A Quest for justice: The ‘Ogoni Nine’ legal saga and the new Kiobel lawsuit against Shell. By Sara Martinetto

Editor's note: Sara Martinetto is an intern at T.M.C. Asser Institute. She has recently completed her LLM in Public International Law at the University of Amsterdam. She holds interests in Migration Law, Criminal Law, Human Rights and European Law, with a special focus on their transnational dimension.


On 29th June 2017, four Nigerian widows launched a civil case against Royal Dutch Shell (RDS), Shell Petroleum N.V., the Shell Transport and Trading Company, and its subsidiary Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria (SPDC) in the Netherlands. Esther Kiobel, Victoria Bera, Blessing Eawo and Charity Levula are still seeking redress for the killing of their husbands in 1995 in Nigeria. They claim the defendants are accomplices in the execution of their husbands by the Abasha regime. Allegedly, the companies had provided material support, which then led to the arrest and death of the activists.  

In the light of this lawsuit, it is interesting to retrace the so-called ‘Ogoni Nine’ legal saga. The case saw the interplay between multiple jurisdictions and actors, and its analysis is useful to point out some of the main legal issues encountered on the path to hold corporations accountable for human rights abuses.

The ‘Ogoni Nine’

‘Ogoni Nine’ is the name given by the media to a group of Nigerian men – Saturday Dobee, Nordu Eawo, Daniel Gbooko, Paul Levera, Felix Nuate, Baribor Bera, Barinem Kiobel, John Kpuine, and Ken Saro Wiwa – who were arrested for the alleged murder of four people. On 10th November 1995, they were executed in Port Harcourt, Southern Nigeria. To understand what led to this episode, it is important to provide some historical context.

Royal Dutch Shell has been undertaking drilling operations in Nigeria since 1958, carried out through SPDC.[1] As explained by the UNEP environmental assessment report of 2011, both water and land were polluted by the extraction of oil and gas, causing massive environmental harm. This drove the inhabitants of Ogoniland, a region in the Niger Delta, to strongly oppose those activities. Thus, they created the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), lead by Ken Saro-Wiwa:[2] in 1993, the movement counted more than 300 000 activists, half of the Ogoni population. They engaged in protests against the Nigerian government – which was accused of turning a blind-eye to Shell’s activities, since they provided for the majority of Nigeria’s export earnings[3] - and against companies extracting the oil, Shell amongst others.

In 1994, the ‘Ogoni nine’ were apprehended and held in military custody; no charges were pressed during their first eighteen months in prison. Eventually, a special military court tried them for the murder of four people, they were found guilty, and then hanged. The manner in which the trial was conducted caused the outrage of the international community and ultimately resulted in the suspension of Nigeria from the Commonwealth.

The Wiwa cases in the New York courts

The first attempt to seek justice for the execution of the nine members of MOSOP took place in 1996, when the son of Ken Saro-Wiwa filed three different lawsuits in a New York District court: one against Royal Dutch Petroleum, one against Shell Petroleum Development Company, and the last against Brian Anderson, the head of Nigerian operations at Royal Dutch Shell. The plaintiff alleged the complicity of Shell in the human rights violations perpetrated by the Nigerian government against MOSOP. In particular, the plaintiff claimed that the company provided material support both to the repression of Ogoni activists during protests and to the actual apprehension of the Ogoni Nine.[4]

Among other things, Shell was accused of offering transport, food and property to Nigerian troops, used to commit human rights abuses, which, according to the plaintiff, amounted to crimes against humanity. Therefore, the claims were brought both under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act.

After thirteen years of legal battles, the parties reached a settlement: Shell paid 15.5 million dollars, covering compensation and legal expenses.[5] However, the company issued no admission of guilt or apologies: it submitted that the payment was given to “aid the process of reconciliation”.[6] Without a doubt, the extrajudicial settlement was a victory for the Ogoni people. However, the absence of a final ruling prevents an in-depth analysis of the multiple legal issues raised by the case.

Nevertheless, one aspect should be highlighted: the suit resisted numerous attempts by the defendant to have the case dismissed on jurisdictional ground. Specifically, the Court of Appeal, overruling the first instance’s dismissal, carried out an in-depth analysis on why the claim fell within the scope of US jurisdiction. It was found that Shell performed a variety of activities in the U.S. and that the claimant was also residing there. Therefore, there were no grounds to dismiss the case, neither under personal jurisdiction, nor under forum non conveniens. These conclusions remain particularly important, especially in the light of the following Kiobel case.

The Kiobel case and the Alien Tort Statute

In 2002, Esther Kiobel filed a civil claim against Shell under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS). This 1789 American Statute allows US District Courts to exercise civil jurisdiction on a claim brought by an alien alleging the violation of the law of nations. The plaintiff accused the defendant of aiding and abetting the Nigerian government to commit the violations of international law at hand in the Wiwa proceedings.

The case made it all the way to the Supreme Court, which famously held that the ATS was not applicable to the fact pattern. The 2013 decision of the Supreme Court was based on two main Arguments. First, the Court seemed unconvinced that the norms allegedly violated are “specific, universal and obligatory” as prescribed in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain et al. Second – and most importantly – the conduct alleged by the plaintiff does not “touch and concern” the U.S. with a sufficient force, which will allow rebutting the presumption against extraterritorial application of the Statute.

The ruling of the Supreme Court attracted many comments and criticism: specifically, the concerns revolve around the interpretation of the ATS’ scope of application, and its possible impact on the outcome of other cases. Indeed, the application of the Statute turns out to be substantially limited by the narrow interpretation given in Kiobel. Regardless of the nationality of the parties, the Court seems to imply that the conduct should take place – at least partly – in the United States. Mere corporate presence is not considered to be enough of a link to ground jurisdiction of American courts.[7] In general, legal scholars are still debating some core questions, left unresolved by the Kiobel decision, related to the scope of the ATS.[8] In any event, the U.S. proved to be an inadequate forum to provide redress to the families of the ‘Ogoni Nine’.

The new Dutch lawsuit

A claim recently lodged in The Netherlands seeks to, at last, hold Shell accountable for the plight of the ‘Ogoni Nine’. Their widows are represented by Channa Samkalden – from the Amsterdam law firm Prakken D’Oliveira – which is managing the Dutch case with the support of Amnesty International.

An indication of what was about to happen came last October when Esther Kiobel petitioned a New York District Court to request discovery by the U.S. lawyers of the respondent. The documents requested were deemed necessary to seek redress for the violation of the applicants’ husbands “right to life, their right to a family life and their right to personal dignity and integrity”.

The new Writ of Summons refers to the “international jurisdiction of Dutch courts” under the Brussels I Regulation and the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure (CCP). The plaintiffs set out three different grounds for jurisdiction. Art. 4(1) and 63 Brussels I (recast Regulation) are used as a jurisdictional basis on RDS.[9] Jurisdiction on the non-Dutch defendant is instead grounded in art. 7(1) CCP, which provides for the possibility to attract multiple defendants to the same forum, where the claims against them are connected. Alternatively, jurisdiction over SPDC could also be established pursuant to art. 9(1) CCP, providing for the rule of forum necessitatis: i.e. Dutch courts have jurisdiction, provided that the claim is sufficiently connected to the Dutch legal sphere and that it is unacceptable to expect the claimant to submit the case to the judgment of a foreign court. The claimants submit that the Dutch parent companies wholly own SPDC, and that the defendants acted as a single entity when perpetrating the alleged conduct. Moreover, one cannot expect the claimants to file the lawsuit in Nigeria, given the involvement of the State apparatus in the events at issue. This argument is further reinforced by the fact that both Kiobel and Bera have been granted refugee status abroad.

To fully appraise the soundness and the chances of success of these jurisdictional grounds, it is necessary to take a step back and to look at the question through the lens of Private International Law (PIL).

Grounds for jurisdiction in PIL: between the European and the national level

Some scholars[10] had already anticipated that the failure to secure jurisdiction under the ATS in the Kiobel case was likely to result in a rekindled attention for PIL rules in business and human rights cases. As far as jurisdiction is concerned, the European PIL instrument par excellence is the Brussels I Regulation “on the jurisdiction, recognition, and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters” within the EU.[11] In this framework, establishing jurisdiction over the parent company is fairly unproblematic. Art. 2 and 60 of the Regulation (transposed in art. 4 and 63 of the Recast) provide that defendants domiciled in a Member State can in principle be attracted in front of the courts of that Member States. This applies also to companies who are seated/have their central administration/have their principal place of business in that Member State.

However, the situation becomes more complex when foreign subsidiaries, especially if incorporated in States outside the EU, come into play. In the Kiobel case, the Dutch court claiming jurisdiction over SPDC is essential for the success of the case as the Nigerian subsidiary was at the heart of the events leading to the death of the ‘Ogoni Nine’. There are two potential grounds for an EU based court to have jurisdiction over non-EU based subsidiaries: the rule on multiple defendants based on related actions and the principle of forum necessitatis.[12] The latter is not provided for in the Brussels I regime. Hence, it is up to national legislation to include such a ground in their PIL. As far as the former is concerned, art. 6(1) Brussels I (art. 8(1) Recast) prescribe that a foreign defendant might faced court proceedings together with a domestic one when the claims against them “are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments”. The actual scope of application of this paragraph is sometimes hard to grasp. For instance, it is doubtful whether it could apply to non-EU based companies.[13] A negative answer will result in the need to resort to national rules of PIL. Thus, the possibility of Dutch courts having jurisdiction in a case involving a subsidiary such as SPDC will most likely hinge on Dutch rules regarding jurisdiction.

Two valuable precedents

An analysis of two recent cases – one in the UK and one in the Netherlands – can shed some light on the issue. In fact, both of them involved Shell and SPDC as defendants, and also invoked Brussels I as a ground to establish jurisdiction.

In the UK case, more than 40.000 individual claimants brought a class action against Shell over alleged environmental damages linked to oil spillage. On 26th January 2017, the High Court of Justice (Queen’s Bench Division) ruled that the claims should be heard in Nigeria. Although jurisdiction over the conduct of RDS could be established pursuant to art. 4 Brussels I Recast Regulation, the possibility to try SPDC was to be assessed under domestic PIL, and specifically, the CPR Practice Direction 6B. Paragraph 3.1(3) of the CPR Practice Direction 6B provides that a claim against multiple defendants could be served if (a) the issue between the claimant and the first defendant is a real issue, “which it is reasonable for the court to try”, and (b) the other defendant is a “necessary and proper party to the claim”. Thus, the English Court focused on verifying whether the claimant had a cause of action against the “anchor defendant” (i.e. RDS). Examining the evidence, the Court held that RDS had no duty of care over the extraction activities carried out by SPDC, and, hence, there was no legal claim that would tie the issue to UK jurisdiction (§118).

In a previous decision, the Dutch courts came to an opposite conclusion. Similarly, the three joint cases[14] concerned alleged negligence of RDS and SPDC with regard to the environmental damages caused in the Niger delta. On 18th December 2015, the Court of Appeal of The Hague held that Dutch courts have jurisdiction to hear the claim both against the parent company (pursuant to art. 2(1) and 60(1) Brussels I)[15] and SPDC (pursuant to both art. 6(1) Brussels I and art. 7(1) Dutch Code of Civil Procedure (CCP)). Art. 7(1) CCP prescribes that a defendant might fall under the jurisdiction of Dutch courts when jurisdiction is established against another defendant, “provided that the rights of action against the different defendants are connected with each other in such a way that a joint consideration is justified for reasons of efficiency”. Therefore, it resembles art. 6(1) Brussels I, and, moreover, the two norms were interpreted by the Court as linked and mutually reinforcing. As a result, the Court stated that the interest of having the claims against both companies heard together prevails over the allegations that the contentions against SPDC should be heard in Nigeria.

Comparing the two judgements, it appears that the two Courts have tackled the issue from two different angles, which reflect the wording of their domestic PIL. In particular, the Dutch Court deferred the question of whether the claims against the parent company were founded for a later phase of the proceeding, holding that it was too soon to determine whether these claims were bound “to fail from the outset”(§3.7). Moreover, the Court referred to the principle of perpetuatio fori. In other words, jurisdictional questions are solved at the outset of the proceeding. In the event claims against RDS proved unfounded on the merit, jurisdiction over SPDC would still stand.

Therefore, the ruling of The Hague Court of Appeal, and the regime provided in CPP by both art. 7(1) and 9 might prove to be a key element for the success of the new Kiobel lawsuit. Were the Dutch Court to find the claims against Shell and SPDC substantially interwoven (in the meaning of art. 7(1) CCP), arguably the need to hear the allegations against the two companies in the same proceeding would outweigh the reasons for having two separate judgements in the Netherlands and in Nigeria. In the alternative, art. 9 CCP, prescribing the principle of forum necessitatis, could still provide a jurisdictional ground on SPDC.

Conclusion

The new Kiobel case brings to the fore the strategies and opportunities available to victims seeking redress from multinational companies for human rights abuses. The strict interpretation of the ATS by the Supreme Court in the American edition of the Kiobel case has caused a geographical re-location of the complaints towards Europe and, in particular, The Netherlands where Shell is seated. In this regard, the jurisdictional regime stemming from private international law rules becomes crucial.

Notwithstanding the valuable ground provided by the Brussels I regime,[16] the national norms on PIL still play a predominant role, at least with regard to the establishment of jurisdiction over non-EU based subsidiaries. As the UK and Dutch cases show, these rules might be more or less flexible and entail diverse legal reasoning potentially leading to contradictory outcomes, and which will ultimately determine the possibility to have the case heard on the merit.

The 2015 precedent bodes well for the Dutch Court to assert jurisdiction in the new Kiobel case. Albeit this does not mean the Court will side with Kiobel and the other widows on substance. Winning on jurisdiction would be a first step, a key initial success necessary to be properly heard, but for the claimants there would still be a long and difficult road ahead before finding justice.  


[1] E. Hennchen, Ibid.

[2] NBC News, Shell settles human rights suit for $15.5 million, 6 August 2009

[3] BBC, 1995: Nigeria hangs human rights activists, 10 November 1995

[4] NBC News, Shell settles human rights suit for $15.5 million, 6 August 2009

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.

[7] S. H. Cleveland, After Kiobel, in  Journal of International Criminal Justice, 2014, 556

[8] See N. Bhuta, The Ninth Life of the Alien Torts Statute - Kiobel and After, in Journal of International Criminal Justice, 539-550; S. H. Cleveland, After Kiobel, in Journal of International Criminal Justice, 2014, 551-577

[9] Prescribing that a claim must in principle be lodged at a court located in the Member States where the defendant is domiciled. Regulation 1215/2012/EU (Brussels I)

[10]See G. van Calster, C. H. Luks, Extraterritoriality and Private International Law, in Recht in Beweging, 2012, 119-135 and G. van Calster, The Role of Private International Law in Corporate Social Responsibility, Erasmus Law Review, No.3, November 2014, 125-133.

[11] The Brussel Regimes now comprises Regulation 44/2001/EC (Brussels I), and was recast as Regulation 1215/2012/EU .

[12] The principle establishes that a State can exercise jurisdiction, when otherwise there will be no access to justice, due to the unavailability of an alternative forum.  F. J. Zamora Cabot, L. Heckendorn Urscheler, S. De Dycker, Implementing the U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. Private International Law Perspectives, Schulthess Medias Juridiques, Geneva, 2017, 43

[13] F. J. Zamora Cabot, L. Heckendorn Urscheler, S. De Dycker, op. cit., 2017, 45 and 147

[14] Court of Appeal of the Hague, A.F. Akpan v. Royal Dutch Shell, plc; E. Dooh v. Royal Dutch Shell, plc; F.A. Oguru v. Royal Dutch Shell plc, 18 December 2015

[15] The two articles refer to the first versions of Brussels I Regulation 44/2001/EC; they are the equivalent of art. 4 and 63 of the recast Regulation.

[16] D. Lustig, Ibid.

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Doing Business Right Blog | The Rise of Human Rights Due Diligence (Part I): A Short Genealogy - By Shamistha Selvaratnam

The Rise of Human Rights Due Diligence (Part I): A Short Genealogy - By Shamistha Selvaratnam

Editor’s note: Shamistha Selvaratnam is a LLM Candidate of the Advanced Masters of European and International Human Rights Law at Leiden University in the Netherlands and a contributor to the Doing Business Right project of the Asser Institute. Prior to commencing the LLM, she worked as a business and human rights solicitor in Australia where she specialised in promoting business respect for human rights through engagement with policy, law and practice.

 

Human right due diligence (HRDD) is a key concept of Pillar 2 of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs), the corporate responsibility to respect human rights. Principle 15 of the UNGPs, one of the foundational principles of Pillar 2, states that in order to meet the responsibility to respect human rights, businesses should have in place a HRDD process to ‘identify, prevent, mitigate and account for how they address their impacts on human rights’. However, how was the concept of HRDD developed? What does it mean? What are its key elements?

This first blog of a series of articles dedicated to HRDD answers these questions by providing an overview of the concept of HRDD and its main elements (as set out in the UNGPs) as well as how the concept was developed. It will be followed by a general article looking at HRDD through the lens of a variety of actors including international organisations, non-state actors and consultancy organisations. Case studies will then be undertaken to look at how HRDD has materialised in practice. To wrap up the series, a final piece will reflect on the effectiveness of the turn to HRDD to strengthen respect of human rights by businesses.

 

History of the Concept of HRDD

The concept of due diligence was around well before John Ruggie assumed the mandate of Special Representative on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises back in 2005. Indeed the concept was initially a creature of American securities law under the auspices of ‘reasonable investigation’. The Securities Act 1933 imposes strict civil liability on certain people for untrue statements and omissions of material fact in a securities registration statement.[1] However, an exception is carved out where ‘reasonable investigations’ have been undertaken.[2] The relevant standard of reasonableness to be applied in this situation is that of a ‘prudent man in the management of his own property’.[3]

Following this, the concept of due diligence emerged in other corporate contexts, particularly with respect to financial transactions such as mergers and acquisitions.[4] While the due diligence carried out on such transactions in the 1980s was quite limited, the process has gradually become much more extensive. Over time, the concept has been transplanted into the international human rights law framework – a positive duty has been imposed on states to conduct due diligence to prevent human rights violations by non-state actors, including businesses.[5] Thus, in the international human rights law arena due diligence has been applied as a standard of conduct that states are required to meet in order to uphold human rights within their jurisdiction.

In the business and human rights sphere, the concept of due diligence was first introduced back in 2003 when the draft Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (draft Norms) were introduced. Article 1 of the draft Norms placed a primary responsibility on states to ensure that businesses respect human rights. It also placed a separate obligation on businesses ‘to promote, secure the fulfillment of, respect, ensure respect of and protect human rights recognized in international as well as national law’ within their sphere of influence. The commentary to article 1 notes that businesses have the responsibility to use ‘due diligence in ensuring that their activities do not contribute directly or indirectly to human rights abuses, and that they do not directly or indirectly benefit from abuses of which they were aware or ought to have been aware’. No further explanation was provided on the due diligence to be conducted and the draft Norms were not approved by the Human Rights Council in 2004.

The concept of due diligence was brought back into the business and human rights arena when Ruggie was appointed as Special Representative. Following the failure of the draft Norms, Ruggie introduced the concept of HRDD back into the international arena in 2008 and developed it over a period of about three years until the UNGPs were endorsed by the UN Human Rights Council. As he acknowledges, until then due diligence was considered a ‘business process’ used in ‘strictly transactional terms’.[6] However, Ruggie sought to broaden the concept into ‘a comprehensive, proactive attempt to uncover human rights risks, actual and potential, over the entire life cycle of a project or business activity, with the aim of avoiding and mitigating those risks.’[7] He did this by drawing on the key elements of due diligence and combining them with the distinctive elements of human rights. This is what is now referred to and articulated as the concept of HRDD in the UNGPs. Ruggie gave HRDD such a key role in Pillar 2 of the UNGPs because he recognised that companies cannot know or show that they are respecting human rights without conducting HRDD.[8] Indeed, he envisioned that HRDD would facilitate movement from ‘naming and shaming’ businesses by external stakeholders to ‘knowing and showing’ through internalising respect for human rights.[9]

Ruggie identified a number of benefits to business for undertaking HRDD, in particular he highlighted that it wouldn’t impose additional burdens on business.[10] He argued that HRDD assists business to ‘address their responsibilities to individuals and communities that they impact and their responsibilities to shareholders, thereby protecting both values and value’.[11] He further acknowledged that HRDD assists companies to lower their risks, particularly with respect to legal non-compliance.[12] He also noted that conducting HRDD has the ability to protect Boards against claims brought by shareholders regarding mismanagement.[13]

In setting out the scope of HRDD, Ruggie stated that it is to be ‘determined by the context in which a company is operating, its activities, and the relationships associated with those activities’[14] by reference to three factors, namely: (a) the country and local context in which the relevant business activities take place; (b) what human rights impacts the business’ own activities may have within that context; and (c) whether the business’ own activities might contribute to abuse through the relationships connected to their activities.[15] Importantly, he noted that the scope of HRDD is not fixed or based on influence, rather it ‘depends on the potential and actual human rights impacts resulting from a company’s business activities and the relationships connected to those activities’.[16]

With respect to the substantive content of HRDD, John Ruggie stated that the minimum requirements are set out in the International Bill of Human Rights and the ILO core conventions, as well as additional standards relevant to the context of a particular business such as international humanitarian law.[17]

As to the HRDD process itself, Ruggie set out four minimum requirements. Businesses should:[18]

  • Adopt a human rights policy.
  • Conduct human rights impact assessments to ‘understand how existing and proposed activities may affect human rights’.
  • Integrate human rights policies through the business, which requires a top down approach in order to ‘embed respect for human rights throughout a company’ as well as training and the ‘capacity to respond appropriately when unforeseen situations arise’.
  • Track their performance through monitoring and auditing processes with regular updates of human rights impact and performance.

 

Following these developments, the HRDD concept was finally articulated in the UNGPs, which were endorsed by the UN General Assembly in 2011.

 

Concept of HRDD as articulated in the UNGPs

Meaning of HRDD and its Scope

Despite being a key element of the UNGPs, HRDD is not defined in the UNGPs itself. Rather, as stated above, the UNGPs states that HRDD is a process – that is, a process that should ‘identify, prevent, mitigate and account for how [businesses] address their impacts on human rights’. However, in interpretative guidance provided by the Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, due diligence is defined as follows:[19]

 such a measure of prudence, activity, or assiduity, as is properly to be expected from, and ordinarily exercised by, a reasonable and prudent [person] under the particular circumstances; not measured by any absolute standard, but depending on the relative facts of the special case”. In the context of the Guiding Principles, human rights due diligence comprises an ongoing management process that a reasonable and prudent enterprise needs to undertake, in the light of its circumstances (including sector, operating context, size and similar factors) to meet its responsibility to respect human rights. (Emphasis added)

It is clear from the definition above that HRDD is separate to the due diligence processes generally carried out by a business (for example, corporate due diligence). It is also clear that HRDD should be undertaken by all businesses in order to respect human rights. However, the extent of the HRDD to be carried out is dependent on various factors. As stated in Principle 17, the scope of HRDD is dependent on the ‘size of the business enterprise, the risk of severe human rights impacts, and the nature and context of its operations’. Accordingly, the scope of HRDD processes should be tailored to a specific business’ needs and should evolve as a business’ operations and operating context develop – therefore, the process that is applied by one business cannot necessarily be applied by another business. For example, larger businesses are required to carry out more extensive HRDD than smaller businesses.

 

Elements of HRDD

The four key interrelated elements of HRDD are set out in Principles 18 to 21 of the UNGPs, namely, assessing actual or potential adverse human rights impacts, integrating findings across the business and taking appropriate action, tracking the effectiveness of their response and communicating with stakeholders. This process will be explained in further detail below.

In order to conduct HRDD, businesses should start by conducting regular human rights impact assessment in order to by identify and assess ‘any actual or potential adverse human rights impacts which they may be involved’ in both their activities as well as their business relationships. Such an assessment is a critical aspect of HRDD as it is necessary for a business to evaluate its human rights risks before it can consider the steps to take to address those risks. The assessments should involve:[20]

assessing the human rights context prior to a proposed business activity, where possible; identifying who may be affected; cataloguing the relevant human rights standards and issues; and projecting how the proposed activity and associated business relationships could have adverse human rights impacts on those identified.

The findings of such assessments should then be integrated across a business’ relevant internal functions and processes to prevent and mitigate risks identified. Further, action should be taken where the business has had actual impacts so as to remediate those affected. Complexities may arise with respect to this element of HRDD, with situations existing where a business may not contribute to an adverse human rights impact, but nevertheless because of the business’ relationship with a third party the impact is directly linked to the business’ operations, products or services. Situations may also exist where a business has little or no leverage to address an impact. In such situations, businesses should seek independent expert advice.[21]

Businesses should then track the effectiveness of their response to adverse human rights impacts. Tracking allows a business to ensure that it is appropriately and adequately addressing the human rights impacts of its operations and to adapt its response if required. It should be ‘based on appropriate qualitative and quantitative indicators’ and ‘draw on feedback from both internal and external sources’.

The approach taken by businesses to address their human rights impacts should be communicated externally, including to those affected. Where severe human rights impacts exist within a business, how the business responds to impacts should be reported in a formal manner. In order to ensure that useful information is provided to external stakeholders, all communications should be accessible to its intended audience and provide sufficient information to ensure that business’ can evaluate the adequacy of their response to a particular human rights impact involved. Such communication ensures accountability and transparency on the part of the business.

The image below developed by Shift illustrates the cyclical nature of the HRDD process and shows that it is an ongoing process that must be undertaken in regular intervals in order to truly assist businesses to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for how they address their impacts on human rights.

 

 


 

Conclusion

As discussed above, HRDD lies at the heart of the corporate responsibility to respect human rights in the UNGPs. While the UNGPs were released in 2011, the concept of due diligence was around almost two decades before that – however, it was applied purely in the context of commercial transactions. The draft Norms imported the idea of due diligence into the business and human rights sphere. After the draft Norms failed, Ruggie revived the concept when he was appointed as Special Representative. He saw HRDD as key to businesses being able to know and show that they respect human rights to their stakeholders. Ruggie developed the concept from 2005 onwards, emphasising its benefits for businesses. Leading to the final articulation of HRDD as a central mechanism of the UNGPs in 2011.

From the discussion in this blog post, it is clear that the UNGPs as well as Ruggie’s reports and statements in the lead up to their inception do not (and probably could not) explicitly address how HRDD is to be applied and operationalised by businesses in practice. This will be explored in greater detail in the upcoming blog posts in this series.


[1] Securities Act 1933, section 11(a).

[2] Ibid, section 11(b).

[3] Ibid, section 11(c).

[4] See Michael Harvey and Robert Lusch, Expanding the Nature and Scope of Due Diligence, 10(1) Journal of Business Venturing 5 (1995); Michael Harvey and Robert Lusch, Beyond Traditional Due Diligence for Mergers and Acquisitions in the 21st Century, 19(3) Review of Business 17 (1998); Olga Martin-Ortega, Human Rights Due Diligence for Corporations: From Voluntary Standards to Hard Law at Last, 32 Neth. Q. Hum. Rts. 44 (2014), p 49.

[5] See for example Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras (1989) 28 ILM 294, [172] and the Council of Europe’s Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (2010), article 5(2).

[6] John Ruggie and John Sherman, The Concept of ‘Due Diligence’ in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: A Reply to Jonathan Bonnitcha and Robert McCorquodale, 28(3) The European Journal of International Law 921 (2017), p 924; Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie: Business and human rights: towards operationalizing of the “protect, respect and remedy” framework (22 April 2009), UN Doc. A/HRC/11/13 (2009 Report), [25].

[7] 2009 Report, [25].

[8] John Ruggie and John Sherman, The Concept of ‘Due Diligence’ in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: A Reply to Jonathan Bonnitcha and Robert McCorquodale, 28(3) The European Journal of International Law 921 (2017), p 924.

[9] Keynote Address by SRSG John Ruggie “Engaging Business: Addressing Respect for Human Rights” (2010).

[10] Ibid.

[11] Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie: Business and human rights: further steps toward the operationalization of the “protect, respect and remedy” framework (9 April 2010), UN Doc. A/HRC/14/27 (2010 Report), [79].

[12] Keynote Address by SRSG John Ruggie “Engaging Business: Addressing Respect for Human Rights” (2010).

[13] 2010 Report, [86].

[14] Ibid, [25].

[15] Ibid, [57]; 2009 Report, [50].

[16] Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie: Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights (7 April 2008), UN Doc. A/HRC/8/5, [72].

[17] Ibid, [58]; 2009 Report, [53]-[54].

[18] Ibid, [60]-[63].

[19] UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, The Corporate Responsibility to Protect Human Rights: An Interpretative Guide, UN Doc. HR/PUB/12/02, p 6.

[20] UNGPs, p 19.

[21] UNGPs, pp 21-22.

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