Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

The Diarra Ruling of the Tribunal of Charleroi: The New Pechstein, Bosman or Mutu?

Yesterday the sports law world was buzzing due to the Diarra decision of the Tribunal de Commerce du Hainaut (the Tribunal) based in Charleroi, Belgium. Newspapers were lining up (here, here and here) to spread the carefully crafted announcement of the new triumph of Jean-Louis Dupont over his favourite nemesis: the transfer system. Furthermore, I was lucky enough to receive on this same night a copy of the French text of the judgment. My first reaction while reading quickly through the ruling, was ‘OMG he did it again’! “He” meaning Belgian lawyer Jean-Louis Dupont, who after a string of defeats in his long shot challenge against FIFA’s TPO ban or UEFA’s FFP (see here and here), had [at least I believed after rushing carelessly through the judgment] manufactured a new “it”: a Bosman. Yet, after carefully re-reading the judgment, it became quickly clear to me that this was rather a new Mutu (in the sense of the latest CAS award in the ‘Mutu saga’, which I have extensively analysed on this blog and in a recent commentary for the new Yearbook of International Sports Arbitration) coupled with some reflections reminding a bit (but not really as will be explicated below) the Pechstein case.

In this blog, I will retrace briefly the story behind the case and then analyse the decision of the Belgium court. In doing so, I will focus on its reasoning regarding its jurisdiction and the compatibility of article 17(2) RSTP with EU law.More...

The Russian Doping Scandal at the Court of Arbitration for Sport: The IPC’s Rio Ineligibility of Russian Paralympic Athletes

Editor's note: This blog is part of a special blog series on the Russian doping scandal at the CAS. Last year I analysed the numerous decisions rendered by the CAS ad hoc Division in Rio and earlier this year I reviewed the CAS award in the IAAF case.

Unlike the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF), the International Paralympic Committee (IPC) was very much unaffected by the Russian doping scandal until the publication of the first McLaren report in July 2016. The report highlighted that Russia’s doping scheme was way more comprehensive than what was previously thought. It extended beyond athletics to other disciplines, including Paralympic sports. Furthermore, unlike the International Olympic Committee (IOC) the IPC had a bit more time to deal with the matter, as the Rio Paralympic Games were due to start “only” in September.

After the release of the McLaren Report, the IPC president Sir Philip Craven was “truly shocked, appalled and deeply saddened at the extent of the state sponsored doping programme implemented in Russia”. He immediately announced the IPC’s intention to review the report’s findings and to act strongly upon them. Shortly thereafter, on 22 July, the IPC decided to open suspension proceedings against the National Paralympic Committee of Russia (NPC Russia) in light of its apparent inability to fulfil its IPC membership responsibilities and obligations. In particular, due to “the prevailing doping culture endemic within Russian sport, at the very highest levels, NPC Russia appears unable or unwilling to ensure compliance with and the enforcement of the IPC’s Anti-Doping Code within its own national jurisdiction”. A few weeks later, on 7 August, the IPC Governing Board decided to suspend the Russian Paralympic Committee with immediate effect “due to its inability to fulfil its IPC membership responsibilities and obligations, in particular its obligation to comply with the IPC Anti-Doping Code and the World Anti-Doping Code (to which it is also a signatory)”. Indeed, these “obligations are a fundamental constitutional requirement for all National Paralympic Committees (NPCs), and are vital to the IPC’s ability to ensure fair competition and to provide a level playing field for all Para athletes around the world”. Consequently, the Russian Paralympic Committee lost all rights and privileges of IPC membership. Specifically, it was not entitled to enter athletes in competitions sanctioned by the IPC, and/or to participate in IPC activities. Thus, “the Russian Paralympic Committee will not be able to enter its athletes in the Rio 2016 Paralympic Games”. More...


The Russian Doping Scandal at the Court of Arbitration for Sport: The IAAF’s Rio Ineligibility of Russian Athletes

Since the release of the earth-shattering ARD documentary two years ago, the athletics world has been in a permanent turmoil. The International Athletics Association Federation (IAAF) is faced with both a never-ending corruption scandal (playing out in front of the French police authorities) and the related systematic doping of Russian athletes. The situation escalated in different phases led by the revelations of Russian insiders. First, in December 2014 with the ARD documentary, which demonstrated how widespread (and organized) the recourse to doping was in Russian athletics. It triggered the Pound investigation financed by the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), which led to two damaging reports (available here and here) for the Russian anti-doping system and the IAAF itself. Thereafter, in November 2015, the IAAF had no other choice but to provisionally suspend the Russian athletics federation (ARAF then RusAF) and its members from IAAF competitions. Yet, this was only the beginning as shortly after the former head of Moscow’s anti-doping laboratory provided a detailed sketch to the New York Times of the operation of a general state-led doping scheme in Russia. The system was designed to avert any positive doping tests for top-level Russian sportspeople and was going way beyond athletics. These allegations were later largely confirmed and reinforced by the McLaren investigation initiated by WADA in May 2016, and which published its first report in July 2016 shortly before the Rio Olympics. In June 2016, the IAAF anticipated the conclusions of the report (it had received most of McLaren’s evidence beforehand) and decided to maintain the ineligibility of Russian athletes for IAAF competitions, and for the Rio Olympics. It did, however, foresee a narrow exception for Russian athletes able to show that they were properly tested outside of Russia. Nonetheless, the athletes using this exception were to compete under a neutral flag at the Olympics. Unsurprisingly, Russian athletes led by pole superstar (and now IOC member), Yelena Isinbayeva, and the Russian Olympic Committee decided to challenge this decision in front of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). Interestingly, while the decision was rendered on 21 July 2016, the full text of the award was publically released only on 10 October 2016. In September, I analysed the Rio CAS Ad Hoc Decisions involving Russian athletes aiming to participate to the Olympics. I will now turn to the IAAF decision, which is of great importance to the future of the anti-doping system. Indeed, it lays out the fundamental legal boundaries of the capacity of international federations to impose sanctions on their members (and their members) in order to support the world anti-doping fight. More...

International and European Sports Law – Monthly Report – November and December 2016. By Saverio Spera.

Editor’s note: This report compiles all relevant news, events and materials on International and European Sports Law based on the daily coverage provided on our twitter feed @Sportslaw_asser. You are invited to complete this survey via the comments section below, feel free to add links to important cases, documents and articles we might have overlooked. 


The Headlines

The Russian State Doping Scandal and the crisis of the World Anti-Doping System

Russian doping and the state of the Anti-Doping System has been the dominant international sports law story in November and December. This is mainly due to the release of the second report of the McLaren’s investigation on 9 December 2016. The outcome of McLaren’s work showed a “well-oiled systemic cheating scheme” that reached to the highest level of Russian sports and government, involving the striking figure of 30 sports and more than 1000 athletes in doping practices over four years and two Olympic Games. The report detailed tampering with samples to swap out athletes’ dirty urine with clean urine.More...


FIFA’s provision on the protection of minors - Part 3: The compatibility of Article 19 with EU law. By Kester Mekenkamp.

Editor’s note: Kester Mekenkamp is an LL.M. student in European Law at Leiden University and an intern at the ASSER International Sports Law Centre. This blog is, to a great extent, an excerpt of his forthcoming thesis, which he shall submit in order to complete his master’s degree.

This final blog aims to provide some broader perspective, by sketching first the grander scheme in which Article 19 RSTP – FIFA's provision on the protection of minors – operates. Thereafter, the focus will shift towards testing Article 19 RSTP, thereby keeping in mind the previous blogs (Part 1: The Early Years and Part 2: The 2009 reform and its aftermath), against EU free movement law.  


Putting Article 19 RSTP into perspective: The bigger picture

After having investigated the nuts and bolts of FIFA’s provision on the protection of minors in the first two parts of this blog, it might be useful to address its bigger picture.

Article 19 RSTP and its accompanying provisions regulate only a small share of the targeted activity. There is, unfortunately, also an illegal world. Circumvention of the prohibition is allegedly commonplace.[1] Visas and passports can be falsified.[2] Work permits can be obtained on the basis of jobs arranged by clubs.[3] More...


FIFA’s provision on the protection of minors - Part 2: The 2009 reform and its aftermath. By Kester Mekenkamp.

Editor’s note: Kester Mekenkamp is an LL.M. student in European Law at Leiden University and an intern at the ASSER International Sports Law Centre. This blog is, to a great extent, an excerpt of his forthcoming thesis, which he shall submit in order to complete his master’s degree.


This is the second part of a three-piece blog on FIFA’s provision on the protection of minors, Article 19 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players. The contribution in its entirety aims to provide an encompassing overview of the rule’s lifespan since its inception in 2001. The previous (first) part has shed light on the “birth” and “first years” of the provision, and as such illustrated the relevant developments from 2001 till 2009. This second part covers the rule’s “adolescent years”, which span from 2009 to the present. The major changes put forward in the 2009, 2015 and 2016 versions of the RSTP will be addressed. Thereafter the important CAS decisions concerning Article 19, Muhic, Vada I and II, FC Barcelona, RFEF, and the FIFA decisions relating to Real Madrid and Atlético Madrid, will be scrutinized. The third, and final, part will constitute a substantive assessment of the provision under EU Internal Market law.

Given that the version adopted in 2008 left Article 19 untouched, the 2009 RSTP represented the next significant step in the regulation of the protection of minors. It had become clear that the system as used up to that point was inadequate to achieve its goal,[1] most notably because several national associations still neglected to strictly apply the rules.[2] More...


FIFA’s provision on the protection of minors - Part 1: The Early Years. By Kester Mekenkamp.

Editor’s note: Kester Mekenkamp is an LL.M. student in European Law at Leiden University and an intern at the ASSER International Sports Law Centre. This blog is, to a great extent, an excerpt of his forthcoming master thesis. 


On 24 November 2016, a claim was lodged before a Zurich commercial court against FIFA’s transfer regulations by a 17-year-old African football player.[1] The culprit, according to the allegation: The provision on the protection of minors, Article 19 of the Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players.[2] The claimant and his parents dispute the validity of this measure, based on the view that it discriminates between football players from the European Union and those from third countries. Besides to Swiss cartel law, the claim is substantiated on EU citizenship rights, free movement and competition law. Evidently, it is difficult to assess the claim’s chance of success based on the sparse information provided in the press.[3] Be that as it may, it does provide for an ideal (and unexpected) opportunity to delve into the fascinating subject of my master thesis on FIFA’s regulatory system aimed at enhancing the protection of young football players and its compatibility with EU law. This three-part blog shall therefore try to provide an encompassing overview of the rule’s lifespan since its inception in 2001. More...


The entitlement to Training Compensation of “previous” clubs under EU Competition Law. By Josep F. Vandellos Alamilla

Editor’s note: Josep F. Vandellos is an international sports lawyer associated to RH&C (Spain). He is also a member of the Editorial Board of the publication Football Legal and a guest lecturer in the ISDE-FC Barcelona Masters’ Degree in Sports Management and Legal Skills.


Article 6 of Annexe IV (Training compensation) of the FIFA-RSTP (Ed. 2016) contains the so-called “Special Provisions for the EU/EEA” applicable to players moving from one association to another inside the territory of the European Union (EU) or the European Economic Area (EEA).
The provisions regarding training compensation result from the understanding reached between FIFA and UEFA with the European Union in March 2001[1], and subsequent modifications introduced in the FIFA-RSTP revised version of 2005 to ensure the compatibility of the transfer system with EU law.[2]
This blog will focus on the exception contained in article 6(3) Annexe IV of the FIFA-RSTP. According to this article, when “the former club” fails to offer a contract to the player, it loses its right to claim training compensation from the players’ new club, unless it can justify that it is entitled to such compensation. Instead, the right of “previous clubs” to training compensation is fully preserved irrespective of their behaviour with the player.[3] From a legal standpoint, such discrimination between the “former club” and the “previous clubs” raises some questions that I will try to address in this paper. More...



The EU State aid and sport saga: The Real Madrid Decision (part 2)

This is the second and final part of the ‘Real Madrid Saga’. Where the first part outlined the background of the case and the role played by the Spanish national courts, the second part focuses on the EU Commission’s recovery decision of 4 July 2016 and dissects the arguments advanced by the Commission to reach it. As will be shown, the most important question the Commission had to answer was whether the settlement agreement of 29 July 2011 between the Council of Madrid and Real Madrid constituted a selective economic advantage for Real Madrid in the sense of Article 107(1) TFEU.[1] Before delving into that analysis, the blog will commence with the other pending question, namely whether the Commission also scrutinized the legality of the operation Bernabeú-Opañel under EU State aid law. By way of reminder, this operation consisted of Real Madrid receiving from the municipality the land adjacent to the Bernabéu stadium, while transferring in return €6.6 million, as well as plots of land in other areas of the city. More...

Resolution of Disputes Arising From Football Contracts in Turkey. By N. Emre Bilginoglu

Editor’s note: N. Emre Bilginoglu[1] is a lawyer based in Istanbul. His book entitled “Arbitration on Football Contracts” was published in 2015.


Introduction

With a total market value of approximately 911 million EUR, the Turkish Super League ranks as one of the prominent football leagues in Europe. Five of the eighteen teams that make up half of the total market value are based in Istanbul, a busy megalopolis that hosts a population of fifteen million inhabitants.[2] As might be expected, the elevated market value brings forth a myriad of disputes, mainly between the clubs and the players. However, other crucial actors such as coaches and agents are also involved in some of the disputes. These actors of the football industry are of all countries, coming from various countries with different legal systems.

One corollary of rapid globalisation is the development of transnational law, which is quite visible in the lex sportiva.[3] Like foreign investors, foreign actors of the sports industry look for some legal security before signing a contract. FIFA does protect these foreign actors in some way, providing players and coaches legal remedies for employment-related disputes of an international dimension. But what if the legal system of the FIFA member association does not provide a reasonable legal remedy for its national actors?[4] More...


Asser International Sports Law Blog | The CAS Ad Hoc Division in 2014: Business As Usual? - Part. 2: The Selection Drama

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

The CAS Ad Hoc Division in 2014: Business As Usual? - Part. 2: The Selection Drama

In a first blog last month we discussed the problem of the scope of jurisdiction of the Ad Hoc Division of the Court of Arbitration for Sport. The key issue was whether an athlete could get his case heard in front of the CAS Ad Hoc Division or not. In this second part, we will also focus on whether an athlete can access a forum, but a different kind of forum: the Olympic Games as such. This is a dramatic moment in an athlete’s life, one that will decide the future path of an entire career and most likely a lifetime of opportunities. Thus, it is a decision that should not be taken lightly, nor in disregard of the athletes’ due process rights. In the past, several (non-)selection cases were referred to the Ad Hoc Divisions at the Olympic Games, and this was again the case in 2014, providing us with the opportunity for the present review.

Three out of four cases dealt with by the CAS Ad Hoc Division in Sochi involved an athlete contesting her eviction from the Games. Each case is specific in its factual and legal assessment and deserves an individual review.

 

I.               Daniela Bauer (CAS OG 14/01)

Daniela Bauer is an Austrian halfpipe freestyle skier contesting the decision by the Austrian Olympic Committee (AOC) and the Austrian Ski Federation (ASF) not to select her for the Sochi Olympic Games. Shortly before the Games, a member of the ASF had informed Ms. Bauer that she would get to participate in the Olympics if Austria were offered an additional quota place for the halfpipe competition.[1] But, when the AOC got the opportunity to fill such a quota spot, it declined to use it. It did so because “the sporting performances of the Austrian athletes in this discipline were not good enough and would adversely affect the overall perception of the Federation and its athletes at the Olympics”[2]. Hence, on 2 February 2014, the athlete decided to file an application with the CAS Ad Hoc Division against her non-selection.

She claimed that ASF and AOC had “induced legitimate expectations in the Applicant that having qualified under the FIS Rules she would be selected through the use of quota places”. Therefore, ASF and AOC “are estopped[3] from changing their course of action, i.e. from relying on their authority in any given case to decline the quota allocated to Austria”[4]. Moreover, she argued that “[t]he right of the ASF to recommend an athlete to the AOC (Rule 44.4 of the OC) as well as the right of the AOC to select an athlete for the Olympic Games (Rule 27.7.2 of the OC) cannot be exercised in an unreasonable manner”[5]. This standard of reasonableness was not met in her case because[6]:

  • “no reasons were given”;
  • “the Respondents’ discretion not to recommend and select her was exercised arbitrarily”;
  • “the applicant was never notified that reference would be made to the above-mentioned criterion of sporting perspective”;
  • “the AOC violated Rule 44.4 of the OC by not investigating whether the ASF’s non-recommendation was based on discrimination”;
  • “the AOC should accept all the quotas allocated to it, irrespective of the potential results of the nominated athletes”;
  • and she “should have been immediately informed of the decisions taken by the ASF and AOC”.

The ASF and AOC opposed that “[n]o person has the authority to bind the ASF and the AOC with respect to the Applicant’s participation in the Olympic Games” and, therefore, “[t]he AOC has the exclusive authority under Rule 27 of the OC to decide which athletes shall take part in the Olympic Games” [7].

The jurisdiction of the CAS Ad Hoc Division was not contested and the panel moved directly to the merit of the case. The panel refers to its settled case-law and reminds that “it is not in issue that it is for an NOC to select its competitors for the Olympics […] (CAS OG 08/03)”[8]. Hence, “although the Applicant satisfied the FIS minimum qualification standards and the AOC was below its maximum athlete quotas for all freestyle events, the AOC would have violated the OC by nominating her for a quota allocation for women’s halfpipe as she had not been recommended by the ASF”[9]. Even though it is acknowledged that ASF member Mr. Rijavec “may have created an expectation that the ASF would recommend to the AOC that she would be nominated for a quota allocation”, he “was not authorized to make any representations, promises or guarantees regarding whether the AOC would nominate her if she satisfied these standards”[10]. Consequently, no legitimate expectations to be selected could arise. In addition to this, the panel found that the ASF disposes of a “significant degree of subjective discretion”[11] as it does not have recourse to any objective criteria regarding the selection of freestyle skiers.[12] Nevertheless, it “has a legal duty not to be arbitrary, unfair, or unreasonable”, which it was not in this instance as “it had a legitimate sports performance justification” .[13]

Finally, the Panel, in a remarkable twist of mind, “wishes to express in clear terms that it does not condone its lack of published qualification criteria that misled the Applicant by failing to provide clear and timely notice of the performance standards she was required to meet in order to be recommended by the ASF for the nomination by the AOC to the Austrian Olympic team”. Additionally, “the panel strongly recommends that the ASF establish, identify, and publish clear criteria to enable athletes to determine in a timely manner the Olympic Games qualification standards they are required to meet” .[14] Despite these final remonstrances, the panel concludes that the claims of Ms. Bauer lack merit.

 

II.             Clyde Getty (CAS OG 14/02)

The claimant, Mr. Getty, is an Argentinean freestyle skier competing in the aerials discipline; the respondent is the International Ski Federation (FIS). This is a case also related to the attribution of an additional quota spot to participate to the Sochi Olympic Games. On 24 January the Argentinean Ski Federation (FASA) received an email from the FIS informing it that it was allocated a quota spot for the aerials competition in Sochi. The FASA immediately informed Mr. Getty of the good news. However, later that day, after confirming its interest in the spot, the federation received a second email from FIS stating that FASA “does not have an athlete that is eligible to participate in the Aerials men event” and therefore cannot get the spot misleadingly offered in the first email. Henceforth, Mr. Getty decided to challenge his proclaimed ineligibility to participate to the Olympics in front of the CAS Ad Hoc Division. 

Mr Getty claims that he is “eligible to be entered into the Sochi Games by the Argentinean NOC irrespective of his current FIS points”[15]. He is of the opinion that FIS rules are ambiguous on the selection process for quota spots and therefore should be interpreted in his favour on the basis of the contra preferentem principle.[16] Moreover, he argues that “FIS is estopped from denying [him] a quota place” [17]. In other words, Mr. Getty claims FIS had prompted legitimate expectations, especially after the 24 January  email, that he would be participating to the Sochi Olympic Games. Finally, Mr Getty submits that denying him the participation in the Sochi Games “would be unfair and contrary to the spirit of the Olympic Movement” [18]. He bases his claim, amongst many other things, on the fact that he is the only freestyle athlete representing South America and that his “dedication to sport is an inspiration to many” [19]. The FIS disputes these claims and points out that “the Applicant’s description of the qualification procedure is incorrect and misleading” [20]. In fact, Mr. Getty never reached the minimum points for eligibility, nor is any alternative qualification criterion accessible. Likewise, the FIS is not estopped, as it could not create any legitimate expectations with its email.

The jurisdiction of the CAS Ad Hoc Tribunal was not contested and the panel proceeded directly to the merit. As a preamble, the arbitrators remind that “[u]nder Swiss law, the interpretation of statutes has to be rather objective and always start with the wording of the rule”[21]. After reviewing the wording of the FIS’s regulations, the panel concludes that, in the present case, “[a] good faith common sense reading leads to the conclusion that the rules unambiguously require all competitors to meet the individual eligibility requirements” [22]. Additionally, “[t]he fact that the Applicant cannot point to a single instance in the past where an athlete was allowed to compete in the Olympic Games without meeting the eligibility requirements […] is further evidence of this conclusion” [23].

Moreover, the FIS is not deemed estopped from denying Mr. Getty a quota place for the Sochi Olympic Games. In this regard, the Panel notes that “FIS never made during the qualification period a representation that Mr. Getty was eligibile” [24], nor is there “evidence that during the qualification period Mr. Getty received from FIS an individual assurance that he was eligible” [25], and “the fact that COA might ultimately obtain a quota place did (and could) not suggest that FIS would waive the minimum individual qualification requirement for any athlete assigned to that quota place” [26], most importantly “all correspondence between FASA or COA and FIS on 24 October 2014 did not contain any express and individual reference to Mr. Getty”[27]. This is a fundamental difference compared to the existing precedents invoked by Mr. Getty. Indeed, in those cases “the athlete had been given specific and individual assurances about his eligibility” (CAS OG 02/06 & CAS OG 08/02) or “the international federation changed its rules with retroactive effects, depriving an athlete of the eligibility that could be assumed on the basis of prior rules”[28] (CAS 2008/O/1455).

Finally, the Panel also held that the fact that the participation of Mr. Getty to the Sochi Games would be in line with the Olympic spirit is a matter of policy. These concerns are for “FIS to consider when adopting the eligibility rules for the Olympic games; they are not for this Panel which is only asked to apply the existing rules”[29]. Even though the Panel is sympathetic to the athlete’s drive to participate to the Sochi Olympic Games it rejects the application filed by Mr. Getty.

 

III.           Maria Birkner (CAS OG 14/03)

The final, and maybe most complex and controversial case, is the one involving a well-known Argentine alpine skier: María Birkner. The National Olympic Committee for Argentina (COA) and the Argentinean Ski Federation (FASA) are the respondents in the proceedings. On 20 January 2014 the FASA told Ms. Birkner that she was not selected for the Sochi Olympic Games. This decision not to select her is challenged in front of the CAS Ad Hoc Division.

Ms. Birkner claims “that she was discriminated against on the basis of her being a member of her family”[30]. For a number of reasons, she claims that the Federation has purposefully conspired to banish her from its activities and to exclude her from the Olympic games[31]. Chiefly, she claims the federation has purposefully informed her after the final decision of the existence of specific selection criteria and of a technical committee in charge of the selection. As discussed in the previous blog, the jurisdiction of the Ad Hoc Division was challenged and the panel found that it did not have jurisdiction. Nonetheless, it decided to consider the merits of the case anyway.

The arbitrators brushed aside any bias against the family of Ms. Birkner noting that two of her siblings were present in Sochi and that her brother had even the privilege of carrying the Argentinean Flag during the opening ceremony.[32] Furthermore, in the eyes of the panel, the claimant failed to establish that the qualification process, the Technical Committee and the selection criteria used were biased against her.[33] Indeed, “it cannot be said that the selection criteria said to be applied were arbitrary or unreasonable”[34]. The panel considers that the recriminations of Ms. Birkner against the selection process, especially the allegations of a bias from the part of the Technical Committee and that the other skiers had previous knowledge of the main selection criteria were not sufficiently substantiated and could not be established for the sake of this procedure.

The panel is of the view that the situation is similar to the one of the Bauer case discussed above. Therefore, it recalls the holding of the Bauer Panel observing that “there was a legal duty not to be arbitrary, unfair or unreasonable in the application of objective criteria or in the exercise of subjective discretion but that the exercise of discretion was not so characterised where there was a legitimate sports performance justification for selection”[35]. It finds that “a discretion based on “the evolution and projection in the future” [as invoked by the FASA] is not arbitrary, unfair or unreasonable” [36]. Nevertheless, the panel refers to the obiter holding in the Bauer case and “recommends that FASA establishes, identifies and publishes clear criteria in a timely manner to enable athletes to understand those criteria and the Olympic Games qualification standards that they are required to meet in order to be recommended for selection by COA” [37]. In the present case, “a dedicated athlete with an outstanding history of representing her country, who had successfully competed in many international as well as national events, was devastated by the decision made not to select her, when she had believed that, on the criteria that she had mistakenly understood had applied, she would represent her country at the Sochi Olympic Games” [38].


Conclusion: Deference is not enough 

Selection disputes constitute a big part of the CAS Ad Hoc Division’s caseload.[39] This is probably inevitable, as the non-selection for the Olympic Games is often the toughest setback faced by an athlete in her career. The Sochi cases do not fundamentally sidestep the existing case law of the CAS Ad Hoc Division in this regard. The deference to the subjective criteria used by the National Olympic Committee’s (NOCs) and the International federations (Ifs) is reaffirmed, unless those criteria are applied in an “arbitrary, unfair or unreasonable” way. Furthermore, an athlete can hardly rely on any legitimate expectations, unless he has been offered personally and officially a spot to participate to the Olympic Games. Hence, a non-selection can only be challenged successfully in the most extreme cases. However, when the behaviour of the federation is, to say the least, ambiguous as in the Birkner case, a very heavy burden of proof lies on the shoulder of the athlete to turn this ambiguity into the recognition of an “arbitrary, unfair or unreasonable” behaviour. 

The Sochi Ad Hoc Division’s approach to selection cases is flawed with paradoxical feelings. On the one hand, it urges the Ifs and NOCs to devise and publish “clear criteria in a timely manner”, but, on the other hand, it encourages them not do so by limiting the reviewability of their subjective and blurry selection practices. In short, Panels openly favour objective and predictable schemes on which athletes can rely, while incentivizing subjective and unpredictable assessments by leaving untouched the wide scope of discretion of the Ifs and NOCs.[40] The paradoxical and irreconcilable nature of these views should lead the CAS to reconsider its approach to the selection process. The Sochi panels instinctively felt there was something fundamentally unfair with the non-selection of Ms. Bauer and Ms. Birkner. In this regard, the panels’ final incantations for change will remain unanswered if the CAS Ad Hoc Division refuses to contribute through its jurisprudence to the rise of clear selection criteria. It should impose a more stringent review of the subjective criteria used by the Ifs, by promoting a less strict understanding of the notion of “arbitrary, unfair or unreasonable” scheme and/or by alleviating the burden of proof bearing on athletes to establish the abusive nature of a selection process.

In fact, such an evolution would be in a line with the will expressed by the Olympic movement during the Olympic Agenda 2020 process to be irreproachable in terms of good governance and transparency. The existence of publicly known and clearly defined standards and rules is a hallmark of such good governance. Getting to the Olympics is just too important for athletes to be left at the mercy of the unchecked will


[1] CAS OG 14/01, point 2.5

[2] CAS OG 14/01, point 2.10

[3] For a quick introduction to the doctrine of Estoppel see : http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Estoppel

[4] CAS OG 14/01, point 4.2 a)

[5] CAS OG 14/01, point 4.2 b)

[6] CAS OG 14/01, point 4.2 b) i) to vi)

[7] CAS OG 14/01, point 4.3 a) and c)

[8] CAS OG 14/01, point 7.5

[9] CAS OG 14/01, point 7.10

[10] CAS OG 14/01, point 7.12

[11] CAS OG 14/01, point 7.15

[12]In contrast with CAS OG 06/08 and CAS OG 06/02.

[13] CAS OG 14/01, point 7.15

[14]CAS OG 14/01, point 7.16

[15] CAS OG 14/02, point 4.2 a)

[16] CAS OG 14/02, point 4.2 a)

[17] CAS OG 14/02, point 4.2 b)

[18] CAS OG 14/02, point 4.2 c)

[19] CAS OG 14/02, point 4.2 c)

[20] CAS OG 14/02, point 4.3 a)

[21] CAS OG 14/02, point 7.4

[22] CAS OG 14/02, point 8.9

[23] CAS OG 14/02, point 8.10

[24] CAS OG 14/02, point 8.17 i.

[25]CAS OG 14/02, point 8.17 ii.

[26] CAS OG 14/02, point 8.17 iii.

[27] CAS OG 14/02, point 8.17 vi.

[28] CAS OG 14/02, point 8.17 vii.

[29] CAS OG 14/02, point 8.20

[30] CAS OG 14/03, point 4.3

[31] CAS OG 14/03, point 4.4

[32] CAS OG 14/03, point 7.4-7.7

[33] CAS OG 14/03, point 7.16-7.25

[34] CAS OG 14/03, point 7.19

[35] CAS OG 14/03, point 8.2

[36] CAS OG 14/03, point 8.3

[37] CAS OG 14/03, point 8.4

[38] CAS OG 14/03, point 8.4

[39] See the following cases : CAS OG 12/06 ; CAS OG 12/01 ; CAS OG 12/02 ; CAS OG 06/008 ; CAS OG 06/002 ; CAS OG 08/002; CAS OG 08/003; CAS OG 02/005

[40] A problem already identified by Antonio Rigozzi, which noted in 2006 that « This case law [CAS OG 06/002  & CAS OG 06/008] could lead to a switch (back) from selection based on objective criteria to more subjective process. This would be a regrettable evolution. To reduce the risk of dispute, the selecting bodies should enact objective criteria, which are easily intelligible, make sure that they are communicated to (and understood) by the athletes, and avoid any modification of the « rules of the game » during the selection » process. » A. Rigozzi, ‘The Decisions Rendered by the CAS Ad Hoc Division at the Turin Winter Olympic Games 2006’, Journal of International Arbitration, pp.453-466, p.466

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