Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

Revisiting FIFA’s Training Compensation and Solidarity Mechanism - Part.1: The historical, legal and political foundations - By Rhys Lenarduzzi

Editor’s note: Rhys Lenarduzzi is a final semester Bachelor of Law (LL.B) and Bachelor of Philosophy (B.Phil.) student, at the University of Notre Dame, Sydney, Australia. As a former professional athlete, then international sports agent and consultant, Rhys is interested in international sports law, policy and ethics. He is currently undertaking an internship at the T.M.C. Asser Institute with a focus on Transnational Sports Law.


In 2019, training compensation and solidarity contributions based on FIFA’s Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (RSTP) amounted to US$ 75,5 million. This transfer of wealth from the clubs in the core of the football hierarchy to the clubs where the professional players originated is a peculiar arrangement unknown in other global industries. Beyond briefly pointing out or reminding the reader of how these systems work and the history behind them, this blog series aims to revisit the justifications for FIFA-imposed training compensation and the solidarity mechanism, assess their efficacy and effects through a case study of their operation in the African context, and finally analyse the potential impact of upcoming reforms of the FIFA RSTP in this context.

First, it is important to go back to the roots of this, arguably, strange practice. The current transfer system and the legal mechanisms constituting it were largely the result of a complex negotiation between European football’s main stakeholders and the European Commission dating back to 2001. The conclusion of these negotiations led to a new regulatory system enshrined in Article 20 and Annex 4 of the RSTP in the case of training compensation, and at Article 21 and Annex 5 in the case of the solidarity mechanism. Before paying some attention to the historical influences and how we arrived at these changes, as well as the justifications from the relevant bodies for their existence, let us briefly recall what training compensation and the solidarity mechanisms actually are.


1.     FIFA’s training compensation and solidarity mechanism: A very short introduction

Training compensation is the obligation of an acquiring/buying/signing/new club to compensate the training clubs of a player. A training club is considered to be the clubs of the player between the ages of 12 and 21, though the obligation to compensate continues if either of the following two instances take place, up until the season of a player’s 23rd birthday:  i) “[A] player is registered for the first time as a professional” or,  ii) “a professional is transferred between clubs of two different associations…”. The obligation does not arise if a former club terminates a player’s contract without just cause, when a professional reacquires amateur status in moving clubs, or when a player transfers to a category 4 club. Regarding the categories, this is important because the amounts owed to a training club hinge on where clubs fall within four categories (For more on the four categories see HERE).

There are some regulatory differences between the EU/EEA and the rest of the football world. A significant distinction is that without sufficient justification that it is worthy of compensation, a former club will not be owed by a “new club”[1] if they have not offered a contract of equivalent value to the player in question.[2]

The Solidarity mechanism provisions stipulate that when a player moves to a new club, mid contract, for a fee agreed between the new club and former club, then 5% of that fee is designated as a solidarity contribution, and each of the player’s training clubs will receive a portion. The apportionment varies depending on what age the player was registered with the training club (further information on apportionment can be found HERE). This obligation arises when a player is transferred definitively or on loan, between clubs from different associations, as well as when a transfer takes place within the same association, but a training club of the player is affiliated to another association.

For both training compensation and the solidarity mechanism, the regulations provide that the national association will instead receive the money when the club owed “has in the meantime ceased to participate in organised football and/ or no longer exists”.[3] In cases as such, the compensation is to be used for youth football development.

Disputes can arise when the new club does not pay on time or at all, or if there is a disagreement on the amount owed, as well as when a new club attempts to make the case that a player has already terminated his training period prior to age of 21. Given the above explanation of the systems is brief, further detail may be found within the relevant articles and annexes (see HERE for the full regulations).

2.     A brief history: From the ‘retain and transfer system’ to the FIFA RSTP 2001

Much of the current framework is the product of various events surrounding the birth of the regulations in 2001, though the ideas and concepts it captures go way back beyond this time. The English Football League’s registration system that would go on to be touted as the ‘retain and transfer system’ dates back to at least 1893.[4] Both this system and the American Baseball ‘reserve rule’ system are often mentioned in the same breath. As Sloane pointed out in 1969: “The justification for the reserve rule and the retain and transfer system lies in their alleged function in bringing about a more or less equal distribution of playing talent between clubs, whilst, their advocates argue, free competition would lead to a concentration of 'star' players into a few rich clubs.”[5]  Both systems were the target of an array of challenges over the years, though up until ‘free agency’[6] in the case of American Baseball (much earlier) and Bosman[7] in football, each system remained largely the same in existence and justification.[8] To further emphasise that the issues recognised, and in turn the ideas and justifications pertinent to the current system are hardly new, the Chester Report of 1969 on the situation regarding employment and transfers in football in England had striking similarities to much of what was raised within the European-level negotiations that lead to the changes in 2001.[9]

With the momentous Bosman case in 1995, the previously commonplace practice of an out of contract player being retained and unable to transfer (regardless of that player’s preferences) was found contrary to EU law. Importantly for the subject of this blog, the court also recognised that “encouraging the recruitment and training of young players must be accepted as legitimate”[10] aim, on the basis of which the free movement rights of players could in principle be restricted. Thus, leaving an opening for a regulatory system that would support the “recruitment and training of young players”[11] and restrict free movement in a proportionate way.

In 1998, the European Commission decided to open an investigation against FIFA based on competition law concerns linked to its then applicable RSTP.  This decision brought FIFA, UEFA and FIFPro to the European Commission’s negotiating table to hammer out a compromise that would satisfy their divergent interests and be compatible with the EU’s antitrust rules. The regulations as they now stand, aside from some minor amendments, reflect the outcome of those negotiations. The final press release of the European Commission concluded that FIFA’s new regulations would have to reflect a set of principles in order to be deemed compatible with EU competition law. In particular it accepted that:

  • in the case of players aged under 23, a system of training compensation should be in place to encourage and reward the training effort of clubs, in particular small clubs;
  • creation of solidarity mechanisms that would redistribute a significant proportion of income to clubs involved in the training and education of a player, including amateur clubs; 

These are in fact quite faithfully transposed in the FIFA RSTP provisions discussed above. Since then, the Bernard[12] ruling of the CJEU further clarified that the societal significance of sport, rendered the incentivisation of training legitimate. In its ruling, the court specified that in order to comply with EU law, a training compensation system ‘must be actually capable of attaining that objective and be proportionate to it, taking due account of the costs borne by the clubs in training both future professional players and those who will never play professionally’.[13] This remains the main benchmark that any FIFA training compensation system must meet in order to comply with EU law.

As we have shown in this section, the shape of the current FIFA training compensation system and solidarity mechanism are very much a direct result of the EU’s interventionism in the regulation of football in the aftermath of the Bosman case. In doing so, the EU institutions also recognised that the idea of redistributing funds to compensate the costs incurred by the training club in instructing a player is a legitimate one.

3.     Justifying redistribution: Sharing the costs of training

Why do football institutions want this system in place and how was it justified? As was alluded to above, these ideas are not new ideas and are rooted in tradition.[14] Football and its intricacies have been deemed in need of protection for a long time, at least from within. More importantly for this blog, there is a desire for wealth to be redistributed in the form of compensation to the training clubs, to manufacture solidarity between the different levels of football and to incentivise goals such as training, education and development. This justification for FIFA’s redistributive systems is largely connected to the recognition that sport is important for the social fabric, and that incentivising development and training clubs goes beyond football and has societal benefits.

These objectives are reflected in the compromise agreed between FIFA and the EC in 2001. The latter’s press release emphasised that training compensation was “to encourage and reward the training effort of clubs, in particular small clubs“. Similarly, FIFA stated in Circular no. 769; “This system is designed to encourage more and better training of young football players, and to create solidarity among clubs, by awarding financial compensation to clubs which have invested in training young players.” Thus, it is clear that both the football authorities and the EU institutions recognise that the core aim of the FIFA’s training compensation and (though less obviously) its solidarity mechanism are to support the recruitment and training of young professional footballers. In fact, the CJEU’s advocate general in Bernard later recognised that training compensation rules “ensure that clubs are not discouraged from recruitment and training by the prospect of seeing their investment in training applied to the benefit of some other club, with no compensation for themselves”.[15] She went on to emphasise that “there is a broad public consensus that the training and recruitment of young players should be encouraged rather than discouraged”.[16]

At the heart of these rationalisations lies the core belief that failing to compensate the club that has helped a young player grow into a professional player is unfair and would discourage the club’s future effort to train players. Whether a training compensation system is necessary to attain such an objective is, however, far from evident. As was pointed out by advocate general Lenz in the Bosman case, such objectives could as well “be attained by a system of redistribution of a proportion of income, without the players' right to freedom of movement having to be restricted for that purpose“.[17] Nevertheless, the idea of redistribution between clubs remains the fundamental policy objective that underpins both FIFA’s training compensation system and solidarity mechanism.

Concluding remarks and subsequent blogs

This blog has highlighted that FIFA’s training compensation system and solidarity mechanism were introduced, after lengthy discussions with the European Commission and relevant stakeholders, in order to create a solidarity and redistributive relationship between the club where a player was trained and the club were a player pursues his professional career. The core justification behind them is that the training clubs provide an important educational service and that their work would be discouraged if they would not be enjoying some economic returns on their investment (in time and resources) to train players that go on to play professionally for a bigger/richer club.

While this objective is certainly respectable, there are, however, questions that remain regarding the adequacy and necessity of these systems to effectively redistribute funds between clubs. First, one should always keep in mind that training compensations are restricting the players’ freedom to move between clubs. Second, as we will see in the coming blog focusing on African players and clubs, it is questionable whether the current FIFA rules are in practice achieving their main redistributive function. Third, if these mechanisms are necessary to encourage training, it is as well remarkable that they are not also introduced in the context of women professional football, as will be discussed in our third blog. Finally, my last blog will assess how the coming changes to FIFA’s RSTP will affect the structure and operation of both the training compensation system and the solidarity mechanism.


[1] “New club” is the language used in the RSTP.

[2] “[I]n writing via registered post at least 60 days before the expiry of his current contract” per RSTP Annex 4 (6) ‘Special provisions for the EU/EEA’.

[3] RSTP - Annex 4 (3) 3; Annex 5 (2) 3.

[4] Sloane, P. J. (1969), The labour market in professional football, British Journal of Industrial Relations, 7, 181-199.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Established from the decision in Curt Flood v. Bowie Kuhn, et al. 407 U.S. 258.

[7] Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Socie´te´s de Football Association and others v. Bosman and others, ECLI: EU: C:1995:463

[8] Gerrard, B. (2002), The Muscle drain, Coubertobin-Type Taxes and the International Transfer System in Association Football,  European Sport Management Quarterly at 50 – “High Court in England ruled in 1963 that the retain-and transfer system was a restraint of trade. This led to a progressive relaxation of the transfer system with players being given more freedom to move between teams at the end of their contracts while transfer fees remained payable”.

[9] Per Sloane (1969) – “Contracts should have a terminable date and be renewable only on the consent of both parties… The committee did, however, suggest that a special levy should be imposed by the Football League on transfer fees, in addition to the present arrangement and graded according to the size of fee at a progressive rate. This levy could be returned to clubs for the purpose of ground improvements and would thereby tend to offset the tax advantage which clubs derive by signing players, since such payments, unlike the cost of ground improvements, are tax allowable.

[10] Bosman, para 106.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Case C-325/08 Olympique Lyonnais SASP v Olivier Bernard and Newcastle UFC, ECLI: EU: C:2010:143

[13] Ibid para 45.

[14] Pearson, G. Sporting Justifications under EU Free Movement and Competition Law: The Case of the Football ‘Transfer System’, European Law Journal, Vol. 21, No. 2, (March 2015) pp. 222.

[15] Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in CJEU case C-325/08 Olympique Lyonnais SASP v Olivier Bernard and Newcastle UFC, para 46.

[16] Ibid para 47.

[17] Opinion of Advocate General Lenz CJEU case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Socie´te´s de Football Association and others v. Bosman and others, para 239.

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Asser International Sports Law Blog | Overdue payables in action: Reviewing two years of FIFA jurisprudence on the 12bis procedure – Part 2. By Frans M. de Weger and Frank John Vrolijk.

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

Overdue payables in action: Reviewing two years of FIFA jurisprudence on the 12bis procedure – Part 2. By Frans M. de Weger and Frank John Vrolijk.

Editor's Note: Frans M. de Weger is legal counsel for the Federation of Dutch Professional Football Clubs (FBO) and CAS arbitrator. De Weger is author of the book “The Jurisprudence of the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber”, 2nd edition, published by T.M.C. Asser Press in 2016. Frank John Vrolijk specialises in Sports, Labour and Company Law and is a former legal trainee of FBO and DRC Database.

This second blog will focus specifically on the sanctions available for FIFA under Article 12bis. It will provide explanatory guidelines covering the sanctions imposed during the period surveyed.


Introduction

The possibility to impose sanctions under article 12bis constitutes one of the pillars of the 12bis procedure. Pursuant to Article 12bis of the RSTP, edition 2016, the DRC and the PSC may impose a sanction on a club if the club is found to have delayed a due payment for more than 30 days without a prima facie contractual basis[1] and the creditor have put the debtor club in default in writing, granting a deadline of at least 10 days.[2] The jurisprudence in relation to Article 12bis also shows that sanctions are imposed ex officio by the DRC or the PSC and not per request of the claimant.

If the basic conditions for the application of Article 12bis are fulfilled, said provision provides for the following sanctions that may be imposed on the defaulting club:

1.    a warning;

2.    a reprimand;

3.    a fine; or

4.    a ban from registering any new players, either nationally or internationally, for one or two entire and consecutive registration periods (hereinafter: “the registration ban”).[3]

Based on the wording of Article 12bis, i.e. the use of the word ‘may’, it is left to the discretionary power of the DRC and the PSC to decide whether or not to impose a sanction on the debtor club.[4] However, this discretionary power has never been used in favour of a defendant in all the published DRC or PSC decisions under review. In other words, a sanction, going from a warning to a transfer ban of two entire and consecutive periods, was imposed in all decisions. Despite the fact that it follows from Article 12bis(4) that sanctions may apply cumulatively, this option was only used once.[5] It seems that it will come into play only if the debtor club did not comply with its obligations on multiple occasions and only after the maximum sanction of a transfer ban of two entire and consecutive periods has been imposed on the debtor club. The discretionary power under Article 12bis is different from the sanction of a transfer ban as laid down in Article 17(4) of the RSTP. The latter article states that the competent body ‘shall’ sanction, as opposed to Article 12bis, which states that the competent body ‘may’ sanction.[6]


 The Warning

Out of the 99 published 12bis decisions of the DRC, 17 warnings have been imposed. Additionally, seven warnings have been imposed out of the 38 published 12bis decisions before the PSC. As follows from the jurisprudence of FIFA,[7] (only) a warning will be given by the FIFA committees in the event two conditions are cumulatively met:

1.             the club (duly) replied to the claim; and

2.             it is not a repeated offence.

It is however important to note that the height of the outstanding amount of overdue payables is not correlated with the imposition of a warning. The outstanding overdue payables in the 24 proceedings ending with a warning range from an overdue payable of 3,468 Euros (hereinafter: “EUR”) in two decisions of the DRC,[8] up to an amount of EUR 1,000,000 in a PSC decision.[9]

The jurisprudence also points out that the debtor club must reply to the claim in order to contain the possible sanction to a warning. Although several decisions refer to the fact that the club should have “duly replied to the claim”,[10] other decisions do not mention “duly” and these consider it enough that the club only “replied to the claim”.[11] Despite this difference in terminology, we conclude that almost any form of reply provided by the debtor club will be considered sufficient. In fact, no distinctive value is ascribed to the word “duly”.

The respondents gave divergent reasons for their non-compliances. One club contested the applicability of Article 12bis,[12] other clubs stated to have administrative difficulties[13] or financial difficulties,[14] whereas others claimed that they were communicating with the player’s agent to settle the matter amicably.[15] Apart from the claim related to the applicability of Article 12bis, which was rejected because the claimant lodged his claim after the entry into force of Article 12bis RSTP,[16] all the arguments raised were not considered valid reasons for non-payment of the outstanding monies. Although the jurisprudence does not give an exact answer to the question what would be considered “a prima facie contractual basis”, it can be concluded that the aforementioned circumstances did not fulfil these criteria.

Notwithstanding the above, the condition of having “(duly) replied to the claim” has recently been tackled by the DRC. In its decision of 23 May 2016, the respondent replied to the claim per e-mail.[17] The DRC considered this reply not to be sufficient to fulfil the standards of “(duly) replied to the claim” because “the Respondent only replied to the claim by e-mail and e-mail petitions shall have no legal effect in accordance with art. 16 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules.” In other words, the respondent should have replied by fax or ordinary mail.

Additionally and in line with the above, the DRC or the PSC has only imposed a warning when there was no repeated offence. In other words, the respondent in a 12bis procedure must actually be considered as a “first offender” in order to (only) get a warning. From the 24 decisions in which a warning has been imposed, there is only one not fulfilling the abovementioned two conditions.[18] In this (PSC) decision, the respondent party did not reply to the claim. However, during the course of the proceedings the respondent made a partial payment to the claimant.[19] Therefore, the PSC decided to impose a warning on the respondent, irrespective of the absence of a reply. In light of this decision, it must be kept in mind that making a partial payment during the course of the 12bis proceedings might alleviate the duty to ‘reply to the claim’.


 The Reprimand

Only two of the decisions published by FIFA contain a reprimand.[20] One decision was issued by the DRC,[21] the other one by the PSC.[22]

In the DRC decision, overdue payables of EUR 40,000 were due to the claimant based on a termination agreement.[23] In its reply to the claim, the respondent admitted that it had to pay compensation to the claimant, but only until he would have found a new club. The respondent considered that, since the claimant found a new club immediately after the agreed termination, no compensation was due.[24] Notwithstanding this, the DRC judge considered that there was no documentary evidence with regard to the argument of the respondent. Therefore, the DRC judge considered that the respondent had delayed a due payment for more than 30 days without a prima facie contractual basis. Based on the foregoing paragraph and the fact that the respondent replied to the claim, one would think that a sanction in the form of a warning should be imposed on the respondent. However, the DRC highlighted that the DRC judge had already imposed a warning on the respondent previously. Thus, it referred to Article 12bis(6), which establishes that “a repeated offence will be considered as an aggravating circumstance and lead to more severe penalty”.[25] Therefore, a reprimand was imposed.[26] In a similar decision of 26 May 2016, the PSC also imposed a reprimand.[27]

In conclusion, one could say that a reprimand is considered as a severe sanction and thus will not be imposed on a first offender. Although there have only been two (published) decisions of FIFA wherein a reprimand was actually imposed, one can expect that a reprimand will be imposed on a repeated offender who replied to the claim in his first and second 12bis procedure. The crucial advice that can be derived from the above analysis is that a respondent club should always reply in a 12bis procedure, because the warning and reprimand do not bring any financial or sportive consequences with it, contrary to the fine and the registration ban, which will be discussed hereunder.


The Fine
Introduction 

The only sanction that leads to direct financial consequences is the fine. The fine is a sanction that can be imposed in a 12bis procedure and needs to be paid by the debtor club to FIFA. As opposed to the warning and the reprimand, the jurisprudence shows that a fine will be imposed in the event that the respondent did not reply to the claim.

66 out of the 99 DRC and 29 out of the 38 PSC decisions involved a fine. After analysing the jurisprudence, we conclude that it is necessary to distinguish between a fine in a DRC procedure and a PSC procedure. In fact, the amount of the outstanding overdue payables differs considerably in both procedures.[28] Additionally, the level of the corresponding fines in DRC procedures compared to the PSC procedures are different.[29] The amounts of overdue payables in a 12bis procedure before the PSC are structurally higher than the amounts in a 12bis procedure before the DRC, while the amount of the fine is not structurally higher in a PSC procedure. Due to these differences between the DRC and the PSC, we decided to discuss the use of fines in the DRC and PSC procedures separately. Our aim was to determine how the judges define the level of the fine in a 12bis procedure. To do so, we use the so-called “category method”, which will be explained below.

Fines imposed by the DRC 

After analysing the decisions of FIFA in which fines were imposed, it seems that they do not correspond to a percentage of the outstanding overdue payables.[30] Instead, the level of a fine can be determined by means of several categories of fines. At least four general conclusions can be derived from the jurisprudence regarding the level of the fine for a defaulting club. 

Firstly, the level of the fine imposed by the DRC increases when the overdue payable is higher. Secondly, there are three categories of fines: i) a fine for the club which did not reply to the claim and is considered to be a first offender (First Category Offence);[31] ii) a fine for a club which did not reply to the claim and has been found by the DRC to have neglected its contractual obligations in the recent past (not being a 12bis procedure) (Second Category Offence) ;[32] and iii) a fine for a club which did not reply to the claim and has been sanctioned in a 12bis procedure previously (Third Category Offence).[33] Thirdly, the fine for a respondent club in a Second Category Offence is double the size of the fine for a respondent club in a First Category Offence.[34] Finally, the fine in a Third Category Offence is three times the size of the given fine in a First Category Offence.[35]

Based on our comprehensive study, we can conclude that the DRC determines the level of the fine by taking into consideration the above-mentioned three categories (First, Second and Third Category Offence) subject to an approximate range in relation to the outstanding amount due. Although the ranges are very hard to define with only 66 published DRC decisions yet, the below table sheds some light and provides for eight standard situations referring to various ranges of overdue payables: 

Situation

Range overdue payables  (in $/€)

Height of the fine (in CHF)

 

Situation 1

 

0,01 – 11,000

First Category  Offence: 1,000

Second Category  Offence: 2,000

Third Category  Offence: 3,000

 

Situation 2

 

11,001 – 20,000[36]

First Category  Offence: 2,000

Second Category  Offence: 4,000

Third Category  Offence: 6,000

 

Situation 3

 

20,001 – 50,000

First Category  Offence: 5,000

Second Category Offence: 10,000

Third Category Offence: 15,000

 

Situation 4

 

50,001 – 75,000

First Category Offence: 7,500

Second Category Offence: 15,000

Third Category Offence: 22,500

 

Situation 5

 

75,001 – 100,000

First Category Offence: 10,000

Second Category Offence: 20,000

Third Category Offence: 30,000

 

Situation 6

 

100,001 – 150,000

First Category Offence: 15,000

Second Category Offence: 30,000

Third Category Offence: 45,000

 

Situation 7

 

150,000 > at least 350,000

First Category Offence: 20,000

Second Category Offence: 40,000

Third Category Offence: 60,000

 

Situation 8

 

950,000[37] and higher

First Category Offence: 30,000

Second Category Offence: 60,000

Third Category Offence: 90,000

Figure 2[38]


Fines imposed by the PSC 

With regard to the PSC decisions, the authors tried to use the same method as for the DRC procedures. At first sight, it looks as if the PSC and the DRC use the same ranges for fines. However, the PSC decisions seem more arbitrary. It is therefore more difficult to draw definitive conclusions in relation to the PSC 12bis decisions. For example, in the decision of 12 October 2015, decided by a PSC’s Single Judge, a fine of CHF 15,000 was handed out to a first offender club with an overdue payable of EUR 1 million.[39] However, one can doubt whether this fine can be considered appropriate. In fact, a first offender club in another decision received the same fine, although with smaller overdue payables of EUR 200,000.[40] Another striking decision involves a fine of CHF 7,500 based on an overdue payable of USD 50,000.[41] In a comparable situation before the DRC, also with regard to a first offender, the club was sanctioned with a fine of CHF 5,000.[42] It is also remarkable that (only) in some cases the single judges did motivate the higher fines by mentioning the criteria for a Second- or Third Category Offence. After analysing these decisions more closely, one notices that two of the three Single Judges always mention the criteria of the Second- or Third Category Offence, while one only did it once (out of his six decisions). Because of this absence of motivation, one cannot definitely conclude whether these decisions fall into the Second- and Third Category Offence as defined in the context of the DRC’s jurisprudence. However, looking past these (minor) inconsistencies, we believe that most of the PSC decisions do fall within the ranges set out in Figure 2.[43] Additionally, one starts to see emerging an additional category, which is the fine of CHF 25,000. Figure 3 provides an overview of the height of the fines in relation to the various overdue payables in PSC proceedings.

 

Situation

Range overdue payable ($/€)

Height of the fine (in CHF)

 

Situation 1

 

0,01 – 11,000

First Category Offence: 1,000

Second Category Offence: 2,000

Third Category Offence: 3,000

 

Situation 2

 

11,000 – 20,000[44]

First Category Offence: 2,000

Second Category Offence: 4,000

Third Category Offence: 6,000

 

Situation 3

 

20,000 – 50,000

First Category Offence: 5,000

Second Category Offence: 10,000

Third Category Offence: 15,000

 

Situation 4

 

50,000 – 75,000

First Category Offence: 7,500

Second Category Offence: 15,000

Third Category Offence: 22,500

 

Situation 5

 

75,000 – 100,000

First Category Offence: 10,000

Second Category Offence: 20,000

Third Category Offence: 30,000

 

Situation 6

 

100,000 – 250,000[45]

First Category Offence: 15,000

Second Category Offence: 30,000

Third Category Offence: 45,000

 

Situation 7

 

250,000 – 500,000[46]

 

First Category Offence: 20,000

Second Category Offence: 40,000

Third Category Offence: 60,000

 

Situation 8

 

500,000 – 750,000[47]

First Category Offence: 25,000

Second Category Offence: 50,000

Third Category Offence: 75,000

 

Situation 9

 

750,000 and higher[48]

First Category Offence: 30,000

Second Category Offence: 60,000

Third Category Offence: 90,000

Figure 3


Transfer Ban

The toughest sanction that can be imposed by the DRC or the PSC in a 12bis procedure is the ban from registering any new players, either nationally or internationally, for one or two entire and consecutive registration periods. Contrary to the transfer ban enshrined in Article 17(4) of the RSTP, in a 12bis procedure a club can be banned from registering new players for the next one or two registration periods. This ban will be imposed if the amount due to the claimant is not paid by the respondent within 30 days as from the date of notification of an Article 12bis decision.[49]

Out of the 137 published 12bis decisions, 16 decisions (15 from the DRC, 1 from the PSC) indicated that a ban will be imposed if the amount due to the respective claimant is not paid by the respondent within 30 days as from the date of notification of the decision. Moreover, 13 decisions refer to a ban for one entire registration period. In three decisions the DRC decided to threaten a ban for the next entire two registration periods. 

What is striking is that in all decisions the respondents did not only not reply to the claim (or only after the investigation phase was closed which is equivalent to not replying)[50], but more importantly the respondents were found to have breached their financial obligations several times before. Either, the defaulting clubs were found to have delayed several outstanding payments for more than 30 days, or the respondent had (also) been found by the DRC as well as the DRC judge responsible for not complying with its financial obligations on various other recent occasions. We also encountered cases in which both conditions were met.[51]

Another striking element of the decisions in 12bis procedures is that the amount due is not deemed relevant to justify the imposition of a registration ban on the debtor club. In fact, a registration ban has been imposed with regard to an overdue payable of EUR 7,500,[52] but also regarding an overdue payable of EUR 250,000.[53]  

It seems that a ban for one entire period will be imposed in two situations:

1) the debtor club has been found by the DRC or the PSC to have delayed a due payment for more than 30 days without a prima facie contractual basis once, as a result of which a fine was imposed, and the debtor club has been found by the DRC to be responsible for not complying with its financial obligations towards players on various occasions in the recent past;[54] or

2) the debtor club has been found by the DRC or the PSC to have delayed a due payment for more than 30 days without a prima facie contractual basis twice, as a result of which a fine was imposed in at least one of the decisions.[55]

Put differently: the jurisprudence of the DRC and the PSC clearly shows a debtor club systematically receiving a registration ban for one entire period if the club had neglected its financial obligation towards players in more than one earlier decision by the DRC or the PSC, and if in these proceedings the respondent failed to reply to the claim and therefore received a fine from FIFA. What remains not entirely clear is what the DRC and PSC exactly mean by “various occasions in the recent past”. This could also refer to convictions in employment-related matters prior to the introduction of the 12bis procedure on 1 April 2015.

In the only PSC decision wherein a registration ban for one entire period was imposed, the debtor club had only once been found by the PSC to have delayed a due payment for more than 30 days without a prima facie contractual basis, as a result of which a fine was imposed.[56] The decision of the PSC did not mention that the respondent was responsible for not complying with its financial obligations towards players on various occasions in the recent past. This might suggest a differing interpretation between the DRC and the PSC.

The two years of jurisprudence further show that a registration ban for two entire and consecutive periods will be imposed when the debtor club has been found by the DRC or the PSC to have delayed a due payment for more than 30 days without a prima facie contractual basis twice, as a result of which fines (or even a registration ban of 1 period)[57] has been imposed and the debtor club has been found by the DRC to be responsible for not complying with its financial obligations towards players on various occasions in the recent past.[58]


Final Remarks 

The 12bis procedure can be considered as a powerful instrument for swift dispute resolution, which could be of great benefit to players and clubs. FIFA has put in place a fast track procedure and a strong enforcement system with respect to overdue payables by defaulting clubs towards players and clubs. So far, FIFA has contributed to the resolution of international disputes in 12bis procedures in a very efficient manner leading to a shortened timeframe for decisions, with an average duration of approximately two months.

The sanctioning power of FIFA is one of the fundamental strengths of the 12bis procedure. In all the 137 published decisions of the DRC and the PSC, a sanction was imposed on the defaulting clubs, varying from a warning to a registration ban. 

From the FIFA decisions, in which fines were imposed on defaulting clubs, it can also be derived that the level of the fine is determined by taking into consideration the earlier-mentioned three categories of wrongdoings (First, Second and Third Category Offence), subject to an approximate range in relation to the outstanding amount due. However, the 12bis decisions of the DRC so far are more systematic and predictable than the PSC’s. Finally, the heaviest sanction, the transfer ban, will only be imposed in case the defaulting club not only did not reply to the claims, but also breached its financial obligations several times in the past. Fortunately, FIFA does not shy away from using sanctions, but only clubs that went too far will face the more severe ones.

Although the conclusions drawn by the authors can help practitioners confronted to 12bis procedures, they are based only on the published jurisprudence between 1 April 2015 and 1 April 2017. It must be taken into account that FIFA committees might change their interpretation and implementation practice regarding the 12bis procedure in the future. However, the jurisprudence of FIFA committees reviewed and analysed in this article can at least shed some light on the functioning of FIFA’s 12bis procedure, and in particular on its effective sanctioning regime, over the last two years.


[1] Art. 12bis(2) RSTP, edition 2016.

[2] Art. 12bis(3) RSTP, edition 2016.

[3] Art. 12bis(4) RSTP, edition 2016.

[4] Art. 12bis(2) RSTP and Art. 12bis(4) RSTP, edition 2016.

[5] DRC 14 November 2016, no. op11161545-E. For a more detailed analysis of DRC decisions, the authors make reference to this more extensive ISLJ article.

[6] Although it follows however from a literal interpretation of Art. 17(4) RSTP that it is a duty of the competent body to impose sporting sanctions whenever a club is found to have breached an employment contract during the protected period, according to the CAS there is a well-accepted and consistent practice of the FIFA DRC not to apply automatically a sanction but to leave it to its free discretion to evaluate the particular and specific circumstances on a case by case basis. See CAS 2014/A/3765 Club X. v. D. & FIFA, award of 5 June 2015.

[7] See inter alia DRC 16 February 2016, no. op02161765.

[8] DRC 28 January 2016, no. op1501703 and DRC 28 January 2016, no. op01161539.

[9] See PSC 7 May 2015, no. op0515353. Even EUR 50,000 higher in PSC 2 June 2016, no. op0616540. The highest outstanding payable in a DRC decision is EUR 950,000. See DRC 11 September 2015, no. 09151030.

[10] See inter alia DRC 28 January 2016, no. op01161539.

[11] See inter alia DRC 13 January 2016, no. op0116826.

[12] DRC 15 October 2015, no. op1015914. See also CAS 2015/A/4153 Al-Gharafa SC v. Nicolas Fedor & FIFA, award of 9 May 2016 and CAS 2016/A/4387 Delfino Pescara 1936 v. Royal Standard Liège & FIFA, award of 8 July 2016. 

[13] PSC 9 July 2015, no. op0715599 and PSC 7 May 2015, no. op0515353.

[14] DRC 13 January 2016, no. op0116826, DRC 25 April 2016, no. op0416115, DRC 7 July 2016, no. op0716778, PSC 2 June 2016, no. op0616540 and PSC 13 September 2016, no. op09161090.

[15] DRC 16 February 2016, no. op02161765 and DRC 15 March 2016, no. op0316303.

[16] Also confirmed in CAS 2016/A/4387 Delfino Pescara 1936 v. Royal Standard Liège & FIFA, award of 8 July 2016.

[17] DRC 23 May 2016, no. op0516571. The DRC can be quite sceptical towards information that is contained in emails. See inter alia DRC 31 July 2013, no. 07133206.

[18] PSC 3 June 2015, no. op0615400.

[19] For a more detailed analysis of the DRC decision, see our pending ISLJ article.

[20] However, some decisions – wherein a heavy sanction such as a transfer ban was issued – refer to an earlier conviction of the debtor club wherein a reprimand was given. See inter alia DRC 26 October 2016, no. op10160931-E.

[21] See DRC 26 November 2015, no. op11151356.

[22] See PSC 26 May 2016, no. op05160482.

[23] DRC 26 November 2015, no. op11151356.

[24] DRC 26 November 2015, no. op11151356, paras. (II) 7 and 8.

[25] DRC 26 November 2015, no. op11151356, para. (II) 17.

[26] DRC 26 November 2015, no. op11151356, para. (II) 18.

[27] For a more detailed analysis of this decision, see our pending ISLJ article.

[28] For a more detailed analysis of DRC decisions in this regard, see our pending ISLJ article.

[29] Cf. DRC 28 January 2016, no. op01161541 and PSC 12 October 2015, no. op10151035. In the DRC decision, the debtor club had an overdue payable of USD 100,807. In this case, the DRC imposed a fine of CHF 15,000. In the PSC decision, the debtor club had an overdue payable of EUR 1 million. However, the PSC imposed the same fine of CHF 15,000.

[30] For a more detailed analysis of the “percentage method”, see our pending ISLJ article.

[31] If these criteria were cumulatively met, the jurisprudence points out that a fine was given by FIFA to a club in a 12bis procedure. A First Category Offence was also given to a debtor club who responded to the claim, but was already sanctioned with a warning and reprimand in earlier 12bis procedures. In that case, the warning and the reprimand sanctions were exhausted and, thus, a fine was ordered by the DRC.

[32] See inter alia DRC 18 May 2016, no. op0516646. For a more detailed analysis of the DRC decisions, see our pending ISLJ article.

[33] See inter alia DRC 3 July 2015, no. op0715641. For a more detailed analysis of the DRC decision, t see our pending ISLJ article.

[34] For a more detailed illustration of DRC decisions, see our pending ISLJ article.

[35] Idem.

[36] This range differs from the range the authors have set in a previous article (see Global Sports Law and Taxation Reports, ‘Overview of the jurisprudence of the FIFA DRC in 12bis procedures’, March 2017). This difference is based on recently published jurisprudence: see DRC 28 February 2017, no. op02172117-E.

[37] DRC 11 September 2015, no. 09151030.

[38] For a more detailed analysis of DRC decisions, see our pending ISLJ article.

[39] PSC 12 October 2015, no. op10151035.

[40] PSC 12 October 2015, no. op10151010. Even more striking is the fact that this decision was dealt with on the same date as the aforementioned decision in footnote 61 above, by the same Single Judge. Only two weeks later, in PSC 29 October 2015, no. op10151014, the PSC imposed a fine of CHF 25,000 with regard to an overdue payable of EUR 590,000 to a first offender club.

[41] PSC 9 July 2015, no. op0715584.

[42] DRC 5 October 2015, no. op10151049.

[43] Only PSC 12 October 2015, no. op10151035 seems to be the odd one out.

[44] See footnote  58.

[45] This border is brought to 250,000, based on PSC 16 November 2015, no. op11151300, wherein a fine based on a Third Category Offence of CHF 45,000 was imposed with an overdue payable of USD 250,000, which sets the border at approximately 250,000.

[46] This border is brought to 500,000, based on PSC 25 February 2016, no. op0216170, wherein a fine of CHF 20,000 based on a First Category Offence was imposed with an overdue payable of EUR 450,093, which sets the border at approximately 500,000.

[47] This border is brought to 750,000, based on the decision PSC 29 June 2016, no. op0616676, wherein a fine of CHF 30,000 based on a First Category Offence was imposed with an overdue payable of EUR 750,000. In a decision with an overdue payable of EUR 675,000 (PSC 24 November 2015, no. op11151385), a fine of CHF 50,000 based on a Second Category Offence was given, which sets the border at approximately 750,000.

[48] At least until an overdue payable of USD 1,367,500 falls within this category; see PSC 21 August 2015, no. op0815530.

[49] See inter alia DRC 8 September 2016, no. op0916308. However, this may differ in a situation where sanctions are imposed cumulatively.

[50] See DRC 8 September 2016, no. op0916308 and DRC 15 July 2016, no. op0716703.

[51] In the context of a retroactive application of Article 12bis, as discussed in the context of the CAS award of 17 June 2016 (see CAS 2015/A/4310 Al Hilal Saudi Club v. Abdou Kader Mangane, award of 17 June 2016), it can be questioned whether the decisions of FIFA bodies prior to the date of 1 April 2015 (which per definition were decisions in ‘regular’ FIFA proceedings) can be taken into account and held against the club in default. For a more detailed analysis of this legal issue of retro-active application, see our pending ISLJ article. See also Lombardi, P., Worlds Sports Law Report, September 2016, “Article 12bis of the FIFA Regulations: 18 months on”, p. 5.

[52] DRC 26 May 2016, no. op0516585.

[53] PSC 20 June 2016, no. op0616676.

[54] See inter alia DRC 8 September 2016, no. op0916308.

[55] See inter alia DRC 27 October 2015, no. op10151248, wherein the debtor club had received a fine in both earlier decisions. In DRC 17 October 2016, no. op10161355-E, the debtor club had only received a fine in the second decision.

[56] PSC 20 June 2016, no. op0616676.

[57] DRC 29 July 2016, no. op0716699. The previous decision, wherein a transfer ban for one entire period was imposed, is also published: DRC 4 February 2016, no. op02161733.

[58] See inter alia DRC 13 September 2016, no. op09161247.

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Asser International Sports Law Blog | Overdue payables in action: Reviewing two years of FIFA jurisprudence on the 12bis procedure – Part 1. By Frans M. de Weger and Frank John Vrolijk.

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

Overdue payables in action: Reviewing two years of FIFA jurisprudence on the 12bis procedure – Part 1. By Frans M. de Weger and Frank John Vrolijk.

Editor's Note: Frans M. de Weger is legal counsel for the Federation of Dutch Professional Football Clubs (FBO) and CAS arbitrator. De Weger is author of the book “The Jurisprudence of the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber”, 2nd edition, published by T.M.C. Asser Press in 2016. Frank John Vrolijk specialises in Sports, Labour and Company Law and is a former legal trainee of FBO and DRC Database.

In this first blog, we will try to answer some questions raised in relation to the Article 12bis procedure on overdue payables based on the jurisprudence of the DRC and the PSC during the last two years: from 1 April 2015 until 1 April 2017. [1] The awards of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (hereinafter: “the CAS”) in relation to Article 12bis that are published on CAS’s website will also be brought to the reader’s attention. In the second blog, we will focus specifically on the sanctions applied by FIFA under Article 12bis. In addition, explanatory guidelines will be offered covering the sanctions imposed during the period surveyed. A more extensive version of both blogs is pending for publication with the International Sports Law Journal (ISLJ). If necessary, and for a more detailed and extensive analysis at certain points, we will make reference to this more extensive article in the ISLJ.

In 2015, FIFA announced a very significant addition to the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: “the RSTP”): the inclusion of a new provision on overdue payables by defaulting clubs towards players and other clubs. On 1 April 2015, the 2015 edition of the RSTP gave birth to a fast-track procedure to deal with overdue payables enshrined in Article 12bis (hereinafter: “the 12bis procedure”). In its Circular letter no. 1468, FIFA also strongly urged all of its member associations to make sure that their affiliated clubs were informed of this new provision immediately.

From Article 12bis, which is also laid down in the 2016 edition of the RSTP, it follows that clubs are required to comply with their financial obligations towards players and other clubs as per the terms stipulated in the contracts signed with their professional players and in the transfer agreements signed with other clubs. In accordance with Article 12bis FIFA is entitled to sanction clubs that have delayed a due payment for more than 30 days without a prima facie contractual basis.

It was a real thorn in the side of FIFA that too many clubs, on a worldwide level, did not comply with their financial contractual obligations without legitimate reasons.[2] With the introduction of this provision, it was not only FIFA’s aim to continue its process to further speed up its proceedings, but also to establish a stronger system regarding overdue payables towards players and clubs. FIFA stressed that it wanted to further improve efficiency and provide clear regulatory steps to deal with overdue payables from clubs to players and from clubs to other clubs.

As from 1 April 2015, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: “the DRC”) and the Players’ Status Committee (hereinafter: “the PSC”) are FIFA’s competent authorities to deal with claims on overdue payables in relation to Article 12bis. Both FIFA committees were given a wide scope of discretion to impose sanctions on defaulting clubs, such as fines and transfer bans. In fact, the possibility to impose sanctions is critical to support a stronger and more efficient dispute resolution system regarding overdue payables, as we will see in the second blog.

The introduction of FIFA’s 12bis procedure also gave rise to many (legal) questions. For example, are only clubs and players entitled to lodge a claim before respectively the PSC and the DRC? Or are other parties, such as coaches and national associations, also entitled to raise their claims under 12bis? Do claims for training compensation and solidarity contribution fall under 12bis? Can the 12bis procedures be considered as a real fast-track procedure? Under what circumstances can an offence be considered a repeated offence? And also, since the imposition of sanctions is key to the efficacy of the 12bis procedure, under what conditions will these sanctions be imposed? These are only a small sample of the questions that arose after the introduction of the 12bis procedure. In this first blog, we will try to answer the most important questions raised based on the jurisprudence of the DRC, PSC and CAS.


General preliminary observations

As a starting point, it must be noted that exactly 137 decisions by the DRC and the PSC regarding Article 12bis have been published by FIFA on its website between 1 April 2015 and 1 April 2017.[3] Of these 137 decisions, 99 decisions have been dealt with by the DRC, including 58 decisions issued by the DRC Single Judge. Additionally, 32 decisions were passed by a Chamber of three judges, whereas 24 of these decisions were passed by circulars and eight were passed by a decision of a sitting Chamber in Zürich, Switzerland. Only nine FIFA decisions were passed by a Chamber of five judges.   

From the 38 decisions of the PSC, 37 were issued by its Single Judge and only one[4] was issued by a Chamber of three judges via a circular. It can be noticed that in most “renouncement of right cases” (in which defaulting clubs have not replied to the claim of the claimant party), a Single Judge has dealt with the case.

Analysing the decisions, it is striking that all claimants in the 137 decisions won their cases. In other words, in none of the decisions of the DRC and the PSC it was found that a “prima facie contractual basis” existed for the respondent party, which would justify non-compliance with the original contract. A sanction was imposed in all decisions.

It can further be observed that in the great majority of the decisions, the respondent party did not reply to the claim. As we will see, the absence of a reply will generally result in more severe 12bis sanctions for the defaulting club.

The jurisprudence of FIFA also illustrates that the 12bis procedure are a step towards swifter proceedings. In the last years we have already noted a positive development with regard to the length of ‘regular’ proceedings before FIFA (not including the 12bis procedures). With regard to the 12bis procedure, FIFA stressed that it has shortened the timeframe for decisions taken on overdue payables, with decisions now being taken within eight weeks and claimants being notified of a decision within nine weeks of lodging their complete claim. After analysing the 12bis decisions of the DRC and the PSC, it is clear that FIFA actually lived up to these expectations. The average duration of a 12bis procedure is two months. It is only exceptionally that a 12bis decision lasted longer (four or ultimately five months) or even took less time (one or one and a half months).[5] As illustrated in Figure 1, approximately 67% of the PSC and the DRC procedures were concluded within eight weeks. Approximately 80% of both FIFA decisions were dealt with within 10 weeks.


Figure 1

 

The scope of Article 12bis

The two years of jurisprudence show that the personal scope of Article 12bis must be interpreted strictly. As follows from the text of Article 12bis(3), only players and clubs are entitled to lodge a claim before FIFA. Put another way, coaches, national associations and intermediaries do not have standing to sue in the 12bis procedure. This textual interpretation of the provision is confirmed by the jurisprudence of the DRC and the PSC. In fact, none of the reviewed decisions of the DRC or the PSC involved a party who was not a club or a player.

Additionally, it can be concluded that claims for training compensation or related to solidarity mechanism are also excluded from the scope of Article 12bis, as this opportunity is not provided in the provision. Moreover, the current jurisprudence does not leave room for any other interpretation. With regard to training compensation and solidarity mechanism, this means that FIFA gives to “overdue payables” a different meaning than the UEFA Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play Regulations, since outstanding amounts for training compensation and solidarity mechanism are considered by UEFA as overdue payables. The same is true for outstanding payments due by clubs to other (than player) club employees and debts by clubs to social/tax authorities; such outstanding amounts will not be considered by FIFA as ‘overdue’ under Article 12bis.

Generally, the DRC deals mainly with contracts signed by clubs with professional players. These include employment contracts but it is to be expected that separate agreements could also fall under the scope of Article 12bis as long as specific elements of that separate agreement suggest that it was in fact meant to be part of the actual employment relationship, as the DRC decided in many other cases (not being 12bis procedures). This is for example the DRC’s position with regard to image right contracts.[6] Based on the jurisprudence reviewed, it follows that termination agreements fall under the scope of Article 12bis.[7] The PSC will only deal with transfer agreements, including both transfers on a definite[8] as well as on a temporary basis[9]. It is to be expected that agreements between clubs that do not concern the status of players, their eligibility to participate in organised football, and their transfer between clubs belonging to different associations, will most likely not fall under Article 12bis.[10]

Finally, it also follows from Article 12bis(3) that the creditor (player or club) must have put the debtor club in default in writing, granting a deadline of at least 10 days to comply with its financial obligations. Regarding this 10-days deadline, FIFA follows a strict interpretation, as we will see in the following paragraph.


The existence of an ‘overdue payable’ 

As follows from the wording of Article 12bis and the corresponding jurisprudence, two prerequisites must be met to establish that an overdue payable exists under Article 12bis. First, the club must have delayed a due payment for more than 30 days without a “prima facie contractual basis”. Second, the creditor (which is the player or club) must have put the debtor club in default in writing, granting a deadline of at least 10 days to comply with its financial obligations. In all the published decisions the FIFA committees verified that a 10-days deadline had been granted. We can therefore assume that this 10-days deadline is a prerequisite for the DRC and the PSC to proceed with the claim. Although Article 12bis is not entirely clear as regards the start of the “10-days deadline”, the jurisprudence shows that it runs as soon as the 30 days have elapsed.[11]

Disputes can arise with regard to the fulfilment of the “10-days deadline”. For example, in the CAS award of 9 May 2016, the player had filed a statement of claim before the DRC on 25 March 2015 and then sent a letter to the club on 30 March 2015 (i.e. five days after filing a claim at the DRC) putting the club in default for the overdue payment. The club however argued that this was a violation of Article 12bis(3) of the RSTP, edition 2015, as it did not make any legal sense whatsoever to address a default notice to a party after lodging a claim at FIFA. The CAS however stated that it was clear that the player had already given the club ample opportunity (the player stated that it had already provided three separate notices of default) to fulfil its obligations in conformity with Article 12bis.[12] The CAS therefore found it curious that the FIFA administration still requested the player to issue yet another default notice in such a situation when it was clear that the player had already given the club many opportunities to fulfil its obligations. This part of the award is interesting. On the one hand it shows that (the) FIFA (administration) obliges creditors to send a “10-days deadline” default letter under all circumstances, while on the other hand it is to be expected that the CAS might show more flexibility. Interestingly, in a case before the PSC, the claimant club put the respondent club in default of payment, starting the 10-days deadline on the exact same date of the submission. This practice was accepted by the PSC.[13] In other words, in order to gain time, claimants might be able to lodge a claim in front of FIFA before the “10-days deadline” of Article 12bis has passed.  

To establish whether “overdue payables” exist, it is decisive that the “overdue payables” existed after 1 April 2015 (the date on which Article 12bis came into force). This is also confirmed by the CAS. In its CAS award of 17 June 2016, the Italian club Pescara referred to the fact that the agreement between Pescara and the Belgian club Standard Liège was entered into on 10 July 2012, while Article 12bis did not take effect until 1 April 2015. Pescara stated that it had no means to know that Article 12bis would be enacted nearly three years later. The Sole Arbitrator however found it decisive and stressed that the claim made by Standard Liège was made after 1 April 2015 and that Standard Liège referred clearly to the overdue payables from Pescara. At the end, all that matters, according to the CAS, was the existence of overdue payables at the assessment date and that the assessment date was after 1 April 2015.[14]

For the sake of clarity, the fact that the DRC and the PSC have decided in 12bis procedures that a defaulting club must pay to the claimant overdue payables does not touch upon the question whether the contract has been terminated with just cause. To put it bluntly, a decision in a 12bis procedure does not justify a unilateral termination based on Article 14 of the RSTP; no legal connection exists in this regard. The jurisprudence of the DRC in relation to its ‘regular’ proceedings (not being 12bis procedures) generally shows that a valid ground for unilateral termination exists only in case there is outstanding remuneration for a period of three (or sometimes two) months.[15] This means the existence of an overdue payable under Article 12bis does not automatically give the claimant the legal right to unilaterally terminate the contract with the defaulting club. It should also be noted in this regard that it follows from Article 12bis(9) that the terms of Article 12bis are without prejudice to the application of further measures derived from Article 17 RSTP in case of a unilateral termination of the contractual relationship.


In the second blog we will focus specifically on the sanctions available to FIFA under Article 12bis and will provide explanatory guidelines covering the sanctions imposed during the period surveyed.


[1] This contribution discusses the jurisprudence of the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC) and the Players’ Status Committee (PSC) as published on FIFA’s website in the period between 1 April 2015 and 1 April 2017. Decisions published after the date of 1 April 2017 (even if issued before this date) will fall outside the scope of this contribution. The awards of the CAS in  relation to Article 12bis will also be discussed in this contribution. However, only the awards as published on the website of CAS before 1 April 2017 will be discussed in this contribution. As far as we know, several cases regarding art. 12bis are currently also pending before CAS.

[2] As was also introduced in FIFA Circular no. 1468, dated 23 January 2015, the new Art. 12bis is added to the list of provisions that are binding at national level and must be included in the association’s regulations (cf. Art. 1(3)(a) of the RSTP.

[3] Dispute Resolution Chamber: http://www.fifa.com/governance/disciplinary/dispute-resolution-system.html. Accessed 1 April 2017. Players’ Status Committee: http://www.fifa.com/governance/disciplinary/dispute-resolution-system.html. Accessed 1 April 2017.

[4] PSC 20 June 2016, no. op0616676.

[5] See for the shorter procedures: inter alia DRC 18 May 2016, no. op0516646, DRC 29 February 2016, no. op0216229, DRC 15 July 2016, no. op0916308 and DRC 30 November 2015, no. 11151578. See for the longer procedures: inter alia DRC 3 June 2016, no. op0616046, DRC 7 April 2016, no. op04161633, DRC 15 October 2015, no. op1015914 and DRC 1 October 2015, no. 1015648.

[6] DRC 13 December 2013, no. 12131045 and DRC 17 January 2014, no. 114396. See also DRC 30 August 2013, no. 08133402, DRC 10 February 2015, no. 02151030 and DRC 28 March 2014, no. 03141211. See also CAS 2014/A/3579 Anorthosis Famagusta FC v. Emanuel Perrone, award of 11 May 2015.

[7] See inter alia DRC 26 November 2015, no. op11151356.

[8] See inter alia PSC 13 September 2016, no. op09161090.

[9] See inter alia PSC 11 June 2015, no. op0615618 and PSC 20 February 2017, no. op02172015.

[10] Art. 1(1) RSTP, edition 2016.

[11] Moreover, parties should be aware that the 30 days deadline will start to run only after the so-called “grace periods” has passed, which also explicitly follows from the applicable jurisprudence of FIFA. A grace period can be considered as the period immediately after the deadline for an obligation during which the amount due, or other action that would have been taken as a result of failing to meet the deadline, is waived provided that the obligation is satisfied during the grace period. See DRC 14 November 2016, no. 11161545-E. Also in “regular” DRC cases so-called “grace periods” are accepted. See inter alia DRC 6 November 2014, no. 11141064.

[12] See CAS 2015/A/4153 Al-Gharafa SC v. Nicolas Fedor & FIFA, award of 9 May 2016. From this award it follows that FIFA applied the incorrect version of the RSTP in its decision of 22 June 2015 as a result of which Art. 12bis was not applicable.

[13] PSC 30 November 2015, no. 10151052.

[14] Also in its award of 17 June 2016, another Sole Arbitrator stressed that as Art. 12bis has been implemented within the 2015 edition of the RSTP, FIFA has the power to impose a sanction listed in Art. 12bis(4) RSTP in that specific case. See CAS 2015/A/4310 Al Hilal Saudi Club v. Abdou Kader Mangane, award of 17 June 2016.

[15] See inter alia DRC 7 September 2011, no. 9111901 (two months) and DRC 11 May 2011, no. 129795 (three months). See also DRC 17 December 2015, no. 12151368. Please note that CAS will hold on to a period of three months in order to establish that a just cause exists; See inter alia CAS 2015/A/4158 Qingdao Zhongneng Football Club v. Blaz Sliskovic, award of 28 April 2016.


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Asser International Sports Law Blog | Sport and EU Competition Law: uncharted territories - (II) Mandatory player release systems with no compensation for clubs. By Ben Van Rompuy

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

Sport and EU Competition Law: uncharted territories - (II) Mandatory player release systems with no compensation for clubs. By Ben Van Rompuy

The European Commission’s competition decisions in the area of sport, which set out broad principles regarding the interface between sports-related activities and EU competition law, are widely publicized. As a result of the decentralization of EU competition law enforcement, however, enforcement activity has largely shifted to the national level. Since 2004, national competition authorities (NCAs) and national courts are empowered to fully apply the EU competition rules on anti-competitive agreements (Article 101 TFEU) and abuse of a dominant position (Article 102 TFEU).

Even though NCAs and national courts have addressed a series of interesting competition cases (notably dealing with the regulatory aspects of sport) during the last ten years, the academic literature has largely overlooked these developments. This is unfortunate since all stakeholders (sports organisations, clubs, practitioners, etc.) increasingly need to learn from pressing issues arising in national cases and enforcement decisions. In a series of blog posts we will explore these unknown territories of the application of EU competition law to sport.

In this second installment of this blog series, we discuss a recent judgment of the regional court (Landgericht) of Dortmund finding that the International Handball Federation (IHF)’s mandatory release system of players for matches of national teams without compensation infringes EU and German competition law.[1] 


Background

In 2009, the Spanish Handball League (ASOBAL) and Group Club Handball (the predecessor of the Forum Club Handball (FCH); an association representing the interest of the top European handball clubs) launched a complaint with the European Commission alleging that the rules of the IHF and EHF on the mandatory release of players were in breach of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.[2] The Commission opened a preliminary investigation. This prompted the EHF to seek an amicable solution with the complainants.

In May 2010, the EHF signed a Memorandum of Understanding with FCH, covering issues such as the terms of compensation for the release of players and the representation of clubs and other stakeholders in the bodies of the EHF:

  • The EHF agreed to pay compensation to the clubs for the release of their players to the national team. Starting from the 2010 European Championship, the EHF paid a fee of 270 EUR per player per match via the national federations to the clubs (amounting to a total compensation of 400.000 EUR, i.e. 10 percent of the profits of the 2010 European Championship).[3]

  • The EHF agreed on the principle that “each day a player spends with the national team/selection his salary should be insured by the National Federation, EHF or IHF in case of injury in favour of the clubs”.[4]

    The EHF took an important step towards more inclusive governance by creating the Professional Handball Board, a strategic platform for various stakeholders (leagues, clubs, national federations, and players). It plays an advisory role through the submission of reports and analyses to the EHF Executive Committee and contributes to the decision-making process through its chairperson (who is a full member of the Executive Committee).

Since many of the complainants’ demands were met, ASBOL and FCH withdrew their competition law complaint. Subsequently, the European Commission closed its preliminary investigation in June 2010.

The EU handball “case” is a good illustration of the remedial potential of EU competition law to strengthen good governance in sport. The mere threat of a formal investigation by the European Commission proved sufficient for the EHF to change its rules for the release of players and to establish a channel for clubs and other stakeholders to participate in its decision-making process.

In 2014, the EHF and FCH renewed the 2010 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) until June 2018. The modified MoU, which has been the subject of negotiations for more than one year, foresees increased fees for the release of players to the European Championships.

Strengthened by the satisfactory outcome reached with the EHF in 2010, the FCH made attempts to come to a similar arrangement with the IHF. Following negotiations during the course of 2010 and 2011, the IHF for the first time in history paid compensation for the release of players to the World Championship and signed insurance for player salaries for injured players. The IHF Council also proposed to integrate the clubs as stakeholders in its bylaws. The clubs, however, did not accept with the terms and conditions of the proposal and no agreement was reached. The clubs were also dissatisfied with the amount of the compensation paid by the IHF: qualification matches were not compensated and the fee only amounted in average to 10-20 percent of the monthly salary paid by the European top clubs. The prospects of reaching an agreement between the IHF and the CFH dimmed. In March 2012, the IHF made clear that it was no longer prepared to discuss a MoU with the FCH. This prompted 30 German clubs to sue the IHF and the German Handball Federation (DHB) before the regional court of Dortmund in April 2013. 


The 2014 Dortmund judgment

The IHF Player Eligibility Code provides that a club having a foreign player under contract is obliged to “release such player to his National Federation if he is called up to take part in activities of that federation's national team” (Article 7.1.2). The activities include the Olympic Games, World Championships, and continental championships as well as the qualification matches and tournaments for these events. According to Article 7.2 of the Code, a club releasing a national player “shall not have any claim to compensation”. Furthermore, the club must take out insurance coverage for the player in the event of personal injury and resulting consequences for the period for which the player has been called to his federation’s activities (Article 7.3.2). A club failing to release a player that is able to play will be penalized in accordance with the IHF Regulations Concerning Penalties and Fines and the disciplinary regulations of the Continental Confederation concerned (Article 7.4.4).

The German handball clubs, supported by the FCH, argued that the rules concerning the mandatory release of players to the national team and their application by the IHF and DHB constitute an abuse of a dominant position prohibited by Article 102 TFEU and the equivalent German competition law provision (§ 19 Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, GWB).

The regional court of Dortmund first addressed a number of procedural issues. Considering that the DHB is bound by the rules of the IHF, the court decided to join the proceedings against the IHF and DHB. Moreover, the court did not defer to the jurisdictional exclusivity claimed by the defendants. It stressed that the internal disciplinary bodies or even the Court of Arbitration could not be considered independent and impartial for the purpose of reviewing the compatibility of the mandatory player release system with competition law.[5] According to the court, neither the IHF nor the DHB regulations could prevent the clubs from seeking direct recourse to an ordinary civil court. Lastly, the court found German law to be applicable. Even though Article 7 of the IHF Player Eligibility Code affects handball clubs worldwide, its obligations also substantially affect the German market in which the claimants operate.[6] The intimate connection between the claims against the IHF and the DHB further supported the conclusion that the regional court of Dortmund was the appropriate legal venue for hearing the case.

On substance, the court found that the IHF is a monopolist on the market for the organisation of international handball events, including the World Championships and the Olympic Games (i.e. events in which national teams compete), and on a number of other separate, but closely related, commercial markets (e.g. sponsorship). Also on the markets for the organisation of European and national handball competitions, the IHF holds a dominant position (solely and together with the EHF and the national federations).[7]

Turning to the contested rule of the IHF Player Eligibility Code (Article 7), the court stressed that the obligation for clubs to release players for matches of national teams without compensation is incompatible with the civil code rule of good faith in contractual performance.[8] In any normal business, it would be unthinkable that an undertaking would provide for free a resource, its employees, to a competitor seeking to make profits from that resource.[9] At the same time, the court found that this obligation constitutes an exploitative abuse of a dominant position prohibited by § 19 GWB and Article 102 TFEU. When recruiting top foreign-raised players, clubs must take into account the costs of paying their players while they are absent and, what is more, the costs incurred if those players would get injured during an international match. As such, uncompensated player release restricts the clubs’ contractual freedom and distorts competition between the clubs.

Although Article 102 TFEU does not contain an exemption clause similar to Article 101(3) TFEU, an undertaking may escape an abuse finding by demonstrating an objective justification or efficiency defense for its conduct. The court, however, brushed aside the arguments put forward by the IHF and DHB to this end. 

First, the defendants contended that without the player release system, clubs would not be willing to release their players to national teams. The release rules would also prevent clubs from trying to weaken foreign national teams in favor of their own national team.[10] The court stressed, however, that the mandatory release of players for national teams in itself is not being contested. It also pointed to the fact that the IHF, notwithstanding Article 7.2 of the Player Eligibility Code, decided to pay compensation for the release of players to the 2011 and 2013 World Championships. This indicates that in principle a compensation would not adversely affect the sporting or other interests of the IHF. In addition, the court made numerous references to the MoU reached between the EHF and the FCH as well as to the MoU between FIFA and the European Club Association (ECA) (i.e. the deal as a result of which the Oulmers litigation was terminated, see below). These examples indeed exemplify that an uncompensated player release system cannot be considered indispensable.

Second, the defendants argued that participation in international handball events increases the exposure and thus the value of the players, which indirectly benefits the clubs.[11] Also this argument failed to convince the court. If the IHF and DHB would be able to quantify this advantage, this could be taken into consideration when determining the compensation. Yet it could not objectively justify the denial of compensation for the release of players or for their potential injuries.

In light of these observations, the court declared the conditions for the release of players to foreign national teams, embedded in Article 7.2 and 7.3.2 of the IHF Player Eligibility Code, null and void. Interestingly, the court also suggested that the IHF would introduce a cap on the number of days an association would be entitled to call up players for the national team. 


A landmark judgment in the making?

Unsurprisingly, the IHF and the DHB lodged an appeal against the judgment before the higher regional court (Oberlandesgericht) of Düsseldorf. It is not unthinkable that eventually the case will trigger a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice and emerge as the successor of the abandoned Oulmers litigation against the FIFA player release system.

The regional court of Dortmund did not expressly rely on the Wouters proportionality test, transposed in Meca-Medina, to assess whether the IHF’s player release system constituted an abuse of a dominant position. The court’s analysis is, however, largely consistent with the analysis that the Court of Justice would follow. After having established that the contested rules emanate from an undertaking that has a dominant position, the court verified whether there are less restrictive means to achieve the objectives pursued by the IHF’s mandatory player release system. It did not call into question the necessity of a mandatory player release system for the organisation of international handball competitions, but the court did conclude that the current system – which leaves clubs uncompensated – could not be objectively justified.

For at least two reasons the Dortmund judgment, while not final yet, has potential to become an important precedent for many other sports.

First and foremost, it offers the first substantive assessment of the compatibility of player release rules with EU (and national) competition law. Particularly in the event of a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice, the case could serve as a much-needed wake up call to all international sports federations that currently operate a similar system. Arguably, federations could assert that the compensation should not cover all the costs incurred by the clubs. Indirect benefits to the clubs could be discounted. Yet it appears undeniable that the imposition of the burden on clubs to supply players without allowing them a fair share of the resulting benefits constitutes an abuse prohibited by Article 102 TFEU.

Second, even though sports federations usually have practical monopolies in a given sport, the remedial potential of Article 102 TFEU to tackle abusive conduct remains underexplored. This case, and even the earlier competition law complaint lodged against the EHF, reveals that it offers a powerful instrument to steer sports federations into the direction of better governance. Eventually the IHF will have to follow the path that others (e.g. EHF, FIFA) have traveled. After all, the determination of a fair compensation for player release necessitates a consensual strategy that balances the needs of stakeholders, in this case the clubs, with the needs of the federation.


We continue to follow this case closely, so stay tuned.



[1] Landgericht Dortmund, Urteil vom 14.05.2014, 8 O 46/13.

[2] Cases COMP/39659 ASOBAL v handball federations and COMP/39669 Group Club Handball v handball federations.

[3] Forum Club Handball, EHF pays compensation to the clubs, 28 February 2010.

[4] Forum Club Handball, Insurance of player salaries in case of injury, 15 June 2010.

[5] Landgericht Dortmund, Urteil vom 14.05.2014, 8 O 46/13, paras. 104-114.

[6] Idem, para. 118.

[7] Idem, paras. 121-122.

[8] German Civil Code, Section 242 (An obligor has a duty to perform according to the requirements of good faith, taking customary practice into consideration”).

[9] Landgericht Dortmund, Urteil vom 14.05.2014, 8 O 46/13, para. 129.

[10] Idem, para. 130.

[11] Idem, para. 132.

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