Asser International Sports Law Blog

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The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

Resolution of Disputes Arising From Football Contracts in Turkey. By N. Emre Bilginoglu

Editor’s note: N. Emre Bilginoglu[1] is a lawyer based in Istanbul. His book entitled “Arbitration on Football Contracts” was published in 2015.


Introduction

With a total market value of approximately 911 million EUR, the Turkish Super League ranks as one of the prominent football leagues in Europe. Five of the eighteen teams that make up half of the total market value are based in Istanbul, a busy megalopolis that hosts a population of fifteen million inhabitants.[2] As might be expected, the elevated market value brings forth a myriad of disputes, mainly between the clubs and the players. However, other crucial actors such as coaches and agents are also involved in some of the disputes. These actors of the football industry are of all countries, coming from various countries with different legal systems.

One corollary of rapid globalisation is the development of transnational law, which is quite visible in the lex sportiva.[3] Like foreign investors, foreign actors of the sports industry look for some legal security before signing a contract. FIFA does protect these foreign actors in some way, providing players and coaches legal remedies for employment-related disputes of an international dimension. But what if the legal system of the FIFA member association does not provide a reasonable legal remedy for its national actors?[4]

That is why lawyers who are involved in sports related disputes have to guide their law-makers in improving their legal systems after thoroughly examining the dispute resolution mechanisms of other countries. Arbitration is indeed growing exponentially as a method of dispute resolution.[5] The renowned alternative dispute resolution is especially preferred in disputes arising from sports contracts, where both a rapid and a confidential resolution is of the essence.[6]  However, some legal systems oblige the parties of a sports related dispute to resolution by arbitration whereas some legal systems do not. This article gives the reader an insight about resolution of disputes arising from football contracts in Turkey. 


Turkish Method of Dispute Resolution

In August 2015, the Turkish Football Federation made certain changes in its Statute and guidelines. Since those changes, disputes arising from contracts between football clubs, players, coaches and agents are resolved within the Turkish Football Federation Dispute Resolution Board (“UCK”).[7] Therefore, applying to State courts for these disputes (the previous way of resolving disputes) is now impossible, which is a substantial legal issue.

Article 59 of the Turkish Constitution states that disputes related to sports administration and disciplinary matters should be resolved by mandatory arbitration.[8] Decisions of these kinds cannot be appealed to any court of the judiciary. The scope of this article does not include employment related disputes. Article 9 of the Constitution declares that judicial power shall be exercised by independent courts. However, courts do not have jurisdiction to hear disputes arising from football contracts because of the regulations of the Turkish Football Federation. Kelsen’s hierarchy of laws is indeed upside down, alas, the current practice without a proper legal basis is the actual practice. It does not seem like a change is scheduled in the near future, given that many are grateful for the rapid resolution of disputes.

The UCK consists of a “Board of Presidents” and arbitrators. It carries out a simple arbitration process and it involves two arbitrators and a UCK official. The applicant is responsible for the application fee (3% of the disputed amount) and paying the arbitrators' fees, which are decided by UCK (between about 450 and 1500 Euros per arbitrator). The UCK decides within four months (they have the right to extend the time limit for a month based on justified grounds). The decision of the UCK may be appealed to the Turkish Football Federation Appeals Board. However, this appeal does not obstruct the enforcement of the award. Although the statute of the Turkish Football Federation recognizes the competence of CAS, it also declares that the decisions rendered by the Appeals Board cannot be reviewed by CAS.[9]

Decisions of the UCK are not published. Decisions of the Arbitral Tribunal are published without reasoning. Hence, it is impossible to know both the facts of the case and how the arbitral tribunal reached a verdict. This negatively impacts the predictability of the UCK and the Arbitral Tribunal.

The proper composition of the UCK is an important condition for fair and equitable proceedings.[10] Arbitrators are nominated by the Foundation of the Clubs, the Association of Football Players and the Association of Coaches. These three institutions may nominate up to 25 arbitrators each. However, the Turkish Football Federation board of directors appoints the arbitrators from the list of nominees, thus casting a shadow on the independence and the impartiality of the arbitral tribunal, which are crucially important for the right to a fair trial.[11] There are numerous links between the UCK, the Arbitral Tribunal and the Turkish Football Federation. The Federation finances the UCK and the Arbitral Tribunal, can modify the Statutes of the UCK and the Arbitral Tribunal and it appoints the arbitrators of the UCK and the members of the Arbitral Tribunal. The current formation of the UCK resembles CAS before Gundel reforms.

Sporting sanctions and training compensations are also within the scope of the UCK.[12] Decisions of the UCK may only be appealed to Arbitral Tribunal of the Turkish Football Federation. The lack of a judicial review for these decisions is disconcerting. I believe the involvement of the Swiss Federal Tribunal in the CAS process could serve as a good model. CAS decisions may be appealed to the Swiss Federal Tribunal but there is no court in Turkey to appeal to once the Arbitral Tribunal decides on the matter. A general court or the Turkish Court of Cassation must review the decisions of the Arbitral Tribunal regarding disputes on football contracts. Decisions of the Arbitral Tribunal related to sports administration and disciplinary matters are accurately not appealable, as stated by Article 59 of the Constitution. However, Article 59 of the Constitution does not include personal actions. Article 9 of the constitution declares that the judicial power shall be exercised by independent courts. The right to access to courts that is granted by the Constitution cannot be breached by an amendment of the Turkish Football Federation. Therefore, courts are wrong for denying jurisdiction for disputes arising from football contracts. 


Players

The rights and obligations between clubs and players are determined by an employment agreement.[13] In Turkey, labour courts have jurisdiction on disputes arising from employment agreements. However, the Turkish Labour Code does not apply to players, thus surprisingly excluding the jurisdiction of labour courts for disputes regarding them. Article 4 of the Labour Code states that the Code does not apply to athletes. The reason behind this exclusion is not to grant certain rights and benefits to athletes, such as severance payments. Before the amendments of August 2015 came into force, disputes regarding players were resolved in general courts, not labour courts. The debate whether general courts or labour courts have jurisdiction is now obsolete, as the players have to apply to the UCK for the disputes arising from football contracts.

The FIFA DRC adjudicates on cases regarding employment related disputes between a club and a player of an international dimension, therefore foreign players do not have to apply to the UCK. In a case of dual citizenship (the player was British/ Turkish), CAS awarded that someone who benefits from Turkish citizenship should also accept its possible burdens, thus refusing jurisdiction.[14]

Arbitration is indubitably more preferable compared to courts for players. The UCK decides within four months and the decision is enforced by the Turkish Football Federation right away. This promptitude surely provides an advantage for players. Nevertheless, arbitrators’ fees are a hefty burden for destitute amateur players or pro players of the third league. On the contrary, application fees that are three percent of the disputed amount is a supernumerary amount for high earning players. High arbitration cost is a concern, as it is strictly related to right of access to courts. Costs should not victimize the plaintiff. 


Coaches

The FIFA PSC adjudicates on disputes between a club and a coach of an international dimension. Turkish coaches working in Turkey do not have that option. Before the implementation of the mandatory arbitration, labour courts had jurisdiction over the disputes arising from employment agreements of coaches. As of August 2015, coaches may only apply to the UCK for disputes arising from their contracts.

The Turkish Super League clubs do not prefer stability with regard to their coaches, as only one team in the league started the 2016-2017 season with the same coach for the third consecutive year. Coaches seem content with the rapid resolution of their contractual disputes and the confidentiality provided by arbitration, however, arbitrators within UCK are seldom appointed by them.


Agents

The FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players state that the PSC has no jurisdiction to hear any contractual dispute involving intermediaries. Agents, foreign or not, have to apply to the UCK for disputes arising from their contracts. This is overall problematic for agents, because they do not have any say on the appointment of arbitrators. Therefore, the independence and the impartiality of the UCK is suspicious, especially for agents. It is highly recommended for foreign agents to work with Turkish lawyers doing business in Turkey. If not, they will have to hire one at some point.  


Conclusion

Arbitration does truly offer a structure that is football-oriented and more aware of the realities of modern football, as stated in the preamble of FIFA NDRC Standard Regulations. “National” arbitration of football related disputes is evolving. The fact that this is genuinely a developing method of dispute resolution should encourage practitioners to improve their national legal systems. Practitioners and those who are in the football business may quite easily benefit from such improvement because it would only influence the business positively. In the Turkish context I would advise the following:

First, decisions not regarding disputes related to sports administration and disciplinary matters of the Arbitral Tribunal should be appealable. This would provide the right to access to courts, as granted by the Constitution.

Second, the independence and the impartiality of the UCK is still a problematic issue that needs to be tackled. The UCK should not be within the structure of the Turkish Football Federation. The process of the appointment of arbitrators should be revised. Clubs, players, coaches and agents must have an equal say on the matter.

The current Turkish system is preferable compared to everlasting court process. Four months to receive an award and the assurance of the enforcement of the award by the Turkish Football Federation is quite encouraging. Mandatory arbitration of UCK is very recent and hopefully the novel system will evolve to fulfil the criteria of FIFA.



[1] Nurettin Emre Bilginoglu, LLM, Attorney-at-law

 Istanbul, Turkey

 e-mail: emre@caglayanyalcin.com

[2] http://www.transfermarkt.com/super-lig/startseite/wettbewerb/TR1

[3] Duval (2013) Lex Sportiva: a playground for transnational law. Eur Law J 19:822-842.

[4] Preamble of the FIFA National Dispute Resolution Chamber Standard Regulations points at this issue:

 “Currently, only a limited number of member associations have a national dispute resolution chamber or a body structured along similar lines that fulfils the criteria of article 22 paragraph b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players. This means that the vast majority of international employment-related disputes fall within the jurisdiction of the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber and that the majority of “national” cases may not find appropriate solutions.”

[5] See Ashford (2014) Handbook on International Commercial Arbitration. JurisNet LLC, New York and Karton (2013) The Culture of International Arbitration and the Evolution of Contract Law. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

[6] See Rigozzi (2005) L’arbitrage international en matière de sport. Helbing & Lichtenhahn, Basel.

[7] See Eksi N (2015) Spor Tahkim Hukuku. Beta, Istanbul and Bilginoglu N (2015) Resolution of Disputes Arising From Football Contracts. Beta, Istanbul.

[8] Artıcle 59- The State shall take measures to develop the physical and mental health of Turkish citizens of all ages, and encourage the spread of sports among the masses. The State shall protect successful athletes. (Paragraph added on March 17, 2011; Act No. 6214) The decisions of sport federations relating to administration and discipline of sportive activities may be challenged only through compulsory arbitration. The decisions of Board of Arbitration are final and shall not be appealed to any judicial authority.

[9] “…the TFF Statutes and the Turkish Football Law expressly exclude any appeal against national arbitral tribunals’ decisions, i.e. against such a decision like the Appealed Decision which is the object of the present case. The particular trumps the general. Therefore the argument of the Player that he has an express right of appeal to the CAS under the TFF Statutes must be rejected.” See CAS 2010/A/1996 Omer Riza v. Trabzonspor Kulübü Dernegi & Turkish Football Federation (TFF).

[10] CAS 2015/A/4172 Association of Unions of Football Players and Coaches v. Football Union of Russia.

[11] Although the formation of the arbitral tribunal was different, see CAS 2006/O/1055 Del Bosque, Grande, Miñano Espín & Jiménez v/ Besiktas. For European Court of Human Rights decisions, see Terra Woningen B.V. v. Netherlands, Application N:     20641/92, Date: 17/12/1996; Tsfayo v. UK, Application N: 60860/00, Date: 14/11/2006.

[12] See de Weger (2016) The Jurisprudence of the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber, T.M.C. Asser Press for extensive information on sporting sanctions and training compensations.

[13] De Weger (2016) p. 132; For the German practise, see Frodl C (2016) Neuer, Hummels, Muller, Gotze & Co: the legal framework governing industrial relations in German professional football, Int Sports Law J (2016) 16:3–21.

[14] CAS 2010/A/1996 Omer Riza v. Trabzonspor Kulübü Dernegi & Turkish Football Federation (TFF). 

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Asser International Sports Law Blog | Caster Semenya at the SFT – in 10 points - By Jack Anderson

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

Caster Semenya at the SFT – in 10 points - By Jack Anderson

Editor's note: Jack Anderson is Professor and Director of Sports Law Studies at the University of Melbourne

 

1.     Caster Semenya appealed to the Swiss Federal Court (SFT) arguing that World Athletics’ regulations violated human rights principles relating to gender discrimination and human dignity. The Swiss Federal Tribunal (as at CAS) held that World Athletics’ regulations may prima facie breach such human rights principles but were “necessary, reasonable and proportionate” to maintain fairness in women's athletics;


2.     Although in part addressed at the SFT, expect further legal argument on this in the domestic courts of South Africa or at the ECtHR, and in the following ways:

  • Necessity - is the athletic advantage that Caster Semenya has of such a scientifically-measurable extent that it is necessary for World Athletics to intervene in such an invasive manner? In a broader ethical sense, is the incidence of what the World Athletics’ regulations call “difference of sex development” of such prevalence in the general population, and specifically in middle-distance athletics, that, by way of the principle of “sporting beneficence”, intervention is justified. Or, in contrast, is the incidence of DSD not at a level which justifies a departure from the ethical principle of primum non nocere – first, do no harm?
  • Reasonableness - if World Athletics’ regulations are necessary, is the manner of implementation reasonable and in line with the principle of human and bodily integrity? In answering such a question, the focus must be on the fact that in order to continue to compete in her favourite events (such as the 800 metres) Caster Semenya will have to lower her testosterone level through medication;
  • Proportionate - if World Athletics’ regulations are necessary and reasonable is the manner of implementation proportionate? In answering such a question, the focus must be on whether the regulations disproportionately discriminate against a certain, limited group of athletes in a certain, limited number of events and in a certain, limited manner.

 

3.     Overall, in assessing whether the qualification of a human right (e.g. freedom of expression) can be justified, the usual issue for a court is that that human right is competing against or in conflict with another human right or issue of public importance (in the instance of free expression, that competing issue might be one of public order or health, for example). The fundamental issue in the Caster Semenya proceedings seems to be whether the qualification of anti-discrimination principles can be justified, not on grounds such as, in the absence of such regulation, other athletes might be endangered in competing against Caster Semenya; but rather and simply that without intervention, it is unfair, in the sporting sense, on other athletes to compete against Caster Semenya. Is a purely sporting right (a level playing field) sufficient of itself to justify a derogation from a fundamental principle of human rights or is that derogation something that can reasonably be reserved to a sporting body on the grounds of fair competition for all?

 

4.     In sum, both CAS and now the SFT, have said that World Athletics has justified the deviation from human rights law because (a) it is necessary, as premised on a scientifically measurable, sporting disadvantage and (b) the resulting regulations have been drafted/implemented in a reasonable/proportionate manner.

 

5.     A key legal issue in the future is how the CAS’s award and the SFT’s judgment can be reconciled with the opinion of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in a report presented recently to the 44th session of the Human Rights Council (15 June to 3 July 2020) on the “Intersection of race and gender discrimination in sport”. In that report, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights elaborated on relevant international human rights norms and standards and the corresponding obligations of States and the responsibilities of sporting bodies towards women and girl athletes. In doing so, the report identified possible gaps in the protection of the human rights of women and girls in sports and including the manner in which sport resolves disputes with a significant human rights element to them.

 

6.     At paragraph 53 of the report, the UN High Commission for Human Rights concluded pertinently:

“In addition, regulations regarding female eligibility to compete in sport raise concerns about the ability of all athletes to enjoy their rights. Private sports bodies and their rules and regulations dominate the current global and corporatized structure of sport governance. Concerns have been raised in this context indicating that women and girl athletes may face serious obstacles to accessing effective remedies and seeking full redress for violations of their human rights. In accordance with their obligations under international human rights law, States should ensure that non-State actors, including sport governing bodies, respect human rights in their own regulatory regimes and are accountable for breaches.”

 

7.     It is also of note that prior to the SFT judgment and with implied reference to the Semenya award at CAS, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights noted the following two points (at paragraph 47). First, the process under Swiss law of appealing a CAS award to the SFT includes an appeal premised on public policy ground of prohibition from discriminatory measures -  A. v. Z., FIFA and X., Case No. 4A_304/2013, judgment of 3 March 2014, sect. 5.1. Second, the Commissioner noted that:

“Other national courts may also refuse to recognize and enforce an arbitral award if doing so would be contrary to the public policy of that State, which may include certain fundamental human rights.”

8.     In this, the UN High Commissioner relied on article V (2) (b) of the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. The Commission did admit however that such a decision by a state (e.g., if South Africa refused to recognised the CAS award in the Semenya case) would be “jurisdictionally limited, as it would not be capable of suspending the regulations of a sport governing body [World Athletics] worldwide.”

 

9.     With regard to World Athletics’ regulations, World Athletics itself appear to recognise the dynamic, living nature of the research and policy objectives that underpin the regulations. It follows that where new evidence is presented (on, for example, the scientific foundations of the regulations or their manner of implementation or impact on athletes) the necessity, reasonable and proportionality of the regulations can and ought to be reassessed.

 

10.  Finally, the proceedings as whole might suggest that where an analogous human rights related case arises again (and not just in athletics) an athlete may resile from having it resolved at CAS, arguing, in the language of human rights law, that CAS does not provide an “effective remedy”.  But the focus on CAS is somewhat misplaced. CAS’s jurisdiction is founded in, granted to it by and largely constricted to the interpretation of the regulations of the referring sports body – in this case World Athletics. Although of little consolation to the athlete herself, the key legal lesson from the Caster Semenya proceedings – which appear far from over -  may be that the campaign to embed human rights principles in the regulations of sports bodies must continue apace and where sport bodies agree to comply with such principles, human rights norms should permeate not just their regulatory activities but should also enable athletes to rely on any and all aspects of human rights law up to and including seeking effective remedy at CAS.  

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Asser International Sports Law Blog | The Russian Ballet at the CAS Ad Hoc Division in Rio - Act II: On being implicated

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

The Russian Ballet at the CAS Ad Hoc Division in Rio - Act II: On being implicated

Editor's note: This is the second part/act of our blog series on the Russian eligibility cases at the CAS ad hoc Division in Rio.

 

Act II: On being implicated


Paragraph 2 of the IOC Decision: The IFs to examine the information contained in the IP Report, and for such purpose seek from WADA the names of athletes and National Federations (NFs) implicated. Nobody implicated, be it an athlete, an official, or an NF, may be accepted for entry or accreditation for the Olympic Games.”

 

The second, and by far largest, wave of complaints involved Russian athletes barred from the game under paragraph 2 of the IOC Decision. None of those were successful in their appeals as the CAS sided with those IFs which took a tough stance with regard to the Russian State doping system. The first set of cases turned on the definition of the word “implicated” in the sense of paragraph 2 of the IOC Decision. In this regard, on 2 August the IOC sent a communication to the IFs aiming at providing some general guidelines. It reads as follows:

"In view of the recent appeals filed by Russian Athletes with CAS, the IOC considers it necessary to clarify the meaning of the notion "implicated" in the EB Decision.

The IOC does not consider that each athlete referred to in the McLaren Lists shall be considered per se "implicated. It is for each International federation to assess, on the basis of the information provided in the McLaren lists and the Independent Person Report, whether it is satisfied that the Athlete in question was implicated in the Russian State-controlled doping scheme.

To assist the International Federations in assessing each individual case, the IOC wishes to provide some information. In the IOC's opinion, an athlete should not be considered as "implicated" where:

·       The order was a "quarantine".

·       The McLaren List does not refer to a prohibited substance which would have given rise to an anti-doping rule violation or;

·       The McLaren List does not refer to any prohibited substance with respect to a given sample."

The CAS went on to address this question concretely in three cases analysed below. [1]

 

A.    CAS OG 16/19 Natalia Podolskaya & Alexander Dyachenko v. ICF

Podolskaya and Dyachenko are two canoeists from Russia who were suspended by the International Canoe Federation (ICF) and removed from the Rio Games as they were deemed implicated in the IP Report. In an affidavit to the CAS, referred to in the award, Richard McLaren disclosed the facts that led to both athletes being considered implicated.

Regarding Podolskaya, McLaren indicated that he has retrieved electronic evidence that “reveals that on 31 July 2013 at 00:50 hours, in contravention of the International Standard for Laboratories, the Moscow Laboratory reported to email address av@sochi2014.com that sample member 2780289, belonging to a female canoe athlete taken at the Russian Championships in Moscow, was suspected for EPO and further inquired what should be done”.[2] In a quick response on 1 August 2013, Alexey Velikodniy, then vice-minister for sports, “communicated back to Laboratory that the sample number 2780289 belonged to Ms. Natalia Podolskaya and instructed the Laboratory to "SAVE"”.[3] Similarly, as far as Dyachenko is concerned, the “electronic evidence reveals that on 5 August 2014 at 12:09 hours, in contravention of the International Standard Laboratories, the Moscow Laboratory reported to Alexey Velikodniy that pre-departure sample number 2917734, collected at a Training Camp on 3 August 2014, contained a lot oftrenbolone and a little methenolone. Alexey Velikodny's response to the laboratory on 6 August 2014 at 1%:26 [sic] was that sample number 2917734 from 3 August 2014 pre-departure test belonging to Mr Alexander Dyachenko, and on instruction from "llR", should be a "SAVE".”[4] McLaren concludes that for both “Ms. Natalia Podolskaya and Alexander Dyachenko, the "SAVE" instruction signalled to the Laboratory that no further analytical bench work was to be done on the samples and the Laboratory filed a negative ADAMS report for each athlete”. [5]

In its assessment of the application of paragraph 2 of the IOC Decision by the ICF, the CAS Panel finds that the “Applicants were among five athletes so [as implicated in the IP Report] named” and that the “ICF was entitled to conclude that the Applicants failed to meet the criteria in paragraph 2”.[6] Moreover, this “conclusion has been reinforced by the evidence made available to the Panel by Professor Mclaren” and “is justified on the standard of comfortable satisfaction”.[7] The applicants, unsuccessfully, argued that they were never sanctioned for an anti-doping rule violation, and that the samples referred to in the IP Report cannot be tested anymore to prove their innocence. They also claimed that other contemporary samples returned negative and “that if they had used prohibited substances, all the tests would have returned positive”.[8] Nonetheless, WADA pointed out that “due to the nature of the substances concerned and the timing of the provision of the samples, this cannot be concluded”.[9] The Panel accepted “WADA's submission, not contradicted by the Applicants, that there are explanations consistent with the Applicant's assertion but also consistent with the taking of the prohibited substances at the relevant time”.[10]

Finally, the Russian applicants tried to fight their ineligibility under the implication criteria laid down in paragraph 2 of the IOC Decision by arguing that it was not compatible with natural justice.[11] Yet, The CAS refused to follow this line of reasoning. Instead, the Panel found that the “Applicants have challenged that decision in the CAS and have been given the opportunity to rebut that evidence”, thus they “have not been denied natural justice or procedural fairness”.[12]

 

B.    CAS OG 16/21 Elena Anyushina & Alexey Korovashkov v. ICF & RCF 

Anyushina and Korovashkov are also two canoeists from Russia. Similar to Podolskaya and Dyachenko, they were suspended on 26 July 2016 by the ICF and removed from the Rio Games as they were deemed implicated in the IP report. However, Anyushina was quickly reinstated and declared eligible to compete at the Games by the IOC.[13] The procedure was, consequently, limited to Korovashkov. He was deemed implicated because, as outlined by Richard McLaren in his affidavit:

"On 15 August 2014 at 09:22 hours, in contravention of the International Standard for Laboratories, the Moscow Laboratory reported to Alexey Velikodniy that sample number 2916461, collected 10 August 2014 in connection with an International Competition being held in Moscow, contained a lot of marijuana that was certainly above the threshold. (The /CF website reflects that the /CF Canoe Sprint World Championships took place in Moscow from the 8-10 August 2014)Alexey Velikodniy's response to the Laboratory on 18 August 2014 at 08:59 identified that sample number 2916461 belonged to Mr. Alexey Korovashkov and instructed that it should be a 'SAVE." Alexey Velikodniy also notes that Mr. Alexey sample is under investigation. Mr. Korovashkov's sample number 2916461 was reported negative in ADAMS."[14]

The Russian canoeist argued that the “evidence concerning the relevant sample on which the ICF relies to support its decision is unreliable”, because “there is no "threshold" provided for marijuana in WADA Technical Document TD 2013DL of 11 May 2013 concerning Decision Limits for the Confirmatory Quantification of Threshold Substances”.[15] In his view, “[i]f there is no threshold, it is unlikely that the laboratory would have provided such odd information to Alexey Velikodniy rather than reporting the threshold itself; the evidence does not resemble a laboratory report
Correspondence could not have been authored by the laboratory's employees, who are fully aware that they would be required to calculate and then state the actual result”.[16] The Panel rebutted this argument by pointing out that, in fact, the relevant WADA document included a threshold for Cannabinoids.[17] The Panel concluded that “the evidence is that the State sponsored doping system was applied to the Second Applicant so as to prevent a positive report of marijuana over the threshold for that substance”.[18] Consequently, Korovashkov was deemed implicated in the IP Report. The Panel did display its sympathy with the Russian athlete, as it pointed out that “[t]he ICF indicated that marijuana is not, in its view, a performance enhancing drug and the Panel notes that there is no suggestion of any other substance involved”.[19] 

The Panel further rejected Korovashkov argument that the ICF’s decision to declare him ineligible for the Rio Olympics amounted to a wrongful anti-doping sanction.[20] The applicant argued that the use of the word “suspended” in the original letter to the ICF was the terminology used under the WADA Code. The Panel finds that even though “suspended” “is a word used, and a sanction provided for, in the WADA Code, this does not mean that its inclusion means that the decision is made under that Code”.[21] Moreover, the CAS arbitrators consider it “clear that the letter was in direct response to the IOC Executive Board’s decision and concerned the eligibility of Russian athletes to compete in the Games of the XXXI Olympiad in Rio de Janeiro Games and to be accredited to those Games”. [22] Thus, it “was not a decision under the WADA Code and was not bound by the provisions of that Code”. [23] In other words, the Decision should not and could not be misconstrued as a doping ban based on the WADA Code, but found its legal basis in the IOC Decision and in Article 12.3 of the ICF Anti-doping Rules.

This case demonstrates the willingness of CAS arbitrators to adopt an objective reading of the notion of implication. If an athlete benefitted from the Russian doping scheme, even in case of a relatively harmless substance like cannabis, it was considered legitimate for an IF to remove him or her from Russia’s Olympic team.

 

C.    CAS OG 16/12 Ivan Balandin v. FISA & IOC

Ivan Balandin is a rower from Russia who was declared ineligible to compete at the Rio Olympics by the World Rowing Federation (FISA) on 27 July 2016, due to his implication in the IP Report. More precisely, he appears in the Report as having been “saved” by the Russian Deputy Minister of Sport and his test was later reported as negative in the ADAMS system.[24] 

The athlete first argued, as did Korovashkov, that this was an anti-doping sanction, which did not follow the appropriate procedure. WADA clarified “that the Athlete may yet face proceedings relating to an ADRV, however, the nature of these could yet to be determined [sic]”[25] and added that the “matter at hand concerns eligibility for the Rio Games”.[26] The Panel concurred and concluded that the “dispute at hand concerns the Athlete’s eligibility for the Rio Games alone”.[27]

The next question was whether Balandin was implicated in the IP Report. The Panel notes, as pointed out in the IOC letter from 2 August 2016, that a simple implication in the Report does not necessarily indicate that an athlete benefited from the State-doping scheme. In his defence, the athlete singled out that a date of collection was missing for the sample, in order to attack the validity of the information provided by McLaren. FISA responded that it had taken “the necessary steps to establish this date by calling UKAD”.[28] Moreover, Richard McLaren revealed in his amicus curiae “the exact date and times of the message from the Moscow Laboratory that the screen of the Athlete’s A sample revealed positive for the prohibited substance GW 1516 and the response from the Deputy Minister to change the positive into a negative, following the DPM” .[29] In any event, “the Panel is satisfied that the information provided to FISA and the additional checks it took with UKAD, were sufficient to show the Athlete was “implicated” in this scheme”.[30] The athlete was deemed implicated, but did he actually benefit from the scheme? The Panel “notes that the substance GW 1516 is a metabolic modulator and a non-specified substance and is prohibited at all times (without a threshold)”.[31] Additionally, “the instruction from the Deputy Minister was “save””[32]. Thus, the CAS arbitrators were “comfortably satisfied” that Balandin had benefitted from the scheme.

 

In all three cases, the athletes mentioned in the Report as ‘saved’ were recognized as implicated by the CAS. The court clearly distinguished the notion of implication from the fact that the athletes committed an anti-doping violation as defined by the WADA Code. However, it is unclear whether the arbitrators would have deemed an athlete implicated, if he or she was not named in the evidence provided by McLaren. As the disappearing positive methodology implemented by the Moscow laboratory was an ultima ratio, this still entails that many Russian athletes competing in Rio might have profited from Russia’s State doping scheme by escaping a positive test altogether. Hence, the IOC’s choice to narrow down on implicated athletes seems rather inadequate to tackle the generalized doping system unveiled by the IC and IP reports. 


[1] CAS OG 16/19 Natalia Podolskaya & Alexander Dyachenko v. ICF; CAS OG 16/21 Elena Anyushina & Alexey Korovashkov v. ICF & RCF; CAS OG 16/12 Ivan Balandin v. FISA & IOC. A fourth case, CAS OG 16/18 Kiril Sveshnikov et al. v. UCI & IOC, was declared inadmissible.

[2] CAS OG 16/19 Natalia Podolskaya & Alexander Dyachenko v. ICF, para. 2.11.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid., para. 7.13.

[7] Ibid., para. 7.14.

[8] Ibid., para. 7.24.

[9] Ibid., para. 7.24.

[10] Ibid., para. 7.26.

[11] Ibid., paras 7.15-7.26.

[12] Ibid., para. 7.18.

[13] CAS OG 16/21 Elena Anyushina & Alexey Korovashkov v. ICF & RCF, para. 3.13.

[14] Ibid., para. 2.6.

[15] Ibid., para. 7.10.

[16] Ibid., para. 7.12.

[17] Ibid., paras 7.15-17.

[18] Ibid., para. 7.20.

[19] Ibid., para. 7.21.

[20] Ibid., paras 7.23-7.27.

[21] Ibid., para. 7.24.

[22] Ibid., para. 7.25.

[23] Ibid.

[24] CAS OG 16/12 Ivan Balandin v. FISA & IOC, para.2.9.

[25] Ibid., para. 7.13.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Ibid., para. 7.15.

[28] Ibid., para 7.28.

[29] Ibid., para 7.29.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Ibid., para 7.30.

[32] Ibid.

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