that scientists get more involved in evaluating ABP evidence rather than obtaining it.[24]

2)        The inherent tension between national federations and the UCI

It is remarkable that the Kreuziger award reflects the furious debate between national federations and the UCI with regard to the legitimacy of finding cyclists guilty of doping based on the ABP evidence. As noted above, the panel strongly criticized the UCI ADR proceedings, which due to their short deadlines are far from guaranteeing a fair trial to the parties. Considering the critically important rights at stake for cyclists, the panel’s remark on the short and expedited proceedings of UCI ADR in assessing ABP evidence sets an important threshold: the crucial need for sufficient safeguards of due process for cyclists accused of doping on the basis of indirect evidence alone. This criticism on the excessively short UCI ADR proceedings becomes even more controversial in view of recent developments. The UCI, obviously worried about the delays in ABP cases, recently announced that it will treat incidents of ABP abnormalities as if a rider had failed an A-sample drug test. This rather aggressive approach of the UCI, however, seems to further undermine the cyclists’ right to due process, raising the inevitable question whether the quest to eliminate doping from cycling outweighs the fundamental rights of cyclists.[25]

Furthermore, considering that the appeal before the CAS is pending, it is noteworthy that the tension between national federations and the UCI has resulted in creating two competing lines of jurisprudence. The Kreuziger award comes in line with a series of national governing bodies’ arbitral panels which have cleared the suspected athletes in view of insufficient proof to establish an anti-doping violation on the basis of the ABP evidence alone. The Slovenia National Anti-Doping Commission panel in the Valjavec case as well as the Italian National Olympic Committee (CONI) Anti-Doping Tribunal in the Pellizotti case did not hesitate to exonerate the cyclists of a doping infraction. However, the CAS has been consistent in overturning such decisions[26], showing its broad willingness to accept the indirect ABP evidence in finding cyclists guilty of ADR violations[27] and it seems highly unlikely that the CAS will deviate from this approach in the Kreuziger case. Remarkably, the wake of Kreuziger’s case and the outlined jurisprudential inconsistency led the UCI to announce the creation of an international anti-doping tribunal. The new tribunal, which will be made up of judges specialized in anti-doping and independent of the UCI, will disempower the national anti-doping organisations and aims to guarantee uniform, consistent and timely decisions. In view of this development, it is expected that a jurisprudential middle way in ABP cases will be followed. However, the question remains whether the criticisms expressed by the national federations undermining ABP’s legitimacy will be fully addressed.

Although promising, the ABP still raises vexing legal and scientific concerns. The Kreuziger case has added to the concerns that anti-doping authorities still need to address. In light of this, the CAS decision is eagerly awaited. It remains to be seen whether the arbitrators will follow the strikingly consistent path of supporting the use of ABP evidence, or whether the Kreuziger case will be a turning point for the CAS to acknowledge the limits of this detection method.

[1] R Rosen, ‘Breaking the Cycle: Balancing the eradication of doping from international sport while holding the rights of the accused athlete’ (2007) 25(3) Entertainment & Sports Law 3

[2] J Macur, ‘As scandals arose, Armstrong just rode on’ (2 January 2010) New York Times

[3] N Hailey, ‘A false start in the race against doping in sport: Concerns with cycling’s biological passport’ (2011) 61 Duke Law Journal, 393.

[4] P-E Sottas, ‘On the evaluation of doping evidence’ (2010) Paper delivered at the Seminar for CAS Jurisprudence and New Developments in International Sports Law, September 17 and 18 2010

[5] http://www.uci.ch/clean-sport/the-athlete-biological-passport-abp/

[6] J Macur, ‘Cycling Union takes leap in fight against doping’ (October 24, 2007) New York Times

[7] TAS 2010/A/2178, Pietro Caucchioli c. CONI & UCI, para 5 and CAS 2010/A/2235, UCI v/ Tadej Valjaveo & Olympic Committee of Slovenia

[8] The World Anti-Doping Agency, ‘The World Anti-doping Code Athlete Biological Passport Operating Guidelines and Compilation of Required Elements’ Article 6.1 Introduction

[9] R McLaren, ‘ Athlete Biological Passport: The juridical viewpoint’ (2012) 4 International Sports Law Review, 81

[10] G Banfi, ‘Limits and pitfalls of Athlete’s Biological Passport’ (2011) 49 (9) Clin Chem Lab med, 1418

[11] R McLaren (n 9), 81

[12] H Findlay, ‘ Athletes’ Biological Passport: Some legal issues’ (May 17, 2012) Lecture delivered at the Conference on Law, Policy and the Olympic Movement at Ithaca College London Centre cited in N Hailey, ‘ A false start in the race against doping in sport: concerns with cycling’s biological passport’ (2011) 61 Duke Law Journal

[13] Arbitration Committee of the Czech Olympic Committee Ref No. 3/2014, Roman Kreuziger v the Czech Cycling Federation (22.09.2014), para 5.2

[14] Roman Kreuziger v the Czech Cycling Federation (n 13), para 4.10

[15] Ibid,  para 4.11

[16] Report of Dr Boer of 25 Auguat 2013, report of Dr Locatelli of 24 June 2014 and report of Dr Hampton

[17]Roman Kreuziger v the Czech Cycling Federation (n 13), para 6.2

[18] Article 3.1 of the World Anti-Doping Code (WADC) 2009

[19] Roman Kreuziger v the Czech Cycling Federation (n 13), para 6.5

[20]Ibid, para 6.7

[21] R McLaren (n 9), 77.

[22] D Mavromati, ‘Indirect detection methods for doping from a legal perspective: the case of the Athlete Biological Passport’ (2014) 6 International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics 2, 255.

[23] CAS 2010/A/2235, UCI v/ Tadej Valjaveo & Olympic Committee of Slovenia

[24] P-E Sottas, ‘On the evaluation of doping evidence’ in A Rigozzi and M Bernasconi (eds) CAS jurisprudence and new developments in international sports law (2010 3^rd CAS & SAV/FSA conference Lausanne)

[25] N Hailey, ‘ A false start in the race against doping in sport: concerns with cycling’s biological passport’ (2011) 61 Duke Law Journal, 427

[26] CAS 2010/A/2235, UCI v/ Tadej Valjaveo & Olympic Committee of Slovenia and Press Release, Court of Arbitration for Sport, The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) Imposes a Two Year Ban on the Italian Cyclists Pietro Caucchioli and Franco Pellizotti 1–2 (Mar. 8, 2011)

[27] N Hailey (n 25), 419

Editor’s note: Kester Mekenkamp is an LL.M. student in European Law at Leiden University and an intern at the ASSER International Sports Law Centre. This blog is, to a great extent, an excerpt of his forthcoming thesis, which he shall submit in order to complete his master’s degree.

This final blog aims to provide some broader perspective, by sketching first the grander scheme in which Article 19 RSTP – FIFA's provision on the protection of minors – operates. Thereafter, the focus will shift towards testing Article 19 RSTP, thereby keeping in mind the previous blogs (Part 1: The Early Years and Part 2: The 2009 reform and its aftermath), against EU free movement law.  

Putting Article 19 RSTP into perspective: The bigger picture

After having investigated the nuts and bolts of FIFA’s provision on the protection of minors in the first two parts of this blog, it might be useful to address its bigger picture.

Article 19 RSTP and its accompanying provisions regulate only a small share of the targeted activity. There is, unfortunately, also an illegal world. Circumvention of the prohibition is allegedly commonplace.[1] Visas and passports can be falsified.[2] Work permits can be obtained on the basis of jobs arranged by clubs.[3]

In any event, a larger dynamic constituted out of a multitude of intertwined forces is at play. Globalization and professionalization are important factors contributing to stardom in football. Football idols, especially those originating from non-European countries, like Messi, Neymar, Suarez, Drogba and Eto’o, symbolised a world of opportunity for millions of children in the developing world eager to follow that same path to global fame.[4] In many parts of South America and Central and West-Africa, where families are driven by the impetus to improve their daily lives and clubs eager to cash FIFA’s training compensation money, an entire training industry emerged with the sole objective of exporting young talents to European clubs.[5] A horrifying example of the (ultimate) consequences this process can generate was seen in 2007: A fishing trawler washed up on a Tenerife beach carrying 130 young African men, of which 15 were made to believe that they would attend trials at Olympique Marseille and Real Madrid.[6] Add to the mix a group of agents focused almost exclusively on harvesting young boys for the international football market, and one can easily understand the extreme difficulty faced by FIFA to rein these practices.[7]

It is evident that the case of minors wanting to transfer internationally is closely related to a broader set of socio-economic difficulties faced by an extremely unequal world. Wars, famine, drought, corruption and the severe economic disparity[8] between the developing and developed world are determinants that can simply not be ignored. National laws applicable to asylum, migration and trade are also part of the equation. The subject of this blog hence opens up a doorway to global complexity. A true protection of minors will therefore undoubtedly require a broader approach than solely measures concerning the world of football. Yet, FIFA’s article 19 could potentially contribute to improving the fate of some minors in the developing world. The question is, does it in practice?  

Arguments supporting the prohibition of international transfers of minors

Former FIFA and UEFA presidents, Blatter, Platini, and Johansson, have all promoted an absolute forbiddance of international transfers of minors.[9] Although such a total ban was never introduced, the 2001 “Commission-condoned” FIFA transfer rules for the first time included a section dedicated to the enhancement of the protection of minors.[10] An accompanying FIFA circular stipulated that the new transfer rules imposed strict conditions “in order to provide a stable environment for the training and education of players”.[11] Moreover, it stated that the abuses, which were frequent in the past, had to be curbed. [12] Crucial in this is “protecting the appropriate and stable development of a minor as a whole”, which includes the training and education of these players.[13]

Another argument supporting Article 19 is its objective to tackle human trafficking. By strictly limiting the possibility for international transfers of minors, it takes the wind out of the traffickers’ sails. The significance of this aim was acknowledged by the European Parliament and the Commission.[14]

The thought behind the prohibition, being open to exception only in specific cases, is that minors are vulnerable, especially when moving to foreign countries. It tries to prevent football from breaking up families and “allows [minor football players] to remain within their country of origin and family networks for longer and hence reduces the psychological and cultural problems associated with adjusting to foreign climes”.[15] FIFA hereby acknowledges that “[w]hile international transfers might, in specific cases, be favourable to a young player’s sporting career, they are likely to be contrary to the best interests of the vast majority of players as minors”.[16] Poli came to a similar conclusion (concerning migration of football players in general) by stating that “the few examples of upward career paths mask the many cases of failure and are sufficient to convince young people and their families that it is worth giving oneself body and soul to football, often to the detriment of school training or an apprenticeship”.[17] 

Arguments against the prohibition of international transfers of minors

There is an opposite narrative that calls Article 19 RSTP’s rationale partially into question.[18] It can be argued that for certain countries (keeping in mind the abovementioned), with respect to the aim of protecting young football players against potential abuse and exploitation through the appropriate and stable development in training and education, minors are in reality not served by staying in their home State.[19] Furthermore, it can be contended that migration by young football players from a developing country to a developed one can be a “viable livelihood strategy to lift an individual and therefore vicariously their family out of poverty”.[20] Paradoxically a measure “with the aim of protecting minors … may, in fact, reduce opportunities for youth living in developing countries”.[21] Moreover, one must beware of an ethnocentric judgement. The argument has been raised that even in cases where third world immigrants had failed with respect to their sporting careers, they considered themselves to have succeeded, “thanks to football”, since they could come to Europe and stay.[22] It becomes a positive “escape”, which stands in contradiction with the whole idea underlying Article 19 RSTP.[23] As we will see in the coming sections, this discussion is key to the evaluation of the compatibility of FIFA’s rule with EU law. 

The Compatibility of Article 19 RSTP with EU free movement law

Applicability

For the purpose of this blog it is assumed that EU free movement law is applicable to Article 19 RSTP in relation to minor football players with an EU nationality. EU minors below the age of 16 might be able to rely on the EU citizenship rights and the free movement right of their parents. Furthermore, it can be reasonably argued that, by referring to inter alia Lawrie Blum[24], EU minor football players of 16 and above can be deemed workers in the sense of the free movement of workers. 

Free movement law aspects

A few aspects that could be deemed restrictive of EU Free movement rights deserve some attention. These are separated into situations concerning either the rights of the minor football player itself, or the rights of their parents.

Article 19(2)(b), the “EU and EEA-rule”, is explicitly created in order for the provision as a whole to meet the requirements of EU free movement law.[25] Yet, the free movement of minors is restricted by the fact that they can only transfer to a club within another Member State once additional criteria concerning football training, education and living arrangements are complied with.[26] These extra criteria, intrinsically, make it harder for minor football players to move to a foreign club. Furthermore, EU minors below the age of 16 are unable to rely on this exception. As already mentioned at the beginning of the blog, this particular age group is unlikely to perform economic services against remuneration in the sense of a “worker” under Article 45 TFEU. Nonetheless, one could envisage that under-16 EU minors could be able to rely on their citizenship rights enshrined in Article 21 TFEU (together with Art. 34(2) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights) as non-economically active EU migrants.

Moreover, under-16 EU minors might be able to rely on the free movement rights of their parents. In short, the reason why an EU national decides to move to another Member State and take up work there is irrelevant under EU free movement law. To the contrary, Article 19 RSTP puts an emphasis on the underlying reason, as the “parents-rule” of Article 19(2)(a) RSTP can only be invoked where the player’s parents move to the country in which the new club is located “for reasons not linked to football”. The CAS has hereby clarified that the family’s move must be entirely disconnected from the transfer of the minor in a new football club. Under the FIFA rule, it is for example insufficient to establish that the move is partially connected to their child’s football activities, although not being the primary aim.[27] Hence, if (a) parent(s) would want to move to another Member State to take up work there for the, sole or partial, reason that their child can play for a club in that country, Article 19 RSTP will deter them from doing so. As such, the contested rule may thus amount to a provision that precludes or deters the parents from leaving their country of origin in order to exercise their right to free movement as workers. 

Is Article 19 RSTP a proportionate measure under EU law?

The previous sections demonstrated that there is some room to argue that Article 19 RSTP could run counter EU Internal Market law, which could form a basis for future challenge to the provision. Regardless of whether this will ultimately be the case, the provision might benefit from some amendments. It goes without saying that the aim is on its face value laudable. Protecting minors against abuses connected to the transfer market must remain a priority. The manner in which this objective has been given practical effect has not been without criticism.

By encouraging minor football players to remain in their home country, the measure is certainly likely to contribute to them enjoying an appropriate and stable development in training and education. Furthermore, by introducing a strict regulatory regime, it lessens the chance of human traffickers using international football transfers as a cover for trafficking purposes. Therefore, it can be argued that the measure is suitable to attain its aim of protecting minors.

It then still has to be assessed whether it passes the test of necessity. As concluded at the time of its inception, an absolute ban on international transfers of minors was deemed too pervasive. The exceptions assured the overall appropriateness and reasonableness of the measure. This test raises in particular the question of existence of less intrusive alternatives. I would argue that there is indeed a less intrusive alternative to the current rule available. It involves a slight amendment of the “parents-rule” and would still attain the aim underlying the overall provision. This is achieved by firstly, omitting the requirement for the parents’ move “not to be linked to football”, and secondly, extending the mandatory obligations of clubs regarding the education and wellbeing of foreign minors, laid down in Article 19(2)(b), to the “parents-rule”. 

Proposed amendment to the “parents-rule”

Article 19(2)(a) RSTP, the “parents-rule”, has shown to be controversial. It has, to give but an example, been stated that this exemption has “effectively made the [entire] rule worthless”. [28] As discussed in the previous blogs, the case law is marred with disputes arising with respect to this exception, wherein the judicial bodies have advocated a strict application of the rule. In brief, the minor must follow its parents and not vice versa. Yet, circumvention of the rule appears to be quite simple.[29] Without implying that this is a sufficient reason for changing the measure, it nevertheless does show that its current form is rather impractical (or hypocritical).

It can be reasonably argued that permitting an international transfer only if the parents move based on “reasons not linked to football” is too stern. There are examples of outcomes being adverse to the interests of the minors concerned, for instance the Acuña case.[30] Even stronger is the appeal by families who have decided to move together to another country in order for the children to pursue their dream of becoming a professional footballer.[31] In the words of the father of a 15-year-old player who was denied to play for FC Barcelona (after they, as a family, had moved from the US to Spain with that particular aim): “Why should FIFA be able to tell our family where it has to live if we want our kid to play [football]?”[32] Indeed, why should families not be able to move out of their own accord, provided that they meet the general criteria for residence within the new country? If for instance a family has enough financial resources to not become a burden on the social welfare systems or both parents find employment within the new country, they obtain the required residence permits, and as a result their child can play for the club of his choosing, it is hard to argue that this is contradictory to the aim of Article 19 RSTP. The CAS has been receptive to this type of arguments in the previously discussed case concerning Atlético Madrid, in which a minor (USA) was allowed to register with the club amongst others because his family was wealthy and its basic financial maintenance was not dependent on the parents’ work.[33] One could rightly contend that less affluent families should equally have the possibility to move together with their child to the country of a new club. Such a move, in particularly when considering a transfer from a club in a developing country to a European club, could be in line with the aim of Article 19 RSTP. Furthermore, the comparison with other sports, i.e. volleyball, hockey, tennis, rugby and athletics, shows that in those sports minors are not explicitly prohibited from moving, together with their parents, to another country in pursuit of their sporting dream.[34] The same can be said, when the children pursue a career in music or dance and the family moves to the place where he or she can learn from the best mentors.

It is no coincidence that the “parents-rule” is the most debated exception of Article 19 RSTP. One can easily agree that it is beneficial (in a vast majority of cases) for minors to keep living with their parents as it enhances their chances of having a stable development. However, does this also have to entail in which country that might be? This author does not believe so and would favour a situation where parents are allowed to move together with their child to another country, whether that is for reasons linked to football or not.

It can be tentatively pleaded that this can be realized, while still reaching the aims of Article 19 RSTP. As abovementioned, this can be achieved by, firstly, omitting the requirement for the parents’ move “not to be linked to football”, and secondly, by extending the mandatory obligations of clubs regarding the education and wellbeing of foreign minors as laid down in the “EU and EEA-rule” (Article 19(2)(b) RSTP), to the “parents-rule”. This alternative measure would warrant the objective of “appropriate and stable development in training and education”, given that the minor and his parents remain a united family and the clubs are additionally made responsible for ensuring that their sporting and academic education is guaranteed. To also attain the anti-human-trafficking aim, this proposed alternative should be safeguarded from abuse by way of legal guardianship (e.g. situations where human traffickers are able to obtain the status of legal guardian of a minor). Therefore the meaning of parents, within the reading of this exception, should constitute solely the biological parents at first. Perhaps it is possible for the PSC subcommittee to devise a suitable test, based on the minor’s best interest, for judging whether anyone other than the biological parents could equally be deemed eligible under this exception.

In an attempt to contribute to the debate on the protection of minors in football, this blog has proposed a modest reform of Article 19 RSTP. It is believed that such a change would tackle some of the problems withnessed in the past years, without loosing sight of the objectives of FIFA's provision on the protection of minors in football.  

[1] J. Señík and T. Gábris, Minors in Sport. Position Paper on Legal Aspects of Minors in Sports in the Slovak Republic, (2010) International Sports Law Journal, p. 69.

[2] Ed Hawkins, The Lost Boys. Inside Football’s Slave Trade. Bloomsbury (2015), inter alia pp. 135, 162 and 229.

[3] S. Van den Bogaert, Practical Regulation of the Mobility of Sportsmen in the EU post Bosman, Kluwer (2005), p. 240; Supra at 2, p. 165.

[4] Supra at 2, pp. 115-116.

[5] J. Schokkaert, Football clubs’ recruitment strategies and international player migration: evidence from Senegal and South Africa, 17 Soccer & Society (2016), p. 121; The Guardian, “The scandal of Africa's trafficked players”, 6 January 2008,; Supra at 2, pp. 117-129.

[6] The Telegraph, “The dark side of football transfers”, 31 December 2014; Supra at 2, p. 132.

[7] R. Poli, African migrants in Asian and European football: hopes and realities, 13 Sport in Society (2010), p. 1008. For more on player’s agents, see A. Duval and K. Mekenkamp, “De- or Re-regulating the middlemen? The DFB’s regulation of intermediaries under EU law scrutiny at the OLG Frankfurt”, Asser International Sports Law Blog.

[8] J. Schokaert showed, supra at 5, p. 132, in comparison, that an economically higher developed country, such as South Africa as opposed to Senegal, which attracts more money to domestic football and higher wages for football players, resulting in more players to stay in their home country. 

[9] Supra at 1, p. 68.

[10] Art. 12 FIFA RSTP 2001.

[11] FIFA Circular no. 769, 24 August 2001.

[12] N. St. Cyr Clarke, The beauty and the beast: Taming the ugly side of the people’s game, 2011 Columbia Journal of European Law, p. 627.

[13] See Blog 1; Commentary on the Status and Transfer of Players, p. 58.

[14] European Parliament, Report on the future of professional football in Europe (2006/2130(INI)), paras. 33-34; The White Paper on Sport, COM(2007) 391 final, p. 16.

[15] P. Darby, “Out of Africa: The exodus of elite African football talent to Europe”, JLS 2007, p. 453.

[16] FIFA, September 2016, “FAQ Protection of Minors”, 

[17] Supra at 7, p. 1008.

[18] J. Esson, Better Off at Home? Rethinking Responses to Trafficked West African Footballers in Europe, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 2015, pp. 526-527.

[19] M. LoPiccolo, You don't have to go home, but you can't stay here: Problems arising when SIJS meets international adoption, Wisconsin International Law Journal 2015, pp. 200-201.

[20] Supra at 18, p. 521.

[21] M. Mauro, Inclusive sport or institutional discrimination? New FIFA regulations, organized football and migrant youth in Italy, Sport in Society 2016, p. 2.

[22] R. Poli, African migrants in Asian and European football: hopes and realities, 13 Sport in Society (2010), p. 1009.

[23] P. Darby and E. Solberg, Differing Trajectories: Football Development and Patterns of Player Migration in South Africa and Ghana, 11 Soccer and Society (2009), pp. 118–130.

[24] Case 66/85, Lawrie Blum v Land Baden-Württemberg, [1986] ECR 2135, para. 17: the crucial elements are that, for a certain period of time, a person performs services for and under the direction of another person in return for which he receives remuneration.

[25] See blog 1.

[26] Art. 19(2)(b) RSTP: Hereby, it is important to indicate that the CAS in Vada II (TAS 2012/A/2862) has established a workable account for the particular case of players with the nationality of a EU or EEA Member State residing in a non-EU/EEA country, by allowing them to invoke this exception.

[27] TAS 2011/A/2494, FC Girondins de Bordeaux c. Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), sentence du 22 décembre 2011 (Vada I), paras. 31-38; CAS 2013/A/3140, A. v. Club Atlético de Madrid SAD & Real Federación Española de Fútbol (RFEF) & Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), award of 10 October 2013 (A. v. Club Atlético de Madrid), para. 8.25.

[28] Supra at 2, p. 246.

[29] KEA, CDES and EOSE, Study on Sports Agents in the Eurropean Union, November 2009, p. 128; Supra at 3, p. 240.

[30] See blog 2.

[31] The New York Times, “An American Boy Wonder in Barcelona”, 7 November 2013.

[32] The New York Times, “Strict Enforcement of FIFA Rules Sidelines Young Players Abroad”, 31 Augustus 2015.

[33] See blog 2; A. v. Club Atlético de Madrid, Supra at  28, para. 8.31.

[34] Supra at 30, pp. 127-129.