The International Sports Law Journal (ISLJ) invites submissions to a special issue focusing on legal aspects of fantasy sports. For some time, fantasy sports has been a major phenomena in North America and this has been reflected in the sports law literature. Fantasy sports have more recently grown in popularity in the rest of world, raising a number of novel legal questions. The ISLJ wants to support fruitful global discussions about these questions through a special issue. We welcome contributions from different jurisdictions analyzing fantasy sports from the perspective of various areas of law including, but not limited to, intellectual property law, gambling law, and competition law.

Please submit proposed papers through the ISLJ submission system (http://islj.edmgr.com/) no later than November 15, 2020. Submissions should have a reccomended length of 8,000–12,000 words and be prepared in accordance with the ISLJ's house style guidelines (https://www.springer.com/journal/40318/submission-guidelines). All submissions will be subject to double-blind peer review.

Question about the special issue can be directed to the Editor–in-Chief, Johan Lindholm (johan.lindholm@umu.se).

The Headlines

Human rights and sport  

Caster Semenya

Human rights issues are taking the headlines in the sporting world at present. A short time ago, Caster Semenya’s appeal at the Swiss Federal Tribunal against the CAS decision was dismissed, perhaps raising more questions than answering them. Within the last few days however, the message from the Semenya camp has been that this is not over (see here).  See the contributions from a range of authors at Asser International Sports Law Blog for a comprehensive analysis of the Semenya case(s) to date.

Navid Afkari

As the sporting world heard of the execution of Iranian Wrestler Navid Afkari, a multitude of legal and ethical questions bubbled to the surface. Not least of all and not a new question: what is the responsibility of sport and the governing bodies therein, in the space of human rights?  And, if an athlete is to acquire a high profile through sporting excellence, does that render athletes vulnerable to be made an example of and therefore in need of greater protection than is currently afforded to them? There are differing views on how to proceed. Consider the following from the World Players Association (Navid Afkari: How sport must respond) and that from the IOC (IOC Statement on the execution of wrestler Navid Afkari) which shows no indication through this press releases and other commentary, of undertaking the measures demanded by World Players Association and other socially active organisations. (See also, Benjamin Weinthal - Olympics refuses to discuss Iranian regime’s murder of wrestler).

Yelena Leuchanka

As this is written and relevant to the above, Yelena Leuchanka is behind bars for her participation in protests, resulting in several sporting bodies calling for her immediate release and for reform in the sporting world around how it ought to deal with these issues. As a member of the “Belarus women's national basketball team, a former player at several WNBA clubs in the United States and a two-time Olympian”, Leuchanka has quite the profile and it is alleged that she is being made an example of. (see here)

Uighur Muslims and Beijing Winter Olympics

British Foreign Secretary, Dominic Raab does not rule out Winter Olympics boycott over Uighur Muslims. ‘The foreign secretary said it was his "instinct to separate sport from diplomacy and politics" but that there "comes a point where that might not be possible".’ Though Raab’s comments are fresh, this issue is shaping as a “watch this space” scenario, as other governments might echo a similar sentiment as a result of mounting pressure from human rights activist groups and similar, in lead up to the Winter Games.

Major International Sports Law Decisions

CAS Decisions (September)

• CAS 2017/A/5444 Olga Zaytseva v. International Olympic Committee (IOC)
• CAS 2017/A/5435 Yana Romanova v. International Olympic Committee (IOC)
• CAS 2017/A/5434 Olga Vilukhina v. International Olympic Committee (IOC)
• CAS 2019/A/6483 Wydad Athletic Club v. Confédération Africaine de Football (CAF) & Espérance Sportive de Tunis

Official Documents and Press Releases

CAS

• Decisions rendered by the CAS in the appeal arbitrations between Russian athletes Olga Vilukhina, Yana Romanova and Olga Zaytseva, and the IOC
•  CAS dismisses the appeal of Wydad Athletic Club
• CAS decides that the International Surfing Association shall be the International Federation governing and administrating the sport of Stand-Up Paddleboard at Olympic level
•  CAS finds Ibai Salas Zorrozua guilty of an anti-doping rule violation; imposes four-year period of ineligibility
•  CAS dismisses the appeal filed by the UAE Football Association

FIFA

•  FIFA publishes first-ever manual on third-party influence and ownership
•  Manual on “TPI” and “TPO” in football agreements
• FIFA publishes first reports for Disciplinary & Ethics Committees and on anti-doping activities
• DISCIPLINARY & ETHICS REPORT 2019/20
• ANTI–DOPING REPORT 2019/20
• FIFA publishes its Guide to Submitting a Minor Application
•  PROTECTION OF MINORS Guide to submitting a Minor Application SEPTEMBER 2020 EDITION
• Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players October 2020 Edition (including COVID-19 temporary amendments)
• Post FIFA Congress press conference
• FIFA President meets US President and US Attorney General
• FIFA COVID-19 Relief Plan helps restart Thai league
• UNODC, FIFA partner to kick out corruption and foster youth development through football
• Normalisation committee appointed for Venezuelan Football Association
• FIFA suspends the Trinidad and Tobago Football Association

FIFPro

• Fake contracts with Turkish clubs

IOC

• IOC Executive Board meeting – Information for the media
• IOC and Tokyo 2020 agree on measures to deliver Games fit for a post-corona world

UEFA

• UEFA allows return of fans at maximum 30% of capacity pending approval of local authorities
• The Executive Committee approved special rules for the group stage of the UEFA Champions League and UEFA Europa League with regard to the organisation of matches in the light of Covid-19.
• 2020/21 UEFA Women’s Champions League, competition regulations revised accordingly and special rules have been introduced, in case of both travel restrictions and positive Covid-19 tests.

WADA

• WADA publishes new Guidelines for Education
• WADA welcomes decision of French court in Diack case
• WADA to boost investigations capabilities with new compliance team
• WADA publishes revised Technical Letter TL22: Ethylmorphine
• WADA issues revised 2021 International Standard for the Protection of Privacy and Personal Information
• WADA publishes redesigned, more athlete-friendly, 2021 Prohibited List
• WADA issues 2021 International Standard for Laboratories
• WADA launches stakeholder consultation regarding 2021 Technical Documents

ITF

• TENNIS GOVERNING BODIES STATEMENT: PLAYER REPRESENTATION

World Athletics

• World Athletics Council extends deadline for RusAF’s reinstatement plan
• World Athletics statement on today's Paris Criminal Court ruling
• World Athletics welcomes Swiss Federal Tribunal decision on its Eligibility Rules for Athletes with Differences of Sex Development (DSD)
•  World Athletics publishes Annual Report

Other Civil Society Organizations/Unions

• World Players responds to WADA’s new rules for substances of abuse: urgent action required
• EU Athletes report - Covid-19 impact on players and their player associations
• Full report - Preliminary Research on the impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Players and their Player Associations European Elite Athletes Association
• EU Athletes supports Belarusian athletes and calls for the release of Yelena Leuchanka

In the News

Cricket

• CSA may consider criminal case against Thabang Moroe after damning findings - Cricket South Africa (CSA) has finally released a summary of the Fundudzi Report which revealed serious allegations of mismanagement by former chief executive Thabang Moroe.

Doping

• U.S. Cycling Athlete Jeff Martin Accepts Sanction for Anti-Doping Rule Violation
• U.S. Weightlifting Athlete Morgan Millican Accepts Sanction for Anti-Doping Rule Violation
•  Liam Morgan - Kenyan President troubled by doping cases among country's athletes
• Sean Ingle - Former Team Sky doctor destroyed laptop before handing it to experts, tribunal told

• French Open 2020: Alleged match-fixing investigated in women's doubles match

Academic Materials

International Sports Law Journal

• Shaun Star & Sarah Kelly - A level playing field in anti-doping disputes? The need to scrutinize procedural fairness at first instance hearings
• Cedrick Aghey - Integration of eSports in the structure of Ifs: disruption or continuity?
• Jacob Kornbeck - What can sports governing bodies do to comply with EU antitrust rules while maintaining territorial exclusivity?

Blog

Asser International Sports Law Blog

• SFT rejects Semenya appeal: nothing changes - By Andy Brown
• The Semenya Decision of the Swiss Federal Tribunal: Human Rights on the Bench - By Faraz Shahlaei
• The SFT’s Semenya Decision under European human rights standards: Conflicting considerations and why a recourse could be successful at Strasbourg - By Kevin Gerenni
• Selected procedural issues –and questions– arising out the Caster Semenya Judgment of the Swiss Federal Tribunal - By Despina Mavromati
• Caster Semenya Case Exposes Design Flaws in International Sports Governance - By Roger Pielke Jr.
• Caster Semenya at the SFT – in 10 points - By Jack Anderson
• Chronicle of a Defeat Foretold: Dissecting the Swiss Federal Tribunal’s Semenya Decision - By Marjolaine Viret
• New Transnational Sports Law Articles Released on SSRN - Antoine Duval

 Law in Sport

• WADA v. Sun Yang & FINA: Reflections of a Chinese lawyer & lessons for sports in China
• Freedom of speech vs. employment obligations in Germany – the cases of Joshiko Saibou & Jadon Sancho
• Cheating in esports: a review of ESIC’s "coach spectator bug" decision
• How rugby union is responding to Covid-19: a legal update
• Is there trouble on the horizon for algorithms in sport?
• What does The Singapore Convention mean for the future of international sports mediation?

Play the Game

• Athletes’ gestures are protected by international human rights law
• The same clubs dominate Champions League despite the corona pandemic: CL Diversity Index 2020/21
• Athletes should not be gagged in exchange for Olympic dream
• Australian football executives sue FIFA whistleblower

Sport and EU Blog

• The Professional Tennis Players Association: a vehicle for improvement in governance standard

Sport Integrity Initiative

• Six tennis players involved in fixed matches
• Fiji footballers set to appeal doping bans
• Sports Integrity Briefs – 1 October 

SportLegis

• Lack of legal interest worthy of protection in case of a sporting competition that already took place
• A letter of appointment of a sole arbitrator is not a decision that can be appealed directly to the Swiss Federal Tribunal
•  Questions of standing to be sued and alleged violation of procedural public policy
• Partial annulment of a CAS award due to violation of the party’s right to be heard

Podcasts

LawInSport

• Ricky Volante, Chief Executive Officer at the Professional Collegiate League - E95
• #Justice4Navid - How should sport respond? – E94
• Moving from exclusive to inclusive models of sport - Takuya Yamazaki - E93

The Forward Line

• EPISODE 27: TFL TACKLES Broadcast Wars, the Big 10 Conference & Conor McKenna's Retirement
• EPISODE 25: TFL TACKLES the Pink Mercedes, Free the Flag & the Tour of Poland

On next Thursday the 2014 World Cup will kick off in Sao Paulo. But next week will also see the FIFA members meeting on Tuesday and Wednesday at a much awaited FIFA congress. For this special occasion we decided to review FIFA’s financial reports over the last ten years. This post is the first of two, analysing the reports and highlighting the main economic trends at play at FIFA. First, we will study the revenue streams and their evolution along the 2003-2013 time span. In order to ensure an accurate comparison, we have adjusted the revenues to inflation, in order to provide a level playing field easing the comparative analysis over the years and types of revenues. Our first two graphs gather the main revenue streams into two comparative overviews. Graph 1 brings together the different types of revenues in absolute numbers, while Graph 2 lays down the share of each type of revenues for any given year (the others category covers a bundle of minor revenue streams not directly relevant to our analysis).

Graph 1: FIFA revenues in Millions of Dollars, 2003-2013 (adjusted for inflation).

Since 2003, FIFA’s total revenues have more than doubled, from 685 Million$ to 1406 Million$. Its constant growth over the last decade turned negative only in 2011 and 2012 due to a fallout in broadcasting revenues (see below Graph 4). In terms of economic power this means that FIFA has doubled its financial capacity within ten years.  It has succeeded in developing new income streams, while also consolidating its traditional source of revenue: broadcasting rights.

Key to FIFA’s continuous enrichment were the broadcasting revenues. From 2006 to 2010 they nearly doubled from 391 Million$ to 779 Million$. A huge 100% jump! Since this peak, revenues have settled for a more modest amount of around 600 Million$, but still much higher than at the turn of the century. In any given year the broadcasting revenues represent 40 to 50% of FIFA’s total revenues. Thus, one can understand the paramount importance of broadcasting rights for the economic stability and health of FIFA. The progressive bite of the revised TV without frontier directive of the EU (revised in 1997), enabling countries to define certain World Cup games as “major events” which therefore must be broadcasted freely, might explain the recent fall in broadcasting revenues. In this context, recent decisions of the EU Courts, in cases T-68/08, C‑205/11 P and  C‑204/11 P reinforce the rights of the Member States to make use of the “major events” listing, this could, on the long run, limit the rise of the broadcasting revenues for FIFA.

Graph 4: FIFA Broadcasting Revenues 2003-2013 (adjusted to Inflation)

The marketing rights (see graph 5) constitute the second leg of FIFA’s financial income stream. They have been constantly growing since 2003. From 168 Million$ in 2003 to 419 Million$ in 2013, reaching quasi 150% growth (at constant prices). In recent years, this has been a more dynamic revenue stream than broadcasting rights, but it has remained less important in absolute terms. It seems that the FIFA Partners Programme launched by FIFA, probably inspired by the TOP Programme created by the IOC, is a tremendous success. Nowadays, marketing rights constitute 30 to 35% of FIFA’s total revenues. Together, broadcasting revenues and marketing rights amount to a staggering 75 to 85% of FIFA’s total revenues. A share which remained more or less stable over the latest years (see Graph2).

Graph 5: FIFA Revenues from Marketing rights 2003-2013

The rather minor revenue streams are constituted by the FIFA hospitality rights, licensing and brand licensing revenues. Hospitality rights revenues (Graph 6) are a relic from the past. They derive from the profits made by MATCH Hospitality, the sole company authorised by FIFA to offer and guarantee exclusive hospitality packages for every match of the FIFA World Cup directly or through its appointed sales agents. With the competition of internet-based travel agencies and the evolution of the ticketing system of FIFA under the pressure of the European Commission, the revenues of match hospitality have been dwindling over the last 10 years.

Graph 6: FIFA Hospitality Rights Revenues 2003-2013 (adjusted for inflation)

The FIFA licensing programme (Graph 7) derives its revenues from fixed royalty payments and variable profit shares paid for the use of the FIFA brand. FIFA’s licensing programme covers a broad range of activities, including for example numismatic and philatelic collections and the more classical retail & merchandising. After a peak at the World Cup 2006 in Germany, where FIFA licensing brought in 51 Million$, licensing revenues have remained more or less stable averaging at 10 to 20 Million$ a year.

Graph 7: FIFA Licensing Revenues 2003-2013 (adjusted for inflation)

Another closely related, but distinct for accountancy purposes, income stream, is the one generated by brand licensing (Graph 8). Five companies dispose of a specific agreement with FIFA: Adidas, Electronic Arts, Hublot, Louis Vuitton and Panini. Each of these companies holds a licence to use the FIFA Brand Marks in the advertising, marketing, promotion and sale of its licensed products or programmes. These long-term licensing agreements bring in more and more money, from 5 Million$ in 2003, to 58 Million$ in 2013. The biggest jump for a category of FIFA revenues.  Its success is exemplified by the world-wide fame of the eponym Electronic Arts video game: FIFA. However, all three revenue streams amount to less than 10% of FIFA’s total revenues in 2013, the lion share is still constituted by the broadcasting rights.

Graph 8: FIFA Brand Licensing Revenues 2003-2013 (adjusted for inflation)

Conclusion: Get rich and die getting richer?

Economically the last 10 years have been a phenomenal success for FIFA. Its revenues have grown substantially and it has, to some extent, managed to diversify its revenue streams. Indeed, FIFA is less and less dependent on broadcasting revenues, while relying more and more on marketing and brand licensing income streams. This diversification appears judicious as the broadcasting market seem to be losing steam, especially in light of a public will, at least at the European level, to control and tame the monopoly of FIFA over the broadcasting of the World Cup. Thus, FIFA is in a paradoxical situation. It will enter its congress engulfed in an unending governance crisis, but financially it looks as profitable as ever. In some way the big leap forward of FIFA’s recent, and highly successful, commercialization might cause the existential crisis it is now confronted with. Indeed, all this fresh money influx may have destabilized even more a governance system prone to favour nepotism. Hence, the paradox might be that FIFA got rich and might die (at least as we know it) because of it. This is also connected to the way FIFA distributes the revenues it collects, which will be the focus point of the second part of this blog series.

Editor's note: Roger Pielke Jr. is a professor at the University of Colorado Boulder

The decision this week by the Swiss Federal Tribunal not to revisit the arbitral decision of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) in the case of Caster Semenya was not unexpected, but it does help to expose a major design flaw in international sports governance. Specifically, the institutions that collectively comprise, create and enforce “sports law” appear incapable of addressing flawed science and violations of basic principles of medical ethics.

While different people will have different, and legitimate, views on how male-female competition classifications might be regulated, the issues highlighted involving science and ethics are not subjective, and are empirically undeniable. In normal systems of jurisprudence, procedures are in place to right such wrongs, but in sports governance processes in place prevent such course corrections. And that is a problem.

The empirical flaws in the science underpinning the IAAF (now World Athletics) Semenya regulations are by now well understood, and have been accepted by WA in print and before CAS (I was an expert witness for Semenya, and was present when IAAF accepted responsibility for the flawed research). You can read all the details here and in the CAS Semenya decision. I won’t rehash the flawed science here, but the errors are fatal to the research and obvious to see.

One key part of the comprehensive institutional failures here is that the journal which originally published the flawed IAAF research (the British Journal of Sports Medicine, BJSM) has, inexplicably, acted to protect that work from scrutiny, correction and retraction. Normally in the scientific community, when errors of this magnitude are found, the research is retracted. In this case, the BJSM refused to retract the paper, to require its authors to share their data or to publish a critique of the IAAF analysis. Instead, upon learning of the major errors, the BJSM published a rushed, non-peer reviewed letter by IAAF seeking to cover-up the errors. All of this is non-standard, and a scandal in its own right.

The violation of basic principles of medical ethics required by the implementation of the WA Semenya regulations is also not contested. Both WA and the IOC have claimed to uphold the World Medical Association’s Helsinki Declaration on medical and research ethics. Yet, the WMA has openly criticized the WA regulations as unethical and asked doctors not to implement them. In response, WA has stated that it will help athletes who wish to follow the regulations to identify doctors willing to ignore medical ethics guidelines.

Flawed science and ethical violations are obviously issues that go far beyond the case of Caster Semenya, and far beyond sport. In any normal system of jurisprudence such issues would prove readily fatal to regulatory action, either in the first instance of proposed implementation or via review and reconsideration.

Sport governance lacks such processes. At CAS, the panel claimed that matters of scientific integrity and medical ethics were outside their remit. The SFT is allowed to reconsider a CAS decision only on narrow procedural grounds, and thus also cannot consider matters of scientific integrity or medical ethics. So far then, the flaws in the WA regulations – sitting in plain sight and obvious to anyone who looks, have not been correctable.

This leaves the world of sport governance in a compromised position. Some may look past the scientific and ethical issues here, perhaps judging that barring Semenya from sport is far more important that correcting such wrongs. 

Regardless of one’s views on sex and gender classification in sport, the WA regulations and the processes that produced and have challenged them reveal that sports governance has not yet entered the 21^st century. Science and ethics matter, and they should matter in sport jurisprudence as well.  It is time to correct this basic design flaw in international sport governance.