Editor's note: Marine Montejo is a graduate from the College of Europe in Bruges and is currently an intern at the ASSER International Sports Law Centre.

The result of the Brexit referendum on 23 June 2016 took the European Union (almost) by surprise. A lot has been said and written about the impact of the United Kingdom leaving the EU. As in all other areas, the British sport sector will also face the effects of the modification of the relationship between the EU and its (probable) former Member State, the UK. It is nearly impossible to foresee all consequences as the UK has not even triggered article 50 TFEU yet to officially start the exit negotiations. However, as the UK position toward the EU will change in any case, this two-part blog aims to examine the main practical implications of such an exit for the UK, but also for the EU, in relation to the actual application of EU law in sport and the EU sport policy.

Unless stated otherwise, the use of the terms Brexit in this blog should be understood as a complete exit of the UK from the European Union. This blog focus in particular on this worst case scenario and its consequences for UK sport. However, it is highly improbable that the future Brexit negotiations with the EU will end up without some kind of special agreement between the two parties the first of which being an EEA type of agreement with full access to the internal market and applicability of EU law. 

The first part of this blog will examined the consequences for UK sport in terms of access to the EU internal market and the applicability of free movement principles. The second part is focused on specific impacts with regard of others domain of EU law for professional and grassroots UK sport. 

Part 1. EU free movement and the internal market

The EU internal market and its free movement of people declination was at the centre of the Brexit referendum. The potential consequences for the Premier League and professional footballers have been commented upon thoroughly elsewhere. Yet, Brexit’s impact is not restricted to British sport’s leading product, such as the Premier League, nor solely the freedom of movement provisions.

The controversy: free movement of sportspeople

The right to free movement is one of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the EU to its citizens and it is at the core of EU treaties. It means that any direct or indirect discrimination based on nationality is prohibited (article 18 TFEU), leaving EU citizens free to exercise their right to move freely and reside within the territories of the 28 EU Members States (article 21 TFEU). These rights apply to both professional and amateur sportspeople, and Brexit will have consequences for them whether they are British citizens or from other Members States.

First, in relation to professional and semi-professional sportspeople, when looking for example at consequences of Brexit on the Premier League, it is the principle of free movement of workers (article 45 TFEU) that is at stake. It should be noted that Brexit will impact not only footballers but also all professional athletes that are considered as “workers” within the meaning of the Treaty. In this context, “workers” means those who are gainfully employed (as stated in 1976 by the European Court of Justice - ECJ - in the Donà and Mantero case, 13/76). These athletes might be rugby or basketball players in a professional clubs or cyclists in a team to give a few examples. Also, other individuals associated with sportspeople may rely on the provisions of free movement of workers, such as doctors, physiotherapists, stable staff, coaches or administrative staff. 

Free movement also currently applies to professional and semi-professional sportspeople that are not “workers”. Freedoms of establishment (article 49 TFEU) and provision of services (article 56 TFEU) apply to athletes that are self-employed (for example tennis players, sailors or horse riders) or to instructors, coaches, or physical trainers. Sports agents may also rely on both freedoms if they are established in another of the EU’s Members States and/or if they are providing their services during a player transfer for example. To illustrate these provisions with genuine practical cases, you may want to think of a UK tennis player that has established himself in France for training purposes for a long period, or of Italian professional horse rider coming to the UK to provide a couple of hours of training for a master class. These situations are much more common than one believes and Brexit might have an important impact on significant number of people working in the sport sector.

At the time of writing it is impossible to know (or even guess) how events will unfold or what the future position of the UK toward the EU will be after Brexit negotiations. The impact will have to be assessed depending on whether and, if so, how the UK will have access to the internal market. A few UK sports officials have raised their voices to recall, for example, the strong position of British football in Europe and asked for exception regimes for their players. Without intending to sound pessimistic, EU officials have already made it very clear that the UK may not pick and choose how they access the internal market and it is difficult to see how a “sport exemption” regarding free movement of athletes may be granted against any other sectors. A solution might be to implement national UK legislation giving free access to professional players to the UK labour market. A problem will however remain regarding free access to the EU market for UK players as, in that case, there is no obligation for the EU to grant reciprocity. If the professional and semi-professional sport sector in the UK (and in the EU as well for UK players) wishes to still be able to recruit athletes that are EU citizens after the exit as easily as it was before Brexit, it should advocate for an EEA agreement (“EEA type” - which seems inconsistent with the intended aims of the referendum as, in this situation, the UK would retain its access to the internal market but would give up its voting rights). 

In the worst case scenario of a complete exit from the EU, is there any good news for UK sport? British sports federations will be able to implement rules entailing direct discrimination, including introducing quotas of players based on nationality or favouring their own athletes which is, for now, completely forbidden under EU law. On the other hand, the return of visas and work permits between the UK and the EU might lessen the level of competition in national championships as it will hinder exchanges of athletes on both sides. It is quite unsure that this is the best option for British sport. Moreover, one should remember that non-discrimination is also granted to sportspeople coming from non-EU countries under the terms of agreements between the EU and third countries (Igor Simutenkov C-265/03). For example, under the terms of the Cotonou Agreements, it is impossible to impose nationality based quotas for sportsmen from Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific Group of States provided the player entered the territory of one of the Member States legally, which is a strict condition. This principle implies that a player coming from one of the countries covered by that agreement is not considered as a “foreign” player if quotas for such players are in force in that sport (this is the case for Rugby Union for example). It also means that the UK not only has to renegotiate its relationship with the EU but with all other non-EU countries that are, for now, covered by these association or partnership agreements. British sport will need to be cautious about it.

It should also be noted that Brexit will lead to the end of the mutual recognition of professional qualifications (see directive 2005/36). This principle applies in the sport sector as well whenever the possession of a diploma is legally required; Member States cannot refuse to permit EU citizens from other Member States to participate in a profession if they hold a recognised qualification from their country for working in that profession unless there are substantial differences in the level of qualification or duration of training. This applies to coaches (i.e. ski instructors) or doctors in the sport sector for example. Another very specific example is the European professional card (directive 2013/55/EU, applicable from 18 January 2016) that has been implemented for mountain guides (and physiotherapists) and allows for a simple and rapid recognition of professional qualifications. Consequences might be less important where an international sports governing body sets up its own set of qualifications (think about the UEFA Pro Licence for football coaches).

Free movement provisions likewise apply to amateur athletes. Based on a combined reading of articles 18, 21 and 165 TFEU, EU citizens who participate in an amateur sporting activity by using their right to free movement should not be discriminated on grounds of nationality. It is, once more, nearly impossible to currently illustrate the impact of Brexit with tangible facts but it means that free movement of EU citizens who are amateur athletes will be affected while coming to or from the UK for competition or training purposes. Furthermore, in terms of injuries or accidents while training or competing, it should be recalled that Brexit may affect the European health insurance system. This system gives every EU citizens access to state-provided healthcare during a stay in any of the EU countries under the same conditions as people insured in that country.

Finally, it should be mentioned that Brexit may impact upon the sport sector as it has links to EU citizenship. A complete Brexit will entail that sports supporters cannot travel as freely between the UK and the EU as they used to. Again, a return to a strict visa policy seems unlikely but giving up EU citizenship will have consequences on border and passport controls and on the organisation of sport events in the UK. The UK and the EU will also no longer be entitled to the cooperation organised against violence and hooliganism within the EU (Council Decision 2002/348/JHA, security at international football matches), or, at least, not in the same terms.

The underlying problem: free movement of goods

Free movement of goods is an essential element of the single market (articles 30, 34 and 35 TFEU) and it provides for the prohibition of measures that restrict trade between Member States, including not only customs duties and quantitative restrictions on imports and exports but all equivalent measures. Sports clothing and materials are covered by these provisions. We shall probably enter a period of uncertainty but the future of trade relations between the UK and the EU will be at the top of the agenda as soon as the negotiations start. Also, in order to facilitate free movement, European standards for sporting purposes goods have been set up by the European Committee for Standardization – n°136 - (full list of standards here). This probably exposes the EU to the bureaucratic suspicion but these harmonisations are necessary to facilitate trade between the EU and to ensure a common level of consumer safety. UK/EU negotiations on Brexit will surely and primarily focus on trade agreements which hopefully will lower the risk of a return to full quotas and tariffs obligations. Nonetheless, trade between the UK and the EU will suffer as much in the sport sector as for other sectors and, again, an EEA type agreement would be welcome for both parties. 

One specific category of goods is important for the sport sector, namely the circulation of civil firearms. EU sport shooters have access to a European firearms pass under directive 91/477/EEC on the control of the acquisition and possession of weapons. This means that they can cross EU internal market borders without prior authorisation in order to attend competitions and trainings. Brexit will withdraw the possibility of obtaining that pass which may result in more red tape for sportspeople at the borders.

Finally, free movement also concerns horses which under EU law are qualified of “goods intended for sporting purposes”. This term is used to refer to the set of directives regulating the movement of and trade in equidae at the EU level. Three different directives are in force and may be impacted by Brexit. In turn, this will have severe consequences for the UK as the horse sector, whether for competition or horseracing, is really strong. Identification requirements – name, genealogy and victories – are established by EU law (directive 90/427/EEC and regulation 504/2008/EC) under strict animal health conditions and “regional” quarantine principles in case of disease (directive 2009/156/EEC). Trade of horses and participation in competitions within the EU is subject to non-discrimination and equal treatment principles between horses without distinction based on the Member States of origin (directive 90/428/EEC). This principle applies to the rules of competition, the judging and the prizes awarded for that competition. Some exceptions regarding specific stud-book, regional or traditional competition are possible. Finally, it should also be noted that a European Community code relating to veterinary medicinal products exists to implement the free movement of veterinary products and to prevent animal doping. Re-entry of registered horses for racing, competition and cultural events after temporary export to non-EU countries is also regulated (directive 93/195/EEC). The UK horse sector will have to change its habits (see, for example the reaction of British horseracing authority to the Brexit vote) after Brexit and the movement of horses with the EU will be more difficult as a consequence. However, as a former EU Member State, the UK will certainly negotiate a favourable agreement with the EU even though obligations concerning the arrival from and return to their home countries outside the EU of sport horses is already regulated. Additionally, it will be possible to negotiate bilateral agreements.[1]

The impact of Brexit regarding the rules of the internal market is important and goes further than just football and the Premier League. The push for a trade agreement with access to the EU internal market here has a special importance for UK sport as for the EU. Otherwise, a complete Brexit will surely end up in a difficult step backward alongside a complete reorganisation of national rules.  

[1] Such an agreement – Tripartite Agreement (TPA) – already exists between France, the United Kingdom and Ireland.

Reforming FIFA, or Not

 Antoine Duval

Book Review: Mark Pieth (ed.), Reforming FIFA, Dike Verlag, St. Gallen, 2014, 28.00 CHF, p.178

This book looks back at the work of the Independence Governance Committee (IGC). This Committee, constituted in 2011, had as primary objective to drive a reform process of FIFA initiated by its President Sepp Blatter. After ordering from the Swiss anti-corruption expert Mark Pieth, a report on the state of FIFA’s governance, FIFA decided to mandate him with the leadership of a consulting body composed of a mix of independent experts and football insiders, which would be accompanying and supervising the internal reform process of FIFA. The IGC was officially dissolved at the end of 2013, after completing its mandate. The book is composed of eight chapters, written by former members of the IGC, including former chairman Mark Pieth. In addition to the chapters, it includes the different reports (available here, here and here) submitted by the IGC to FIFA across the years. In the words of Pieth, this account is “fascinating because it gives a hands-on, realistic perspective of the concrete efforts, the achievements and the remaining challenges in the struggle for the reform of this organization [FIFA], avoiding the usual glorification or vilification.”[1] This review will first summarize the core of the account of the FIFA reform process provided by the book, before critically engaging with the outcome of the process and outlining the deficiencies that culminated on 29 May 2015 with the re-election of Sepp Blatter as FIFA president.

I.               Reforming FIFA…

In his introduction to the book, Mark Pieth provides a compelling account of the reasons why FIFA needs a reform process in the first place. He talks of the ““old boys” suddenly becoming rich”[2] and of the lack of “public accountability”[3] of FIFA. This narrative is similar to the one provided by Guillermo Jorge later in the book. He highlights the fact that FIFA relies on a “solide patronage network”, creating “incentives for member associations to engage in rent seeking – which means: spend time and efforts in obtaining such funds – and, at the same time, creates incentives for incumbents to request the favour back at the ballot box.”[4] Jorge’s detailed account of the institutional features of FIFA underlying this “patronage system” is in itself of great value.

It is further argued that with the scandals triggered by the Bin Hammam affair, in 2011, “Mr Blatter, realized that the governance structure needed to be adapted to the new challenges.”[5] In other words, it “was a product of the personal ambition of its president.” [6] All along the book, Pieth and other members of the IGC, consider Blatter as a key supporter of the reform process and shift the blame for its incompleteness on UEFA’s shoulders amongst others.[7]. UEFA, it is claimed, has been instrumental in blocking a centralized integrity check on FIFA officials (especially the members of the ExCo). Blatter, for his part, is said to have understood “sooner than many of his colleagues”, that “the system” was falling apart”[8] and that a “self-controlled reform seemed to be a rational response to pre-empt or delay external regulation and mitigate the risk for future, more uncertain investigations.”[9]

The substance of the reform triggered by the IGC is not discussed in great detail, nor is its implementation in practice assessed in depth. To be fair, the book chapters were probably written early 2014 and could hardly have done so. The core changes highlighted by the members of the IGC concern the function and structure of the Ethics Committee and the Audit and Compliance Committee. As claimed by Pieth, “the most tangible changes are the institutional changes in the area of the Ethics Committee and the Audit and Compliance Committee.”[10] In particular, “the independent permanent chairs and deputy chairs of the Ethics Committee and the Audit and Compliance Committee.”[11] Pieth praises the fact that “[t]he investigator and his deputy have full discretion which cases they take on and decide to investigate.”[12] Moreover, the “investigation is independent both from the FIFA administration and from the judicial chamber.”[13] This is also underlined by the contribution of Lord Peter Goldsmith focusing on the investigatory process.[14] Damian Heller discusses the core changes introduced to the Audit and Compliance Committee (ACC) in a separate chapter.[15] After the reform, the ACC has gained new important competences, e.g. drawing up the Organisation Regulation (governing the rights and obligations of FIFA’s organs), controlling the compensation policy of FIFA executives, monitoring the bidding process for the World Cup and auditing the use of the development funds. In addition to this, the independence of the Committee members has been reinforced. Thus, Pieth expect “that these independent agents within FIFA will make a big difference in the culture of the organization during their tenure.”[16]

The members of the IGC are not all positive about the changes triggered by the reform process engaged by FIFA. For Leandro Grosso, the member of IGC representing FIFPro, the football players’ union, the reform is clearly a failure.[17] Pieth himself is cautious enough to remind in his introduction “that pure self-regulation is a slow and uncertain process.”[18] He insists, that “[t]o be successful it has to change the culture of the whole organization, it needs to reach the associations in particular and it has to permeate the everyday life of the organization.”[19] Yet, throughout the book, there is still a clear sentiment that the FIFA reform process was a success. Indeed, Pieth considers that “[w]ith the new independent chairs in place, a first essential step has been taken.”[20] He adds: “it must be acknowledged that, overall, the last three years have been rather successful in bringing the regulations up to a certain standard.”[21] As another IGC member puts it “[t]he IGC has largely succeeded in its efforts to reform FIFA’s governance.”[22] After the reform, “there are far greater systems and controls and far greater ethical standards within FIFA.”[23] In short, “FIFA is today much closer to public and corporate governance standards than it was two years ago.”[24] Is this true?

II.             …Or Not

The IGC’s members’ optimism might go a bit too far. The recent events surrounding the investigation of the bidding process for the World Cup 2018 and 2022 seem to call for a critical assessment of the scope of progress made. Independent investigatory personnel make little difference if a final report is later shelved without allowing for external scrutiny of its findings as happened with the by now infamous Garcia report on the attribution of the 2018 and 2022 World Cup. Similarly, having a competent check on FIFA’s compensation policy is of little use if those rigorous accounts are not made freely available for journalists and the public to peruse them. The institutional changes celebrated by the members of the IGC are not negligible, but to gain real currency they must be coupled with a duty of transparency and the new Committees must be able to dispose of their findings independently. The resignation of Michael Garcia, who was deemed a token figure of the success of the reforms supported by the IGC, is there to remind us that even the, allegedly, best individuals are powerless if the institution is in a position to block their work. With his scorecard (see also here and the response of FIFA) on the reform process, Roger Pielke had convincingly quantified the limited nature of FIFA’s reforms. His findings are now corroborated in practice; even the few reform proposals FIFA actually implemented did not fundamentally change the institution. This is critical stance is shared by a recent report on ‘The reform of football governance’ adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, urging FIFA to reinforce transparency and accountability across the board.

The IGC’s members were probably blinded by Blatter’s apparent goodwill. In fact, Blatter may even have held these good intentions, though his new stint at the head of FIFA is there to remind us that however enlightened, he remains a power-hungry monarch. Moreover, Blatter is truly accountable to only one forum: the FIFA Congress. Thus, it is doubtful that the “patronage system” put in place to control it will go away without resistance. In fact, Blatter would probably have never been re-elected in 2015 if he had imposed a radical clean up of past (and maybe present) FIFA practices relating to the use of development funds and vote buying. In that regard, the recent decision to give to the FIFA Congress the responsibility for the election of the host state of the FIFA World Cups is a potentially dangerous move that could enhance the risk of vote-buying. It shifts even more the decisive power away from the biggest Confederations to the small peripheral FAs.

All in all, it is naturally difficult for the members of a body that was invested with the responsibility to guide FIFA’s latest reform to recognize their failure to really change the way FIFA works. Some members of the IGC have done so; Alexandra Wrage resigned in protest against FIFA's “rotten reform record”. Even though one can criticize the independence of the IGC, the IGC’s members were probably genuinely committed to changing FIFA. But the main lesson one can draw from their very limited success in doing so is that sheer commitment and expertise is not enough to transform an institution grounded on a political system that promotes inertia and to some extent corruption. The illusion of an enlightened reform of FIFA driven by insiders, especially by Mr. Blatter, has been shattered. In the case of FIFA, a revolution is needed, heads need to roll, and a radically new political system needs to be put in place. Those are not easy tasks. Triggering a revolution will take time and energy. It will involve the appliance of extreme political pressure, either through the open threat of secession of UEFA or through criminal proceedings initiated by public authorities. In the end, Pieth himself is right: “self-regulation alone rarely works”[25]. This points to ‘[t]he responsibility of the host country’.[26] The “lax regulatory attitude”[27] of the Swiss government is certainly a key disincentive to a true FIFA reform. It is Switzerland’s duty to “define the minimum standard for organizations, in particular in the areas of democracy, accountability and financial controls.”[28] As the recent raid by the Swiss Police has proven, if there is the will to intervene, there is no insurmountable legal obstacle to do so. It is true, as many members of the IGC argue, that States are not in an easy position. The power of the FIFAs and IOCs of this world is extremely strong. Through their exit option, they can blackmail national States, and in particular Switzerland, into adopting an accommodating stance. But, it is simply not true that “ISOs [International Sporting Organisations] have extensive privileges and immunities, and are not governed by national laws – so cannot generally be reached by such prosecutors and regulators”[29], as Lord Goldsmith states. Still, it makes sense that the most far-reaching interventions to date that triggered reforms of Sports Governing Bodies (SGBs) were made by the EU and the US.[30] Both are strong enough to confront the political strength of the SGBs. Hence, the recent indictment of a number of FIFA officials on various criminal grounds in the US might be the first necessary step towards truly reforming FIFA.

This book is a valuable testimony of a process that has unfortunately failed to fundamentally change FIFA for the time being. One should not radically undermine the progress done, the new institutions put in place and rules adopted might serve as a basis for an overhaul of FIFA in the future, though for that to happen it will most likely need an assist from the EU or the US.

[1] M. Pieth, ‘Reforming FIFA’ in M. Pieth (ed.) Reforming FIFA, Dike Verlag, St. Gallen, 2014, p.1

[2] M. Pieth, ‘Introduction’ in M. Pieth (ed.) Reforming FIFA, p.8. In similar terms see M. Hershman, ‘The need for reform’ in M. Pieth (ed.) Reforming FIFA, p.17-18.

[3] M. Pieth, ‘Introduction’, p.9

[4] Guillermo Jorge, ‘From Patronage to managerial accountability’ in M. Pieth (ed.) Reforming FIFA, p.53

[5] M. Pieth, ‘Introduction’, p.9

[6] G. Jorge, ‘From Patronage to managerial accountability’, p.56

[7] M. Pieth, ‘Beyond changing the code: reforming culture’, in M. Pieth (ed.) Reforming FIFA, p.60

[8] G. Jorge, ‘From Patronage to managerial accountability’, p.57

[9] Ibid.

[10] M. Pieth, ‘Introduction’, p.15

[11] M. Pieth, ‘Beyond changing the code: reforming culture’, p.61

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid.

[14] See in particular the contribution by Lord Peter Goldsmith, ‘How to investigate misbehaviour in international sports organizations’ in M. Pieth (ed.) Reforming FIFA, p.31-38

[15] D. Heller, ‘The role of the Audit & Compliance Committee’ in M. Pieth (ed.) Reforming FIFA, p.63-69

[16] M. Pieth, ‘Beyond changing the code: reforming culture’, p.61

[17] Leonardo Grosso, ‘The reform’s impact on stakeholder involvement from the players’ perspective’ in M. Pieth (ed.) Reforming FIFA, p.39-48

[18] M. Pieth, ‘Introduction’, p.16

[19]Ibid and M. Pieth, ‘Beyond changing the code: reforming culture’, p.59-62 . In similar terms, see G. Jorge, ‘From Patronage to managerial accountability’, p.58

[20] M. Pieth, ‘Introduction’, p.16

[21] M. Pieth, ‘Beyond changing the code: reforming culture’, p.59

[22] M. Hershman, ‘The need for reform’, p.20

[23] M. Pieth, ‘Introduction’, p.16

[24] G. Jorge, ‘From Patronage to managerial accountability’, p.57

[25] M. Pieth, ‘The responsibility of the host country’ in M. Pieth (ed.) Reforming FIFA, pp.23-30, p.26

[26] Ibid, pp.23-30.

[27] Ibid, p.25.

[28] Ibid, p.26

[29] Lord Peter Goldsmith, ‘How to investigate misbehaviour in international sports organizations’, p.32

[30] See for the EU, A. Geeraert & E. Drieskens, ‘The EU controls FIFA and UEFA: a principal–agent perspective’, Journal of European Public Policy, 03/2015. See for the US, R. Pielke, ‘How can FIFA be held accountable?’, Sport Management Review 16 (2013) 255–267.

Introduction

The year 2015 promises to be crucial, and possibly revolutionary, for State aid in football. The European Commission is taking its time in concluding its formal investigations into alleged State aid granted to five Dutch clubs and several Spanish clubs, including Valencia CF and Real Madrid, but the final decisions are due for 2015.

A few months ago, the Commission also received a set of fresh State aid complaints originating from the EU’s newest Member State Croatia. The complaints were launched by a group of minority shareholders of the Croatian football club Hajduk Split, who call themselves Naš Hajduk. According to Naš Hajduk, Hajduk Split’s eternal rival, GNK Dinamo Zagreb, has received more than 30 million Euros in unlawful aid by the city of Zagreb since 2006.

Investigations into potential aid granted to Dinamo are not something new. Croatia’s most successful club was already under scrutiny by the Croatian Competition Agency (CCA) prior to the country joining the EU on 1 July 2013. In a highly controversial decision dated from 13 June 2013, the CCA decided to terminate the proceedings. With Croatia joining the EU, the CCA ceased to have the legal competence to carry out State aid investigations. Instead, the European Commission has the exclusive competence to deal with the Dinamo Zagreb case.

It is no secret that football and politics, including direct State intervention, go hand-in-hand in many EU Member States. Remarks made by Spanish Government officials after news broke out that the Commission commenced formal investigations relating to Spanish clubs illustrate this point, thereby making it more sensitive for the Commission to decide these cases.

In that sense, the Dinamo Zagreb case could prove a real snake pit, since State funding of professional sports undertakings is authorised by a national law known as the “Sports Act”. In Naš Hajduk’s eyes, joining the EU has not changed existing practices since Dinamo is still receiving unlawful State aid. In fact, they believe that the main reason for the City of Zagreb’s public funding is to preserve the dominant position of Dinamo Zagreb in Croatian football. Furthermore, according to the complainant, the CCA’s decision to declare the aid compatible with Croatian national law was unjustifiable because the CCA did not correctly interpret the relevant provisions stipulated in the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and its Member States and the Republic of Croatia and the Treaty concerning the accession to the EU of the Republic of Croatia. 

This blog post will briefly discuss the measures imposed by the relevant Croatian authorities regarding public funding to Croatian sporting entities in general and Dinamo Zagreb in particular in light of the decision of the CCA. Furthermore, now that a complaint has been lodged with the Commission, I will analyse the key legal issues raised by the case.  

Background

Since Croatia gained its independence from Yugoslavia in 1991, GNK Dinamo Zagreb has been the country’s most successful football club by a distance. It has won 16 national championships in total, and is currently well on its way to win its 10^th consecutive title. Notwithstanding all the sporting success, it has suffered great financial difficulties in this period of time, which climaxed in a Croatian Court declaring the football club bankrupt in 2002. However, after restructuring the club, Dinamo was allowed to remain active in the highest professional football league of Croatia.[1]

Since the introduction of the latest version of the Sports Act in 2006, Dinamo has been consistently included in the public financing programs adopted on the basis of Articles 74-76 (Sport Financing) of this Act. Article 75 allows public funding in sport on State level, whereas Article 76 allows for public funding in sport on regional and local level. Article 76 (1) lists the types of programs that are suitable for public finding. The list includes: implementing sporting activities of children, youth and students; sports preparations, Croatian and international competitions, as well as the general and special health protection of athletes; hiring persons to do professional work in sports and; planning, construction, maintenance and use of sports facilities important to the public authorities.[2]

In Zagreb, for example, the system of public funding works as follows: The Zagreb Sports Association (SSGZ), a public institution or “sports community” created by the City of Zagreb, submits a proposal to the city regarding the public needs for sport within the city.[3] The final decision on this proposal and the annual budget for the public needs for sporting entities within the city lies with the governing body of the City of Zagreb in accordance with Article 74 (2) and 76 (4).

In general terms, the program on public funding in sport of the SSGZ includes:

• Investing in the development of young athletes;

• Encouraging participation in sport for larger number of citizens, especially children and youth.

However, the program also includes:

• Improving the quality of elite professional sport that encourages the development of sport and contributes to the reputation of the City of Zagreb

• Planning, construction, maintenance and use of sports facilities important to the City of Zagreb.

The criteria of what can be considered “elite professional sport” are found in the Conclusion on the allocation criteria for the promotion of professional sport.[4] Funding for elite professional sport could be awarded to all sporting entities who have won a European title, who have gained the right to participate in European competitions, or that are successful in domestic and/or European professional competitions. Based on these criteria, special agreements were signed between the City of Zagreb and elite professional sport entities such as basketball club KK Cibona, waterpolo club HAVK Mladost, handball club RK Lokomotiva Zagreb and football club GNK Dinamo Zagreb.[5]

The City of Zagreb argued that public funding to these elite sport clubs was needed because the private market did not provide sufficient sponsor money in order for these clubs to compete at an adequate competitive level. Nonetheless, the complaints were launched by people who believe that the part of the program that allows specific funding for elite professional sport creates a financial advantage for a selective groups of professional sport clubs, which in turn can lead to unlawful State aid under EU law or under article 70 (1) (iii) of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement.[6] It was therefore no great surprise that the Croatian Competition Agency was urged to decide whether the public funding to one of the recipients, Dinamo Zagreb, amounted to a breach of the EU State aid rules. 

The CCA’s decision

The CCA considered the measures not to constitute unlawful State aid under the Stabilisation and Association Agreement.[7] More specifically, the CCA argued that until Croatia joined the EU on 1 July 2013, the City of Zagreb complied with all the requisites of the Program of public needs in sport and with Article 76 of the Sports Act. Given that “the Sports Act, which is in force and applicable in the Republic of Croatia (…), enables the financing of professional sports by local and regional governments, including the City of Zagreb, the (CCA) has found that there are no legal requirements for assessing whether the resources assigned to Dinamo Zagreb (should be) considered illegal state aid.”[8]

However, the CCA underlined that from the date of accession onwards EU Law will be applicable to Croatia and recognised that the Sport Act could contradict the EU State aid rules.[9]  Consequently, the CCA recommended the Croatian legislator to reformulate the relevant provisions in the Sports Act.[10] Therefore, since joining the EU the Sports Act contains a new paragraph which reads as follows: In accordance with the provisions of (the Sports Act), the financing of professional sports by the national, regional and local governments of Croatia and the city of Zagreb that effects trade between the Croatian State and other EU Member States is only possible if (the financing) is in line with the rules regarding State aid.[11] However, according to the CCA, with Croatia joining the EU, the CCA seized to have the competence for carrying out further State aid investigations for the measures granted to Dinamo Zagreb from both before as after the date of accession.[12]

The question whether aid granted to Dinamo Zagreb specifically due to a lack of sponsor money constituted unlawful State aid was also discussed by the CCA in its decision. In the end, the CCA held that it was “unable to determine whether the sponsoring contracts signed between publicly owned legal persons and (Dinamo Zagreb) contained State aid due to the following: from 2010 to 2012 (Dinamo Zagreb) did not receive financing from sponsoring contracts concluded with (public entity) Zagrebacki Holding, whereas at the moment of signing of the concerned contracts (public entity) Croatia Osiguranje acted as a market economy investor while the City of Zagreb Tourist Board and (public entity) Hrvatska Elektroprivreda signed sponsoring contracts not only with (Dinamo Zagreb) but also with other professional sport clubs.”[13]

The CCA’s decision to consider the public funding in line with the Sports Act and the Program of public needs in sport was heavily criticised, especially by Naš Hajduk. In their view, the CCA erred in their decision to justify the aid granted to Dinamo Zagreb. Their second concern involves the funding programs themselves, which are still in place after Croatia’s accession to the EU. Since 2006, Dinamo has received up to 244 million Kuna (31.7 million Euro) by the City of Zagreb for a variety of services, and there is no indication that the City of Zagreb is planning to seize the funding any time soon.  

The complainants’ arguments

Firstly, the complaint stipulates that Dinamo Zagreb is receiving unlawful State aid because it is allowed to use the Maksimir Stadium and several training grounds free of charge. This “free of charge lease agreement” has been anchored in several agreements signed between the City of Zagreb and Dinamo Zagreb, the latest of which being signed on 13 October 2011 for a period of five years with the possibility of extending that lease. Using the football stadium and the training grounds for free constitutes a selective advantage, they argue, because no private operator would consider leasing out real estate free of charge.

Secondly, Naš Hajduk argues that the maintenance costs of the stadium are not being paid by Dinamo Zagreb, but by the City of Zagreb. In fact, the maintenance costs for the period 2010 – 2014 amounted to 4.8 million Euro. This amount can be considered as an unlawful aid granted to Dinamo Zagreb.

Thirdly, the City of Zagreb has funded (and still does) the operating costs of “sport clubs of a particular importance for the city”. Operating costs include: Youth development and expenses made by Dinamo Zagreb’s youth categories; travel and accommodation costs for matches played in European competitions, international friendlies and training programs; the organisation of home games in European competitions; and “other development programs”.

Fourthly, Naš Hajduk regards the fact that the City of Zagreb has (partially) paid the salaries of the football trainers working for Dinamo for the last three years as further evidence of unlawful State aid. As a rough average, the city pays the club 100.000 Kuna (13.000 Euro) a year per trainer. According to the complainant, 30 trainers received this amount in 2012, 23 in 2013 and 22 in 2014. In fact, the operating costs and the payment of trainer salaries combined would amount to nearly 4.9 million Euros.

Fifthly, in addition to describing which measures should be deemed as unlawful State aid, Naš Hajduk argued in the complaint that regardless of whether the measures are considered illegal State aid or not, the Croatian authorities failed to meet their notification obligation as stipulated in Article 108 (3) TFEU and Article 2 of the Procedural Regulations 659/1999. A notification by the Croatian authorities, they argue, is not just a procedural obligation for Member States, but it would also lead to greater transparency on public funding and would take away any doubts disagreeing citizens, such as themselves, might have about how the State spends public money.

Lastly, the complainant pointed out to the Commission that the CCA erred in its decision to justify the public funding under the national Sports Act. The principle of supremacy of EU law is also applicable as regards accession treaties such as the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and its Member States and the Republic of Croatia and the Treaty concerning the accession to the EU of the Republic of Croatia.  

Is Dinamo Zagreb receiving (unlawful) State aid?

Naš Hajduk believes, and perhaps rightly so, that the advantages gained by the free of charge lease contract, the maintenance costs of the stadium, the operating costs reimbursements and the trainer salaries cannot be justified because of “lack of sponsorship from the private sector”. Moreover, as regards the lease and maintenance agreements between the club and the city, there is a realistic possibility that the City of Zagreb did not behave in accordance with the Market Economy Investor Principle[14] and that Dinamo gained a financial advantage from these deals. It would not be the first time that the Commission would find such agreements contrary to Article 107 (1) TFEU. For example, in its decision regarding alleged municipal aid to several professional Dutch football clubs, the Commission found that the payment agreement between the municipality of Tilburg and the football club Willem II for the stadium provided a selective advantage to Willem II with the use of public resources. In essence, the Commission accepted the possibility that stadiums belonging to municipalities that are not rented out at market conditions to professional football clubs could entail State aid.[15]

Similarly, it cannot be denied that an undertaking would gain a financial advantage if the public authorities were to fund a large part of its operational costs, such as travel expenses, accommodation costs and (youth) trainings. The question remains however, whether the payment by the City of Zagreb of the operational costs endured by Dinamo Zagreb are selective. It is important to note the legal basis for the measures are found in the Sports Act, which is applicable in the entire Republic of Croatia. Even though it is not clear whether the public funding granted to other sport clubs in Zagreb differed from the public funding granted to the football club Dinamo, the measures do appear to be selective. Firstly, the criteria for public funding set by the SSGZ distinguish between professional sport that can be considered elite and (professional) sport not considered elite. Because Dinamo is considered an “elite professional sports clubs”, it is entitled to receive public funding. However, other professional sporting entities that are not considered “elite professional sports clubs” do not receive this public funding. Therefore, if the contested measures by the City of Zagreb are solely granted to Dinamo Zagreb for being an “elite sporting entity”, the measures could be considered selective in the light of Article 107 (1) TFEU. Secondly, the selectivity criterion should also be assessed by comparing how different regional and local governments fund their respective “elite sporting entities”. Once a discrepancy is found from one region to another regarding the amount of money granted to sports (i.e. because some local governments simply have more money to spend), the measure could be deemed selective.

Apart from determining whether the public funding of Dinamo could entail State aid, as is the case with all State aid cases, one has to look at possible arguments that could justify the measures. Keeping in mind recent State aid decisions, it becomes clear that measures that support sport’s educational, public health, social and recreational functions will be declared compatible with EU law.[16] It is therefore worth remembering that Article 76 (1) of the Croatian Sports Act, also includes the possibility of public funding with the aim of implementing sporting activities of children, youths and students, protecting the health of athletes and hiring persons to do professional work in sports. Furthermore, on numerous occasions in the last few years, the European Commission has declared State aid provided for sports infrastructure compatible, with EU law.[17]

The facts of the Dinamo Zagreb case show that at least part of the aid measures are aimed at supporting the educational functions of sport, i.e. covering expenses of Dinamo’s youth teams. Moreover, the City of Zagreb’s decision to aid Dinamo paying for the maintenance costs of the stadium and training grounds could show similarities with Commission decisions where such aid was declared justified. These measures may, in principle, be compatible with EU law, where there is a clear common objective. However, the positive effects on the common objective must outweigh the negative effects on competition and trade in order for these measures to be compatible with EU law. Therefore, in the Dinamo Zagreb case, this balancing test has to determine whether the objectives of the measures (i.e. improving the quality of elite professional sport that contributes to the reputation of the City of Zagreb and the planning, construction, maintenance and use of sports facilities important to the City of Zagreb) outweigh the negative effects this could have on other entities in general, and football clubs in particular.

In addition, it should not be forgotten that Croatia joined the EU on 1 July 2013. This means that Dinamo Zagreb received the contested aid before and after the date of accession. Therefore, another key question is to what extent the Commission can sanction Croatia for aid measures implemented before the accession date. It follows from settled EU case law that Articles 107 – 109 TFEU and the Procedural Regulations 659/1999 are applicable on to a Member State only as from its accession to the European Union.[18] Moreover, it follows inter alia from EU case law[19], and Article 19 of the Procedural Regulations that existing aid can be found to be incompatible with prospective effect only. With regard to the Dinamo Zagreb case, this effectively means that the Commission can only order a recovery of the aid granted to the football club after the date of accession. Therefore, should the Commission, for example, decide that the stadium lease agreement (signed in 2011) constitutes unlawful State aid, it can only order the recovery of the advantage gained through this agreement as of 1 July 2013.

The last point that Naš Hajduk addressed in their complaint to the Commission that the CCA incorrectly allowed the aid to be granted to Dinamo because it was compatible with Croatian national law. Irrespective of whether the CCA interpreted the Accession Treaties correctly or incorrectly, it is my understanding that EU law does not allow the Commission the power to overrule the CCA’s decision. As has been stated above, since the Commission can only order the recovery of the aid granted after the date of accession, it has no competence to decisions made regarding State aid before the date of accession. In other words, any options Naš Hajduk could have in challenging the CCA’s decision have to be found in national appeal procedures.

The Dinamo Zagreb State aid case currently finds itself in a preliminary investigatory phase. Given the Commission’s inconsistency regarding the time frames to decide whether to commence formal investigations or not, it is impossible to say if we can expect news from Brussels any time soon. Nonetheless, this case will certainly drive forward the discussion in the quickly expanding field of State aid and sport.

[1] Vanja Smokvina, “Case Law of the Croatian Supreme Court in the Fields of Sports Law – Emphasis on Labour Relations”, International Sports Law Journal, 2012/1-2, pages 106 - 108

[2] Article 76 (1) points 2, 4, 5 and 8 of the Sports Act

[3] Article 76 (2) of the Sports Act

[4] A Croatian version of the Program is available on: http://www.zagreb.hr/default.aspx?id=60227.

^[5] CCA UP/I 430-01/13-05/001, Financing of the Football Club Dinamo by the City of Zagreb and other publicly owned legal entities, pages 7 – 10 (Croatian version).

[6] Article 70 (1) (iii): “The following are incompatible with the proper functioning of the Agreement, in so far as they may affect trade between the Community and Croatia: any State aid which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or certain products.”

[7] CCA UP/I 430-01/13-05/001, Financing of the Football Club Dinamo by the City of Zagreb and other publicly owned legal entities, (English version), page 1

[8] CCA UP/I 430-01/13-05/001, Financing of the Football Club Dinamo by the City of Zagreb and other publicly owned legal entities, pages 19

[9] Ibid, page 18

[10] Tatjana Jakovljević, “Public Support for Sports: The Name of the Game – Football!”, EStAL, 3/2013, page 445

[11] Article 74 (3) of the Sports Act

[12] CCA UP/I 430-01/13-05/001, Financing of the Football Club Dinamo by the City of Zagreb and other publicly owned legal entities, (English version), page 1

[13] Ibid

[14] The essence of the MEIP is that when a public authority invests in an enterprise on terms and in conditions which would be acceptable to a private investor operating under normal market economy conditions, the investment is not a State aid.

[15] SA.33584 – Alleged municipal aid to professional Dutch football clubs Vitesse, NEC, Willem II, MVV, PSV and FC Den Bosch in 2008-2011, paras. 51-52

[16] See for example: SA.31722 - Supporting the Hungarian sport sector via tax benefit scheme

[17] See for example: SA.37109 – Football Stadiums in Flanders; SA.35440 - Multifunktionsarena der Stadt Jena and; SA.37342 - Regional Stadia Development in Northern Ireland

[18] Case C-262/11 Kremikovtzi AD, paragraph 50

[19] Ibid, paragraph 54