Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

Joint Statement from Legal Experts on Genetic Sex Testing in Sport

We, the undersigned legal experts in human rights and sports, issue this statement out of urgent concern about the regressive move toward genetic testing as a precondition of participation in women’s sport. Such eligibility rules, which have already been adopted by several major International Federations—including World Athletics, World Boxing, World Aquatics, and the International Ski and Snowboard Federation—not only conflict with the IOC’s existing guidelines on the matter, but also violate domestic and international laws that protect human rights and regulate the use of genetic testing and genetic information. 


Violations of the IOC Framework

The IOC’s Framework on fairness, inclusion and non-discrimination on the basis of gender identity and sex variationsoutlines fundamental principles to be followed within the Olympic Movement when defining eligibility criteria for the men’s and women’s categories of competition. According to the Framework, any such eligibility criteria should be aimed at ensuring that no athlete has an unfair and disproportionate competitive advantage or at preventing a risk to the physical safety of other athletes. Under the Framework, such an advantage or risk cannot be presumed based on an athlete’s sex variations, physical appearance, or transgender status. It must instead be established based on evidence in the form of robust and peer reviewed research. 

In particular, such evidence should be “based on data collected from a demographic group that is consistent in gender and athletic engagement with the group that the eligibility criteria aim to regulate” and must demonstrate “disproportionate competitive advantage and/or unpreventable risk exists for the specific sport, discipline and event that the eligibility criteria aim to regulate.” Contrary to this evidence-based approach, exclusion based on the presence of the SRY gene constitutes a categorical ban based on a single biological marker, rather than on peer-reviewed research demonstrating that transgender athletes and/or athletes with sex variations have a disproportionate competitive advantage or pose an unpreventable safety risk in specific sporting disciplines.

Moreover, the IOC Framework advises International Federations to prioritize athletes’ health, wellbeing, bodily autonomy, and privacy. Current genetic sex testing rules fail to do so, in violation of numerous domestic and international laws, which we urgently draw attention to below.


Violations of national, regional, and international human rights laws

As several Special Procedures of the UN Human Rights Council have observed, genetic sex testing as a condition of eligibility for women’s sport infringes on athletes’ internationally recognized rights to equality, bodily and psychological integrity, and privacy. 

Further, the IOC, along with the many International Federations based in Europe, must comply with the European Convention on Human Rights. Indeed, the European Court of Human Rights has recognized that the failure of a sport governing body to respect human rights may engage the responsibility of Switzerland under the Convention and, further, that the Swiss Federal Supreme Court must subject female eligibility rules in sport to particularly rigorous review given the seriousness of the personal rights at issue, including privacy, bodily and psychological integrity, economic freedom, and human dignity. 

We consider that mandatory genetic sex testing, and the exclusion of women athletes on this basis, violates Articles 8 (right to respect for private life) and 14 (prohibition of discrimination) of the European Convention. Such violations can only be justified if the eligibility rules are reasonable, necessary, and proportionate, which International Federations bear the burden of proving and which they are currently unable to do. As the European Court of Human Rights recently recognized, the harms of sex testing include the inevitable disclosure of certain athletes’ private and confidential medical information, the potential loss of their livelihoods, and a range of other serious harms. In our view, these consequences—and particularly the social exclusion, psychological distress, physical harm, and material loss that accompany them—cannot be considered reasonable and proportionate to the aim pursued. This is particularly so given the absence of conclusive scientific evidence demonstrating that transgender women athletes or athletes with sex variations have a systematic advantage over other women athletes. 

The exclusion of athletes on the basis of genetic sex testing likewise violates domestic laws, as a Belgian court recently concluded, finding that international cycling regulations barring transgender women were discriminatory, lacking a sound scientific basis, and disproportionate. 


Violations of laws regulating genetic testing and genetic data

Genetic sex testing as a condition of participation in sport also violates numerous national, regional, and international laws, which strictly circumscribe the use of genetic testing and genetic data. 

First, the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, along with the domestic laws of many jurisdictions, prohibit genetic testing unless it serves a health-related purpose, which sex testing rules clearly do not. Some domestic laws place additional restrictions on the range of permissible medical purposes when it comes to minors, however International Federations apply genetic sex testing rules indiscriminately to athletes of all ages. Because of such domestic legal restrictions, athletes in some countries have been pushed to access genetic testing abroad, in less protective jurisdictions.

Second, across jurisdictions, free and informed consent is a fundamental precondition for genetic testing. Not only do individuals below a certain age lack the legal capacity to consent, the consent of an athlete of any age cannot be freely given when it is a condition of sports eligibility. Illustrating this legal principle, the International Declaration on Human Genetic Data specifies that consent to genetic testing is only valid if it is not induced by financial or other personal gain, yet sports eligibility rules do exactly that. While many jurisdictions require the provision of non-directive genetic counselling prior to any testing, this safeguard is nullified by the directive nature of sports eligibility rules. 

Third, domestic and international laws prohibit discrimination based on genetic characteristics, as well as the use of genetic data in ways that stigmatize individuals or groups. Yet genetic sex testing rules do so, first, by targeting only women athletes for testing, and second, by excluding those with a particular genetic trait, resulting in the further stigmatization and marginalization of transgender and intersex people, not only in sport but in society at large.

Fourth, in order to prevent such discrimination, certain jurisdictions specifically prohibit making genetic testing or disclosure of test results a condition of a contract and prohibit anyone other than medical practitioners or researchers, and particularly employers, from requesting or using genetic information. International Federations cannot circumvent these legal restrictions by outsourcing genetic testing to authorities at the national level.

Finally, privacy and data protection laws around the world, including the General Data Protection Regulation(GDPR) afford heightened protection to genetic information. The GDPR prohibits the processing of genetic data, except in very narrow circumstances, such as where the data subject gives explicit, voluntary and informed consent, or where the processing is necessary for and proportionate to reasons of substantial public interest set out in EU or member state law.  Such voluntary and informed consent does not exist for genetic sex testing as athletes are forced to grant consent under the threat of exclusion from sport, and often in circumstances where they are not knowledgeable about the risks of harm that might result from the data processing. There is also no EU or member state law that describes the purported aim of sex testing in sport as a substantial public interest and, even if there was, the data processing in pursuit of that aim would not be necessary and proportionate due to the absence of scientific evidence that women with the SRY gene have a competitive advantage over other women athletes and the significant harms to athletes that can result from genetic sex testing.

The processing of genetic data for sex testing may violate other data protection laws that have been recognized as providing an adequate level of protection similar to the GDPR, such as the data protection laws in Brazil, Canada, Japan, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.


Our Call

We call on the IOC, as it finalises the work to find a “consensus” to “protect the female category”, to reject mandatory genetic testing as a condition of eligibility. We call on International Federations that have already adopted such eligibility rules to withdraw them immediately. And we call on all sport governing bodies to recommit—in practice, not only in policy—to the principles of inclusion and non-discrimination that they have already affirmed.

If international sport governing bodies fail to do so, we call on National Federations to refuse to apply and implement international eligibility rules that violate their respective domestic laws and international legal obligations. Simultaneously, we call on states to urgently review the legality of mandatory genetic sex testing policies that are being applied to athletes and/or at competitions within their jurisdictions. 

We also call on athletes to challenge the national or regional implementation of mandatory genetic sex testing, demanded by the IOC or International Federations, before domestic courts, by invoking national or regional laws protecting human rights, prohibiting anti-discrimination, and regulating the use of genetic testing and genetic data. 

At the same time, we call on courts, particularly the Court of Arbitration for Sport, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, and ultimately the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union, to uphold their duty to ensure a particularly rigorous review of the rules and decisions of the IOC and International Federations, which is compliant with European human rights law and public policy. 

Mandatory genetic sex testing is a stigmatizing and exclusionary policy that lacks democratic legitimacy, scientific grounding, and proportionality between its harms and its aims. It simply has no place in international sport if sport is to be respectful of the values of human dignity, inclusion, fairness, and non-discrimination.  

 

First signatories:

 

Dr. Antoine Duval, T.M.C. Asser Instituut, The Netherlands

Dr. Michele Krech, Toronto Metropolitan University, Canada 

 

 

Signatories

 

1.     Dr. Cem Abanazir, Manchester Metropolitan University, United Kingdom

2.     Rafia Akram, University of Pretoria, South Africa

3.     Dr. Shreya Atrey, University of Oxford, United Kingdom

4.     Francis Awaritefe, lawyer, Professional Footballers Australia (PFA), Australia

5.     Dr. Mathieu Le Bescond de Coatpont, Université de Lille, France

6.     Manon Beury, Geneva Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Switzerland

7.     Dr. Audrey Boisgontier, Paris Nanterre University, France

8.     Jensen Brehaut, Osgoode Hall Law School - York University, Canada

9.     Prof. Eva Brems, Ghent University, Belgium

10.  Prof. Erin Buzuvis, Western New England University School of Law, USA

11.  Dr Seamus Byrne, Manchester Law School, Manchester Metropolitan University, United Kingdom 

12.  Prof. Gillian Calder, University of Victoria, Faculty of Law, Canada

13.  Dr. Pieter Cannoot, Ghent University, Belgium

14.  Amritananda Chakravorty, Advocate, India

15.  Jonathan Cooper, University of Gloucestershire, United Kingdom 

16.  Prof. Sharon Cowan, University of Edinburgh, United Kingdom 

17.  Dr. Martine Dennie, University of Manitoba, Canada

18.  Moya Dodd, lawyer, Former Matilda (Australian Women’s Football Team), Australia

19.  Nikki Dryden, lawyer, The Right Collective, Australia

20.  Dr Eleanor Drywood, School of Law and Social Justice, University of Liverpool, United Kingdom

21.  Prof. Maria C Dugas, Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie University, Canada

22.  Prof. Ariel Dulitzky, University of Texas at Austin, School of Law, USA

23.  Dr. Hilary Findlay, Brock University (retired), Canada

24.  Deekshitha Ganesan, Human rights lawyer, Germany

25.  Dr. Ryan GauthierThompson Rivers University

26.  Alexandra Gómez Bruinewoud, Director Legal at FIFPro, The Netherlands

27.  Kaushik Gupta, Senior Advocate High Court at Calcutta, India  

28.  Dr Matthew Harvey, Victoria University Melbourne, Australia

29.  Dina Francesca Haynes, Orville H. Schell, Jr. Center for International Human Rights and Yale University, USA

30.  Prof. Kristin Henrard, Brussels School of Governance, Free University Brussels, Belgium

31.  Dr. Daniela Heerdt, T.M.C. Asser Instituut, The Netherlands

32.  Tim Holden, Solicitor admitted in Australia, Australia

33.  Dr. Lena Holzer, University of Cambridge, United Kingdom

34.  Shubham Jain, University of Cambridge, United Kingdom

35.  Timothy Kajja, Advocate of the High Court of Uganda, Uganda

36.  Dr. Ido Katri, York Institute of Science and Technology, Canada

37.  Prof. Bruce Kidd, University of Toronto, Canada

38.  Prof. Jennifer Koshan, Faculty of Law, University of Calgary, Canada

39.  Prof. Mélanie Levy, Health Law Institute - Faculty of Law - University of Neuchâtel, Switzerland

40.  Marcus Mazzucco, University of Toronto, Canada

41.  Dr. Julie Mattiussi, Associate Professor, University of Strasbourg, France

42.  Pedro José Mercado Jaén, European University Instute, Italy

43.  Alice M. Miller, Global Health Justice Partnership of the Yale Law and Public Health Schools, Yale University, USA

44.  Bárbara Monzerrat Meré Carrión, Legal Counsel at FIFPro, The Netherlands

45.  Dr. Tomáš Morochovič, University of Edinburgh, United Kingdom

46.  Prof. Benjamin Moron-Puech, Université Lumière Lyon 2, France

47.  George Newhouse, Human rights lawyer, Australia

48.  Dr. Matt Nichol, Central Queensland University, Australia

49.  Khayran Noor, International Sports Lawyer, Kenya

50.  Dr Catherine Ordway, University of New South Wales, Australia

51.  Prof. David Pavot, Université de Sherbrooke, Canada

52.  Prof. Debra Parkes, Peter A. Allard School of Law, University of British Columbia, Canada

53.  Dr. Seema Patel, Nottingham Law School, University of Nottingham, United Kingdom 

54.  Prof. Carmen Pérez-González, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Spain

55.  Prof. Isabelle Rorive, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium

56.  Mihir Samson, Advocate, India

57.  Dr. Yassine Sangare, King Stage Business School, United Kingdom

58.  Maya Satya Reddy, Former Professional Golfer, founder of the Harvard Law School LGBTQ+ Advocacy Clinic Sports Project, LGBTQ+ Sports Law and Policy Consultant (JD), USA

59.  Kate Scallion, Jones Emery LLP, Canada

60.  Dr. Bérénice K. Schramm, Galatasaray University, Turkey

61.  Jhuma Sen, Advocate, Calcutta High Court, India

62.  Dr. Faraz Shahlaei, LMU Loyola Law School, USA

63.  Dr. Maayan Sudai, University of Haifa, Israel

64.  Prof. Jessica Tueller, University of Oklahoma College of Law, USA

65.  Faranaaz Veriava, University of Pretoria, South Africa

66.  Prof. Ekaterina Yahyaoui Krivenko, University of Galway, Ireland

67.  Dr. Jan Zglinski, LSE Law School, United kingdom

68. Monique Hennessy, ANZLA, Australia

69. Indiradevi Kollipara, Sports and Gaming Lawyer, India

70. David Rutherford, Human rights lawyer, New Zealand 

71. Prof. Alberto Carrio Sampedro, Pompeu Fabra Universiry, Spain

72. Sam Chollet, PhD Candidate, Université de Lausanne, France/Switzerland

73. Daniel Cardona A, Sports lawyer, Colombia

74. Dr. Alice de Jonge, Monash University, InterAction for Health and Human Rights, Australia

75. Dr Aileen Kennedy, UTS Faculty of Law and InterAction for Health and Human Rights, Australia

76. Inês Espinhaço Gomes, Porto Faculty of Law, Universidade Católica Portuguesa, Portugal

77. Dr. Daniel Del Gobbo, Assistant Professor & Chair in Law, Gender, and Sexual Justice, University of Windsor Faculty of Law, Canada

78. Brendan Schwab, Professional Footballers Australia, Australia

79. Dr. Erin C. Tarver, Emory University, Oxford College, USA

80. Dr. Matteo Winkler, HEC Paris, France

81. Isabel Abella Ruiz de Mendoza, Abella Legal, Spain

82. Roland Sètondji Adjovi, UQAM, Canada

83. Prof. Dr. Peter W. Heermann, LL.M, University of Bayreuth, Germany

84. Andrei Kampff de Melo, Lei em Campo, Brazil

85. Megan L. Manion, Yale Law School, USA

86. Dr Andrea Cattaneo, Edge Hill University, United Kingdom

87. Prof. Alessandra Arcuri, Erasmus School of Law, Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands

88. Gabriel Vieira Terenzi, Centro Universitário Toledo Wyden, Brazil

89. Heather Corkhill, Legal Director, Equality Australia, Australia

90. Carlos J. Zelada, Universidad del Pacífico, Peru

91. Louise Collard, Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières, Canada 

92. Prof. Sarah Joseph, Griffith University, Australia

93. Sven Demeulemeester, Partner, Atfield, Belgium

94. Andrea Florence, Lawyer, Executive Director, Sport & Rights Alliance, Brazil

95. Surbhi Kuwelker, Independent Legal Counsel, Doctoral Candidate, University of Neuchatel, Denmark

96. Prof. Pascal Borry, KU Leuven, Belgium 

97. Clément Lanier, Paris-Nanterre University, France

98. Prof. Machteld Vonk, Faculty of Law, Radboud University, The Netherlands

99. Shoichi Sugiyama, Field-R Law Office / Japan Safe Sport Project, Japan

 

A World Cup Without the World? How Trump’s Travel Ban Contradicts FIFA’s Values - By Rasoul Rahmani

Editor's note: Rasoul Rahmani is a PhD Candidate at the Faculty of Law, University of Turku, Finland. His doctoral research examines sports governance and human rights, with a focus on how EU law, particularly recent CJEU rulings, is reshaping the autonomy of sports governing bodies and the institutional implications of these developments.

 

The Ban and Its Expansion

On 4 June 2025, President Donald Trump imposed sweeping entry restrictions on nationals from 12 countries: Afghanistan, Burma, Chad, Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Haiti, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen. The proclamation made clear that “these restrictions distinguish between, but apply to both, the entry of immigrants and non-immigrants”; including those traveling on visitor visas for business and tourism, precisely the category under which World Cup fans would enter the United States.

The President invoked his Executive Order of 20 January 2025, which declared it “the policy of the United States to protect its citizens from aliens who intend to commit terrorist attacks, threaten our national security, espouse hateful ideology, or otherwise exploit the immigration laws for malevolent purposes.”[1] Alongside these complete bans, he imposed partial restrictions on seven additional countries: Burundi, Cuba, Laos, Sierra Leone, Togo, Turkmenistan, and Venezuela.

The restrictions expanded drastically on 16 December 2025. Five more nations joined the fully banned list; Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, South Sudan, and Syria along with individuals holding Palestinian Authority-issued travel documents. Laos and Sierra Leone were upgraded from partial to full bans. Most significantly, 15 countries were added to the partial restriction category: Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominica, Gabon, The Gambia, Malawi, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Tonga, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

By December 2025, the travel restrictions encompassed 39 countries plus Palestinian Authority passport holders; a staggering expansion of barriers to entry for what is supposed to be a celebration of global unity. 


One Billion People Locked Out

The scale of exclusion is breathtaking. According to the latest population data, the fully banned countries represent 479.3 million people. The partially restricted nations account for another 537.6 million. Combined, over 1.017 billion people, more than one-eighth of the world’s population, face barriers to entering the World Cup’s primary host nation.

This mass exclusion stands in jarring contradiction to FIFA President Gianni Infantino’s repeated promises that 2026 would be “the greatest and most inclusive FIFA World Cup in history”; a World Cup  which is projected to have 6.5 million attendees in the host countries. The tournament expanded from 32 to 48 teams precisely to embrace more of the world. Yet as the field grew more diverse, the host country’s doors slammed shut.

Of the 42 nations already qualified for World Cup 2026, four face direct impact  from Trump’s restrictions. Iran and Haiti, home to 104.1 million people combined, are under full entry bans. Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal, representing 47.9 million people, face partial restrictions. Among the nations competing for the remaining six spots, Iraq (full ban) and DR Congo (partial restriction) could also qualify, potentially raising the total to six affected teams.

The geographic reality compounds the problem. Of the tournament’s 104 matches, the United States will host 78, while Mexico and Canada together host only 26. For fans from banned or restricted countries, only the handful of matches in Toronto, Vancouver, Mexico City, Guadalajara, and Monterrey remain accessible. The vast majority of the World Cup, including likely knockout rounds in American cities, will be beyond their reach.

The ban carves out exemptions for athletes, coaches, and support staff  competing in “major” events like the World Cup and the 2028 Olympics. But fans, athletes’ families, and journalists receive no such consideration. Iranian supporters, who brought 20,000 passionate voices to Qatar 2022, now face a dream deferred. Haiti’s vibrant fan base, a joyful presence at the 2023 Women’s World Cup, finds itself similarly sidelined. The policy creates a two-tier system: the teams can play, but their people cannot watch.


FIFA’s Hollow Response

In a carefully choreographed White House meeting attended by President Donald Trump and FIFA President Gianni Infantino, the U.S. Department of State unveiled the FIFA Priority Appointment Scheduling System, dubbed "FIFA PASS", for World Cup 2026 ticket holders attending matches in the United States. The service promises every fan who purchases a ticket the opportunity to obtain a prioritized visa interview.

Yet this solution is nothing more than window dressing. While expedited interviews may help fans from unrestricted countries navigate bureaucracy more smoothly, it remains fundamentally unclear, and deliberately unaddressed, how the system would function for passport holders from the 39 banned or restricted nations. A faster path to rejection is no path at all.

Contrast FIFA’s tepid response with the International Olympic Committee’s principled stand when faced with a comparable situation (not identical). When Indonesia denied visas to Israeli athletes and officials for the 53rd FIG Artistic Gymnastics World Championships in October 2025, the IOC responded with immediate, forceful condemnation. The organization expressed “great concern” and “regret,” emphasizing that “all eligible athletes, teams and sports officials must be able to participate in international sports competitions and events without any form of discrimination from the host country, in accordance with the Olympic Charter and the fundamental principles of non-discrimination, autonomy and political neutrality.”[2] The message was unambiguous: violate the principles of inclusive access for athletes and support staff, and you forfeit the privilege of hosting.

The comparison to Indonesia is instructive not because the violations are identical-they are not- but because both cases involve host nations imposing discriminatory entry barriers that undermine the inclusive, global nature of international sporting competitions. Indonesia’s complete ban on Israeli participants was more severe in scope; America’s ban affects fans and journalists rather than athletes. Yet both violate the same fundamental principle: that major sporting events should be accessible to all eligible participants and their supporters without discrimination based on nationality.

The IOC treated Indonesia’s violation as a serious breach of Olympic principles requiring immediate consequences. FIFA, by contrast, has treated the U.S. ban as a non-issue warranting no public comment, let alone corrective action. The different responses reveal not different principles, but different calculations about which hosts can be challenged and which cannot.


A Friendship More Valuable Than Principles

FIFA’s paralysis becomes comprehensible when viewed through the lens of Gianni Infantino’s relationship with Donald Trump. Since assuming the FIFA presidency in February 2016, Infantino has cultivated an unusually close bond with the American leader. He has been a frequent White House visitor throughout Trump’s presidencies, their meetings marked by mutual praise and conspicuous displays of camaraderie.

Independent human rights organizations have repeatedly accused Infantino of violating FIFA’s duty of political neutrality. The most egregious example came in December 2025, when FIFA awarded its inaugural Peace Prize to Trump, a sitting political leader presiding over the very policies that exclude a billion people from accessing the World Cup. According to media reports, the FIFA Council was not even consulted on this decision, suggesting it was Infantino’s personal initiative.

Human Rights Watch captured the absurdity with biting clarity: “FIFA’s so-called peace prize is being awarded against a backdrop of violent detentions of immigrants, national guard deployments in U.S. cities, and the obsequious cancellation of FIFA’s own.” anti-racism and anti-discrimination campaigns

That last point deserves emphasis. At the Club World Cup held in the United States in summer 2025, FIFA conspicuously dropped its anti-racism messaging, the very campaigns it had championed at Qatar 2022, where it backed “no discrimination” armbands and introduced enhanced disciplinary codes “to fight racism more efficiently and decisively.” The sudden abandonment of these principles on American soil suggests a troubling calculation: FIFA’s values are negotiable depending on the host’s political sensitivities.

Most damning of all, this close relationship has produced no tangible benefits for the fans Trump’s policies exclude. Both Iran and Haiti, the two fully banned qualified teams, will play all their group stage matches in U.S. cities, not in Canada or Mexico. If Infantino’s friendship with Trump held any real value for the sport, surely it would manifest in exemptions for fans whose teams earned their place on the pitch. Instead, the friendship appears entirely one-directional: FIFA accommodates Trump’s preferences while receiving nothing in return for football’s global community.

The uncomfortable truth is that Infantino seems unwilling to risk his personal relationship with Trump by publicly criticizing policies that fundamentally contradict FIFA’s stated mission. In this calculation, diplomatic access to the White House trumps the organization’s commitment to inclusion, non-discrimination, and the unifying power of football.


Violating FIFA’s Own Statutes

The travel ban does not merely contradict FIFA’s rhetoric; it directly violates the organization’s foundational legal documents. Article 3 of the FIFA Statutes declares: “FIFA is committed to respecting all internationally recognised human rights and shall strive to promote the protection of these rights.” The commitment is absolute, not conditional on political convenience.

Article 4 goes further, stating that “discrimination of any kind against a country, private person or group of people on account of race, skin colour, language, religion, politics, national or social origin, property, birth or any other status is strictly prohibited and punishable by suspension or expulsion.” As pointed out by the HRW, the language could hardly be clearer: discrimination based on national origin is not just discouraged, it is grounds for the most severe penalties FIFA can impose.

Article 2a and 2g establishes FIFA’s fundamental objectives, including promoting football “in the light of its unifying, educational, cultural and humanitarian values” and preventing “all methods or practices which might jeopardise the integrity of matches, competitions, players, officials and member associations”.[3] A World Cup where qualified teams’ players’ families, supporters, and journalists cannot attend matches, as they are not included in U.S. entry exemptions, fundamentally jeopardizes the competition’s integrity in several interconnected ways. Firstly, the absence of supporters and families strips matches of their cultural and emotional meaning, turning them into hollow simulations rather than genuine contests between nations. Secondly, banning some fans while allowing others creates unfair competitive imbalances unrelated to sporting merit. Thirdly, excluding journalists from affected countries undermines transparent coverage. Finally, excluding vast populations from attending erodes the tournament’s moral and symbolic legitimacy.

FIFA’s Human Rights Policy and the FIFA World Cup 2026 Human Rights Framework reinforce these commitments. The Framework explicitly commits all host cities to stage the tournament “guided by the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights” and in line with FIFA’s Human Rights Policy. As mentioned by the Human Rights Watch letter to FIFA, the current United States immigration policies “directly contradict FIFA’s stated values of human rights, inclusion and global participation.”

FIFA itself has stated that “its position on inclusivity and the protection of human rights is unequivocal, and clearly laid out in the FIFA Statutes.” The organization has historically enforced these standards on host nations. During the World Cup 2022, Qatar was subjected to sustained scrutiny and pressure[4] and FIFA ensured the host became fully aware of its responsibility to adhere “to FIFA’s human rights and non-discrimination, equality and neutrality statutes, and committed to do so.” Yet for the United States, a far larger market and a more powerful political entity, FIFA has issued no such reminders, made no such demands, extracted no such commitments.[5] The double standard is glaring. 


The Hypocrisy of Selective Enforcement

FIFA presents itself as a neutral guardian of football’s “fundamental principles,” committed to human rights, unity, and the integrity of the game. Yet its recent decisions reveal a far less principled reality. From the intense moral scrutiny imposed on smaller or geopolitically weaker host nations to the striking restraint shown toward powerful Western states, FIFA’s enforcement of its own standards appears deeply selective. This pattern raises a troubling question: are FIFA’s rules applied universally, or are they calibrated according to political influence, economic power, and market value?

FIFA presents itself as a neutral guardian of football’s “fundamental principles,” committed to human rights, unity, and the integrity of the game. Yet its recent decisions reveal a far less principled reality: a pattern of enforcement that scholars have characterized as operating through “modern human rights frameworks [that are] (largely) Western-led and controlled.”[6] From the intense moral scrutiny imposed on smaller or geopolitically weaker host nations to the striking restraint shown toward powerful Western states, FIFA’s application of its own standards appears calibrated according to political influence rather than universal principles. The contrast between FIFA’s treatment of Qatar 2022 and the United States 2026 exemplifies this troubling inconsistency.

After awarding FIFA World Cup 2022 to Qatar, the Gulf state faced unprecedented international scrutiny. Human rights organizations, media outlets, and civil society groups subjected Qatar to relentless and enormous pressure, focusing on migrant labour conditions, with critics characterizing the kafala system as amounting to forced labour and accusing Qatar of being a slave state,[7] as well as LGBTQ+ rights and restrictions on alcohol consumption. While FIFA initially awarded Qatar the tournament in 2010 without imposing human rights conditions, years of sustained external pressure from the International Labour Organization, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and other actors eventually prompted reforms. Qatar became the first Gulf nation to abolish the kafala system, introduce minimum wages, and permit limited trade union activity.[8]

However, such level of moral examination rarely applied to Western hosts. Much of this criticism was justified, but where is the equivalent systematic pressure on the United States, a nation with its own well-documented issues regarding migrant treatment, labour rights, and systemic discrimination, and recent immigration policies that exclude a billion people from accessing the tournament?

The answer is uncomfortable but obvious: the U.S. market is too valuable to jeopardize. American broadcasting rights, sponsorship revenues, and political influence make confrontation unthinkable for FIFA’s leadership. 

This selectivity extends beyond host nation oversight. When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, FIFA condemnedthe use of force by Russia and any type of violence that same day. Four days later, on 28 February 2022, FIFA and UEFA jointly suspended Russian teams from all competitions. Notably, FIFA framed its justification narrowly, citing force majeure and competition integrity[9] rather than human rights violations or illegal war. The response demonstrated that FIFA possesses the will and the mechanisms to act decisively when a geopolitical crisis threatens football’s integrity and continuity.

No similar urgency has materialized regarding U.S. entry restrictions that exclude fans from qualified and non-qualified teams, despite the direct contradiction with FIFA’s statutory commitments. The inconsistency suggests that FIFA’s enforcement of its principles depends less on their violation than on the violator’s geopolitical influence.

When European football associations and UN experts called for action against Israel over its conduct in Gaza and treatment of Palestinian football, FIFA appealed to vague notions of “unity” and avoided substantive measures: “FIFA cannot solve geopolitical problems.”  In September 2025, the Trump administration, through its Secretary of State intervened directly to prevent Israel’s suspension, with a spokesperson declaring: We will absolutely work “to fully stop any effort to attempt to ban Israel’s national soccer team from the World Cup.”

The message is unmistakable: FIFA’s “fundamental principles” are enforced selectively, calibrated to the political power and market value of the nations involved. Russia can be excluded swiftly; the United States cannot be challenged at all. Smaller nations face stringent human rights requirements; powerful Western states receive diplomatic silence even when their policies directly contradict FIFA’s own statutes.

This pattern raises a fundamental question: is FIFA an independent governing body committed to universal principles, or does it operate within, and defer to, the framework of Western political and economic power? The answer increasingly appears to be the latter.


A Call to Action

This situation demands a response; from FIFA, from fans, and from the global football community. But these responses must take different forms, leveraging different sources of power and accountability. 

  • FIFA’s Institutional Obligations

FIFA must break its silence. The Statutes are not suggestions; they are binding commitments with enforcement mechanisms. FIFA must publicly demand that the United States provide exemptions for World Cup fans especially from all qualified nations, regardless of broader immigration policies. This is defending the integrity of FIFA’s own tournament and honouring commitments made when awarding hosting rights.

The goal is not perfect equality of access; economic disparities will always mean that wealthier fans travel more easily than those with fewer resources. What FIFA must ensure is equality in principle: that fans holding legitimate tickets face no discriminatory barriers based solely on their nationality.

If the United States refuses to provide such exemptions, FIFA must be prepared to impose consequences. At least FIFA could relocate affected teams’ matches to Canadian or Mexican venues, ensuring their supporters can attend. It could reduce the number of matches hosted by U.S. cities that fail to guarantee fan access. At minimum, it must publicly document the violation of hosting commitments and ensure this factors into future hosting decisions.

FIFA must also address a fundamental question for its governance framework: Should nations be awarded hosting rights if their immigration policies preclude the inclusive, non-discriminatory access that FIFA’s own statutes require? The organization needs clear, enforceable criteria that apply equally to all candidates, regardless of their geopolitical power or market value. The current situation demonstrates the dangers of awarding tournaments without such safeguards.

National federations, particularly those from affected countries, should formally petition FIFA to address this access crisis through official channels. Player unions can lend their institutional weight to these demands. Media coverage must continue highlighting the contradiction between FIFA’s rhetoric and its complicity through silence. These institutional pressures, channelled through formal FIFA structures, represent the proper mechanisms for holding the organization accountable to its own rules.

  • Beyond Institutions: A Fan-Led Protest

Yet even as we demand that FIFA fulfil its obligations, we cannot wait passively for institutional action that may never come. Fans themselves possess a powerful tool: visibility.

When Iran, Haiti, Côte d'Ivoire, or Senegal takes the field in American stadiums, supporters of their opponents, and also neutrals who cherish football’s unifying spirit, should leave sections of seats conspicuously empty in solidarity. These vacant seats, broadcast to millions worldwide, would create an undeniable visual reminder of who is missing and why.

This is not a call for general boycott of the tournament, which would harm the very teams whose fans are excluded. Rather, it is a targeted, symbolic action: empty sections during specific matches as visible protest. Supporters’ groups could coordinate which sections to leave vacant, creating clear visual patterns that television cameras cannot ignore. Social media campaigns could explain the protest to global audiences, connecting the empty seats directly to the billion people locked out. It would demonstrate that football’s community rejects discrimination even when football’s governors tolerate it.

  • The Soul of the Game

The beautiful game has always transcended borders and brought together people whom politics seeks to divide. That is its soul, its magic, its moral authority.[10] By allowing Trump’s travel ban to stand unchallenged, FIFA acts in direct contradiction to the values it claims to uphold.

The question is whether those who truly love the game, players, fans, federations, will accept this silence, or whether they will demand that FIFA honour its own principles through every avenue available: formal institutional pressure and visible, grassroots action.

FIFA must use its leverage to ensure equal access in principle. Fans, in turn, must use both their presence and their strategic absence to demand accountability when FIFA fails to act.

The world is watching. The seats are waiting. What will we choose?


[1] Executive Order 14161 “Protecting the United States From Foreign Terrorists and Other National Security and Public Safety Threats”, 20 January 2025. Available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/protecting-the-united-states-from-foreign-terrorists-and-othernational-security-and-public-safety-threats/

 

[2] More importantly, IOC backed its words with action. Its Executive Board ended all dialogue with Indonesia’s National Olympic Committee regarding hosting future events and recommended that International Federations avoid holding competitions or meetings in the country until adequate guarantees were provided.

[3] FIFA Statutes (Edition August 2024), Articles 2a and 2g.

[4] “The many critiques of Qatar were mobilizing a range of rights-claims based in international treaties or conventions… . Simultaneously, similar claims were being advanced against FIFA for failing to abide by its responsibility to respect human rights. Ultimately, this advocacy and public pressure triggered legislative and policy changes in Qatar and at FIFA.” Antoine Duval & Daniela Heerdt, How the FIFA World Cup 2022 Changed Qatar: Playing the Game of Transnational Law on a Global Pitch, 24 German Law Journal 1677 (2023).

[5] “This contrast underscores how FIFA’s claim to neutrality in human rights matters is not a principled stance but a strategically deployed position that aligns with its broader governance model. When financial interests are involved, FIFA does not hesitate to intervene, demonstrating that it possesses the capacity and institutional mechanisms to enforce binding regulations when deemed necessary. Yet, when it comes to human rights, FIFA’s commitments often remain aspirational, non-binding, or selectively enforced.” Pedro José Jaén, Angeliki Bistaraki & Mathias Schubert, The Universal Game? Deconstructing FIFA’s Human Rights Discourse, The International Sports Law Journal (2025).

[6] Shubham Jain, Resistance and Reform as Responses to Human Rights Criticism: Relativism at FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022, 24 Ger. Law J. 1691, 1701 (2023).

[7] “Qatar’s migrant workers were literally put on the world’s agenda overnight. The number of publications mentioning Qatar and“migrant workers” issued by the four organizations shows, first, that Qatar’s migrant workers were of very marginal interest to them before 2010 and, second, that their reporting or advocacy on the issue picked up quickly after the attribution of the FIFA World Cup 2022.” Antoine Duval, Spectacular International Labor Law: Ambush Counter-Marketing In the Spotlight of Qatar’s 2022 FIFA World Cup, 24 German Law Journal 1712 (2023). 

[8] Jain, supra note 6 at 1696.

[9] The bureau pointed out that the participation of the Russian teams in these competitions posed potential disruptions due to the refusals of other national associations to play against them, security concerns, and overall uncertainty related to the conflict. See CAS 25 November 2022, 2022/A/8708 (Football Union of Russia v. Fédération Internationale de Football Association et al). 

*The legal justifications advanced by both FIFA and UEFA for the suspension of Russian teams “did not link the suspensions to the illegality of Russia’s war or the human rights violations committed by Russia’s armed forces.” A. Duval, FIFA and UEFA’s Reaction to Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: How the Neutrality of Sport Survived the War, 3 Voetbal- & Sportjuridische Zaken (2023).

 

[10] David Goldblatt, The Ball Is Round: A Global History of Football 21–22 (2006).

Chronicle of a Defeat Foretold: Dissecting the Swiss Federal Tribunal’s Semenya Decision - By Marjolaine Viret

Editor's note: Marjolaine is a researcher and attorney admitted to the Geneva bar (Switzerland) who specialises in sports and life sciences.

 

On 25 August 2020, the Swiss Supreme Court (Swiss Federal Tribunal, SFT) rendered one of its most eagerly awaited decisions of 2020, in the matter of Caster Semenya versus World Athletics (formerly and as referenced in the decision: IAAF) following an award of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). In short, the issue at stake before the CAS was the validity of the World Athletics eligibility rules for Athletes with Differences of Sex Development (DSD Regulation). After the CAS upheld their validity in an award of 30 April 2019, Caster Semenya and the South African Athletics Federation (jointly: the appellants) filed an application to set aside the award before the Swiss Supreme Court.[1] The SFT decision, which rejects the application, was made public along with a press release on 8 September 2020.

There is no doubt that we can expect contrasted reactions to the decision. Whatever one’s opinion, however, the official press release in English does not do justice to the 28-page long decision in French and the judges’ reasoning. The goal of this short article is therefore primarily to highlight some key extracts of the SFT decision and some features of the case that will be relevant in its further assessment by scholars and the media.[2]

It is apparent from the decision that the SFT was very aware that its decision was going to be scrutinised by an international audience, part of whom may not be familiar with the mechanics of the legal regime applicable to setting aside an international arbitration award in Switzerland.

Thus, the decision includes long introductory statements regarding the status of the Court of Arbitration for Sport, and the role of the Swiss Federal Tribunal in reviewing award issued by panels in international arbitration proceedings. The SFT also referred extensively throughout its decision to jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), rendered in cases related to international sport and the CAS. More...

International and European Sports Law – Monthly Report – April and May 2019. By Tomáš Grell

Editor's note: This report compiles all relevant news, events and materials on International and European Sports Law based on the daily coverage provided on our twitter feed @Sportslaw_asser. You are invited to complete this survey via the comments section below, feel free to add links to important cases, documents and articles we might have overlooked.

 

The Headlines 

Caster Semenya learns that it is not always easy for victims of discrimination to prevail in court

The world of sport held its breath as the Secretary General of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) Matthieu Reeb stood before the microphones on 1 May 2019 to announce the verdict reached by three arbitrators (one of them dissenting) in the landmark case involving the South African Olympic and world champion Caster Semenya. Somewhat surprisingly, the panel of arbitrators came to the conclusion that the IAAF’s regulations requiring female athletes with differences of sexual development to reduce their natural testosterone level below the limit of 5 nmol/L and maintain that reduced level for a continuous period of at least six months in order to be eligible to compete internationally at events between 400 metres and a mile, were necessary, reasonable and proportionate to attain the legitimate aim of ensuring fair competition in female athletics, even though the panel recognised that the regulations were clearly discriminatory. Ms Semenya’s legal team decided to file an appeal against the ruling at the Swiss Federal Tribunal. For the time being, this appears to be a good move since the tribunal ordered the IAAF at the beginning of June to suspend the application of the challenged regulations to Ms Semenya with immediate effect, which means that Ms Semenya for now continues to run medication-free.

 

Champions League ban looms on Manchester City

On 18 May 2019, Manchester City completed a historic domestic treble after defeating Watford 6-0 in the FA Cup Final. And yet there is a good reason to believe that the club’s executives did not celebrate as much as they would under normal circumstances. This is because only two days before the FA Cup Final the news broke that the chief investigator of the UEFA Club Financial Control Body (CFCB) had decided to refer Manchester City’s case concerning allegations of financial fair play irregularities to the CFCB adjudicatory chamber for a final decision. Thus, the chief investigator most likely found that Manchester City had indeed misled UEFA over the real value of its sponsorship income from the state-owned airline Etihad and other companies based in Abu Dhabi, as the leaked internal emails and other documents published by the German magazine Der Spiegel suggested. The chief investigator is also thought to have recommended that a ban on participation in the Champions League for at least one season be imposed on the English club. The club’s representatives responded to the news with fury and disbelief, insisting that the CFCB investigatory chamber had failed to take into account a comprehensive body of irrefutable evidence it had been provided with. They eventually decided not to wait for the decision of the CFCB adjudicatory chamber, which is yet to be adopted, and meanwhile took the case to the CAS, filing an appeal against the chief investigator’s referral.

 

The Brussels Court of Appeal dismisses Striani’s appeal on jurisdictional grounds

The player agent Daniele Striani failed to convince the Brussels Court of Appeal that it had jurisdiction to entertain his case targeting UEFA’s financial fair play regulations. On 11 April 2019, the respective court dismissed his appeal against the judgment of the first-instance court without pronouncing itself on the question of compatibility of UEFA’s financial fair play regulations with EU law. The court held that it was not competent to hear the case because the link between the regulations and their effect on Mr Striani as a player agent, as well as the link between the regulations and the role of the Royal Belgian Football Association in their adoption and enforcement, was too remote (for a more detailed analysis of the decision, see Antoine’s blog here). The Brussels Court of Appeal thus joined the European Court of Justice and the European Commission as both these institutions had likewise rejected to assess the case on its merits in the past.

 

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A New Chapter for EU Sports Law and European Citizenship Rights? The TopFit Decision - By Thomas Terraz

Editor’s note: Thomas Terraz is a third year LL.B. candidate at the International and European Law programme at The Hague University of Applied Sciences with a specialisation in European Law. Currently he is pursuing an internship at the T.M.C. Asser Institute with a focus on International and European Sports Law.

 

1.     Introduction

Christmas has come very early this year for the EU sports law world in the form of the Court of Justice of the European Union’s (CJEU) judgment in TopFit eV, Daniele Biffi v Deutscher Leichtathletikverband eV by exclusively analyzing the case on the basis of European citizenship rights and its application to rules of sports governing bodies that limit their exercise. The case concerned an Italian national, Daniele Biffi, who has been residing in Germany for over 15 years and participates in athletic competitions in the senior category, including the German national championships. In 2016, the Deutscher Leichtathletikverband (DLV), the German Athletics Federation, decided to omit a paragraph in its rules that allowed the participation of EU nationals in national championships on the same footing as German citizens. As a result, participation in the national championship was subject to prior authorization of the organizers of the event, and even if participation was granted, the athlete may only compete outside of classification and may not participate in the final heat of the competition. After having been required to compete out of classification for one national championship and even dismissed from participating in another, Mr. Biffi and TopFit, his athletics club based in Berlin, brought proceedings to a German national court. The national court submitted a request for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU in which it asked essentially whether the rules of the DLV, which may preclude or at least require a non-national to compete outside classification and the final heat, are contrary to Articles 18, 21 and 165 TFEU. Articles 18 and 21 TFEU, read together, preclude discrimination on the basis of nationality against European citizens exercising their free movement. The underlying (massive) question here is whether these provisions can be relied on by an amateur athlete against a private body, the DLV.

Covered in a previous blog, the Advocate General’s (AG) opinion addressed the case from an entirely different angle. Instead of tackling the potentially sensitive questions attached with interpreting the scope of European citizenship rights, the opinion focused on the application of the freedom of establishment because the AG found that participation in the national championships was sufficiently connected to the fact Mr. Biffi was a professional trainer who advertised his achievements in those competitions on his website. Thus, according to the AG, there was a sufficient economic factor to review the case under a market freedom. The CJEU, in its decision, sidelined this approach and took the application of European citizenship rights head on.

The following will dissect the Court’s decision by examining the three central legal moves of the ruling: the general applicability of EU law to amateur sport, the horizontal applicability of European citizenship rights, and justifications and proportionality requirements of access restrictions to national competitions. More...

Guest Blog - The Role of Sport in the Recognition of Transgender and Intersex Rights by Conor Talbot

Editor's note: Conor Talbot is a Solicitor at LK Shields Solicitors in Dublin and an Associate Researcher at Trinity College Dublin. He can be contacted at ctalbot@tcd.ie, you can follow him on Twitter at @ConorTalbot and his research is available at www.ssrn.com/author=1369709. This piece was first published on the humanrights.ie blog.

Sport is an integral part of the culture of almost every nation and its ability to shape perceptions and influence public opinion should not be underestimated.  The United Nations has highlighted the potential for using sport in reducing discrimination and inequality, specifically by empowering girls and women.  Research indicates that the benefits of sport include enhancing health and well-being, fostering empowerment, facilitating social inclusion and challenging gender norms.

In spite of the possible benefits, the successful implementation of sport-related initiatives aimed at gender equity involves many challenges and obstacles.  Chief amongst these is the way that existing social constructs of masculinity and femininity — or socially accepted ways of expressing what it means to be a man or woman in a particular socio-cultural context — play a key role in determining access, levels of participation, and benefits from sport.  This contribution explores recent developments in the interaction between transgender and intersex rights and the multi-billion dollar industry that the modern Olympic Games has become.  Recent reports show that transgender people continue to suffer from the glacial pace of change in social attitudes and, while there has been progress as part of a long and difficult journey to afford transgender people full legal recognition through the courts, it seems clear that sport could play an increasingly important role in helping change or better inform social attitudes.More...



Asser International Sports Law Blog | The Specificity of Sport - Comparing the Case-Law of the European Court of Justice and of the Court of Arbitration for Sport - Part 2 - By Stefano Bastianon

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

The Specificity of Sport - Comparing the Case-Law of the European Court of Justice and of the Court of Arbitration for Sport - Part 2 - By Stefano Bastianon

Editor’s note: Stefano Bastianon is Associate Professor in EU Law and EU sports law at the University of Bergamo and lawyer admitted to the Busto Arsizio bar.


1. EU law and the CAS case-law

Bearing in mind these questions, it is possible to affirm that under EU law, the specificity of sport

i) refers to the inherent characteristics of sport that set it apart from other economic and social activities and which have to be taken into account in assessing the compatibility of sporting rules with EU law; and

ii) under EU law these inherent characteristics of sport must be  considered on a case by case  basis, per the Wouters test as developed by the ECJ in the Meca Medina ruling.

Both aspects can be found in the CAS case-law too, although the CAS case-law shows some remarkable differences and peculiarities. From a general point of view, the application of the principle of specificity of sport in the CAS case-law represents an aspect of the more general issue related to the application of EU law by the CAS. However, the purpose of this paper is not to fully examine if and to what extent the CAS arbitrators apply EU law rules on free movement and competition; rather, the aim is to analyse the way the CAS deals with the concept of the specificity of sport, highlighting similarities and differences compared to the ECJ.

Taking for granted that ‘a CAS panel is not only allowed, but also obliged to deal with the issues involving the application of [EU] law’,[1] as far as the compatibility of sporting rules with EU law is concerned the CAS case-law shows different degrees of engagement. For instance, in the ENIC award concerning the so-called UEFA integrity rule, the CAS panel went through a complete competition-law analysis in perfect harmony with the Wouters et al. ruling by the ECJ.[2] On the contrary, in the above-quoted Mutu case, the issue of compatibility of the FIFA’s transfer regulations with EU competition law was analysed in a rather simple way, merely stating that the FIFA rules at stake were not anti-competitive under EU competition law without giving any reason to support this conclusion. More recently, in the Galatasaray and Milan A.C. awards, concerning the UEFA’s financial fair-play regulations, the CAS  applied a detailed analysis of EU competition law. However, in both cases, according to the CAS the proportionate character of sanctions listed in the UEFA’s financial fair-play regulations cannot affect the evaluation of the legitimacy of these regulations under Art. 101 TFEU. This conclusion represents a clear breaking point with respect to the ECJ case-law, according to which the evaluation of the restrictive effects of a rule necessarily presupposes the analysis of the proportionate character of the sanction imposed in the event of a violation of that rule as well.[3]   In regard to EU free movement, the CAS case-law tends to be less analytical in terms of the principle of proportionality. For instance, in the RFC Seraing award  which concerned both EU free movement and competition law, the CAS panel mainly focused on the legitimate objectives of the contested rule (FIFA’s ban on Third-Party Ownership – TPO), merely affirming that the restrictive measures under EU free movement were justified and inherent in the pursuit of those objectives.

 

2. Art. 17 FIFA RSTP and the specificity of sport

In practice, the CAS case-law on the specificity of sport is mainly related to the application of Art. 17 (1) of the FIFA Regulations on the status and transfer of players concerning the consequences of terminating a contract without just cause.[4] According to Art. 17(1), ‘the party in breach shall pay compensation. Subject to the provisions of Art. 20 and Annexe 4 in relation to training compensation, and unless otherwise provided for in the contract, compensation for the breach shall be calculated with due consideration for the law of the country concerned, the specificity of sport, and any other objective criteria. These criteria shall include, in particular, the remuneration and other benefits due to the player under the existing contract and/or the new contract, the time remaining on the existing contract up to a maximum of five years, the fees and expenses paid or incurred by the former club (amortised over the term of the contract) and whether the contractual breach falls within a protected period’.

Although written in very general terms, from Art. 17(1) it is possible to derive that:

 i) it does not provide the legal basis for a party to freely terminate an existing contract at any time, prematurely, without just cause;

ii) the provision clarifies that  compensation is due;

iii) the amount of compensation to be awarded must necessarily take into account all of the specific circumstances of the case. It is for this reason that Art. 17.1 of the FIFA RSTP does not establish a single criterion or even a set of rigid rules, but rather provides guidelines to be applied to fix  just and fair compensation.

It is evident that Art. 17 of the FIFA RSTP involves or points to the specificity of sport. Beyond what Art. 17 implicitly states, the CAS case-law has contributed to defining the scope of the specificity of sport.

To fully understand the relevance of specificity of sport in the context of Art. 17 FIFA RSTP, it is important to investigate the rationale of this provision as well as the principle of positive interest. To expand, the rationale of the rule is to foster the maintenance of contractual stability between professionals and clubs. In the post-Bosman era, the concept of contractual stability was introduced to replace the former transfer-fee system by compensation due for the breach or undue termination of an existing agreement.[5] According to the CAS jurisprudence, Art. 17 of FIFA RSTP plays a central role: ‘the purpose of Art. 17 is basically nothing else than to reinforce contractual stability, i.e. to strengthen the principle of pacta sunt servanda in the world of international football, by acting as deterrent against unilateral contractual breaches and terminations, be it breaches committed by a club or by a player. This, because contractual stability is crucial for the well functioning of the international football. The principle pacta sunt servanda shall apply to all stakeholders, "small" and "big" clubs, unknown and top players, employees and employers, notwithstanding their importance, role or power. The deterrent effect of Art. 17 FIFA Regulations shall be achieved through the impending risk for a party to incur disciplinary sanctions, if some conditions are met (cf. Art. 17 para. 3 to 5 FIFA Regulations), and, in any event, the risk to have to pay a compensation for the damage caused by the breach or the unjustified termination. In other words, both players and club are warned: if one does breach or terminate a contract without just cause, a financial compensation is due, and such compensation is to be calculated in accordance with all those elements of Art. 17 FIFA Regulations that are applicable in the matter at stake, including all the non-exclusive criteria listed in para. 1 of said article that, based on the circumstances of the single case, the panel will consider appropriate to apply’.[6]

The concept of positive interest, is strictly linked to the way of calculating the compensation. In case of breach or unjustified termination of the contract, the judging body will have to establish the damage suffered by the injured party, taking into consideration the circumstances of the case, the arguments raised by the parties and the evidence produced. In so doing the judging authority shall be led by the principle of the so-called positive interest (or “expectation interest”), i.e. it will determine an amount geared towards placing the injured or aggrieved party in the position they would otherwise have been, had the contract been performed .[7] More specifically, according to the CAS case-law, ‘the principle of the “positive interest” shall apply not only in the event of an unjustified termination or a breach by a player, but also when the party in breach is the club. Accordingly, the judging authority should not satisfy itself in assessing the damage suffered by the player by only calculating the net difference between the remuneration due under the existing contract and a remuneration received by the player from a third party. Rather, the judging authority will have to apply the same degree of diligent and transparent review of all the objective criteria, including the specificity of sport, as foreseen in Art. 17 FIFA Regulations’.[8]

Pursuant to the above-mentioned jurisprudence, in the joint cases FC Shakhtar Donetsk (Ukraine) v/ Mr. Matuzalem Francelino da Silva (Brazil) & Real Zaragoza SAD (Spain) & FIFA and Mr. Matuzalem Francelino da Silva (Brazil) & Real Zaragoza SAD (Spain) v/ FC Shakhtar Donetsk (Ukraine) & FIFA, the Panel emphasised that ‘by asking the judging authorities, i.e. the competent FIFA bodies and, in the event of an appeal, the CAS, to duly consider a whole series of elements, including such a wide concept like "sport specificity", and asking the judging authority to even consider "any other objective criteria", the authors of Art. 17 FIFA Regulations achieved a balanced system according to which the judging body has on one side the duty to duly consider all the circumstances of the case and all the objective criteria available, and on the other side a considerable scope of discretion, so that any party should be well advised to respect an existing contract as the financial consequences of a breach or a termination without just cause would be, in their size and amount, rather unpredictable. At the end, however, the calculation made by the judging authority shall be not only just and fair, but also transparent and comprehensible’.[9]

Similarly, in the joint cases FC Sion v. Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) & Al-Ahly Sporting Club and E. v. Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) & Al-Ahly Sporting Club, according to the Panel ‘Art. 17.1 of the FIFA Transfer Regulations also asks the judging body to take into due consideration the “specificity of sport”, that is the specific nature and needs of sport, so as to attain a solution which takes into account not only the interests of the player and the club, but also, more broadly, those of the whole football community (…). Based on this criterion, the judging body should therefore assess the amount of compensation payable by a party keeping duly in mind that the dispute is taking place in the somehow special world of sport. In other words, the judging body should aim at reaching a solution that is legally correct, and that is also appropriate upon an analysis of the specific nature of the sporting interests at stake, the sporting circumstances and the sporting issues inherent to the single case (…). Taking into account the specific circumstances and the course of the events, a CAS panel might consider as guidance that, under certain national laws, a judging authority is allowed to grant a certain “special indemnity” in the event of an unjustified termination. The specific circumstances of a sports case might therefore lead a panel to either increase or decrease the amount of awarded compensation because of the specificity of sport (…). However, in the Panel’s view, the concept of specificity of sport only serves the purpose of verifying the solution reached otherwise prior to assessing the final amount of compensation. In other words, the specificity of sport is subordinated, as a possible correcting factor, to the other factors’.[10]

Pursuant to such case-law, in the well-known Webster cases the CAS referred to the specificity of sport from two different perspectives:

i) based on the fact that Art. 17.1 expressly refers to the specificity of sport and that it is in the interest of football that solutions to compensation be based on uniform criteria rather than on provisions of national law chosen by the parties led the panel to the conclusion that it was not appropriate to apply the general principles of Scottish law on damages for breach of contract;

ii) the Panel recalled that ‘in light of the history of Art. 17 (…) the specificity of sport is a reference to the goal of finding particular solutions for the football world which enable those applying the provision to strike a reasonable balance between the needs of contractual stability, on the one hand, and the needs of free movement of players, on the other hand, i.e. to find solutions that foster the good of football by reconciling in a fair manner the various and sometimes contradictory interests of clubs and players’.[11]

More specifically, in FC Pyunik Yerevan v. L., AFC Rapid Bucaresti & FIFA, the panel considered ‘that the specificity of the sport must obviously take the independent nature of the sport, the free movement of the players (…) but also the football as a market, into consideration. In the Panel's view, the specificity of the sport does not conflict with the principle of contractual stability and the right of the injured party to be compensated for all the loss and damage incurred as a consequence of the other party’s breach. This rule is valid whether the breach is by a player or a club. The criterion of specificity of sport shall be used by a panel to verify that the solution reached is just and fair not only under a strict civil (or common) law point of view, but also taking into due consideration the specific nature and needs of the football world (and of parties being stakeholders in such world) and reaching therefore a decision which can be recognised as being an appropriate evaluation of the interests at stake, and does so fit in the landscape of international football. Therefore, when weighing the specificity of the sport a panel may consider the specific nature of damages that a breach by a player of his employment contract with a club may cause. In particular, a panel may consider that in the world of football, players are the main asset of a club, both in terms of their sporting value in the service for the teams for which they play, but also from a rather economic view, like for instance in relation of their valuation in the balance sheet of a certain club, if any, their value for merchandising activities or the possible gain which can be made in the event of their transfer to another club. Taking into consideration all of the above, the asset comprised by a player is obviously an aspect which cannot be fully ignored when considering the compensation to be awarded for a breach of contract by a player’.[12]

In Al Gharafa S.C. & M. Bresciano v. Al Nasr S.C. & FIFA, the panel first identified the following basic principles:

i)  the fundamental importance to reach a solution that is legally correct and appropriate to the specific nature of the sporting interests at stake, and

ii)  the sporting circumstances and the sporting issues inherent to the single case;

The panel then underlined that ‘the “specificity of sport” is not an additional head of compensation, nor a criteria allowing to decide in ex aequo et bono, but a correcting factor which allows the Panel to take into consideration other objective elements which are not envisaged under the other criteria of Art. 17 RSTP”.[13] On that basis, the panel decided to increase the amount of compensation for  damages, taking into account the sporting importance of the player for the team and the behaviour of the player at the time of the termination. To the contrary, in FC Senica A.S. v. Vladimir Vukajlovic & FIFA, the panel referred to the specificity of sport and that neither club  or player was interested in maintaining their labour relationship, as the basis for excluding any compensation to the player.[14]

 

3. Concluding remarks

It should be rather clear that the concept of specificity of sport has different meanings and purposes in the ECJ and CAS jurisprudence. According to the ECJ case-law, ante its Meca Medina ruling, the reference to the special character of sport was a way to deal with purely sporting rules in the context of EU law; on the contrary, after the judgment in 2006, this approach seems rather questionable. Unfortunately, at present the specificity of sport looks less like a guiding principle than a concept in search of itself. Perhaps also for this reason the ECJ has always carefully avoided defining it or expressly mentioning it; at the same time, the 2011 definition by the Commission – i.e. the specificity of sport encompasses all the characteristics that make sport special – sounds rather tautological.On the contrary, in the CAS case-law the concept of specificity of sport is expressly referred to in cases of breach or unjustified termination of football contracts and amounts to a criterion, among others, to be taken into account to make the compensation just and fair not only under a strict civil law point of view but also taking into due consideration the specific nature and needs of the football world. In this context, according to the CAS jurisprudence the specificity of sport is neither an additional basis for compensation nor a criterion allowing a decision one way or the other in equity. Instead, it represents a correcting factor allowing the panel to award extra compensation in cases where the panel is not convinced that the costs so far awarded fully compensate the party entitled to compensation under Art. 17 FIFA RSTP. That said, the concept of specificity of sport remains rather unclear and vague in the CAS case-law as well.


[1] CAS 2008/A/1644 Adrian Mutu v. Chelsea Football Club Limited, award of 31 July 2009, para. 100,

[2] CAS 98/200 AEK Athens and SK Slavia Prague / Union of European Football Associations (UEFA).

[3] See S. Bastianon, The proportionality test under Art. 101 (1) TFEU and the legitimacy of UEFA Financial fair-play regulations: From the Meca Medina and Majcen ruling of the European Court of Justice to the Galatasaray and AC Milan awards of the Court of Arbitration for Sport, 14 October 2018, https://www.asser.nl/SportsLaw/Blog/

[4] M. Colucci, F. Majani, The specificity of sport as a way to calculate compensation in case of breach of contract, European Sports Law and Policy Bulletin, 1/2011, p. 125.

[5]M. Colucci, R. Favella, La stabilità contrattuale nei regolamenti FIFA e nella giurisprudenza rilevante, RDES, 1/2022, p. 39; K. Futtrup Kjær, Substituting at Half-Time: Contractual Stability in the World of Football, https://law.au.dk/fileadmin/Jura/dokumenter/forskning/rettid/Afh_2017/afh1-2017.pdf

[6] CAS 2008/A/1519-1520, para 80.

[7]Given that the compensation to be granted derives from a breach or unjustified termination of a valid contract, it will be guided in calculating the compensation due by the principle of the so-called “positive interest” or “expectation interest”… [and] accordingly… determin[e] an amount which shall basically put the injured party in the position that the same party would have had if no contractual breach had occurred’ (CAS 2009/A/1880 & 1881, at para. 80).

[8] CAS 2008/A/1519-1520, para 88

[9] CAS 2008/A/1519 and CAS 2008/A/1520, para 89.

[10] CAS 2009/A/1880 and CAS 2009/A/1881, para 109.

[11] CAS 2007/A/1298; CAS 2007/A/1299; CAS 2007/A/1300, para 40.

[12] CAS 2007/A/1358, para 40.

[13] CAS 2013/A/3411, para 118.

[14] CAS 2013/A/3089, para 83.

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