Editor’s note: Thomas Terraz is a L.LM. candidate in the European Law programme at Utrecht University and a former intern of the Asser International Sports Law Centre

1.     Sport Nationalism is Politics

Despite all efforts, the Olympic Games has been and will be immersed in politics. Attempts to shield the Games from social and political realities are almost sure to miss their mark and potentially risk being disproportionate. Moreover, history has laid bare the shortcomings of the attempts to create a sanitized and impenetrable bubble around the Games. The first blog of this series examined the idea of the Games as a sanitized space and dived into the history of political neutrality within the Olympic Movement to unravel the irony that while the IOC aims to keep the Olympic Games ‘clean’ of any politics within its ‘sacred enclosure’, the IOC and the Games itself are largely enveloped in politics. Politics seep into the cracks of this ‘sanitized’ space through: (1) public protests (and their suppression by authoritarian regimes hosting the Games), (2) athletes who use their public image to take a political stand, (3) the IOC who takes decisions on recognizing national Olympic Committees (NOCs) and awarding the Games to countries,[1] and (4) states that use the Games for geo-political posturing.[2] With this background in mind, the aim now is to illustrate the disparity between the IOC’s stance on political neutrality when it concerns athlete protest versus sport nationalism, which also is a form of politics.

As was mentioned in part one of this series, the very first explicit mention of politics in the Olympic Charter was in its 1946 version and aimed to combat ‘the nationalization of sports for political aims’ by preventing ‘a national exultation of success achieved rather than the realization of the common and harmonious objective which is the essential Olympic law’ (emphasis added). This sentiment was further echoed some years later by Avery Brundage (IOC President (1952-1972)) when he declared: ‘The Games are not, and must not become, a contest between nations, which would be entirely contrary to the spirit of the Olympic Movement and would surely lead to disaster’.[3] Regardless of this vision to prevent sport nationalism engulfing the Games and its codification in the Olympic Charter, the current reality paints quite a different picture. One simply has to look at the mass obsession with medal tables during the Olympic Games and its amplification not only by the media but even by members of the Olympic Movement.[4] This is further exacerbated when the achievements of athletes are used for domestic political gain[5] or when they are used to glorify a nation’s prowess on the global stage or to stir nationalism within a populace[6]. Sport nationalism is politics. Arguably, even the worship of national imagery during the Games from the opening ceremony to the medal ceremonies cannot be depoliticized.[7] In many ways, the IOC has turned a blind eye to the politics rooted in these expressions of sport nationalism and instead has focused its energy to sterilize its Olympic spaces and stifle political expression from athletes. One of the ways the IOC has ignored sport nationalism is through its tacit acceptance of medal tables although they are expressly banned by the Olympic Charter.

At this point, the rules restricting athletes’ political protest and those concerning sport nationalism, particularly in terms of medal tables, will be scrutinized in order to highlight the enforcement gap between the two.

2.     The Legal Framework

a.     Athlete Led Political Protest

The groundwork for political neutrality is set out in the Fundamental Principles of Olympism (point 5) and Rule 2 (5) of the Olympic Charter. As was illuminated in the first blog, this is presented by the Olympic Charter to ensure the autonomy of sport. One of the specific ways in which the Olympic Charter tries to secure this ideal is through Rule 50 which bans political protest at Olympic sites.[8] Last year, the IOC Athletes’ Commission released its Guidelines on Rule 50 which underscored the far-reaching prohibitions Rule 50 entails. Athletes are not allowed to display any sort of ‘political messaging’ or make any ‘gestures of a political nature’. This includes no ‘signs or armbands’, no ‘hand gestures or kneeling’. Even ‘refusal to follow the Ceremonies protocol’ is considered a violation of Rule 50. Rubbing salt in the wound is the fact that the geographic scope of this ban extends to ‘all Olympic venues’, thus even covering the Olympic Village. Athletes may only disperse their political speech during ‘press conferences and interviews’, ‘team meetings’ and through ‘digital or traditional media, or on other platforms’. The Guidelines, however, underline that this exception only applies to ‘expressing views’, making a distinction from ‘protests and demonstrations’, which includes the actions described above. Arguably, drawing such a line may be blurry in practice. In other words, at what point does an athlete’s expression of a view become political protest? This question is particularly relevant given the broad interpretation the Guidelines have taken on what constitutes political protest. In the end, while the Guidelines claim that this is only to ensure that everyone ‘can enjoy the experience of the Olympic Games without any divisive disruption’, such a broad interpretation of Rule 50 arguably goes beyond the attempt to prevent any ‘disruption’ to athletes’ achievements.

The consequences for athletes who do not follow these rules can be very serious. Bye-Law 1 to Rule 50 states that if such ‘propaganda’ appears on an athlete’s clothing or equipment (e.g. an armband or hidden t-shirt), they may be disqualified. The Guidelines, on the other hand, remain rather vague. Instead, each case is to be decided by the athlete’s ‘National Olympic Committee, International Federation and the IOC’ and ‘disciplinary action’ will be decided on an individual basis. Nevertheless, given simply the looming threat of a disqualification, it is likely that the vast majority of athletes will simply fall into line.[9]

b.    Sport Nationalism and Medal Tables

The clearest example of the wilful disregard of the Olympic Movement to combat sport nationalism is its tacit acceptance of Olympic medal tables despite an explicit ban in the Olympic Charter. The foundations of this ban can be found in Rule 6 of the Olympic Charter which stipulates that the ‘Olympic Games are competitions between athletes in individual or team events and not between countries’ (emphasis added). Rule 57 then specifically addresses medal tables, stating that the ‘IOC and the OCOG shall not draw up any global ranking per country’. Finally, Rule 27 (6) highlights how NOCs bear a special responsibility to ‘preserve their autonomy and resist all pressures of any kind, including but not limited to political, legal, religious or economic pressures which may prevent them from complying with the Olympic Charter’. With this framing, while the IOC and OCOG are not allowed to create a medal table, the NOCs have essentially been left off the hook. In practice, NOCs have not hesitated to boast of their performances on medal tables. For instance, the United States Olympic Committee jumped at the opportunity to celebrate how it had topped the medal chart for the ‘6th straight games’ at Rio 2016.[10] In the meantime, political leaders and the media continue to gush over the achievements of their countries through their standing in the medal table.[11] While hosting Olympic athletes at the White House, Obama emphasized how Team USA had ‘won the most medals by far’ at the Rio Games.[12] Additionally, national governments are aware of their standings in medal tables and have used them to shape their sport policies, including funding for elite sport.[13] NOCs play a role here as well. For example, the Dutch NOC*NSF, in its overview of its elite sport strategy and finance, has set its goal to be a top 10 nation in elite sport, which involves ‘striving for more medals’.[14] Indeed, the determination of whether a nation is in the top 10 presupposes the creation of some sort of ‘global ranking per country’. Lastly, concerning the media, the IOC’s editorial guidelines for Olympic properties at Rio 2016 even clearly states that it has ‘no objection’ to medal tables in published material.[15]

The Olympic Charter requires the IOC ‘to oppose any political ... abuse of sport and athletes’.[16] All the above examples are illustrations of using sport and athletes’ achievements for political purposes.[17] Given this picture, it could be argued that the IOC has increasingly taken a rather laid back approach to medal tables and does not seem to mind how other actors – both within and outside the Olympic Movement – use them to stimulate a country versus country narrative around the Olympic Games.[18] In essence, medal tables paint those countries at the top as the winners and those at the bottom as the losers, further elevating nationalist politics: the myth of the nations of the innately strong and those of the weak. The IOC, as the ‘supreme authority’ of the Olympic Movement, could adopt a stronger tone to push back against the omnipresent nature of medal tables within the Games as it stands in complete opposition to its fundamental principles.[19] Indeed, part of the IOC’s mission is to ‘to take action to strengthen the unity of the Olympic Movement, to protect its independence, to maintain and promote its political neutrality and to preserve the autonomy of sport’ (emphasis added).[20] But there is no unity in the Olympic Movement concerning medal tables, only disarray, ranging from tacit acceptance to zealous celebrations of a nation’s ranking.

3.     Unveiling the Hypocrisy

In view of this, there seems to be a disparity in the Olympic Movement’s approach to politics when it comes from athletes, where there is the potential for severe sanctions, compared to sport nationalism arising from medal tables, where it seems to have all but accepted their existence. Looking beyond simply medal tables, so much of the Olympic Games emphasizes a competition between countries, further stimulating sport nationalism: (1) an opening ceremony where athletes march into an arena behind their nation’s flag and where the host puts on ‘cultural performances’ that ‘dramatize national myths, experiences, and values’[21]; (2) national anthems that are religiously played during each medal ceremony while national flags are hoisted up; (3) the way in which many team sports are played between countries. More credence is given to this view when one also observes how the media – and sometimes even NOCs -  help push a country versus country narrative, which can potentially overshadow athletes’ individual accomplishments.^[22] The constant flood of national imagery during the Games casts doubt on the idea that the Olympic Games is not a competition between countries, creating greater friction between the ideas of ‘universalism and nationalism’.[23] It should also be recalled, as was pointed out in the first blog, that states use sport nationalism to help push foreign and internal political agendas.  Some have argued that in this way sport can be ‘regarded as compensation, a sense of nostalgia or as a cure against the erosion of national identity’, even becoming ‘an alternative to war’.[24] Others have taken another view that instead of acting as a sort of pressure release, the Games ‘may provide opportunities for extending and exacerbating nationalist-inspired conflicts’, further entrenching nationalism.[25]

However, this blog is not arguing that the IOC should take heavy handed action to discourage the media from tallying up medals or to reel in a NOC’s pride in the performance of its athletes or to rid the Olympic Games of all signs of national imagery. On the contrary, it seems that the idea to minimize sport nationalism through the inclusion of Rule 6 and 57 of the Olympic Charter should be characterized as an expression of a lofty ideal that personifies international unity – i.e. something to be aspired to but not some concrete goal to be realized through rigorous enforcement. Again, it is completely legitimate for the Olympic Movement to strive for this ideal and to also defend its political neutrality. Yet, given how the IOC has all but accepted this form of politics (sport nationalism), it is puzzling why it has not taken a more tolerant approach to political expression from athletes, including protests/demonstrations, especially when considering how medal tables arguably pose a far greater threat to the fundamental principles of the Olympic Movement.[26] Perhaps given how sports can help stir national pride within a populace, it is possible that this phenomenon may encourage more viewership hours. Consequently, presenting the Games as a country versus country competition may be more lucrative. On the other hand, potentially unpredictable athlete protests may risk dividing audiences and may also put Olympic sponsors on edge. But assuming this is the case, is this reason enough to ban such expression altogether?

Regardless, in the same way sport nationalism will likely never be completely erased, athletes’ political expression will continue to be part of the Olympic fabric. Fundamentally, it all boils down to whether it is truly possible to disentangle politics and sport? If so, is it realistic or even desirable? One could maybe argue that this unbundling is necessary to promote international unity and to ensure the universality, neutrality and autonomy of sport. However, how far should the Olympic Movement go to achieve this result and is such a consequentialist approach appropriate considering the pressures it places on athletes – i.e. do the ends justify the means? I would argue that this process of sanitization is burdened with too many moral concerns and is an enforcement minefield in practice. While outside the scope of this blog, it should be noted that it is not difficult to imagine an athlete challenging the concerned provisions on the basis of human rights and/or EU law.

All things considered, the IOC chooses the kind of politics it is willing to tolerate within its sphere of influence. The national structures within the Olympic Movement, the influence of national governments, and the seducing narratives of nationalism create significant headwinds in favor of the politics of sport nationalism. Therefore, the IOC, an entity that embodies the transnational, has a responsibility to be a counterbalance in this system.[27] In doing so, the IOC - the leader of the Olympic Movement – should defend, or at least tolerate, the free expression of its ‘people’, the athletes. This is not a radical proposition. It is worth remembering that athletes form an integral part of the Olympic Movement.^[28] Simply respecting the free expression of athletes does not automatically sacrifice the political neutrality of the Olympic Movement.

4.     Conclusion

Over the past year, the IOC has faced increasing public pressure, particularly from athlete stakeholders (see here, here and here) to reverse its course concerning Rule 50 of the Olympic Charter. As a result, it announced that the IOC Athletes Commission would conduct a consultation process concerning Rule 50. The IOC Athletes Commission just recently finished its consultation and its ‘recommendations will be presented to the IOC Executive Board by the end of April 2021’. Meanwhile, NOCs have also individually taken certain steps to allow more athlete activism, such as the US Olympic and Paralympic Committee (USOPC) which has committed to not sanction athletes who ‘peacefully and respectfully’ protest ‘in support of racial and social justice for all human beings’. In this regard, the USOPC declared that ‘human rights are not political, calls for equity and equality must not be confused with divisive demonstrations’. While perhaps attractive at first glance, the USOPC is only moving the goalposts by playing semantics with ‘politics’ by narrowing its definition to eliminate ‘human rights’[29] from its ambit. In doing so, the USOPC does not explain why human rights are not political issues. The reality is that the scope and implications of human rights remain hotly contested issues everywhere in the world, they can hardly be depoliticized. Nevertheless, the softening of the USOPC’s position and its acknowledgement of some its past mistakes is a good start.[30]

In view of today’s strong social currents, the IOC may be forced to abandon its dream of a pure and apolitical Olympic Games. Politics has and will continue to ooze into the sanitized spaces of the Olympic Games. Allowing athletes to raise their voice during the Games would allow them to share their political views with the world, instead of confining them to remaining passive laborers in the Olympic economy subject to the power politics of states.

[1] Although the current IOC President, Thomas Bach, would likely dispute this point. Bach recently argued: ‘Neither awarding the Games, nor participating, are a political judgment regarding the host country.’ See Thomas Bach, ‘The Olympics are about diversity and unity, not politics and profit. Boycotts don't work’ (The Guardian, 24 October 2020).

[2] This is by no means an exhaustive list.

[3] Philip Barker, ‘The forbidden Olympic table’ (Inside the Games, 24 January 2020).

[4] See how the Washington Post gleefully counts the number of US gold medals and celebrates the fact that the U.S. has ‘more than double any other country’s count’. See Team GB’s (British Olympic Association) fervent count of its medals at Rio 2016. See also Team USA’s (U.S. Olympic and Paralympic Committee) glorification of its record-breaking medal count at the Rio 2016.

[5] For example when athletes are used during photo ops for political leaders around the world. See United States (Trump and Obama), Russia (here and here), and The Netherlands among many others.

[6] Ivo van Hilvoorde, Agnees Elling and Ruud Stokvis, ‘How to influence national pride? The Olympic medal index as a unifying narrative’ [2010] 45 International Review for the Sociology of Sport 87.

[7] Jackie Hogan, ‘Staging The Nation: Gendered and Ethnicized Disources of National Identity in Olympic Opening Ceremonies’ [2003] 27 Journal of Sport and Social Issues 100.

[8] Rule 50: ‘No kind of demonstration or political, religious or racial propaganda is permitted in any Olympic sites, venues or other areas.’

[9] Indeed, athletes have been banned for life in the past for political actions. For instance, Vince Matthews and Wayne Collett who were banned for life after a podium protest at the 1972 Munich Olympics. Recently, there have been calls to undo their life bans.

[10] See also Team GB’s tracking of its own ‘record-breaking’ medal performance at the Rio Games.

[11] For some examples of the media obsession around the Olympic Games’ medal tables see: ‘Tokyo Olympics 2020 medal table: How does it work, which country usually wins and what are Britain's hopes?’ (The Telegraph, 26 January 2021); ‘Rio Olympics 2016: Team GB’s record breakers return home from Rio’ (BBC, 23 August 2016). ‘2020 Olympics: USA forecast to top medals table with GB and Australia fifth’ (The Guardian, 23 July 2019); Lazaro Gamio, Kim Soffen and Chiqui Esteban, ‘1,000 Times Gold’ (The Washington Post).

[12] Some have even suggested that the US performance at the 2012 London Olympics could have contributed to a boost in Obama’s polling for the presidential election that year. See John Cassidy, ‘Did the Olympics Boost Obama?’ (The New Yorker, 10 August 2012).

[13] See Germany’s concern of its place in medal rankings to justify restructuring its funding for elite sport. This is also acknowledged by van Hilvoorde, Elling and Stokvis (n 6).

[14] Original: ‘We streven naar meer medailles, in meer disciplines, met meer impact.’

[15] The Pyeongchang editorial guidelines (page 14) do not discourage their use.

[16] Rule 2 (11) Olympic Charter.

[17] See also other examples of the abuse of sport and athletes for political purposes by ‘states that use the Games for geo-political posturing’ in the first blog of this series.

[18] On the narratives around medal tables and the Games see van Hilvoorde, Elling and Stokvis (n 6).

[19] Rule 1 (1) Olympic Charter. Principles such as political neutrality and the autonomy and universality of sport.

[20] Rule 2 (5) Olympic Charter.

[21] Hogan (n 7).

[22] The media may also help stir nationalism by depicting the athletes of its home-nation as ‘succeeding because of their intellect, commitment, and consonance’ while foreign athletes fail due to insufficient ‘strength and skill’. See James Angelini, Andrew Billings and Paul MacArthur, ‘The Nationalistic Revolution Will Be Televised: The 2010 Vancouver Olympic Games on NBC’ [2012] 5 International Journal of Sport Communication 193. Also – Andrew Billings and others, Nationalistic Notions of the Superpowers: Comparative Analyses of the American and Chinese Telecasts in the 2008 Beijing Olympiad [2011] 55 Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media 251. Again, on narratives surrounding the Games and medal tables see van Hilvoorde, Elling and Stokvis (n 6).

[23] See Hogan (n 7). See also John Hargreaves, ‘Olympism and Nationalism: Some Preliminary Consideration’ [1992] 27 International Review for the Sociology of Sport 119.

[24] van Hilvoorde, Elling and Stokvis (n 6). See also George Orwell’s description of nationalism and sport in ‘The Sporting Spirit’.

[25] Hargreaves (n 23). It is interesting to note Hargreaves mentions how the Olympic Movement in of itself could perhaps be a sort of counterweight to such a ‘international relation model’. However, given how the Olympic Movement seems to have in many respects abandoned its fight against sport nationalism in the decades since, this caveat has arguably lost much of its weight.

[26] IOC President Thomas Bach even recognizes the trends of ‘rising nationalism’.

[27] This relates to Hargreaves’ point of the Olympic Movement acting to a certain extent autonomously and not simply ‘instruments of foreign policy’ of states. See Hargreaves (n 23).

[28] Rule 1 (1) Olympic Charter: ‘Under the supreme authority and leadership of the International Olympic Committee, the Olympic Movement encompasses organisations, athletes and other persons who agree to be guided by the Olympic Charter. The goal of the Olympic Movement is to contribute to building a peaceful and better world by educating youth through sport practised in accordance with Olympism and its values.’ (emphasis added)

[29] It is possible that the USOPC primarily is referring to ‘racial and social justice’.

[30] The USOPC also recognized its past errors in taking positions against athletes in previous instances.

2015 was a good year for international sports law. It started early in January with the Pechstein ruling, THE defining sports law case of the year (and probably in years to come) and ended in an apotheosis with the decisions rendered by the FIFA Ethics Committee against Blatter and Platini. This blog will walk you through the important sports law developments of the year and make sure that you did not miss any.

The Court of Arbitration for Sport challenged by German Courts 

The more discrete SV Wilhelmshaven ruling came first. It was not even decided in 2015, as the ruling was handed out on 30 December 2014. Yet, unless you are a sports law freak, you will not have taken notice of this case before 2015 (and our blog). It is not as well known as the Pechstein ruling, but it is challenging the whole private enforcement system put in place by FIFA (and similar systems existing in other SGBs). Indeed, the ruling foresees that before enforcing a sanction rendered by FIFA, the national (or in that case regional) federation must verify that the award underlying the sanction is compatible with EU law. The decision has been appealed to the Bundesgerichtshof (BGH) and a final ruling is expected in 2016.

Later on, in January, the Oberlandesgericht München dropped its legal bomb in the Pechstein case. The court refused to recognize the CAS award sanctioning Claudia Pechstein with a doping ban, as it was deemed contrary to German antitrust rules. The reasoning used in the ruling was indirectly challenging the independence of the CAS and, if confirmed by the BGH, will trigger a necessary reform of the functioning and institutional structure of the CAS. Paradoxically, this is a giant step forward for international sports law and the CAS. The court acknowledges the need for CAS arbitration in global sport. However, justice must be delivered in a fair fashion and the legitimacy of the CAS (which relies on its independence from the Sports Governing Bodies) must be ensured (see our long article on the case here).

We will see how the BGH will deal with these cases in 2016. In any event, they constitute an important warning shot for the CAS. In short, the CAS needs to take EU law and itself seriously. If it truly addresses these challenges, it will come out way stronger.

The new World Anti-Doping Code and the Russian Doping Scandal

On the doping front, 2015 is the year in which the new World Anti-Doping Code (WADC) came into force (see our Blog Symposium). The Code introduces substantial changes in the way the anti-doping fight is led and modifies the sanction regime applicable in case of an adverse analytical finding. It is too early to predict with certainty its effects on doping prevalence in international sports. For international sports lawyers, however, it is in any event a fundamental change to the rules applicable to anti-doping disputes, which they need to get closely acquainted with.

The new World Anti-Doping Code was largely overshadowed by the massive doping scandal involving Russian sports, which was unleashed by an ARD documentary (first released in 2014) and revived by the crushing report of the Independent Commission mandated by the World Anti-Doping Agency to investigate the matter. This scandal has shaken the legitimacy of both the anti-doping system and the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF). It has highlighted the systematic shortcomings of the anti-doping institutions in Russia, and, the weakness of the control exercised on these institutions at a transnational level, be it by IAAF or WADA.

In 2015 again, doping proved to be a scourge intimately linked with international sports. The confidence and the trust of the public, and of clean athletes, in fair sports competitions is anew put to the test. WADA, which was created in the wake of another massive doping scandal in the nineties, has shown its limits. In practice, the decentralization of the enforcement of the WADC empowers local actors, who are very difficult to control for WADA. Some decide to crackdown on Doping with criminal sanctions (see the new German law adopted in December 2015), others prefer to collaborate with their national athletes to improve their performances. The recent proposals at the IOC level aiming at shifting the testing to WADA can be perceived as a preliminary response to this problem. Yet, doing so would entail huge practical difficulties and financial costs.

EU law and sport: 20 years of Bosman and beyond

2015 was also the year in which the twentieth anniversary of Bosman was commemorated through multiple conferences and other sports law events. The ASSER International Sports Law Centre edited a special edition of the Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law and a book celebrating the legacy of the ruling is forthcoming with the publisher Springer. The ruling did not have the dramatic effects predicted at the time of the decision, since football is still alive and kicking. Surely, it has given way to new challenges and sharply accelerated the transnationalization of football (and sport in general). A key legacy of Bosman is that this transnationalization, which goes hand in hand with the commercialization of sport, cannot side-line an essential category of stakeholders: the athletes.

It is with this spirit in mind, and a little push of the ASSER International Sports Law Centre, that the European Commission decided to open an investigation into the rules of the International Skating Union (ISU) barring, under the threat of a life ban, speed skaters (and any other affiliate) from joining speed skating competitions which are not condoned by the ISU. Though the case is rather low profile outside of the Netherlands, this is an important step forward for the EU Commission, as it had not opened an EU competition law investigation in sporting matters in almost 15 years. Many other competition law complaints (e.g. TPO or Formula 1) involving sport are currently pending in front of the EU Commission, but it is still to decide whether it will open a formal investigation. 2015 is also the year in which we have desperately expected the release of the EU State aid decisions regarding football clubs, and amongst them Real Madrid, but in the end this will be a matter for 2016.

FIFA and the chaotic end of the Blatter reign

FIFA is not the only SGB to have put an abrupt end to the (very) long reign of its great leader (think of the messy downfall of Diack at the IAAF). Yet, when talking about FIFA and football, the resonance of a governance crisis goes well beyond any other. It is truly a global problem, discussed in nearly all news outlets. This illustrates very much how a Swiss association became a global public good, for which an Indian, Brazilian, American or European cares as much as a Swiss, who is in traditional legal terms the only one able to influence FIFA’s structure through legislation. The global outrage triggered by the progressive release by the US authorities of information documenting the corrupt behaviour of FIFA executives has led to two immediate consequences: a change of the guard and a first reform of the institution.

There are now very few FIFA Executive Committee members left who were present in 2010 for the election of Qatar as host city for the 2022 World Cup. The long-time key figures of FIFA, Blatter, Platini and Valcke, are unlikely to make a comeback any time soon. And, the upcoming February election of the new FIFA president is more uncertain than ever with five candidates remaining. Simultaneously, FIFA has announced some governance reforms, which aim at enhancing the transparency of its operation and the legitimacy of its decision-making. We are living through a marvellous time of glasnost and perestroika at FIFA. The final destination of this transformative process remains unknown. There are still some major hurdles to overcome (starting with the one association/one vote system at the FIFA congress) before FIFA is truly able to fulfil its mission in a transparent, accountable and legitimate manner. We hope it will be for 2016!

The ASSER International Sports Law Blog in 2015

Finally, a few words on our blog in 2015. In one year we have published 60 posts, our most-read-blog concerned the Pechstein ruling that was read 3054 times.

Our peak day was reached on 4 September with 621 page views (thanks to a great post on the Essendon case by @jrvkfootball).

Our readers are based all around the world, but the majority is based in the EU and the US.

We hope to be able to keep you interested and busy in 2016 and we wish you a great year!

The ASSER International Sports Law Blog Team

This is the second and final part of the ‘Real Madrid Saga’. Where the first part outlined the background of the case and the role played by the Spanish national courts, the second part focuses on the EU Commission’s recovery decision of 4 July 2016 and dissects the arguments advanced by the Commission to reach it. As will be shown, the most important question the Commission had to answer was whether the settlement agreement of 29 July 2011 between the Council of Madrid and Real Madrid constituted a selective economic advantage for Real Madrid in the sense of Article 107(1) TFEU.[1] Before delving into that analysis, the blog will commence with the other pending question, namely whether the Commission also scrutinized the legality of the operation Bernabeú-Opañel under EU State aid law. By way of reminder, this operation consisted of Real Madrid receiving from the municipality the land adjacent to the Bernabéu stadium, while transferring in return €6.6 million, as well as plots of land in other areas of the city. 

The Commission’s ‘pragmatic’ solution regarding the Operation Bernabéu-Opañel

As was explained in part 1 of this blog, during the formal investigation period (i.e. from 18 December 2013 until 4 July 2016), the operation Bernabéu-Opañel (referred to by the Commission as the ‘2011 urban development agreement’) was firstly suspended by the Madrid High Court (31 July 2014) and later completely annulled (2 February 2015) by that same Court. It is worth reiterating that the Court believed there to be a sufficient link between the 2011 settlement agreement and the operation Bernabéu-Opañel in order to examine the agreements together.[2]

The Commission, however, was actually surprisingly brief on this matter. As can be read from paragraphs 79 and 80 from the decision, “(a)s a result of (the judgment of 2 February 2015), the 2011 urban development agreement has been cancelled between the parties. Consequently, that agreement will no longer be implemented so that the Commission assessment of the 2011 urban development agreement has become without object. The present Decision therefore only examines the 2011 settlement agreement under State aid rules”.[3]

From an EU State aid law perspective, declaring the operation Bernabéu-Opañel “without object” makes sense. With the agreement annulled, there has been no transfer of resources from the State to Real Madrid of any sorts, nor could Real Madrid have obtained an economic advantage from an annulled agreement. Therefore, removing all the problematic aspects of the agreement from a State aid perspective. Yet, it does remain slightly ironic that that the ‘standstill obligation’ was applied to an agreement that was later on never analysed by the Commission. True, the subsequent annulment (based solely on Spanish administrative law) made Commission scrutiny redundant, but one does wonder what the Commission would have decided had the Madrid Court not annulled the operation. 

The 2011 settlement agreement under Article 107(1) TFEU

By way of reminder, in the opening decision, the Commission primarily doubted whether:

1) It was impossible for the Council of Madrid to transfer the Las Tablas property to Real Madrid;

2) This legal impossibility automatically led to an obligation for the Council of Madrid to compensate Real Madrid;

3) A market value of the Las Tablas plot of land has been sought;

4) And whether the value of the properties which were transferred to Real Madrid by the 2011 settlement agreement were market conform.[4]

In reaction to the opening decision Spain argued that transferring the plot in Las Tablas was illegal based on the local urban law 9/2001 of 2001, this interpretation was later confirmed by the Spanish High Court in 2004. Yet, this was already the case in 1998 when the Madrid Council agreed to transfer the land to Real Madrid.[5] Given that Real Madrid had legitimate expectations that it was the owner of the land, it has suffered damages as a consequence of the transfer’s invalidity. As a consequence, Real Madrid needed to be compensated by an amount equal to the market value of Las Tablas in 2011, namely €22.693.054,44. Since this sum was calculated on the basis of an objective model set by the Ministry of Economy and Industry[6], Spain considered that it matched the market value and could not constitute State aid.

The economic advantage criterion according to the market economy operator principle

The Commission’s State aid assessment essentially revolved around the question whether the 2011 settlement agreement between the Council of Madrid and Real Madrid resulted in an economic advantage to the benefit of Real Madrid.[7] As is standard Commission practice[8], “to determine whether a particular transaction carried out by a public authority has been carried out in line with normal market conditions, it is necessary to compare the behaviour of that public authority with that of a similarly situated hypothetical “market economic operator” operating under normal market conditions. If the “market economy operator” would have entered into that transaction under similar terms, then the presence of an advantage may be excluded as regards that transaction”.[9] Referring to EU case law[10], the Commission argued that a prudent market operator would carry out his own ex ante assessment on the basis of sound economic and legal evaluations, when entering such transactions. Public authorities cannot claim that evaluations made after the transaction, based on a retrospective finding that it was actually economically rational, like the Madrid Council did in this case, is the course of action that a prudent market operator would take under similar circumstances.[11]

In continuation, the Commission indicated the two criteria it used in order to determine whether the amount of compensation offered to Real Madrid was in line market conditions:

1) The probability that the Madrid Council would be held liable for its inability to perform its contractual obligations;

2) And the maximum extent of its financial exposure resulting from finding such a liability.[12]

Though these criteria are clearly cumulative, it should be noted that the Commission did not support the criteria with a reference to case law, its own decisional practice or documents of (soft) law. Be that as it may, based primarily on these criteria the Commission concluded that a market economy operator in a similar situation to the Madrid Council would not have entered into the 2011 settlement agreement.

As regards the first criteria, the Commission argued that the Madrid Council should have sought legal advice so as to establish the likelihood that it was indeed liable for not performing its contractual obligations. Without legal advice, the Commission found it hard to believe that a prudent market operator would have assumed full legal liability, especially considering “the legal uncertainties surrounding the potential impossibility to perform (the land transaction), the legal consequences of that potential impossibility, and the Madrid Council’s ability to remedy that legal impossibility through other means”.[13] The Commission seems definitely correct in questioning the chain of events that eventually led to the compensation of more than €20 million. Even though, as Spain now claims[14], it was already legally impossible to transfer the land in 1998, why did the Madrid Council sign this agreement in the first place? After the introduction of local urban law 9/2001, shouldn’t the parties have been aware of the legal impossibility at that moment, or in any case after the 2004 judgment of the Madrid High Court? Consequently, why did the Council wait until 2011 before compensating Real Madrid? In paragraphs 103 and 104, the Commission also drew an interesting comparison with the operation Bernabéu-Opañel. Although this latter operation was declared void by a Spanish Court for not being in line with the general interest, it simultaneously shows that reclassifying a terrain from public to private (sport) use is not entirely legally impossible. In other words, by analogy, the plot in Las Tablas could have been reclassified for private use (provided the reclassification served the general interest) and be legally transferred to Real Madrid.

With regard to the second criteria, i.e. the maximum extent of the Madrid Council’s financial exposure resulting from finding such a liability, the Commission firstly argued that the different valuations of 1998 and 2011 of the land in Las Tablas were based on the mistaken assumption that this land could have been transferred in 2011, which, in hindsight appeared to be legally impossible. “Assuming the Madrid Council could not be held liable for that legal impossibility, for which it never solicited legal advice, it is at least arguable that the market value of the plot in its relationship with Real Madrid would be zero, since the land in question cannot be transferred”.[15] On the other hand, and assuming the Madrid Council is liable and Real Madrid had a right to a compensation, this amount should have been way less than €22 million as a Commission-assigned study concluded. Taking into account the Commission’s consideration that the correct parameter for the valuation of the concerned plot is the long-term exploitation of the land for sport use, the study arrived at a valuation in 2011 of €4.275 million.[16]

For all the above reasons, the Commission established that the Madrid Council had not acted as a prudent market operator. It had not sought legal advice before entering the 2011 settlement agreement, and the subsequent compensation granted to Real Madrid too high. In conclusion, by means of the 2011 settlement agreement, a selective economic advantage was granted to Real Madrid and the State aid criteria of Article 107(1) TFEU were fulfilled. As a result, the amount of aid that Spain was required to recover from the football club amounted to €18.418.054,44 (€22.693.054,44 - €4.275.000) plus interests.[17]

The aftermath

On 2 September 2016, the municipality of Madrid officially ordered Real Madrid to repay €20.3 million, an obligation complied with by the club in early November. Nonetheless, the Real Madrid ‘saga’ has not come to an end. In fact, now that Real Madrid’s appeal is registered by the CJEU, it has become clear that it could take several more years until the case is finally closed. The pending questions are; what are the grounds of Real Madrid’s appeal and could the appeal be successful?

As a preliminary remark, neither Spain nor Real Madrid have claimed that the 2011 settlement agreement falls, or could fall, under one of the exceptions of Article 107(3) TFEU. In principle, this does not prevent Real Madrid from advancing a compatibility plea in front of the General Court, even though it did not raise the argument during the formal investigation.[18] Nonetheless, given the Commission’s wide discretion in applying the exceptions of Article 107(3)[19], the review of the legality of its decision is restricted to determining whether the Commission committed a manifest error in its assessment of the facts or misused its powers.[20] Moreover, as the Commission indicates in paragraph 135 of the decision, the aid granted to Real Madrid is considered as operating aid.[21] In other words, the aid releases an undertaking from costs which it would normally have to bear in its day to day activities.[22] Both the Commission and the CJEU have been very reluctant in permitting operating aid since it rarely facilitates the development of certain economic activities without adversely affecting trading conditions.[23]

In a press-release following the Commission’s announcement of its recovery decision, Real Madrid inter alia argued that the valuation method used in the 2011 settlement agreement is the “only objective method, as it is based in the cadastral value, legally obliging for all Spanish City Councils, and therefore is applied in all transaction between City Councils and third parties whether they are public or private”.[24] The Commission’s final decision takes note of the criticism expressed by Real Madrid regarding the Commission-assigned valuation study, especially concerning the (in its eyes erroneous) valuation method used for the study.[25] Though the Commission rebutted Real Madrid’s criticism[26], it will be up to the General Court of the EU (and potentially later the Court of Justice) to decide whether the Madrid Council used the correct valuation method when determining the 2011 value of las Tablas. This will not be completely new territory for the General Court, given the rich jurisprudence available on valuation methods.[27] As regards the standard of review applied by the General Court, Conor Quigley argues that “where the Commission is found by the Court to have committed a sufficient error of assessment, the decision will be annulled”.[28] It is settled EU case law, that the valuation method must be based on the available objective, verifiable and reliable data, which should be sufficiently detailed and should reflect the economic situation at the time at which the transaction was decided, taking into account the level of risk and future expectations.[29] The General Court remains, however, entitled to fully review and assess the valuation methods presented by the Commission and the interested parties.[30]

The Real Madrid case is too complex and intertwined to draw definitive conclusions on the possible outcome of the appeal. Nonetheless, the thorough State aid assessment conducted by the Commission in its decision should not be underestimated. This will be a tough “legal match” on an entirely new turf for Real Madrid.

[1] By way of reminder, Article 107(1) TFEU reads: “Save as otherwise provided in the Treaties, any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal market”.

[2] See Oskar van Maren, “The EU State aid and sport saga: The Real Madrid Decision (part 1)”, Asser International Sports Law Blog, 15 November 2016.

[3] Commission decision SA.33753 of 4 July 2016 on the State aid implemented by Spain for Real Madrid CF, paras. 79 and 80.

[4] Commission decision SA.33753 of 18 December 2013, State aid– Spain Real Madrid CF, paras. 41-43.

[5] Interestingly enough, Spain’s comments contradict Real Madrid’s comments, according to which, as can be read in paragraph 46 of the decision, Spanish law did allow Las Tablas to be reclassified for private use in 1998 and beyond until a specific law that prohibits that was introduced in 2001.

[6] Commission decision SA.33753 of 4 July 2016 on the State aid implemented by Spain for Real Madrid CF, paras. 29-36.

[7] Since it was clear State resources were transferred, that the measure was selective and that it at least had the potential of affecting intra-Union trade, the other criteria of Article 107(1) TFEU were only briefly discussed.

[8] See also e.g. Commission decision SA.41613 of 4 July 2016, on the measure implemented by the Netherlands with regard to the professional football club PSV in Eindhoven.

[9] Commission decision SA.33753 of 18 December 2013, State aid– Spain Real Madrid CF, para. 88.

[10] Case C-124/10 P Commission v. EDF ECLI:EU:C:2012:318, paras. 84, 85 and 105.

[11] Commission decision SA.33753 of 18 December 2013, State aid– Spain Real Madrid CF, para. 89.

[12] Ibid, para. 92.

[13] Ibid, para. 94.

[14] Ibid, para. 29.

[15] Ibid, para. 108.

[16] Ibid, paras. 111-112.

[17] Ibid, paras. 139-142.

[18] See for example T-110/97 Kneissl Dachstein v Commission ECLI:EU:T:1999:244, para. 102.

[19]Case T-304/08 Smurfit Kappa Group v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2012:351, para. 90.

[20] Conor Quigley, “European State Aid Law and Policy”, Hart Publishing, 3^rd edition (2015), pages 738-739. See also for example T-20/03 Kahla/Thüringen Porzellan v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2008:395, para. 115.

[21] Commission decision SA.33753 of 18 December 2013, State aid– Spain Real Madrid CF, para. 135.

[22] See for example Case C-172/03 Heiser ECLI:EU:C:2005:130, para. 55.

[23] Quigley, page 276.

[24] Real Madrid further found it surprising that the Commission used a valuation made by an architect’s office in Barcelona to dictate their decision. Though many will find this comment by Real Madrid rather amusing, it once again shows that the rivalry between the two clubs (and cities) far exceeds the performances on a football field.

[25] Commission decision SA.33753 of 18 December 2013, State aid– Spain Real Madrid CF, para. 89.

[26] Ibid, paras. 119-128.

[27] See for example T-366/00 Scott v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2007:99; and C-239/09 Seydaland Vereinigte Agrarbetriebe ECLI:EU:C:2010:778.

[28] Quigley, page 737. Based on the case law of the Court, it is not entirely clear whether a “sufficient error of assessment” by the Commission is enough for the Court to annul the decision.

[29] T-366/00 Scott v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2007:99, para. 158. See also Commission Notice C 262/1 of 19 July 2016 on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, para. 101.

[30] Case T-274/01 Valmont v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2004:266.

Editor's note: Laura Donnellan is a lecturer at University of Limerick. You can find her latest publications here.

Introduction

On Tuesday the 12^th of April, João Carvalho passed away in the Beaumont Hospital after sustaining serious injuries from a mixed martial arts (MMA) event in Dublin on the previous Saturday. The fighter was knocked out in the third round of a welterweight fight against Charlie Ward. Aside from the tragic loss of life, the death of Carvalho raises a number of interesting legal issues. This opinion piece will discuss the possible civil and criminal liability that may result from the untimely death of the Portuguese fighter.

It is important to note at the outset that MMA has few rules and permits wrestling holds, punching, marital arts throws and kicking. MMA appears to have little regulation and a lack of universally accepted, standardised rules. There is no international federation or governing body that regulates MMA. It is largely self-regulated. MMA is not recognised under the sports and governing bodies listed by Sport Ireland, the statutory body established by the Sport Ireland Act 2015 which replaced the Irish Sports Council. MMA is considered a properly constituted sport so long as the rules and regulations are adhered to, there are appropriate safety procedures, the rules are enforced by independent referees, and it appropriately administered.

The Acting Minister for Sport, Michael Ring, has called for the regulation of MMA. Currently there are no minimum requirements when it comes to medical personnel; nor are there any particular requirements as to training of medical personnel. The promoter decides how many doctors and paramedics are to be stationed at events. In February 2014 Minister Ring wrote to 17 MMA promoters in Ireland requesting that they implement safety precautions in line with those used by other sports including boxing and rugby.

Despite this lack of regulation, this does not exempt MMA from legal liability as the discussion below demonstrates.

Legal Issues-Civil Liability

The death of Carvalho may expose those involved in the event and the organisation of the sport to liability for lack of due care. Although case law is limited in Ireland, English case law has demonstrated that sports governing bodies, referees and coaches may incur civil liability. The referee in the fight involving Carvalho and Ward could be subject to civil liability if it is found that he failed to stop the fight at the appropriate time, a claim that the referee vehemently refutes. Referees have been held to owe a duty of care to participants. The role of the referee is not just to enforce the rules of the game to ensure fair play but also to ensure that the sport is played according to the rules for the safety of the participants. In the case of English case of Smolden v Whitworth and Nolan ([1997] E.L.R. 249  [1997] P.I.Q.R. P133), the plaintiff successfully sued the referee for injuries sustained as a result of a collapsed scrum in game involving underage rugby players.

With regard to governing bodies, a court may find them liable for negligence due to the fact that they have advance planning for events or the organisation of a sport. Under the “deep pocket theory”, the governing body will be viewed as the more attractive target for a claim of negligence as it will have more money to pay in damages. Total Extreme Fighting organises events in order to promote amateur and professional MMA in Ireland. The Irish Amateur Pankration Association (IAPA), a body established in 2014, is the Irish body that is affiliated to the International Mixed Martial Arts Federation. The IAPA is also affiliated to the Irish Amateur Wrestling Association (IAWA) (which according to the IAPA Facebook page, is affiliated “for its lighter Amateur training and activities (Pankration), which form part of its progressional pathway for participants”). However, the IAWA is a recognised sports governing body and receives direct from the Department of Transport, Tourism and Sport and indirect state funding through the auspices of Sport Ireland.  Sport Ireland exercises quasi-governmental regulation. It provides funding and support to recognised sports governing bodies.

A case that is instructive is the English case of Watson v British Boxing Board of Control ([2001] 2 WLR 1256), the British Boxing Board of Control (BBBC) was held liable for the injuries sustained by Michael Watson.  The referee stopped the fight in the final round when Watson appeared to be unable to defend himself. Watson had sustained a brain haemorrhage and, after returning to his corner, he lapsed into unconsciousness on his stool. Disorder among the crowd ensured and Watson’s trainer suddenly realised that he was unconscious. It took seven minutes for the doctor to arrive to the ring and a further 25-30 minutes before Watson arrived at the hospital. By the time Watson arrived at the hospital, he had sustained serious brain damage. He suffered a subdural haemorrhage which left him paralysed down the left side and with other physical and mental disability. The BBBC argued that it did not owe Watson a duty of care. The BBBC further argued that had the necessary medical equipment and personnel been there on time it would not have made any difference given the nature of the injuries sustained. The BBBC is a limited liability company and is the sole controlling body that regulates boxing in the UK.  All fighters, clubs, agents, match-makers and any person involved in the sport of boxing must obtain a licence from the BBBC. Although the BBBC was not directly involved in the fight (i.e. there was no contractual involvement), it was held to be negligent in not providing immediate resuscitation at the ring side. As the BBBC had sanctioned the fight, the court held that to be sufficient proximity between Watson and the BBBC. In drawing parallels between IAPA, Total Extreme Fighting and the BBBC, a claim for negligence could arise.

In addition to potential liability for a lack of due care, there is a possibility of criminal liability arising. When an individual plays a contact sport, it is reasonable foreseeable that he or she will sustain an injury, as contact sports by their very nature involve contact between the players. Individuals consent to inherent risks that are associated with the sport. However, there are limits to what an individual can consent to. If a sports person deliberately and recklessly disregards the rules of the sport and intentionally goes beyond the limits of that sport, the criminal law may be invoked. A sports person may be charged with manslaughter if the opponent dies as a result of their actions. It would be very unlikely that a sportsperson would be charged with murder as it would require premeditation. Even in a sport like MMA, a participant consents to injuries that are within the rules of the sport, that incidental to the playing of the game by the rules and those which are part of the playing culture, something outside the rules but it has become an accepted part of the sport. If the injuries sustained go beyond what the participant consented to, the opponent could be charged with assault. It is to the issue of criminal liability that the opinion piece now turns.

Legal Issues-Criminal Liability

In Ireland, the Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997 governs assault. Section 2 defines assault as the actual carrying out or threat of reckless or intentional, direct or indirect application of force or causes an impact on the body of another without the consent of the person. Section 3 concerns “assault causing harm” with consent being absent. Section 4 relates to assault “causing serious harm”. Serious harm is defined as “injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious disfigurement or substantial loss or impairment of the mobility of the body as a whole or of the function of any particular bodily member or organ” (section 1). Section 4 does not include the provision consent being absent as it does under sections 2 and 3. However, it is extremely doubtful that the defence of consent could be invoked under Section 4 as the offender, if found guilty of the offence, could face life imprisonment. Section 22 (1) provides the following: “the provisions of this Act have effect subject to any enactment or rule of law providing a defence, or providing lawful authority, justification or excuse for an act or omission”. Section 22 retains the basic common law rule that consent cannot be an absolute defence to all forms of assault (F McAuley, P McCutcheon, Criminal Liability (Dublin: Round Hall Sweet & Maxwell, 2000), 533).

Mixed Martial Arts are in a precarious legal position. While there are MMA clubs in Ireland, these clubs are not illegal per se, but they derive their legal status from boxing, which is defined in negative terms. Boxing is legal because it is not prize-fighting as prize-fighting caused a breach of the peace. In order to understand the contemporary position of boxing and by extension MMA, it is necessary to examine its origins. Prize fighting and bare-knuckle fighting were not devoid of rules but lacked a uniform set of principles (A formal roped-off section was rarely used, often the ground would be marked with chalk, there was no such thing as rounds and there was no limit on the duration of the fight. See J Anderson, The Legality of Boxing: A Punch Drunk Love (OXON: Birkbridge Law Press, 2007), 15). Prize fighting, as the name suggests, concerned a pecuniary reward to the fighter who had physically overcome his opponent. In 1743 the Broughton Rules were introduced, which became the sport’s first uniform set of rules. The Broughton Rules, while welcomed at first, proved to be inadequate. In 1865 the Queensbury Rules were introduced by the eighth Marquis of Queensbury. Under these rules there would be no wresting or hugging permitted, rounds would be three minutes in length, and one minute’s time between rounds, the ring would be twenty-four feet, gloves of the best quality would be worn and if a glove burst or came off it would be replaced to the referee’s satisfaction (Anderson, 28) Gunn and Ormerod (‘The Legality of Boxing’ in Greenfield and Osborn (eds) Law and Sport in Contemporary Society (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 23) refer to the legal recognition of boxing as being by “default rather than design”. In the nineteenth century, prize fighting became increasingly associated with breaches of the peace. A number of cases came before the courts, which presented the courts with an opportunity to outlaw prize fighting. While prize fighting was banned, a tamer version of the sport, namely boxing, gained judicial acceptance. Boxers differed from their prize fighting counterparts as boxers wore padded gloves and the fight was held in private.

As prize fighters began to wear gloves, the distinction between boxing (sparring) and prize fighting became quite blurred. The courts distinguished between sparring matches and prize fighting on the basis of the likelihood of one of the fighters suffering serious injury (Gunn and Ormerod, at p.24). The courts, finding it difficult to distinguish the two, decided to leave the issue to the jury. In R v Orton (14 Cox CC 226; (1878) 39 LT 293), the court held (at 294) if a fight were a mere exhibition of skill in sparring it was not unlawful, however, if the combatants had met intending to fight until one gave into exhaustion or injury he had received it was a breach of the peace and thus unlawful irrespective of whether the fighters wore gloves.  In R v Young (8 C. & P. 644; (1866) 10 Cox CC 371), a boxer faced charges for the manslaughter of an opponent during an indoor sparring match. Bramwell J (at 373) instructed the jury as follows: “If a death ensued from a fight, independently of it taking place for money, it would be manslaughter, because a fight was a dangerous thing and likely to kill; but the medical witness here stated that this sparring was not dangerous, and not a thing likely to kill”.

In the leading case of R v Coney ((1882) 8 QBD 534), the court established that prize fighting was illegal as it caused a breach of peace. The court did not hold boxing or sparring legal, but declared prize fighting illegal.  The Court of Appeal declared prize fighting illegal as it encouraged a breach of the peace and gambling. The dangerous nature of the sport seemed to be secondary consideration. Judges Stephen and Matthew were the only judges that seemed concerned about the degree of harm inflicted on a combatant during a fight. Stephen J (at 549) held prize fighting to be not only injurious to the public but also the fighters themselves. 

Boxing is a legal and recognised sport.  As a recognised sport, the law provides it with significant protection. If a fight took place in the street, it would be considered illegal as a breach of the peace and charges under the Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act, 1997 may ensue.  In the fight that takes place on the street, the combatants could be consenting, they are both adults with capacity to consent, yet their actions are deemed illegal. However, an organised boxing match is legal because boxing is a recognised sport.  The fight in the street would be deemed to cause a breach of the peace. The national governing body for amateur boxing in Ireland is the Irish Amateur Boxing Association (IABA). All local boxing clubs are affiliated to the IABA. Professional boxing is regulated by the Professional Boxing Union of Ireland, which is affiliated to the European Boxing Union, the World Boxing Union and the World Boxing Association.  What distinguishes the example of the two consenting adults settling their differences by fighting out in the street is the fact that a recognised boxing match has rules which must be followed. There is a referee, there are safety measures in place, and the pugilists wear padded gloves.  Rules are devised for sports to ensure fairness and uniformity but they also are devised in a way to ensure that the likelihood of participants being injured is minimised. However, the legality of boxing has long been debated. Over the years there have been calls to declare it illegal. Boxing remains a sport due to its popularity and there is a public interest in it continuing as a lawful sport.

The Law Reform Commission Report on Non-Fatal Offences and its application to Sport

The 1997 Act was largely based on the recommendations of a Law Reform Commission (LRC) Report from 1994 (LRC-45–1994). The Report examined the position of contact sport in Chapter 9. The 1997 Act did not include any of the recommendations relation to sport. The Report acknowledged that contact sports, by their very nature, entail violent conduct. In a fast paced match tempers rise and subsequently rules are broken (para.9.148, at p.272). In professional sports violent conduct is often penalised in the form of a fine or suspension. For the most part, the civil law will provide an injured player with compensation. Quoting from the Canadian Law Reform Commission’s Working Paper, the LRC proposed that the criminal law should be used as a “policeman” of last resort or as an “enforcer” (para.9.148, at p.272) The LRC recommended that no general exemption should be given to contact sports where the victim does not expressly or impliedly consent to the infliction of injury (para.9.149, at p.271).

The LRC summarised the situations in which a person is said to have consented in a contact sport: 

1.              to any contact within the rules of the game;

2.              to any contact of an accidental nature arising from incidentally in the course of it; and

3.              to incidental pain to the risk of hurt or injury from such contact (para.9.152, at p.273). 

In giving the example of a footballer, a footballer impliedly consents to be tackled, to being kicked accidentally and to the risk of being injured, but a footballer does not consent to being punched or kicked (para. 9.153, at p.273). As most sports do not authorise intentional or reckless tackles or injury, there should be no exemption given to contact sports. If a player does not have the requisite intent or recklessness and the contact is within the rules of the sport, it is irrelevant that the force used was likely to cause injury.

The LRC acknowledged that it is very difficult if not impossible to ascertain whether a contact is intentional or reckless. The courts, when faced with a sporting case, often refer to the standards of the particular sport in deciding whether or not the conduct is acceptable (para.9.154, at p.274). Such an approach is understandable given that “sports produce valuable social benefits through the practice and example of fair play within an agreed set of rules” (para.9.154, at p.274).

In reference to the amateur nature of Irish sport, the LRC noted that rules of most sports place reasonable limits on the degree of violence which may be consented. Consequently, the LRC concluded that no specific penalties should be devised for sporting violence (para.9.157, at p.274).

It was also concluded that boxing should not be signalled out for exemption. The LRC proffered that any proposed changes to the rules of the sport is a matter for the relevant regulatory sports body in according with public debate and medical evidence (para.9.157, at p.274).

In the absence of any statutory intervention, the LRC concluded that the criminal law would continue to apply in situations where the rules of the sport are breached. It did, however, note its limitations (para.9.158, at pp.275-275). At the time of the LRC Report MMA had just been resurrected by the Ultimate Fighting Championship (UFC) which was founded in 1993. It is interesting that the LRC referred to martial arts which are lawfully recognised sports. The LRC gave the following example: In some martial arts, a serious injury may result from a kick which is within the rules of the sport. Failure to prosecute and attempts to prosecute would both attract public debate. It would seem unjust to hold the opponent criminally liable for conduct that is part of the rules of the sport. The victim had also consented to the risk. Public opinion may call for sports that can cause serious injury, including professional boxing, to be declared unlawful. The LRC recommended that a specific provision be made for consent to injuries inflicted in the course of, and in accordance with the rules of a lawful sporting activity. It summed up its position as follows:               

“Every person is protected from criminal responsibility for causing harm or serious harm to another where such harm is inflicted during the course of, and in accordance with the rules of any bona fide sporting activity” (para.9.159, at p.275)

The above summation could be applied to Charlie Ward, who won the fight against Carvalho. Another factor to consider is that Carvalho consented to the risk of being seriously injured or to a substantial risk of death as defined by section 4 of the Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997.

The Legality of Mixed Martial Arts

Mixed martial arts (MMA) are hybrid sports in that they combine traditional martial arts sports with non-traditional ones. MMA is an ancient sport, however, its modern inception dates back to 1993 when the Ultimate Fighting Championship (UFC) was founded. As noted above, MMA is largely self-regulated and it has no international federation or governing body that regulates the sport.

In Ireland, the traditional martial arts (including Aikido, Kickboxing, Tae Kwon Do, Karate, Sumo, Kung Fu, Jiu Jitsu, Tai Chi, Muaythai, Ninjitsu and Bujitsu) are governed by the Irish Martial Arts Commission (IMAC). IMAC, as a recognised national governing body, receives funding from Sport Ireland. MMA is not recognised under the sports and governing bodies listed by Sport Ireland. MMA is considered a properly constituted sport so long as the rules and regulations are adhered to, there are appropriate safety procedures, the rules are enforced by independent referees, and it appropriately administered. If these criteria are followed, then MMA will be “at least as safe as boxing as it places so much less emphasis on blows to the head that so concern the British Medical Association” (M James, Sports Law (2^nd ed.) (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013), 155).

Concluding Remarks

The death of João Carvalho has brought to the fore a plethora of legal issues. The Acting Minister for Sport, Michael Ring, has called for the regulation of MMA. It has taken a fatality for the state to intervene. Currently there are no minimum requirements when it comes to medical personnel present at events nor are there any particular requirements as to training of medical personnel. The promoter decides how many doctors and paramedics are to be stationed at events but that can vary from one to three. While some have called for the banning of MMA, this may only serve to send the sport underground and have even less safety precautions than present. Also, the issue of consent must be considered. If consenting adults decide to partake in such a sport and are aware of the dangers, then arguably on the grounds of civil liberties such individuals should be permitted to engage in MMA. The most prudent action at the moment would be to reform the sport and for the state to require high standards of health and safety at events.

While MMA could be referred to as a form of licenced thuggery, MMA is legal due to its association with boxing and other lawfully recognised fighting sports. It is now accepted as a mainstream sport. Its legality is somewhat dubious as it derives its legality from boxing. Boxing is legal because it is not prize fighting. Prize fighting was declared illegal as it caused a breach of peace. The death of Carvalho may well change the legal landscape of MMA. It is doubtful it will be banned but it may well be subject to the rigours of the law in criminal or civil proceedings.