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A World Cup Without the World? How Trump’s Travel Ban Contradicts FIFA’s Values - By Rasoul Rahmani

Editor's note: Rasoul Rahmani is a PhD Candidate at the Faculty of Law, University of Turku, Finland. His doctoral research examines sports governance and human rights, with a focus on how EU law, particularly recent CJEU rulings, is reshaping the autonomy of sports governing bodies and the institutional implications of these developments.

 

The Ban and Its Expansion

On 4 June 2025, President Donald Trump imposed sweeping entry restrictions on nationals from 12 countries: Afghanistan, Burma, Chad, Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Haiti, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen. The proclamation made clear that “these restrictions distinguish between, but apply to both, the entry of immigrants and non-immigrants”; including those traveling on visitor visas for business and tourism, precisely the category under which World Cup fans would enter the United States.

The President invoked his Executive Order of 20 January 2025, which declared it “the policy of the United States to protect its citizens from aliens who intend to commit terrorist attacks, threaten our national security, espouse hateful ideology, or otherwise exploit the immigration laws for malevolent purposes.”[1] Alongside these complete bans, he imposed partial restrictions on seven additional countries: Burundi, Cuba, Laos, Sierra Leone, Togo, Turkmenistan, and Venezuela.

The restrictions expanded drastically on 16 December 2025. Five more nations joined the fully banned list; Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, South Sudan, and Syria along with individuals holding Palestinian Authority-issued travel documents. Laos and Sierra Leone were upgraded from partial to full bans. Most significantly, 15 countries were added to the partial restriction category: Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominica, Gabon, The Gambia, Malawi, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Tonga, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

By December 2025, the travel restrictions encompassed 39 countries plus Palestinian Authority passport holders; a staggering expansion of barriers to entry for what is supposed to be a celebration of global unity. 


One Billion People Locked Out

The scale of exclusion is breathtaking. According to the latest population data, the fully banned countries represent 479.3 million people. The partially restricted nations account for another 537.6 million. Combined, over 1.017 billion people, more than one-eighth of the world’s population, face barriers to entering the World Cup’s primary host nation.

This mass exclusion stands in jarring contradiction to FIFA President Gianni Infantino’s repeated promises that 2026 would be “the greatest and most inclusive FIFA World Cup in history”; a World Cup  which is projected to have 6.5 million attendees in the host countries. The tournament expanded from 32 to 48 teams precisely to embrace more of the world. Yet as the field grew more diverse, the host country’s doors slammed shut.

Of the 42 nations already qualified for World Cup 2026, four face direct impact  from Trump’s restrictions. Iran and Haiti, home to 104.1 million people combined, are under full entry bans. Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal, representing 47.9 million people, face partial restrictions. Among the nations competing for the remaining six spots, Iraq (full ban) and DR Congo (partial restriction) could also qualify, potentially raising the total to six affected teams.

The geographic reality compounds the problem. Of the tournament’s 104 matches, the United States will host 78, while Mexico and Canada together host only 26. For fans from banned or restricted countries, only the handful of matches in Toronto, Vancouver, Mexico City, Guadalajara, and Monterrey remain accessible. The vast majority of the World Cup, including likely knockout rounds in American cities, will be beyond their reach.

The ban carves out exemptions for athletes, coaches, and support staff  competing in “major” events like the World Cup and the 2028 Olympics. But fans, athletes’ families, and journalists receive no such consideration. Iranian supporters, who brought 20,000 passionate voices to Qatar 2022, now face a dream deferred. Haiti’s vibrant fan base, a joyful presence at the 2023 Women’s World Cup, finds itself similarly sidelined. The policy creates a two-tier system: the teams can play, but their people cannot watch.


FIFA’s Hollow Response

In a carefully choreographed White House meeting attended by President Donald Trump and FIFA President Gianni Infantino, the U.S. Department of State unveiled the FIFA Priority Appointment Scheduling System, dubbed "FIFA PASS", for World Cup 2026 ticket holders attending matches in the United States. The service promises every fan who purchases a ticket the opportunity to obtain a prioritized visa interview.

Yet this solution is nothing more than window dressing. While expedited interviews may help fans from unrestricted countries navigate bureaucracy more smoothly, it remains fundamentally unclear, and deliberately unaddressed, how the system would function for passport holders from the 39 banned or restricted nations. A faster path to rejection is no path at all.

Contrast FIFA’s tepid response with the International Olympic Committee’s principled stand when faced with a comparable situation (not identical). When Indonesia denied visas to Israeli athletes and officials for the 53rd FIG Artistic Gymnastics World Championships in October 2025, the IOC responded with immediate, forceful condemnation. The organization expressed “great concern” and “regret,” emphasizing that “all eligible athletes, teams and sports officials must be able to participate in international sports competitions and events without any form of discrimination from the host country, in accordance with the Olympic Charter and the fundamental principles of non-discrimination, autonomy and political neutrality.”[2] The message was unambiguous: violate the principles of inclusive access for athletes and support staff, and you forfeit the privilege of hosting.

The comparison to Indonesia is instructive not because the violations are identical-they are not- but because both cases involve host nations imposing discriminatory entry barriers that undermine the inclusive, global nature of international sporting competitions. Indonesia’s complete ban on Israeli participants was more severe in scope; America’s ban affects fans and journalists rather than athletes. Yet both violate the same fundamental principle: that major sporting events should be accessible to all eligible participants and their supporters without discrimination based on nationality.

The IOC treated Indonesia’s violation as a serious breach of Olympic principles requiring immediate consequences. FIFA, by contrast, has treated the U.S. ban as a non-issue warranting no public comment, let alone corrective action. The different responses reveal not different principles, but different calculations about which hosts can be challenged and which cannot.


A Friendship More Valuable Than Principles

FIFA’s paralysis becomes comprehensible when viewed through the lens of Gianni Infantino’s relationship with Donald Trump. Since assuming the FIFA presidency in February 2016, Infantino has cultivated an unusually close bond with the American leader. He has been a frequent White House visitor throughout Trump’s presidencies, their meetings marked by mutual praise and conspicuous displays of camaraderie.

Independent human rights organizations have repeatedly accused Infantino of violating FIFA’s duty of political neutrality. The most egregious example came in December 2025, when FIFA awarded its inaugural Peace Prize to Trump, a sitting political leader presiding over the very policies that exclude a billion people from accessing the World Cup. According to media reports, the FIFA Council was not even consulted on this decision, suggesting it was Infantino’s personal initiative.

Human Rights Watch captured the absurdity with biting clarity: “FIFA’s so-called peace prize is being awarded against a backdrop of violent detentions of immigrants, national guard deployments in U.S. cities, and the obsequious cancellation of FIFA’s own.” anti-racism and anti-discrimination campaigns

That last point deserves emphasis. At the Club World Cup held in the United States in summer 2025, FIFA conspicuously dropped its anti-racism messaging, the very campaigns it had championed at Qatar 2022, where it backed “no discrimination” armbands and introduced enhanced disciplinary codes “to fight racism more efficiently and decisively.” The sudden abandonment of these principles on American soil suggests a troubling calculation: FIFA’s values are negotiable depending on the host’s political sensitivities.

Most damning of all, this close relationship has produced no tangible benefits for the fans Trump’s policies exclude. Both Iran and Haiti, the two fully banned qualified teams, will play all their group stage matches in U.S. cities, not in Canada or Mexico. If Infantino’s friendship with Trump held any real value for the sport, surely it would manifest in exemptions for fans whose teams earned their place on the pitch. Instead, the friendship appears entirely one-directional: FIFA accommodates Trump’s preferences while receiving nothing in return for football’s global community.

The uncomfortable truth is that Infantino seems unwilling to risk his personal relationship with Trump by publicly criticizing policies that fundamentally contradict FIFA’s stated mission. In this calculation, diplomatic access to the White House trumps the organization’s commitment to inclusion, non-discrimination, and the unifying power of football.


Violating FIFA’s Own Statutes

The travel ban does not merely contradict FIFA’s rhetoric; it directly violates the organization’s foundational legal documents. Article 3 of the FIFA Statutes declares: “FIFA is committed to respecting all internationally recognised human rights and shall strive to promote the protection of these rights.” The commitment is absolute, not conditional on political convenience.

Article 4 goes further, stating that “discrimination of any kind against a country, private person or group of people on account of race, skin colour, language, religion, politics, national or social origin, property, birth or any other status is strictly prohibited and punishable by suspension or expulsion.” As pointed out by the HRW, the language could hardly be clearer: discrimination based on national origin is not just discouraged, it is grounds for the most severe penalties FIFA can impose.

Article 2a and 2g establishes FIFA’s fundamental objectives, including promoting football “in the light of its unifying, educational, cultural and humanitarian values” and preventing “all methods or practices which might jeopardise the integrity of matches, competitions, players, officials and member associations”.[3] A World Cup where qualified teams’ players’ families, supporters, and journalists cannot attend matches, as they are not included in U.S. entry exemptions, fundamentally jeopardizes the competition’s integrity in several interconnected ways. Firstly, the absence of supporters and families strips matches of their cultural and emotional meaning, turning them into hollow simulations rather than genuine contests between nations. Secondly, banning some fans while allowing others creates unfair competitive imbalances unrelated to sporting merit. Thirdly, excluding journalists from affected countries undermines transparent coverage. Finally, excluding vast populations from attending erodes the tournament’s moral and symbolic legitimacy.

FIFA’s Human Rights Policy and the FIFA World Cup 2026 Human Rights Framework reinforce these commitments. The Framework explicitly commits all host cities to stage the tournament “guided by the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights” and in line with FIFA’s Human Rights Policy. As mentioned by the Human Rights Watch letter to FIFA, the current United States immigration policies “directly contradict FIFA’s stated values of human rights, inclusion and global participation.”

FIFA itself has stated that “its position on inclusivity and the protection of human rights is unequivocal, and clearly laid out in the FIFA Statutes.” The organization has historically enforced these standards on host nations. During the World Cup 2022, Qatar was subjected to sustained scrutiny and pressure[4] and FIFA ensured the host became fully aware of its responsibility to adhere “to FIFA’s human rights and non-discrimination, equality and neutrality statutes, and committed to do so.” Yet for the United States, a far larger market and a more powerful political entity, FIFA has issued no such reminders, made no such demands, extracted no such commitments.[5] The double standard is glaring. 


The Hypocrisy of Selective Enforcement

FIFA presents itself as a neutral guardian of football’s “fundamental principles,” committed to human rights, unity, and the integrity of the game. Yet its recent decisions reveal a far less principled reality. From the intense moral scrutiny imposed on smaller or geopolitically weaker host nations to the striking restraint shown toward powerful Western states, FIFA’s enforcement of its own standards appears deeply selective. This pattern raises a troubling question: are FIFA’s rules applied universally, or are they calibrated according to political influence, economic power, and market value?

FIFA presents itself as a neutral guardian of football’s “fundamental principles,” committed to human rights, unity, and the integrity of the game. Yet its recent decisions reveal a far less principled reality: a pattern of enforcement that scholars have characterized as operating through “modern human rights frameworks [that are] (largely) Western-led and controlled.”[6] From the intense moral scrutiny imposed on smaller or geopolitically weaker host nations to the striking restraint shown toward powerful Western states, FIFA’s application of its own standards appears calibrated according to political influence rather than universal principles. The contrast between FIFA’s treatment of Qatar 2022 and the United States 2026 exemplifies this troubling inconsistency.

After awarding FIFA World Cup 2022 to Qatar, the Gulf state faced unprecedented international scrutiny. Human rights organizations, media outlets, and civil society groups subjected Qatar to relentless and enormous pressure, focusing on migrant labour conditions, with critics characterizing the kafala system as amounting to forced labour and accusing Qatar of being a slave state,[7] as well as LGBTQ+ rights and restrictions on alcohol consumption. While FIFA initially awarded Qatar the tournament in 2010 without imposing human rights conditions, years of sustained external pressure from the International Labour Organization, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and other actors eventually prompted reforms. Qatar became the first Gulf nation to abolish the kafala system, introduce minimum wages, and permit limited trade union activity.[8]

However, such level of moral examination rarely applied to Western hosts. Much of this criticism was justified, but where is the equivalent systematic pressure on the United States, a nation with its own well-documented issues regarding migrant treatment, labour rights, and systemic discrimination, and recent immigration policies that exclude a billion people from accessing the tournament?

The answer is uncomfortable but obvious: the U.S. market is too valuable to jeopardize. American broadcasting rights, sponsorship revenues, and political influence make confrontation unthinkable for FIFA’s leadership. 

This selectivity extends beyond host nation oversight. When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, FIFA condemnedthe use of force by Russia and any type of violence that same day. Four days later, on 28 February 2022, FIFA and UEFA jointly suspended Russian teams from all competitions. Notably, FIFA framed its justification narrowly, citing force majeure and competition integrity[9] rather than human rights violations or illegal war. The response demonstrated that FIFA possesses the will and the mechanisms to act decisively when a geopolitical crisis threatens football’s integrity and continuity.

No similar urgency has materialized regarding U.S. entry restrictions that exclude fans from qualified and non-qualified teams, despite the direct contradiction with FIFA’s statutory commitments. The inconsistency suggests that FIFA’s enforcement of its principles depends less on their violation than on the violator’s geopolitical influence.

When European football associations and UN experts called for action against Israel over its conduct in Gaza and treatment of Palestinian football, FIFA appealed to vague notions of “unity” and avoided substantive measures: “FIFA cannot solve geopolitical problems.”  In September 2025, the Trump administration, through its Secretary of State intervened directly to prevent Israel’s suspension, with a spokesperson declaring: We will absolutely work “to fully stop any effort to attempt to ban Israel’s national soccer team from the World Cup.”

The message is unmistakable: FIFA’s “fundamental principles” are enforced selectively, calibrated to the political power and market value of the nations involved. Russia can be excluded swiftly; the United States cannot be challenged at all. Smaller nations face stringent human rights requirements; powerful Western states receive diplomatic silence even when their policies directly contradict FIFA’s own statutes.

This pattern raises a fundamental question: is FIFA an independent governing body committed to universal principles, or does it operate within, and defer to, the framework of Western political and economic power? The answer increasingly appears to be the latter.


A Call to Action

This situation demands a response; from FIFA, from fans, and from the global football community. But these responses must take different forms, leveraging different sources of power and accountability. 

  • FIFA’s Institutional Obligations

FIFA must break its silence. The Statutes are not suggestions; they are binding commitments with enforcement mechanisms. FIFA must publicly demand that the United States provide exemptions for World Cup fans especially from all qualified nations, regardless of broader immigration policies. This is defending the integrity of FIFA’s own tournament and honouring commitments made when awarding hosting rights.

The goal is not perfect equality of access; economic disparities will always mean that wealthier fans travel more easily than those with fewer resources. What FIFA must ensure is equality in principle: that fans holding legitimate tickets face no discriminatory barriers based solely on their nationality.

If the United States refuses to provide such exemptions, FIFA must be prepared to impose consequences. At least FIFA could relocate affected teams’ matches to Canadian or Mexican venues, ensuring their supporters can attend. It could reduce the number of matches hosted by U.S. cities that fail to guarantee fan access. At minimum, it must publicly document the violation of hosting commitments and ensure this factors into future hosting decisions.

FIFA must also address a fundamental question for its governance framework: Should nations be awarded hosting rights if their immigration policies preclude the inclusive, non-discriminatory access that FIFA’s own statutes require? The organization needs clear, enforceable criteria that apply equally to all candidates, regardless of their geopolitical power or market value. The current situation demonstrates the dangers of awarding tournaments without such safeguards.

National federations, particularly those from affected countries, should formally petition FIFA to address this access crisis through official channels. Player unions can lend their institutional weight to these demands. Media coverage must continue highlighting the contradiction between FIFA’s rhetoric and its complicity through silence. These institutional pressures, channelled through formal FIFA structures, represent the proper mechanisms for holding the organization accountable to its own rules.

  • Beyond Institutions: A Fan-Led Protest

Yet even as we demand that FIFA fulfil its obligations, we cannot wait passively for institutional action that may never come. Fans themselves possess a powerful tool: visibility.

When Iran, Haiti, Côte d'Ivoire, or Senegal takes the field in American stadiums, supporters of their opponents, and also neutrals who cherish football’s unifying spirit, should leave sections of seats conspicuously empty in solidarity. These vacant seats, broadcast to millions worldwide, would create an undeniable visual reminder of who is missing and why.

This is not a call for general boycott of the tournament, which would harm the very teams whose fans are excluded. Rather, it is a targeted, symbolic action: empty sections during specific matches as visible protest. Supporters’ groups could coordinate which sections to leave vacant, creating clear visual patterns that television cameras cannot ignore. Social media campaigns could explain the protest to global audiences, connecting the empty seats directly to the billion people locked out. It would demonstrate that football’s community rejects discrimination even when football’s governors tolerate it.

  • The Soul of the Game

The beautiful game has always transcended borders and brought together people whom politics seeks to divide. That is its soul, its magic, its moral authority.[10] By allowing Trump’s travel ban to stand unchallenged, FIFA acts in direct contradiction to the values it claims to uphold.

The question is whether those who truly love the game, players, fans, federations, will accept this silence, or whether they will demand that FIFA honour its own principles through every avenue available: formal institutional pressure and visible, grassroots action.

FIFA must use its leverage to ensure equal access in principle. Fans, in turn, must use both their presence and their strategic absence to demand accountability when FIFA fails to act.

The world is watching. The seats are waiting. What will we choose?


[1] Executive Order 14161 “Protecting the United States From Foreign Terrorists and Other National Security and Public Safety Threats”, 20 January 2025. Available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/protecting-the-united-states-from-foreign-terrorists-and-othernational-security-and-public-safety-threats/

 

[2] More importantly, IOC backed its words with action. Its Executive Board ended all dialogue with Indonesia’s National Olympic Committee regarding hosting future events and recommended that International Federations avoid holding competitions or meetings in the country until adequate guarantees were provided.

[3] FIFA Statutes (Edition August 2024), Articles 2a and 2g.

[4] “The many critiques of Qatar were mobilizing a range of rights-claims based in international treaties or conventions… . Simultaneously, similar claims were being advanced against FIFA for failing to abide by its responsibility to respect human rights. Ultimately, this advocacy and public pressure triggered legislative and policy changes in Qatar and at FIFA.” Antoine Duval & Daniela Heerdt, How the FIFA World Cup 2022 Changed Qatar: Playing the Game of Transnational Law on a Global Pitch, 24 German Law Journal 1677 (2023).

[5] “This contrast underscores how FIFA’s claim to neutrality in human rights matters is not a principled stance but a strategically deployed position that aligns with its broader governance model. When financial interests are involved, FIFA does not hesitate to intervene, demonstrating that it possesses the capacity and institutional mechanisms to enforce binding regulations when deemed necessary. Yet, when it comes to human rights, FIFA’s commitments often remain aspirational, non-binding, or selectively enforced.” Pedro José Jaén, Angeliki Bistaraki & Mathias Schubert, The Universal Game? Deconstructing FIFA’s Human Rights Discourse, The International Sports Law Journal (2025).

[6] Shubham Jain, Resistance and Reform as Responses to Human Rights Criticism: Relativism at FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022, 24 Ger. Law J. 1691, 1701 (2023).

[7] “Qatar’s migrant workers were literally put on the world’s agenda overnight. The number of publications mentioning Qatar and“migrant workers” issued by the four organizations shows, first, that Qatar’s migrant workers were of very marginal interest to them before 2010 and, second, that their reporting or advocacy on the issue picked up quickly after the attribution of the FIFA World Cup 2022.” Antoine Duval, Spectacular International Labor Law: Ambush Counter-Marketing In the Spotlight of Qatar’s 2022 FIFA World Cup, 24 German Law Journal 1712 (2023). 

[8] Jain, supra note 6 at 1696.

[9] The bureau pointed out that the participation of the Russian teams in these competitions posed potential disruptions due to the refusals of other national associations to play against them, security concerns, and overall uncertainty related to the conflict. See CAS 25 November 2022, 2022/A/8708 (Football Union of Russia v. Fédération Internationale de Football Association et al). 

*The legal justifications advanced by both FIFA and UEFA for the suspension of Russian teams “did not link the suspensions to the illegality of Russia’s war or the human rights violations committed by Russia’s armed forces.” A. Duval, FIFA and UEFA’s Reaction to Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: How the Neutrality of Sport Survived the War, 3 Voetbal- & Sportjuridische Zaken (2023).

 

[10] David Goldblatt, The Ball Is Round: A Global History of Football 21–22 (2006).

Chronicle of a Defeat Foretold: Dissecting the Swiss Federal Tribunal’s Semenya Decision - By Marjolaine Viret

Editor's note: Marjolaine is a researcher and attorney admitted to the Geneva bar (Switzerland) who specialises in sports and life sciences.

 

On 25 August 2020, the Swiss Supreme Court (Swiss Federal Tribunal, SFT) rendered one of its most eagerly awaited decisions of 2020, in the matter of Caster Semenya versus World Athletics (formerly and as referenced in the decision: IAAF) following an award of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). In short, the issue at stake before the CAS was the validity of the World Athletics eligibility rules for Athletes with Differences of Sex Development (DSD Regulation). After the CAS upheld their validity in an award of 30 April 2019, Caster Semenya and the South African Athletics Federation (jointly: the appellants) filed an application to set aside the award before the Swiss Supreme Court.[1] The SFT decision, which rejects the application, was made public along with a press release on 8 September 2020.

There is no doubt that we can expect contrasted reactions to the decision. Whatever one’s opinion, however, the official press release in English does not do justice to the 28-page long decision in French and the judges’ reasoning. The goal of this short article is therefore primarily to highlight some key extracts of the SFT decision and some features of the case that will be relevant in its further assessment by scholars and the media.[2]

It is apparent from the decision that the SFT was very aware that its decision was going to be scrutinised by an international audience, part of whom may not be familiar with the mechanics of the legal regime applicable to setting aside an international arbitration award in Switzerland.

Thus, the decision includes long introductory statements regarding the status of the Court of Arbitration for Sport, and the role of the Swiss Federal Tribunal in reviewing award issued by panels in international arbitration proceedings. The SFT also referred extensively throughout its decision to jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), rendered in cases related to international sport and the CAS. More...

A New Chapter for EU Sports Law and European Citizenship Rights? The TopFit Decision - By Thomas Terraz

Editor’s note: Thomas Terraz is a third year LL.B. candidate at the International and European Law programme at The Hague University of Applied Sciences with a specialisation in European Law. Currently he is pursuing an internship at the T.M.C. Asser Institute with a focus on International and European Sports Law.

 

1.     Introduction

Christmas has come very early this year for the EU sports law world in the form of the Court of Justice of the European Union’s (CJEU) judgment in TopFit eV, Daniele Biffi v Deutscher Leichtathletikverband eV by exclusively analyzing the case on the basis of European citizenship rights and its application to rules of sports governing bodies that limit their exercise. The case concerned an Italian national, Daniele Biffi, who has been residing in Germany for over 15 years and participates in athletic competitions in the senior category, including the German national championships. In 2016, the Deutscher Leichtathletikverband (DLV), the German Athletics Federation, decided to omit a paragraph in its rules that allowed the participation of EU nationals in national championships on the same footing as German citizens. As a result, participation in the national championship was subject to prior authorization of the organizers of the event, and even if participation was granted, the athlete may only compete outside of classification and may not participate in the final heat of the competition. After having been required to compete out of classification for one national championship and even dismissed from participating in another, Mr. Biffi and TopFit, his athletics club based in Berlin, brought proceedings to a German national court. The national court submitted a request for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU in which it asked essentially whether the rules of the DLV, which may preclude or at least require a non-national to compete outside classification and the final heat, are contrary to Articles 18, 21 and 165 TFEU. Articles 18 and 21 TFEU, read together, preclude discrimination on the basis of nationality against European citizens exercising their free movement. The underlying (massive) question here is whether these provisions can be relied on by an amateur athlete against a private body, the DLV.

Covered in a previous blog, the Advocate General’s (AG) opinion addressed the case from an entirely different angle. Instead of tackling the potentially sensitive questions attached with interpreting the scope of European citizenship rights, the opinion focused on the application of the freedom of establishment because the AG found that participation in the national championships was sufficiently connected to the fact Mr. Biffi was a professional trainer who advertised his achievements in those competitions on his website. Thus, according to the AG, there was a sufficient economic factor to review the case under a market freedom. The CJEU, in its decision, sidelined this approach and took the application of European citizenship rights head on.

The following will dissect the Court’s decision by examining the three central legal moves of the ruling: the general applicability of EU law to amateur sport, the horizontal applicability of European citizenship rights, and justifications and proportionality requirements of access restrictions to national competitions. More...

International and European Sports Law – Monthly Report – April and May 2019. By Tomáš Grell

Editor's note: This report compiles all relevant news, events and materials on International and European Sports Law based on the daily coverage provided on our twitter feed @Sportslaw_asser. You are invited to complete this survey via the comments section below, feel free to add links to important cases, documents and articles we might have overlooked.

 

The Headlines 

Caster Semenya learns that it is not always easy for victims of discrimination to prevail in court

The world of sport held its breath as the Secretary General of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) Matthieu Reeb stood before the microphones on 1 May 2019 to announce the verdict reached by three arbitrators (one of them dissenting) in the landmark case involving the South African Olympic and world champion Caster Semenya. Somewhat surprisingly, the panel of arbitrators came to the conclusion that the IAAF’s regulations requiring female athletes with differences of sexual development to reduce their natural testosterone level below the limit of 5 nmol/L and maintain that reduced level for a continuous period of at least six months in order to be eligible to compete internationally at events between 400 metres and a mile, were necessary, reasonable and proportionate to attain the legitimate aim of ensuring fair competition in female athletics, even though the panel recognised that the regulations were clearly discriminatory. Ms Semenya’s legal team decided to file an appeal against the ruling at the Swiss Federal Tribunal. For the time being, this appears to be a good move since the tribunal ordered the IAAF at the beginning of June to suspend the application of the challenged regulations to Ms Semenya with immediate effect, which means that Ms Semenya for now continues to run medication-free.

 

Champions League ban looms on Manchester City

On 18 May 2019, Manchester City completed a historic domestic treble after defeating Watford 6-0 in the FA Cup Final. And yet there is a good reason to believe that the club’s executives did not celebrate as much as they would under normal circumstances. This is because only two days before the FA Cup Final the news broke that the chief investigator of the UEFA Club Financial Control Body (CFCB) had decided to refer Manchester City’s case concerning allegations of financial fair play irregularities to the CFCB adjudicatory chamber for a final decision. Thus, the chief investigator most likely found that Manchester City had indeed misled UEFA over the real value of its sponsorship income from the state-owned airline Etihad and other companies based in Abu Dhabi, as the leaked internal emails and other documents published by the German magazine Der Spiegel suggested. The chief investigator is also thought to have recommended that a ban on participation in the Champions League for at least one season be imposed on the English club. The club’s representatives responded to the news with fury and disbelief, insisting that the CFCB investigatory chamber had failed to take into account a comprehensive body of irrefutable evidence it had been provided with. They eventually decided not to wait for the decision of the CFCB adjudicatory chamber, which is yet to be adopted, and meanwhile took the case to the CAS, filing an appeal against the chief investigator’s referral.

 

The Brussels Court of Appeal dismisses Striani’s appeal on jurisdictional grounds

The player agent Daniele Striani failed to convince the Brussels Court of Appeal that it had jurisdiction to entertain his case targeting UEFA’s financial fair play regulations. On 11 April 2019, the respective court dismissed his appeal against the judgment of the first-instance court without pronouncing itself on the question of compatibility of UEFA’s financial fair play regulations with EU law. The court held that it was not competent to hear the case because the link between the regulations and their effect on Mr Striani as a player agent, as well as the link between the regulations and the role of the Royal Belgian Football Association in their adoption and enforcement, was too remote (for a more detailed analysis of the decision, see Antoine’s blog here). The Brussels Court of Appeal thus joined the European Court of Justice and the European Commission as both these institutions had likewise rejected to assess the case on its merits in the past.

 

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Guest Blog - The Role of Sport in the Recognition of Transgender and Intersex Rights by Conor Talbot

Editor's note: Conor Talbot is a Solicitor at LK Shields Solicitors in Dublin and an Associate Researcher at Trinity College Dublin. He can be contacted at ctalbot@tcd.ie, you can follow him on Twitter at @ConorTalbot and his research is available at www.ssrn.com/author=1369709. This piece was first published on the humanrights.ie blog.

Sport is an integral part of the culture of almost every nation and its ability to shape perceptions and influence public opinion should not be underestimated.  The United Nations has highlighted the potential for using sport in reducing discrimination and inequality, specifically by empowering girls and women.  Research indicates that the benefits of sport include enhancing health and well-being, fostering empowerment, facilitating social inclusion and challenging gender norms.

In spite of the possible benefits, the successful implementation of sport-related initiatives aimed at gender equity involves many challenges and obstacles.  Chief amongst these is the way that existing social constructs of masculinity and femininity — or socially accepted ways of expressing what it means to be a man or woman in a particular socio-cultural context — play a key role in determining access, levels of participation, and benefits from sport.  This contribution explores recent developments in the interaction between transgender and intersex rights and the multi-billion dollar industry that the modern Olympic Games has become.  Recent reports show that transgender people continue to suffer from the glacial pace of change in social attitudes and, while there has been progress as part of a long and difficult journey to afford transgender people full legal recognition through the courts, it seems clear that sport could play an increasingly important role in helping change or better inform social attitudes.More...



Asser International Sports Law Blog | Unpacking Doyen’s TPO Deals: In defence of the compatibility of FIFA’s TPO ban with EU law

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

Unpacking Doyen’s TPO Deals: In defence of the compatibility of FIFA’s TPO ban with EU law

FIFA’s Third-Party Ownership (TPO) ban entered into force on the 1 May 2015[1]. Since then, an academic and practitioner’s debate is raging over its compatibility with EU law, and in particular the EU Free Movement rights and competition rules. 

The European Commission, national courts (and probably in the end the Court of Justice of the EU) and the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) will soon have to propose their interpretations of the impact of EU law on FIFA’s TPO ban. Advised by the world-famous Bosman lawyer, Jean-Louis Dupont, Doyen has decided to wage through a proxy (the Belgian club FC Seraing) a legal war against the ban. The first skirmishes have already taken place in front of the Brussels Court of first instance, which denied in July Seraing’s request for provisional measures. For its part, FIFA has already sanctioned the club for closing a TPO deal with Doyen, thus opening the way to an ultimate appeal to the CAS. In parallel, the Spanish and Portuguese leagues have lodged a complaint with the European Commission arguing that the FIFA ban is contrary to EU competition law. One academic has already published an assessment of the compatibility of the ban with EU law, and many practitioners have offered their take (see here and here for example). It is undeniable that the FIFA ban is per se restrictive of the economic freedoms of investors and can easily be constructed as a restriction on free competition. Yet, the key and core question under an EU law analysis, is not whether the ban is restrictive (any regulation inherently is), but whether it is proportionate, in other words justified.

I will first present the key arguments of the opponents of the ban, before offering my own assessment. As the reader might know, I am no friends of FIFA and a staunch critic of its bad governance syndrome. Although I am convinced that FIFA’s governance deserves a ground-up rebuilt, I also believe that FIFA’s TPO ban is justified.

 

I.               Antithesis: FIFA’s TPO ban is contrary to EU law 

The legal waters are very much chartered insofar as the question of the application of EU law to FIFA’s TPO ban is concerned.[2] The key legacy of the CJEU’s jurisprudence on sport, starting with the Bosman ruling, is that FIFA’s regulations do not escape the reach of EU law and that they must be subjected to a proportionality control of the restrictions they impose on economic freedoms. The fundamental question with respect to the TPO ban is then whether it will be deemed justified and proportionate by the national courts, the CAS, the European Commission and ultimately the CJEU.

The opponents of the FIFA ban consider first and foremost that the practice of TPO (they usually prefer to refer to as Third-Party Investments or Third-Party Entitlements) is a legitimate financial investment practice, which is needed to sustain and raise the competitiveness of certain clubs. Basically if banks are reluctant to finance those clubs, then less risk-averse investors have to step in. Thus, they support investment in the training capacity of the clubs (especially in South America) and their capacity to take their chances in the most prestigious competitions (for example FC Porto or Atlético Madrid). Hence, TPO can be seen as a legitimate investment practice and its regulation left to the contractual freedom of the parties. Such a radical libertarian view is not often supported nowadays,[3] as the potential integrity risks of TPO are widely acknowledged.[4]

Instead, if the risks connected to TPO are to be tackled, it is argued that TPO should be properly regulated. In EU law jargon, this is labelled a less restrictive alternative.[5] The existence of a less restrictive alternative would point at the disproportionate nature of the FIFA ban. For example, a bundle of regulatory measures are suggested by the Spanish league (La Liga):

·      Prohibition of certain transactions based on the player's age;

·      Maximum percentage of participation in the "economic rights";

·      Quantitative limitations on the maximum number of players per club;

·      Maximum remuneration for the investor;

·      Prohibition of certain clauses that may limit the independence and autonomy of the clubs; and

·      Prohibition of transactions depending on the investor's particular status or business (or participation in the same) such as shareholders, directors and managers of the clubs.

The proposed regulatory changes would undeniably be an improvement with regard to the current situation. However, I do not believe they are sufficiently credible to undermine the legality of FIFA’s TPO ban.

 

II.             Thesis: FIFA’s TPO ban is compatible with EU law

A.    The necessity to tackle the integrity risks generated by TPO

First, we need to come back to the function and functioning of TPO deals. There is a reason why banks refuse to offer loans to certain clubs. They are often in difficult financial situations, their revenues do not add up with their expenses. Investment funds fill this gap, they replace banks in financially supporting these clubs. In return, they expect a modern version of the “pound of flesh”, a share of the transfer fee attached to a specific player. For a club, the TPO investments will only be fruitful while it is successful on the pitch and lucky in picking the players it recruits. It is a very risky bet on the future. In good times everybody wins, but in bad times the club is in deep trouble (see FC Twente’s fate). The TPO system works as a devil’s circle, the club is drawn into more and more TPO deals to stay financially viable.

Furthermore, TPO deals are not unlike the complex financial instruments that led to the terrible financial crisis of 2008. They give way to similar conflicts of interest. Where banks were selling derivatives based on subprime mortgages to their clients while betting against them at the same time, TPO funds might push their clients to recruit (thanks to loans they have generously provided for high interests) a mediocre player in which they already have a stake. Another option would be for a TPO fund, which is often (if not always) also acting as an agent, to force the departure of a player by triggering an offer which the club cannot refuse (or it would have to buy back the rights which is impossible due to its financial situation). The many hat(s) of TPO investment funds are extremely worrying in terms of conflicts of interest.[6] The most dangerous, though in my view less likely (but see the Tampere case), risk being that TPO investors would use their broad networks of influence to fix games. FIFA’s objective of curbing those risks is clearly a legitimate one.

The heart of the trade of TPO funds is to leverage the hubris of football clubs, to corner them into making a bad financial deal in return for a credible shot at winning a title. But once the high is over, the low starts and the awakening is rather uncomfortable. The high financial risks saddled to the club are sustainable only so long as it is a winner. As soon as its fate on the pitch turns, the bad news accumulates and not unlike a bank run the club crashes, while the investors have more often than not managed to escape before the fall. In short, unless you truly believe in the superpowers of the invisible hand of the market, this practice, as well as the financial practices that led to the financial crisis, deserves either a thorough regulation or an outright ban.

B.    Is there a realistic regulatory alternative to the ban?

The key question for the assessment of the TPO ban under EU law is whether the many negative externalities triggered by the use of TPO could be tackled by the way of a less restrictive encroachment on the economic freedoms of the investors/clubs than the FIFA ban. Critics of the ban have very much insisted on the existence of less restrictive regulatory alternatives and put forward some proposals. Yet, I am of the opinion that these alternatives are generally unworkable in the present context. The main reason being that FIFA is incapable to properly regulate and control the TPO investment market. This is due to the fact that FIFA does not dispose of the legal competence needed to force investment funds to disclose information. To do so, it must be empowered by governments to be able to cease the information wanted, which is unlikely. Some would object, that this could be done via the FIFA TMS system put in place to supervise international transfers. But it would be extremely difficult for FIFA to verify any complex set of contractual information entered into the TMS. The destiny of former article 18 bis of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfers of Players (see the 2014 version here) is there to prove this point. Under article 4.2 of Annexe 3 of the FIFA RSTP 2014, Clubs were already supposed to provide a “Declaration on third-party payments and influence”. Nonetheless, in previous years, FIFA was unable to charge any club (except for Tampere in a match-fixing context and due to a local police investigation) on the ground that an investor was exercising undue influence, mainly because it lacked the knowledge needed to do so. This is exemplified in the case of the ERPA signed by Doyen and FC Twente, which was only partially disclosed to the Dutch Football Association.

If FIFA is powerless, how is it supposed to enforce the ban? Well here lies the crucial difference between a ban and complex regulation. A ban is simpler to enforce, as it is merely a black-or-white matter. FIFA will be able to rely on investigative journalists unearthing investment contracts linked to transfers. The mere existence of a TPO contract will lead to a dissuasive sanction, without the need to get into the nitty-gritty details of each case. It thus makes it easier for FIFA to control the use of TPO and to force investment funds to come out in the open and take charge of the management of a club if they wish to stay active on the transfer market. The higher probability of being caught linked to the use of TPO will most likely work as a strong deterrent for clubs to engage in such a financing practice. This is undeniably a blunt instrument, and in an ideal world a true regulation of the TPO market would be put in place and enforced, but this ideal world is not compatible with the pluralist and complex transnational legal setting in which the transfer system operates. The complex regulatory schemes proposed as substitute to the ban are very well intended, but they do not take into account the extreme difficulty (and costs) linked to their implementation. The fiasco of the old FIFA Players’ Agents Regulations illustrates the practical constraints that burden any regulation of the football transfer market.

C.    TPO is not compatible with the 2001 agreement between the European Commission and FIFA

There is a final argument in favour of the compatibility of the TPO ban with EU law, which is grounded in the 2001 agreement between FIFA, UEFA and the European Commission. As should be obvious by now, the existence of TPO is dependent on the existence of the FIFA transfer system. Such a transfer system is unknown in other industries (though one could very well imagine a transfer system for academics for example). In turn, the FIFA transfer system restricts the economic freedom of both clubs and players. The European Commission highlighted these restrictions during its investigation of the FIFA transfer system in the early 2000s. However, the Commission signed an agreement with FIFA and UEFA signalizing its support for a new (the current) FIFA transfer system in 2001 and put an end to its investigation. This support was conditioned on the idea that a form of transfer system was needed to maintain the contractual stability necessary to the existence of stable and successful teams.[7] This is the fundamental assumption that underlies the compatibility with EU law of the FIFA transfer system, and therefore the sheer existence of TPO. Yet, TPO as a practice is per se promoting contractual instability. Players have to change clubs for TPO investors to cash in on their investments. It is perfectly logical for TPO contracts to include various clauses strongly incentivizing clubs to sell their players. If not, they will have to bear the costs, for example, of paying a fee (usually the invested amount plus a healthy interest) in case the player leaves the club on a free transfer, or forcing the club to buy back at market rate the investors’ shares in the economic right of a player in case of an offer above a minimum price. For a cash-strapped club, e.g. a club that lost access to the banking system and has to turn to TPO investors, this is usually impossible and means that it will be forced to sell-on the player. In a way, TPO is a radical perversion of the deal stroke by FIFA/UEFA and the Commission. The transfer system was meant to ensure that contractual stability is secured in football, not to enhance contractual instability. This contradiction between TPO and the rationale conditioning the legality under EU law of the FIFA transfer system will necessarily bear on the EU Commission’s analysis of FIFA’s TPO ban.

 

Conclusion: TPO is a symptom, the transfer system is the problem

20 years of the Bosman case oblige, the case has been back in the news cycle this week (see here, here, and here). It is widely credited, or rather blamed, for having changed football for bad, turning it into some kind of commercial monster. I very much doubt this storytelling is right. It is based on a collective misreading of the case. Bosman took stock of a contemporary development in football at that time: the eagerness of the “football family” to commercialize its activities by primarily selling TV rights in a monopoly position. What Bosman is about, then, it is the regulation of this economic activity. Central questions are: How should the proceeds be distributed and especially who should bear the costs of ensuring competitive balance amongst the teams? Until Bosman the players were the main losers, they could not move freely across Europe and in some countries they could not transfer for free even after the end of their contracts. This situation was deemed an unjustified restriction on the player’s freedom by the Court. Nevertheless, and this is widely forgotten, Bosman is not about dogmatically ensuring that economic freedoms and a deregulated market always prevail. In fact, Advocate General Lenz was advocating as an alternative to the transfer system that the economic revenues derived from TV rights be shared more equally to ensure competitive balance.[8] This is obviously an important restriction on the economic freedom of clubs and leagues, yet the Court endorsed it as viable alternative.[9] Since then, the Court has repeatedly approved various type of sporting regulations restricting the economic freedoms of athletes or clubs.[10] After Bosman, FIFA and UEFA (supported by many clubs) insisted on maintaining a transfer system instead of the alternative suggested by Lenz and the Court. Despite the Commission’s aforementioned challenge of the legality of the FIFA transfer system, FIFA and UEFA were able to marshal the political support of the most influential Member States (France, Germany and the UK) in their bid to save the transfer system.[11] This led to the 2001 agreement and to the survival of the transfer system in its current form.

It is certainly ironical that the transfer system is based on the same legal principles denounced by UEFA and FIFA officials when they talk of slavery regarding TPO. This hypocrisy, rightly pointed out by the critics of the ban,[12] does not entail that the TPO ban is contrary to EU law, as they in turn seem to assume. However, it does imply that TPO as a practice is just the tip of the iceberg. In fact, it is a symptom, as well as the murky world of agents, of a global transfer market gone rogue. This is due mainly to the insistence of FIFA in transforming players into moveable assets included on the balance sheets of clubs. The transfer system is certainly not about contractual stability or the financing of training facilities. Indeed, FIFA is trumpeting the growing number of transfers each year (see this year’s celebratory press release here) and is very much dragging its feet as far as enforcing training compensations and solidarity payments is concerned.[13] Undoubtedly, there is some doublespeak going on. If clubs are forced to turn to TPO investors it is mainly because FIFA and UEFA (and the big clubs) have refused to put in place the necessary redistributive mechanisms to ensure a minimum of competitive balance as was advocated by the CJEU in the Bosman ruling 20 years ago (and by the EU Commission recently). Instead, they have put their faith into a transfer system that is neither correcting competitive imbalances nor guaranteeing contractual stability (a view supported by Stefan Szymanski on behalf of FIFPro). FIFA has lost control over its Frankenstein-like transfer system and it is desperately trying to rein its negative externalities with regulatory patches (e.g. UEFA’s Financial Fair-play Rules or FIFA’s TPO ban). In this regard, the TPO ban is unlikely to contravene EU law, but it is also unlikely to be a solution to the many problems caused by FIFA and UEFA’s handling of the post-Bosman football era.


[1] See FIFA Circular no. 1464 announcing the ban.

[2] This is well done by Johan Lindholm in his article: Can I please have a slice of Ronaldo? The legality of FIFA’s ban on third-party ownership under European union law.

[3] The Spanish Competition Authority comes close to such a view in its advisory opinion criticizing FIFA’s TPO ban. It states at page 6 (in Spanish): “Se ha de partir del hecho de que si el mercado ha facilitado la aparición de estas operaciones es porque una multitud de agentes (tanto clubs como jugadores), actuando de manera descentralizada, han considerado que es lo mejor para sus intereses. Por tanto, la prohibición del TPO resulta en una limitación de la capacidad de obrar y de la libertad de empresa, restringiendo el uso de una conducta que en principio es maximizadora de beneficios (o minimizadora de pérdidas).”

[4] Even though very reluctantly by the Spanish Competition Authority, see p.9-10.

[5] This is also the view of Johan Lindholm, he considers that “regulation is likely a legally more successful response to the perceived ills of TPO”.

[6] This is also true for other types of third party funding, for example in arbitration.

[7] This is in essence the meaning of paragraph 57 of the EU Commission’s rejection decision in the Affaire IV/36 583-SETCA-FGTB/FIFA. The paragraph states : « La protection des contrats pendant une période de durée limitée qui se traduit par des sanctions correspondant notamment à la suspension du joueur pendant une période de 4 mois à 6 mois (dans des cas de récidives) semble indispensable pour garantir la construction d’une équipe. Un club a besoin d’un temps minimum pour construire son équipe. Si un joueur pouvait rompre unilatéralement son contrat dès la première année et être transféré à la fin de la saison vers un autre club, sans aucune sanction autre que la compensation financière, son club d’origine n’aurait pas de possibilité de construire convenablement son équipe. Les sanctions visent donc à démotiver les joueurs de rompre unilatéralement leurs contrats pendant les deux premières années pour permettre l’existence d’équipes stables. En raison des spécificités du secteur en cause la durée de la période protégée et des sanctions semble être proportionnée aux objectifs légitimes quelles visent à atteindre. »

[8] See in particular paragraphs 218-234 of his Opinion.

[9] See para. 110 of the Bosman ruling.

[10] For example: Selection rules in Deliège; Transfer windows in Lehtonen; FIFA’s agent regulation in Piau; Doping sanctions in Meca-Medina; Training compensations in Bernard. The European Commission also recognised the legality of UEFA’s rule limiting the multiple ownership of clubs in ENIC.

[11] On this episode see Borja Garcia’s article, ‘The 2001 informal agreement on the international transfer system’.

[12] In his article Johan Lindholm criticizes this moral posture taken by FIFA and UEFA. He rightly points at its hypocrisy: “[…] a third party owning fifty percent of the economic rights to a player is the very height of moral corruption, but a club owning one hundred percent of the same right is not only perfectly acceptable but also applauded”.

[13] A recent study commissioned by the European Clubs Association (ECA) on the transfer market, shows (at page 88) that the solidarity payments are way below the 5% threshold imposed by the FIFA RSTP (reaching instead only 1,15% of the transfer fees).

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Asser International Sports Law Blog | How 2019 Will Shape the International Sports Law of the 2020s - By Thomas Terraz

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

How 2019 Will Shape the International Sports Law of the 2020s - By Thomas Terraz

Editor’s note: Thomas Terraz is a fourth year LL.B. candidate at the International and European Law programme at The Hague University of Applied Sciences with a specialisation in European Law. Currently he is pursuing an internship at the T.M.C. Asser Institute with a focus on International and European Sports Law.

 

1.     Introduction

As we begin plunging into a new decade, it can be helpful to look back and reflect on some of the most influential developments and trends from 2019 that may continue to shape international sports law in 2020 and beyond. Hence, this piece will not attempt to recount every single sports law news item but rather identify a few key sports law stories of 2019 that may have a continued impact in the 2020s. The following sections are not in a particular order.

2.     Court of Justice of the European Union’s TopFit Decision

The Court of Justice of the European Union’s decision in TopFit in June sent shockwaves in the EU sports law world by finally providing some answers to a long untouched issue of purely amateur sport. The case concerned an Italian amateur athlete, living in Germany for several years who had been precluded from participating in a German national championship in the senior category due to no longer fulfilling the nationality requirements because of a change of the Deutscher Leichtathletikverband’s (DLV) regulations governing this issue. Daniele Biffi, the athlete in the case, argued that this violated his European citizenship rights under Articles 18 and 21 TFEU. Leading up to the final decision, the Advocate General’s opinion in the case, analyzed in an earlier blog, had sidelined this argument in favor of embracing a more familiar economic argument based on the freedom of establishment. AG Tanchev contended that an analysis based on Article 18 and 21 TFEU may open a pandora’s box by giving horizontal direct effect to Article 21 TFEU. In the end, the CJEU took the issue of European citizenship rights head on. The CJEU’s decision, also analyzed in our blog, focused on three themes: the general applicability of EU law to amateur sport, the horizontal applicability of European citizenship rights, and the justifications and accompanied proportionality requirements to nationality restrictions in national championships. It found that Mr. Biffi could rely on Articles 18 and 21 TFEU and ruled that the DLV’s justifications for the rule change were disproportionate.

All things considered, there are a variety of ways TopFit may have a lasting impact. For example, the ‘golden rule’ of EU sports law had once been that an economic dimension was always needed to trigger the applicability of EU law. This is clearly no longer the case as the CJEU in TopFit expressly confirmed that European citizenship rights, which do not require an economic dimension to be invoked, could be relied upon in a sports related case, meaning that all sport activity is subject to EU law. Additionally, TopFit may have unlocked the true potential behind European citizenship rights by giving them horizontal direct effect, which may have ramifications far beyond sports law.[1]  In the years ahead, it will be interesting to see whether this will trigger a flood of new cases based on European citizenship rights.

3.     Decision of the Bundeskartellamt (German Competition Authority) Concerning Rule 40 of the Olympic Charter

As has become tradition in the lead up to an Olympic year, athletes have once more been pushing back against bye-law 3 of rule 40 of the Olympic Charter (OC), which restricts advertisements from athletes participating in the Olympic Games. While rule 40’s intent is to combat ambush marketing at the Games to protect the value of the Olympic Partner Programme (TOP), athletes have argued that it severely restricts their ability to financially exploit their sport achievements during the Olympic Games, which for many is a once in a lifetime opportunity for greater exposure.[2] This is compounded by the fact that many athletes struggle to make a living from their sport. This situation most recently culminated in a decision of the Bundeskartellamt (the German competition law authority) that focused on this issue. In its preliminary assessment of the case, the Bundeskartellamt took a restrictive view of when limitations on athlete advertisements could be justified by narrowly interpreting ambush marketing and finding that restrictions on advertisement must aim to protect specific intellectual property rights. In the end, the Deutscher Olympischer Sportbund (Germany’s national Olympic committee) made several commitments to resolve the case.[3]

The decision is likely to (and has already to a certain extent[4]) help spark a shift in the IOC’s position on this issue. Furthermore, the British Olympic Association has just recently faced a new complaint on behalf of some of its athletes. Regardless, it is clear the European Commission is closely following the situation and given the Bundeskartellamt’s decision is only enforceable within Germany, there is a continued possibility that the Commission and ultimately the CJEU may eventually have a final say on this issue. Rule 40 undoubtedly is an issue that deserves attention, especially with Tokyo 2020 around the corner.

4.     Sun Yang’s Public Hearing at the CAS

2019 also proved to be quite the historic year for sport arbitration since for the second time in its 35-year history, the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) conducted a public hearing. It signals that the European Court of Human Rights’ (ECtHR) Pechstein decision is starting to have a transformative effect at the CAS. To quickly recap, the ECtHR had found in Pechstein that clauses that impose CAS arbitration as a condition to participate in sport activity amount to forced arbitration, meaning that in cases resulting from such circumstances (especially disciplinary cases) the CAS must observe Article 6§1 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), which sets out the right to a fair trial.[5] This includes that ‘in principle, litigants have a right to a public hearing’.[6] Consequently, parties have greater room to request a public hearing at the CAS, especially when the dispute is of a disciplinary nature.[7] Hence, Sun Yang’s public hearing may be heralding a new era where public hearings at the CAS become a common display.

Sun Yang’s hearing also highlighted some of the practical challenges of conducting live hearings when the proceedings are in a different language as some of the parties and/or witnesses. As covered in our monthly report, the interpreters failed to properly translate multiple testimonies during the Sun Yang hearing. Many wondered whether there would be a need for greater safeguards in terms of the quality of translation given how it can affect one’s right to be heard. However, the CAS maintained that it could not directly hire its own ‘official’ translators because it would potentially threaten its ‘independence and neutrality’. Yet, one could envision that the CAS would set certain minimum standards for parties’ interpreters and or manages a list of accredited interpreters from which the parties could pick. In any event, this case signals the beginning of a new public era in sports arbitration that will profoundly shift the way the game is played at the CAS in the 2020s.

5.     New FIFA Legal Portal

FIFA has taken a step towards increasing its transparency through the launch of a new legal portal in which it has undertaken to publish all the decisions of the Disciplinary Committee, Appeal Committee, the Adjudicatory Chamber of the FIFA Ethics Committee, the Dispute Resolution Chamber, the Player Status Committee, the CAS where FIFA is a party, and a multitude of other documents with a legal dimension. According to FIFA, these decisions will be updated every 4 months, meaning that a new batch of decisions should be expected to be posted soon. The initiative for the FIFA Legal portal was resulting from a push for greater transparency in its governance as a cornerstone of its 2016 FIFA 2.0: The Vision for the Future.

Increasing transparency in this manner will give greater room for stakeholders and the general public to keep FIFA accountable, review the work of its disciplinary bodies and criticise the legal reasoning they use. However, only time will tell whether this portal will deliver a reliable and useful level of transparency enabling a rigorous public scrutiny on FIFA.

6.     Caster Semenya Case

Caster Semenya’s struggles with World Athletics (formerly IAAF) continued in 2019, culminating in a CAS award followed by an interim decision of the Swiss Federal Tribunal (SFT), both in favor of World Athletics. The case revolved around World Athletics’ DSD Regulations (difference of sex development) that required athletes competing in the female category in certain events (400m to one mile) at an international level to keep their testosterone levels below five nmol/L. Caster Semenya challenged these regulations arguing that they were ‘unfairly’ discriminating against females and especially those with ‘certain physiological traits’ because they were not scientifically based, they are ‘unnecessary to ensure fair competition within the female classification’ and would likely ‘cause grave, unjustified and irreparable harm’. The CAS award found that the DSD Regulations are discriminatory, however, they are also proportionate to World Athletics’ ‘aim of preserving the integrity of female athletics’. The award was subsequently appealed to the Swiss Federal Tribunal who in a second interim decision lifted its provisional suspension of the DSD Regulations. With this decision, Caster Semenya was barred from participating in the World Championships in Doha.

Looking at the case as a whole, some have underlined the manner in which World Athlete’s regulations only target women and argued that it is fundamentally rooted in gender stereotypes. It also illustrates how certain assumptions on sex[8] have shaped World Athletics policies on this issue, while others also contend that it is unethical to force athletes to have to reduce their testosterone levels if there is no underlying medical need.[9]  To be fair, the issue is not entirely black and white and nuanced arguments have also been made in support of testosterone testing.[10] In any event, this case will necessarily become an important classic of international sports law and most likely linger in the docket of the ECtHR (or of the South African constitutional court) for years to come. It will refine the scope of the autonomy of SGBs and test the reputation of the CAS.   

7.     Russian Doping Scandal Continues

The last, and perhaps the news item that received the most media attention, is the ongoing Russian doping scandal. Worries arose once again earlier this year after inconsistencies were uncovered from data retrieved from the Moscow Laboratory. In response, the WADA Executive Committee decided unanimously on December 9 in favor of a four-year period of non-compliance, following the recommendation of WADA’s Compliance Review Committee. RUSADA swiftly appealed the WADA’s decision to the CAS.

The reemergence of the Russian doping scandal has reignited discussions on whether the original decision to declare Russia compliant in September 2018 was perhaps premature. At the time, that decision had been especially criticized by athlete representative groups. This round of the Russian doping scandal may prove to be a greater test on WADA’s ability to keep credibility with the world’s athletes and the general public. Some, like Richard Pound have contended that the new sanctions are tough,[11] but others have argued that more could be done and that leaving the door open to certain ‘approved’ Russian athletes puts clean sport at risk. So far, Russia‘s leadership have mainly characterized the investigation and following sanctions as a witch-hunt stemming from anti-Russian sentiment. The scandal will loom large over the Tokyo Olympics and will probably lead to a fresh wave of Russian cases before the CAS and the SFT.

8.     Conclusion

2019 was a rich year for international and European sports law with many landmark decisions taken, which will have a long-lasting effect on the field. Changes linked to the transparency of sports justice and governance are more likely to have unpredictable transformative consequences as they will enhance the ability of the media to subject sports arbitrators and administrators to rigorous scrutiny. Furthermore, the Rule 40 case and the TopFit decision are also strong reminders of the power of EU law (be it competition law or citizenship rights) as a vehicle to check the decisions of the SGBs. Finally, the Semenya case is certainly the CAS award of the year. It pushed to the forefront a fundamental ethical and philosophical question: Should SGBs be entitled to define the sporting sex of an athlete? What is their legitimacy in taking such a decision?


[1] It is possible that these situations may still be limited since the CJEU’s decision indicates that a power disparity is needed between the parties. See Case C-22/18 TopFit e.V. Daniele Biffi v Deutscher Leichtathletikverband e.V. [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:497, para 39.

[2] See our previous blog on rule 40 (and the Bundeskartellamt’s decision), which goes in depth on rule 40’s inception and purpose.

[3] Commitments included: ‘(1) no more authorization required for advertisements during the frozen period and instead athletes can request that the DOSB review planned advertisements beforehand to confirm if it meets the admissibility criteria; (2) advertisement campaigns may now be launched during the frozen period; (3) pictures of athletes during Olympic competitions may be used for advertisement so long as it does not include protected Olympic logos, symbols or designations; (4) videos are restricted only to the German House, the Olympic village or the back of house areas and (5) sports related sanctions are no longer available (only economic sanctions are possible) and athletes may have recourse to German courts.’

[4] Rule 40 OC has been reformulated from a ban on athlete advertisement with certain exceptions to where athlete advertisements are allowed subject to restrictions.

[5] See Antoine Duval, ‘The “Victory” of the Court of Arbitration for Sport at the European Court of Human Rights: The End of the Beginning for the CAS’ (Asser International Sports Law Blog, 10 October 2018).

[6]Guide on Article 6 of the European Convention on Huma Rights’ (ECtHR 2019).

[7] The R57 of the Code was amended in January of last year. See the current version of R57 CAS Code.

[8] While this piece was written in relation to the previous IAAF regulations ‘Regulations Governing Eligibility of Females with Hyperandrogenism to Compete in Women's Competition’, it is still relevant to the current regulations: Cheryl Cooky and Shari L Dworkin, ‘Policing the Boundaries of Sex: A Critical Examination of Gender Verification and the Caster Semenya Controversy’ [2013] 50 Journal of Sex Research 103.

[9] This piece also was written concerning the previous IAAF regulations, it also is still relevant to the current discussion: Malcolm Ferguson-Smith and Dawn Bavington, ‘Natural Selection for Genetic Variants in Sport: The Role of Y Chromosome Genes in Elite Female Athletes with 46,XY DSD’ [2014] 44 Sports Medicine 1629.

[10] This piece also was written concerning the previous IAAF regulations, it also is still relevant to the current discussion: Francisco J. Sánchez , María José Martínez-Patiño and Eric Vilain, ‘The New Policy on Hyperandrogenism in Elite Female Athletes is Not About “Sex Testing”’ [2013] 50 Journal of Sex Research 112.

[11] See also LawInSport’s interview with Jonathan Taylor QC, chair of WADA’s Compliance Review Committee, explaining the reasoning behind the recommendations.

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