Qatar’s successful bid to host the 2022 World Cup left many people
thunderstruck: How can a country with a population of 2 million people and with
absolutely no football tradition host the biggest football event in the world?
Furthermore, how on earth can players and fans alike survive when the
temperature is expected to exceed 50 °C during the month (June) the tournament
is supposed to take place?
Other people were less surprised when FIFA’s President, Sepp Blatter,
pulled the piece of paper with the word “Qatar” out of the envelope on 2
December 2010. This was just the latest move by a sporting body that was reinforcing
a reputation of being over-conservative, corrupt, prone to conflict-of-interest
and convinced of being above any Law, be it national or international.
Interestingly enough, by 2011, FIFA itself was increasingly becoming
aware of its loss of popularity. After his (third) re-election, President
Blatter began to promote the idea of a “Solutions Committee to help promote
reforms within FIFA”. In August of that same year Prof. Dr. Mark Pieth, Chairman
of the OECD Working Group on Bribery, was asked to analyse the existing
governance structure and to make recommendations for its improvement. His review, published on 19 September 2011, recommended
FIFA to e.g. introduce a conflict-of-interest regulation foreseeing the removal
of FIFA officials in case of breach and to set term limits for FIFA officials
such as the President. As a result of the review, President Blatter decided to
appoint an Independent Governance Committee (IGC), to be led by Prof. Pieth.
The project called the ‘FIFA Governance Reform Project’ was to “oversee
the creation and implementation of a framework of good governance and controls
for FIFA to ensure the organization’s integrity with the ultimate goal of
restoring confidence amongst FIFA stakeholders, including fans and the wider
public”[1]. The
IGC’s first report, published on 20 March 2012, contained a set
of recommendations that were very similar to what Prof. Pieth had recommended
in his previous review: FIFA had to become more transparent and independent
judicial and financial/compliance oversight bodies had to be established.
Initially, FIFA followed the IGC’s proposals by establishing an Ethics
Committee and an Audit & Compliance Committee. However, The IGC stated that the reform process was far from
completed, highlighting that there is still an urgent need to update internal
regulations on compliance, conflict-of-interest and the internal organization
in general. To the IGC’s growing disappointment, it soon became clear that FIFA
was proving very reluctant to modernize in accordance with good governance
requirements.
On numerous occasion the IGC stressed the need to introduce further
transparency and accountability throughout FIFA[2].
To achieve this, FIFA officials would have to undergo an integrity check
performed by an independent body prior to their (re-) election, the President
and the Members of the FIFA Executive Committee would have to be be subjected
to limited terms in office and two independent Members would have to attend the
meetings of the FIFA Executive Committee. A major setback for the IGC was the unanimous declaration of all
53 Member Associations of UEFA of 24 January 2013. UEFA was of the opinion that
no term limits for members of the FIFA Executive Committee and that integrity
checks on candidates shall not be performed by FIFA but by the Confederations,
such as UEFA. Quoting IGC’s own report, this was a signal that the reform
agenda was likely to be high-jacked by rivalling interest groups within FIFA,
supported by those fearing to lose their long-time privileges and networks[3]. The
fact that on the eve of the FIFA Congress of 2013 UEFA demanded a decision to
be taken on the limited terms proposal, knowing that the motion would fail to
meet the ¾ majority vote, meant that it would do everything in its power to
prevent the IGC’s recommendations of being implemented. Feeling frustrated,
several members of the IGC decided to leave the Independent Governance
Committee after it became clear to them that FIFA was not serious about the
proposed changes[4].
The remaining Members of the IGC, whose mandate terminated at the end of
2013, published their final report on 22 April 2014. The 15 page report specifies
a detailed chronological summary of the IGC’s work, including why FIFA gave it
the task to provide recommendations and what recommendations had been
implemented. More importantly, however, the report also mentioned all the
difficulties the IGC encountered while performing its mandate and it
highlighted once again the recommendations, which had not been implemented by
FIFA: term limits for FIFA officials, integrity checks for all members of FIFA
standing committees performed by FIFA itself and improved reviews of key
processes, such as the World Cups bidding process[5]. Not
surprisingly, the IGC strongly advocates that these recommendations are implemented
nonetheless. Furthermore, the IGC insisted that the new Ethics Committee should
be able to investigate events that occurred before the Governance Reform
Project was started, especially Qatar’s successful bid to host the 2022 World
Cup.
The next FIFA Congress will take place in Sao Paulo on 11 June 2014, one
day before the World Cup kicks off. As the supreme and legislative body, the
Congress has the right to vote on proposals for amendments to FIFA Statutes and
Regulations and is therefore competent for implementing scores of the IGC’s
recommendations. Taking into account UEFA’s position at last year’s Congress
and FIFA’s overall reluctance to reform itself in accordance with good
governance standards, chances of a significant change are very slim. But, with
the whole world looking at FIFA due to the World Cup, this could well be a golden
opportunity to push FIFA to endorse the IGC’s remaining recommendations and finally
become the transparent and accountable sporting governing body that the
football family deserves.
[1] Final Report by the
Independent Governance Committee to the Executive Committee of FIFA, 22 April
2014
[2] See for example:
Media releases of 8 February 2013 and 21 March 2013
[3] Final Report by the
Independent Governance Committee to the Executive Committee of FIFA, page 10
[4] See for example:
Media release of 24 April 2013
[5] Final Report by the Independent
Governance Committee to the Executive Committee of FIFA, page 12-13