On October 24^th and 25^th 2019, the T.M.C. Asser Institute and the International Sports Law Centre hosted the International Sports Law Journal (ISLJ) Conference for a third year in a row, bringing together a group of academics and practitioners from around the world. This year’s conference celebrated the 20^th year of the International Sports Law Journal, which was originally started by Robert Siekmann. Over the past 20 years, the ISLJ has aimed to be a truly international journal that addresses global topics in sports law while keeping the highest academic standards.

With this background, the conference facilitated discussions and exchanges over six differently themed panels on international sports law’s most pertinent issues and gave participants wide opportunities to engage with one another. Additionally, this year’s edition also had the great honor of hosting two distinguished keynote speakers, Moya Dodd and Ulrich Haas, who were able to share their wealth of experience and knowledge with the conference participants.

The following report aims to give an overview of the ISLJ Conference 2019 to extract and underline the fundamental ideas raised by the different speakers.

Day 1:

Opening Speech: Moya Dodd

The conference was kickstarted by Moya Dodd, a former FIFA Council member and current ICAS member, who gave an engaging presentation on her experiences as an athlete in boardrooms of FIFA. After retiring from the Australian National Team, she began to become involved in sport governance, starting as a member of the AFC Executive Committee. She eventually made her way to the FIFA Executive Committee where she made it a priority to represent groups who did not have a voice in FIFA’s governance. In this vain, she launched a task force for women, which helped spearhead reforms that brought gender issues into light. Ms. Dodd also explained how she worked hard to keep connections with persons outside of the sports governing structures in order to represent them from the inside. In the end, she explained how the experience playing sports helped develop skills that became invaluable in the boardroom. This includes, teamwork skills, constantly striving to improve oneself, valuing persons for their capabilities, and the ability to deal with setbacks. This discussion led particularly well into the first panel of the conference, which took a magnifying glass to the role of athletes in sports governance.

Panel 1: Where is the athletes’ voice? The (il)legitimacy of international sports governing bodies

Antoine Duval and Marjolaine Viret began the first panel of the conference by exploring the athletes’ voice in the fight against doping and particularly within WADA. They explained that in order for the World Anti-Doping Code (WADC) and WADA to be considered legitimate, the actors most affected by its policies, athletes, would need to be participating meaningfully and have a real input in the decision-making process. This input requires an actual reflection in the regulatory output of WADA, and it entails not only consulting with athlete stakeholders but that representatives have voting powers on both the code revision process and the administrative bodies of WADA. Their study examines to what extent the current operation of WADA is in line with these ideals by examining the role of athletes in WADA’s bodies and its actual regulatory output.

Mark Conrad studied the issue from a wider lens by explaining how the current representation of athletes in sports governing bodies is inadequate and why there needs to be a fundamental rethinking of the current athlete committee model. This model, he explains, is ineffective in truly representing athletes’ interests, since their mandates are not clearly defined and greatly rely on the good favor of the federations’ management. As an alternative model, he presented a collective bargaining approach, which already is widespread in North America, in which athlete unions would represent athletes’ interests in a bargaining process with the sports governing bodies. Such a model would give the athletes ‘real’ representation by relying on their strength in numbers and by negotiating agreements that would entitle them to specific rights. These agreements could cover salary standards, salary controls, free agency, drug testing and many other aspects of the employment relationship. He concluded by discussing the general pros and cons of such a model but that overall, since athletes would actually have an effective representation, it would overcome any of the negative effects of such a model.

Panel 2: Criminal law and sports – criminal law of sports

The day’s conversation then shifted from sports governance structures to the application of criminal law in sports. Björn Hessert kicked off the panel with a presentation on the cooperation and reporting obligations in sport investigations. He began by illustrating the catch-22 situation in which athletes may find themselves during an investigation. On the one hand, they are required to ‘cooperate fully’ with the investigation authorities, including providing self-incriminating evidence, or face sanctions. If they choose not to cooperate, then they also receive sanctions. This state of affairs may have had a direct impact on the skyrocketing number of sanctions over the past few years involving reporting and cooperation violations. Hessert argued that this situation could be significantly improved by introducing fundamental procedural rights found in criminal law systems to these investigations, such as the right to remain silent and the privilege against self-incrimination. These rights are found in article 6 (1) and (2) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Such a regime would force sports governing bodies to be creative in finding new strategies to investigate and prosecute alleged sports rule violations.

After Hessert’s presentation on procedural rights in sports investigations, Jan Exner took the podium to discuss the proportionality of the sanctions in the anti-doping code. He began by giving an overview of the characteristics of the sanctions in the WADC, which include a fixed sanction framework and limited flexibility for panels hearing alleged doping rule violations. He explained that due to the rigid sanction framework of the WADC, panels hearing a doping dispute are unable to go below limits set therein and that in certain exceptional cases, these sanctions may be disproportionate. Exner then illustrated some of the negative effects of the current system in which CAS panels hearing similar factual circumstances end up with delivering different sanctions. Such a predicament, Exner argues, goes against any equality of outcome of the proceedings. In the end, he contended that there should be a revised sanction framework that would allow hearing panels to go below the limits set in the WADC as long as certain criteria are met in order to ensure that the sanction is proportionate to the rule violation.

Ruby Panchal closed the panel by shining a light on match-fixing. She argued that sports governing bodies have been so concerned with doping that match fixing has not been sufficiently addressed. Much like how anti-doping rules have been significantly developed over time, anti-match-fixing laws also need to be made far more robust. Panchal explained that certain factors essential for the development of lex sportiva will be essential in the growth of this field. These factors include the validity of unilateral action clauses, a growing relationship between sports governing bodies and state courts, the creation of evidentiary processes in disciplinary proceedings, and co-operation between sports governing bodies and investigative authorities. Panchal closed her talk by examining the approach of the Convention on the Manipulation of Sports Competitions (Macolin Convention) in addressing this regulatory void. While the Convention takes a ‘hopeful approach’, the question remains open as to how effective it will be in combatting match-fixing.

Panel 3: Transfer systems in international sports

The last panel of day one of the conference took a deep dive into transfer systems in international sports. Jan Łukomski opened the panel by studying the finalization of international football transfers and professional football players’ contracts. There are many kinds of agreements that could be potentially involved in the transfer of a football player, including offers, pre-contracts, definite contracts, that have significantly different legal effects. For example, the CAS explained in CAS 2008/A/1589 MKE Ankaragücü Spor Külübü v. J. that the difference between a pre-contract and a contract ‘is that the parties to the ‘precontract’ have not agreed on the essential elements of the contract or at least the “precontract” does not reflect the final agreement’. This is just one example of a growing CAS case law on issues of contractual validity of football contracts. In the end, Łukomski explains that often times disputes on contractual validity stems from ‘mistakes’ that were made by clubs and players during the negotiation process.

Following the examination of the transfer system in football, Xavier Mansat gave the participants a small peek into the archaic transfer model currently in place in volleyball. He took the audience on a journey of the transfer of one volleyball player by emphasizing all the different steps and actors participating in the process. Mansat also elucidated the various administrative and transfer fees that are taken out at every step by the involved actors. He closed the panel by explaining that the current system is in the process of being challenged by a new stakeholder group, Association des Clubs Professionels de Volleyball (ACPV) and that it is likely that some of the components in the current transfer framework are incompliant with EU law.

Day one ended with an opportunity for the conference participants to unwind over a dinner in the charming harbor of Scheveningen.

Day 2:

Keynote lecture: Ulrich Haas

Day two of the ISLJ Conference was launched by a lecture from Ulrich Haas, who gave an in-depth lecture on the nature and function of association tribunals in international sport. Haas underlined that while association tribunals are the most important dispute resolution mechanism in practice, legal literature on them is scarce. The sheer volume of the decisions made by association tribunals is staggering. In the case of FIFA, the decisions are around 10000-11000 per year. After having demonstrated the incredible importance of association tribunals to the functioning of sports governance, he outlined their legal basis, which is based in the freedom of association (in Switzerland and Germany). Austria, on the other hand, makes association tribunals mandatory. Haas then began to unpack the differences between authoritarian decision-making, used by association tribunals, compared to other forms of alternative dispute resolution, such as mediation, conciliation, and arbitration. Interestingly, he concluded that while all these differences can serve as indications of whether a body is an association tribunal or an arbitration panel, there is no set international standard to make this determination. Hence, there is a need to refer to national law in order to fill this void. In conclusion, Haas endorsed a procedural law approach over a substantive law approach to determine the appeals status of an association body’s decision.

Panel 4: Rethinking sports arbitration

The first panel of day two of the ISLJ Conference took to rethinking the current framework of sports arbitration. Veronica Lavista was first to go and presented her findings on the influence of international dispute settlement on sports. She took an empirical approach to her study by going through CAS’ case law and placing the arbitrators in those cases into different categories based on their background, such as a sports law, corporate law, or international law specialist. Based on this determination, Lavista was then able to identify that the makeup of the panel had an appreciable influence on the extent certain legal issues were discussed in the award. Lavista also underlined some of the overlaps between international dispute resolution and the CAS, including the voluntary nature of their jurisdiction, the use of ad hoc panels, and the explosion of case law over the past few decades.

Next up, Daniela Mirante and Artur Flaminio da Silva offered a case study in the Portuguese context of sports arbitration to argue that perhaps switching to a mandatory arbitration scheme would alleviate many of the issues currently present in the ‘voluntary’ arbitration model. Portugal created a permanent sport arbitration center in the Portuguese Court of Arbitration for Sport (TAD), which has a mandatory jurisdiction for ‘all sports disputes related to administrative law’. After underlining many of the issues plaguing the TAD, such as institutional independence and arbitrators’ impartiality, the confidentiality of the awards, and the high costs of arbitration, they explained the advantages of mandatory sports arbitration. First, it would get rid of the concept of consent, which they argue is a fiction since athletes must consent to arbitration or else not be able to participate in the sport. It would also reduce the time needed to render a decision since there would be less room for parties to challenge the jurisdiction of arbitration panels. They concluded that mandatory arbitration definitely could be a future path for sports arbitration but that it would have to follow a different path than the current Portuguese model.

To close the panel, Massimiliano Trovato brought forth his three ‘radical’ proposals to ensure the legitimacy of the CAS. Before unveiling the three proposals, Trovato gave a brief historical overview of the CAS and its relationship with the Olympic Movement to contextualize his arguments. He highlighted the interactions between the two and how certain individuals have held top positions in the CAS bodies and other sports governing bodies, like the IOC, leading to potential conflicts of interest. At this point, Trovato revealed his first proposal that article S4 and S6 of the CAS Statutes be amended to make the ICAS into a body ran by the arbitrators themselves, since they have both the ability and expertise to run the CAS for the interests of all the parties involved. Second, Trovato argued that the closed-list system of arbitrators be abolished under article S14 and move towards an open system. The quality of the arbitrators, Trovato explained, could still be assured by introducing certain minimum eligibility requirements for the arbitrators. The third proposal Trovato presented was that Article R65 be altered to make sports governing bodies responsible for the costs of arbitration, not the parties.  Shifting the burden would make sports governing bodies more disciplined and would help compensate for the fact that athletes are essentially forced into arbitration.

Book L(a)unch: The Court of Arbitration for Sport and its Jurisprudence: An Empirical Inquiry Into Lex Sportiva by Johan Lindholm

During lunchtime, the conference participants were treated to a very special book launch from the ISLJ’s chief editor, Johan Lindholm. His book, The Court of Arbitration for Sport and its Jurisprudence: An Empirical Inquiry Into Lex Sportiva, is an exhaustive and thorough empirical study into the CAS’ jurisprudence, its arbitrators, and its parties. Covering a period of 30 years (1984-2014), the book tries to unpack some of the most often raised arguments against the CAS and puts these claims to the ultimate test. For example, whether particular arbitrators are more likely to be chosen by certain parties. Furthermore, the book, through impressive data visualization graphics, illustrates a variety of intriguing data samples, including what kind of cases the CAS has deliberated and to what extent the CAS can call itself a global international sports tribunal.

Panel 5: Revisiting the (in)dependence and transparency of the CAS

Following the book l(a)unch, the next panel treated conference participants to a fascinating debate on the (in)dependence and transparency of the CAS. Velislava Hristova launched the panel by exploring the intersection between human rights and sports arbitration and in particular, the right to a public hearing in sport cases. She used the ECtHR case of Mutu and Pechstein v. Switzerland to illustrate the topic. Before jumping into the legal issues, Hristova gave an overview of the nearly 10-year legal history of the Pechstein Saga. She explained that the case boiled down to four main issues: whether Article 6 (1) ECHR (right to a fair and public hearing) could be applicable to sports arbitration, whether Pechstein waived this right, whether the CAS is sufficiently independent and impartial, and whether the lack of a public hearing in this case actually violated Article 6 (1). Next, Hristova analyzed the findings of the ECtHR on these four issues and explained how the ECtHR concluded that while the right to a public hearing is not absolute, the lack of a public hearing in Pechstein’s case was a violation because of the compulsory nature of sports arbitration, the fact that a public hearing was requested, the ‘nature and complexity’ of the case, and since the factual background had been contested. In the end, athletes, arbitrators and the CAS will have to take this landmark ruling into account moving forward.

Antonio Rigozzi further delved into the issue of the (in)dependence of the CAS by not only looking at the Pechstein case but also the Swiss Federal Tribunal’s (SFT) decision in the Seraing case and how these rulings could potentially impact the CAS. Concerning the Seraing case, he explained how the SFT had to determine whether the CAS is structurally independent, which differs from the Lazutina case because the SFT had to determine whether it was independent from FIFA, not the IOC. In the end, the SFT did not find it necessary to depart from its analysis in the Lazutina case and deemed the CAS to be independent so long there were no overriding reasons indicating that FIFA is given special treatment. Furthermore, the SFT noted that the CAS had made significant efforts to strengthen its independence by improving its structure and functioning. Rigozzi finished by drawing some conclusions from the Pechstein and Seraing cases. First, the Pechstein case has made public hearings at the CAS an inevitability now that Article 6 (1) ECHR is fully applicable to its proceedings, and the CAS will have to improve the optics concerning its rules on the appointment of the president of the panel. Secondly, the SFT in the Seraing made clear that while CAS could be further ‘perfected’, it was not the proper institution to take on such a project. Instead, it placed the responsibility in the hands of the Swiss legislator, and it is yet to be seen whether they will actually take the initiative to introduce change.

The panel was brought to a close by Tom Seamer, who plunged into the issue of the independence and impartiality of CAS arbitrators. He argued that there could be two main areas of improvement in this regard, the ICAS and the appointment of arbitrators. Concerning the ICAS, only minor changes would be necessary to drastically improve the status quo, such as ensuring that its president be neutral and has no connections with any sports governing body, athlete or clubs. Secondly, Seamer supported the contention that certain arbitrators are repeatedly nominated by the same parties and often make decisions in favor of that particular party. He explained that in order to test this theory, one must only look at the period in which the particular arbitrator was on the approved CAS list and then determine the proportion of cases they were called upon by a particular party during that same period. Seamer closed by asserting more needed to be done in order to tackle these issues, while acknowledging some of the challenges ahead.

Panel 6: The future of sports: sports law of the future

The last panel of the conference took the opportunity to look forward into the future of sports law and discussed the growing fields of e-sports and extreme sports. On e-sports, Cedric Aghey tackled the issue of e-sports governance and how it could be potentially integrated into the current sports governing structures, since currently there is an unharmonized e-sport structure. At the moment, e-sports relies on a variety of stakeholders operating at different levels, such as games publishers, e-sports governing bodies, and investors. In order to address this situation, Aghey argued that the e-sports definition should be narrowed only to video games that seek to emulate ‘traditional’ sports. This would allow for a rather seamless integration of these e-sports into the already existing sports federations. For example, FIFA would absorb its FIFA e-sport counterpart.

Nick Poggenklaas also presented on e-sports but instead took a wider definition of e-sports by not only limiting e-sports to games based on ‘traditional’ sports. He contended that the current regulatory framework present in e-sports is inadequate to sufficiently protect minors from the negative aspects of sport. This issue is particularly pertinent, since minors make an exceptionally large share of the e-sport athletes, which is especially worrying since there have been cases of doping and sexual and financial abuse. Such cases question whether enough is being done to really combat these problems. Thus, Poggenklaas put forth several proposals that could substantially improve the situation of minor’s rights in e-sports. He submitted that by creating an overarching e-sport governing body that would manage an abuse hotline, minors would be subject to a more rigid regulatory regime that would at least provide them with the opportunity and means to raise their concerns. Furthermore, Poggenklaas believes that the creation of players unions and further parent involvement would also help to ensure that minors’ interests are sufficiently protected.

Lastly, Angela Busacca examined extreme sports and the kind of civil liability applicable to these activities. She first described the elements and different classifications of extreme sports under Italian law. For instance, extreme sports have a component of risk and require a certain interaction with nature. They can also be placed on a scale ranging from sports that have a set of pre-defined rules to those where there are no pre-defined rules and consequently giving a free range for the athlete’s actions. In addition, extreme sports are categorized by those that have a clear governance organizational structure to those who do not have a defined structure. All these aforementioned components can have an impact on the establishment of civil liability and whom is responsible in case of an accident.

Conclusion

After two intense days of discussion and debate of international sports law’s most pressing topics through six differently themed panels, two keynote lectures, eighteen invited speakers, and many other highlights, the ISLJ Conference 2019 came to a close. The Asser International Sports Law Centre was honored to have been able to host another successful edition. On behalf of the organizers, we would like to thank all the speakers and participants who made this conference such a success and look forward to seeing you all back at the Institute soon!

Editor’s note: Josep F. Vandellos is an international sports lawyer associated to RH&C (Spain). He is also a member of the Editorial Board of the publication Football Legal and a guest lecturer in the ISDE-FC Barcelona Masters’ Degree in Sports Management and Legal Skills.

Article 6 of Annexe IV (Training compensation) of the FIFA-RSTP (Ed. 2016) contains the so-called “Special Provisions for the EU/EEA” applicable to players moving from one association to another inside the territory of the European Union (EU) or the European Economic Area (EEA).
The provisions regarding training compensation result from the understanding reached between FIFA and UEFA with the European Union in March 2001[1], and subsequent modifications introduced in the FIFA-RSTP revised version of 2005 to ensure the compatibility of the transfer system with EU law.[2]
This blog will focus on the exception contained in article 6(3) Annexe IV of the FIFA-RSTP. According to this article, when “the former club” fails to offer a contract to the player, it loses its right to claim training compensation from the players’ new club, unless it can justify that it is entitled to such compensation. Instead, the right of “previous clubs” to training compensation is fully preserved irrespective of their behaviour with the player.[3] From a legal standpoint, such discrimination between the “former club” and the “previous clubs” raises some questions that I will try to address in this paper.
For that purpose, the author will depart from the restrictive interpretation of article 6(3) adopted by the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC) and continue with a substantive assessment of the rule, firstly by looking at its purposive aim and secondly, by evidencing the potential negative impact on players’ mobility and its inherent anticompetitive effects. 

A. Article 6(3) Annexe IV of the FIFA-RSTP (Ed. 2016)

Article 6(3) of the FIFA-RSTP reads as follows: “3. If the former club does not offer the player a contract, no training compensation is payable unless the former club can justify that it is entitled to such compensation. The former club must offer the player a contract in writing via registered post at least 60 days before the expiry of his current contract. Such an offer shall furthermore be at least of an equivalent value to the current contract. This provision is without prejudice to the right to training compensation of the player’s previous club(s).”[4]
In summary, as a general rule, the former club of the player loses its right to claim training compensation if it fails to offer the player a contract in the terms described by the article, or cannot demonstrate a legitimate interest.
So far, the DRC has been consistent in interpreting that the obligation to offer the player a contract lies exclusively with the former club of the player as opposed to the previous clubs. In other words, the previous club is entitled to ask for training compensation when the player signs the first professional contract[5] no matter whether they offered the player a contract or showed bona fide interest in retaining him.
At first glance, this rigid interpretation might appear controversial in light of the more pragmatic approach towards the formal requirements of article 6(3) adopted in the CAS award 2009/A/1757 between MTK Budapest v. FC Internazionale Milano SpA[6]. In this case, in order to conclude that MTK Budapest was still entitled to request training compensation despite not having offered the player a contract in the terms indicated in the regulation, the adjudicating Panel emphasized that “[the] aims of sporting justice shall not be defeated by an overly formalistic interpretation of the FIFA Regulations which would deviate from their original intended purpose”.[7]
The DRC has thus systematically admitted claims of previous clubs against clubs that have registered professional players for the first time (e.g. DRC decision of 17 May 2016[8]) without delving into whether such clubs are indeed entitled to training compensation or not.
In an attempt to defy such dogmatic approach to the issue, I question whether the different references made in Annexe IV of the FIFA RSTP to the “former club”[9] could and should instead be interpreted more extensively, so as to include all former clubs (thus including previous clubs) where a player has been registered. Firstly, by having a look at the systematic context of the rule and its purposive interpretation[10], and secondly, by taking into consideration the potential competitive disadvantages between European clubs resulting from the regulation.
As to the rationale of the rule, the FIFA DRC jurisprudence (vid. e.g. DRC Decision of 27 April 2006 ref. no. 461185[11]) indicates that “the spirit of and purpose of article 6 para 3 of Annexe 4 of the RSTP, 2016 edition, is to penalise clubs which are obviously not interested in the players’ services as a professional, no matter if the club would have to offer the player an employment contract for the first time or a renewal due to the expiry of an already existing contract.”[12]
It appears therefore, contrary to the spirit of the rule that a club that has shown no interest in keeping the player as a professional, a roster or for its academy, can at a later stage request to be rewarded for the training of that player, irrespective of whether it was the former club, strictly speaking, or the former former club, so to speak (i.e. the previous club in the RSTP exact wording).
One could easily argue at this point, and I would subscribe to it, that at very young ages it is either legally prohibited for training clubs to offer a contract, or unreasonable to require clubs to offer contracts to all its players in order to safeguard their potential right to training compensation.  This was highlighted by the CAS Panel in the CAS award 2006/A/1152 ADO Den Haag v. Newcastle United FC[13] which was the appeal against the above cited DRC Decision of 27 April 2006.
However, nothing prevents training clubs to at least show a genuine interest in retaining the player as an amateur by formally offering him to continue training with them or even through a simple positive evaluation of the player. In order to alleviate the unreasonable burden that such obligation would suppose on training clubs, a solution could be to require the genuine interest at least, for players as from the season of their 16^th birthday. This would coincide with the age when in most EU countries players are legally allowed to sign employment contracts, and form a strict sportive perspective, the age from when training compensation is calculated in full according to article 5(3) of Annexe IV.
The final reference in article 6(3) (i.e. “This provision is without prejudice to the right to training compensation of the players’ previous club(s)”) helps to ground this interpretation. It is difficult to justify from a legal standpoint, why previous clubs should be exempted (as they, in fact, are) from observing the same rules and obligations as the former clubs, especially considering the principle of free movement of workers in the EU. The right to claim training compensation is, being redundant, “without prejudice to the right (…) of the players’ previous club(s)”. Previous clubs should therefore, demonstrate as well their entitlement to training compensation by evidencing a genuine interest in the player, such as former clubs do. 
To illustrate the situation, consider the case were an EU football club omits to offer one of its players (e.g. 18 years old) a professional contract in the terms of article 6(3) of Annexe IV, and that player further registers as an amateur with another EU club for one season. That second club also fails to offer the player (now 19 years old) a professional contract. After two seasons as an amateur, the player, finally signs a professional contract with a third EU club at the age of 20 years. The current interpretation of the exception leads to conclude that the first club, which failed to offer the player a professional contract, perhaps because he was simply not sufficiently interesting to retain, would now be reinstated in the right to claim training compensation, while the former club, under identical circumstances and reasons would be deprived from it.
Within those parameters, de lege ferenda the exception of article 6(3) could reasonably be extended to those previous clubs that failed to show the so-called bona fide interest. This way, by failing to show real interest in keeping a player, the previous clubs would be also prevented from asking training compensation upon the first registration of the player as a professional, to the same extend as the former club when it fails to offer the player a contract, in the terms indicated by the exception.
Turning now the attention, to EU law, the conclusions on why article 6(3) Annexe 4 current interpretation seems unfair and should be reformulated, point towards the same direction. 
 

B. Article 6(3) Annexe IV of the FIFA RSTP and EU competition law

The Bosman ruling and its most recent successor, the Bernard ruling, stand out as constant reminders that EU Law applies to the realm of European club football insofar as it constitutes an economic activity in the sense of Article 2 of the Treaty.[14] It is nowadays unarguable that football is a real economic activity and that the regulations adopted by its governing bodies must respect EU Law as long as they apply in the territory of the EU, or in case the player concerned has a European passport and is transferring to an EU Member State. Only rules which are “inherent to sport” such as the rules of the game, and other “practices likely to be exempted” meaning, those activities not necessarily linked to sport but which are worth of protection, could potentially fall outside the remit of EU competition law (the sporting exception) as pointed out by the “Helsinki Report on Sport” in 1999. However, the decision in the Meca-Medina case went even further, overcoming the traditional distinction between rules of purely sporting nature from others, to determine that rules cannot be of purely sporting nature when they have economic repercussions, and consequently, making it possible to explore new legal avenues to test regulations that in principle may seem outside the scope of EU competition law (such as the doping regulations in Meca-Medina).
According to Bosman[15] and Bernard, training compensation is a practice worth of protection, but it is undeniable that its rules have strong economic implications, for they are expressly meant to financially reward[16] football clubs involved in the training and education of players when these move to other clubs. For that reason, they fall under the remit of EU Law.
The legitimate aim of the training compensation system is also embraced by legal scholars. For example, while delving into the aftermath of the Bosman case and the agreement reached between FIFA and the EU Commission in 2001, S. Weatherill remarked that “(…). Sport has special features that deserve respect. In accordance with Bosman, it should be regarded as legally permissible for football to devise an internal taxation system to transfer money into the hands of nursery clubs, as part of a scheme for sustaining a larger number of clubs than would survive in ‘pure’ market conditions and to diminish gaps in economic strength between clubs.”[17]
However, it is my firm belief that Annexe IV of the FIFA RSTP has in many ways gone beyond the indications in Bosman, the Helsinki Report[18] and later in Bernard. In this last case, the Court referred to a system meant to compensate[19] and not reward training; and it is precisely that difference regarding the foundations of the system implemented by FIFA that leads to disproportionate results when the amounts to pay as training compensation are superior to the real costs incurred by the training clubs.[20]
All these issues jeopardize free mobility within the EU[21], for they restrict the chances of clubs to recruit players, and have an impact on the commercial relations between clubs and players in the sense of Article 101. By way of example, a Romanian football club registering a 21-year old player trained in Romania as a professional for the first time, would end up paying the training club a significantly lower amount of training compensation than a Hungarian club of the same category, wishing to sign that same player. The reason for that is that whilst in the first scenario the Romanian club would be subject to the internal training compensation mechanism; in the second scenario, the Hungarian club would be subject to the FIFA regulations that impose higher training compensations.
With these premises in mind, the testing of article 6(3) Annexe IV of the FIFA RSTP under EU competition law seems appropriate, although the application of EU competition law in this type of cases will probably remain an exception.[22]
In short, Article 101 TFEU[23] prohibits agreements, decisions of associations and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion within the internal market.[24] Saskia King, explaining the so-called “objective criterion”[25], has highlighted that “when determining whether an agreement restricts competition under Article 101(1) TFEU, ‘object’ expresses a true alternative to ‘effect’ and as such requires separate consideration”. Therefore, if the object of the agreement is anticompetitive, there is no need to look behind the effects.
A primary aspect of competition law is the identification of the relevant market where a possible anticompetitive practice takes place. In the present context, the relevant market is the transfer market of football players, that is, the market on which the offer and supply of players meets and clubs compete against each other to recruit the best players.[26] Geographically speaking, the market is limited to the territory of the Member States of the EU.
Assuming also, that the FIFA RSTP (ed. 2016) qualifies as a “decision by an association of undertakings”[27] and that the rules of training compensation have an appreciable affect in trade between Member States[28] since any change of clubs for players under the age of 23 requires the payment of a training compensation[29]; the questions left to answer are therefore, whether or not article 6(3) of Annexe IV of the FIFA-RSTP (Ed. 2016), in its current formulation is (1) likely to prevent, restrict or distort competition in the EU transfer market of football players under Article 101(1) TFEU and more importantly, (2) whether the restrictive effects are proportionate and “[reasonably] necessary for the organization and proper conduct of sport?”[30]
As to the first question, it is my view that both the object and the effects produced by, article 6(3) restrict and distort competition between clubs, for they discriminate former clubs vis-à-vis previous clubs with regard to their right to claim training compensation. Additionally, the compensation limits the ability of clubs to take on players acting as free agent.
As to the second question, the Meca-Medina case –though in a different context[31]- offered valuable guidance to test the compatibility of rules of sports associations with EU competition law: “42. Not every agreement between undertakings or every decision of an association of undertakings which restricts the freedom of action of the parties or of one of them necessarily falls within the prohibition laid down in Article 81(1) EC. For the purposes of application of that provision to a particular case, account must first of all be taken of the overall context in which the decision of the association of undertakings was taken or produces its effects and, more specifically, of its objectives. It has then to be considered whether the consequential effects restrictive of competition are inherent in the pursuit of those objectives (Wouters and Others, paragraph 97) and are proportionate to them.”
Following the Meca-Medina reasoning, and focusing on the rationale behind article 6(3) Annexe IV, in the CAS award 2006/A/1152 ADO Den Haag v. Newcastle United FC, the CAS Panel corrected the view of the original DRC decision of 27 April 2006. Specifically, it remarked that the aim of the rule is “to ensure that no player, whether amateur or professional, in whom the training club has no interest, is impeded to accept the offer of another club because he carries some sort of ‘compensation price tag”[32] rather than to penalize clubs failing to offer a contract to their amateur players. The unquestionably legitimate goal of “the exception to the exception” - as the Panel calls article 6(3) - is thus to limit the obstacles to the free mobility of players aforementioned.
However, as to “whether the consequential effects restrictive of competition are inherent in the pursuit of those objectives and are proportionate to them” there cannot be a positive answer. To me it is doubtful whether the anticompetitive effects produced by establishing different conditions between former clubs and previous clubs are inherent or a necessary consequence to ensure the objective of rule (i.e. contributing to free mobility). I believe the contrary to be true. (i.e. uently,conditions ctive of the rule, tt of EU Law. by scholars.r compensation. in the application of such principle. nsatI bI be The effects generated by the current interpretation of article 6(3) collide with the aim of the rule (i.e. protecting free mobility), for reinstating previous clubs in their rights to claim training compensation irrespective of their behaviour vis-à-vis the player, compromises free movement within the EU and creates unfair competitive advantages for previous clubs.
In conclusion, my suggestion is to rethink, the current formulation of article 6(3) (if not the entire training compensation system) and correct its detrimental effects by preventing all previous clubs that fail to offer players a professional contract or to show bona fide interest as from the season in which a player turns 16 years old from requesting training compensation. It is certainly not the role of the CAS to do so, but the responsibility of the EU Commission to take an active lead to ensure full compliance of football regulations with EU law. 

[1] See FIFA Executive Committee, “Commentary on the Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players”, Annex 4 (29 June 2005) at page 124.

[2] European Commission Press Release of 5 March 2001, “Outcome of discussions between the Commission and FIFA/UEFA on FIFA Regulations on international football transfers”.

[3] A bona fide and genuine interest in keeping the player must be demonstrated before the DRC cf. Arbitration CAS award 2009/A/1757 MTK Budapest v. FC Internazionale Milano S.p.A., award of 30 July 2009.

[4] FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, article 6(3) Annexe IV.

[5] In cases of subsequent transfer, the club entitled to claim training compensation will always be the “former club”.

[6]“17. As noted earlier, it is the 2005 Regulations which apply in the present case. At the same time, however, FIFA itself has clarified that the aim of the revisions introduced in 2005 was simply to “facilitate the evidence of a contract offer being made”. In its Decision, the DRC stated that “...when revising the Regulations it was decided to integrate in the 2005 edition of the Regulations some formal preconditions in order to facilitate the evidence that a contract offer was effectively made...This is the actual aim of the relevant formalities”. Consequently, the Panel does not interpret the 2005 revisions to the Regulations as constituting a substantive or material alteration to the 2001 regulatory regime because, as FIFA has said, the changes introduced related only to matters of form, and not of substance.”

[7] See para. 31 of the award. Although, the transfer structure used in this case could qualify as a bridge transfer used for the purpose of circumventing the FIFA regulations on transfer compensation.

[8] Decision of the Single Judge of the Sub-committee of the DRC case Budapest Honved FC (Hungary) v. AFC ASA 2013 Targu Mures (Romania) ref. TMS 243. Unpublished.

[9] See also FIFA RSTP, article 2 para. 2 of Annex IV.

[10] See the CAS award 2007/A/1363 TTF Liebherr Ochsenhausen v/ETTU, award of 5 October 2007 para 12 page 8: “10. By interpreting rules and regulations of associations, the starting point and the predominant element of construction is the wording (literal interpretation). Other elements such as the systematic context, the purpose and the history of the rule may contribute to the correct understanding of the meaning of the rule. This principle is accepted in both civil and common law and it has been constantly applied by CAS panels. It is also embedded in the law of Luxembourg (see, e.g., Art. 1156 of the Code Civil of Luxembourg) and the parties have not argued otherwise.” Emphasis added.

[11] Decision not published.

[12] De Weger, The Jurisprudence of the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber, Asser Press, 2^nd Edition, 2016. Page 401.

[13] See para. 22 of the CAS award 2006/A/1152 ADO Den Haag v. Newcastle United FC, award of 7 February 2007.

[14] See also Case 36/74, Walrave and Koch v UCI, ECLI:EU:C:1974:140.

[15] Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association and Others v Bosman and Others, ECLI:EU:C:1995:463, paras. 106-110.

[16] See FIFA Executive Committee, “Commentary on the Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players”, article 1(2) and Annex 4 para. 1 (Objectives), page 112.

[17] S. Weatherill, European Sports Law Collected Papers, Asser Press, 2^nd Edition (2014), pages 218 and 219.

[18] See Report from the Commission to the European Council of 10 December 1999 with a view to safeguarding current sports structures and maintaining the social function of sport within the Community framework – The Helsinki Report on Sport - para. 4.2.1.3: The Report refers to a system of objectively calculated payments that are related to the costs of training.

[19] Case C-325/08, Olympique Lyonnais SASP v Olivier Bernard and Newcastle UFC, ECLI:EU:C:2010:143, paras. 44 and 45.

[20] As an example of this disproportionality, a simple comparison between the training costs established for Cat. III UEFA clubs (30.000 Euro per) with the training costs established for internal transfers by the Romanian Football Football Federation (5.000 RON per year equivalent to 1.107 Euro).

[21] Training compensation rules were recently tested against EU law, and in particular with regard to the freedom of movement of workers, by TAS-CAS in the Riverola case (CAS award 2014/A/Bologna FC 1909 SpA v. FC Barcelona). The award is not public, but a full comment and legal analysis is published in: Luca Smacchia, “The Riverola case: how the enforcement of FIFA rules may restrict the freedom of movement for workers within the EU”, Football Legal, #5 (June 2016), pages 20-24.

[22] See e.g. Ben Van Rompuy, “Sport and EU Competition Law: New developments and unfinished business”, Asser International Sports Law Blog (22 May 2015).

[23] Article 101 TFEU: “The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market, and in particular those which: (…) (d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;”

[24] “The distinction between "restrictions by object" and "restrictions by effect" arises from the fact that certain forms of collusion between undertakings can be regarded, by their very nature, as being injurious to the proper functioning of normal competition.” - Commission Staff Working Document of 25 June 2014, Guidance on restrictions of competition “by object” for the purpose of defining which agreements may benefit from the De Minimis Notice, page 3.

[25] Saskia King, “Agreements that restrict competition by object under Article 101 (1) TFEU: Past, present and future”, PhD Thesis – The London School of Economics and Political Science (2015), Page 28.

[26] “The combined investment of summer and winter transfer windows in the top five European leagues was almost €3.4 billion. That was up by 29 per cent versus last season and again a record high ever.” - Soccerex Transfer Review Winter Edition 2016, Prime Time Sport, page 4.

[27] See, for example, Case T-193/02, Piau v. Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2005:22, para. 69: “As regards, first, the concept of an association of undertakings, and without it being necessary to rule on the admissibility of the arguments put forward by an intervener which go against the claims made by the party in support of which it is intervening, it is common ground that FIFA's members are national associations, which are groupings of football clubs for which the practice of football is an economic activity. These football clubs are therefore undertakings within the meaning of Article 81 EC and the national associations grouping them together are associations of undertakings within the meaning of that provision.”

[28] For an in-depth economic data analysis see, e.g., FIFA T.M.S., Global Transfer Market 2012 Highlights, pages 14 and 15 – Overall Market Activity - and pages 23 and 24 - Player Age.

[29] David Nilsson, “The Revised FIFA Regulations for the Status and Transfers of Players’ Compatibility with EU competition law – the Transfer System revised”. Master Thesis. Faculty of Law - University of Lund, (September 2006).

[30] Supra, 30.

[31] Doping rules under EU competition law.

[32] See para. 20 page 7 of the award: “The Panel does not share the DRC’s view that the purpose of the first sentence of Article 6 para. 3 is to penalise clubs which do not offer professional terms to their amateur players. Rather, in the Panel’s opinion, the purpose of the above provision is to ensure that no player, whether amateur or professional, in whom the training club has no interest is impeded to accept the offer of another club because he carries some sort of “compensation price tag”.