Asser International Sports Law Blog

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International and European Sports Law – Monthly Report – November and December 2016. By Saverio Spera.

6. January 2017 Oskar van Maren Blog, International Sports Law Cases, International Sports Law Commentaries, International Sports Law Events, International Sports Law Material, International Sports Law Publications (0)

Editor’s note: This report compiles all relevant news, events and materials on International and European Sports Law based on the daily coverage provided on our twitter feed @Sportslaw_asser. You are invited to complete this survey via the comments section below, feel free to add links to important cases, documents and articles we might have overlooked. 


The Headlines

The Russian State Doping Scandal and the crisis of the World Anti-Doping System

Russian doping and the state of the Anti-Doping System has been the dominant international sports law story in November and December. This is mainly due to the release of the second report of the McLaren’s investigation on 9 December 2016. The outcome of McLaren’s work showed a “well-oiled systemic cheating scheme” that reached to the highest level of Russian sports and government, involving the striking figure of 30 sports and more than 1000 athletes in doping practices over four years and two Olympic Games. The report detailed tampering with samples to swap out athletes’ dirty urine with clean urine. Simultaneously, the IOC has over the last months announced 101 positive tests from retesting samples collected at Beijing 2008 and London 2012 and announced sanctions, 27 of which were for Russians athletes (for more information, see here, here and here).

A few weeks before the publication of the McLaren report, on 20 November the WADA Foundation Board met in Glasgow, in what, at least that we argued on this blog, should have been a turning point in the global fight against drugs in sport. In that occasion, the board endorsed a sanctioning framework for non-compliance that “will equip the anti-doping system with the ability to levy meaningful, predictable and proportionate sanctions in cases of non-compliance by anti-doping organizations (ADOs) with the World Anti-Doping Code (Code)”. The Board also agreed to continue evaluating the request made by the Olympic Summit to establish an Independent Testing Authority (ITA). In addition, the Board’s recommendation about the whistleblower program aims at appropriately supporting, protecting and rewarding whistleblowers in order to strengthen the Anti-Doping System. The hope is that those recommendations will help filling the massive gaps exposed in the World Anti-Doping System by the Russian scandal. 


The Football Leaks: Second edition

It is not the first time that the football leaks appear on this blog. Already in December 2015, we started analysing contracts released by an earlier (certainly more amateurish, but also more transparent) apparition of the football leaks. Back then we focused on Doyen’s TPO deals (you can dive back into the blogs here, here, here and here). Our conclusion was very much the same as the one advanced by the European Investigative Collaborations (EIC): there is something rotten in the globalized football economy and it is in dire need of proper regulation (and regulators).

Moving forward, on 9 December Der Spiegel published its first in-depth piece on the new football leaks. The data gathered by Der Spiegel (Germany) and the European Investigative Collaborations (EIC), includes 18.6 million documents comprising of original contracts. This data revealed a large and uncontrolled use of murky financial operations, complex contractual networks and tax schemes in the world of professional football. In particular linked to the operation of the transfer market. Evidence on player contracts revealed by football leaks showed, for example, that in what has been called ‘the Cypriot scheme’ football players were bought and loaned out by the Cypriot club Apollon Limassol without ever playing for the club, or – at least in one case - without even entering the country. In so doing, the Cypriot club had taken over the role of Third Party Owner usually held by investment funds, a practice that was banned by the FIFA’s regulation from May 2015, in order to avoid, among other things, loss of control over transfer operations.

NRC (The Netherlands) and EIC network have also discovered that agents of various South American football stars (such as Colombian James Rodríguez) used the Netherlands as a pivot country for tax reasons to carry out the transfer of their clients to top clubs in Europe (a story to which our Senior Researcher, Antoine Duval, contributed). There is also evidence of continuous alternation of companies involved in the transfers, with contracts passing from firms in The Netherlands to the tax heavens British Virgin Island, Panama and The Caribbean. The story of the transfer of the football player Kondogbia from the Spanish club Sevilla to the French club Monaco in 2013, emerged through football leaks as well, adds another layer to the evidence of dirty tricks linked to TPO (for more information on the Economic Rights of Players Agreement (ERPA) involving Kondogbia, see our ‘old’ blog from April 2016).

So, should one be fatalist about these wrongdoings and abuses on the transfer market and around it? No. We believe that the European Union and its Member States could and should act (see our proposition in French here, and comments to NRC in this piece) to regulate the worst economic practices of the football worlds. 


CAS award on Real Madrid’s transfers of minors

Finally, in the much-watched dispute between Real Madrid FC and FIFA over the Spanish club’s transfers of minors, the CAS partially sided with the football club. The CAS award modifies the decision rendered by the FIFA Appeal Committee in these terms: Real Madrid’s ban from registering any new national or international player is reduced from two transfer periods to one and the fine the club is imposed to pay to FIFA is reduced from 360,000 CHF to 240,000 CHF. The reasoned decision will be notified to the parties early 2017.  


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Asser International Sports Law Blog | Olympic Agenda 2020: To bid, or not to bid, that is the question!

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

Olympic Agenda 2020: To bid, or not to bid, that is the question!

6. October 2014 Antoine Duval Blog, International Sports Law Commentaries (0)

This post is an extended version of an article published in August on hostcity.net.

The recent debacle among the candidate cities for the 2022 Winter Games has unveiled the depth of the bidding crisis faced by the Olympic Games. The reform process initiated in the guise of the Olympic Agenda 2020 must take this disenchantment seriously. The Olympic Agenda 2020 took off with a wide public consultation ending in April and is now at the end of the working groups phase. One of the working groups was specifically dedicated to the bidding process and was headed by IOC vice-president John Coates.  




The bidding crisis: From Mega to Giga events

The century started with two successful summer and winter Olympics in Sydney and Salt Lake City. However, since then, we could witness the oversized Athens Games that helped to bankrupt Greece, the first Olympic Games of China’s communist dictatorship, and the most expensive Winter Olympics ever in Sochi. In fact, the Olympic Games seem to have left the world of mega-events to enter the universe of giga-events: events that require investments on a massive scale, which are under a permanent global scrutiny and which can have a dramatic impact on local social, economic and environmental life worlds. Meanwhile, the growing competition from countries whose leaders’ political accountability is (to say the least) relative, crowds out modest (and more sustainable) bids. Recent Games, culminating evidently in the Sochi experiment, have shown a propension for grandiosity leading to a lack of respect for their negative impact in terms of environmental, social and economical sustainability. This has led to widespread distrust from the global citizenry; clearly noticeable in places where public opinion is sought after and practically demonstrated by the string of defections in the bids for the 2022 Winter Games. To end this crisis and regain the necessary trust, confidence and passion of the citizens, real changes to the bidding process are required.     


Changing the Olympic bidding process

How could these changes to the bidding process look like? Three types of proposals can be sketched: changing the weighing formula of the different evaluation criteria in order to clearly favour sustainability; introducing a budget ceiling to bids (a kind of financial fair play rule); and, finally, increasing the transparency and fairness of the selection process itself. This is only a set of potential reform orientations, many more good proposals to improve the bidding process have been suggested. 


Changing the weighing of the Olympic criteria

How much weight is currently put on the sustainability of a candidacy? Very little. To be precise, in the case of Sochi, merely 5,7% of the final mark depended on the quality of the project in terms of its environmental legacy. At the moment, the social and economic sustainability of a project is not even considered in the evaluation process. This explains that despite its very poor environmental showing, the Sochi bid managed to go through the evaluation process unharmed. In an era apprehensive about climate change and environmental hazards, in a time of heightened inequality and economic austerity, however, the sustainability of giga-events cannot be easily brushed aside. The image of the Olympic Games has tremendously suffered from the IOC’s doublespeak: on one side, praising sustainability and environmental responsibility in the Olympic Charter and, on the other, knowingly awarding the Games to bids incompatible with these proclaimed values. Not only must the Olympic Charter be taken seriously, but it is also time for the IOC to put its money where its mouth is. These are exactly the kind of concerns, which, thanks to the Olympic Agenda 2020 process, should finally find their way into the bidding process. 


Introducing a ‘Financial Fair Play’ for bidding

From a purely economic point of view, the Olympics are faced with the emergence of the “nouveau riches”, BRICS and others, which are ready to spend lavishly and sometimes irrationally on “their” Games. In certain countries, where the accountability of government towards their citizens is relative, there are no limits in sight to the size of the investments incurred to get and organize the Games. This competition drives the price of the Games through the roof and crowds out a growing number of countries from the exclusive circle of Game organizers. What can be done to rein it? Why not try out a form of financial fair play: a golden rule limiting on the basis of a reasonable (and context-dependent) formula the amounts a host-city is authorized to spend on bidding for, and organizing of, the Games. Such a rule would limit the costs of organizing the Games to a reasonable amount and refocus the bidding competition on non-economic dimensions. Furthermore, it would pre-empt the prospect of governments overspending on the Games and later facing a wave of global criticisms when the price tag is disclosed and the citizens’ awareness of the costs, in terms of schools or hospitals not-built, turns into anger.  


Towards a transparent and independent selection process

Finally, there is an urgent need of opening up the selection process to public scrutiny. This is not exclusively a concern for the Olympic Games as illustrated by the on-going FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 scandal. Its two phases, evaluation and nomination, should be institutionally neatly separated. A team composed equally of Olympic family members and external experts should lead the evaluation phase. Its findings should be binding in designating the candidate cities and to some extent binding on the election of the host city by the IOC. Especially, since host-city elections have historically been marred with intrigues and suspicions of votes being sold to the highest bidder. Hence, to restore the image of the Games, the Agenda 2020 should consider making the individual votes public and limiting as much as possible the contacts between bidders and IOC members. In many ways, the IOC operates still as though it were a local Swiss chess club. Political power is concentrated in the hands of its non-elected members, but it has widely outgrown a chess club and now affects millions of people’s lives around the world. Those deserve at least to be able to fully scrutinize the decisions taken, if not to participate in their adoption.  


Bidders of the world Unite!

The Olympic Agenda 2020 might be unsatisfactory in terms of transparency and inclusiveness. Nevertheless, this is a unique opportunity to publicly influence the way the Olympic Games are run and to shape Olympic policies for the years to come. It is the bidders’ (cities, countries, federations) responsibility to seize this opportunity and to raise their voices to impose the changes they see fit, in order to restore the trust of citizens and improve the Games’ public perception. Thus, one can only welcome the recent initiative taken by four NOCs, which have produced a thoroughly argued joint paper on ‘the bid experience’, making an immediate impact on the Olympic Agenda 2020 and forcing the IOC to acknowledge publically the necessity to reform the bidding process. The political battle for the future of the Olympics will be played out until 8 and 9 December 2014, when the IOC Session is due to adopt the changes to the Olympic Charter and its bylaws brought forward in the framework of the Olympic Agenda 2020 process. Until then, stakeholders with a lot at stake, like the bidders, should publically call and argue for the reforms they wish for. A united front of the bidders can and should drive forward the Olympic Agenda 2020 and bear on the fundamental orientations the Games will take in the upcoming years.


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