With this blog post, we continue the blog series on Turkish match-fixing cases and our attempt to map the still unchartered waters of the CAS’s match-fixing jurisprudence.

The first blog post addressed two issues related to the substance of match-fixing disputes, namely the legal characterization of the match-fixing related measure of ineligibility under Article 2.08 of the UEL Regulations as administrative or disciplinary measure and the scope of application of Article 2.08. In addition, The Turkish cases have raised procedural and evidentiary issues that need to be dealt with in the framework of match-fixing disputes.

The CAS panels have drawn a clear line between substantial and procedural matters. In this light, the Eskişehirspor panel declared the nature of Article 2.08 UEL Regulations to be administrative and rejected the application of UEFA Disciplinary Regulations to the substance. Nonetheless, it upheld that disciplinary rules and standards still apply to the procedure. This conclusion, however, can be considered puzzling in that disciplinary rules apply to the procedural matters arising by a pure administrative measure. To this extent, and despite the bifurcation of different applicable rules into substantial and procedural matters, the credibility of the qualification of Article 2.08 as administrative seems to be undermined. And here a question arises: How can the application of rules of different nature to substantial and procedural matters in an identical match-fixing dispute be explained?

This paradoxical approach can be justified by the conflicting duty of the CAS in match-fixing disputes. The CAS aims to strike the right balance between due process concerns, on the one hand, and the urge to fight against match-fixing effectively, on the other hand. In this sense, procedural matters have to be examined in conjunction with substantial issues raised in match-fixing disputes. Having as a starting point, therefore, the fundamental distinction between administrative and disciplinary measures, this blogpost will proceed with an analysis of the standard of proof applicable in match-fixing disputes (1) and of the admissibility of evidence (2). 

Standard of proof in Match-Fixing disputes: To be ‘comfortable’ or not to be?

It has been argued that in international arbitration the standard of proof has an impact on the form and not on the substance of a dispute.[1] However, in cases of corruption and particularly in match-fixing disputes, the determination of the standard of proof is significant, since the application of a different standard may lead the CAS to adopt a different substantive conclusion on the merits.[2] Considering, also, the severity of the ineligibility sanction imposed to a club for being involved in an act or an attempt of match-fixing, it is important to assess the emerging trends of the CAS jurisprudence in setting this standard.

The CAS Code does not define the applicable standard of proof in CAS proceedings. As a result, sports-governing bodies may explicitly specify a pre-determined standard of proof in their regulations. Indeed, in the Bin Hammam, Köllerer and Adamu cases, the CAS recognized the autonomy of a sports federation in determining the applicable standard of proof[3] by acknowledging that ‘in the absence of any overarching regulation, each association can decide for itself which standard of proof to apply’. Specifically, in the context of UEFA match-fixing proceedings, UEFA has embedded the standard of ‘comfortable satisfaction’ as the applicable standard of proof in Articles 2.05 of the UEFA Champions League (UCL) Regulations and 2.08 of the UEFA Europa League (UEL) Regulations. However, even in cases where the standard of proof is enshrined in the applicable regulations, the CAS is not impeded to deviate from this standard. In any case, it is interesting to analyse the reasoning of the panels in coming to the conclusion that the comfortable satisfaction standard or another standard of proof is applicable.

The first time the CAS was called to adjudicate on the standard of proof to be used in match-fixing disputes was in the Pobeda case.[4] Since then, in a number of awards, including the most recent example of the Turkish cases, the CAS has attempted to establish certain general principles on the standard of proof to be applied in match-fixing cases. However, this has not been done in an entirely consistent way.

In the Fenerbahçe case, the Panel determined the comfortable satisfaction as the standard applicable in the event of a maximum one year period of ineligibility to participate in the UEFA CL or UEFA EL, namely in case of application of Articles 2.05 UCL or 2.08 UEL. Nevertheless, to determine the standard of proof when Articles 2.06 UCL or 2.09 UEL apply, in absence of a standard explicitly provided, the CAS referred to Swiss civil law cases and to the CAS jurisprudence. In fact, the panel observed a contradiction. While according to Swiss civil law cases the standard to be applied is the ‘beyond reasonable doubt’, the CAS jurisprudence, making an analogy to doping cases, has found that the applicable standard of proof in match-fixing cases should be ‘comfortable satisfaction’. The CAS jurisprudence has justified this departure from the commonly applicable standard of proof in civil cases to the reduced standard of comfortable satisfaction by referring to the ‘restricted investigative powers of sports governing bodies’[5]and to the fact that in corruption cases the parties involved seek evasive means to escape from sanction.[6] The Fenerbahçe panel acknowledged the difficulties of proving an occurrence of match-fixing in the case at hand, since UEFA had access to circumstantial evidence only and concluded that the reduced standard of comfortable satisfaction had to be applied.

A similar approach was adopted in the Besiktas case. Although Article 2.08 UEL Regulations explicitly provided for the standard of comfortable satisfaction, the panel referred extensively to the match-fixing related CAS jurisprudence and particularly to the Metalist case[7] in order to justify the application of the comfortable satisfaction standard. Interestingly enough, although the Appellant claimed that in this case UEFA and the CAS had access to the broad investigatory powers of the Turkish authorities and therefore the beyond any reasonable doubt standard should have applied, the Besiktas panel declared that the pure civil character of the CAS proceedings excludes per se the application of a standard of proof applicable in criminal proceedings.

Finally, the Eskişehirspor panel confirmed the application of the comfortable satisfaction standard, which is in line with the existing CAS jurisprudence. By contrast to the Besiktas case, the Eskişehirspor panel relied on the wording itself of Article 2.08 and then went a step further by elaborating the meaning of the comfortable satisfaction standard. Specifically, the comfortable satisfaction standard was defined as a ‘kind of sliding scale’ based on the seriousness of the allegation. In practice this means that ‘the more serious the allegation and its consequences, the higher certainty the Panel would require to be comfortable satisfied’.[8] The comfortable satisfaction standard, therefore, requires that the offence be demonstrated to a higher level than a mere balance of probability but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt bearing in mind the seriousness of the allegation which is being made. In this light, considering the serious repercussions of being found guilty of match-fixing and particularly the sizeable economic consequences due to missing out on the Europa League or Champions League competitions, the comfortable satisfaction standard provides sufficient safeguard to the football clubs.[9]

The comfortable satisfaction fits better disciplinary proceedings, where the burden of proof must be proportionate to the sanction imposed. At this point, however, a paradox emerges. Taking into consideration the CAS declaration in the Eskişehirspor case of the administrative character of the ineligibility measure under Article 2.08 UEL Regulations, it comes as a surprise that the CAS applies a standard of proof, which in principle is linked to disciplinary proceedings. This transposition can be explained by the fact that, according to the CAS, the UEFA DR still apply in procedural matters. However, the author of this commentary is of the opinion that the CAS falls prey to a contradiction. Having identified the enforcement of Article 2.08 as administrative, the CAS distinguished between substance and procedure in a controversial way, by applying to the later the comfortable satisfaction standard usually used in the framework of disciplinary proceedings. This blurs again the line between administrative and disciplinary measures, and raises the question whether the CAS can cherry pick procedural elements from disciplinary proceedings.

More importantly, the Eskişehirspor assessment seems to undermine the ratio itself of the distinction between administrative and disciplinary measures and the qualification of article 2.08 as administrative. As the Fenerbahçe panel remarked, the bifurcation of the proceedings regarding the administrative measure and the proceedings in respect of the disciplinary measure can be justified by the necessity of having to act quickly in respect of the administrative measure in order to protect the integrity of the competition, while the imposition of the final and appropriate disciplinary measure might require a more comprehensive evaluation of the case. In this sense, due to the urgency of rendering a club ineligible as a result of its involvement in match-fixing, a lower standard than the comfortable satisfaction could be tolerated, namely the standard of balance of probability.

It seems, therefore, that in the match-fixing framework the CAS is called to reconcile two contradictory but equally overriding aims: the due process concerns generally embraced by the CAS and the fundamentality of the fight against match-fixing in the eyes of UEFA. In the Eskişehirspor case, and in previous match-fixing cases, the CAS opted for a standard of proof in line with the intensity of the administrative measure adopted, a standard that safeguards the due process rights of a club to the detriment of systematic coherency. 

Admissibility and evaluation of evidence in match-fixing disputes

With regard to the evidentiary measures in match-fixing proceedings, it is well-established jurisprudence that sports federations and arbitral tribunals enjoy considerable discretion and are not necessarily barred from taking into account evidence, which may not be admissible in civil or criminal state courts.[10] 

In the Turkish match-fixing scandal, two issues have been specifically raised: the reliance of the CAS panel on findings of a state court in match-fixing (1) and the admissibility of the use of wiretaps (2).

In both the Fenerbahçe and Besiktas cases, at the time of the CAS proceedings, criminal proceedings were pending before the Turkish Supreme Court. The legal question arising out of these parallel proceedings was whether the CAS panels could rely on the findings of domestic courts. The Fenerbahçe panel took into account that there was no final and binding criminal conviction in domestic courts yet, and, thereby, chose to adopt a slightly independent approach. The panel tried to provide its own evaluation of the facts. However, it concluded that based on the lower standard of comfortable satisfaction the criminal case could be taken into account to corroborate the conclusion reached by UEFA, namely that one of the Fenerbahçe’s officials was suspected of being involved in match-fixing.[11] On the other hand, the Besiktas panel using the Oriekhov[12] case as a point of reference argued that due to the restricted investigative powers of UEFA and the CAS, the panel should be able to rely on domestic courts’ decisions. It noted, however, that the CAS should not blindly rely on a particular national decision, but rather assess and evaluate all the evidence available in the context of its own case. While the two panels justified the use of findings of a state court in a different way, their approach reflects a rather cautious approach of the CAS when extending a criminal conviction to a disciplinary conviction the readiness of the CAS to import evidentiary material from national courts even though it is to do so in a rather cautious manner, weary of the disciplinary nature of the case presented to its jurisdiction.

As far as the use of wiretaps is concerned, the Eskişehirspor case is adding to a series of CAS awards allowing wiretaps recordings as an admissible type of evidence. After having conducted the ‘balancing exercise’, which was introduced in the Fusimalohi[13] case and taking into account the limited investigative powers of UEFA, the CAS concluded that the inclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained is outweighed by the interests of UEFA in uncovering the truth in match-fixing cases. In this light, the use of wiretaps should be admissible as the only evidentiary medium susceptible to ascertain the factual truth. The CAS, therefore, confirmed once again its growing concern to support the fight against match-fixing with all the possible evidentiary means available in its legal toolkit. 

Conclusive Remarks

A series of CAS awards over the past years have addressed procedural and substantial matters related to match-fixing cases. Some of the issues discussed above, i.e. the applicable standard of proof and the evidentiary means accessible in match-fixing cases, seem to be solidly established. Two important conclusions can be drawn with regard to CAS jurisprudence procedural matters: firstly, it is unlikely that the CAS would deviate from a standard of proof enshrined expressively in the regulations of sports-governing bodies and secondly, with regard to the admissibility of evidence, future CAS panels are likely to take into account the difficult position of federations when investigating match-fixing offences.

There are nevertheless a number of issues still open for discussion. In the Eskişehirspor case the CAS attempted to clarify the legal nature and scope of Article 2.08, drawing a clear line between administrative and disciplinary measures. However, by applying UEFA DR in procedural matters, the CAS maintains alive the uncertainty over the real nature of the ineligibility imposed by Article 2.08: is it an administrative measure or a disciplinary sanction? It seems that the CAS is willing to confer an administrative flavour to the ineligibility measure, but at the same time it attempts to ease the draconian economic consequences of this measure by imposing a relatively strict burden of proof on the shoulder of UEFA.

After all, and despite the CAS’s willingness to effectively support the fight against match-fixing, it seems that - for the moment at least - the CAS is not willing to adopt a Machiavellian ‘the end justifies the mean’ approach, namely an approach where due process concerns would come entirely short.

[1] F Rodriguez, ‘ICCA 2014. Standard of Proof: A plea for Precision or an Unnecessary Remedy?’ (http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2014/04/10/icca-2014-standard-of-proof-a-plea-for-precision-or-an-unnecessary-remedy/).

[2] E Barak and D Koolaard, ‘Match-fixing. The aftermath of Pobeda-what have the past four years brought us?’ 18 (http://www.tas-cas.org/d2wfiles/document/5890/5048/0/Bulletin202014-120final.pdf).

[3] A Rigozzi and B Quinn, ‘Evidentiary Issues before CAS’ (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2438570), 24.

[4] CAS 2009/A/1920, FK Pobeda, Aleksandar Zabrcanec, Nicolce Zdraveski v UEFA.

[5] CAS 2010/A/2172, Oleg Oriekhov v UEFA.

[6] CAS 2009/A/1920 (n 4).

[7] CAS 2010/A/2267-2281, Football Club “Metalist” et al. v. FFU.

[8] CAS 2013/A/3256, Fenerbahçe Spor Kubülü v UEFA, para 123.

[9] CAS 2004/A/607, B. v. International Weightlifting Federation (IWF), para 34.

[10] CAS 2011/A/2425, Ahongalu  Fusimalohi v FIFA, para 79.

[11]CAS 2013/A/3256 (n 8), para 543-544.

[12] CAS 2010/A/2172 (n 5).

[13] CAS 2011/A/2425 (10), para 80.

The CAS denial of the urgent request for provisional measures filed by the Legia Warszawa SA in the course of its appeal against the UEFA Appeals Body Decision of 13 August 2014 put a premature end to Legia’s participation in the play-offs of the UEFA Champion’s League (CL) 2014/2015. Legia’s fans- and fans of Polish football - will now have to wait at least one more year to watch a Polish team playing in the CL group stage for the first time since 1996.

While the CAS proceedings for the appeal filed by Legia against UEFA and Celtic FC are pending and the grounds of dismissal by the CAS of the application for provisional measures have not been publicly known, the CAS is called to rule on the interpretation of the proportionality principle with regard to the application of the 3-0 defeat sanction against a club that fielded an ineligible player. The cornerstone question is whether the final award on the merits will be in line with UEFA and CAS jurisprudence suggesting a literal interpretation of Article 21.2 of the UEFA Disciplinary Regulations (UEFA DR) or whether the CAS will allow for a broader interpretation of the proportionality principle in case of mere technical administrative errors. 

Background and facts of the case

Legia’s adventures began when Legia’s player, Bartosz Bereszynski, was sent off in their final Europa League tie of last season against Apollon Limassol FC and was sanctioned by the UEFA Control and Disciplinary Body decision of 13 February 2014 with three-match suspension.  UEFA regulations are clear in that a ban applies to a player if he is listed in a club’s squad for matches. Bereszynski did not play in Legia’s games with St Patrick’s Athletics and in the first leg against Celtics FC. However, due to a technical error of Legia’s administrator, which was to prove fatal, the player was not registered in the squad list for the St Patrick’s tie and the first two games of his suspension were never properly recognized. As a result of the player’s failure to serve the suspension, Bereszynski’s participation in the second leg against Celtics FC as a 86^th minute substitute triggered the application of Article 18 of the Regulations of the UEFA Champions League 2012-2015 and Article 21.2 of the UEFA DR and Legia was to be sanctioned for fielding a suspended player. Therefore, the match was declared forfeited; for UEFA’s purposes, Legia lost the game 3-0 and the initial 6-1 aggregate defeat for Celtic was reversed to a 4-4 aggregate score, opening the door for Celtic to progress in UEFA CL play-offs on away goals.  

The Legia case in the light of UEFA jurisprudence

At a first glance, the case at issue seems to present several factual similarities with the Bowyer and Matoukou cases brought before UEFA’s Control and Disciplinary Body, which, however, have never been appealed before the CAS.

In the first case, similarly to the Legia case, due to an administrative error of Newcastle United FC, Bowyer had not been registered as ‘eligible to play’ in the six UEFA matches in 2004. As a result, UEFA’s Control and Disciplinary body, applying UEFA Regulations, decided that Bowyer had not served the suspension carried over from his days as a Leeds United player and was banned for the next six European matches. This decision was challenged by Newcastle and the English Football Association (FA) before the UEFA’s Appeal Body, which upheld the initial decision. It is remarkable that the FA supported Newcastle’s appeal, expressing its concerns with regard to the ambiguous language of the rules on players’ eligibility.

In the second case, Matoukou while playing for KRC Genk against FC Porto on 19 August 2010 in a UEFA Europa League qualifier, received a red card and as a consequence was sanctioned with a two-match suspension. Matoukou sat out the second leg of that tie and, after Genk’s elimination, played no further European games for Genk. On 2 August 2012, Matoukou, as a player of Arsenal Kiev FC, scored against ND Mura 05. However, Matoukou had not served the second part of his suspension before taking part to this game. As a result of his ineligibility, UEFA’s Control and Disciplinary Body declared the match forfeited. Although there is no doubt that the player did not serve the two-match suspension, this case illustrates the most recent example of the clear-cut application of Disciplinary Regulations by UEFA.

A similar example is the harsh sanction of 3-0 defeat applied against PAOK Saloniki in 2004 for fielding the suspended player, Laisis Louca, in the first leg of the CL third qualifying round against Maccabi Tel Aviv. NK Zepce was also punished with the same severity in 2005 for fielding a suspended player in the first half of their match against FK Baskimi. The inevitable conclusion of this brief overview of UEFA jurisprudence is that UEFA’s practice has been consistent; UEFA Regulations on players’ eligibility are sufficiently clear and they give no room for a different interpretation. However, it should be noted that the UEFA decisions can be appealed before the CAS. Therefore, the CAS jurisprudence needs to be examined in order to assess whether the CAS in interpreting UEFA Regulations has deviated from this rather simplistic clear-cut approach of UEFA.  

The Legia case in the light of CAS jurisprudence

The Sion[1] case has been the CAS landmark case with regard to the proportionality of the sanction of forfeiture for clubs fielding ineligible players. In this case, the CAS confirmed that FC Sion was banned from registering five new players in the summer transfer period of 2011/12 pursuant to the FIFA decision and was excluded from UEFA Europa League. Funnily enough, Celtic was also back then the lucky club, which enjoyed a ‘second bite of the cherry’. While this case presents only few factual similarities with the Legia case, its importance lies in that the CAS had to rule whether a club’s exclusion mandated by UEFA Regulations is in conformity with Swiss antitrust law and the proportionality principle.

The CAS confirmed that UEFA is an undertaking enjoying a dominant position on the market of international football competitions.[2] However, according to the CAS,  Article 18 of the UEFA Regulations authorizing UEFA to sanction clubs which field ineligible players does not constitute an abuse of its dominant position, but rather ‘guarantees the efficiency and equal treatment of the clubs’[3]. Relying on its mandate to establish uniform regulations applicable equally to all clubs and to guarantee legal certainty in sports competitions, the CAS found that the sanction of forfeiture for clubs fielding ineligible players is an appropriate, necessary and proportionate measure.[4] To reach this conclusion, the CAS applied a twofold test for the proportionality principle to be enforced: (1) the capacity of the sanction of forfeiture to achieve the aim it pursues, i.e. to ensure the equal treatment of the clubs; and (2) the necessity of the sanction, i.e. the absence of alternative measures, since during the qualification phase of the tournament other sanctions such as the deduction of points are not possible.

In this case, the CAS deviated from the strict literal interpretation of Article 21.2 of UEFA Disciplinary Regulations and elaborated an interpretation of the forfeiture sanction in the light of the proportionality principle, applying the twofold test. It is highly likely that the CAS in the Legia case will follow this interpretation, relying on the necessity of the sanction, i.e. because of the absence of alternative measures, and its mandate to protect the equal treatment of the clubs and will confirm, therefore, the conformity of the UEFA decision with Article 21.2. However, it is the suggestion of this case commentary that a different interpretation of Article 21.2 in the light of the proportionality principle could also be elaborated on.  

Mapping an alternative interpretation of Article 21.2 of UEFA Disciplinary Regulations

In this attempt to elaborate a different interpretation of Article 21.2 in the light of the proportionality principle, this article will use as a benchmark the CAS finding that ‘other elements such as the systematic context, the purpose and history of the rule may contribute to the correct understanding of the meaning of the rule’[5]. Although the wording of Article 21.2 is clear and seems to create a lex specialis rule with regard to the forfeiture sanction in case of a player’s ineligibility, it is suggested that a different interpretation of Article 21 can be envisaged if it is examined in conjunction with the General Principles laid down in Article 17.1 of the UEFA Disciplinary Regulation.

Specifically, Article 17.1 states that the disciplinary body determines the type and extent of the disciplinary measures to be imposed in accordance with the objective and subjective elements of the offence, taking account of both aggravating and mitigating circumstances.[6] This means that a sanction may be scaled down when proper consideration is given to the specific circumstances. This provision is in line with the well-established in Swiss law, EU law and CAS jurisprudence[7] proportionality principle, namely that in disciplinary matters a reasonable balance must be struck between the violation and the sanction.

Therefore, in the case at issue the question could be articulated as such: Could an interpretation of Article 21.2 in the context of Article17.1 and the proportionality principle result in a different sanction than forfeiture?

In the light of Article 17.1, an argument deriving from the specific ‘aggravating and mitigating’ circumstances of Article 17.1 could be that the ineligible player did actually abstain from three matches and it was due to a mere technical error that the player did not serve his suspension correctly. It could be suggested, therefore, that the forfeiture sanction is too harsh, since Legia acted in good faith and it was only because of this administrative error that the player was considered ineligible.

Furthermore, in the same spirit, Legia could claim that the sanction should be scaled down given that the player in question played for only four minutes as a substitute with the aggregate score of 6-1 in Legia’s favour. Considering that the ineligible player did not have any considerable impact on the tie[8], Legia could claim that the forfeiture sanction is too harsh as compared to the violation committed by the club. In a similar case, in 2010, UEFA fined Debrecen VSC for fielding in a good faith an ineligible player, instead of declaring the match forfeit: UEFA considered that Debrecen ‘had no interest in fielding this player for the three last minutes of additional time, when the score was so clearly in its favour’. It should be pointed out that in the Debrecen case the ineligible player was free to play if registered and, as a result, Article 21.3 applied. By contrast, in the Legia case the player was suspended and therefore excluded from the competition.

However, it could be argued that UEFA’s decision in the Debrecen case could serve as a guideline for a more flexible interpretation of Article 21.2. While the wording of Article 21.3 itself gives enough room for discretion to UEFA to declare a match forfeit (‘a match may be declared forfeit’), an interpretation of Article 21.2 in the light and purpose of Articles 17.1 and 21.3 could lead to a less draconian sanction, taking into consideration the specific circumstances of the case. Although the difference in the wording between Articles 21.2 (‘a match is declared’) and 21.3 draws a clear distinction between the consequences of fielding a suspended player and an ineligible player, it is the suggestion of this commentary that this distinction is at odds with the proportionality principle. Considering the proportionality’s principle status as a ‘general principle of law governing the imposition of sanctions of any disciplinary body’[9], it is surprising that Article 21.2 imposes the forfeiture sanction, without any reference to the proportionality of the sanction as compared to the violation committed. In this sense, the sanction of forfeiture leading to Legia’s exclusion from UEFA CL – and to the enormous economic loss for the club that this exclusion entails- seems disproportionate in the light of the specific circumstances of the case. In other words, a literal interpretation of Article 21.2, even in cases where the violation is the result of a mere technical error and the fact that the Club had no interest in fielding the suspended player, seems to overturn the reasonable balance between the violation and the sanction. 

Conclusive remarks

Until today, in the name of legal certainty, UEFA and the CAS have applied in a consistent way a literal interpretation of Article 21.2 of UEFA Disciplinary Regulations. While legal certainty is the ratio legis and justification of the sanctions imposed by UEFA[10], this commentary argued that the ‘without-exemption’ application of the forfeiture sanction can undermine the proportionality principle, which is also a fundamental principle recognized by the CAS jurisprudence. In this light, it has been demonstrated that a flexible interpretation of Article 21.2 in the context of the general provisions of Article 17.1, i.e. an interpretation which would render the act of fielding a suspended player subject to the full scale of disciplinary measures and would leave sufficient room for discretion to UEFA disciplinary body and to the CAS, would be in compliance with the proportionality principle. To this extent, construing a method for interpretation of Article 21.2 in conjunction with Articles17.1 and 21.3 is an important step to arrive at a better evaluation of the existing regime and to clarify the complex and still unsettled interplay between the intensity of the violation and the sanction.

Therefore, it remains to be seen whether the CAS will follow the path -strikingly consistent until now- of a literal interpretation of Article 21.2 or whether it will opt for a tailored sanction, which would be in compliance with the proportionality principle.

[1] CAS 2011/O/2574 UEFA v. Olympique des Alpes SA/FC Sion

[2] CAS 2011/O/2574 (n 5), para 115.

[3] Ibid, paras 124 & 130.

[4] Ibid, para 135.

[5] CAS 2007/A/1363 TTF Liebherr Ochsenhausen v/ETTU, award of 5 October 2007, para 12

[6] Article 17.1 (n 1).

[7] CAS 2001/A/330 R. v. Fédération Internationale des Sociétés d'Aviron (FISA), Award of 23 Nov 2001

[8] By contrast, see Sion case (n5) where Pascal Feindouno, one of Sion’s ineligible players, scored against Celtic.

[9] G. Kaufmann-Kohler and A. Rigozzi, ‘Legal Opinion on the Conformity of Article 10.6 of the 2007 Draft WADA Code with the Fundamental Rights of Athletes’, 42.

[10] CAS 2007/A/1278&1279,  para 131.