Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

The Court of Arbitration for Sport after Pechstein: Reform or Revolution?

The Pechstein ruling of the Oberlandesgericht (OLG) München rocked the sports arbitration world earlier this year (see our initial commentary of the decision here and a longer version here). The decision has been appealed to the German Bundesgerichtshof (BGH), the highest German civil court, and the final word on the matter is not expected before 2016. In any event, the case has the merit of putting a long-overdue reform of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) back on the agenda. The last notable reform of the structure and functioning of the CAS dates back to 1994, and was already triggered by a court ruling, namely the famous Gundel case of the Swiss Federal Tribunal (SFT). Since then, the role of the CAS has shifted and its practical significance has radically changed (the growth of CAS’s caseload has been exponential). It has become the most visible arbitration court in Switzerland in terms of the number of awards appealed to the SFT, but more importantly it deals with all the high-profile disputes that arise in global sport: think, for instance, of Pistorius, the recent Dutee Chand decision or the upcoming FIFA elections.

In response to the Pechstein ruling, the CAS issued a press release claiming “that the findings of the Munich Appeals Court [the OLG] are based on the CAS rules and organization in force in 2009, when Claudia Pechstein appealed before CAS, and do not take into account the changes leading to the current organization, with amended procedural rules regarding the nomination of arbitrators, development of the legal aid program and the appointment of new ICAS Members not active in or connected to sports-bodies”. The CAS administration implied that the decision would have been different if the OLG had taken into account the current rules. This is a slightly misleading statement. The OLG’s reasoning as to the CAS’s lack of independence was based on various features of CAS procedure that are still in place today, most notably the composition of the CAS governing body: the International Council of Arbitration for Sport (ICAS). In the same press release, the CAS emphasizes that “[i]t is always prepared to listen and analyze the requests and suggestions of its potential users i.e. the athletes, sports federations and other sports entities, in order to continue its development with appropriate reforms”. If it is to avoid a true revolution targeting (and potentially destroying) CAS arbitration, it should better put its money where its mouth is and urgently initiate an inclusive and participative reform procedure. Such a reform process ought to bring to the table not only the Sports Governing Bodies (SGBs), as was the case after the Gundel ruling, but also representatives of athletes and public authorities.

This long blog post aims at providing a blueprint to start thinking about how to reform the CAS. It will highlight the key issues that need to be discussed and make 10 preliminary (and necessarily incomplete) proposals. Three pillars for a reform of CAS are identified: independence, transparency and access to justice.

 

I.               Independence

The Pechstein ruling of the OLG focuses mainly on the question of the independence of the CAS (and chiefly the ICAS). This is not a new matter of concern. Over the years, there has been mounting academic scholarship putting this independence into doubt[1]. However, the SFT sided with the CAS and shielded it from challenges, until the OLG München begged to differ. In fact, ensuring independence ought to be the fundamental objective of any future reform of the CAS. In my view, this is not so much about securing the institution’s financial independence from the SGBs, nor should the CAS’s financial reliance on the SGBs be seen as a big threat to its independence, as long as its management is truly independent. Indeed, it is the SGBs’ duty, in the interest of sports, to finance the CAS via a form of tax on their revenues.  The true issues to be tackled in relation to independence arise from the composition of the ICAS, the identity and role of the President of the CAS Appeals Division and the closed list of arbitrators.


a.    Independence of ICAS

The ICAS is the body in charge of taking the most significant institutional decisions in the life of the CAS. It decides, in particular, who gets to be a CAS arbitrator[2], who gets to be the president of the CAS appeal division[3], and who gets to be the secretary general of the CAS[4]. It also rules on challenges to the independence of arbitrators[5]. In short, the ICAS decides all the main institutional matters which have a decisive influence on the broader legal orientations of the CAS and its jurisprudence. This powerful body, sitting quietly at the top of the CAS, is all but independent. Three fifths of its current members are selected by the SGBs, and that group, in turn, selects the remaining two fifths of the members[6]. It is natural that the SGBs would pick individuals who share their views on the application of their rules and more broadly their mindset in relation to the management of sports. Thus, many ICAS members have had (or still have) a career inside national and international SGBs, and several among them have acted as legal advisors to the SGBs[7]. The President of the ICAS himself, John Coates, is the Vice-president of the IOC. Can you imagine, for example, the Vice-president of the United States presiding at the same time over the Supreme Court? How can such a homogenous group of people be deemed independent from the collective interest and views of the members of the Olympic movement? Simply put, it can’t and it isn’t. This is the crux of the OLG’s decision in Pechstein and it is extremely difficult not to be convinced by it. 

However, and this is a legitimate question, how should we then select ICAS members? There are in my view two solutions that ideally should be combined. On the one hand, a slight change should be made to the CAS statutes, imposing that only 4 of the ICAS members shall be selected by the SGBs, while the next 4 shall be selected by representatives of the athletes (at a specific conference or assembly including, for example, FIFPro, UNI World Athletes, EU Athletes, and the IOC Athletes' Commission), and the final 12 members shall be picked by the first 8. By empowering athlete representatives to appoint half of the first 8 members of ICAS, the CAS would automatically ensure the independence and impartiality of the additional 12 (neutral) ICAS members, who would still have the upper hand on the two partisan fractions inside ICAS. On the other hand, it is necessary to impose stringent individual requirements of independence for all ICAS members. They should both fulfill qualitative requirements (i.e. show some legal credentials) and be subjected to strict conflicts of interests restrictions (i.e. ICAS members must sever all personal, contractual and financial ties with SGBs and athlete representatives). In short, no IOC or FIFPro member should be able to have a seat at the ICAS’s table. This is a preliminary proposal and other analogical solutions can be devised. It aims at tackling the two core challenges for the independence of ICAS: its selection procedure and the individual independence of its members.

Recommendation 1: Change the selection procedure for ICAS members, with SGBs to select 4 members, athletes’ representatives to select 4 other members, and those 8 members together jointly selecting the remaining 12 members.

Recommendation 2: Impose a strict regime governing conflicts of interest for ICAS members. ICAS members should forego all their mandates within the SGBs and sever all contractual and other ties susceptible of giving rise to a conflict of interest.

 

b.    Independence of the President of the Appeals Division

The Appeals Division of the CAS is for our purposes (as well as in quantitative terms) the only one that truly matters. Indeed, it deals with all the disputes related to doping and transfer cases, but also those arising from disciplinary sanctions imposed by the SGBs and their political decisions. In short, the appeals procedure transforms the CAS in the ‘Supreme Court of World Sport’ as the saying goes. In Pechstein, the OLG was particularly troubled with the way in which the president of each appeal panel is selected. Basically, as provided by article R54 of the CAS Code[8], the president of the Appeals Division decides who is to be the president of a specific appeal panel. He or she will consult the arbitrators nominated by the parties, but their suggestions are not binding. In fact, especially when they disagree, the Division President is the one that decides who is to chair the panel, and, thus, who is most likely to tilt the balance in one direction or another. Consequently, the President of the Appeals Division occupies probably the most important and powerful position at the CAS. You wouldn’t guess who was occupying this position until 2013…Thomas Bach, the current IOC President. The current holder is Ms. Corinne Schmidhauser, herself a President of Antidoping Switzerland and a member of the Legal Committee of FIS (Fédération Internationale de Ski). Athletes challenging an anti-doping decision cannot be expected to believe in the independence of a panel which has been composed, to a significant (decisive) extent, by someone so directly involved in the anti-doping fight and thus necessarily and inevitably partisan of the work done by anti-doping authorities.

The position of head of the CAS Appeals Division is so crucial, that it cannot be occupied by anybody who is closely connected to any one side of the sporting world. The designation process must ensure that the person selected is universally perceived as independent and impartial. Only by ensuring that he or she has no direct and personal, contractual or financial links with the SGBs can the CAS preserve its independence and legitimacy.

Recommendation 3: Impose a regime of incompatibilities to the President of the Appeals Division. He or she must accept to forego all his or her mandates within the SGBs and sever all contractual ties susceptible of giving rise to a conflict of interest.


c.     Independence of individual arbitrators

The final, most often discussed, yet in my view less important, point concerns the independence of individual CAS arbitrators. The OLG München pointed out that it is not against a closed list of CAS arbitrators. However, the fact that under the current procedures the arbitrators are selected by a structurally biased ICAS was seen as highly problematic. Even more so due to the lack of transparency as to who had proposed the nomination to the CAS under the pre-2010 rules. Closed lists of arbitrators are a relatively rare occurrence in international arbitration, nonetheless it does make sense to introduce a qualitative limit to who is deemed sufficiently qualified to become an arbitrator in a specific sector, where disputes can raise rather complex “technical” or scientific issues, such as sport (think of some anti-doping cases). This is especially so because CAS arbitration, contrary to commercial arbitration, is mandatory in essence and aims more at providing legal certainty in the global sports sector than at solving individual disputes. This calls for enhanced stability in the judicial personnel. In this regard, some have suggested providing tenure and a fixed wage to CAS arbitrators[9]. This might be difficult to put in place logistically, at least for now, though it is not necessarily a bad idea in the long run. 

Be that as it may, implementing such measures would still not exonerate the CAS from having to deal with some of the acute problems that arise regarding the independence of CAS arbitrators included on the list. In particular, the phenomenon of so-called repeat arbitrators, ie arbitrators who are nominated several times by the same party, poses a real danger. In such cases, the party that is frequently involved in disputes before the CAS has an edge over the other party because it knows which arbitrator is more susceptible to favor its cause. One way to avoid this bias would be to clearly limit the number of times an arbitrator can be selected by a specific party. Moreover, to put the parties on an equal stand, the CAS would need to publish detailed information on arbitrators’ past nominations (in this regard, see also point II.a. below). Finally, the ICAS should exercise a more stringent standard of control over the independence of individual arbitrators in case of challenge. Nevertheless, if the list is drawn by an independent ICAS and the parties have the possibility to know better the record of each arbitrator and have a true ability to challenge them in case of doubt, the existence of a closed list does not seem to be as such a structural limitation to the independence of the CAS.

Recommendation 4: Limit the number of times an arbitrator can be nominated by a specific party (e.g. 5 times during his or her four-year mandate).

Recommendation 5: CAS to provide detailed information on each arbitrator’s past nominations.

Recommendation 6: ICAS to exercise a more stringent control over the independence and impartiality of CAS arbitrators in case of challenge.

 

II.             Transparency

The OLG in Pechstein did not tackle the question of the lack of transparency of the CAS. Yet, some authors have insisted that as the jurisdiction of CAS is mandatory for athletes wanting to participate in international competitions (as the Olympic Games or, as in Pechstein’s case, the world championships) its processes should abide by the standards of the European Convention of Human Rights[10]. In this regard, the independence of the arbitrators is important, but also the transparency of the judicial process.


a.    Information on arbitrators

First, as discussed above, there is a lack of transparency as far as the arbitrators are concerned. The list of CAS arbitrators on the CAS website gives too little substantial information for parties to be comprehensively informed on the arbitrators’ personal jurisprudential record. Here again, due to the phenomena of repeat-players, information asymmetries are indirectly promoted. The parties, mainly SGBs, which have been involved in many CAS arbitration proceedings will typically dispose of an internal database tracking the different positions of CAS arbitrators as they have access to the raw data. The majority of athletes, who are not supported by a strong legal team, will be unable to rely on the same knowledge and will necessarily be in an unfavorable position compared to the SGBs. This calls for full transparency regarding the profile and record of each CAS arbitrator. Similarly, the CAS lacks mandatory disclosure rules regarding the arbitrators’ biographical details[11]. Each arbitrator should have to disclose, in the information included on the CAS website, their past (for example over the last 5 years) and/or present contractual relationships, or other significant personal or financial ties with SGBs and any other relevant stakeholder in sport.

Recommendation 7: CAS to impose more stringent ex ante disclosure rules imposing that each CAS arbitrator discloses on the CAS website all present and past (previous 5 years) contractual links with SGBs and other sport stakeholders.

 

b.    Publication of CAS awards

What is even more important, also because it would enable the parties and external observers to better check the independence and evaluate the track record of arbitrators, is the systematic publication of CAS awards. Nowadays, the CAS publishes only a limited sample of all the awards rendered by the Appeals Division. Indeed, article R59 CAS Code provides that “[t]he award, a summary and/or a press release setting forth the results of the proceedings shall be made public by CAS, unless both parties agree that they should remain confidential”. It is true that compared to commercial arbitration the CAS is relatively transparent. Yet, commercial arbitration is the wrong benchmark, as the CAS’s function is more akin to that of a court of law. The secrecy might be acceptable, though it remains hotly debated, when two multinationals decide to settle their dispute via arbitration. This state of affairs is, however, totally unsatisfactory in the context of a forced arbitration process. CAS draws its legitimacy from the necessity to provide a global level playing field to settle disputes arising out of international sport. This might be a valid justification to impose the global jurisdiction of the CAS, but in return it must also entail that CAS has the duty to publish all the decisions it renders. This, in fact, could be very easily achieved by amending article R59 CAS Code and by simply deleting its final sentence indicating that the award is published “unless both parties agree that they should remain confidential”.

The full publication of CAS awards is a necessity to secure the equality of arms of the parties to CAS arbitration. Indeed, in the current situation, some actors, often SGBs, have access to much greater pools of CAS awards, which they can refer to, thus improving their chances of prevailing. In contrast the general public and the athletes are unable to critically assess and use the many awards that remain unpublished and therefore inaccessible. A transparent access to all appeal awards is a vital question of procedural justice, and a crucial development in order to subject the CAS and its judicial work to the critical scrutiny of the global public sphere.

Recommendation 8: CAS to systematically publish on its website all the CAS awards rendered following the appeal procedure.

 

c.     Publication of administrative documents

The CAS is extremely reluctant to publish internal administrative material. In other words, nobody knows precisely the financial records of the CAS or the precise content of the discussions happening inside the ICAS. This is not compatible with the very public function played by the CAS in global sports. With great power, comes great responsibility. Transparency, as a tool serving enhanced public scrutiny, is a key element of CAS’s accountability. Thus, it is important that the CAS adopts transparent administrative practices. It should, for example, publish the minutes of the ICAS meetings and its annual reports.

Recommendation 9: CAS to systematically publish on its website all the key administrative documents (such as the minutes of ICAS meetings and its annual reports)

 

III.           Access to Justice

Finally, and this is largely overlooked by many, the CAS has a problem with access to justice[12]. CAS proceedings are too expensive for many athletes who are not part of the 1% elite of superstars. Article R64.1 CAS Code provides that « [u]pon filing of the request/statement of appeal, the Claimant/Appellant shall pay a non-refundable Court Office fee of Swiss francs 1,000 »[13]. Moreover, the parties must pay an advance on the costs of arbitration and bear the costs of their own witnesses, experts and interpreters[14]. Unless the dispute involves a decision by an international federation in disciplinary matters[15], an appellant will have to bear the costs of the arbitration process, usually several thousands Swiss Francs. Athletes end up in a double bind: they are often constrained to go to the CAS by a mandatory arbitration clause, but cannot afford to do so properly. In recent years, the CAS has started to tackle the issue by introducing two mechanisms: a pro-bono list of CAS lawyers and a procedure granting legal aid to athletes in financial hardship. These steps certainly go in the right direction, but as some with hands-on experience have pointed out[16], they are still too small and uncertain. Athletes, especially in doping cases, are faced with disputes which require costly scientific investigations, experts must be recruited etc. Thus, they can be forced to waive their access to the national courts (and state legal aid), only if the CAS provides sufficient financial means for them to dispose of a fair chance to present their case, ie to “have their day in the CAS”. It is again a question of equality of arms; SGBs are way richer and enjoy substantial economies of scale thanks to their repeat player status. This potential inequality before sporting justice runs counter to the very essence of a fair process, and should be remedied. This will be possible only if the SGBs which provide for CAS arbitration in their regulations accept to take on a larger share of the costs of CAS proceedings, for instance by paying a levy corresponding to a specific share of their revenues.

Recommendation 10: CAS to fund, through a levy on the SGBs, a more comprehensive and accessible legal aid scheme for appellants to the CAS that lack sufficient financial resources.

 

Conclusion

Global sport is at a turning point, this time is different, it is truly about “reform or revolution”. As FIFA and IAAF sink more and more into chaos, it becomes clear that one of the sporting challenges of the 21st century will be to democratize and check the massive transnational organizations fuelled by TV and sponsoring money that govern global sport. To this end, the CAS has a key role to play. For example, it will most probably be reviewing the ban imposed by the FIFA Ethics Committee on Michel Platini. More generally, the CAS could become a sort of global constitutional court for sport, reviewing the legislative and administrative decisions of the SGBs. However, this metamorphosis will be realistic only if CAS itself is reformed to match the level of independence, transparency and accessibility needed to ensure its legitimating function. This is exactly the spirit of good governance endorsed by the IOC’s Olympic Agenda 2020 that should guide the whole Olympic movement in the coming years.

Now is not the time for the CAS to put its head in the sand and pray for the BGH to overrule the OLG in the Pechstein case. Sure, that might happen. Yet, the BGH cannot magically erase the fundamental questions that have been raised by the lower courts as the case made its way into its docket. It will only be a matter of time for those same questions to pop up again in another judicial forum (be it the ECHR or the CJEU). The independence of ICAS, and therefore of the CAS, is simply too fragile and urgently needs to be buttressed. Let’s not just wait, comme si de rien n’était, for the revolution to come. Now is the time for all interested parties (CAS, SGBs, athletes, public authorities) to come together and shape a comprehensive reform of the CAS that must be guided by the will to ensure a stronger independence, greater transparency and broader access to justice.


[1] See ten years ago A. Rigozzi, L’arbitrage international en matière de sport, Helbing & Lichtenhahn, Basel, 2005; pp. 289-300 and D. Yi, ‘Turning Medals into Metal : Evaluating the Court of Arbitration of sport as an international tribunal’, 6 Asper Rev. Int’l Bus. & Trade L. 289, 2006. More recently, A. Vaitiekunas, The Court of Arbitration for Sport : Law-Making and the Question of Independence, Stämpfli Verlag, Berne, 2014 and P. Zen-Ruffinen, ‘La nécessaire réforme du Tribunal Arbitral du Sport’ in A. Rigozzi and al (eds), Citius, altius, fortius : mélanges en l'honneur de Denis Oswald, Helbing & Lichtenhahn, Basel, 2012, pp. 555-567.

[2] Article S6 para 3 CAS Code (Statutes of ICAS and CAS).

[3] Article S6 para 2 CAS Code.

[4] Article S6 para 6 CAS Code.

[5] Article S6 para 4 CAS Code.

[6] See Article S4 CAS Code :
ICAS is composed of twenty members, experienced jurists appointed in the following manner :

1.     four members are appointed by the International Federations (IFs), viz. three by the Association of Summer Olympic IFs (ASOIF) and one by the Association of the Winter Olympic IFs (AIOWF), chosen from within or outside their membership;

2.     four members are appointed by the Association of the National Olympic Committees (ANOC), chosen from within or outside its membership;

3.     four members are appointed by the International Olympic Committee (IOC), chosen from within or outside its membership;

4.     four members are appointed by the twelve members of ICAS listed above, after appropriate consultation with a view to safeguarding the interests of the athletes;

5.     four members are appointed by the sixteen members of ICAS listed above, chosen from among personalities independent of the bodies designating the other members of the ICAS.

[7] In the current ICAS, 13 (out of 20) members have (or had) direct ties to SGBs if you trust their official bios: Abdullah Al Hayyan, Tjasa Andrée-Prosenc, Patrick Baumann, Scott Blackmun, Alexandra Brilliantova, John D. Coates, Moya Dodd, Ivo Eusebio, Michael B. Lenard, Göran Petersson, Richard W. Pound, Corinne Schmidhauser, Tricia C.M. Smith. None of the 20 has any ties with athletes’ representative organisations.

[8] Article R54 CAS Code stipulates:

“If three arbitrators are to be appointed, the President of the Division shall appoint the President of the Panel following nomination of the arbitrator by the Respondent and after having consulted the arbitrators.”

[9] A. Vaitiekunas, The Court of Arbitration for Sport: Law-Making and the Question of Independence, Stämpfli Verlag, Berne, 2014, p. 199.

[10] R. Muresan and N. Korff, ‘Sportschiedsgerichtsbarkeit: Wie weiter nach dem « Pechstein-Urteil » des Landgerichts München?’, Causa Sport 3/2014, pp. 199-211.

[11] Article R33 CAS Code only stipulates that «Every arbitrator shall be and remain impartial and independent of the parties and shall immediately disclose any circumstances which may affect his independence with respect to any of the parties».

[12] But not by all see A. Rigozzi & F. Robert-Tissot, ‘"Consent" in Sports Arbitration: Its Multiple Aspects’, E. Geisinger & E. Trabaldo de Mestral (eds), Sports Arbitration: A Coach for other players?, ASA Special Series No. 41, pp. 59-95, at 73-81.

[13] This is true also in case of an appeal against decisions issued by international federations in disciplinary matters, see article R65.2 CAS Code.

[14] See article R64.2 and R64.3 CAS Code.

[15] See article R65 CAS Code.

[16] A. Rigozzi & F. Robert-Tissot, ‘"Consent" in Sports Arbitration: Its Multiple Aspects’, E. Geisinger & E. Trabaldo de Mestral (eds), Sports Arbitration: A Coach for other players?, ASA Special Series No. 41, pp. 59-95, at 73-81.

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Asser International Sports Law Blog | The New FIFA Intermediaries Regulations under EU Law Fire in Germany. By Tine Misic

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

The New FIFA Intermediaries Regulations under EU Law Fire in Germany. By Tine Misic

I'm sure that in 1985, plutonium is available in every corner drugstore, but in 1955, it's a little hard to come by.” (Dr. Emmett L. Brown)[1]


Back to the future?

Availing oneself of EU law in the ambit of sports in 1995 must have felt a bit like digging for plutonium, but following the landmark ruling of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the Bosman case[2], 20 years later, with all the buzz surrounding several cases where EU law is being used as an efficient ammunition for shelling various sports governing or organising bodies, one may wonder if in 2015 EU law is to be “found in every drug store” and the recent cases (see inter alia Heinz Müller v 1. FSV Mainz 05, Daniel Striani ao v UEFA, Doyen Sports ao v URBSFA, FIFA, UEFA) [3] cannot but invitingly evoke the spirit of 1995.

One of the aforementioned cases that also stands out pertains to the injunction decision[4] issued on 29 April 2015 by the Regional Court (Landesgericht) in Frankfurt am Main (hereinafter: the Court) in the dispute between the intermediary company Firma Rogon Sportmanagement (hereinafter: the claimant) and the German Football Federation (Deutschen Fußball-Bund, DFB), where the claimant challenged the provisions of the newly adopted DFB Regulations on Intermediaries (hereinafter: DFB Regulations)[5] for being incompatible with Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.[6] The Court, by acknowledging the urgency of the matter stemming from the upcoming transfer window and the potential loss of clients, deemed a couple of shells directed at the DFB Regulations to be well-aimed, and granted an injunction due to breach of Article 101 TFEU.


(Un)harnessing the brokerage in football

The recently adopted FIFA Regulations on Working with Intermediaries (hereinafter: FIFA Regulations)[7] arguably represent the biggest turning point in the regulation of player and club representation in the history of professional football.[8] While some will argue that by implementing these Regulations, FIFA has thrown in the towel on regulating the ambit of representation in football altogether, it could be said that by steering away from controlling the access to the activity and switching the onus on regulating it, FIFA has not deregulated the activity, but rather shifted the scope of the regulation itself.[9] It has been anticipated that the implementation process would expose several contentious issues (e.g. recommended commission cap, duty of disclosure, representation of minors, suitability of intermediaries, etc.),[10] and the DFB’s adoption of the new Regulation has been no exception in that regard.[11]

The DFB, pursuant to Article 1(2) of FIFA Regulations,[12] and following a rather lengthy exchange of information with the German Football League (Deutsche Fußballliga GmbH, DFL) and the German Association of Players’ Agents (Deutschen Fußballspieler-Vertmittlervereinigung, DFVV),[13] adopted the new DFB Regulations on 13 March 2015. By availing itself of the discretion embedded in Article 1(3) of FIFA Regulations,[14] the DFB tailor-made its regulations, which entered into force on 1 April 2015, to a certain extent, which shall be elaborated upon further below. 

Since the new DFB Regulations by virtue of paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 3[15] indirectly bound the intermediary agencies through binding players and clubs when entering employment or transfer contracts,[16] which had not been the case with the pre-existent norms, the claimant first unsuccessfully sought the annulment of the Regulations directly from DFB. Subsequently, the claimant sought relief in the form of a temporary injunction from the Court, based upon the pending imminent danger stemming from the abuse of the DFB’s dominant position. Such behaviour, according to the claimant, limited the free choice of profession. Furthermore, according to the claimant, the obligatory disclosure of the remuneration amounts and the prohibition of representation remuneration when the player concerned is a minor went way beyond the borders of necessity and were thus unjustified.[17] The DFB, on the other hand, by rejecting the existence of a pending danger since the claimant had allegedly known of the FIFA Regulations for almost a year, deemed the claim inadmissible due to wrongful recourse to the urgent procedure (Eilverfahren), and additionally claimed the Articles 101 and 102 TFEU to be inapplicable, since the addressed provisions did not restrict competition, but au contraire prevented its distortion (i.e. by prohibiting the abuse of  the intermediary activity, providing for the independence of clubs and players, and guaranteeing transparency and contractual stability, hence bringing their scope within the borders of proportionality).[18]


Intermediaries v DFB: 1-0

The DFB’s guerrilla tactics of throwing the sink back at the claimant screaming for inadmissibility proved rather futile. The Court deemed the claim to be admissible and also found a large portion of the claimant’s arguments in the form of EU law-shaped shells to be well-founded. Subsequently, it granted an injunction as sought from the claimant. It addressed the issue through the prism of the Article 101 TFEU, and specific steps in the reasoning shall be dealt with separately below.

Admissibility as a non-issue

The DFB argued that such a claim could not be made in the urgent procedure, since the issue would pertain to the main cause. However, the Court pointed out that such a claim would be possible under Article 33 of the Act against Restraints of Competition (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, GWB).[19] Refusal of such a claim would deprive the claimant of its rights and legal remedies, particularly in the light of the pending danger of losing potential customers (clubs and players), bound directly by the DFB Regulations.[20] The Court also rejected the claim that the issue pertained to an internal decision-making process of the DFB, and said that the adoption of the Regulations had an externally oriented scope and effect.[21]


DFB Regulations are an inter-state trade restricting decision of an association of undertakings

The DFB asserted that it could not be seen as an association of undertakings in the sense of Article 101(1) TFEU considering that it also includes members with an amateur status. By referring to Piau,[22] the Court removed any ambiguity pertaining to the status of the DFB saying that: “...the mere fact that a sports association or federation unilaterally classifies sportsmen or clubs as 'amateur' does not in itself mean that they do not engage in economic activities within the meaning of Article 2 EC.”[23] Furthermore, strengthening its reasoning by first quoting Frubo,[24] stating that: ”Article 101 TFEU applies to associations in so far as their own activities of those of the undertakings belonging to them are calculated to produce the results to which it refers”,[25] and then BNIC,[26] it seemingly left no doubt as to the passive standing of DFB.

Having established the DFB’s status as per Article 101(1) TFEU, the Court moved to the DFB Regulations, and by drawing from Bosman,[27] Lehtonen,[28] and most importantly Piau,[29] qualified them as a decision of an association of undertakings, since they entail the regulation of the economic activity of intermediaries, whereby it is clear “...that the purpose of the occupation of players' agent, under the very wording of the amended regulations, is 'for a fee, on a regular basis [to introduce] a player to a club with a view to employment or [to introduce] two clubs to one another with a view to concluding a transfer contract'...”,[30] and therefore this economic activity cannot be qualified as one of a purely sporting nature.[31]

Albeit steering clear of an explicit reference to CJEU’s vast jurisprudence, the Court deemed the relevant market to be the one of intermediary services where the clubs and the players represented the customers and the intermediaries the providers,[32] hence following to a large extent the pre-established path in Piau.[33] It also pointed out that pursuant the provisions of Article 101(1) TFEU the core of the restriction of competition lied within an agreement (or a decision) which hampered the independence of economic decision making of the companies involved in a particular activity. The present case would prove as no exception since the intermediaries’ ability to provide services would take toll by the eventual non-submission of the signed declaration when entering an agreement with a player or a club upon whom loomed the eventual DFB sanctions. In other words, refusal to declare, which at the same time brought the intermediaries within the scope of DFB norms, limited the intermediaries’ economic freedom to be engaged by players or clubs.[34]

Moreover, the Court had little doubts about the Regulations affecting the inter-State trade. With Bundesliga alone representing the third largest national club football competition in Europe, the size of the market itself leads to the conclusion that the decision in question could have a negative impact on an actual or potential, direct or indirect inter-State provision of intermediary services, all the more so, since it lead to partitioning of markets on a territorial basis. In fact, by invoking Wouters,[35] the Court stressed that: “...it is sufficient to observe that an agreement, decision or concerted practice extending over the whole of the territory of a Member State has, by its very nature, the effect of reinforcing the partitioning of markets on a national basis, thereby holding up the economic interpretation which the Treaty is designed to bring about...[36]


Possible justifications

Having brought the Regulations within the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU, the Court promptly looked at the available justifications, either within the ambit of Article 101(1) TFEU pursuant to the relevant ECJ jurisprudence, or as one of the explicit Treaty exceptions embedded within Article 101(3) TFEU. In light of the former provision it is worth pointing out that the notion of inherence to legitimate (sporting) purposes is crucial in this ambit, since certain potentially restrictive behaviours (e.g. adoption of transfer rules), may be, although caught by Articles 101 and 102 TFEU respectively, exempted from their scope due to their necessity in pursuance of such objectives. Such an inherent necessity must, however, be assessed on a case-to-case basis. Following such reasoning, and by referring to the landmark Meca-Medina case,[37] the Court invoked an almost blasphemous notion in the ambit of EU competition law by stating that such assessment of legitimate goals under Article 101(1) TFEU was to be addressed through the “rule of reason” doctrine.[38]

As an alternative route stemming explicitly from the Treaty, by referring back to Piau, the Court identified the provisions of Article 101(3) TFEU, which envisage that the Regulations “might enjoy an exemption on the basis of this provision if it were established that they contribute to promoting economic progress, allow consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, do not impose restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives, and do not eliminate competition.” [39]

Summing up, the Court rather curiously, and perhaps simplistically, pointed out that the common denominator of both approaches entailed three key components; namely the Regulations would have to pursue a legitimate goal, and they would have to be necessary and proportionate. As one such legitimate goal, the Court recognised the issue of necessity to level the playing field in football competitions through a transfer system and thereof stemming regulation of the activity of intermediaries in order to prevent eventual abuses in the form of coerced transfers, and, even more importantly, to protect the minors involved in the process.[40] Both parties recognised the existence of past abusive practices that needed to be eradicated. Regardless of the legitimacy of the majority of the aims pursued, the Court established that certain provisions lacked the needed necessity and were disproportionate, as shall be addressed below.[41]


Individual (un)successful claims

Firstly, the Court deemed the registration obligation for clubs and players, which would bring the intermediaries within the scope of DFB and FIFA rules, to be disproportionate. While the registration and declaration obligations as such could be justified, the same could not be said for the pertaining subsumption of the intermediary service under the overarching umbrella of the DFB rules. The disproportionate full submission to DFB rules, which would strip the intermediaries of their possibility of recourse to ordinary justice, could be just as effectively replaced by a proper enforcement by the DFB of the registration rules themselves. Moreover, the Court found it unclear why the DFB would not be able to safeguard the goals pursued by the DFB Regulations before ordinary courts. [42]

Unlike the registration obligation, the duty to submit a criminal record along with the duty to pay a registration fee were seen as justified and thus proportionate in the eyes of the Court. Due to a potentially large impact of the intermediary activity on competition stemming from the potential influence on players and clubs, no less restrictive measure other than a registration duty could be put in place in order to safeguard the transparency of the football leagues. Moreover, considering the utmost necessity to protect the minors, the duty to submit a criminal record is clearly justified. Since the intermediaries financially benefit from their activity, the pertaining registration fee could also be deemed as a proportionate measure.[43]

The third addressed measure, i.e. the remuneration disclosure requirement, was also seen as justified by the Court. The legitimate aims set out in the previous paragraph were also to be pursued through the disclosure of agreements entered into and remuneration paid to the intermediaries. Such measures represented suitable means for controlling the intermediaries’ behaviour and were thus necessary and proportionate.[44]

The same can be said of the prohibition of acceptance of intermediary transfer fees for future transfers. In this context, the premature termination of contracts between clubs and players represented a major incentive for the intermediaries and at the same time a major source of revenue for clubs. The possibility of claiming a share of the transfer fees would therefore draw the intermediaries into seeking actively an early contract termination, as the new Regulations’ provisions were aimed at preventing such external influence, they are considered justified and proportionate.[45]

Fifthly, the imposition of flat-rate transfer fees was deemed unjustified by the Court, since it prohibited the agreed fee to be expressed in percentage pertaining to the cumulative transfer sum. This reinforced doubts that had previously been expressed about the proportionality of the parent FIFA Regulations provision, namely Article 7. Contrary to DFB’s arguments that such a scheme only required an a priori determination of the fee, the Court was not of the opinion that such a restrictive interpretation was appropriate, and that it could also lead to interpreting the provision in the way to detach the flat-rate fee entirely from the transfer sum. In other words, clubs would only be allowed to pay a prefixed amount that could not be expressed in percentage of the entire transfer sum. The Court also had doubts as to how such a restriction would serve the previously mentioned purposes.[46]

Last but not least, the Court also found the prohibition of remuneration of intermediaries of minors having the status of licensed players to be unjustified and disproportionate. By refusing the DFB’s argument to draw parallels with legal representation, the Court rather focused on the potential vulnerability of minors and their susceptibility to influence from the intermediaries, making this the crucial argument for (non)justification of the prohibition.[47] Stressing the legitimacy of a special protection of minors, who would due to their age and consequent inexperience rely heavily on the advice of the intermediaries, it also drew the line between the players plying their trade in the first and second league (licensed players) and others who participated in lower leagues. In the latter case a particular attention ought to have been given to minors brought to Germany from abroad.[48] It was only obvious, according to the Court, that minors playing in the lower leagues should benefit from a higher level of protection due to their stronger economic dependency to the intermediaries and hence susceptibility to their instructions. Minor licensed players, however, due to their market position alone warrant no such protection. Moreover, the significant disproportion of the amount of money spent on transfer fees for licensed minors makes such a prohibition in this ambit even more restrictive.[49]

Summed up, the Court deemed three out of six of the claimant’s legal missiles to have hit their target. First, the intermediaries may still be registered with the DFB without subjecting to its authority. Second, the prohibition of flat-rate transfer fees was unjustified, and third, the prohibition of remuneration of intermediaries of licensed minor players also exceeded the borders of necessity.[50] Since an injunction decision required an imminent and pending danger to be substantiated, as anticipated above, the Court circumvented the DFB’s argument that the claimant had almost a year, hence enough time, to get acquainted with the Regulations, by saying that Article 1(2) of the FIFA Regulations merely provided a minimum compulsory basis to be implemented, and that the DFB adopted substantially different Regulations pursuant Article 1(3) of the FIFA Regulations, leaving significantly less time for the claimant to comply.[51] The reference to previous FIFA Regulations met the same end, since the former pertained only to natural and not to legal persons.[52] 


Side-stepping Article 102 TFEU?

While the Court went to significant depths when analysing the case through the prism of Article 101 TFEU, it quite surprisingly almost completely refused to be drawn into the assessment of the matter through Article 102 TFEU, despite admitting, hence quite possibly just elegantly restating Piau,[53] to a possible existence of a collective dominant position by the DFB and its related associations on the market of intermediary service provision.[54] It merely concluded that there was no abuse in the sense of Article 102 TFEU.[55] One may find this curious at the very least, since the Court itself stated that DFB imposed its rules on non-members, intermediaries in this case, through economic pressure stemming from its monopolistic position on the market in question, which could to a certain extent at least be deemed as abusive.[56]


The epilogue or merely the end of Round One?

With the battle dust temporarily subsided, the DFB has seemingly complied with the Court’s injunction decision by issuing a note in which it restated the judgment’s tenor and informed the interested parties (intermediaries) of an ongoing possibility of a non-binding registration with DFB. The truce may only be a temporary one though, since the DFB has through its president already announced to pursue the matter in the main proceedings and a battle won does not necessarily mean that the war has been won.[57] Regardless of the outcome in Germany though, the issue carries a larger relevance. Since some of the DFB Regulations provisions, addressed in the hitherto analyzed injunction decision, resemble to a large extent if not entirely those embedded in the FIFA Regulations (e.g. the suspended Article 7(7) of DFB Regulations and Article 7(8) of FIFA Regulations),[58] one may wonder if, considering the already pending complaint of the of the Association of Football Agents (AFA) to the Commission,[59] legal challenges of the intermediaries regulations in other countries may only be a matter of time. Especially, since apparently these days EU law conveniently happens to be “available in every drug store”.




[1] R. Zemeckis, B. Gale, Back to the Future (Universal Pictures, 1985).

[2] Case C-415/93, Union royale belge des sociétés de football association ASBL v Jean-Marc Bosman ao, [1995] ECR I-04921.

[3] See inter alia Case AZ: 3 Ca 1197/14, Heinz Müller v 1. FSV Mainz 05, Arbeitsgericht Mainz, 19 March 2015 ; Case 2013/11524/A, Daniel Striani ao v UEFA, Tribunal de première instance francophone de Bruxelles, Section Civile, 29 May 2015.

[4] Case Az. 2-06 O 142/15*, Firma Rogon Sportmanagement v Deutschen Fußball-Bund (DFB), Landgericht Frankfurt am Main, 29 April 2015.

[5] DFB-Reglement für Spielvermittlung, adopted on 13 March 2015.

[6] Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), Consolidated Version, O.J. 2012, C326, 26 October 2012 and as amended by the Croatian Accession Treaty, O.J. 2012, L112/1.

[7] FIFA Regulations on Working with Intermediaries, adopted in Zürich on 21 March 2014.

[8] D. Lowen, A guide to the FA’s Regulations on Working with Intermediaries (www.lawinsport.com, 17 February 2015), <http://www.lawinsport.com/articles/item/a-guide-to-the-fa-s-regulations-on-working-with-intermediaries>.

[9] D. Lowen, FIFA’s Regulation on Working with Intermediaries (T.M.C. Asser Instituut – Summer Programme, 30 June 2015), pp. 2.

[10] N. De Marco, The new FA Intermediaries Regulations & disputes likely to arise (www.lawinsport.com, 31 March 2015), <http://www.lawinsport.com/articles/item/the-new-fa-intermediaries-regulations-disputes-likely-to-arise>.

[11] Focus, Streit mit DFB: Gericht gibt Spielervermittler in Teilen Recht (www.focus.de, 30 April 2015), <http://www.focus.de/regional/frankfurt-am-main/fussball-streit-mit-dfb-gericht-gibt-spielervermittler-in-teilen-recht_id_4650008.html>.

[12] Article 1(2) FIFA Regulations, cited supra note 7: ”Associations are required to implement and enforce at least these minimum standards/requirements in accordance with the duties assigned in these regulations, subject to the mandatory laws and any other mandatory national legislative norms applicable to the associations. Associations shall draw up regulations that shall incorporate the principles established in these provisions.

[13] Rogon v DFB, cited supra note 4, paras. 15-16.

[14] Article 1(3) FIFA Regulations, cited supra note 7: “The right of associations to go beyond these minimum standards/requirements is preserved.

[15] Arts. 3(2), 3(3) DFB-Reglement für Spielvermittlung, cited supra note 5.

[16] Rogon v DFB, cited supra note 4, paras. 16-17: “Mit dieser Erklärung erkennt der Vermittler das Reglement auch für sich als verbindlich an und unterwirft sich damit der Verbandshoheit des Antragsgegners einschliesslich der Sportgerichtsbarkeit.”

[17] Ibid., para. 19.

[18] Ibid., paras. 32-39.

[19] Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (GWB), (BGBl. I S. 1554), 26.07.2011.

[20] Rogon v DFB, cited supra note 4, paras. 43-45.

[21] Ibid., para. 46.

[22] Case T-193/02, Laurent Piau v Commission, [2005] ECR II-00209, para. 70.

[23] Rogon v DFB, cited supra note 4, para. 50.

[24] Case 71/74, Nederlandse Vereniging voor de fruit- en groentenimporthandel, Nederlandse Bond van grossiers in zuidvruchten en ander geimporteerd fruit "Frubo" v Commission, [1975] ECR 00563, para. 17.

[25] Rogon v DFB, cited supra note 4, para. 51.

[26] Case 123/83, Bureau national interprofessionnel du cognac (BNIC) v Guy Clair, [1985] ECR 00391, para. 17.

[27] Bosman, cited supra note 2, para. 127.

[28] Case C-176/96, Jyri Lehtonen and Castors Canada Dry Namur-Braine ASBL v Fédération royale belge des sociétés de basket-ball ASBL (FRBSB), [2000] ECR I-02681, paras. 53-60.

[29] Piau, cited supra note 22, para. 73: “As regards, second, the concept of a decision by an association of undertakings...This is therefore an economic activity involving the provision of services, which does not fall within the scope of the specific nature of sport, as defined by the case-law.”

[30] Ibid.

[31] Rogon v DFB, cited supra note 4, paras. 52-53.

[32] Ibid., para. 55.

[33] Piau, cited supra note 22, paras. 112-115.

[34] Rogon v DFB, cited supra note 4, paras. 57-58.

[35] Case C-309/99, J.C.J. Wouters ao v Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten, [2002] I-01577, para. 95.

[36] Rogon v DFB, cited supra note 4, paras. 59-61.

[37] Case C-519/04 P, David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v Commission, [2006] ECR I-06991.

[38] Rogon v DFB, cited supra note 4, paras. 63-64.

[39] Piau, cited supra note 22, paras. 100-104.

[40] Rogon v DFB, cited supra note 4, paras. 66-68.

[41] Ibid., paras. 69-70.

[42] Ibid., paras. 72-73.

[43] Ibid., paras. 75-78.

[44] Ibid., para. 80.

[45] Ibid., paras. 83-84.

[46] Ibid., paras. 86-87.

[47] Ibid., paras. 89-91.

[48] Ibid., para. 93.

[49] Ibid., para. 94: “Für die Vermittlung von Lizenzspielern ist eine derartige Beschränkung allerdings unverhältnismäÿig. Lizenzspieler der ersten und zweiten Bundesliga sind nicht in dem Masse schutzbedürftig wie Vertragsspieler der unteren Ligen.

[50] Handelsblatt, Gericht gibt Spielervermittler teils recht (www.handelsblatt.com, 30 April 2015),<http://www.handelsblatt.com/sport/fussball/streit-mit-dfb-gericht-gibt spielervermittler-teils recht/11716170.html>.

[51] Rogon v DFB, cited supra note 4, para. 104.

[52] Ibid., para. 105.

[53] Piau, cited supra note 22, paras. 117-118

[54] Rogon v DFB, cited supra note 4, paras. 98-99.

[55] Rogon v DFB, cited supra note 4, para. 100.

[56] Ibid., para. 96: “Hier geht es jedoch darum, dass die Antragsgegnerin aufgrund ihrer Monopolstellung Dritte faktisch in die Verbandsherrschaft zwingt, indem sie Verbandsangehörige mit Sanktionen bedroht, sollten diese nicht auf die Antragstellerin im Sinne einer Zustimmung zur Vermittlererklärung einwirken. Insofern fehlt es an der freiwilligen Unterwerfung; es handelt sich vielmehr um eine durch wirtschaftlichen Druck erzwungene Unterwerfung eines nicht verbandsangehörigen Dritten.”

[57] Hamburger Abendblatt, Landgericht bestätigt teilweise neue Spielerberater-Regeln (www.abendblatt.de, 30 April 2015), <http://www.abendblatt.de/sport/article205286615/Landgericht-bestaetigt-teilweise-neue-Spielerberater-Regeln.html>.

[58] Article 7(8) FIFA Regulations, cited supra note 7: “Players and/or clubs that engage the services of an intermediary when negotiating an employment contract and/or a transfer agreement are prohibited from making any payments to such intermediary if the player concerned is a minor ...

[59] D. Lowen, cited supra, note 8.

 

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