Editor’s note: Rhys Lenarduzzi is a final semester Bachelor of Law (LL.B) and Bachelor of Philosophy (B.Phil.) student, at the University of Notre Dame, Sydney, Australia. As a former professional athlete, then international sports agent and consultant, Rhys is interested in international sports law, policy and ethics. He is currently undertaking an internship at the T.M.C. Asser Institute with a focus on Transnational Sports Law.

In 2019, training compensation and solidarity contributions based on FIFA’s Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (RSTP) amounted to US$ 75,5 million. This transfer of wealth from the clubs in the core of the football hierarchy to the clubs where the professional players originated is a peculiar arrangement unknown in other global industries. Beyond briefly pointing out or reminding the reader of how these systems work and the history behind them, this blog series aims to revisit the justifications for FIFA-imposed training compensation and the solidarity mechanism, assess their efficacy and effects through a case study of their operation in the African context, and finally analyse the potential impact of upcoming reforms of the FIFA RSTP in this context.

First, it is important to go back to the roots of this, arguably, strange practice. The current transfer system and the legal mechanisms constituting it were largely the result of a complex negotiation between European football’s main stakeholders and the European Commission dating back to 2001. The conclusion of these negotiations led to a new regulatory system enshrined in Article 20 and Annex 4 of the RSTP in the case of training compensation, and at Article 21 and Annex 5 in the case of the solidarity mechanism. Before paying some attention to the historical influences and how we arrived at these changes, as well as the justifications from the relevant bodies for their existence, let us briefly recall what training compensation and the solidarity mechanisms actually are.

1.     FIFA’s training compensation and solidarity mechanism: A very short introduction

Training compensation is the obligation of an acquiring/buying/signing/new club to compensate the training clubs of a player. A training club is considered to be the clubs of the player between the ages of 12 and 21, though the obligation to compensate continues if either of the following two instances take place, up until the season of a player’s 23^rd birthday:  i) “[A] player is registered for the first time as a professional” or,  ii) “a professional is transferred between clubs of two different associations…”. The obligation does not arise if a former club terminates a player’s contract without just cause, when a professional reacquires amateur status in moving clubs, or when a player transfers to a category 4 club. Regarding the categories, this is important because the amounts owed to a training club hinge on where clubs fall within four categories (For more on the four categories see HERE).

There are some regulatory differences between the EU/EEA and the rest of the football world. A significant distinction is that without sufficient justification that it is worthy of compensation, a former club will not be owed by a “new club”[1] if they have not offered a contract of equivalent value to the player in question.[2]

The Solidarity mechanism provisions stipulate that when a player moves to a new club, mid contract, for a fee agreed between the new club and former club, then 5% of that fee is designated as a solidarity contribution, and each of the player’s training clubs will receive a portion. The apportionment varies depending on what age the player was registered with the training club (further information on apportionment can be found HERE). This obligation arises when a player is transferred definitively or on loan, between clubs from different associations, as well as when a transfer takes place within the same association, but a training club of the player is affiliated to another association.

For both training compensation and the solidarity mechanism, the regulations provide that the national association will instead receive the money when the club owed “has in the meantime ceased to participate in organised football and/ or no longer exists”.[3] In cases as such, the compensation is to be used for youth football development.

Disputes can arise when the new club does not pay on time or at all, or if there is a disagreement on the amount owed, as well as when a new club attempts to make the case that a player has already terminated his training period prior to age of 21. Given the above explanation of the systems is brief, further detail may be found within the relevant articles and annexes (see HERE for the full regulations).

2.     A brief history: From the ‘retain and transfer system’ to the FIFA RSTP 2001

Much of the current framework is the product of various events surrounding the birth of the regulations in 2001, though the ideas and concepts it captures go way back beyond this time. The English Football League’s registration system that would go on to be touted as the ‘retain and transfer system’ dates back to at least 1893.[4] Both this system and the American Baseball ‘reserve rule’ system are often mentioned in the same breath. As Sloane pointed out in 1969: “The justification for the reserve rule and the retain and transfer system lies in their alleged function in bringing about a more or less equal distribution of playing talent between clubs, whilst, their advocates argue, free competition would lead to a concentration of 'star' players into a few rich clubs.”[5]  Both systems were the target of an array of challenges over the years, though up until ‘free agency’[6] in the case of American Baseball (much earlier) and Bosman[7] in football, each system remained largely the same in existence and justification.[8] To further emphasise that the issues recognised, and in turn the ideas and justifications pertinent to the current system are hardly new, the Chester Report of 1969 on the situation regarding employment and transfers in football in England had striking similarities to much of what was raised within the European-level negotiations that lead to the changes in 2001.[9]

With the momentous Bosman case in 1995, the previously commonplace practice of an out of contract player being retained and unable to transfer (regardless of that player’s preferences) was found contrary to EU law. Importantly for the subject of this blog, the court also recognised that “encouraging the recruitment and training of young players must be accepted as legitimate”[10] aim, on the basis of which the free movement rights of players could in principle be restricted. Thus, leaving an opening for a regulatory system that would support the “recruitment and training of young players”[11] and restrict free movement in a proportionate way.

In 1998, the European Commission decided to open an investigation against FIFA based on competition law concerns linked to its then applicable RSTP.  This decision brought FIFA, UEFA and FIFPro to the European Commission’s negotiating table to hammer out a compromise that would satisfy their divergent interests and be compatible with the EU’s antitrust rules. The regulations as they now stand, aside from some minor amendments, reflect the outcome of those negotiations. The final press release of the European Commission concluded that FIFA’s new regulations would have to reflect a set of principles in order to be deemed compatible with EU competition law. In particular it accepted that:

• in the case of players aged under 23, a system of training compensation should be in place to encourage and reward the training effort of clubs, in particular small clubs;
• creation of solidarity mechanisms that would redistribute a significant proportion of income to clubs involved in the training and education of a player, including amateur clubs; 

These are in fact quite faithfully transposed in the FIFA RSTP provisions discussed above. Since then, the Bernard[12] ruling of the CJEU further clarified that the societal significance of sport, rendered the incentivisation of training legitimate. In its ruling, the court specified that in order to comply with EU law, a training compensation system ‘must be actually capable of attaining that objective and be proportionate to it, taking due account of the costs borne by the clubs in training both future professional players and those who will never play professionally’.^[13] This remains the main benchmark that any FIFA training compensation system must meet in order to comply with EU law.

As we have shown in this section, the shape of the current FIFA training compensation system and solidarity mechanism are very much a direct result of the EU’s interventionism in the regulation of football in the aftermath of the Bosman case. In doing so, the EU institutions also recognised that the idea of redistributing funds to compensate the costs incurred by the training club in instructing a player is a legitimate one.

3.     Justifying redistribution: Sharing the costs of training

Why do football institutions want this system in place and how was it justified? As was alluded to above, these ideas are not new ideas and are rooted in tradition.[14] Football and its intricacies have been deemed in need of protection for a long time, at least from within. More importantly for this blog, there is a desire for wealth to be redistributed in the form of compensation to the training clubs, to manufacture solidarity between the different levels of football and to incentivise goals such as training, education and development. This justification for FIFA’s redistributive systems is largely connected to the recognition that sport is important for the social fabric, and that incentivising development and training clubs goes beyond football and has societal benefits.

These objectives are reflected in the compromise agreed between FIFA and the EC in 2001. The latter’s press release emphasised that training compensation was “to encourage and reward the training effort of clubs, in particular small clubs“. Similarly, FIFA stated in Circular no. 769; “This system is designed to encourage more and better training of young football players, and to create solidarity among clubs, by awarding financial compensation to clubs which have invested in training young players.” Thus, it is clear that both the football authorities and the EU institutions recognise that the core aim of the FIFA’s training compensation and (though less obviously) its solidarity mechanism are to support the recruitment and training of young professional footballers. In fact, the CJEU’s advocate general in Bernard later recognised that training compensation rules “ensure that clubs are not discouraged from recruitment and training by the prospect of seeing their investment in training applied to the benefit of some other club, with no compensation for themselves”.[15] She went on to emphasise that “there is a broad public consensus that the training and recruitment of young players should be encouraged rather than discouraged”.[16]

At the heart of these rationalisations lies the core belief that failing to compensate the club that has helped a young player grow into a professional player is unfair and would discourage the club’s future effort to train players. Whether a training compensation system is necessary to attain such an objective is, however, far from evident. As was pointed out by advocate general Lenz in the Bosman case, such objectives could as well “be attained by a system of redistribution of a proportion of income, without the players' right to freedom of movement having to be restricted for that purpose“.[17] Nevertheless, the idea of redistribution between clubs remains the fundamental policy objective that underpins both FIFA’s training compensation system and solidarity mechanism.

Concluding remarks and subsequent blogs

This blog has highlighted that FIFA’s training compensation system and solidarity mechanism were introduced, after lengthy discussions with the European Commission and relevant stakeholders, in order to create a solidarity and redistributive relationship between the club where a player was trained and the club were a player pursues his professional career. The core justification behind them is that the training clubs provide an important educational service and that their work would be discouraged if they would not be enjoying some economic returns on their investment (in time and resources) to train players that go on to play professionally for a bigger/richer club.

While this objective is certainly respectable, there are, however, questions that remain regarding the adequacy and necessity of these systems to effectively redistribute funds between clubs. First, one should always keep in mind that training compensations are restricting the players’ freedom to move between clubs. Second, as we will see in the coming blog focusing on African players and clubs, it is questionable whether the current FIFA rules are in practice achieving their main redistributive function. Third, if these mechanisms are necessary to encourage training, it is as well remarkable that they are not also introduced in the context of women professional football, as will be discussed in our third blog. Finally, my last blog will assess how the coming changes to FIFA’s RSTP will affect the structure and operation of both the training compensation system and the solidarity mechanism.

[1] “New club” is the language used in the RSTP.

[2] “[I]n writing via registered post at least 60 days before the expiry of his current contract” per RSTP Annex 4 (6) ‘Special provisions for the EU/EEA’.

[3] RSTP - Annex 4 (3) 3; Annex 5 (2) 3.

[4] Sloane, P. J. (1969), The labour market in professional football, British Journal of Industrial Relations, 7, 181-199.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Established from the decision in Curt Flood v. Bowie Kuhn, et al. 407 U.S. 258.

[7] Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Socie´te´s de Football Association and others v. Bosman and others, ECLI: EU: C:1995:463

[8] Gerrard, B. (2002), The Muscle drain, Coubertobin-Type Taxes and the International Transfer System in Association Football,  European Sport Management Quarterly at 50 – “High Court in England ruled in 1963 that the retain-and transfer system was a restraint of trade. This led to a progressive relaxation of the transfer system with players being given more freedom to move between teams at the end of their contracts while transfer fees remained payable”.

[9] Per Sloane (1969) – “Contracts should have a terminable date and be renewable only on the consent of both parties… The committee did, however, suggest that a special levy should be imposed by the Football League on transfer fees, in addition to the present arrangement and graded according to the size of fee at a progressive rate. This levy could be returned to clubs for the purpose of ground improvements and would thereby tend to offset the tax advantage which clubs derive by signing players, since such payments, unlike the cost of ground improvements, are tax allowable.

[10] Bosman, para 106.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Case C-325/08 Olympique Lyonnais SASP v Olivier Bernard and Newcastle UFC, ECLI: EU: C:2010:143

[13] Ibid para 45.

[14] Pearson, G. Sporting Justifications under EU Free Movement and Competition Law: The Case of the Football ‘Transfer System’, European Law Journal, Vol. 21, No. 2, (March 2015) pp. 222.

[15] Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in CJEU case C-325/08 Olympique Lyonnais SASP v Olivier Bernard and Newcastle UFC, para 46.

[16] Ibid para 47.

[17] Opinion of Advocate General Lenz CJEU case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Socie´te´s de Football Association and others v. Bosman and others, para 239.

In the wake of the French Labour Union of Basketball (Syndicat National du Basket, SNB) image rights dispute with Euroleague and EA Games, we threw the “jump ball” to start a series on players’ image rights in international professional basketball. In our first blogpost, we discussed why image rights contracts in professional basketball became a fertile ground for disputes when it comes to the enforcement of these contracts by the Basketball Arbitral Tribunal (BAT). Indeed, we pointed out that clubs might take advantage of the BAT’s inconsistent jurisprudence to escape obligations deriving from image rights contracts.

In this second limb, we will open a second field of legal battles “around the rim”: the unauthorized use of players’ image rights by third parties. We will use as a point of reference the US College Athletes image rights cases before US Courts and we will thereby examine the legal nature of image rights and the precise circumstances in which such rights may be infringed. Then, coming back to where we started, we will discuss the French case through the lens of US case law on players’ image rights. 

Source: http://philadelphia.cbslocal.com/2013/09/27/ea-sports-settles-college-likeness-case/ 

The American College Athletes image rights cases in a nutshell

The legal qualification of image rights varies in different jurisdictions. In the USA, image rights refer to the right of publicity: an intellectual property right, which gives the player an exclusive right on his image. The commercial exploitation of this image without permission constitutes an offence and practice of unfair competition.[1] Although the right of publicity is a creation of the common law not recognized under Federal law, many state courts and legislatures have embraced it.

The US legal system as a “true forerunner of marketing applied to sport”[2] considers, contrary to other legal systems, that image rights extends to the exploitation of players’ image rights linked to college championships. Indeed, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) Basketball has acquired a monopoly power in the college sports entertainment market, with broadcast and cable television serving as powerful handmaidens.[3] This financially massive industry exploits the free labour of student-athletes’ due to their so-called amateur status.[4]  In fact, as a precondition to participate in NCAA Championships, student-athletes have to sign the ‘Form 08-3a’ authorizing NCAA to use their “name and picture to generally promote NCAA championships or other NCAA events, activities or programs”.[5]

The NCAA’s exploitation of players’ image rights generates millions of dollars of profits through licensing agreements for their use in e.g. television broadcasts, advertising, DVDs or video games. The fact that student-athletes are not compensated for the use of their rights has given rise to a wave of lawsuits filed by former student athletes against the NCAA and video game makers. O’Bannon’s, Sam Keller’s and other former student athletes’ image is still making money for the NCAA through licensed merchandizing.

As a result of the NCAA’s exploitation of players’ image rights, an unprecedented legal battle started in 2009 before the Federal Courts of the US. In May 2009, Sam Keller, a former football player of the Arizona University sued NCAA and EA Games for unlawfully using his image and likeness in a video game. The case continued before the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in California which dismissed the appeal of EA Games on the grounds that EA was not protected by the First Amendment, which offers a shield to video games via freedom of speech. In fact, the Court concluded that the EA’s use of the player recreates him in the very setting in which he has achieved fame.[6] Similarly, in Ryan Hart’s case, a former Rutgers football player, the Federal Court of Appeals, overturning the district court’s ruling, concluded that players in video games are renditions of actual players who should be compensated.

Undoubtedly, the O’Bannon case is to be considered a milestone. It is the widest-ranging anti-trust lawsuit before US Courts with regards to college athletes’ image rights. On 21 July 2009, Ed O’Bannon, one of the most recognized collegiate basketball players of the last 30 years, along with another 19 former college athletes, filed a class action against EA Games, NCAA, and the Collegiate Licencing Company, the nation’s leading collegiate trademark licensing and marketing firm, seeking compensation from the unauthorized use of their image rights. Their claim implicated two core areas of law: (1) federal antitrust law and (2) intellectual property rights law. By requiring athletes to relinquish in perpetuity their image rights through the ‘Form 08-3a’ and fixing at zero the amount of compensation athletes could receive from the share of revenues, they contended that the NCAA has restrained trade and, thus, acted in violation of the Sherman Act, i.e. federal antitrust law. The athletes that signed this form had been deprived of their right to negotiate on their own with licensing firms after leaving college. Furthermore, they argued that they had been deprived of their right of publicity and their subsequent right to the commercial exploitation of their image, name, likeness or voice.

Following a contentious five years trial proceeding and thousands of pages of filings, on 8 August 2014, the US District Judge Claudia Wilken in a 99-page decision shook the basketball world by ruling in favour of O’Bannon and the other plaintiffs.[7] The injunction issued allows college athletes to get a share of the licensing revenues via the creation of a trust fund available to them once they leave college.

The O’Bannon landmark ruling: What the French (and Europe) can learn?

The O’Bannon ruling, while under appeal, has been ground-breaking in that it questions the ‘sacrosanct’ NCAA notion of amateurism. Judge Wilken was clear: maintaining amateurism is not legitimate sufficient justification for implementing anticompetitive labour rules, which bar players from being compensated for the use of their image rights. The collapse of NCAA’s amateurism defence and the resulting establishment of an equitable bargaining relationship between student-athletes and NCAA could blow up the entire college basketball system. Nonetheless, this not the only important lesson we can derive from the O’Bannon ruling and the American cases.

The link between amateurism and image rights, which deprives student-athletes from any compensation, is a unique phenomenon of US college sports system and lies at the heart of the American cases. In Europe, as we extensively explained in our fist blogpost, some professional basketball players assign to their clubs the commercial use of their image rights and they receive an adequate compensation through an image rights contract concluded with a third party, an image rights contract. However, this sum cannot be deemed as an actual compensation for the use of their image, but rather it constitutes a part of their remuneration under the employment contract. Therefore, at the European level, the question that could be raised is whether basketball players can request further compensation, i.e. a compensation proportionate to the revenues generated by the exploitation of their image rights. In this light, the O’Bannon ruling has the potential to create an important precedent for image rights disputes in European professional basketball as well:

(1) The license agreement of image rights between players and basketball associations

The issue at heart of the O’Bannon case regarding the ownership of the student-athletes image and likeness is the NCAA ‘Form 08-3a’. By means of this form, student-athletes authorize the NCAA to use their image rights for the promotion of its activities.[8] O’Bannon strongly argued that this form is illegal for the following reasons: First and foremost, the language of Part IV, which provides that the NCAA can use their “name and picture to generally promote NCAA championships or other NCAA events, activities or programs”, is vague and ambiguous. It does not define when, where, for how long, and how the NCAA may ‘generally’ promote events or activities. Secondly, as a result of student-athletes’ amateur status, this form is signed without representation. This can be considered as exploitative, since student-athletes’ are usually unaware of the legal consequences of signing such forms. Finally, this form is illegal, because it is coerced from student-athletes in exchange for their eligibility to play in the championship. Doug Szymul, former star football player at Northwestern University puts it clearly: “I had to sign it to be able to play, so it’s not like I’m going to argue about it”.[9]

Let’s transpose these arguments to the European professional basketball world and more particularly to the potential French case at hand. In fact, in the contracts between professional basketball players and National or European Basketball Associations, there is an image rights provision according to which players or their union agree, without further compensation, to the use of players’ image rights by the Club, the National or European League.[10] In this regard, the reference to the use of players’ image rights “in any manner” is quite ambiguous.[11]

In the French case, players transfer their image rights to the French Labour Union of Basketball (SNB). But, when players sign their contract with their club, they license the use of their image rights to their Club, French Basketball League and Euroleague, without further compensation. Can this agreement be interpreted as giving carte blanche to the Clubs, National Leagues or Euroleague to use basketball players’ image rights for an indefinite time period and indefinite manner, without further compensation? Well, if we follow the reasoning used in the O’Bannon ruling, this question should be answered in the negative: players and subsequently their labour union should have a share of licensing revenues. 

(2) The ‘without further compensation’ provision

A key issue raised during the O’Bannon trial was whether image rights (as well as name and likeness rights) even exist for the purposes of licencing agreements. The NCAA argued and provided supporting evidence[12] that although image rights are included in the contractual language, in practice, during the negotiation of broadcasting or licencing deals, they are not valued separately. The contractual provisions on image rights refer only to their use in event promotions and they play no further role during the licencing dealing.

Plaintiff’s witness, Edwin Desser, who was formerly the NBA head of broadcasting, disputed this argument by stating the ‘obvious’ from a commercial point of view: “ it’s simply impossible to conceive of sports telecast without being able to show the images of the participants”.[13] In other words, players’ image rights are a quid pro quo requirement of every broadcasting or licencing agreement.

This argument, which stems from commercial law practice, could serve as the perfect pick-n-roll in other image rights cases, including the French case. True, when, for example, EA Games negotiates with Euroleague for the conclusion of a licencing agreement, image rights are not separately calculated. However, in practice, the package of entitlements conveyed to video makers by the Clubs and Euroleague in exchange for exclusive licensing rights is essential for the deal. Realistically speaking, would it be possible for EA Games to create the NBA 2K 15 with Strasbourg and Nanterre playing, without including their players’ image rights? Clubs and Euroleague license players’ image rights and it goes without saying that they get significant revenues from the licencing agreement, while some players receive only a compensation which has been fixed in advance as part of their overall remuneration. It is this ‘without further compensation’ use of image rights provided by the contracts signed by players, therefore, that infringes their right to the commercial exploitation of their own image rights. 

Conclusive Remarks

In our previous blogpost, we cited the SNB’s president words: the SNB motion against EA Games is not about the money, but rather to defend basketball players’ rights.[14] Undoubtedly, image rights are also about the money, even if in the European context the monetary compensation is limited. We have shown that the unauthorized use of players’ image rights or the loss of their exclusive use may deprive them from a fair share of the club’s lucrative endorsement contracts. Furthermore, the existence of products bearing a player’s image without his authorization can in some cases seriously damage the value of his licensing rights.[15] Moreover, irrespectively of the legal qualification of image rights as ‘right of publicity’ or ‘right to personality’, this is a right gained through hard work on the basketball courts and the player should in any events get a share of the licensing revenues it generates.

The ‘David against Goliath’ American college sports crusade shows the way for European professional basketball players: a ‘without further compensation’ use of image rights or the denial of liability of the Clubs for non-payment of image rights contracts can be (and should be) successfully fought against.

[1] L Colantuoni and C Novazio, ‘Intellectual Property Righs in Basketball’ (2011) 1-2 International Sports Law Journal, 59.

[2] Ibid, 58.

[3] http://economics.stanford.edu/files/Theses/RobertLemonsHonorsThesis-May2014.pdf

[4] For an interesting insight on NCAA practice, see: B Starkey, ‘College Sports Aren't Like Slavery. They're Like Jim Crow’ where the author compares college athletes’ status to the status of “blacks after slavery”.

[5] Form 08-3a, Part Iv

[6] United States Courts of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, NCAA Student-Athlete name & likeness litigation (No 10-15387)

[7] Edward O’Bannon et al v National Collegiate Athletics Association, Electronic Arts Inc and Collegiate Licensing Company (US District Court, 08.08.2014)

[8] M Zylstra, Ed. O’Bannon vs. NCAA: An examination of O’Bannon’s legal claim that the NCAA illegally uses the likeness and image of former student-athletes (2009) 205 Business Law, 5.

[9] Ibid, 6.

[10] See for example, Article 69  of the Euroleague Bylaws 2012-2013: “The Company and EP have the right to use the image of the club’s players, the players’ likeness (photograph, caricature, etc), name, number, or any combination thereof for any and all commercial and promotional purposes solely in connection with the Euroleague and provided that the image of the player appears linked to the club, the player wearing its apparel and footwear, or when the player participates in public events organised by the club or by the Company”.

[11] See, Standard Player Contract of SIG BASKET SAEMSL , Clause 9.1 : “The Player agrees, without further compensation, to allow the Club or the National League or Euroleague Basketball and their respective sponsors to take pictures of the Player, during game action or posed, as necessary, alone or together with others, for still photographs, motion pictures, internet, TV or any other form of media whether presently known or unknown, at such times as the Club or the National League or Euroleague Basketball may designate. Such pictures may be used, without further compensation, in any manner desired by either the Club or the National League or Euroleague Basketball or their respective sponsors only for publicity or promotional purposes. The rights in any such pictures taken by the Club or by the National League or by Euroleague Basketball shall belong to the Club or to the National League or to Euroleague Basketball as their interests may appear.”

[12] Reporter’s Transcript of Proceedings, Testimony of the NCAA’s lead expert Neal Pilson (vol 4) 715-815

[13] Reporter’s Transcript of Proceedings, Testimony of Edwin Desser (vol 4), 618-708.

[14] Johan Passave-Ducteil, the president of SNB remarks in l’Equipe:"Ce n’est pas une histoire d’argent, on défend le droit des joueurs".

[15] L Colantuoni and C Novazio (n1), 60

On 25 and 26 October 2022, the Asser Institute in The Hague will host the 2022 edition of the International Sports Law Journal (ISLJ) Conference. The ISLJ is the leading academic journal in transnational sports law and governance and is proud to provide a platform for transnational debates on the state of the field. 2022 has put a number of complex issues and disputes on the top of the transnational sports law agenda, which will be at the heart of the conference.

Sports governing bodies react to Russia's invasion of Ukraine
First, Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine in February triggered a swift and decisive reaction by a wide range of international sports governing bodies (SGBs), leading in particular to the exclusion of Russian teams and athletes from many international sporting competitions, including most prominently the FIFA World Cup 2022 in Qatar. These reactions have shown, once again, that sport is far from immune from the turbulences of international relations and raise the question of its alleged neutrality and apolitical nature. To engage with these issues, we have invited Prof. Jonathan Grix (Metropolitan Manchester University) to deliver a keynote speech and will dedicate a specific panel to discussing the intersection between transnational sports law and international law/relations.

Monopoly of sports governing bodies
Second, the organization of international sports is also currently threatened by challenges to the traditional monopoly position of international SGBs raised under EU antitrust law. Early July 2022, the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union heard two crucial cases (International Skating Union and Superleague) concerning the compatibility of the rules of international SGBs aimed at sanctioning athletes and clubs who participate in unauthorized third-party competitions. Dr. Van Rompuy (Leiden University), the driving force behind the ISU case, will be discussing with us the potential impact of competition law on the governance of sport and what to expect from the pending decisions of the CJEU. Additionally, we will host two panels dedicated to the application of competition law to sports governance, both at an international and national level.

Human rights and mega-sporting events
Third, with both Beijing and Qatar hosting mega-sporting events this year, it is difficult to ignore the human rights issues raised by international sporting competitions. A fast-growing social movement aimed at urging the SGBs to abide by their human rights responsibilities has been developing around the activism of some NGOs and the creation of the Centre for Sport and Human Rights (CSHR). The CEO of the CSHR, Mary Harvey, will be joining us to share her thoughts on the role of sports lawyers and sports law academics in this discussion. Her intervention will be followed by a panel dedicated to the intersections between human rights and transnational sports law and governance.

Trans and queer participation in sporting competitions
Finally, the question of the participation of transgender athletes in sporting competitions has become an extremely contentious issue of debate in recent years, especially in the United States. Furthermore, International SGBs, such as FINA recently, have started to impose specific requirements to the participation of trans athlete in international competitions. Our closing panel will take a fresh look at this question by foregrounding the way in which trans and queer participation in sporting competitions has been accommodated in South Asia.

Online participation available
For the first time this year, we will allow online participation to the conference for an affordable price. Our aim is to internationalise and diversify further our audience and to reach people who in light of the current challenges, be it Covid-19 or climate change, are not in a position to come in person to The Hague.

Programme
Download the full programme.

Register HERE! (Early Bird Registration is available only until 1 October, 23:59CET)