Pursuant to Kelsen’s famous pyramid, the authority of norms may be ranked according to their sources: Constitution is above the Law, which is in turn superior to the Regulations, which themselves stand higher to the Collective Agreement etc…Under French labour law, this ranking can however be challenged by a “principle of favourable treatment” which allows a norm from a lower rank to validly derogate from a superior norm, if (and only if) this derogation benefits to the workers.

On 2 April 2014, the Cour de Cassation (the French Highest Civil Court) considered that these principles apply in all fields of labour law, regardless of the specificity of sport[1].  In this case, Mr. Orene Ai’i, a professional rugby player, had signed on 13 July  2007 an employment contract with the Rugby Club Toulonnais (RCT) for two sport seasons with effect on 1 July 2007.

Yet, article L. 1242-13 of the French Labour Code states that a fixed term employment contract must be handed to the worker within a maximal period of two days after the beginning of the contract. Should this period of two days not be respected the worker is entitled to claim for a requalification of his fixed term contract into permanent contract[2]. Mr. Ai’i relied on this article to argue for the requalification of his contract.

It must be noted that the requalification of the initial two seasons contract in a permanent contract, implies that it can be terminated by the employer with a cause. Therefore, a termination at the occurrence of the term of the contract, i.e. after the 2 years, may be regarded as a “dismissal without genuine and serious cause” which in turn would allow the player to seek compensation.  

The RCT argued on the other hand that article L. 1242-13 and the potential requalification is inapplicable to professional rugby players whose employments relationships can never be for an indefinite time period. Indeed, according to article 1.3 of the collective agreement of professional Rugby, an employment contract with a professional rugby player can last for a maximum of 5 sport seasons.

The Cour de Cassation reminds however that a collective agreement cannot depart unfavourably for the worker to the imperative provisions of the law and therefore states that the provisions of article 1.3 of the collective agreement of professional Rugby shall not impede the requalification of a fixed term contract between a professional rugby player and his club, into a permanent contract.

This solution is not limited to Rugby and may be extended to all fields of professional sports. Indeed, like the collective agreement of professional Rugby, article 12.3.2.3 of the national collective agreement of sports, which is applicable for every professional athlete, also provides that “the duration of a same contract cannot be superior as 5 sport seasons (60 month)”.

Based on the above mentioned decision it is fair to conclude that any French professional athlete can claim for a requalification of his fixed term employment contract if he hasn’t received a copy of his employment contract within the 2 days of its beginning. Potential consequences could be significant considering that a professional athlete can terminate a permanent contract, without cause or compensation[3]. In this regard it will be interesting to see if the requalification of fixed term sport contract into a permanent contract will facilitate their termination and allow some professional athlete to change Club without any transfer fee…

This decision could have wider implications for sporting labour relationships in general. Indeed, the Cour de Cassation rejected the specificity argument put forward by the Rugby Club. The legal reasoning on which the decision is grounded could, therefore, easily be transposed to other instances, where core labour rights of athletes are at stake. 

Patrick Millot, Avocat à la Cour

[1] Cass. Soc. 2 April 2014 n° 11-25442 (cf. concurring; CA Aix-en-Provence,  17 May  2013 R.G. n° 12/06543).

[2] Cass. Soc. 6 December, 2011 n° 16-16454 ; Cass. Soc. 4 April, 2012 n° 11-10986; Cass. 11 March, 2013 n° 11-28687.

[3] In opposition to a fixed term employment contract, which could only be terminated for a serious cause (i.e. serious misconduct, force majeure or medical inability to work)  

The European Commission’s competition decisions in the area of sport, which set out broad principles regarding the interface between sports-related activities and EU competition law, are widely publicized. As a result of the decentralization of EU competition law enforcement, however, enforcement activity has largely shifted to the national level. Since 2004, national competition authorities (NCAs) and national courts are empowered to fully apply the EU competition rules on anti-competitive agreements (Article 101 TFEU) and abuse of a dominant position (Article 102 TFEU).

Even though NCAs have addressed a series of interesting competition cases (notably dealing with the regulatory aspects of sport) during the last ten years, the academic literature has largely overlooked these developments. This is unfortunate since all stakeholders (sports organisations, clubs, practitioners, etc.) increasingly need to learn from pressing issues arising in national cases and enforcement decisions. In a series of blog posts we will explore these unknown territories of the application of EU competition law to sport.

We kick-start the series with a recent investigation of the Swedish National Competition Authority (NCA) into a so-called duty of loyalty clause applied by the Swedish Bodybuilding and Fitness Federation (Svenska Kroppskulturförbundet, SKKF).[1]

Source: http://www.scmp.com/photos/recent/all/1046780

The facts

The SKKF is the only national member of the International Bodybuilding Federation (IFBB) and organises various championships in the sport of bodybuilding and fitness in Sweden. It is essential for Swedish clubs, individual athletes, and officials to be a member of the SKKF as this is prerequisite for participation in IFBB international competitions.

The IFBB’s rules and regulations form an integral part of the SKKF’s Statutes. According to the SKKF’s rules, members who compete or otherwise participate in contests that are not approved or authorised by the SKFF or IFBB can be fined or suspended (i.e. the duty of loyalty clause). Athletes who have taken part in an unsanctioned event must also test for doping, at their own expenses, before they are allowed to compete at SKKF or IFBB events again.

In October 2013, BMR Sport Nutrition AB, a manufacturer of nutritional and bodybuilding supplements that also occasionally organises unsanctioned bodybuilding and fitness events in Sweden, filed a complaint before the NCA alleging that this rule violates Article 101 TFEU and Chapter 2, Article 1 of the Swedish Competition Act as it prevents event organisers from effectively competing with the SKKF (i.e. they are deprived from the chance to gather the human resources necessary for a successful event). The complainant submitted evidence that the threat of a fine and/or the withdrawal of their license by the SKKF effectively deterred athletes from participating in non-sanctioned events.

The context

The Swedish bodybuilding case follows a 2011 decision of the NCA, which ordered the Swedish Automobile Sports Federation (Svenska Bilsportförbundet, SBF) to abolish its rules preventing members from participating in motorsport events not authorized by the KKF.[2] On appeal by SBF, the Swedish Market Court upheld the decision in its entirety.[3]

This “precedent” case dealt with two duty of loyalty clauses in the SBF’s Common Rules prohibiting officials and contestants, licensed by the SBF, to officiate or participate in motor sport events other than those organised by the SBF or its member clubs. A violation of these provisions could result in a fine and/or withdrawal of the licence to officiate or compete in SBF events.

The NCA and the Market Court established that the contested rules constituted a decision by an association of undertakings. While the NCA had only applied national competition law, the Market Court, having defined the organisation of motorsport competitions in Sweden as the relevant product market, found that trade between the Member States was affected and therefore also applied Article 101 TFEU. According to the Court, the mere existence of the rules considerably distorted competition because they led to an absolute ban for SBF members to participate in non-sanctioned events. It concluded that, even if the rules would be regarded as serving a legitimate objective, the total ban could not be considered proportional to achieving such an objective. Moreover, the Court concluded that the restriction of competition could not benefit from an exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU or Chapter 2, Article 1 of the Swedish Competition Act.

While the Market Court’s judgment is far from innovative and carefully followed the proportionality test adopted by the Court of Justice in Meca-Medina, the case drew much media attention and raised concerns and criticism from the Swedish sports movement. Having demonstrated the remedial potential of EU competition law to challenge organisational sporting rules, it was only a matter of time before further national enforcement action would result from this case. 

The outcome

In a statement responding to the filing of the complaint by BMR Sport Nutrition AB, the chairman of the SKKF contested the apparent analogy with the SBF (motorsport) case. He essentially put forward three reasons. First, the SKKF is a non-profit organisation that pursues an aim in the general interest (i.e. the promotion of sport) and reinvests all its income, which is insufficient to cover its costs, in its sports activities, e.g. to fund education and training activities, doping tests, and travel expenses of the national team. This precludes the assumption that it pursues an economic activity. It follows that the SKKF cannot be regarded as an undertaking for the purposes of competition law (contrary to commercially successful sports associations). Second, the SKKF does not act independently of the will of its members. Similar to trade unions, member athletes voluntarily submit themselves to the applicable regulations when they join a member club. They can move to change certain rules if they find, in a true democratic spirit, a majority for such change. Alternatively, member athletes can choose to leave their club and join another association. Third, the right of freedom of association excludes the rule-making powers of the SKKF from the ambit of the competition rules.

Nevertheless, following several meetings between the NCA and the SKKF, the latter committed no longer to suspend or fine athletes, coaches, officials or judges that participate in non-sanctioned events.[4] The requirement that they must test for doping, at their own expense, was not abolished. According to the SKFF, this requirement was necessary to comply with the IFBB anti-doping rules, which conform to the provisions of the World Anti-Doping Code.

Given the commitment of the SKKF to no longer apply the duty of loyalty clause, the NCA decided to close the investigation without concluding whether competition law had been infringed.

Commentary

Those familiar with sports-related competition law cases will surely recognize the arguments of the chairman of the SKKF to assert immunity from the application of the competition rules. While they have been tried and tested many times, also before the Union courts, these arguments keep popping up. So let’s take a closer at why they are not accepted.

Regarding the claim that the SKKF is a non-profit organisation that exclusively aims to promote the development of the sport, it must be recalled that – if there still was any doubt - in Meca-Medina the Court of Justice made clear that the qualification of a rule as “purely sporting” was insufficient to remove the body adopting that rule (or the person engaging in the activity covered by it) from the scope of the Treaty. It thus must be examined, irrespective of the nature of the rule, whether the specific requirements of the various provisions of the Treaty are met. For the purpose of the competition rules, the notion of “undertaking” is a core jurisdictional element. According to established case law, this concept covers “any entity engaged in an economic activity regardless of the legal status of the entity or the way in which it is financed”.[5]

In an attempt to escape the bite of the competition rules, various other sports associations have time and again asserted that they cannot be regarded as “undertakings” because their objective is not the pursuit of economic interests. Even when only considering their regulatory functions, this reasoning finds no support in the case law. The Court of Justice has consistently held that the concept of undertaking does not presuppose a profit-making intention. The fact that entities are non-profit making has no effect on their classification as undertakings.[6] Similarly, the fact that entities pursue cultural or social activities does not in itself prevent these activities from being regarded as economic.[7]

In the case at hand, it is clear that in addition to the SKKF, even assuming that it organises bodybuilding and fitness events without seeking to make profit, other entities like BMR Sport Nutrition AB are also engaged in that activity (and do seek to make a profit). The SKKF offers goods or services on a market in competition with others. The success or economic survival of the SKKF ultimately depends on it being able to impose its services to the detriment of those offered by other event organisers. Consequently, the SKKF must be considered as an undertaking engaged in the markets for the organisation and marketing of bodybuilding and fitness events.

Regarding the somewhat chucklesome claim that the SKKF should be qualified as a trade union (or other professional association) that cannot act independently of the will of its members, it is sufficient to stress that Article 101 TFEU also applies to “associations of undertakings”. A federation like the SKKF, the beacon of democracy it may be, is not an association of employees but (also) of member clubs that engage in economic activities. Hence, the result of the delimitation between the federation acting “in its own right” or “merely as an executive organ of an agreement between its members” is irrelevant: Article 101 TFEU still applies to its regulations.

Regarding the claim based on the principle of freedom of association, indeed protected in the Swedish constitution as well as in the EU legal order, it is difficult to see how the duty of loyalty clause could be considered an inevitable result thereof. In any event, the Court of Justice has made clear that this right cannot be so absolute as to afford sports federations’ complete immunity from EU law.[8] In other words, the need to guarantee sports’ right of self-regulation cannot be a blank check to avoid scrutiny of measures that may conceal the pursuit of economic interest. Provided that its rules are proportional to a legitimate objective, SKKF should have nothing to fear from the competition rules.

So contrary to what the chairman of the SKKF contented, the analogy between its rule and the contested rule in the SBF (motorsport) case was accurate. A confrontation with this inconvenient truth was sufficient to convince the SKKF to commit itself to no longer suspend or fine athletes, coaches, officials or judges for participating in non-sanctioned competitions. That the requirement of a doping test (for those having participated in competing events) could remain clearly illustrates that competition law will leave unscratched restrictive sporting rules that are deemed inherent and proportionate to the organisation and proper conduct of sport. It almost makes you wonder what all the fuss is about when competition law confronts the world of sport.

One final note: the contested “SKKF” rule is the national equivalent of the clause contained in the IFBB Constitution (which forms an integral part of the SKKF’s statutes). Article 19.4.7 stipulates that:

“Any athlete or official who participates in a competition or event not approved or sanctioned by the IFBB, may be fined, suspended or expelled. The amount of the fine as well as the suspension period will be decided by the IFBB Disciplinary Commission … Once the suspension has been completed and before participating in an IFBB competition or event, the athlete must be drug tested at his or her own expenses”

Participation in an event or competition includes (but is not limited to!) competing, guest posing, giving a seminar, lecture or similar presentation, judging, officiating, allowing the use of one’s name and/or likeness for promotional purposes, and/or taking part in a non-IFBB sanctioned competition or event in any other way, shape or form.

To the IFBB and all other European member federations, who have to the author’s knowledge not decided to no longer enforce or abolish this rule: beware!

[1] Swedish Competition Authority (Konkurrensverket), 28 May 2014, Bodybuilding and Fitness Competitions, Decision dnr. 590/2013, http://www.kkv.se/upload/Filer/Konkurrens/2014/13-0590.pdf

[2] Swedish Competition Authority (Konkurrensverket) 13 May 2011, Swedish Automobile Sports Federation, Decision dnr. 709/2009, available at http://www.kkv.se/upload/Filer/Konkurrens/2011/Beslut/09-0709.pdf

[3] Swedish Market Court's ruling 2012:16 in Case A 5/11, Svenska Bilsportförbundet v Konkurrensverket (December 20, 2012), http://www.kkv.se/t/NewsArchive.aspx?id=529

[4] The SKKF notified its member athletes and clubs of the changes via its newsletter and website.

[5] Case C-41/90 Höfner and Elser [1991] ECR I-1979, para. 21.

[6] See e.g. Case C-222/04 Ministero dell'Economia e delle Finanze v Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze SpA and others [2006] ECR I-289; Case C-475/99 Firma Ambulanz Glöckner v Landkreis Südwestpfalz [2001] ECR I-8089; Joined Cases 209/78 to 215/78 and 218/78 Van Landewyck v Commission [1980] ECR 3125; C-244/94 Fédération Française des Sociétés d’Assurances and others v Ministère de l'Agriculture [1995] ECR I-4013; Joined Cases C-115/97 to C-117/07 Brentjens’ Handelsonderneming BV v Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds voor de Handel in Bouwmaterialen [1999] ECR I-6025.

[7] See e.g. Joined case C-180/98 to C-184/98 Pavel Pavlov and Others v Stichting Pensioenfonds Medische Specialisten [2000] ECR I-6451; Case C‑218/00 Cisal [2002] ECR I‑691.

[8] Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association and others v Bosman and others [1995] ECR I-4921, paras. 79-80

Editor's note: Branislav Hock (@bran_hock)  is PhD Researcher at the Tilburg Law and Economics Center at Tilburg University. His areas of interests are transnational regulation of corruption, public procurement, extraterritoriality, compliance, law and economics, and private ordering. Author can be contacted via email: b.hock@uvt.nl.

This blog post is based on a paper co-authored with Suren Gomtsian, Annemarie Balvert, and Oguz Kirman.

Game-changers that lead to financial success, political revolutions, or innovation, do not come “out of the blue”; they come from a logical sequence of events supported by well-functioning institutions. Many of these game changers originate from transnational private actors—such as business and sport associations—that produce positive spillover effects on the economy. In a recent paper forthcoming in the Yale Journal of International Law, using the example of FIFA, football’s world-governing body, with co-authors Suren Gomtsian, Annemarie Balvert, and Oguz Kirman, we show that the success of private associations in creating and maintaining private legal order depends on the ability to offer better institutions than their public alternatives do. While financial scandals and other global problems that relate to the functioning of these private member associations may call for public interventions, such interventions, in most cases, should aim to improve private orders rather than replace them.

FIFA example – from gentlemen’s agreements to a rich global regulator

FIFA is the governing body for football (or soccer, as it is known in some countries). Founded in 1904 under Swiss law by seven football associations, just 40 years ago, FIFA was a small gentlemen's club with a staff of 11, far from politics, which produced little cash. Since then, it has evolved into a powerful organization generating billions of dollars in annual revenues through sales of media and marketing rights; now it employs hundreds. The rise of FIFA has been a continuous process that was made possible by the reluctance of states and supra-national organizations such as the European Union (EU) to intervene in the governance of sport, particularly football. Hence, supported by and benefitting from the special treatment of sports, FIFA filled the regulatory gap and strengthened its status as a private regulator.

Besides the rules of the game, FIFA’s legal order includes privately-designed rules of cooperation and a complex organizational structure that spans every involved party including players, clubs, coaches, managers, club investors, officials, sponsors, and spectators. The centerpiece of the relations regulated by the rules of FIFA are employment-related questions. Most importantly, FIFA’s Transfer Regulations create strong tensions between FIFA’s regulatory autonomy and public orders such as the sovereign jurisdictions of FIFA’s member associations and supra-national organizations. Tensions between different levels of employment rules are especially visible in matters related to equality and/or non-discrimination of workers, the treatment and qualification of minors, the freedom to choose employment, and the freedom of movement. For example, the inability of players to terminate their contracts without cause, before expiry and without paying compensation, is in stark contrast with traditional employment laws, according to which employees are free to end employment without cause by prior notice. Figure below illustrates the relationships between the different levels of “football ordering” and public ordering when it comes to labor rules.

The Relationship of Labor Rules in Football

Furthermore, FIFA has also private dispute resolution venues and sophisticated system of sanctions and incentives promoting compliance with the decisions of the private order’s dispute resolution bodies. Possible sanctions vary but they are leveraged by the monopoly power of FIFA. Consider the right of FIFA to suspend a member association for a specific period or expel it fully from FIFA for failure to comply with its obligations, including an obligation to comply with FIFA or CAS decisions. Given FIFA's monopoly, this, in fact, means that national teams and licensed clubs from the suspended or expelled country cannot participate in any organized game. As a consequence, FIFA has been able to maintain cooperation among all involved actors, yet, along with the increasing commercial dimension, the incentives of states and other public orders, particularly the EU, to intervene have grown.

Integrity vs. legal order

The fact that FIFA is undermined by corruption is nothing surprising. Prof. Alina Mungiu-Pippidi shows that the average public integrity in more than 200 countries whose soccer associations are the FIFA constituents “is just 5, on a scale where New Zealand has ten and Somalia 1” […] “Were FIFA a country, it would clearly not be in the upper half, but somewhere near Brazil, whose officials seem to have been waist deep in its corruption, and which ranks around 121, with a 4.2”. FIFA’s administrative structure, certainly, needs reforms that will improve its financial stability and decrease corruption risks within the organization. These reforms, indeed, may require “public nudge” by the enforcement of extraterritorial “anti-mafia” statutes such as the US Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) that played the central role in the so-called FIFAGate. Moreover, in the light of “the second FIFAGate”—six months after the original scandal, a number of FIFA officials that replaced the old leadership were charged with a 92-count indictment—and after the recent neutralization of its internal corruption investigations (see here), more radical “public nudge” may be desirable. Indeed, these developments, as was discussed in this blog some time ago, may call for a more powerful intervention by, for example, the EU, to impose ‘certain basic “constitutional” requirements’ to FIFA.

Nevertheless, while FIFA may need “public help” to clean its house and improve some areas of its legal order, no public order is a better alternative. Common rules spanning across borders, predictable contractual relations, and incentives to invest in training young players are only some advantages made possible by FIFA’s tailored rules of behavior. These advantages would be lost if public interventions would crash the FIFA order and replace it by a patchwork of national laws, unstable contractual relations, more costly dispute resolution and enforcement mechanisms, and limited ability to encourage talent development. Therefore, while FIFA as an administrative organization may generally be considered as more corrupt than an average government, it has been able to offer harmonized institutions that in many cases are better accustomed to the needs of the involved parties than their state-made alternatives, which often are based on one-size-fits-all approach and lack certainty of application.

Public orders as the reversed civil society

It does not mean that public orders such as the EU and nation states should do nothing. Private entities often need a “public nudge” not only to prevent excesses, but also to maintain incentives to produce rules that reflect new economic and social developments. In numerous writings (for an overview see Katz), law-and economics scholars indicate that while in principle private orders should be best left alone, states should limit the potential of powerful interest groups to undermine the roots of private orders such as FIFA. Who, how, and when should determine the benchmark of what is excessive is difficult, and law-and economics has declined to offer a general theory of the role of public orders in nudging private orders to limit interest groups’ power. Nevertheless, determining the role of public orders is no more difficult than the question what civil society should do when it comes to the performance of nation states.

In the context of nation states, the key role in limiting the power of elites belongs to the civil society. In case of monopolistic orders such as FIFA’s, however, there is often no direct representation of various actors inside such orders. Shouldn’t, then, states and the EU assume the role of a reversed civil society when interacting with large and successful private orders? In practice, particularly the EU is more and more involved in an informal co-determination of football-related regulation (for similar argument see here). For example, the recent social dialogue in European football, brokered by the EU Commission, is an example how public orders can fulfill their role as reversed civil society. The EU Commission, instead of intervening directly and regulating sports, encouraged, and should do so much more, various stakeholder groups, such as the European Club Association and FIFPro, to engage in a dialogue with the purpose of improving the practices of player protection (however, it is true that the EU Commission had a way deeper impact through EU competition law, see Duval). For the private order itself participation in this dialogue and active encouragement of the enforcement of its results is the best way to guarantee its role as a supplier of rules (see generally Colucci & Geeraert). In contrary, refusal to accommodate certain mechanisms, and mainly these that effectively limit FIFA’s executives’ power (e.g. Ethics Committee), may lead to a forceful, but legitimate, public intervention with possibly tragic consequences for the world of football.

Conclusion: Taking over fallen FIFA

What is so fascinating about FIFA is that it exemplifies how a very small number of enthusiastic people could set a mechanism that is ultimately able to create institutions that aim to regulate behavior of involved actors globally as well as to keep them away from regular courts. FIFA is an example of an order that has created huge economic and social value by being able to overcome many hurdles that prevented countless other member associations from creating their own orders (think of lawyers or investment bankers, for example). The fact that such order locks-in all involved football actors, despite some, such as small teams, benefiting significantly less by their participation than others, suggests that there is a value, despite FIFA’s monopoly power, that alternatives cannot offer. Some of them, such as increased certainty, are in the interests of all involved actors, whereas others, such as commitment to enforce contractual practices or training compensation awards, are more preferred by sophisticated actors (i.e. clubs and prominent footballers) and small clubs, respectively. This, though not allowing to state plainly that the private order is maximizing the welfare of all involved actors, also does not justify arguments for abandoning the current system in favor of state laws. In contrary, failure to accommodate mechanisms that limit the power of inside interest groups might undermine the order by giving incentives to interest groups to advocate public orders’ involvement, thereby putting an end to the monopoly of FIFA’s order, and possibly its destruction.