Editor’s note: Stefano Bastianon is Associate Professor in EU Law and EU sports law at the University of Bergamo and lawyer admitted to the Busto Arsizio bar. He is also member of the IV^th Division of the High Court of Sport Justice (Collegio di Garanzia dello sport) at the National Olympic Committee.

1. On the 20^th July 2018, the Court of Arbitration for Sport (hereinafter referred to as “CAS”) issued its decision in the arbitration procedure between AC Milan and UEFA. The subject matter of this arbitration procedure was the appeal filed by AC Milan against the decision of the Adjudicatory Chamber of the UEFA Financial Control Body dated 19^th June 2018 (hereinafter referred to as “the contested decision”). As many likely know, the CAS has acknowledged that, although AC Milan was in breach of the break-even requirement, the related exclusion of the club from the UEFA Europe League was not proportionate. To date, it is the first time the CAS clearly ruled that the sanction of exclusion from UEFA club competitions for a breach of the break-even requirement was not proportionate. For this reason the CAS award represents a good opportunity to reflect on the proportionality test under Art. 101 TFEU and the relationship between the landmark ruling of the European Court of Justice (hereinafter referred to as “ECJ”) in the Meca Medina and Majcen affair and the very recent case-law of the CAS.

2. According to the contested decision, AC Milan was guilty for failing to comply with Articles 58 to 63 of the UEFA Financial fair-play regulations on the break-even requirement. As a consequence the Adjudicatory Chamber has excluded AC Milan from participating in the next UEFA Europe League for which AC Milan has already qualified (2018-2019) at the end of the 2017-2018 Italian football championship. The appeal filed at the CAS by AC Milan was mainly aimed at seeking the annulment of the contested decision and ordering UEFA to enter into a settlement agreement.

3. The theory of proportionality test under Art. 101(1) TFEU in sports matters goes back to the ECJ’s ruling in the 2006 Meca Medina and Majcen case, while, in general terms, this theory was enunciated by the ECJ for the first time in the 1994 DLG case and then repeated in the 2002 Wouters and Others case although in a slightly different way.

In the DLG case the ECJ has ruled that:

«in order to escape the prohibition laid down in Article 85(1) of the Treaty, the restrictions imposed on members by the statutes of cooperative purchasing associations must be limited to what is necessary to ensure that the cooperative functions properly and maintains its contractual power in relation to producers (…). In addition, it is necessary to establish whether the penalties for non-compliance with the statutes are disproportionate to the objective they pursue and whether the minimum period of membership is unreasonable». 

Eight years later, in the Wouters and Others case the ECJ established the following principles:

(i) not every agreement between undertakings or every decision of an association of undertakings which restricts the freedom of action of the parties or of one of them necessarily falls within the prohibition laid down in Art. 101(1) of the Treaty;

(ii) for the purposes of application of that provision to a particular case, account must first of all be taken of the overall context in which the decision of the association of undertakings was taken or produces its effects; and

(iii) it has then to be considered whether the consequential effects restrictive of competition are inherent in the pursuit of those objectives.

Unlike the DLG case, in the Wouters and Others ruling the ECJ did not expressly refer to the concept of proportionality, but preferred to recall the concept of inherent restrictions. However, from the overall wording of the ECJ, it is clear that in both cases it tried to apply in the antitrust sector the same theory of mandatory requirements developed in relation to the internal market.

4. On the contrary, in the Meca Medina and Majcen case, the ECJ expressly referred to the concept of proportionality. In particular, the ECJ has literally quoted the passage of the Wouters and Others ruling where it is stated that:

«not every agreement between undertakings or every decision of an association of undertakings which restricts the freedom of action of the parties or of one of them necessarily falls within the prohibition laid down in Article 81(1) EC. For the purposes of application of that provision to a particular case, account must first of all be taken of the overall context in which the decision of the association of undertakings was taken or produces its effects and, more specifically, of its objectives. It has then to be considered whether the consequential effects restrictive of competition are inherent in the pursuit of those objectives (Wouters and Others, par. 97)». 

However, unlike the Wouters and Others case, the ECJ has added that the effects restrictive of competition must also be proportionate to the objectives pursued.

More specifically, in anti-doping issues the test of proportionality is a means to avoid the risk that a given rule (and the sanctions imposed in case of a breach of it) may prove excessive by virtue of:

(i) firstly, the conditions laid down for establishing the dividing line between circumstances which amount to doping in respect of which penalties may be imposed and those which do not, and

(ii) secondly, the severity of those penalties (in the case at issue the penalty was a two year suspension).

Regarding the first point, the ECJ has underlined that the dividing line was determined by the threshold of 2 ng/ml of urine above which the presence of Nandrolone in an athlete's body constitutes doping. Based on documents before the Court, the ECJ could conclude that the average endogenous production observed in all studies then published was 20 times lower than 2ng/ml of urine and that the maximum endogenous production value observed was nearly a third lower. As a consequence, the ECJ rejected the argument according to which the threshold was set at such a low level that it should have been regarded as not taking sufficient account of the phenomenon of the endogenous production of Nandrolone.

Regarding the second point, instead, the ECJ simply observed that: 

«since the appellants have, moreover, not pleaded that the penalties which were applicable and were imposed in the present case are excessive, it has not been established that the anti-doping rules at issue are disproportionate».

This is the most critical passage of the ruling as one could wonder what would happen if the plaintiffs had contested the proportionality of the penalties. In such a case the ECJ should have examined the substance of the plea and stated whether the two year suspension was proportionate or not. However, in the event that the ECJ had come to the conclusion that the penalty was not proportionate, the anti-doping rules at issue should have been declared null and void unless it was possible to prove that the conditions of Art. 101 (3) TFEU were fulfilled.

The same reasoning was applied by the EU Commission in the ISU decision concerning the Eligibility rules enacted by the International Skating Union. In its decision, the Commission clearly underlined that:

«even if the Eligibility rules and their consequential effects restrictive of competition were inherent in the pursuit of any legitimate objective, the sanctions imposed on athletes in case of breach of the Eligibility rules are manifestly disproportionate» (par. 260).[1]

Thus, in sports matters there seem to be no doubt that the proportionality test must involve also the sanctions imposed on athletes. As already said, in the ISU decision, the Commission has clearly underlined that the Eligibility rules were not proportionate to achieve legitimate objectives in particular in view of the disproportionate nature of the ISU’s ineligibility sanctions. More specifically the Commission has pointed out that:

«the 2014 Eligibility rules provided for the heaviest sanction of a lifetime ban, even for the first infringement of the Eligibility rules, without taking into consideration the circumstances of the case (…). For the purposes of the assessment of the proportionality of the Eligibility rules it is however not relevant how many times the ISU has actually imposed sanctions. The fact that a lifetime ban was imposed only once on an athlete may even underline the strong deterrent effect of the sanctions. Although the sanctions system has been modified in the General Regulations 2016, the sanctions remain disproportionately punitive, as they provide for periods of ineligibility that go up to five years for negligent participation in unauthorized events, up to 10 years for athletes that knowingly participate in unauthorised events and a lifetime ban for athletes participating in unauthorised events endangering, inter alia, the ‘ISU jurisdiction’. These are disproportionately heavy sanctions in particular in view of the fact that on average a professional athlete's entire career is around eight years long. Also the imposition of a five-year ban is therefore likely to impact very heavily on an athlete's career who, after years of training and sacrifices, loses the possibility to gain income through the participation in the ISU's international events». 

This reasoning clearly shows that the Commission has considered the sanctions imposed to be disproportionate, not simply the rule forbidding participation in unauthorized events.

5. To date, neither the EU Commission nor the ECJ has had the opportunity to comment on the compatibility of the UEFA Financial Fair-play rules with EU Competition law. Indeed, regarding the Striani affair, the Commission has dismissed the complaint on procedural grounds only (the lack of Community interest), while the ECJ has declared a reference for preliminary ruling send by a Belgian court manifestly inadmissible and therefore did not rule on the substance of the case. As a consequence, to date there is no European formal decision that has assessed the compatibility of UEFA Financial Fair-play rules with EU law.

This opportunity, however, was offered to the CAS in the context of the Galatasaray/UEFA award (2016/A/4492). To fully understand the case one must go back to the 2^nd March 2016 when the Adjudicatory Chamber of the UEFA Financial Control Body issued a decision in which it decided that Galatasaray has failed to comply with the terms of the Settlement Agreement and imposed on Galatasaray an exclusion from participating in the next UEFA Club competition for which it would otherwise qualify in the next two seasons.

On the 11^th March 2016, Galatasaray filed an appeal with the CAS to challenge the decision of the Adjudicatory Chamber of the UEFA Financial Control Body. Basically, the arguments put forward by Galatasaray were based:

(i) on the alleged incompatibility of the break-even rule with EU law (namely, Art. 101 TFEU on cartels, Art. 102 TFEU on abuse of dominant position, Art. 63 TFEU on free movement of capital, Art. 56 TFEU on free movement of services and Art. 45 TFEU on free movement of workers); and, in the event the first argument is rejected,

(ii) on the alleged disproportionate nature of the sanctions imposed by UEFA.

It is very interesting to note that from the point of view of Galatasaray the incompatibility of the break-even rule with EU law is something different and completely divorced from the proportionate character of the sanction. Indeed, the latter argument is invoked only in the event the first argument is rejected. In other words, according to this line of defence, the compatibility of the break-even rule with EU principles must be assessed only on the basis of the alleged restrictive effects on competition and the (alleged legitimate) objectives pursued, without considering the sanctions imposed.

In line with this approach, the CAS examined the two arguments put forward by Galatasaray separately. Regarding the relationship between the break-even rule and EU Competition law, the CAS reasoning can be summarized as follows:

(i) UEFA Financial fair-play regulations have neither the object nor the effect of restricting competition because: (a) UEFA Financial fair-play regulations do not prevent the clubs from competing among themselves on the pitch or in the acquisition of football players; (b) they prevent the distortion of competition by overspending; (c) clubs are free to pay the players as much as the wish provided that salaries are covered by revenues; (d) large dominant clubs have always existed and will always exist and therefore the alleged ossification of the structure market is a nonsense; (d) overspending is not completely prohibited because the break-even rule only applies over rolling periods of three years; and

(ii) in any case, even assuming that the break-even rule has anticompetitive effects, the objectives sought by UEFA Financial fair-play regulations do appear legitimate and their alleged restrictive effects inherent to the achievement of those objective. Put simply: if UEFA intends to control the level of indebtedness of European football clubs, the imposition of limits to spending beyond revenues is a natural element of a financial discipline seeking that objective.

By contrast, regarding the proportionality of the sanction imposed by the UEFA, the reasoning of the CAS is completely based on external factors which allegedly affected the finances of Galatasaray (i.e., the Syrian refugee crisis, the terrorist attacks in Turkey, the Turkish major match-fixing scandal, the exchange rate and rate fluctuations, the national economic downturn in Turkey, the inefficiencies of the market and the management changes). However, according to the CAS, this argument cannot be accepted because the club failed to provide the Panel with the accounting evidence of how and in which proportion each of these factors would have caused the break-even deficit. Moreover, the CAS has underlined that the sanction was not disproportionate because:

(i) it was imposed as a sanction for a second violation (i.e., after the Settlement Agreement which presupposes the previous violation of the rules on financial fair play);

(ii) an exclusion limited in time (one season) from the UEFA competitions is consistent with the principle of equal treatment and fair competition, as it protects the club respecting the UEFA Financial Fair-play regulations and does not prevent future compliance with them.

It follows from the foregoing that, according to the CAS the proportionate character of sanctions listed in the UEFA Financial Fair-play regulations cannot affect the evaluation of the legitimacy of these regulations under Art. 101 TFUE.

6. To some extent the AC Milan/UEFA case is similar to the Galatasaray case. Both clubs have failed to comply with the break-even requirement; both clubs have been sanctioned with the exclusion for one season from the UEFA competitions; both clubs have contested the proportionality of the sanction. Unlike Galatasaray, however, AC Milan was denied the possibility to enter into a Settlement Agreement[2]. On the contrary, it is worthy to note that the CAS has confirmed the decision of the Adjudicatory Chamber of the UEFA CFCB, which was rendered on the 19^th June 2018, establishing that AC Milan had failed to fulfil the break-even requirement. However, it has annulled the decision to the extent that it has excluded AC Milan from participating in the next UEFA Club competition for which it would otherwise qualify in the next two seasons (i.e., the 2018-19 and 2019-20 seasons), arguing that the sanction was not proportionate. As a consequence, the CAS has referred back the case to the Adjudicatory Chamber to issue a proportionate disciplinary measure. The press release issued on the 20^th July 2018 (the full text of the award is not yet available) indicates that the decision to annul the sanction and refer back the case to the Adjudicatory Chamber is based on the following arguments:

(i) some important elements regarding the financial situation of the Club and the recent change in the Club’s ownership have not been properly assessed by the Adjudicatory Chamber, or could not be properly assessed at the moment when the contested decision was rendered;

(ii) the Adjudicatory Chamber is in a better position than the CAS Panel to issue a new proportionate disciplinary measure on the basis of the current financial situation of the Club.

Despite the differences between the two cases, it is interesting to note that in the Galatasaray case the CAS assessed the sanction imposed by the Adjudicatory Chamber on the merits and found it proportionate. To the contrary, in the AC Milan case the CAS has assessed the sanction on the merits only to state that it was not proportionate, but refrained from saying which other sanction could be considered proportionate, arguing that the Adjudicatory Chamber is in a better position than the CAS to issue a new proportionate disciplinary measure. In other words, the CAS seems to say that it has no problem to assess the proportionality of a given sanction ; however, if it deems that the sanction is not proportionate, it is not for the CAS to replace the penalty imposed with another sanction.

7. Comparing the awards in the Galatasaray and AC Milan cases with the ruling in Meca Medina and Majcen affair some aspects deserve to be underlined. First of all, according to the case-law of the ECJ in sports matters, the evaluation of the restrictive effects of a rule necessarily presupposes the analysis of the proportionate character of the sanction imposed in the event of violation of that rule. On the contrary, according to the case-law of the CAS the analysis of the proportionate character of a sanction necessarily presupposes a positive evaluation of the legitimate character of the objectives pursued by the rule and its inherence to those objectives. In other words, it seems that according to the CAS the disproportionate nature of a sanction is not capable of affecting the legitimacy of the rule whose violation determined that sanction. Although the full text of the award is not yet available from the AC Milan/UEFA case it emerges that the disproportionate nature of the penalty imposed only resulted in the referral of the case to the Adjudicatory Chamber for the imposition of another sanction. Although apparently in line with the Wouters and Others case, this approach is clearly in contrast with the Meca Medina and Majcen case and, more generally, with the whole theory of mandatory requirements in the field of the internal market.

To this regard it is of paramount importance not to underestimate the fundamental difference between rules which are applied a priori and rules that are applied a posteriori. As also recognized by the CAS in the well-known ENIC case:

«rules that are applied a priori tend to prevent undesirable situations which might prove difficult or useless to deal with afterwards, rather than imposing a penalty on someone guilty of something. On the other hand, rules that are applied a posteriori are bound to react to specific behaviours. For example, under EC law and several national laws, rules on mergers are applied a priori, whereas rules on abuses of dominant position are applied a posteriori. Merger operations are checked before they actually take place, and are blocked if the outcome of the merger would be the establishment of a dominant position because of the possible negative consequences on the market and not because the individuals owning or managing the merging undertakings are particularly untrustworthy and the company after the merger is expected to abuse of its dominant position (…). All such a priori rules are applied on a preventive basis, with no appraisal of any specific wrongdoing and no moral judgement on the individuals or companies concerned. On the other hand, rules setting forth obligations and corresponding penalties or sanctions, such as criminal or disciplinary rules, can be applied only after someone has been found guilty of having violated an obligation». 

In this context it is clear that rules applied a posteriori (such as the UEFA Financial Fair-play regulations) consist of both the obligations set forth and the corresponding sanctions. In addition, it is not possible nor correct to arbitrarily separate the obligation from the sanction. Indeed, the fact that in the Meca Medina and Majcen ruling the proportionality test was referred precisely to the restrictive effects and not to the prohibition of doping cannot be ignored. The prohibition of doping as such, without the corresponding sanctions, does not have any restrictive effect on competition.

Secondly, the sanctioning system envisaged by the UEFA does not provide clear and transparent criteria as to how the sanctions are to be applied. There is no scale to measure and define the seriousness of the violation and no provision illustrating the relationship between the violation and the sanction that can be imposed. It is interesting to note that the same reasoning was applied by the EU Commission in the ISU decision. And everyone knows the outcome of this case.

Thirdly, the choice of the CAS to refer back the case to the Adjudicatory Chamber could mean that the AC Milan/UEFA case is not yet closed definitively. According to Art 29 of the Procedural rules governing the UEFA Club Financial Control Body in case of a breach of the UEFA Financial Fair-play regulations the clubs may be sanctioned with the following measures: a) warning, b) reprimand, c) fine, d) deduction of points, e) withholding of revenues from a UEFA competition, f) prohibition on registering new players in UEFA competitions, g) restriction on the number of players that a club may register for participation in UEFA competitions, including a financial limit on the overall aggregate cost of the employee benefits expenses of players registered on the A-list for the purposes of UEFA club competitions, h) disqualification from competitions in progress and/or exclusion from future competitions, i) withdrawal of a title or award. If the exclusion from UEFA competitions is certainly one of the most serious sanctions, there are other particularly serious penalties, such as the prohibition on registering new players in UEFA competitions or the restriction on the number of players that a club may register for participation in UEFA competitions. Consequently, since the seriousness of the ascertained infringement seems to exclude that the Adjudicatory Chamber may decide to apply a very minimal sanction (such as a warning or a reprimand), it cannot be excluded that the new sanction will also be perceived as excessive and therefore disproportionate. And in this case, at least in theory, nothing could prevent AC Milan from appealing to the CAS by challenging again the disproportionate character of the (new) sanction.

8. The Meca Medina and Majcen ruling presents many ambiguities and for this reason is rightly criticized. To say nothing else, it cannot be ignored that the extension of the proportionality test also to the sanctioning system provided for by sports regulations raises at least two fundamental problems: (a) firstly, to establish which criteria are to be used to determine the proportionate character of the sanctions; and (b) secondly, the opportunity to invest judges or arbitrators of such a task. However, the recent case-law of the CAS on the proportionality test of UEFA Financial Fair-play regulations seems to reveal no less serious concerns and perplexities.

[1] For more details, see my blog and Ben Van Rompuy’s blog.

[2] As a consequence one could argue that the decision of the panel to find that the sanction is disproportionate is probably connected to the fact that Milan was not offered a settlement.

…and everything under the sun is in tune,

but the sun is eclipsed by the moon…[1] 

The issue

Ruffling a few feathers, on 30 May 2015 the FIFA Executive Committee rather unsurprisingly, considering the previous warnings,[2] adopted a decision to suspend with immediate effect the Indonesian Football Federation (PSSI) until such time as PSSI is able to comply with its obligations under Articles 13 and 17 of the FIFA Statutes.[3] Stripping PSSI of its membership rights, the decision results in a prohibition of all Indonesian teams (national or club) from having any international sporting contact. In other words, the decision precludes all Indonesian teams from participating in any competition organised by either FIFA or the Asian Football Confederation (AFC). In addition, the suspension of rights also precludes all PSSI members and officials from benefits of any FIFA or AFC development programme, course or training during the term of suspension. This decision coincides with a very recent award by the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) in this ambit, which shall be discussed further below.[4]

The former decision, substantiated upon the alleged governmental infringement of the independence of PSSI, is the latest in a line of similar decisions adopted by FIFA in recent years. It succeeds inter alia the suspension of the Nigerian Football Federation and subsequent non-recognition of its General Assembly decisions,[5] and the suspensions of the Cameroonian Football Association[6], the Football Federation of Belize,[7] the Kenya Football Federation,[8] and the Islamic Republic of Iran Football Federation.[9]

The common denominator of all these decisions is the alleged impediment of third parties, usually governments or their related bodies, in the affairs of national football associations. In the Indonesian case, the trigger was the imposition of additional licensing criteria for football clubs by BOPI, an agency of the Indonesian Ministry of Youth and Sports, which resulted in two clubs (Arema and Persebaya) being precluded from competing in the Indonesian Super League (ISL) and subsequent measures adopted by the ministry aimed at relieving PSSI of all of its responsibilities.[10] While in the Nigerian case, an initial High Court injunction prevented the elected Executive Committee from taking office, and a later intervention from the Nigerian Department of State Security Service (SSS), resulted in the suspension of the Nigerian Football Federation[11] and subsequently in the non-recognition of its General Assembly decisions,[12] the other cited cases include violations in the form of, among others, “blatant government interference”,[13] non-provision of security services from government forces,[14] and violation of the independence of the decision-making process of the national football governing body.[15] 

Grounds for intervention by FIFA

The normative basis for the aforementioned interventions lies primarily within Articles 13, 14 and 17 of the FIFA Statutes.[16] The Members’ obligation of an independent management of their affairs is embedded in Article 13(1)(i), which states that: ”Members have the following obligations... to manage their affairs independently and ensure that their own affairs are not influenced by any third parties...” Strengthening that notion, Article 17(1) provides that: “Each Member shall manage its affairs independently and with no influence from third parties.” Furthermore, the second paragraph of Article 17 explicitly points out that all the bodies need to be elected or appointed within each respective Member, which prima facie appears even more stringent than Article 7 bis of the UEFA Statutes, that constitutes:”...their executive body is freely elected and that their other bodies are elected or appointed in a completely independent way.”[17]

Enjoying full discretion that stems from its Statutes, FIFA acts upon information received about the alleged violations, usually from the Members themselves. Prior to the adoption of a decision, a “prevention” phase takes place, during which FIFA, through means of correspondence with respective Members or/and third parties involved, addresses the alleged infringements and usually allows for a deference period for compliance with specific conditions. Members and/or third parties are warned that non-compliance may result in possible sanctions. Article 13(2) of the Statutes expressly provides that: “Violation of the above-mentioned obligations by any Member may lead to sanctions provided for in these Statutes.”

One of the most daunting repercussions FIFA may avail itself of is the suspension of a Member. In accordance with Article 14(1) of the Statutes, the primary responsibility for suspending a Member lies with the Congress. However, and as seen in the cases cited above, when violations are deemed to be so serious to require prompt attention, the Executive Committee or even the Emergency Committee may step in and adopt the relevant decision.[18] If not lifted beforehand, such a decision must be confirmed by a three-quarter majority at the next Congress, otherwise it is automatically lifted. A suspension leads to a loss of all membership rights, which effectively prevents other Members from entertaining any sporting contact with the suspended Member. Moreover, the suspension does not preclude the Disciplinary Committee from imposing further sanctions (e.g. fines, return of awards, deduction of points, etc.).[19]

Another measure for addressing an eventual non-compliance with the obligation of independent management of affairs is the non-recognition of wrongfully elected bodies or decisions passed by such bodies in accordance with Article 17(2) of the Statutes. In other words, FIFA has the authority not to recognize an election of a body of one of its Members, if such an election lacks uncompromised independence vis-à-vis third parties, as was the case with the Nigerian Football Federation.

Lastly, it is also worth mentioning that sanctions may be imposed regardless of the grounds and fault for interference of third parties since Article 13(3) of the Statutes, by going beyond the actual interference, provides that: “Violations of par. 1(i) may also lead to sanctions even if the third-party influence was not the fault of the Member concerned.” This basically means that FIFA shall not entertain explanations of third party interventions that may possibly even be justified under the provisions of national law. 

To comply, or not to comply – the CAS escape route

Since a suspension decision virtually ostracises and isolates a Member, a valid point to raise is, whether apart from yielding and fulfilling the imposed conditions, other means remain available to the disgraced Member to challenge such a decision. The same could be said for the situation pertaining to the non-recognition of elected bodies of particular Members.

In accordance with Article 66 of the Statutes any dispute arising between FIFA and its Members shall be resolved by CAS applying the relevant FIFA regulations and subsidiarily Swiss law. The exclusive jurisdiction of CAS is further strengthened in Article 67 of the Statutes which also outlines the procedural requirements for an appeal against a final decision passed by one of the FIFA bodies. Moreover, the Members explicitly agree not to avail themselves of recourse to ordinary courts of law, which significantly narrows their options down.[20]

Given that jurisprudence in named cases is relatively scarce, it is worth having a closer look at the above mentioned award rendered by CAS in the joined cases brought before it by the Nigerian Football Federation.[21] Notwithstanding the previous FIFA decision to suspend the appellant, which was later lifted, the form of relief sought with the appeal was the annulment of two decisions in the form of letters, addressed at the appellant by FIFA. Considering the Court’s conclusion, stemming from the relevant CAS jurisprudence,[22] to dismiss the appeal against the second letter because it did not constitute an appealable decision since it did not contain a ruling affecting the rights of the appellant, hence lacking the animus decidendi,[23] the onus of the award was on the first challenged letter.

In its preliminary remarks the Panel narrowed down the subjective and the objective scope of the review saying that it:”...may only assess de novo, putting itself in FIFA’s place, whether FIFA had sufficient factual and legal grounds, in terms of Article 17 of its Statutes, to adopt the decisions allegedly set forth in the letters challenged by the Appellant.”[24] By abstaining from assessing the eventual legality of the third party infringement, and despite harbouring some doubts about the (non)compliance of the elections with the national law, it further stated that:”...this Panel may not assess the validity of the various NFF elections on the basis of the NFF rules or of Nigerian law, because such appraisal falls outside the scope of FIFA’s authority under Article 17 of its Statutes and, thus, falls outside of the Panel’s scope of review.”[25]

By observing that none of the parties challenged the Court’s jurisdiction, applying the FIFA regulations and additionally Swiss law pursuant to Article R58 of the CAS Code, and by dismissing the Respondent’s arguments pertaining to the admissibility and the Appellant’s active standing, the Panel addressed the legitimacy of FIFA’s non-recognition of the elections pursuant to Article 17 of the Statutes in the merits of the award.[26]

As per the legal grounds of the decision, the Panel stressed that: “The purpose of Article 17 is to grant FIFA the power to not recognize an election where the member association’s electoral process does not guarantee the complete independence of the election.”[27] It went further saying: “...the Panel is of the view that the requirement of “complete independence” found in para. 2 must be understood in the light of para. 1 of Article 17, forbidding “influence from third parties”. Accordingly, an electoral process does not guarantee such complete independence where the election is not managed in a totally independent manner and, in particular, where it is influenced by third parties of any kind (e.g. government officials or bodies).”[28]

Having established FIFA’s authority, the Panel subsequently assessed the relevant evidence submitted by the parties. After determining the relevant factual circumstances, the Panel noted that the intervention from the State Security Services (SSS) influenced the unfolding of the election and consequently of the General Assembly itself, constituting a manifest insufficiency of the independence of the election from the influence of third parties pursuant to Article 17 of the Statutes.[29] The appeal was thus duly dismissed on merits as well.

By dismissing the appeal, and in spite of recognizing the connection of the dispute with “a longstanding struggle occurring in Nigerian football between different personalities and factions fighting for leadership within the NFF”,[30] the Court, by setting a precedent to a certain extent, distanced itself from assessing the compliance of the interference with national law, hence virtually affirming FIFA’s discretion in the evaluation of the circumstances leading to its intervention, which appears to leave an eventual appeal by the Indonesian Football Federation with very slim chances of success. 

Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?[31]

When it comes to independence and third party influence issue, the Members are subject to instant scrutiny from FIFA and are swiftly held accountable, even when they hold no responsibility for a third party intervention, as may be seen in the above cited cases. The same cannot be said when the situation is reversed. FIFA is often not submitted to the same levels of accountability checks as those who are affected by its decisions.[32]

While in some instances FIFA’s prompt intervention appears well-grounded, since interference from a third party is manifestly ill-founded, as may be seen in the case of the Nigerian Football Federation (interventions from State Security Forces and unidentified armed individuals seem to go way beyond the borders of necessity, and can hence hardly be justified), other cases, namely the latest suspension of the PSSI, show that FIFA may have been slightly too quick when pulling the trigger. All the more so, given the circumstantial background of the case (e.g. pressing issues related inter alia to financial, tax and ownership issues of the clubs participating in national leagues which the PSSI, despite previous warnings, was unable or unwilling to cope with, and which in some extreme cases resulted in players losing their lives due to lack of medical care owed to arrears of health care contributions by the clubs), and the government’s intervention could arguably to a certain extent be seen as necessary.[33]

However, as seen above, under the existing rules FIFA is not inclined to look beyond the mere interference of third parties and verify whether such actions might be justified, thus possibly breaching the principle of proportionality which is recognized as a general principle by CAS.[34] Since such discretion seems to have been condoned by the latest CAS decision,[35] one may wonder whether there is actually any room for a more thorough and systematic factual assessment of the background of such interferences in the light of a possible justification, which inevitably raises questions of the eventual (over)restrictive nature of the relevant Statutes provisions themselves. Furthermore, the fact that any government intervention, regardless of the eventual acceptability and consideration of local specificities of each respective Member, is to be seen as a punishable infringement, puts the issue within the frame of the perpetual conundrum of the legitimate boundaries of the lex sportiva.

Since FIFA is virtually accountable to no-one from the hierarchical point of view, and given that governments, with the exception of the Swiss government, have no supervisory powers over it (some would argue that FIFA may itself be seen as a government),[36] the only plausible route for the assessment of the proportionality of the Statutes would seem to be through the legal accountability channel, using EU law, especially its provisions on competition and internal market.[37] In fact, given the precedents (e.g. Charleroi)[38] and the recent legal challenge of FIFA’s decision to ban Third-Party Ownership,[39] these rules appear to have become an increasingly important tool to hold the organization accountable, regardless of the latest developments regarding the prosecution of its officials.[40] A further analysis as to whether such a route remains available to potential appellants from outside of the European Union would, however, go beyond the scope of this paper. 

Conclusion

As presented throughout this brief overview, FIFA has seemingly developed a zero-tolerance policy for any governmental interference regarding the affairs of its Members, thus arguably safeguarding their independence. It has consistently availed itself of one of the most stringent corrective measures for alleged violations envisaged by its Statutes, suspending the non-compliant Members, hence often provoking strong emotional response within the pertinent countries.[41] Whereby such sanctions might be deemed necessary in certain cases, non-consideration of factual background and eventual justifications in others has led to accusations of double standards,[42] and raised questions of proportionality of the relevant Statutes provisions and the borders of the rules governing “purely sporting issues”.

The outcome of the deadlock in the latest case of PSSI remains to be seen, with the government’s intention to thoroughly reform the Indonesian football suggesting that a swift solution might not quite lie around the corner.[43] Given that compliance with the imposed conditions appears to be the route that will be taken in this case, and as long as provisions of the Statutes are not submitted to scrutiny of a competent judicial body, arguably in the form of the European Court of Justice, any future third party interferences shall most likely continue to be dealt with strictly by FIFA and the non-compliant Members will keep finding themselves “on the dark side of the moon”.[44]

[1] Pink Floyd, Eclipse (Dark Side of the Moon, EMI, 1973).

[2] Letter of FIFA to the Republic of Indonesia Minister of Youth and Sports, written in Zurich and sent on 10 April 2015.

[3] Decision of the FIFA Executive Committee: Suspension of the Indonesian Football Federation (PSSI), adopted in Zurich on 30 May 2015.

[4] Joined cases CAS 2014/A/3744 and CAS 2014/A/3766 Nigerian Football Federation v. FIFA, award of 18 May 2015.

[5] Decision of the FIFA Emergency Committee: Suspension of the Nigerian Football Federation (NFF), adopted in Zurich on 9 July 2014.

[6] Decision of the FIFA Emergency Committee: Suspension of the Cameroonian Football Association, adopted in Zurich on 4 July 2013 (FIFA Circular no. 1367, Zurich, 4 July 2013).

[7] Decision of the FIFA Emergency Committee: Suspension of the Football Federation of Belize, adopted in Zurich on 17 June 2011.

[8] Decision of the FIFA Emergency Committee: Suspension of the Kenya Football Federation, adopted in Zurich on 2 June 2004.

[9] Decision of the FIFA Emergency Committee: Suspension of the Islamic Republic of Iran Football Federation (IRIFF), adopted in Zurich on 23 November 2006.

[10] FIFA Decision of 30 May 2015, cited supra note 3.

[11] FIFA Decision of 9 July 2014, cited supra note 5.

[12] Letter of FIFA to Nigerian Football Federation (NFF), written in Zurich and sent on 29 August 2014.

[13] FIFA Decision of 2 June 2004, cited supra note 8.

[14] FIFA Decision of 17 June 2011, cited supra note 7.

[15] FIFA Decision of 23 November 2006, cited supra note 9.

[16] FIFA Statutes (Regulations Governing the Application of the Statutes, Standing Orders of the Congress), adopted in São Paulo on 11 June 2014.

[17] UEFA Statutes (Rules of Procedure of the UEFA, Congress Regulations governing the Implementation of the UEFA Statutes), adopted in Astana on 24 March 2014.

[18] FIFA Statutes, cited supra note 16, Art. 33.

[19] Ibid., Arts. 63, 65.

[20] Ibid., Art. 68.

[21] Nigerian Football Federation v. FIFA, cited supra note 4.

[22] Case CAS 2005/A/899 FC Aris Thessaloniki v. FIFA & New Panionios N.F.C., award of 15 July 2005, para. 12; Case CAS 2004/A/659 Galatasaray SK v. Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) & Club Regatas Vasco da Gama & F. J., award of 17 March 2005, paras. 23-25.

[23] Nigerian Football Federation v. FIFA, cited supra note 4, paras. 192,196.

[24] Ibid., para. 160.

[25] Ibid., para 160.

[26] Ibid., paras. 160-182.

[27] Ibid., para. 200.

[28] Ibid., para. 200.

[29] Ibid., paras. 203-211.

[30] Ibid., para. 213.

[31] “Who guards the guardians?” (translation mine); Juvenal, Satires, (Book II, Satire VI, 1st and early 2nd centuries AD), lines 347–8.

[32] R. Pielke Jr., How can FIFA be held accountable? (Sport Management Review, Issue 16, 2013), pp. 258.

[33] FIFPro, Death of Mendieta must be the turning point for Indonesia, http://www.fifpro.org/en/news/death-of-mendieta-must-be-turning-point-for-indonesia (last visited 28 June 2015).

[34] See inter alia Cases CAS Arbitration CAS 2005/A/830 S. v. FINA, award of 15 July 2005, CAS 2009/A/2012 Doping Authority Netherlands v. N., award of 11 June 2010, CAS 2012/A/2740 Marcelo Carracedo v. Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), award of 18 April 2013.

[35] Nigerian Football Fedration v. FIFA, cited supra note 4.

[36]S. Bradley, FIFA reforms face resistance – and huge support (swissinfo.ch, 5 December 2012), http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/football-scandals_fifa-reforms-face-resistance---and-huge-support/34067104 (last visited 28 June 2015).

[37] R. Pielke, cited supra note 32, pp. 259-262.

[38] Case A/05/03843, SA Sporting du Pays de Charleroi ao v FIFA, Tribunal de Commerce de Charleroi, 15 May 2006 (Case was referred to the European Court of Justice, but did not reach a judgment since the parties reached a settlement out of court),

[39] A. Duff, Portugal, Spain Said to Complain to EU on Soccer Finance Rules (BloombergBusiness, 4 February 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-04/portugal-spain-said-to-complain-to-eu-on-soccer-finance-ban (last visited 28 June 2015).

[40] BBC News, Fifa corruption inquiries: Officials arrested in Zurich (bbc.com, 27 May 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32895048 (last visited 28 June 2015).

[41] ESPN, Iranian Federation suspended by FIFA (espn.com, 23 November 2006), http://www.espnfc.com/story/393454/iranian-federation-suspended-by-fifa (last visited 28 June 2015).

[42] M. Zandi, Is FIFA's Decision in the Best Interest of Football (Association Internationale De La Presse Sportive),http://www.aipsmedia.com/index.php?cod=551&page=news&tp=n#.VZAhwRuqqko (last visited 28 June 2015).

[43] Reuters, Indonesia government takes responsibility for ban (uk.reuters.com, 31 May 2015), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/05/31/uk-soccer-fifa-indonesia-idUKKBN0OG03920150531 (last visited 28 June 2015).

[44] Pink Floyd, Brain Damage (Dark Side of the Moon, EMI, 1973).

Editor’s note: Kester Mekenkamp is an LL.M. student in European Law at Leiden University and an intern at the ASSER International Sports Law Centre. This blog is, to a great extent, an excerpt of his forthcoming thesis, which he shall submit in order to complete his master’s degree.

This is the second part of a three-piece blog on FIFA’s provision on the protection of minors, Article 19 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players. The contribution in its entirety aims to provide an encompassing overview of the rule’s lifespan since its inception in 2001. The previous (first) part has shed light on the “birth” and “first years” of the provision, and as such illustrated the relevant developments from 2001 till 2009. This second part covers the rule’s “adolescent years”, which span from 2009 to the present. The major changes put forward in the 2009, 2015 and 2016 versions of the RSTP will be addressed. Thereafter the important CAS decisions concerning Article 19, Muhic, Vada I and II, FC Barcelona, RFEF, and the FIFA decisions relating to Real Madrid and Atlético Madrid, will be scrutinized. The third, and final, part will constitute a substantive assessment of the provision under EU Internal Market law.

Given that the version adopted in 2008 left Article 19 untouched, the 2009 RSTP represented the next significant step in the regulation of the protection of minors. It had become clear that the system as used up to that point was inadequate to achieve its goal,[1] most notably because several national associations still neglected to strictly apply the rules.[2] In response to this perceived failure, a new set of rules and procedures was adopted and came into force on 1 October 2009: the creation of a special FIFA oversight sub-committee of the PSC, the introduction of a special provision on football academies, and the instalment of a transfer matching system.[3] Importantly, with the enactment of these new regulations, Articles 19 and 19bis RSTP were included in the set of provisions binding upon the national level, which consequently had to be incorporated into the national associations’ regulations without alteration.[4]

This new 11-member PSC sub-committee (consisting of representatives of the confederations, leagues, clubs, players and the PSC’s chairman and deputy chairman) became the supervising body concerning the examination, and potential approval, of every international transfer and first registration of a minor player.[5] Its approval is mandatory and needs to be obtained prior to any request for any association’s ITC-request.[6] Moreover, non-compliance can be sanctioned by the FIFA’s Disciplinary Committee, although a limited exception from this obligation exists for minor amateur players.[7]

Article 19bis RSTP on the registration and reporting of minors at academies was another substantial modification with respect to the protection of minors.[8] A football academy is defined by the regulations as “an organisation or an independent legal entity whose primary, long-term objective is to provide players with long-term training through the provision of the necessary training facilities and infrastructure. This shall primarily include, but not be limited to, football training centres, football camps, football schools, etc.”[9] With the creation of this new provision, all minor players that attend an academy, indifferent to whether or not that academy takes part in a national championship or has a legal, financial or de facto link to a club participating in a national championship, must be reported to the national association upon whose territory the academy operates.[10] This regulation of academies resembles an attempt to deal with what was previously a major loophole, the unregistered academies.[11]

The third major change was the instalment of a transfer matching system (“TMS”), which is a web-based data information system that, first of all, aims to simplify the processing of international transfers.[12] Its task is to provide more details to football’s governing bodies on all transfers taking place.[13] This should furthermore increase the transparency of the individual transactions, and in doing so, it will “improve the credibility and standing of the entire transfer system, and additionally also “safeguard the protection of minors”.[14] In practice, the TMS is a central database that monitors the international movement of players. As mentioned earlier, every application for an international transfer by a minor player must receive the approval of the PSC sub-committee. This process is managed through the transfer matching system, the details of which are stipulated in annexe 2 of the RSTP.[15] The sub-committee decides with three of its members, or, in urgent cases, through a sole member acting as “single judge”.[16] The national association wanting to register a player, files the application for an approval of an international transfer (or first registration) into the TMS.[17] Accompanying this application, the TMS requires a great number of specific documents, depending on the facts of the case and the exception that is being invoked.[18] This mandatory release of information spans documentation on, inter alia: academic and football education, accommodation, player’s and/or player’s parent(s) contract, parental authorisation and a birth certificate.[19] Subsequently, the sub-committee decides whether or not it gives its approval. If so, an ITC will be delivered via the TMS and the transfer can be finalized.[20] Parties involved have 10 days to inquire for the grounds of the decision, after that an appeal before the CAS is still open. Note that this procedure for minors differs from a regular international transfer, in that for the latter there is no substantive review by a third party. The clubs provide the relevant information and the TMS merely, automatically, checks whether the two strands of facts match.[21]

The Elmir Muhic case

The regulatory system laid down in the 2009 RSTP operates in roughly the same manner today, as the revisions of 2010, 2012, 2014, 2015, did not substantially amend the core rules.[22] The case law of the CAS during this period, from 2009 to 2012, provides some examples of the application and interpretation of the 2009 rules.

In Elmir Muhic v. FIFA, a 16-year-old football player from Bosnia-Herzegovina joined the German OFC Kickers Offenbach.[23] Following the PSC sub-committee refusal to give its approval, the case ended up before the CAS. The Panel found that none of the three exceptions applied in the matter at hand. It did specify, in relation to the “parents-rule” of Article 19(2)(a), that the term “parents” needs to be applied stricto sensu.[24] Even though it could “conceivably cover situations beyond the natural parents”, such was not the case here.[25] Muhic’s parents still lived in Bosnia and Herzegovina (and it remained uncertain why they did not joined their child), while the player stayed at his aunt’s house.[26] The Panel stated that an aunt (and relatives alike) cannot replace the player’s parents in order to invoke the exception.[27] 

The Vada II case

Around the same time, Vada II made an important contribution to the application of Article 19(2)(b) (the first case had evolved along the lines of the Acuña award).[28] Valentin Vada was a football player living in Argentina, with dual citizenship. Next to possessing the Argentinian nationality, Vada also owned an Italian passport.[29] The 16-year-old was of the opinion that he could transfer to the French Club Girondins de Bordeaux, based on the “EU and EEA-rule” of Article 19(2)(b) RSTP.[30] FIFA’s single judge rejected the request, as he found the facts of the transfer not to match the strict requirements of the exception.[31] The arbiter reasoned that this exception is based on the criterion of territoriality, not nationality, and thus only refers to “a transfer taking place within the territory of the EU or EEA”.[32] Therefore, as Vada wished to transfer from an Argentinian club, Article 19(2)(b) RSTP could not be applied. Be that as it may, the CAS Panel argued (in length) otherwise. It agreed that the “EU and EEA-rule” merely stipulates a criterion of territoriality not nationality.[33] Still, it also noted that the FIFA’s RSTP commentary (as abovementioned) revealed that this exception was included in the 2001 informal agreement between FIFA/UEFA and the Commission in order for it to respect EU free movement law.[34] Thus, this objective to comply with EU free movement rights could not be ignored.[35] Additionally the CAS found, in line with FC Midtjylland, that the list of exceptions in Article 19(2) is not exhaustive.[36] This was supported by a document submitted by Girondins de Bordeaux setting out the case law of the PSC sub-committee. It explained that “if a club believes that very special circumstances, which do not meet any of the exceptions provided…the association of the club concerned may, on behalf of its affiliate, submit a formal request in writing to the FIFA sub-commission to consider the specific case and make a formal decision”.[37] Moreover, the document showed that the sub-committee in the majority of cases takes free movement law into consideration when “assessing the transfer of a player who, with a passport from an EU or EEA country, wishes to register with a club in an EU or EEA country”.[38] Consequently, the Panel accepted an unwritten exception allowing a player such as Vada, with the nationality of one of the EU or EEA member countries, to invoke Article 19(2)(b) RSTP.[39] 

The Spanish lawbreakers

From 2013 onwards the three biggest and richest football clubs in Spain, at the same time belonging to the top 15 clubs worldwide, Atlético Madrid, Real Madrid and FC Barcelona, found themselves embroiled in a number of legal disputes as a result of signing minors.[40] A significant step unto its own, as it demonstrates that FIFA will not shy away from taking on the big iconic clubs when enforcing its regulations.

This “Spanish saga” kicked-off with a dispute concerning a US teenager, of 13 years old, who moved to Spain together with his parents and wanted to register with Atlético Madrid in September 2012.[41] Once more, the main question was whether the factual constellation of the case supported the application of the “parents-rule” (did the parents move to the country of the new club for reasons not linked to football?), and again the Panel stressed, in line with both Acuña and FC Midtjylland,[42] the need to apply the protection of minors rules in a “strict, rigorous and consistent manner”.[43] This means, following its decision in Vada I, that the family’s move must be unconnected altogether to football.[44] It is insufficient to establish that the move is partially connected to their child’s football activities, although not being the primary aim.[45] The Panel’s factual assessment distinguished multiple relevant elements to come to a decision on the possible application of the exception. Contra: the short timeline (six weeks) between the minor’s arrival in Madrid and the registration request (which hints at a previous intention); the player’s previous footballing activities; the player’s statement, reported on his school’s official website, “that the reason of his move to Spain was the possibility that he has been given to play with the Club Atlético de Madrid”.[46] Pro: the family of the player is partially Colombian, which connected them to Spain for reasons of culture and language; “The family is wealthy and…the basic maintenance of the family is not dependent of a working activity of the parents”; The player’s sister had already moved to Europe for her studies; The first preparations were undoubtedly made several months before the interaction with the club commenced; The club does not have a particular interest in the player “other than having in its team a teenager which may have a certain talent for football, such as many others in the Madrid area”.[47] In sum, the CAS concluded that, due to the exceptional facts, there is no link between the move of the family and their son’s football activities.[48]

The FC Barcelona case

Atlético’s fellow-townsman Real Madrid ended up in a likewise dispute with FIFA regarding a 13-year-old player from Venezuela.[49] The main hitter however was the case regarding their Catalonian archenemy: FC Barcelona.[50] The FIFA TMS, in January 2013, became aware of a potential breach, which ultimately lead to a case involving registrations of 31 minors.[51] These players, of various nationalities, were registered at FC Barcelona in the period from 2005 until 2012.[52] Via the FIFA Disciplinary Committee and Appeal Committee, who both found the club to have violated i.a. Articles 19(1), 19(3), 19(4), 19bis, and Annexe 2 of the RSTP, the case ended up before the CAS.[53] The Panel addressed the different potentially breached articles in a consecutive order, starting with Article 19(1) RSTP. The Panel found FC Barcelona to have infringed this provision with respect to nine players. The club had tried to shelter behind the fact that it had complied with all the rules laid down by the regional Catalonian football association, and, as such, had acted rightfully. The Panel held instead that the ban on internationally transferring minors is without doubt “addressed to both ‘associations’ and clubs”.[54] It thereby emphasized that national associations are paramount to the enforcement of FIFA’s statutes, and in the extent thereof the enforcement of the RSTP. Regional associations, such as the Catalonian, cannot govern the international transfer of players.[55] Given that clubs are the starting point of every international transfer, they “must primarily observe this ban”. The Panel stressed furthermore that Article 19(4) RSTP marks this by obliging the associations to ensure the clubs’ compliance in this matter, and moreover, Article 1(4) RSTP, explains that the Regulations “are binding for all associations and clubs”.[56] FC Barcelona may thus not hide behind apparent mistakes/breaches by both the Catalonian and the Spanish football associations, given that it “did not even try to request the transfers based on any one of the exceptions”.[57] Furthermore, FC Barcelona “should have been aware of the simple fact that they [the Spanish and the Catalonian associations] could not register the minors in any legitimate way under the RSTP”, which the CAS compared to “wilful ignorance” or, the “deliberate shutting of eyes”.[58]

Of the group of minors at the centre of the dispute, three were below the age of 12. FC Barcelona put forward a restrictive reading of the personal scope of application of the Articles 19 and 9(4) RSTP (2010 edition), arguing “that there are no prohibitions for the transfer of players under the age of 12”.[59] It thereby relied on Article 9 of the 2006 RSTP Commentary that stipulates “for players younger than 12, the Regulations do not provide for an obligation to issue an ITC for international transfers”.[60] The Panel nonetheless made short work of this argumentation by explaining that Article 9(4) RSTP’s absence of an obligation to issue an ITC for under-12 players merely addresses a formal requirement. The substantive rules for the international transfer of minors (irrespective whether below or above 12 years of age) are found in Article 19 RSTP, including paragraph 2 of that article.[61] This led the Panel to conclude that “no ITC was required when the transfers occurred for players below the age of 12; their transfer nevertheless, can only be lawful if it complies with the requirements embedded in Article 19(2) RSTP”.[62] The Panel also noted the amendment to Article 9(4) RSTP, effective as of 1 March 2015, which lowered the age at which an ITC is required from 12 to 10.[63]

In short, the CAS also ruled that FC Barcelona had violated Article 19(3) RSTP in relation to one minor, for the same reasons referred to in its findings under Article 19(1) RSTP.[64] Moreover, six cases violated Article 19(4) RSTP, as the Catalonian association had failed to refer these transfers to the PSC sub-committee. These infringements of paragraph 4 further justify that “sanctions may also be imposed (…) on the clubs that reached an agreement for the transfer of a minor”. The CAS in this regard defined the interpretation of the word “agreement” to include “agreements concluded between the registering club and the player himself, his parents, agents, etc”.[65] Further, the Panel established a breach of Article 19bis RSTP for all 31 players under investigation.[66] This constitutes a procedural violation, being “the lack of reporting of information regarding the progress and development of players” attending FC Barcelona’s well-known academy ‘La Masía’”.[67] Be that as it may, the CAS did praise the training and educational track record of La Masía. Thereby it deviated from the Appeal Committee’s ruling. In opposition to the latter it found that the attending players’ potential football careers are not endangered. On the contrary, if FC Barcelona in the future commits itself to its reporting duties under Article 19bis RSTP, then it “will be contributing to the overarching principles governing the protection of minors, since it will be providing other clubs with an enviable benchmark for the education and training of players”.[68] The CAS Panel found the sanctions imposed by the FIFA Disciplinary Committee and the Appeal Committee to be proportionate, and hence confirmed the earlier verdict.[69] Concretely, FC Barcelona was imposed a transfer ban for two transfer periods, as well as a fine of CHF 450,000.[70]

The RFEF case and latest developments

Things had not completely settled down yet with regard to the Spanish national football association: Real Federación Española de Fútbol (“RFEF”).[71] As has become clear in the coverage of the Barcelona case, apparent mistakes were made in the Spanish supervision of the ban on international transfers of minors. In a dispute regarding 31 international minor transfers to several Spanish football clubs[72], the RFEF was found by the CAS to have violated its guarding role and thereby induced a passive infringement of Articles 19(1), 19(3), 19(4) together with Annexes 2 and 3, and Articles 5(1) and 9(1) RSTP. [73] A fine of CHF 280,000 was imposed. The Panel pointed out that the RFEF could not justify its failure by arguing that the RSTP was conflicting with Spanish law, given that the rules on the protection of minors had come about in the 2001 agreement between FIFA/UEFA and the EU, which was acknowledged by Spain as a Member State of the EU.[74] Also, for 21 players below the age of 12 the RFEF had failed to fulfil its notification obligations, which the Panel condemned for the exact same reasons as in the FC Barcelona case.[75] The RFEF had failed to “make use of the statutory frameworks and tools at its disposal to ensure the full protection of minors”, and was found negligent as it failed to ensure that clubs and regional associations strictly complied with Article 19.[76] Furthermore, it had in some cases not fulfilled its obligation to seek the approval of the PSC subcommittee nor even submitted an application for such transfers.[77]

Ultimately in 2016, a fate similar to that of “Barça” fell upon both Atlético and Real Madrid.[78] The concise FIFA press release indicates that investigations were conducted by FIFA TMS, which “concerned minor players who were involved and participated in competitions with the clubs over various periods”, between roughly 2005 and 2014. Both clubs were sanctioned for violating, amongst others, Articles 19 and 19bis as well as annexe 2 of the RSTP. The clubs appealed (by which the sanctions were temporarily lifted), yet in September 2016 these appeals were similarly rejected by FIFA’s Appeal Committee.[79] This meant that Atlético Madrid and Real Madrid will have to serve a transfer ban lasting two consecutive transfer periods (e.g. until January 2018), during which they will not be able to attract any players, and were fined CHF 900,000 and CHF 360,000 respectively. The clubs were given a 90 day period “to regularise the situation of all minor players concerned”.[80] A little over a week later, Real Madrid informed the CAS that it would appeal FIFA’s decision before the court in Lausanne.[81] The final outcome of this appeal is still unknown.

In a similar vein, very recently, the English club Manchester City has come under suspicion for allegedly wanting to transfer a 15-year-old player from Argentina, while the Dutch club Ajax was denied by the CAS to sign an American player aged 15.[82] These cases exemplify that clubs might just not be ready to put the practice of internationally transferring minors to bed yet. Moreover, the adaptation of the relevant rules is a sign for the need of continuous monitoring the effect of the provision on the protection of minors. The latest update, the June 2016 version, has incorporated another exception to the prohibition for the international transfer of minors, which has been created through the Sub-Committee’s case law.[83] Players that have for the five years preceding the request continuously lived in the country (other than that of their nationality) of intended registration are now exempted from the prohibition.[84]

In this part 2 of the blog, I have shown that FIFA’s restrictions on minor transfers have become more stringent after the 2009 reform. In recent years, FIFA has also cracked down on various prominent clubs, especially in Spain, which were still involved in recruiting minor players while disregarding, with the tacit support of their national federation, FIFA’s rules. Unsurprisingly, these developments have also flared up again the debate on the compatibility of those rules with EU law.[85] Thus, the next, third and final, part of this blog on FIFA’s provision on the protection of minors will offer a substantive assessment of FIFA’s rule under the requirements of EU Internal Market law. 

[1] A. Najarian, “’The Lost Boys’: FIFA's Insufficient Efforts To Stop Trafficking of Youth Footballers”, Sports Law. J. 2015, p. 167; R. Simons, “Protection of Minors vs. European Law”, Eur Sports Law Bulletin 2010, p. 172.

[2] R. Simons, “FIFA Transfer Matching System wel effectief?”, TvS&R 2011, p. 100.

[3] FIFA Circular no. 1190, 20 May 2009.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Art. 19(4) FIFA RTSP 2009.

[6] FIFA Circular no. 1206, 13 October 2009.

[7] FIFA Circular 1209, 30 October 2009.

[8] Art. 19bis FIFA RSTP 2009.

[9] Definition 12 FIFA RSTP 2009.

[10] Art. 19bis(1) and (2) FIFA RSTP 2009; Supra at 5.

[11] V. Derungs, “Protecting underage football players in the transfer system”, World Sports L. Report 2015, p. 15.

[12] Definition 13 FIFA RSTP 2016.

[13] N. St. Cyr Clarke, “The beauty and the beast: Taming the ugly side of the people’s game”, 2011 Columbia Journal of European Law, p. 619.

[14] FIFA Circular No. 1174, 12 January 2009.

[15] Annexe 2 FIFA RSTP 2016

[16] Art. 3(2) Annexe 2 FIFA RSTP 2009.

[17] Art. 5(1) Annexe 2 FIFA RSTP 2009.

[18] Art. 5(2) Annexe 2 FIFA RSTP 2009.

[19] FIFA Document, Protection of minors – Pertinent facts to be included in documents.

[20] Art. 9 and Annexe 3 FIFA RSTP 2009.

[21] For precise steps see FIFA TMS, Global Transfer Market Report 2016, p. 8; Supra at 4, p. 101.

[22] FIFA, Transfers, Player’s status, Clubs, Agents Regulations - Archived regulations

[23] Arbitration CAS 2011/A/2354 E. v. Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), award of 24 August 2011: At the same time, he participated in a three-year educational/trainee program at a company in Frankfurt, which aimed “to prepare him as office clerk to apply for a job as ‘Airport Manager’”. The German national football association, on behalf of Muhic and Kickers Offenbach made a request to FIFA for an exception via a special authorization for the transfer, founded on the “hardship based on the specific circumstances of the present case, namely the move of the player from Bosnia and Herzegovina to Germany without his parents, but with their expressed consent, for reasons not linked to football but to benefit from a humanitarian educational project” (p. 2.).

[24] Ibid, para. 17.

[25] Ibid, para. 18.

[26] Ibid, para. 18 and p. 2; Furthermore, the Panel recalled that Bosnia and Herzegovina is neither a member of the EU nor of the EEA and, as a consequence thereof, a player with this nationality cannot rely on the exception of Article 19(2)(b) RSTP (para. 20). The Panel subsequently, by emphasizing that the rationale for this exception is the “free movement of services and services suppliers within the EU and the EEA (and other production factors)”, quickly dismissed the appellant’s claim for the application of this provision resting on “the Stabilization and Association Agreement signed between the EU and Bosnia and Herzegovina” (paras. 21-23). In final, the CAS once more indicated that Article 19’s rationale was not to stop voluntary movement, yet it felt compelled to apply the protection of minors strictly: “Opening up the door to exceptions beyond those carefully drafted and included in the present text would unavoidably lead to cases of circumvention of the rationale for this provision” (para. 26). Moreover, Muhic could still continue his education, which was his primary reason to move to Germany, and likewise train with his team. He did have to wait a few months before becoming 18 years of age and thus eligible to start in professional matches. Nevertheless, the Panel concluded that this could not amount to constitute an “exceptional hardship going beyond the general impact of the provisions on the protection of minors” (para. 27).

[27] Supra at 11, p. 15.

[28] Arbitrage TAS 2012/A/2862 FC Girondins de Bordeaux c. Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), sentence du 11 janvier 2013 (Vada II); Arbitrage TAS 2011/A/2494 FC Girondins de Bordeaux c. Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), sentence du 22 décembre 2011 (Vada I).

[29] TAS 2012/A/2862 (Vada II), para. 3.

[30] Ibid, para. 18.

[31] Ibid, para. 19.

[32] Ibid, para. 19; Bulletin TAS CAS Bulletin 2014/2, p. 29.

[33] Supra at 29, para. 91.

[34] Ibid, para. 94.

[35] Ibid, para. 95.

[36] CAS 2008/A/1485 FC Midtjylland A/S v. Féderation Internationale de Football Association, paras. 19-21.

[37] Supra at 29, para. 96; Bulletin TAS CAS Bulletin 2014/2, p. 29.

[38] Supra at 29, para. 97.

[39] Ibid, paras. 98-100.                                                                                                                                                                  

[40] The Guardian, 29 April 2015, “Atlético Madrid and Real deny reports they are facing Fifa transfer embargo”.

[41] Arbitration CAS 2013/A/3140 A. v. Club Atlético de Madrid SAD & Real Federación Española de Fútbol (RFEF) & Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), award of 10 October 2013.

[42] CAS 2005/A/955 Càdiz C.F., SAD v FIFA and Asociación Paraguaya de Fútbol and CAS 2005/A/956 Carlos Javier Acuña Caballero v/FIFA and Asociación Paraguaya de Fútbol; CAS 2008/A/1485 FC Midtjylland A/S v. Féderation Internationale de Football Association.

[43] Supra at 41, paras. 8.20-8.23.

[44] TAS 2011/A/2494 FC (Vada I), paras. 31-38.

[45] Supra at 41, paras. 8.25.

[46] Ibid, para. 8.30.

[47] Ibid, para. 8.31.

[48] Ibid, paras. 8.32-36.

[49] Arbitration CAS 2014/A/3611 Real Madrid FC v. Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), award of 27 February 2015: The PSC Sub-Committee had rejected the request, which was again founded on the “parent rule”. It did so inter alia since the player’s parents had merely obtained a temporary residence permit that denied them the right to work, while the submitted employment contracts “made reference to enterprises incorporated and domiciled in Venezuela” (para. 11). This in combination with the fact that the player had moved to Spain one month in advance of his parents, led the PSC to believe that their move was linked to Real Madrid’s interest in their son (paras. 12-14). The subsequent proceedings before the CAS are only of interest in relation to the procedural aspects, since the appeal was declared inadmissible and consequently did not address the merits (paras. 63-66).

[50] CAS 2014/A/3793 Fútbol Club Barcelona v. Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), award of 24 April 2015.

[51] Bulletin TAS CAS Bulletin 2015/2, p. 76; Supra at 52, paras. 2.3-2.11.

[52] Supra at 50, para. 2.2.

[53] Supra at 51, p. 77.

[54] Supra at 50, paras. 9.1-9.2.

[55] Ibid, paras. 9.2-9.3.

[56] Ibid, para. 9.4.

[57] Ibid.

[58] Ibid.

[59] Ibid, para. 9.7.

[60] Ibid.

[61] Ibid, para. 9.8.

[62] Ibid.

[63] Ibid, para. 9.9.

[64] Ibid, paras. 9.10-9.12.

[65] Ibid, para. 9.14.

[66] Ibid, para. 9.18.

[67] Ibid, para. 9.19.

[68] Ibid.

[69] Ibid, paras. 9.29-9.36 and 10.

[70] Ibid, para. 2.18.

[71] CAS 2014/A/3813 Real Federación Española de Fútbol (RFEF) v. Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), 27 November 2015.

[72] Coincidentally the exact same number of minors under investigation as in the FC Barcelona Case. Be that as it may, in the case a hand the minors transferred to various Spanish clubs.

[73] Bulletin TAS CAS Bulletin 2016/1. P. 66.

[74] Ibid, p. 63, the Panel stated “As a member of the European Union, the Kingdom of Spain had acknowledged the application of this general prohibition throughout Spain and no express Spanish law stating otherwise had been brought to the Panel’s attention”.

[75] Supra at 73, p. 63.

[76] Ibid, p. 64.

[77] Ibid.

[78] FIFA, 14 January 2016, “Atlético de Madrid and Real Madrid sanctioned for international transfers of minors”.

[79] FIFA, 8 September 2016, “FIFA rejects appeals of Atlético de Madrid and Real Madrid in relation to transfers of minors”.

[80] The Guardian, 8 September 2016, “Real Madrid and Atlético Madrid lose appeals against Fifa transfer ban”.

[81] CAS, 16 September, “Request for stay filed by Real Madrid CF granted by the Court of Arbitration for Sport”.

[82] Independent, 22 September 2016, “Manchester City could face transfer ban after being reported to Fifa for 'trafficking' of youngster”; USA Today, 29 October 2016, “CAS rejects US teenager’s challenge to FIFA transfer rules”.

[83] Supra at 11, p. 15; FIFA Circular no. 1542, 1 June 2016.

[84] Art. 19(3) FIFA RSTP 2016.

[85] Reuters, 24 November 2016, “FIFA faces lawsuit over rules banning transfer of minors”.