On 25 and 26 October 2022, the Asser Institute in The Hague will host the 2022 edition of the International Sports Law Journal (ISLJ) Conference. The ISLJ is the leading academic journal in transnational sports law and governance and is proud to provide a platform for transnational debates on the state of the field. 2022 has put a number of complex issues and disputes on the top of the transnational sports law agenda, which will be at the heart of the conference.

Sports governing bodies react to Russia's invasion of Ukraine
First, Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine in February triggered a swift and decisive reaction by a wide range of international sports governing bodies (SGBs), leading in particular to the exclusion of Russian teams and athletes from many international sporting competitions, including most prominently the FIFA World Cup 2022 in Qatar. These reactions have shown, once again, that sport is far from immune from the turbulences of international relations and raise the question of its alleged neutrality and apolitical nature. To engage with these issues, we have invited Prof. Jonathan Grix (Metropolitan Manchester University) to deliver a keynote speech and will dedicate a specific panel to discussing the intersection between transnational sports law and international law/relations.

Monopoly of sports governing bodies
Second, the organization of international sports is also currently threatened by challenges to the traditional monopoly position of international SGBs raised under EU antitrust law. Early July 2022, the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union heard two crucial cases (International Skating Union and Superleague) concerning the compatibility of the rules of international SGBs aimed at sanctioning athletes and clubs who participate in unauthorized third-party competitions. Dr. Van Rompuy (Leiden University), the driving force behind the ISU case, will be discussing with us the potential impact of competition law on the governance of sport and what to expect from the pending decisions of the CJEU. Additionally, we will host two panels dedicated to the application of competition law to sports governance, both at an international and national level.

Human rights and mega-sporting events
Third, with both Beijing and Qatar hosting mega-sporting events this year, it is difficult to ignore the human rights issues raised by international sporting competitions. A fast-growing social movement aimed at urging the SGBs to abide by their human rights responsibilities has been developing around the activism of some NGOs and the creation of the Centre for Sport and Human Rights (CSHR). The CEO of the CSHR, Mary Harvey, will be joining us to share her thoughts on the role of sports lawyers and sports law academics in this discussion. Her intervention will be followed by a panel dedicated to the intersections between human rights and transnational sports law and governance.

Trans and queer participation in sporting competitions
Finally, the question of the participation of transgender athletes in sporting competitions has become an extremely contentious issue of debate in recent years, especially in the United States. Furthermore, International SGBs, such as FINA recently, have started to impose specific requirements to the participation of trans athlete in international competitions. Our closing panel will take a fresh look at this question by foregrounding the way in which trans and queer participation in sporting competitions has been accommodated in South Asia.

Online participation available
For the first time this year, we will allow online participation to the conference for an affordable price. Our aim is to internationalise and diversify further our audience and to reach people who in light of the current challenges, be it Covid-19 or climate change, are not in a position to come in person to The Hague.

Programme
Download the full programme.

Register HERE! (Early Bird Registration is available only until 1 October, 23:59CET)

Editor's note: This is the (belated) fifth part/act of our blog series on the Russian eligibility cases at the CAS ad hoc Division in Rio. The other acts are available at:

• Act I: Saved by the Osaka Déjà-Vu
• Act II: On being implicated 
• Act III: On being sufficiently tested
• Act IV: On Bringing a sport into disrepute

Act V: Saving the last (Russian) woman standing: The Klishina miracle 

Darya Klishina is now an Olympic celebrity. She will enter the history books not because she won a gold medal or beat a world record. Instead, her idiosyncrasy lies in her nationality: she was the sole Russian athlete authorized to stand in the athletics competitions at the Rio Olympics. And yet, a few days before the start of the long jumping contest in which she was due to take part, the IAAF surprisingly decided to revoke her eligibility (‘And Then There Were None’). But Klishina appealed the decision to the CAS ad hoc Division and, as all of you well-informed sports lawyers will know, she was allowed to compete at the Olympics and finished at a decent ninth place of the long jump finals.

Two important questions are raised by this case:

• Why did the IAAF changed its mind and decide to retract Klishina’s authorization to participate?
• Why did the CAS overturn this decision?

A.    The IAAF’s second thoughts over the implication of Klishina

What happened between 9 July, when Klishina was first green lighted by the IAAF Doping Review Board (DRB) and 10 August when the DRB revoked its previous decision to let her compete? Basically, the publication of the McLaren Report, and especially evidence showing “that the Applicant had been directly affected and tainted by the State-organised doping scheme described in the IP Report”.[1] More concretely, according to the Report, Klishina was affected in the following three ways:

      i.   “a sample collected on 26 February 2014, yielding a T/E ratio of 8.5, had been subject to a "SAVE" order by the Ministry of Sport on 3 March 2014;

      ii.   a sample collected on 17 October 2014 and subsequently seized by WADA December 2014 was found to bear marks and scratches consistent with the removal of the cap and contained urine from the Applicant but also from another female athlete; and

      iii.  a sample collected on the occasion of the 2013 IAAF World Championships in Moscow was also found to bear marks and scratches consistent with the removal of the cap.”[2]

In its original decision, the DRB had reserved its right “to reconsider the Applicant’s case should information ever be brought to its attention (including but not limited to as a result of the current investigation being conducted by Professor McLaren on behalf of WADA) that the Doping Review Board considers is such as to undermine the basis upon which the application was accepted”.[3] Thus, unsurprisingly, the CAS acknowledged that the DRB had the competence to reconsider the eligibility granted to the athlete. Nonetheless, surprisingly, it found that such reconsideration was not legitimate in light of the new information gathered.

B.    The surprising decision of CAS to let Klishina jump

Klishina won in front of the CAS. From the outset this is a surprising decision, since she was at least as implicated in the IP Report as numerous other Russian athletes who were barred from entering the Games.[4] Indeed, she had clearly profited from being “saved” by the Russian Ministry of Sport. So why on earth would the CAS decide to let her jump?

This decision is intimately linked with the legal basis of the original decision of the DRB. Despite the repeated view of the IOC that the IAAF policy was stricter than its own,[5] the Klishina case demonstrates that this is not universally true in practice. The main point was that the IAAF’s DRB had recognized that since 1 January 2014, Klishina “had been subject to fully compliant drug testing in- and out-of-competition”[6] and therefore fulfilled the criteria enshrined in the IAAF Competition rule 22.1A(b). This was based on the following factual findings:

• “The fact that she had spent 632 days out of Russia, being 86.6% of her time, in the Relevant Period;
• She had relocated permanently to the United States in March 2014 and had been trained under a US coach since October 2013;
• She regularly competes in competitions on the international circuit;
• A total of 11 samples had been collected from the Applicant outside of Russia in the Relevant Period;
• 1 sample had been collected by the IAAF since June 2016 and sent for analysis by a laboratory outside of Russia.”[7]


The question is then whether the new information, indicating that Klishina was implicated and benefitted from the Russian doping scheme, recognized as valid by the Panel[8], could justify revisiting the first decision. In other words, could this new information lead to reconsidering the eligibility of Klishina under the regime of IAAF Competition rule 22.1A(b) on which the original decision was based? To assess this, the Panel starts by pointing out that the rule “is not the same as the decision of the IOC Executive Board made after the publication of the IP Report. (…) As the parties agreed, the IOC Executive Board decision is not in evidence in this case and decisions of the Ad hoc Panel of the CAS for the Games of the XXXI Olympiad in Rio de Janeiro as to the application of, or the terms of, the IOC Executive Board decision are not applicable”.[9]

The CAS Panel insists that the IAAF’s DRB “was comfortably satisfied that during the Relevant Period the Applicant satisfied each of the criteria set out in the Rule for exceptional eligibility, notwithstanding the suspension of the National Federation”.[10] Furthermore, “in making its findings, the DRB was aware of, and took no account of, tests conducted in Russia and that it was cognisant of inadequacies in the system of testing in Russia, for which RusAF had been suspended”.[11] Those are decisive conclusions that will lead to the second decision being set aside. The CAS Panel was of the view “that the conclusion reached in the Second Decision, and the basis for that decision, are not in accordance with the Rule which was purportedly invoked”.[12] It is so, because “the further evidence considered by the DRB for the purposes of the Second Decision did not undermine its finding in the First Decision that the Applicant was eligible to compete by reason of her compliance with the Rule”.[13] This analysis leads to an unfair solution as the undisputed evidence points at Klishina profiting not once but on three occasions from the Russian doping scheme and still this evidence is not considered as relevant to reconsider the IAAF’s original decision to let her jump.

This decision is grounded on the following legal reasoning: the Panel considers that the “implication [of Klishina in the State-doping system] is not relevant to the application of criteria which, if fulfilled, mean that for the purposes of the Rule [22 IAAF], the Applicant is not affected or tainted by the failures of the National Federation”.[14] The CAS Panel is of the view that the IAAF Rule “provides for a mechanism or a basis by which an athlete is granted exceptional eligibility”.[15] And this “mechanism is fulfilment of the two criteria which, for this athlete, was established by the DRB in the First Decision”.[16] Thus, the “fact that the athlete was subjected to or the subject of drug testing that was not fully compliant during the Relevant Period does not derogate from the fact that she was, during the Relevant Period (that is, ‘a sufficiently long period’), subject to fully compliant drug testing in- and out-of- competition by reason of the fact that she was during that time training in and resident in the United States and not in Russia”.[17] Additionally, “there is no evidence to suggest that the testing that she was subject to was other than equivalent in quality to the testing to which her competitors were subject”.[18] In other words, “an athlete may have undergone non-compliant testing while concurrently being subject to fully compliant testing and still fulfil the second criterion”.[19] This is comforted by the fact “that the Rule is addressed to the suspension of any International Federation for failure to put in place an adequate system and the impact on the eligibility of the athlete” and the “criteria are directed to the establishment by an athlete that he or she is outside the country of his or her National Federation during the Relevant Period”.[20] Hence, it “is not addressed to the implication of an athlete in a defective system”.[21] Instead, “it states that an athlete is taken not to be affected or tainted by the action of the National Federation if he or she was subject to other, compliant systems outside of the country”.[22] In a nutshell, for the CAS Panel, the “relevant question is not whether the athlete was affected by the Russian System, or how, or whether she had knowledge of the way in which the system worked”.[23] No, the only question is “whether she fulfilled the criteria of the Rule”.[24] And the answer to that question is: she did early July; and she still does in August!

This case is disconcerting as it contradicts the line of cases regarding the implication of athletes in the IP Report discussed a few days ago. The CAS relied on the ambiguous wording of the IAAF provision to offer an escape route to Klishina. In doing so, it disregarded the spirit and objective of the provision, which was to provide a mechanism for athletes who were not personally tainted by the Russian doping scandal to participate in IAAF competitions. Yet, another aspect of the case is even more bizarre. Why did the IOC not block the eligibility of Klishina on the basis of paragraph 2 of the IOC Decision? She was undoubtedly implicated and benefited from the scheme. In fact, only one of the three sources of implication provided by McLaren should (and would) have been enough for the IOC Review Panel and the CAS arbitrator reviewing her eligibility to discard her from the Olympics. It did not happen, Zeus only knows why…

Epilogue

These five blogs have discussed the awards rendered by the CAS ad hoc Division in Rio involving Russian athletes wishing to compete at the Olympics. In general, the CAS has been willing, with few exceptions (Efimova and Klishina), to approve the ineligibility of Russian athletes. Rightfully, in my view, the CAS has supported the IFs that have opted for a strict approach in dealing with the eligibility of Russian athletes for the Rio Olympics. The CAS has also unsurprisingly rebutted the blunt rule of the IOC excluding Russian athletes who were previously sanctioned for doping. But, it has surprisingly let Klishina jump, in spite of all the factual elements pointing at her being implicated in, and having profited from, the Russian State-doping scheme. Overall, the CAS ad hoc Division has served its purpose as a review instance well, forcing the IFs and the IOC to properly justify their decisions and providing an avenue for the Russian athletes to be heard.

These cases also highlight the variety/plurality of responses to the Russian doping scandal and its impact on the eligibility of Russian athletes for the Rio Olympics. It seems that some IFs have taken WADA’s call for a strong response of the SGBs seriously. Unfortunately, and this is one of the negative consequences of the IOC’s decision to not decide, due to a lack of information, it is impossible to assess the different policies of the IFs which have not faced (due to their reluctance to act or else) a challenge of their eligibility decisions in front of the CAS ad hoc Division. In light of recent revelations concerning the International Swimming Federation (FINA) it is likely that a number of IFs decided to interpret narrowly the IOC criteria and waved through the overwhelming majority of Russian athletes without a proper check.

Finally, the awards show that CAS arbitrators would have been ready to condone a general exclusion of Russian athletes, with a narrow exception for those not tainted by the scandal or who could not benefit from the scheme because they were residing outside of the Russian Federation (this is very much the position adopted in the recent decision of the CAS in the dispute between the Russian Paralympic Committee and the International Paralympic Committee). The CAS recognized the seriousness of the situation and the collective responsibility of Russian sports organizations. It seemed also ready to follow up on this collective responsibility by endorsing collective sanctions that would most likely have been found compatible with the Russian athletes ‘natural rights’. Hence, ultimately, the IOC’s decision to let the Russian athletes compete at the Rio Olympics may have been politically unavoidable, but was certainly not legally mandated. I leave you to appreciate whether this decision is compatible with the IOC’s proclaimed fundamental values and its commitment to enforcing the World Anti-Doping Code. What is certain, however, is that the World Anti-Doping System needs an overhaul (for some reform proposals/directions see here) sooner rather than later.

[1] CAS OG 16/24 Darya Klishina v. IAAF, para. 2.12.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., para. 2.8.

[4] See Act II of this blog series.

[5] See CAS OG 16/13 Anastasia Karabelshikova and
Ivan Podshivalov v. 
World Rowing Federation (FISA)
and
International Olympic Committee (IOC), para. 7.14 and CAS OG 16/12 Ivan Balandin v. FISA & IOC, para. 7.22.

[6] CAS OG 16/24 Darya Klishina v. IAAF, para. 7.3.

[7] Ibid., para. 7.14.

[8] Ibid., paras 7.40-45.

[9] Ibid., para. 7.24.

[10] Ibid., para. 7.34.

[11] Ibid., para. 7.35.

[12] Ibid., para. 7.46.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid., para. 7.56.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Ibid., para. 7.57.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid., para. 7.58.

[20] Ibid., para. 7.60.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid.

On the first of May 2015, the Spanish Government finally signed the Royal Decree allowing the joint selling of the media rights of the Spanish top two football leagues. The Minister for Sport stated that the Decree will allow clubs to “pay their debts with the social security and the tax authorities and will enable the Spanish teams to compete with the biggest European Leagues in terms of revenues from the sale of media rights”.[1]Although the signing of the Royal Decree was supposed to close a very long debate and discussion between the relevant stakeholders, its aftermath shows that the Telenovela is not entirely over. 

This blog post will first provide the background story to the selling of media rights in Spain. It will, thereafter, analyse the main points of the Royal Decree and outline how the system will work in practice. Finally, the blog will shortly address the current frictions between the Spanish League (LFP) and the Spanish football federation (RFEF). 

I. The road to the royal decree 

The old individual selling system 

The individual selling model of media rights in Spain was adopted in the 1997/1998 season. The Spanish individualized marketing system required that the TV operators and the clubs sign individual agreements over the media rights for La Liga games. Obviously, not all the agreements were born equals. The two biggest clubs in Spain, Real Madrid and FC Barcelona, were soon deriving much more revenue from TV rights as the other clubs. Hence, it is not surprising that latter have been asking for a bigger share of the TV rights revenues since then. For the 2014/15 season, for example, Barcelona and Madrid earned 140 million € each, whereas Córdoba, Eibar and Deportivo la Coruña have only earned 17.5 million €. Even the last winner of La Liga (Atlético de Madrid) has received only 45 million € (3.1 times less than Barcelona and Madrid). Meanwhile, the overall sum paid by the operators to all the teams (MEDIAPRO Agency and PRISA Media Group) reached 742.5 million €/year for a three-year deal (2012/13 to 2014/15).[2] 

Due to the delay in approving the Royal Decree, some clubs (such as Barcelona) decided to sign an individual contract with a TV operator for the 2015/16 season. Consequently, it is unlikely that La Liga will be able to collectively sell its media rights for the next season. However, the new system should be in place for the 2016/17 season.  

Disagreements prior to the Royal Decree 

The negotiating process prior to signing the Royal Decree involved three main stakeholders: the Spanish Government (CSD –High Sports Council- and the Minister for Sport), the RFEF and, obviously, the LFP. The most difficult hurdle to overcome was the RFEF’s demand of a non-negotiable 2% share of the broadcasting revenues. Both the CSD and the LFP refused to budge and considered that the RFEF should not get more than 1%. The negotiations were especially tense as a consequence of a personal feud between the presidents of the main bodies involved.  

Why a Royal Decree? 

Notwithstanding the RFEF’s outspoken disapproval, the Royal Decree 5/2015 was adopted by the Council of Ministers on 30 April 2015 and was published in the Official Journal on the following day. In principle, a Royal Decree is only used for extraordinary and urgent matters and the Spanish Parliament must consolidate it in a law 30 days after its approval, which was done, last week. Nevertheless, one may question whether this was truly a matter of urgency requiring the introduction of a Royal decree. According to the explanatory memorandum of the Royal Decree it is justified on the basis of the public interest in securing a new system to commercialize the media rights. The justifications included in the Decree read as follows: 

“Concerning the media rights of professional football competitions, three reasons justify the need for an urgent response by the Government: first, the undisputed social relevance of professional sport, second, the repeated and unanimous demands to intervene from all parties involved and, finally, the need to promote competition in the market for the ‘pay-per-view’ television.”[3]

II. The new LFP’s media rights collective selling system 

The LFP’s media rights remain owned by the clubs. However, the football clubs are obliged to assign the right to commercialize them to the organizing bodies of the competition, i.e. the LFP (first and second division) and the RFEF (the cups).[4] 

The conditions for the joint selling of the media rights

In accordance with article 4 of the Royal Decree, the organising bodies will commercialize the media rights on an exclusive or non-exclusive basis.  Moreover, the procedure must be fair and equitable. The LFP and the RFEF will define the different packages commercialized in line with Article 4(4) of the Royal Decree.  These conditions will be attached by the organizing body into categories (‘packages’), depending whether it is on an exclusive basis or not, the time of the game and the duration (maximum 3 years), in accordance with the Article 4(4). The structure of the packages will be set out when the collective selling takes place.  

The specific distribution key of the revenues derived from the collective selling is enshrined in Article 5: 90% of the revenues will go to the first division clubs, and 10% to the second division clubs.   

Graph: Distribution of the money regarding the media rights of the first and second division:

Payments by the clubs after the distribution of revenue: The overdue debts to the Public Revenue and the indirect solidarity contributions.  

After receiving their share of revenue from the media rights, the clubs must first cover their overdue debts with the Spanish tax authorities. Indeed, Article 6(2) holds that “(t)he payment of overdue and payable debts owed to the ‘State Agency Tax Administration’ and the ‘General Treasury of the Social Security’ shall be considered on a preferential basis”. No club will be able to carry out the indirect solidarity payments foreseen by Article 6(1), if they do not reimburse their outstanding liabilities with the public authorities.

It is a well-known fact that Spanish football clubs have accumulated large amounts of debts over recent years. Indeed, at the end of the year 2013, the debt of the Spanish football amounted to 3.600 million € in total, with “around 700 million” to the public authorities. The Royal Decree is also aimed at tackling this longstanding debt “addiction” of many Spanish football clubs.                                             

Furthermore, in accordance with article 6(1) of the Decree, the clubs will have to make solidarity contributions to specific funds and Institutions promoting football and sport. These contributions will only be made after the obligatory contributions to the tax authorities have been paid. The five contributions include:

1. 3.5% of the broadcasting revenues will be used to create a ‘Compensation Fund’ in order to assist relegated clubs from the first Division to the second and from the second division to the third division (in Spain known as the second division “B”). Out of the Compensation Fund, 90% will flow to the relegated clubs from the first Division and 10% to the relegated clubs from the second Division.

2. 1% of the broadcasting revenues will go to the LFP for the purpose of promoting the League on the domestic and international market.

3. 1% of the broadcasting revenues will go to the RFEF as a solidarity contribution to develop amateur football[5].

4. Up to 1% of the broadcasting revenues will go to the Consejo Superior de Deportes (CSD), a Spanish Governmental body encouraging the development of sport in Spain. The goal of this contribution is to finance the social protection of high-level athletes (not just football players).

5. A further 0,5% of the broadcasting revenues will go to the CSD, and shall be distributed in the following way:

   1. Aid to female football clubs participating in the Women’s First Division, covering social security contributions.

   2. Aid to football clubs participating in the Second Division “B”, in order to pay social security contributions.

   3. Aid to associations or unions of players (‘AFE’), referees, coaches and trainers. 
      

The Spanish cup and Supercup revenue-sharing criteria

The packages will be made according to the criteria similar to those applicable to the LFP’s media rights. The revenue generated by the RFEF’s competitions will be shared as follows (Article 8):

1. 90% will be directly allocated to the LFP teams (first and second division). This money will be distributed to these clubs using similar criteria as for LFP Competitions. The revenue share depends on the results obtained by the teams in the cup. The distribution envisaged foresees 22%, for the winner; 16%, for the runner-up; 9%, for the semi-finalists; 6%, for the quarter-finalists; and 2,5%, for the clubs who got knocked-out the round of the last 16.

2. 10% will be used for the promotion of lower (semi) professional football and amateur football, that is to say, for clubs who play in the cup but are not in first or second division.

III. The Problem with the Decree: RFEF and AFE’s Opposition 

The main beneficiaries, i.e. the clubs, are quite exultant after the publication of the Royal Decree. Nonetheless, two bodies believe that they are the principal losers of the distribution model adopted, namely the RFEF and AFE (Spanish Professional Footballer's Association). In fact, the RFEF and AFE’s discontent is such that they have threatened to organize a strike paralysing the last few games of the current season, should the Decree not be renegotiated.

RFEF

The RFEF wanted 2% of the total revenue for itself, but the Decree allocated to the RFEF only 1% of the total. , As discussed above, this share will be paid indirectly by the club as outlined in Article 6(1). This implies that the federation will get paid only once, and if, the clubs have serviced their overdue debts with the public authorities.

In addition to this, the Federation did not obtain any compensation for women’s football or (semi) professional football in lower divisions. The competence for supporting women’s football and lower professional football rests with the CSD even though it is the RFEF that is in charge of the organisation of the competitions. In other words the RFEF has no control over the money flowing into the competitions it is responsible for. 

AFE

The frustration expressed by AFE (Professional Footballer's Association) is also understandable. The players have not obtained a fixed share of the broadcasting revenues, as is the case in England (1.5%) or France (1.09%). Nevertheless, according to the Royal Decree, AFE will receive from the CSD a contribution of “up to 0.5%” (Article 6(1)(e), par. 3). Moreover, the players’ representatives claim they were unjustifiably excluded from the negotiations. Without the ability of partaking to the negotiations, they were unable to secure higher guarantees for the players regarding the payment of the salaries in the lower divisions of Spanish football. Given that many players do not receive their salaries on time in the lower Spanish divisions, this money would have been a potential solution to a chronicle problem.

The strike

In return, AFE (supported by elite players like Casillas, Xavi, Piqué or Ramos) threatened with a strike. For its part, RFEF suspended all the Spanish football competitions. In response to these moves, the LFP lodged a case against AFE in the Spanish Courts, requesting the suspension of the strike and the recognition of its illegality as it would lack a legitimate ground and would violate the existing collective bargaining agreement. 

The Audiencia Nacional (the National High Court in Spain) decided on 14 May in a preliminary decision to suspend the strike. This decision ensured that the last two games of the season and the final of the Copa del Rey will be played. The case is still pending and awaits a decision on the merits. The hearing will be held on 17 June. The parties have already commenced negotiations in order to reach an agreement before the hearing. But, given that the Royal Decree has been ratified by the Parliament, very few substantial changes to the system put in place by the Decree can be made. Thus, only minor peripheral adjustments are to be expected.  

Conclusion

In my opinion, there are two key aspects that must be kept in mind. First, the duty to pay overdue debts to the public Authorities. This mandatory requirement cannot be found in any other countries and is clearly linked with the specific problems that exist in Spanish football with regard to the clubs’ indebtedness and the enmeshment of local politicians in their management. On the other hand, the other key change introduced by the Royal Decree will be that La Liga will be in a position to negotiate a much hoped for gigantic TV deal with the broadcasters. A deal, which will not exclusively benefit Real Madrid and FC Barcelona. The economic gap between these two teams and the rest of the pack was growing bigger and bigger over the last years. With the new system in place, this gap is poised to be reduced. Nevertheless, the distribution method still heavily favours the status-quo. The traditionally large clubs are rewarded for having a large number of supporters, and for their past performances. Hence, it is still virtually impossible for a smaller Spanish clubs to become, over a short time span, one of the top-earning clubs in La Liga.

[1] IUSPORT: “Aprobado el Real Decreto-Ley de los derechos audiovisuales del fútbol”

http://iusport.com/not/6713/aprobado-el-real-decreto-ley-de-los-derechos-audiovisuales-del-futbol/

[2] MARCA, “Así será el reparto del dinero televisivo”, available at http://www.marca.com/2015/05/01/futbol/1430467483.html

[3] RD 5/2015, Explanatory Memorandum.

[4] Article 2 RD 5/2015.

[5] This percentage may be expanded by agreement

Editor’s note: Kester Mekenkamp is an LL.M. student in European Law at Leiden University and an intern at the ASSER International Sports Law Centre. This blog is, to a great extent, an excerpt of his forthcoming thesis, which he shall submit in order to complete his master’s degree.

This final blog aims to provide some broader perspective, by sketching first the grander scheme in which Article 19 RSTP – FIFA's provision on the protection of minors – operates. Thereafter, the focus will shift towards testing Article 19 RSTP, thereby keeping in mind the previous blogs (Part 1: The Early Years and Part 2: The 2009 reform and its aftermath), against EU free movement law.  

Putting Article 19 RSTP into perspective: The bigger picture

After having investigated the nuts and bolts of FIFA’s provision on the protection of minors in the first two parts of this blog, it might be useful to address its bigger picture.

Article 19 RSTP and its accompanying provisions regulate only a small share of the targeted activity. There is, unfortunately, also an illegal world. Circumvention of the prohibition is allegedly commonplace.[1] Visas and passports can be falsified.[2] Work permits can be obtained on the basis of jobs arranged by clubs.[3]

In any event, a larger dynamic constituted out of a multitude of intertwined forces is at play. Globalization and professionalization are important factors contributing to stardom in football. Football idols, especially those originating from non-European countries, like Messi, Neymar, Suarez, Drogba and Eto’o, symbolised a world of opportunity for millions of children in the developing world eager to follow that same path to global fame.[4] In many parts of South America and Central and West-Africa, where families are driven by the impetus to improve their daily lives and clubs eager to cash FIFA’s training compensation money, an entire training industry emerged with the sole objective of exporting young talents to European clubs.[5] A horrifying example of the (ultimate) consequences this process can generate was seen in 2007: A fishing trawler washed up on a Tenerife beach carrying 130 young African men, of which 15 were made to believe that they would attend trials at Olympique Marseille and Real Madrid.[6] Add to the mix a group of agents focused almost exclusively on harvesting young boys for the international football market, and one can easily understand the extreme difficulty faced by FIFA to rein these practices.[7]

It is evident that the case of minors wanting to transfer internationally is closely related to a broader set of socio-economic difficulties faced by an extremely unequal world. Wars, famine, drought, corruption and the severe economic disparity[8] between the developing and developed world are determinants that can simply not be ignored. National laws applicable to asylum, migration and trade are also part of the equation. The subject of this blog hence opens up a doorway to global complexity. A true protection of minors will therefore undoubtedly require a broader approach than solely measures concerning the world of football. Yet, FIFA’s article 19 could potentially contribute to improving the fate of some minors in the developing world. The question is, does it in practice?  

Arguments supporting the prohibition of international transfers of minors

Former FIFA and UEFA presidents, Blatter, Platini, and Johansson, have all promoted an absolute forbiddance of international transfers of minors.[9] Although such a total ban was never introduced, the 2001 “Commission-condoned” FIFA transfer rules for the first time included a section dedicated to the enhancement of the protection of minors.[10] An accompanying FIFA circular stipulated that the new transfer rules imposed strict conditions “in order to provide a stable environment for the training and education of players”.[11] Moreover, it stated that the abuses, which were frequent in the past, had to be curbed. [12] Crucial in this is “protecting the appropriate and stable development of a minor as a whole”, which includes the training and education of these players.[13]

Another argument supporting Article 19 is its objective to tackle human trafficking. By strictly limiting the possibility for international transfers of minors, it takes the wind out of the traffickers’ sails. The significance of this aim was acknowledged by the European Parliament and the Commission.[14]

The thought behind the prohibition, being open to exception only in specific cases, is that minors are vulnerable, especially when moving to foreign countries. It tries to prevent football from breaking up families and “allows [minor football players] to remain within their country of origin and family networks for longer and hence reduces the psychological and cultural problems associated with adjusting to foreign climes”.[15] FIFA hereby acknowledges that “[w]hile international transfers might, in specific cases, be favourable to a young player’s sporting career, they are likely to be contrary to the best interests of the vast majority of players as minors”.[16] Poli came to a similar conclusion (concerning migration of football players in general) by stating that “the few examples of upward career paths mask the many cases of failure and are sufficient to convince young people and their families that it is worth giving oneself body and soul to football, often to the detriment of school training or an apprenticeship”.[17] 

Arguments against the prohibition of international transfers of minors

There is an opposite narrative that calls Article 19 RSTP’s rationale partially into question.[18] It can be argued that for certain countries (keeping in mind the abovementioned), with respect to the aim of protecting young football players against potential abuse and exploitation through the appropriate and stable development in training and education, minors are in reality not served by staying in their home State.[19] Furthermore, it can be contended that migration by young football players from a developing country to a developed one can be a “viable livelihood strategy to lift an individual and therefore vicariously their family out of poverty”.[20] Paradoxically a measure “with the aim of protecting minors … may, in fact, reduce opportunities for youth living in developing countries”.[21] Moreover, one must beware of an ethnocentric judgement. The argument has been raised that even in cases where third world immigrants had failed with respect to their sporting careers, they considered themselves to have succeeded, “thanks to football”, since they could come to Europe and stay.[22] It becomes a positive “escape”, which stands in contradiction with the whole idea underlying Article 19 RSTP.[23] As we will see in the coming sections, this discussion is key to the evaluation of the compatibility of FIFA’s rule with EU law. 

The Compatibility of Article 19 RSTP with EU free movement law

Applicability

For the purpose of this blog it is assumed that EU free movement law is applicable to Article 19 RSTP in relation to minor football players with an EU nationality. EU minors below the age of 16 might be able to rely on the EU citizenship rights and the free movement right of their parents. Furthermore, it can be reasonably argued that, by referring to inter alia Lawrie Blum[24], EU minor football players of 16 and above can be deemed workers in the sense of the free movement of workers. 

Free movement law aspects

A few aspects that could be deemed restrictive of EU Free movement rights deserve some attention. These are separated into situations concerning either the rights of the minor football player itself, or the rights of their parents.

Article 19(2)(b), the “EU and EEA-rule”, is explicitly created in order for the provision as a whole to meet the requirements of EU free movement law.[25] Yet, the free movement of minors is restricted by the fact that they can only transfer to a club within another Member State once additional criteria concerning football training, education and living arrangements are complied with.[26] These extra criteria, intrinsically, make it harder for minor football players to move to a foreign club. Furthermore, EU minors below the age of 16 are unable to rely on this exception. As already mentioned at the beginning of the blog, this particular age group is unlikely to perform economic services against remuneration in the sense of a “worker” under Article 45 TFEU. Nonetheless, one could envisage that under-16 EU minors could be able to rely on their citizenship rights enshrined in Article 21 TFEU (together with Art. 34(2) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights) as non-economically active EU migrants.

Moreover, under-16 EU minors might be able to rely on the free movement rights of their parents. In short, the reason why an EU national decides to move to another Member State and take up work there is irrelevant under EU free movement law. To the contrary, Article 19 RSTP puts an emphasis on the underlying reason, as the “parents-rule” of Article 19(2)(a) RSTP can only be invoked where the player’s parents move to the country in which the new club is located “for reasons not linked to football”. The CAS has hereby clarified that the family’s move must be entirely disconnected from the transfer of the minor in a new football club. Under the FIFA rule, it is for example insufficient to establish that the move is partially connected to their child’s football activities, although not being the primary aim.[27] Hence, if (a) parent(s) would want to move to another Member State to take up work there for the, sole or partial, reason that their child can play for a club in that country, Article 19 RSTP will deter them from doing so. As such, the contested rule may thus amount to a provision that precludes or deters the parents from leaving their country of origin in order to exercise their right to free movement as workers. 

Is Article 19 RSTP a proportionate measure under EU law?

The previous sections demonstrated that there is some room to argue that Article 19 RSTP could run counter EU Internal Market law, which could form a basis for future challenge to the provision. Regardless of whether this will ultimately be the case, the provision might benefit from some amendments. It goes without saying that the aim is on its face value laudable. Protecting minors against abuses connected to the transfer market must remain a priority. The manner in which this objective has been given practical effect has not been without criticism.

By encouraging minor football players to remain in their home country, the measure is certainly likely to contribute to them enjoying an appropriate and stable development in training and education. Furthermore, by introducing a strict regulatory regime, it lessens the chance of human traffickers using international football transfers as a cover for trafficking purposes. Therefore, it can be argued that the measure is suitable to attain its aim of protecting minors.

It then still has to be assessed whether it passes the test of necessity. As concluded at the time of its inception, an absolute ban on international transfers of minors was deemed too pervasive. The exceptions assured the overall appropriateness and reasonableness of the measure. This test raises in particular the question of existence of less intrusive alternatives. I would argue that there is indeed a less intrusive alternative to the current rule available. It involves a slight amendment of the “parents-rule” and would still attain the aim underlying the overall provision. This is achieved by firstly, omitting the requirement for the parents’ move “not to be linked to football”, and secondly, extending the mandatory obligations of clubs regarding the education and wellbeing of foreign minors, laid down in Article 19(2)(b), to the “parents-rule”. 

Proposed amendment to the “parents-rule”

Article 19(2)(a) RSTP, the “parents-rule”, has shown to be controversial. It has, to give but an example, been stated that this exemption has “effectively made the [entire] rule worthless”. [28] As discussed in the previous blogs, the case law is marred with disputes arising with respect to this exception, wherein the judicial bodies have advocated a strict application of the rule. In brief, the minor must follow its parents and not vice versa. Yet, circumvention of the rule appears to be quite simple.[29] Without implying that this is a sufficient reason for changing the measure, it nevertheless does show that its current form is rather impractical (or hypocritical).

It can be reasonably argued that permitting an international transfer only if the parents move based on “reasons not linked to football” is too stern. There are examples of outcomes being adverse to the interests of the minors concerned, for instance the Acuña case.[30] Even stronger is the appeal by families who have decided to move together to another country in order for the children to pursue their dream of becoming a professional footballer.[31] In the words of the father of a 15-year-old player who was denied to play for FC Barcelona (after they, as a family, had moved from the US to Spain with that particular aim): “Why should FIFA be able to tell our family where it has to live if we want our kid to play [football]?”[32] Indeed, why should families not be able to move out of their own accord, provided that they meet the general criteria for residence within the new country? If for instance a family has enough financial resources to not become a burden on the social welfare systems or both parents find employment within the new country, they obtain the required residence permits, and as a result their child can play for the club of his choosing, it is hard to argue that this is contradictory to the aim of Article 19 RSTP. The CAS has been receptive to this type of arguments in the previously discussed case concerning Atlético Madrid, in which a minor (USA) was allowed to register with the club amongst others because his family was wealthy and its basic financial maintenance was not dependent on the parents’ work.[33] One could rightly contend that less affluent families should equally have the possibility to move together with their child to the country of a new club. Such a move, in particularly when considering a transfer from a club in a developing country to a European club, could be in line with the aim of Article 19 RSTP. Furthermore, the comparison with other sports, i.e. volleyball, hockey, tennis, rugby and athletics, shows that in those sports minors are not explicitly prohibited from moving, together with their parents, to another country in pursuit of their sporting dream.[34] The same can be said, when the children pursue a career in music or dance and the family moves to the place where he or she can learn from the best mentors.

It is no coincidence that the “parents-rule” is the most debated exception of Article 19 RSTP. One can easily agree that it is beneficial (in a vast majority of cases) for minors to keep living with their parents as it enhances their chances of having a stable development. However, does this also have to entail in which country that might be? This author does not believe so and would favour a situation where parents are allowed to move together with their child to another country, whether that is for reasons linked to football or not.

It can be tentatively pleaded that this can be realized, while still reaching the aims of Article 19 RSTP. As abovementioned, this can be achieved by, firstly, omitting the requirement for the parents’ move “not to be linked to football”, and secondly, by extending the mandatory obligations of clubs regarding the education and wellbeing of foreign minors as laid down in the “EU and EEA-rule” (Article 19(2)(b) RSTP), to the “parents-rule”. This alternative measure would warrant the objective of “appropriate and stable development in training and education”, given that the minor and his parents remain a united family and the clubs are additionally made responsible for ensuring that their sporting and academic education is guaranteed. To also attain the anti-human-trafficking aim, this proposed alternative should be safeguarded from abuse by way of legal guardianship (e.g. situations where human traffickers are able to obtain the status of legal guardian of a minor). Therefore the meaning of parents, within the reading of this exception, should constitute solely the biological parents at first. Perhaps it is possible for the PSC subcommittee to devise a suitable test, based on the minor’s best interest, for judging whether anyone other than the biological parents could equally be deemed eligible under this exception.

In an attempt to contribute to the debate on the protection of minors in football, this blog has proposed a modest reform of Article 19 RSTP. It is believed that such a change would tackle some of the problems withnessed in the past years, without loosing sight of the objectives of FIFA's provision on the protection of minors in football.  

[1] J. Señík and T. Gábris, Minors in Sport. Position Paper on Legal Aspects of Minors in Sports in the Slovak Republic, (2010) International Sports Law Journal, p. 69.

[2] Ed Hawkins, The Lost Boys. Inside Football’s Slave Trade. Bloomsbury (2015), inter alia pp. 135, 162 and 229.

[3] S. Van den Bogaert, Practical Regulation of the Mobility of Sportsmen in the EU post Bosman, Kluwer (2005), p. 240; Supra at 2, p. 165.

[4] Supra at 2, pp. 115-116.

[5] J. Schokkaert, Football clubs’ recruitment strategies and international player migration: evidence from Senegal and South Africa, 17 Soccer & Society (2016), p. 121; The Guardian, “The scandal of Africa's trafficked players”, 6 January 2008,; Supra at 2, pp. 117-129.

[6] The Telegraph, “The dark side of football transfers”, 31 December 2014; Supra at 2, p. 132.

[7] R. Poli, African migrants in Asian and European football: hopes and realities, 13 Sport in Society (2010), p. 1008. For more on player’s agents, see A. Duval and K. Mekenkamp, “De- or Re-regulating the middlemen? The DFB’s regulation of intermediaries under EU law scrutiny at the OLG Frankfurt”, Asser International Sports Law Blog.

[8] J. Schokaert showed, supra at 5, p. 132, in comparison, that an economically higher developed country, such as South Africa as opposed to Senegal, which attracts more money to domestic football and higher wages for football players, resulting in more players to stay in their home country. 

[9] Supra at 1, p. 68.

[10] Art. 12 FIFA RSTP 2001.

[11] FIFA Circular no. 769, 24 August 2001.

[12] N. St. Cyr Clarke, The beauty and the beast: Taming the ugly side of the people’s game, 2011 Columbia Journal of European Law, p. 627.

[13] See Blog 1; Commentary on the Status and Transfer of Players, p. 58.

[14] European Parliament, Report on the future of professional football in Europe (2006/2130(INI)), paras. 33-34; The White Paper on Sport, COM(2007) 391 final, p. 16.

[15] P. Darby, “Out of Africa: The exodus of elite African football talent to Europe”, JLS 2007, p. 453.

[16] FIFA, September 2016, “FAQ Protection of Minors”, 

[17] Supra at 7, p. 1008.

[18] J. Esson, Better Off at Home? Rethinking Responses to Trafficked West African Footballers in Europe, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 2015, pp. 526-527.

[19] M. LoPiccolo, You don't have to go home, but you can't stay here: Problems arising when SIJS meets international adoption, Wisconsin International Law Journal 2015, pp. 200-201.

[20] Supra at 18, p. 521.

[21] M. Mauro, Inclusive sport or institutional discrimination? New FIFA regulations, organized football and migrant youth in Italy, Sport in Society 2016, p. 2.

[22] R. Poli, African migrants in Asian and European football: hopes and realities, 13 Sport in Society (2010), p. 1009.

[23] P. Darby and E. Solberg, Differing Trajectories: Football Development and Patterns of Player Migration in South Africa and Ghana, 11 Soccer and Society (2009), pp. 118–130.

[24] Case 66/85, Lawrie Blum v Land Baden-Württemberg, [1986] ECR 2135, para. 17: the crucial elements are that, for a certain period of time, a person performs services for and under the direction of another person in return for which he receives remuneration.

[25] See blog 1.

[26] Art. 19(2)(b) RSTP: Hereby, it is important to indicate that the CAS in Vada II (TAS 2012/A/2862) has established a workable account for the particular case of players with the nationality of a EU or EEA Member State residing in a non-EU/EEA country, by allowing them to invoke this exception.

[27] TAS 2011/A/2494, FC Girondins de Bordeaux c. Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), sentence du 22 décembre 2011 (Vada I), paras. 31-38; CAS 2013/A/3140, A. v. Club Atlético de Madrid SAD & Real Federación Española de Fútbol (RFEF) & Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), award of 10 October 2013 (A. v. Club Atlético de Madrid), para. 8.25.

[28] Supra at 2, p. 246.

[29] KEA, CDES and EOSE, Study on Sports Agents in the Eurropean Union, November 2009, p. 128; Supra at 3, p. 240.

[30] See blog 2.

[31] The New York Times, “An American Boy Wonder in Barcelona”, 7 November 2013.

[32] The New York Times, “Strict Enforcement of FIFA Rules Sidelines Young Players Abroad”, 31 Augustus 2015.

[33] See blog 2; A. v. Club Atlético de Madrid, Supra at  28, para. 8.31.

[34] Supra at 30, pp. 127-129.