Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

With or without them? Russia’s state doping system and the Olympic fate of Russian athletes. By Antoine Duval, Kester Mekenkamp and Oskar van Maren

On Monday 18 July 2016, Canadian lawyer Richard McLaren presented the Independent Person Report to the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), regarding the alleged Russian doping program surrounding the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics. The report was expected to seriously threaten the participation of Russian Athletes to the rapidly approaching Rio Games, starting on 5 August. In the weekend prior to the report’s publishing, Reuters obtained a leaked letter drafted by the CEO’s of the US and Canadian anti-doping agencies, which according to the New York Times was backed by “antidoping officials from at least 10 nations— including those in the United States, Germany, Spain, Japan, Switzerland and Canada — and 20 athlete groups”, urging the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to ban all Russian athletes from the upcoming Olympics.

Source: http://ww4.hdnux.com/photos/50/23/01/10563667/3/920x920.jpg

During the press conference, McLaren listed his main findings, which are shocking, interesting and peculiar at same time. First, “the Moscow Laboratory operated, for the protection of doped Russian athletes, within a State-dictated failsafe system”. Second, “the Sochi Laboratory operated a unique sample swapping methodology to enable doped Russian athletes to compete at the Games”. Third, “the Ministry of Sport directed, controlled and oversaw the manipulation of athlete’s analytical results or sample swapping, with the active participation and assistance of the FSB (Russian federal security service), CSP (Centre of Sports Preparation in Russia), and both Moscow and Sochi Laboratories”.

Though the recent findings of the Independent Person Report should not be underestimated, yet it is only one piece of a complex jigsaw puzzle constituted by many reports and disciplinary decisions involving systemic doping in Russia over the last few years. One could compare it to a snowball rolling down the mountain continuously gaining speed and mass. The ball started rolling in December 2014 with an ARD broadcasted documentary titled Geheimsache Doping: Wie Russland seine Sieger macht (“Top Secret Doping: How Russia makes its Winners”). Less than two years later, Russian athletes might be excluded from participating at the Rio Olympic Games all together. The information now available on Russia’s systematic doping program would make an excellent movie script (one that has probably already been set in motion at a Hollywood studio). This blog, however, will more modestly provide a recap of the events leading up to the Independent Person Report, and assess its potential (short term) legal consequences. 


Episode 1: German investigative journalism and WADA’s response

As stated above, the unravelling of this doping story began in December 2014, with an ARD documentary, Geheimsache Doping: Wie Russland seine Sieger macht (“Top Secret Doping: How Russia makes its Winners”). Filmmaker Hajo Seppelt investigated rumors on widespread doping use by Russian athletes in preparation of and during the Winter Olympics held in Sochi. The film showed athletes, coaches and civil servants testifying, secret camera footage, audio recordings, and official documents, all pointing towards: systemic doping use within the All-Russia Athletics Federation (ARAF), corrupt practices regarding results management and the collection of samples. Implicated parties included athletes, coaches, trainers, doctors, the Russian State, the IAAF, the Moscow accredited laboratory and the Russian Anti-Doping Agency (RUSADA).

In response to the international stir, WADA, in December 2014, launched an Independent Commission to investigate the allegations made. The Commission consisted of former WADA chairman Richard Pound, Richard McLaren and WADA’s Chief Investigations Officer Jack Robertson. The first part of this commission’s findings was published on 9 November 2015.[1] In August 2015 the commission’s mandate was extended following the release of another Seppelt documentary “Doping – Top Secret: The Shadowy World of Athletics”. This resulted in a second report which was published on 14 January 2016.[2] Especially the former of the two “Pound Reports” is of particular interest.

First and foremost, it addresses the existence of “a deeply rooted culture of cheating”. The report insinuates that this culture of cheating existed since well before the Sochi Games. The coaches active in 2014 appear to be the crucial transferors of the knowledge they acquired at the time they were athletes themselves. Medical connections cultivated during their professional careers were passed on to the current generation of athletes. Athletes not wishing to be part of this system were likely to be “excommunicated” from top-level coaches and support.[3]

The second issue addressed is the exploitation of athletes. “Unethical behaviours and practices” by the people involved have become the norm. Coercion has been employed on athletes to make them participate in the doping program, for instance by informing them that “they would not be considered as part of the federation’s national team for competition”.[4]

The report’s third finding is a blatant unwillingness of Russian athletes to cooperate in the investigation. Nonetheless, the Pound Commission confirms a “consistent and systematic use of performance enhancing drugs by many Russian athletes”.[5]

Fourthly, it confirmed that, next to coaches, some Russian doctors and laboratory personnel equally acted as “enablers for systematic cheating”. It also pointed out “inadequate testing and poor compliance around testing standards”, as well as the malicious destruction of over 1400 samples, which were explicitly requested by WADA to be preserved.[6]

A fifth major discovery was the identification of corruption and bribery within the IAAF. The severity of the corruption allegations involving several highly placed members and officials of IAAF and the ARAF was such that this part of the investigation had to be transferred to the competent authorities for “potential criminal prosecutions”, i.e. Interpol (see the second Pound Report).[7]

The first Pound Report recommended provisional suspensions in respect of five athletes, four coaches and one medical doctor and identified some additional suspicious cases. It further asked WADA to declare both ARAF and RUSADA to be “code noncompliant” and to withdraw WADA’s accreditation of the Moscow laboratory, as well as to permanently remove the lab’s director from his position. The Report also recommended that the IAAF should suspend ARAF.[8]

A mere four days after the publication of the first Pound Report (13 November 2015) the IAAF provisionally suspended the Russian ARAF as an IAAF Member. As a result of this decision, athletes, and athlete support personnel from Russia could not compete in International Competitions expected, the Russian Olympic Committee (ROC) as well as its athletes did not take the decision lightly. In a request for arbitration filed at the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) on 3 July 2016, the ROC and the 68 Russian Athletes asked the CAS 1) to review specific legal issues surrounding IAAF’s decision to suspend ARAF, and 2) to order that any Russian athlete who was not currently the subject of any period of ineligibility for the commission of an anti-doping rule violation be declared eligible to participate at the 2016 Olympic Games in Rio.[9] The outcome of the appeal will be discussed further below. 


Episode 2: The Independent Person Report

Meanwhile, on 8 May 2016, new far-reaching allegations concerning Russia’s doping program were made by newsmagazine 60 Minutes, and subsequently on 12 May, by the New York Times.[10] The primary source behind these articles was whistle-blower Grigory Rodchenkov, the former director of the Moscow and Sochi doping control laboratories who found refuge in an undisclosed location in the USA. This time around, the allegations were not limited to athletics, but involved all Russian athletes that competed at the Sochi Olympics.[11] In response to these claims, WADA announced that it would immediately probe the new Russian doping allegations brought forward, once again, by the press, and appointed an Independent Person (i.e. Richard McLaren) supported by a multidisciplinary team to conduct an investigation of the allegations made by Dr. Rodchenkov.[12]

McLaren was presented with a five-point investigation mandate:

“1. Establish whether there has been manipulation of the doping control process during the Sochi Games, including but not limited to, acts of tampering with the samples within the Sochi Laboratory.

2. Identify the modus operandi and those involved in such manipulation.

3. Identify any athlete that might have benefited from those alleged manipulations to conceal positive doping tests.

4. Identify if this Modus Operandi was also happening within Moscow Laboratory outside the period of the Sochi Games.

5. Determine other evidence or information held by Grigory Rodchenkov.”[13]

The Report first mentions the time constraints faced in drafting it. It explains, in relation to the third paragraph of the mandate, that the “compressed timeline” of the investigation (57 days) “did not permit compilation of data to establish an antidoping rule violation”, consequently that third paragraph should be deemed of lesser importance. This shortage of time also resulted in the fact that McLaren had to be selective in examining the large amount of data and information available to it. In other words, it could “only skimmed the surface of the extensive data available”.[14] Be that as it may, McLaren considered the found evidence to be established “beyond a reasonable doubt”.[15]

With due respect to both its mandate and its investigative limitations, McLaren made three key findings[16]:

A) The Moscow Laboratory operated, for the protection of doped Russian athletes, within a State-dictated failsafe system, described in the report as the Disappearing Positive Methodology;

B) The Sochi Laboratory operated a unique sample swapping methodology to enable doped Russian athletes to compete at the Games;

C) The Ministry of Sport directed, controlled and oversaw the manipulation of athlete’s analytical results or sample swapping, with the active participation and assistance of the FSB, CSP, and both Moscow and Sochi Laboratories.

The Independent Person Report makes account of a systemic state directed doping program, incentivized by the “very abysmal” medal count of the Russian Olympic athletes participating in the 2010 Vancouver Olympic Winter Games. A system where, under direction and control of Yuri Nagornykh, Russia’s deputy minister of sport, the laboratory was forced to change any positive result into a negative analytical finding, a method named by the McLaren team the “disappearing positive”.[17]

Nagornykh was informed of every positive analytical finding arising in the Moscow laboratory from 2011 onwards, which in itself is a violation of the WADA International Standard for Laboratories. The deputy minister was the linchpin that decided which athlete would benefit from a cover up and thus be protected and which athlete would not. If ordered to do so, laboratory personnel were required to report the sample as being negative in WADA’s anti-doping management system. Next, the laboratory personnel had to falsify the screen result in the laboratory information management system to show a negative laboratory result.[18] Conclusion, the shielded athlete could continue to compete.

However, at international events independent observers would prevent Russian athletes from slipping through the net. That is why the FSB developed a method for covertly removing the caps of tamper evident sample bottles containing the urine (“without any evidence visible to the untrained eye”). This technique was used to replace positive dirty samples during the Sochi Olympic Games and in December 2014 to cover up some dirty samples out of the Moscow Laboratory, which WADA had aimed to confiscate.[19] The McLaren team subsequently found evidence that this sample swapping also occurred after the 2013 IAAF World Championships in respect of positive samples.

The coordinating role of Irina Rodionova in this sample swapping method is remarkable. She was a staff member of the Russian Olympic Committee during the Sochi Games. During the Games, she served as the head of the Monitoring and Management of Medical Anti-doping Programs Department and is currently deputy director of the “Center of Sports Preparation of National Teams of Russia, a subordinate organisation of the Russian Ministry of Sport”.[20] As the report shows, Rodionova would receive and freeze storage samples, which the athletes thought were “clean urine samples outside of the wash out periods for any PEDs they were using”. The investigation’s main informant, Grigory Rodchenkov would test the samples to make sure they were negative. These samples were then secretly transported to the FSB storage freezer, which coincidentally happened to be in the building located next to the Sochi Laboratory.[21]

The actual swapping occurred by passing the A and B bottles through the “mouse hole” located between the “aliquoting room” inside the Sochi Laboratory secure perimeter into an adjacent operations room, outside that secure perimeter. While an FSB officer would take the B bottles somewhere else, the athlete’s stored clean urine would be taken out of the FSB freezer and brought over to the operations room. The FSB officer would return with B sample bottle to the operations room. The B sample bottle’s cap would be removed. The dirty urine would be replaced by clean urine and put in the A and B bottles. Then, the stopper in the A bottle would be replaced and the B bottle cap screwed back on. Ultimately, the bottles would be brought back to the “aliquoting room” via the mouse hole.[22] Subsequently, Rodchenkov had to manipulate the substituted sample to as closely as possible match the “specific gravity” indicated on the original doping control form. He did this by “adding table salt to raise the clean urine SG or distilled water to dilute the clean urine sample so as to closely match the SG number on the DCF”. A laboratory analysis of the salt content of selected samples revealed that six had “salt contents higher than what should be found in urine of a healthy human”.[23] As the Independent Person Report elucidates: “The Sochi sample swapping methodology was a unique situation, required because of the presence of the international community in the Laboratory. It enabled Russian athletes to compete dirty while enjoying certainty that their antidoping samples would be reported clean”.[24]

The Report notes another incident following a WADA request giving notice to the Moscow laboratory of a forthcoming collection of samples stored in the laboratory for further analysis. This resulted in the laboratory quickly destroying thousands of dirty samples that had been collected and reported negative (use of the Disappearing Positive Methodology). Deputy minister Nagornykh then arranged the FSB to fix the problem of the samples collected between 10 September 2014 and 10 December 2014, which could not be destroyed (as a result of the minimal 90-day period of storage following the ISL). When the WADA investigators came to the laboratory, they found sample bottles without their caps and, moreover, that these samples all had negative findings recorded on WADA’s Anti-Doping Management System. Furthermore, forensic examination confirmed tampering and “a urine examination of 3 of the samples showed that the DNA was not that of the athlete involved”.[25] 


Episode 3: The ball is in the IOC’s corner…

In a statement released shortly after Richard McLaren’s press conference, WADA president Craig Reedie conveyed WADA executive committee’s vision on the Independent Person Report. First it condemned the “public speculation made by certain national anti-doping organizations as to the investigation’s outcome in the days leading up to the report’s publication”. More importantly however, it recommended the IOC (and the International Paralympic Committee, IPC) to decline entry for the 2016 Rio Olympic Games to all athletes wishing to compete under the Russian Olympic Committee banner. Moreover, he added that “any exceptional entry of a Russian athlete should be considered by the IOC and IPC for participation under a neutral flag and in accordance with very strict criteria”.

The IOC responded on 19 July by implementing some provisional measures. It decided amongst others: not to organise or give patronage to any sports event or meeting in Russia, not grant any accreditation to any official of the Russian Ministry of Sport or any person implicated in the Independent Person Report for the Rio Games, and “initiate a full inquiry into all Russian athletes who participated in the Olympic Winter Games Sochi 2014 and their coaches, officials and support staff”.

The key question, however, was whether the IOC would follow WADA’s recommendation and decline entries to all athletes under the Russian Olympic Committee banner to the Rio Games. Even though its president Thomas Bach stated that “the findings of the report show a shocking and unprecedented attack on the integrity of sport and on the Olympic Game” and that “the IOC will not hesitate to take the toughest sanctions available against any individual or organisation implicated”[26], it did not actually do so (yet). Instead, it announced that it would carefully evaluate the Independent Person Report and “explore the legal options” weighing a collective ban against the right to compete of individual athletes. Moreover, the IOC was adamant that it would “take the CAS decision of 21 July 2016 concerning the IAAF rules into consideration”.


Episode 4: Now the CAS has ball possession…

Hence, the IOC’s final decision regarding Russia’s participation at this summer’s Olympic Games depended on a large extent on the CAS decision regarding the ROC and 68 Russian athletes’ appeal against the IAAF ban. On 21 July, the CAS Panel confirmed the validity of the IAAF’s decision to suspend the ARAF from participating at the Games as well as the Russian athletes who do not satisfy the conditions set by IAAF Competition Rule 22.1(A).[27] Nonetheless, the CAS expressed its concern about “about the immediate application with retroactive effect of such Rule [IAAF Rule 22.1(A)], implemented by the IAAF on 17 June 2016, providing for exceptional criteria to grant eligibility to athletes whose national federation is suspended. Since such Rule involves criteria based on long-term prior activity, it left no possibility in practice, and as applied, for the Claimant Athletes to be able to try to comply with them.”

Yet, it clearly refused to weigh in directly on the IOC’s pending decision regarding all Russian athletes. Indeed, “since the IOC was not a party in the arbitrations, the CAS found that it had no jurisdiction to determine whether the IOC is entitled generally to accept or refuse the nomination by ROC of Russian track and field athletes to compete at the Rio 2016 Olympic Games”. In other words, the ball is neatly passed back to the IOC, who will now need to make a definite decision on whether Russian athletes, both for athletics and all the other sports, can compete at the upcoming Games or not. As the public pressure is mounting on the IOC, it is now doomed to decide whether to block the entry of all Russian athletes or to leave this decision to the International Federations on a case-by-case basis, like the IAAF has done in the case of athletics. A story to be continued…


Conclusion: Who is to blame for the systemic failures of the World Anti-Doping System?

Russian athletes are currently bearing the brunt of the blame for the State-sponsored doping system in place in Russia, they are being placated in the media and by the World Anti-Doping Agency as cheats, they are being excluded from the Rio Olympics (and potentially many more international competitions), and they are the ones suffering dire economic losses. Yet, are they truly the main responsible for their unenviable fate?

The first key culprit that comes to mind is obviously the Russian State and its political leaders, who have constructed a demonic system imposed on athletes in their young age to ensure that Russia shines on the global sporting scene. They have done so with the implicit (and in the case of the IAAF explicit) support of the international sports governing bodies, which preferred to look away rather than challenge the Russian political clout inside their executive bodies. One has to remember, for example, that Russia’s sports minister Vitaly Mutko, currently decrying the politicization of sport, is a member of FIFA Council (formerly the FIFA Executive Committee).

Furthermore, this is also the failure of WADA. It was supposed to be the independent global gendarme of the world anti-doping fight. Yet, it comes out of these episodes at best as a toothless paper tiger, at worse as a complacent window dresser. A recent piece in the New York Times highlights very well its passive complicity in maintaining the invisibility of the Russian state doping system. WADA is now front and centre in calling for the harshest sanctions on athletes, but for years it has been ignoring the warning signs and refusing to do its homework as far as the implementation of the WADA Code is concerned. It is only because of the public outrage over Hajo Seppelt’s documentary that WADA finally decided to act. What is the Code worth if its implementation at the local level, where it is supposed to apply on a day-to-day basis, is not closely monitored? Only the paper (or the computer code) on which it is written. The general hypocrisy of having a global set of rules, but very little biting enforcement mechanisms underlies the failure of the current world anti-doping system.  



[1] The Independent Commission Report #1, Final Report, 9 November 2015 (Pound report #1).

[2] The Independent Commission Report #2, 14 January, Amended 27 January 2016 .

[3] Pound report #1, p. 10.

[4] Ibid, p. 11.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Pound report #1, p. 12 and 124.

[8] Ibid, p. 9.

[9] Media Release of the CAS of 21 July 2016, Athletics – Olympic Games Rio 2016 - The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) rejects the claims/appeal of the Russian Olympic Committee (ROC)

and of 68 Russian athletes.

[10] Rebecca R. Ruiz and Michael Schwirtz, “Russian Insider Says State-Run Doping Fueled Olympic Gold”, New York Times, 12 May 2016 < http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/13/sports/russia-doping-sochi-olympics-2014.html > accessed 21 July 2016.

[11] In this regard, it is also worth mentioning that Russia ended first in the medal table with 33 medals, including 13 gold medals.

[12] The Independent Person Report, p. 2.

[13] Ibid, p. 3.

[14] Ibid, p. 4.

[15] Ibid, p. 6.

[16] Ibid, p. 1.

[17] Ibid, p. 10.

[18] Ibid, p. 11.

[19] Ibid, p. 12.

[20] Ibid, p. 13.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Ibid, p. 14.

[23] Ibid, p. 15.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid, p. 17.

[26] Statement of the executive board of the International Olympic Committee of 19 July 2016 on the WADA Independent Person Report.

[27] IAAF Competition Rule reads as follows: “Any athlete, athlete support personnel or other person shall be ineligible for competitions, whether held under these Rules or the rules of an Area or a Member, whose National Federation is currently suspended by the IAAF”.

 

Comments are closed
Asser International Sports Law Blog | Bailing out your local football club: The Willem II and MVV State Aid decisions as blueprint for future rescue aid (Part 1)

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

Bailing out your local football club: The Willem II and MVV State Aid decisions as blueprint for future rescue aid (Part 1)

The European Commission’s decisions of 4 July 2016 to order the recovery of the State aid granted to seven Spanish professional football clubs[1] were in a previous blog called historic. It was the first time that professional football clubs have been ordered to repay aid received from (local) public authorities. Less attention has been given to five other decisions also made public that day, which cleared support measures for five football clubs in the Netherlands. The clubs in question were PSV Eindhoven, MVV Maastricht, NEC Nijmegen, FC Den Bosch and Willem II.

Given the inherent political sensitivity of State aid recovery decisions, it is logical that the “Spanish decisions” were covered more widely than the “Dutch decisions”. Furthermore, clubs like Real Madrid and FC Barcelona automatically get more media attention than FC Den Bosch or Willem II. Yet, even though the “Dutch decisions” are of a lower profile, from an EU State aid law perspective, they are not necessarily less interesting.

A few days before entering the quiet month of August, the Commission published the non-confidential versions of its decisions concerning PSV Eindhoven, Willem II and MVV Maastricht (hereinafter: “MVV”). The swiftness of these publications is somewhat surprising, since it often takes at least three months to solve all the confidentiality issues. Nonetheless, nobody will complain (especially not me) about this opportunity to analyze in depth these new decisions.

In the case of PSV, the Dutch State argued successfully that the measure implemented by the city of Eindhoven was in line with the so-called ‘Market Economy Investor Principle’ (MEIP), thereby not constituting a selective advantage to PSV. In other words, the measure did not fulfill the criteria of Article 107(1) TFEU and was not considered State aid. The aid measures granted by the cities of Tilburg and Maastricht to Willem II and MVV respectively were considered compatible State aid under Article 107(3)c) TFEU. Interestingly enough, in the Willem II and MVV cases, the Dutch authorities also argued that the respective measures did not confer any selective advantage to the clubs, but they failed to convince the Commission.

A comparison between the PSV decision on the one hand, and the other “Dutch” decisions on the other, taking into account the definition and operation of the MEIP in the (professional) football sector, will be left for a future blog. This two-part blog, instead, will focus on the compatibility assessment under Article 107(3)(c) done by the Commission in the Willem II and MVV cases and explain why it considered the State aid measure justified.

Part one will serve as an introduction on the two cases. It will provide background information on the compatibility assessment. In part two, the compatibility assessment conducted by the Commission in the two decisions will be analyzed. As will be argued, the conditions set out by the Commission can serve as a blueprint for all public authorities within the EU willing to grant State aid to football clubs in financial difficulties.  


Background

Willem II

In 2004, the municipality of Tilburg and football club Willem II concluded a contract, by which Tilburg became the owner of Willem II’s stadium and the club obtained a lease for the use of the stadium.[2] The annual rent of the stadium was established at €1 million, based on a depreciation period of 30 years, investment costs and an interest rate of 5.5%.[3]

In May 2010, Willem II found itself on the verge of bankruptcy. The municipality was quick to realize the potential negative effects a bankruptcy could have for Tilburg. These negative effects consisted of (1) the loss of rental income; (2) the absence of a tenant for the stadium; (3) the absence of professional football in Tilburg; and (4) the necessity to demolish the stadium and all the costs it would entail.[4] As a result, on 31 May 2010 the municipality decided to lower the rent to €905,000 per year and to decrease the variable costs. Both measures were taken with retroactive effect till 1 July 2004, which resulted in Willem II receiving a total of €2.4 million from the municipality.[5]

Tilburg’s rescue operation of Willem II was never notified to the Commission.[6] Instead, a citizen informed DG Competition shortly after the measure was implemented by means of a letter. This prompted the Commission to send a request for information to the Netherlands on 14 March 2011.[7]

In response to the Commission, the Dutch authorities argued that the new rent agreement was in conformity with the current municipal calculation methods and that the basic principles of the 2004 agreement were still respected. Moreover, the costs Tilburg would suffer for letting Willem II go bankrupt would be higher than the rescue costs. Consequently, the municipality believed it acted in accordance with the so-called ‘Market Economy Investor Principle’ (MEIP).[8] Moreover, the municipality imposed a restructuring plan that aimed at restoring the club’s long-term viability. The conditions of this plan included finding a way to clean up its balance sheet and the need to respect the national football association's norms for salaries of players.[9]

In its decision to open a formal investigation, the Commission counter argued that the depreciation of the stadium’s rent was already adjusted in 2007, and would not justify the retroactive application until 2004. Additionally, the lowering of the variable costs with retro-active effects ended up to be lower than the actual maintenance costs for that period, and should therefore be considered as State aid in accordance with Article 107(1) TFEU.[10] Finally, at the time the Commission launched the formal investigation, it nourished doubts whether the aid measure could be considered compatible with the internal market pursuant Article 107(3)(c). Having received no notification of the rescue measure, the Commission was unable to carry out a proper compatibility assessment. 


MVV

In 2010, football club MVV was facing severe financial difficulties: its total debt amounted to €6.5 million, including €1.7 million to the municipality of Maastricht. As a means of aiding its local football club, the municipality decided to waive its claim of €1.7 million and bought the stadium for €1.85 million.[11] The municipality held that the purchase was done in accordance with the MEIP and that the stadium would be used for multifunctional purposes. The parties agreed that MVV would use the €1.85 million to finance preferential claims, such as taxes and pensions.[12] 

The Commission opened a formal investigation procedure, because it was unable to conclude on the basis of the available information (the rescue measures were not notified[13]) that the behaviour of the municipality had been that of the typical creditor in a market economy.[14] Firstly, it doubted whether a total remission of the claim (€1.7 million) was entirely necessary, since other creditors transformed their claim into a claim on future income from transfer payments or “only” waived 50% of their claim. Secondly, according to the Commission, the purchase price of the stadium was estimated on the basis of replacement value rather than the real market value. It further raised doubts as to whether the municipality acted in accordance with the MEIP since investing in a football stadium depending on one captive user entails a very high risk, even when claiming that you want to make it multifunctional.[15] Similar to the Willem II case, no compatibility assessment of the aid measure in favour of MVV was carried out, because the measure was not notified.[16] 


The rules on compatibility

Pursuant to Article 107(3)(c) TFEU, aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities, where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest, may be considered compatible with the internal market. Only the Commission has the competence (subject to control by the EU Courts) to determine whether or not certain aid merits derogation from the general prohibition of Article 107(1).[17] However, it is settled case law that it is up to the Member State to invoke possible grounds of compatibility and to demonstrate that the conditions for such compatibility are met.[18] Due to its own wide discretion to assess the compatibility, the Commission has developed its own methodologies and approaches over the years, found in the decisional practice, policy documents[19] and sector specific guidelines.[20] 


The Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines

The Community Guidelines of 1 October 2004 on State aid for rescue and restructuring firms in difficulty (hereinafter: “Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines”) primarily serve as a tool for the Commission to assess similar cases in a similar way.[21] The criteria and conditions laid down in the Guidelines are mostly based on the Commission’s own experience in dealing with cases involving State aid in favour of firms in difficulty and case law by the Court of Justice of the EU. Due to the continuous developments in the area of EU State aid law, the Guidelines are regularly updated.[22] In the Guidelines, the Commission sets out the conditions under which State aid for rescuing and restructuring undertakings in difficulty may be considered compatible with the internal market. These conditions include the notification obligation for the Member State,[23] as well as demonstrating that the firm qualifies as ‘a firm in difficulty’. As is stipulated in point 11 of the Guidelines, a firm is considered to be in difficulties where the usual signs of a firm being in difficulty are present, such as increasing losses, diminishing turnover and mounting debt.

In order to rescue a firm from bankruptcy, the Member State has to show that it limits the amount of aid provided to that which is strictly necessary to keep the firm in business.[24] Section 3.2 of the Guidelines requires that the grant of the aid must be conditional on the implementation of a restructuring plan that restores the long term viability of the firm.[25] The restructuring plan needs to be approved by the Member State concerned and communicated to the Commission.[26]

The Member States granting the restructuring aid will have to limit the amount and intensity of the aid to the strict minimum of the restructuring costs necessary to enable restructuring to be undertaken in the light of the existing financial resources of the firm. This also means that the beneficiaries are expected to make a significant contribution to the restructuring plan from their own resources.[27] The Commission will normally consider the following contributions to the restructuring to be appropriate: at least 25 % in the case of small enterprises, at least 40 % for medium-sized enterprises and at least 50 % for large firms.[28]

The Guidelines also stipulate that, in case the firm in difficulty is considered a medium-sized enterprise or larger[29], compensatory measures must be taken by the Member State that grants the rescue and/or restructuring aid in order to ensure that the adverse effects on trading conditions are minimized as much as possible, so that the positive effects pursued outweigh the adverse ones.[30] These last two conditions (i.e. limiting the aid to what is strictly necessary and introducing compensatory measures) have the aim of ensuring that the State aid measure is proportionate to the objective tackled, namely rescuing and/or restructuring a firm in difficulty.

Last but not least, the so-called ‘one time, last time’ principle has to be applied. According to this principle, rescue aid should only be granted once.[31] 


In the coming days, the key part of the Commission’s decisions, the compatibility assessment, will be discussed in part two of this blog.



[1] Real Madrid (twice), FC Barcelona, Valencia CF, Athletic Bilbao, Atlético Osasuna, Elche and Hércules.

[2] Commission Decision on State Aid SA.40168 of 4 July 2016 implemented by the Netherlands in favour of the professional football club Willem II in Tilburg, para. 10.

[3] Commission Decision SA.33584 of 6 March 2013 – The Netherlands Alleged municipal aid to the Professional Dutch football clubs Vitesse, NEC, Willem II, MVV, PSV and FC Den Bosch in 2008-2011, para. 29.

[4] Ibid, para. 30.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid, para. 67.

[7] Ibid, paras. 3-4. To find out how a citizen’s letter can instigate a preliminary State aid investigation, see Ben Van Rompuy and Oskar van Maren, “EU Control of State Aid to Professional Sport: Why Now?” In: “The Legacy of Bosman. Revisiting the relationship between EU law and sport”, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2016.

[8] The essence of this principle is that when a public authority invests in an enterprise on terms and in conditions that would be acceptable to a private investor operating under normal market economy conditions, the investment is not State aid.

[9] SA.40168, para. 12.

[10] SA.33584, paras. 29-31 and 51-53.

[11] Ibid, para. 32.

[12] Ibid, para. 57.

[13] Ibid, para. 67.

[14] Commission Decision on State Aid SA.41612 of 4 July 2016 implemented by the Netherlands in favour of the professional football club MVV in Maastricht, para. 12.

[15] SA.33584, paras. 54-57.

[16] SA.41612, para. 11.

[17] According to settled case law, national courts do not have the power to declare a State aid measure compatible with the internal market. See e.g. C-354/90, Fédération Nationale du Commerce Extérieur des Produits Alimentaires and Syndicat National des Négociants et Transformateurs de Saumon v French Republic, ECLI:EU:C:1991:440, para. 14.

[18] SA.41612, para. 42; see also Case C-364/90, Italy v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1993:157, point 20.

[19] See for example Communication from the Commission COM(2012) of 8 May 2012 to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – EU State Aid Modernisation (SAM), para. 12.

[20] See for example the Communication from the Commission OJ C25/01 of 26 January 2013 on the EU Guidelines for the application of State aid rules in relation to the rapid deployment of broadband networks, paras. 32-34.

[21] In July 2014, the Commission published new Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring undertakings in difficulty, but they are not applicable to aid granted in 2010.

[22] The Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines published in 2014 are the fourth of its sort after earlier versions published in 1994, 1999 and 2004.

[23] Communication from the Commission of 1 October 2004 (2004/C 244/02) Community Guidelines on State Aid for Rescuing and Restructuring firms in difficulty, point 25(c).

[24] Ibid, point 25(d).

[25] Ibid, poins 34-37.

[26] Ibid, point 59. In this regard, it should be noted that the Commission does not need to endorse the restructuring plan.

[27] By “own resources” the Commission also understands funding from external financiers at market conditions.

[28] Guidelines on State Aid for Rescuing and Restructuring firms in difficulty, points 43-44.

[29] The Commission’s definition of Small and Medium-Sized enterprises (SMEs), as stipulated in the Annex of the Commission Recommendation concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises, is also used in the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines. Pursuant to Article 2 of the SME Recommendation, a small enterprise is defined as an enterprise which employs fewer than 50 persons and whose annual turnover and/or annual balance sheet total does not exceed €10 million, whereas a medium-seized enterprise is defined as an enterprise which employs fewer than 250 persons and which has an annual turnover not exceeding €50 million, and/or an annual balance sheet total not exceeding €43 million.

[30] Guidelines on State Aid for Rescuing and Restructuring firms in difficulty, point 38.

[31] Ibid, point 25(e) and section 3.3. In practice, this actually means that rescue or restructuring aid can only be granted once every 10 years.

Comments are closed