Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

Time to focus on freedom of expression: Rainbows, armbands, and FIFA’s commitment to human rights - By Prof. Mark James (Manchester Metropolitan University)

Editor's note: Mark James is Professor of Sports Law at Manchester Metropolitan University and the author of a leading Sports Law textbook.


The opening days of the FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 have already resulted in a number of issues of interest to sports lawyers and human rights lawyers, with FARE’s Piara Powar claiming that this is the most political major sporting event that he has attended. Both FIFA and the local organisers have been active in their suppression of expressions of support for LGBTQIA+ rights by players, fans and journalists alike, calling into question once again the legality of restricting free speech by sporting rules and regulations.

There have been two major flashpoints to date. First, seven European federations had asked FIFA for permission for their captains to wear armbands supporting the ‘OneLove’ campaign. FIFA’s response was to refuse, resulting in the German players covering their mouths for their pre-match photographs in protest at their being silenced. There are several grounds on which FIFA would seek to support its position:

  •  Law 4.5 of the Laws of the Game prohibits any playing equipment from carrying any political, religious or personal slogans, statements or images.
  • Regulation 4.3.1 of FIFA’s Equipment Regulations and Regulation 27.1 of the FIFA World Cup 2022 Regulations prohibits clothing or equipment that includes political, religious, or personal slogans, statements, or images, or otherwise does not comply in full with the Laws of the Game.
  • Regulation 33.3 of the FIFA World Cup 2022 Regulations prohibits the display of political, religious or personal messages or slogans of any nature in any language or form by players and officials.
  • Regulation 13.8.1 of FIFA’s Equipment Regulations states that for FIFA Final Competitions, the captain of each Team must wear the captain’s armband provided by FIFA (all Regulations available in the FIFA Legal Handbook 2022).

Although the DFB is considering a challenge to FIFA’s refusal to allow its captain to wear the OneLove armband, which would ultimately be heard before CAS, it is unlikely to succeed in the face of the strict requirements of the above Laws and Regulations. However, what could cause more difficulty for both FIFA and CAS is if the DFB frames its case as a challenge to the compliance of the rules that restrict players’ freedom of expression with Article 3 of FIFA’s Statutes, which states that ‘FIFA is committed to respecting all internationally recognised human rights.’ Article 3, together with the additional detail provided by FIFA’s Human Rights Policy, ensures that freedom of expression as defined in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights are limitative rules that can be applied directly to FIFA’s activities, as has been argued by Bützler and Schöddert. Further, if the affected players and associations can define themselves as human rights defenders, then Article 11 of FIFA’s Human Rights Policy states that, ‘FIFA will respect and not interfere with the work of … human rights defenders who voice concerns about adverse human rights impacts relating to FIFA.’ Any challenge using this approach would be the first real test of the enforceability of the human rights protections to which FIFA claims to be committed. It would also be a test of CAS’s ability to require adherence to the human rights commitments made by ISFs and to prove that they are more than simple window-dressing.

Secondly, members of The Rainbow Wall, a contingent of LGBTQIA+ rights-supporting Welsh fans, were prevented from entering the Ahmed bin Ali stadium whilst wearing bucket hats incorporating a rainbow into its design. No explanation for why was given, however, FIFA and the local organisers would argue that openly supporting LGBTQIA+ rights with the aim of promoting legal change in a country where homosexuality is illegal is a political statement on apparel and therefore entry into the stadium wearing the rainbow hat is in breach of the Regulation 3.1.23 of the Stadium Code of Conduct. A similar argument could be used to justify preventing US journalist Grant Wahl from entering the stadium wearing a t-shirt incorporating a rainbow into its design and Danish journalist Jon Pagh from wearing the OneLove armband. However, it must be stressed that no such explanation for the prohibitions applied to these garments was provided to any of the affected fans or journalists. It must also be recognised that the opinion that promoting LGBTQIA+ rights is a political expression is highly contested. In a statement from FIFPRO, the opposing view was stated succinctly: ‘We maintain that a rainbow flag is not a political statement but an endorsement of equality and thus a universal human right.’

It is clear that, as with Rule 50 of the Olympic Charter, the chilling effect that FIFA’s Regulations have on players’ and fans’ freedom of expression is likely to be unlawful, as has been discussed at length both on this blog and on the Verfassungsblog Debate on Freedom of Expression in the Olympic Movement. Instead of revisiting these arguments, which are taken to apply to FIFA’s actions at Qatar 2022, two additional issues related to the FIFA Statutes are explored here.

Articles 3 and 4 of FIFA’s Statutes state that:

3 Human rights

FIFA is committed to respecting all internationally recognised human rights and shall strive to promote the protection of these rights.

4 Non-discrimination, equality and neutrality

4.1 Discrimination of any kind against a country, private person or group of people on account of race, skin colour, ethnic, national or social origin, gender, disability, language, religion, political opinion or any other opinion, wealth, birth or any other status, sexual orientation or any other reason is strictly prohibited and punishable by suspension or expulsion.

FIFA is a long-time supporter of pride events and in its press release for Pride Month 2022 stated:

[The] FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022™ will be a celebration of unity and diversity – a joining of people from all walks of life – regardless of race, ethnicity, religion, age, disability, sex characteristics, sexual orientation, gender identity and expression – everybody will be welcome.

Claims that all staff involved in the Qatar 2022 including public and private security forces, would be trained on how to accomplish their tasks in a non-discriminatory manner, seem not to have been operationalised effectively.

This begs the question whether FIFA is in breach of its own Statutes by refusing to allow players to express themselves freely on armbands and failing to protect fans’ freedom of expression by wearing rainbows. At the very least, FIFA should have ensured that a protective LGBTQIA+ regime in the stadiums and the fan zones during the World Cup was implemented to enable the ‘celebration of unity and diversity’ it claims that Qatar 2022 should be. FIFA’s actions in Qatar call into question its claims to be an inclusive and supportive leader on anti-discrimination and human rights, and is likely to see a backlash from the LGBTQIA+ community that it claims to support when it engages with Pride 2023; accusations of hypocrisy and virtue signalling are guaranteed.

With no resolution to the debate at the time of writing, Articles 3 and 4 could provide players and fans with the opportunity to demonstrate their support for human rights and anti-discrimination causes. At the Sochi 2014 Winter Olympics, Athlete Ally developed the ‘Principle 6 Campaign.’ Instead of criticising directly Russia's so called anti-gay laws, which are currently in the process of being extended, athletes promoted Principle 6 of the Olympic Charter, which at the time stated that, ‘Any form of discrimination with regard to a country or a person on grounds of race, religion, politics, gender or otherwise is incompatible with belonging to the Olympic Movement.’ The eventual outcome of this campaign was the addition of sexual orientation to the list of characteristics protected by Principle 6. Unlike at Sochi 2014, there is no need to campaign for a change to either of Articles 3 or 4 of the FIFA Statutes; instead, activists want to ensure that they are being applied. An immediate response for both players and fans would be for them to quote specifically from Articles 3 and 4, as it would be extremely difficult for FIFA to claim that they are making political or personal statements when promoting FIFA’s own foundational values. A creative reminder of what FIFA claims to stand for could enable player and fan activism to continue throughout the tournament, and beyond, whilst affected players and associations can develop a compelling case for the restrictions on freedom of expression to be struck out by CAS, the Swiss Federal Tribunal and/or the European Court of Human Rights.

WISLaw Blog Symposium - Freedom of Expression in Article 10 of the ECHR and Rule 50 of the IOC Charter: Are these polar opposites? - By Nuray Ekşi

Editor's note: Prof. Dr. Ekşi is a full-time lecturer and chair of Department of Private International Law at Özyeğin University Faculty of Law. Prof. Ekşi is the founder and also editor in chief of the Istanbul Journal of Sports Law which has been in publication since 2019.


While Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’) secures the right to freedom of expression, Rule 50 of the Olympic Charter of 17 July 2020 (‘Olympic Charter’) restricts this freedom. Following the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) relating to sports, national and international sports federations have incorporated human rights-related provisions into their statutes and regulations. They also emphasized respect for human rights. For example, Article 3 of the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (‘FIFA’) Statutes, September 2020 edition, provides that “FIFA is committed to respecting all internationally recognised human rights and shall strive to promote the protection of these rights”. Likewise, the Fundamental Principles of Olympism which are listed after the Preamble of the of the Olympic Charter 2020 also contains human rights related provisions. Paragraph 4 of Fundamental Principles of Olympism provides that the practice of sport is a human right. Paragraph 6 forbids discrimination of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, sexual orientation, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. In addition, the International Olympic Committee (‘IOC’) inserted human rights obligations in the 2024 and 2028 Host City Contract.[1] The IOC Athletes’ Rights and Responsibilities Declaration even goes further and aspires to promote the ability and opportunity of athletes to practise sport and compete without being subject to discrimination. Fair and equal gender representation, privacy including protection of personal information, freedom of expression, due process including the right to a fair hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial panel, the right to request a public hearing and the right to an effective remedy are the other human rights and principles stated in the IOC Athletes’ Rights and Responsibilities Declaration. Despite sports federations’ clear commitment to the protection of human rights, it is arguable that their statutes and regulations contain restrictions on athletes and sports governing bodies exercising their human rights during competitions or in the field. In this regard, particular attention should be given to the right to freedom of expression on which certain restrictions are imposed by the federations even if it done with good intentions and with the aim of raising awareness. More...


WISLaw Blog Symposium - Stick to Sports: The Impact of Rule 50 on American Athletes at the Olympic Games - By Lindsay Brandon

Editor's note: Lindsay Brandon is Associate Attorney at Law Offices of Howard L. Jacobs


“Tell the white people of America and all over the world that if they don’t seem to care for the things black people do, they should not go to see black people perform.” – American sprinter and Olympic Medalist John Carlos

On 21 April 2021, the Athletes’ Commission (AC) of the International Olympic Committee (“IOC”) received the “full support of the IOC Executive Board for a set of recommendations in regard to the Rule 50 of the Olympic Charter and Athlete Expression at the Olympic Games.” This came over a year after the 2020 Tokyo Olympic Games were postponed due to the Covid-19 pandemic, and almost a year after the IOC and AC embarked on an “extensive qualitative and quantitative” consultation process to reform Rule 50 involving over 3,500 athletes from around the globe.

Since its introduction of the new guidelines in January 2020, Rule 50 has been touted by the IOC as a means to protect the neutrality of sport and the Olympic Games, stating that “No kind of demonstration or political, religious or radical propaganda is permitted in any Olympic sites, venues, or other areas.”  In other words, the Olympics are a time to celebrate sport, and any political act or demonstration might ruin their “moment of glory”.

In fact, the Rule 50 Guidelines say that a fundamental principle of sport is that it is neutral, and “must be separate from political, religious or any other type of interference.” But this separation is not necessarily rooted in totality in modern sports culture[1], particularly in the United States (“U.S.”).  This is evidenced by the United States Olympic and Paralympic Committee (“USOPC”) committing to not sanctioning Team USA athletes for protesting at the Olympics. The USOPC Athletes stated “Prohibiting athletes to freely express their views during the Games, particularly those from historically underrepresented and minoritized groups, contributes to the dehumanization of athletes that is at odds with key Olympic and Paralympic values.” More...



(A)Political Games? Ubiquitous Nationalism and the IOC’s Hypocrisy

Editor’s note: Thomas Terraz is a L.LM. candidate in the European Law programme at Utrecht University and a former intern of the Asser International Sports Law Centre

 

1.     Sport Nationalism is Politics

Despite all efforts, the Olympic Games has been and will be immersed in politics. Attempts to shield the Games from social and political realities are almost sure to miss their mark and potentially risk being disproportionate. Moreover, history has laid bare the shortcomings of the attempts to create a sanitized and impenetrable bubble around the Games. The first blog of this series examined the idea of the Games as a sanitized space and dived into the history of political neutrality within the Olympic Movement to unravel the irony that while the IOC aims to keep the Olympic Games ‘clean’ of any politics within its ‘sacred enclosure’, the IOC and the Games itself are largely enveloped in politics. Politics seep into the cracks of this ‘sanitized’ space through: (1) public protests (and their suppression by authoritarian regimes hosting the Games), (2) athletes who use their public image to take a political stand, (3) the IOC who takes decisions on recognizing national Olympic Committees (NOCs) and awarding the Games to countries,[1] and (4) states that use the Games for geo-political posturing.[2] With this background in mind, the aim now is to illustrate the disparity between the IOC’s stance on political neutrality when it concerns athlete protest versus sport nationalism, which also is a form of politics.

As was mentioned in part one of this series, the very first explicit mention of politics in the Olympic Charter was in its 1946 version and aimed to combat ‘the nationalization of sports for political aims’ by preventing ‘a national exultation of success achieved rather than the realization of the common and harmonious objective which is the essential Olympic law’ (emphasis added). This sentiment was further echoed some years later by Avery Brundage (IOC President (1952-1972)) when he declared: ‘The Games are not, and must not become, a contest between nations, which would be entirely contrary to the spirit of the Olympic Movement and would surely lead to disaster’.[3] Regardless of this vision to prevent sport nationalism engulfing the Games and its codification in the Olympic Charter, the current reality paints quite a different picture. One simply has to look at the mass obsession with medal tables during the Olympic Games and its amplification not only by the media but even by members of the Olympic Movement.[4] This is further exacerbated when the achievements of athletes are used for domestic political gain[5] or when they are used to glorify a nation’s prowess on the global stage or to stir nationalism within a populace[6]. Sport nationalism is politics. Arguably, even the worship of national imagery during the Games from the opening ceremony to the medal ceremonies cannot be depoliticized.[7] In many ways, the IOC has turned a blind eye to the politics rooted in these expressions of sport nationalism and instead has focused its energy to sterilize its Olympic spaces and stifle political expression from athletes. One of the ways the IOC has ignored sport nationalism is through its tacit acceptance of medal tables although they are expressly banned by the Olympic Charter.

At this point, the rules restricting athletes’ political protest and those concerning sport nationalism, particularly in terms of medal tables, will be scrutinized in order to highlight the enforcement gap between the two. More...


(A)Political Games: A Critical History of Rule 50 of the Olympic Charter - By Thomas Terraz

Editor’s note: Thomas Terraz is a fourth year LL.B. candidate at the International and European Law programme at The Hague University of Applied Sciences with a specialisation in European Law. Currently he is pursuing an internship at the T.M.C. Asser Institute with a focus on International and European Sports Law.

 

Since its inception, the Olympic Movement, and in particular the IOC, has tirelessly endeavored to create a clean bubble around sport events, protecting its hallowed grounds from any perceived impurities. Some of these perceived ‘contaminants’ have eventually been accepted as a necessary part of sport over time (e.g. professionalism in sport),[1] while others are still strictly shunned (e.g. political protest and manifestations) and new ones have gained importance over the years (e.g. protection of intellectual property rights). The IOC has adopted a variety of legal mechanisms and measures to defend this sanitized space.  For instance, the IOC has led massive efforts to protect its and its partners’ intellectual property rights through campaigns against ambush marketing (e.g. ‘clean venues’ and minimizing the athletes’ ability to represent their personal sponsors[2]). Nowadays, the idea of the clean bubble is further reinforced through the colossal security operations created to protect the Olympic sites.

Nevertheless, politics, and in particular political protest, has long been regarded as one of the greatest threats to this sanitized space. More recently, politics has resurfaced in the context of the IOC Athletes’ Commission Rule 50 Guidelines. Although Rule 50 is nothing new, the Guidelines stirred considerable criticism, to which Richard Pound personally responded, arguing that Rule 50 is a rule encouraging ‘mutual respect’ through ‘restraint’ with the aim of using sport ‘to bring people together’.[3] In this regard, the Olympic Charter aims to avoid ‘vengeance, especially misguided vengeance’. These statements seem to endorse a view that one’s expression of their political beliefs at the Games is something that will inherently divide people and damage ‘mutual respect’. Thus, the question naturally arises: can the world only get along if ‘politics, religion, race and sexual orientation are set aside’?[4] Should one’s politics, personal belief and identity be considered so unholy that they must be left at the doorstep of the Games in the name of depoliticization and of the protection of the Games’ sanitized bubble? Moreover, is it even possible to separate politics and sport?  

Even Richard Pound would likely agree that politics and sport are at least to a certain degree bound to be intermingled.[5] However, numerous commentators have gone further and expressed their skepticism to the view that athletes should be limited in their freedom of expression during the Games (see here, here and here). Overall, the arguments made by these commentators have pointed out the hypocrisy that while the Games are bathed in politics, athletes – though without their labor there would be no Games – are severely restrained in expressing their own political beliefs. Additionally, they often bring attention to how some of the most iconic moments in the Games history are those where athletes took a stand on a political issue, often stirring significant controversy at the time. Nevertheless, what has not been fully explored is the relationship between the Olympic Games and politics in terms of the divide between the ideals of international unity enshrined in the Olympic Charter and on the other hand the de facto embrace of country versus country competition in the Olympic Games. While the Olympic Charter frames the Games as ‘competitions between athletes in individual or team events and not between countries’, the reality is far from this ideal.[6] Sport nationalism in this context can be considered as a form of politics because a country’s opportunity to host and perform well at the Games is frequently used to validate its global prowess and stature.

To explore this issue, this first blog will first take a historical approach by investigating the origins of political neutrality in sport followed by an examination of the clash between the ideal of political neutrality and the reality that politics permeate many facets of the Olympic Games. It will be argued that overall there has been a failure to separate politics and the Games but that this failure was inevitable and should not be automatically viewed negatively. The second blog will then dive into the Olympic Charter’s legal mechanisms that attempt to enforce political neutrality and minimize sport nationalism, which also is a form of politics. It will attempt to compare and contrast the IOC’s approach to political expression when exercised by the athletes with its treatment of widespread sport nationalism.More...

Asser International Sports Law Blog | Luxembourg calls…is the answer from Nyon the way forward? Assessing UEFA’s response to the ECJ’s ISU judgment - By Saverio Spera

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

Luxembourg calls…is the answer from Nyon the way forward? Assessing UEFA’s response to the ECJ’s ISU judgment - By Saverio Spera

 

Editor's note: Saverio P. Spera is an Italian qualified attorney-at-law. He has practiced civil and employment law in Italy and briefly worked at the Asser International Sports Law Centre before joining FIFA in 2017. Until May 2024, he has worked within the FIFA legal division - Litigation Department, and lectured in several FIFA sports law programmes. In the spring of 2024 he has co-founded SP.IN Law, a Zurich based international sports law firm.

 

 

On 21 December 2023 a judicial hat-trick stormed the scene of EU sports law. That day, the European Court of Justice (the “ECJ”) issued three decisions: (i) European Superleague Company, SL v FIFA and UEFA (Case C-333/21); (ii) UL and SA Royal Antwerp Football Club v Union royale belge des sociétés de football association ASBL (Case C-680/21)and (iii) International Skating Union (ISU) v. European Commission – Case C-124/21.

These judgments were much scrutinised (see herehere and here) in the past 6 months. For the reader’s relief, this paper will not venture into adding another opinion on whether this was a fatal blow to the foundation of EU sports law or if, after all, the substantive change is minimal (as persuasively argued here). It will analyse, instead, UEFA’s recent amendments of its Statutes and Authorisation Rules governing International Club Competitions (the “Authorisation Rules”) and whether these amendments, clearly responding to the concerns raised in the ISU judgment with respect to the sports arbitration system,[1] might pave the way for other Sports Governing Bodies (SGBs) to follow suit and what the implications for CAS arbitration might be.

 

The ISU judgement in a nutshell

On 23 June 2014, two professional speed skaters belonging to the Royal Netherlands Skating Federation (KNSB), Mr Tuitert and Mr Kerstholt, filed a complaint to the European Commission (the “Commission”) against the ISU (of which, the KNSB is a member) for an alleged violation of Article 101 and 102 TFEU by the ISU Prior Authorisation and Eligibility Rules. Three years later, on 8 December 2017, the Commission issued its decision, considering the compatibility with EU competition law of (i) the ISU Eligibility Rules (i.e., the provisions determining the conditions in which athletes could take part in skating competitions); (ii) the ISU Prior Authorisation Rules (i.e., the provisions setting out the procedure to follow in order to obtain from the ISU the authorisation to organise international skating competitions) and (iii) the ISU Arbitration Rules (i.e., the provisions establishing that, in case of disputes, the relevant ISU decision would have had to be appealed at the CAS).[2] In essence, the Commission found that the Eligibility and Prior Authorisation Rules did not satisfy the conditions required by Article 101(3) TFEU in order to benefit from an exemption and, importantly, that the Arbitration Rules had to be revised because they were reinforcing the restriction of commercial freedom already determined by the substantive rules under scrutiny. 

The ISU appealed the EC’s Decision to the General Court (the “GC”), seeking its annulment. On 16 December 2020, the GC issued its decision (the “Appealed Decision”) rejecting most of the appeal. However, the judges annulled the part of the EC’s Decision dedicated to the ISU Arbitration Rules. In essence, the GC considered that conferring exclusive jurisdiction to the CAS, a specialised arbitral tribunal capable of quickly resolving these disputes, was justified by legitimate interests linked to the specific nature of the sport.[3]

On 26 February 2021, the ISU filed an appeal to the ECJ against the ruling of the GC, while the speed skaters (supported by the Commission) filed a cross-appeal requesting to set aside the Appealed Ruling in so far as it annulled the part of the EC Decision that concerned the Arbitration Rules.  

Regarding these, the ECJ was not convinced by the GC’s conclusion that legitimate interests linked to the specific nature of sport can justify arbitration rules when they confer exclusive jurisdiction to the CAS to review decisions capable of touching upon public policy provisions of the EU (such as matters of EU competition law). Instead, it stressed that the contested Arbitration Rules concerned disputes that could arise in the context of economic activities linked to the organisation and marketing of international speed skating events. Hence, any disputes subjected to these Arbitration Rules come under EU competition law, and the relevant decision must comply with it.[4] The ECJ demanded that the court having jurisdiction to review the award perform an effective judicial review to guarantee that substantive rights – part of EU public policy – are safeguarded.[5] In this context, the ECJ also underlined that it is not sufficient to provide ex postremedies allowing parties to seek damages for violations of competition law condoned through the arbitration process.[6]


A standstill between two systems which inevitably cross paths

According to the ECJ, any provision or decision of an association of undertakings crossing the boundaries of “questions of interest solely to sport […] extraneous to any economic activity”[7] and potentially restrictive of competition must be scrutinised through the lens of EU competition law.

A problem of coexistence between two legal regimes that inevitably interact seems to be evident. On the one hand, the international sports arbitration system, with the CAS as specialised dispute resolution method and the SFT as judicial apex, and on the other EU law and the EU institutions.  

i.               The problem does not lie with the CAS in itself…

Notoriously, CAS panels do apply EU law when required.[8] The legislative basis upon which they do so is Article R58 CAS Code,[9] Article 19 of the Swiss Federal Act on Private International Law (PILA)[10]  and – depending on the circumstances – Article 187(1) PILA.[11] Over the years, CAS panels have regularly assessed the compatibility of regulations of UEFA and FIFA with EU Competition law. 

In CAS 2007/A/1287 Danubio FC v. FIFA & FC Internazionale Milano S.p.A., the panel analysed the compatibility of the FIFA solidarity mechanism with EU competition law. On that occasion, it recognised that “it is not only allowed, but also obliged to deal with the issues involving the application of EC law in the present matter”. The same conclusion was reached by other panels on several occasions over the years (see, inter aliaCAS 2009/A/1788 UMMC Ekaterinburg v. FIBA Europe e. V., In CAS 2012/A/2852 S.C.S Fotbal Club CFR 1907 Cluj S.A. & Manuel Ferreira de Sousa Ricardo & Mario Jorge Quintas Felgueiras v. FRFCAS 2014/A/3561 & 3614 IAAF & WADA).

A recent CAS award entirely revolved around the compatibility of the newly adopted FIFA Football Agents Regulations (FFAR) with EU law.[12]

The ECJ’s demands for an effective scrutiny through the lens of EU Competition law of certain types of regulations of associations of undertakings is thus met by the arbitral body having (almost invariably) exclusive jurisdiction to review them.

ii.              …but with the court which reviews its awards

However, while a CAS award can be challenged before the Swiss Federal Tribunal (SFT) on the ground of – inter alia – incompatibility with public policy,[13] Swiss public policy and EU public policy (which covers EU competition law[14]) are two very distinct concepts and the SFT (i) only takes the former into account and (ii) certainly does not refer questions to the ECJ for preliminary rulings. 

Hence, the failure to apply (or the wrong application of) EU law does not necessarily result in the setting aside of the relevant CAS award since it does not violate Swiss public policy.[15]

On a few occasions, the SFT has considered whether EU competition law is part and parcel of Swiss public policy.[16] In a judgment of 8 March 2006, the SFT rejected a request to set aside an arbitral award on the basis of a claimed incompatibility with substantive public policy due to an alleged violation of EU (and Italian) competition law. On that occasion, the SFT – once having formulated a definition of Swiss public policy[17] – determined that EU competition law does not meet the test.[18]

Thus, even if EU law is considered to be a mandatory foreign substantive law by the relevant arbitral panel, this does not make it part of the Swiss public order. The SFT seems to be content with the conclusion that the public policy weighing on the Court is different from the one weighing upon the arbitrator.[19]

Ultimately, the problem is not really the CAS per se, but the fact that it is seated in Switzerland.


Is UEFA paving a way forward to diffuse the potential conflict between CAS arbitration and EU competition law?

It is not the first time that the EU judges draw the SGBs’ attention to the fact that their rules and decisions are not adopted in a social and economic vacuum and that their (a priori legitimate) governing authority needs to account for its effects on the EU’s internal market. As illustrated in the ISU case, this extends to dispute resolution processes that are provided for in the SGBs’ rulebooks. 

UEFA has recently attempted to address these concerns by amending its Authorisation Rules and its Statutes. Article 16 of the Authorisation Rules, concerning ‘Dispute resolution’, was amended through the addition of paragraph 3 and 4 reading as follows:

3. CAS shall primarily apply the UEFA Statutes, rules and regulations and subsidiarily Swiss law. The party filing the statement of appeal and/or a request for provisional measures, whichever is filed first with CAS, shall indicate in its first written submission to CAS whether the party accepts Lausanne, Switzerland, as seat of the arbitration or if the seat of the arbitration shall be in Dublin, Ireland, in derogation of Article R28 of the CAS CodeIn the latter case, UEFA is bound by the choice of Dublin, Ireland, as seat of the arbitration and UEFA shall confirm its agreement to such seat in its first written reply to CAS. In case no seat is indicated in the first written submission to CAS, Article R28 of the CAS Code shall apply. 

4. The decision of CAS shall be deemed to be made at the seat of the arbitration determined as per paragraph (3) above. The CAS award shall mention the seat of the arbitration. The decision of CAS shall be final and binding to the exclusion of jurisdiction of any ordinary court or any other court of arbitration. This is without prejudice to the right of appeal of any party in accordance with the applicable law of the seat of the arbitration as well as the right to challenge the enforcement or recognition of a CAS award on grounds of public policy (which may include European Union public policy laws) in accordance with any applicable national or European Union procedural laws

Article 63 of Statutes, in turn, was modified in its paragraph 2 (now reading “CAS shall primarily apply the UEFA Statutes, rules and regulations and, subsidiarily, Swiss law. In addition, any party before CAS shall be entitled to raise mandatory provisions of foreign law in accordance with Article 19 of the Swiss Private International Law Act, which may include European Union public policy laws”) and an entirely new third paragraph was added to it:

3. CAS awards shall be final and binding to the exclusion of jurisdiction of any ordinary court or any other court of arbitration. This is without prejudice to the right to file an appeal against a CAS award before the Swiss Federal Tribunal in accordance with Swiss law and the right to challenge the enforcement or recognition of a CAS award on grounds of public policy (which may include European Union public policy laws) in accordance with any applicable national or European Union procedural laws or the right to file a case before a competent competition authority.

While laudable, the clarification in the Statutes does not add much to the picture. As seen, CAS panels were already applying foreign mandatory law. The new paragraph 3 does not seem to change the general balance of the UEFA arbitration rules either, since the possibility to challenge the enforcement or recognition of a CAS award existed already.

The changes to the Authorisation Rules are much more significant with regard to the CAS arbitration procedure. They concern disputes related to UEFA’s decisions not to authorise the organisation of International Club Competitions.[20]According to the Authorisation Rules, a potential organiser needs to meet administrative and financial criteria,[21]sporting and technical criteria,[22] ethical criteria,[23] sporting merit criteria,[24] and submit to UEFA a request for authorisation containing all the relevant information and supporting documents concerning the mentioned prerequisites in order to obtain authorisation to organise an International Club Competition.[25] Any dispute related to these rules has to be brought to the CAS. Yet, the appellant can derogate to Article R28 of the CAS Code and choose to have the CAS seated in Dublin rather than in Lausanne and if it does so: (A) UEFA is bound by that choice; (B) the relevant award will be subjected to setting aside proceedings before the Irish High Court (on the limited grounds of Article 34(2) of the Model Law, which include public policy, as explained here).

The amendment is significant. Is it revolutionary? Probably not, but it certainly shows UEFA’s willingness to appease Luxembourg and Brussels’ concerns. The Authorisation Rules are a textbook example of the type of rules whose compatibility with EU competition law might be challenged and for which access to the preliminary reference procedure ought to be available. 

Does the reform address the ECJ’s concerns as expressed in the ISU ruling? In part, undoubtedly. In the future, in cases involving the Authorisation Rules, the appellants will be able to choose to bind UEFA to an arbitral process subjected to the review of the national court of a Member State which can refer to the ECJ a preliminary reference. However, there are many more UEFA rules that can potentially infringe EU competition law which are currently outside of the scope of this new procedure.[26]

Is this a model for other SGBs to follow? Possibly. It preserves the CAS as a specialised international arbitral tribunal sitting in Switzerland (which is dear to many stakeholders for a variety of reasons) yet guaranteeing that – when it comes to some rules typically touching upon issues of EU competition law – potentially affected parties can opt to have an effective EU law review by choosing a seat of the arbitration within the EU, while at the same time being reassured about the enforceability of the award (as Ireland is signatory of the New York Convention).

This compromise appears to offer a feasible and potentially fruitful path to appease the concerns of the ECJ, while preserving the specific relationship between sports governance and the CAS. In the end, the CAS might have to be ‘EUropeanised’, but it seems high time to ensure a greater embeddedness of sports arbitration in the EU legal order in order to protect the lex sportiva from a head-on conflict with EU law and the EU institutions.


[1] As argued by Antoine Duval: “one of the least visible and yet potentially most consequential findings in the trio of decisions”.

[2] In parallel, Article 25 of the ISU Statutes provided for the possibility for athletes who wished to challenge a decision imposing a penalty of ‘loss of eligibility’ or ‘ineligibility’ on them to lodge an appeal against that decision before the CAS.

[3] Appealed Decision, para. 156.

[4] ISU judgment, para. 189.

[5] Ibid, paras. 198 – 199.

[6] Ibid, paras. 200 – 204. 

[7] It is interesting to note that the revival of the concept of ‘purely sporting rule’ by the Court has been authoritatively criticised (see here and here).

[8] For a complete overview of the interaction between EU law and the CAS, see Duval A (2015) The Court of Arbitration for Sport and EU law: chronicle of an encounter. Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative law, 22(2) 224-255.

[9] Article R58 CAS Code (law applicable to the merits): “The Panel shall decide the dispute according to the applicable regulations and, subsidiarily, to the rules of law chosen by the parties or, in the absence of such a choice, according to the law of the country in which the federation, association or sports-related body which has issued the challenged decision is domiciled or according to the rules of law the Panel deems appropriate. In the latter case, the Panel shall give reasons for its decision” (emphasis added)

[10] Article 19 PILA: “1. If interests that are legitimate and clearly preponderant according to the Swiss conception of law so require, a mandatory provision of a law other than the one referred to by this Act may be taken into consideration, provided the situation dealt with has a close connection with that other law. 2. In deciding whether such a provision is to be taken into consideration, consideration shall be given to its purpose and the consequences of its application, in order to reach a decision that is appropriate having regard to the Swiss conception of law”.

[11] Article 187(1) PILA: “The arbitral tribunal shall decide the dispute according to the rules of law chosen by the parties or, in the absence of such a choice, according to the rules of law with which the case has the closest connection”.

[12] The panel indeed assessed whether Article 15(2) FFAR: (i) pursued legitimate objectives recognised by the EU legal order (paras. 283 – 288); (ii) was appropriate to pursue those objectives (paras. 289 - 297) and (iii) was proportionate (paras. 298 – 310) and concluded in the affirmative with respect to each of them.

[13] See Article 190(2) lit. e) PILA.

[14] See, for instance, Case C-126/97 – Eco Swiss China Time Ltd. v Benetton International NV, [1999] ECR I-3055.

[15] See Sandra de Vito Bieri – the application of EU law by arbitral tribunal seated in Switzerland in ASA Bulletin 1/2017 (Volume 35, pages 55 – 66), who points out that the only chance for such an action to be successful would be in the improbable case in which the CAS were to find EU law applicable to the dispute but were to deny jurisdiction to decide on matter of EU law.

[16] ATF 128 III 234, consid. 4c at 242; Judgment 4P.119/1998 of 13 November 1998, consid. 1b/bb, published in ASA Bulletin 1999 at pp 529 et seq.

[17] Judgment of 8 March 2006, 4P.278/2005, consid. 2.2.3: “[…] an award is incompatible with public policy if it disregards essential and widely recognised values which, in accordance with conceptions prevalent in Switzerland, must constitute the foundation of any legal order”.

[18] In essence, the SFT did not consider competition law to be a fundamental principle of law applicable in any legal order given the different extents to which this is accepted in the various legal systems. In particular, with respect to EU competition law, the SFT observed that the values that it protects are confined to the EU because drafted in the attempt to guarantee the functioning of the European internal market, and – as such – they cannot be considered part of a more universal principle that can be shared by all countries, including Switzerland

[19] Ibid, consid. 3.3. See Landolt P. “Judgment of the Swiss Supreme Court of 8 March 2006 – A Commentary”.

[20] See Article 2 of the Rules for more details on their scope of application.

[21] Article 4 of the Rules.

[22] Article 5 of the Rules.

[23] Article 6 of the Rules.

[24] Article 7 of the Rules.

[25] Articles 8 to 12 of the Rules.

[26] There are rules admittedly escaping EU law scrutiny, however – as poignantly argued by Prof. Weatherill here – those entirely extraneous to economic activity are not many and possibly the focus should not be on their purely sporting nature but rather on the effect of their practice.

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