Introduction: The new WADA Code 2015
Day 1: The impact of the revised World Anti-Doping Code on the work of National Anti-Doping Agencies
Day 2: The “Athlete Patient” and the 2015 World Anti-Doping Code: Competing Under Medical Treatment
Day 3: Proof of intent (or lack thereof) under the 2015 World Anti-Doping Code

Editor's note
Mike Morgan is the founding partner of Morgan Sports Law LLP. His practice is focused exclusively on the sports sector. He advises on regulatory and disciplinary issues and has particular experience advising on doping and corruption disputes.

Mike acted on behalf of National Olympic Committees at three of the last four Olympic Games and has represented other sports bodies, clubs and high profile athletes in proceedings before the High Court, the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber, the American Arbitration Association and the Court of Arbitration for Sport.

I. Introduction

According to the World Anti-Doping Agency (“WADA”), the 2015 World Anti-Doping Agency Code (the “2015 Code”), which came into effect on 1 January 2015,  is a “stronger, more robust tool that will protect the rights of the clean athletes”[1]. Among the key themes of the revised Code, is the promise of “longer periods of Ineligibility for real cheats, and more flexibility in sanctioning in other specific circumstances”[2].

While Article 10 of the 2015 Code unquestionably provides for longer periods of ineligibility, the validity of WADA’s claim that the harsher sanctions will be reserved for “real cheats” depends partly on how one defines the term “real cheat”, and partly on how the 2015 Code’s mechanisms for reducing sanctions are to be interpreted.

This blog reflects on the totality of the context from which the current sanctions regime arose.  That is important because Article 10 will have to be applied in a manner consistent with that context in mind if the 2015 Code is to become the tool promised by WADA and if it is to avoid the scrutiny of the courts.

II. Context

A.   Katrin Krabbe

In the lead up to the adoption of the first version of the WADA Code (the “2003 Code”), there was considerable debate as to what length of sanction could lawfully be imposed on an athlete for a first violation[3].

The decision finally to settle on a two-year ban for first offences was heavily influenced by the findings of the Munich Courts in the case of Katrin Krabbe, that a suspension exceeding two years was disproportionate[4]:

(a)           The Regional Court held that a two-year suspension imposed on an athlete for a first offence “represents the highest threshold admissible under fundamental rights and democratic principles”.[5]

(b)           The High Regional Court held that the three-year ban imposed by the IAAF “was excessive in respect of its objective. Such a rigid disciplinary measure as a sanction for a first sports offence is inappropriate and disproportionate”.[6]

And so it came to pass that a first violation under Article 10.2 of the 2003 Code would be punished with a two-year sanction. Various legal opinions procured by WADA between 2003 and 2008 affirmed the position that a two-year sanction for a first violation (1) was a significant incursion on the rights of the individual affected; and (2) was likely the limit of the severity that could be imposed in the absence of aggravating circumstances[7].

B.   Specified Substances

The 2003 Code proved somewhat inflexible, which resulted in two-year bans for unintentional and minor anti-doping rule violations. One of the starkest examples of that inflexibility arose in CAS OG 04/003 Torri Edwards v IAAF & USATF.

Edwards had consumed glucose powder that, unbeknownst to her, contained the stimulant nikethamide. A two-year ban was imposed on her on the basis that she could not meet the thresholds for “No Fault” and “No Significant Fault” and despite the fact that she had, in the words of the CAS panel, “conducted herself with honesty, integrity and character, and that she has not sought to gain any improper advantage or to ‘cheat’ in any way”[8].

Ms Edwards’ case became a cause célèbre, leading the IAAF to lobby WADA to have nikethamide and other similar stimulants reclassified as Specified Substances. The then vice-president of the IAAF, Dr Arne Lungqvist explained as follows:

I asked Torri Edwards whether she would allow me to use her case as an example of the importance of making some sort of differentiation between those weak stimulants that you can get over the counter by accident, carelessness, negligence or whatever.  We are not after those who are negligent.

WADA acceded to the IAAF’s lobbying and downgraded nikethamide to the Specified Substance list in September 2005. The IAAF Council shortly thereafter reinstated Edwards to competition further to the doctrine of lex mitior. Following Edwards’ reinstatement, Dr Lungqvist explained as follows:

The IAAF wishes to see strong penalties for real cheats. This was a different case, […]  I did not feel comfortable when I had to defend the then-existing rules against her at the CAS hearing in Athens.

I judge that Torri has paid a high price for having inadvertently taken a particular substance at the 'wrong' time, shortly before [the reclassification] and from now on such an intake would result in a warning only. (Emphasis added)

Four years later, WADA went one step further and, with the introduction of the 2009 version of the WADA Code (the “2009 Code”), broadened the list of substances that would be categorised as Specified Substances, promising “lessened sanctions….where the athlete can establish that the substance involved was not intended to enhance performance” under Article 10.4[10].  

The aim was to avoid the likes of the Edwards case. Indeed, a number of cases determined under the 2009 Code which involved the same glucose brand that had landed Edwards with a two-year ban in 2004, resulted in periods of ineligibility ranging between 0 – 6 months[11].

C.   The rise and fall of “aggravating circumstances”

The primary themes of the 2009 Code were, according to WADA, “firmness and fairness”. “Fairness” was to be reflected by the broadening of the Specified Substance list, while “firmness” was intended to manifest itself through the concept of “aggravating circumstances” [12].  

The presence of “aggravated circumstances” permitted Anti-Doping Organizations (“ADOs”) to increase periods of ineligibility beyond the standard two-year ban up to a maximum of four years[13].

A legal opinion commissioned by WADA in relation to the “aggravated circumstances” provisions (the “Third WADA Legal Opinion”) noted as follows[14]:

91. […] it is clear that the intention to enhance performance is not in and-of-itself an aggravating circumstance.

92. […] This provision makes it clear that cheating is an important element of the notion of aggravating circumstances. However, the mere fact of cheating alone is not sufficient. Additional elements are required.

93. The essence of the concept of aggravating circumstances is thus a qualified kind of cheating, which involves an additional element. (Emphasis added)

Not only, therefore, was actual cheating required to invoke the provision but there needed to be something more than the mere fact of cheating. Examples provided by the 2009 Code included being part of a doping scheme or using multiple prohibited substances[15]. 

The “aggravated circumstances” provision was rarely invoked and, when it was, it rarely resulted in the maximum increase[16]. That ultimately led to the removal of the “aggravated circumstances” provision from the 2015 Code and the introduction of standard four-year sanctions, explained as follows by WADA[17]:

There was a strong consensus among stakeholders, and in particular, Athletes, that intentional cheaters should be Ineligible for a period of four years.  Under the current Code, there is the opportunity for a four-year period of Ineligibility for an Adverse Analytical Finding if the Anti-Doping Organization can show “Aggravating Circumstances.” However, in the more than four years since that provision has been part of the Code, it has been rarely used. (Emphasis added)

The decision to double the standard two-year sanctions to four years may have surprised anyone who had ever read the Third WADA Legal Opinion, since that opinion had expressly cautioned as follows:

138. […] one should bear in mind that a four-year ban would most often put an end to an athlete’s (high level) career and thus be tantamount to a life ban. Therefore, an aggravated first offence could de facto be punished as harshly as numerous second offences (Article 10.7.1) and almost all third offences (Article 10.7.3).

139. This could raise problems if the ineligibility period were automatically of four years in the presence of aggravating circumstances. In reality, Art. 10.6 provides for an increased suspension of up to four years, which means that the adjudicating body is afforded sufficient flexibility to take into account all the circumstances to ensure that aggravating circumstances do not systematically result in a four-year period of ineligibility. (Emphasis added)

D.   Proportionality

The principle of proportionality plays an important role in the determination of sanctions applicable in doping matters. The principle pervades Swiss law[18], EU law[19] and general principles of (sports) law[20].  

The CAS itself has consistently measured sanctions imposed on athletes against the principle of proportionality both before the inception of the WADA Code and since.

(a)           Pre-WADA Code: the anti-doping rules of many sports prior to the creation of the WADA Code mandated fixed sanctions without the possibility of reductions. The CAS nevertheless sometimes reduced these sanctions on the basis they were not proportionate.[21]

(b)           Post-WADA Code: The WADA Code introduced mechanisms by which sanctions could be reduced or eliminated.  However, the CAS has made clear that the introduction of these mechanisms does not remove the obligation of disciplinary panels to measure the sanctions applied in any particular case against the principle of proportionality. In CAS 2005/A/830 Squizzato v. FINA, the CAS held that:

10.24 […] the Panel holds that the mere adoption of the WADA Code […] by a respective Federation does not force the conclusion that there is no other possibility for greater or less reduction a sanction than allowed by DC 10.5. The mere fact that regulations of a sport federation derive from the World Anti-Doping Code does not change the nature of these rules. They are still – like before – regulations of an association which cannot (directly or indirectly) replace fundamental and general legal principles like the doctrine of proportionality a priori for every thinkable case.

Though the 2015 Code asserts that it “has been drafted giving consideration to the principles of proportionality and human rights”[22], that obviously does not mean that proportionality no longer plays a part in the assessment of sanctions for the same reasons propounded by the CAS in Squizzato. Indeed, the 2015 Code itself recognises that it “is intended to be applied in a manner which respects the principles of proportionality and human rights”[23]. Moreover, the most recent CAS decisions in which the principle of proportionality was applied concerned the sanctioning regimes of the 2003 and 2009 Code, both of which mandated default sanctions of two years, not four years[24].  The principle of proportionality is, therefore, arguably even more relevant now than it previously was.

III. Comment

While the 2015 Code does have more mechanisms by which to modify the default sanctions than in previous versions of the WADA Code, that is partly because the default sanctions with regards to most of the violations have doubled[25]:

Athletes accused of committing a violation under Articles 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 or 2.6 are now in a position in which they are required to meet the Article 10.2 thresholds regarding “intent” simply to get them back to the two-year default sanctions that would have applied under previous versions of the Code[26].

If the 2015 Code is to become the tool promised by WADA and if it is to avoid or survive legal challenges, tribunals will need to ensure that their interpretations of the reduction mechanisms, such as those contained at Article 10.2, do not result in disproportionate sanctions.

The parameters within which the proportionality of a sanction falls to be measured were described as follows by the panel in CAS 2005/C/976 & 986 FIFA & WADA:

139. A long series of CAS decisions have developed the principle of proportionality in sport cases. This principle provides that the severity of a sanction must be proportionate to the offense committed. To be proportionate, the sanction must not exceed that which is reasonably required in the search of the justifiable aim. (Emphasis added)

The evaluation of whether a sanction is proportionate therefore begins with the identification of the “justifiable aim”. According to WADA, the increased sanctions were intended to target “intentional cheats”. That is echoed by the wording of Article 10.2.3 of the 2015 Code, which provides as follows:  

As used in Articles 10.2 and 10.3, the term “intentional” is meant to identify those Athletes who cheat. The term, therefore, requires that the athlete or other Person engaged in conduct which he or she knew constituted an anti-doping rule violation or knew that there was a significant risk that the conduct might constitute or result in an anti-doping rule violation and manifestly disregarded that risk [….] (Emphasis added)

The final sentence emphasised above is, arguably, open to interpretation.  However, the first line identifies the overarching aim of the provision – i.e. “the term ‘intentional’ is meant to identify those athletes who cheat”.

According to the Oxford Dictionary, a “cheat” is a “person who behaves dishonestly in order to gain an advantage” and the act of “cheating” amounts to “a fraud or deception”.  A reasonable inference, therefore, is that athletes who “cheat” are athletes who have acted knowingly and dishonestly to gain an unfair advantage.

Article 10.2 cannot, therefore, be intended to punish careless athletes.  Bearing in mind the limits pronounced by the courts in Krabbe and bearing in mind the “justifiable aim”, any interpretation of the provision that would result in a four-year ban for nothing more than careless – or even reckless, but otherwise honest - conduct would risk inviting the sort of scrutiny exercised by the German courts in the Pechstein[27] and Krabbe cases.

Likewise, the interpretation of the other reduction mechanisms, such as Article 10.5 (“No Significant Fault or Negligence”), will require the same degree of pragmatism.  If the parameters for “No Significant Fault” were to be applied as strictly today as they were in the Edwards case, anti-doping would end up right back to where it was in 2004, when the Code’s sanctioning regime was perceived to be so inflexible that it had to be overhauled in 2009. Assuming that the aim of the 2015 Code is not to take 11 years’ worth of backward steps, tribunals will have to ensure that “No Significant Fault” is interpreted in a manner that fulfils WADA’s promise of “greater flexibility”, particularly in cases involving Specified Substances and Contaminated Products[28].

IV. Concluding Remark

The 2015 Code has the potential to become the fairest WADA Code to date. However, it also has the potential to be the cruelest. Interpreting it in a manner consistent with the totality of the context from which it was conceived is the surest way to ensure that the right version prevails.

[1] https://www.wada-ama.org/en/what-we-do/the-code

[2] https://wada-main-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/wadc-2015-draft-version-4.0-significant-changes-to-2009-en.pdf

[3] See (1) http://library.la84.org/OlympicInformationCenter/OlympicReview/1999/OREXXVI26/OREXXVI26s.pdf; and (2) http://library.la84.org/OlympicInformationCenter/OlympicReview/1999/OREXXVI26/OREXXVI26t.pdf

[4] See Kaufmann-Kohler, G., Rigozzi, A., and Malinverni, G., “Doping and fundamental rights of athletes: comments in the wake of the adoption of the World Anti-Doping Code”, I.S.L.R. 2003, 3(Aug), 39–67 *61

[5] Krabbe v. IAAF et. al., Decision of the LG Munich of 17 May 1995, SpuRt 1995 p. 161, p. 167

[6] Krabbe v. IAAF et. al., Decision of the OLG Munich of 28 March 1996, SpuRt 1996 p. 133, 138

[7] See (1) Legal Opinion on the Conformity of Certain Provisions of the Draft World Anti-Doping Code with Commonly Accepted Principles of International Law, dated 23 February 2003, paragraphs 142 and 143; (2) Legal Opinion on whether Article 10.2 of the World Anti-Doping Code is compatible with the Fundamental Principles of Swiss Domestic Law, dated 25 October 2005, paragraph 3 (b) (aa) at page 26 and paragraph 3. (f) (aa) at page 32; and (3) Legal Opinion on the Conformity of Article 10.6 of the 2007 Draft World Anti-Doping Code with the Fundamental Rights of Athletes, dated 13 November 2007, at paragraphs 33, 114, 138 and 139

[8] See paragraph 5.8 of CAS OG 04/003 Torri Edwards v IAAF & USATF

[9] See IAAF press release dated 22 November 2005

[10] 2009 Code, Article 10.4 (“Elimination or Reduction of the Period of Ineligibility for Specified Substances under Specific Circumstances”)

[11] See (1) CAS 2011/A/2493 Antidoping Switzerland v/ X; (2) CAS 2013/A/3327 Marin Cilic v. International Tennis Federation & CAS 2013/A/3335 International Tennis Federation v. Marin Cilic; (3) AFLD Decision No. 2011-71 dated 7 July 2011; (4) AFLD Decision No. 2009-50 dated 10 December 2009

[12] Article 10.6 of the 2009 WADA Code (Aggravating Circumstances Which May Increase the Period of Ineligibility)

[13] Note that Violations under Articles 2.7 (Trafficking) and 2.8 (Administration) were not subject to the application of Article 10.6 since the sanctions for those violations (four years to life) already allowed discretion for aggravating circumstances

[14] Legal Opinion on the Conformity of Article 10.6 of the 2007 Draft World Anti-Doping Code with the Fundamental Rights of Athletes, dated 13 November 2007

[15] See commentary to Article 10.6 of the 2009 Code

[16] See CAS 2013/A/3080 Alemitu Bekele Degfa v. TAF and lAAF for a detailed assessment by the CAS of the “aggravated circumstances” provision

[17] WADA, Significant Changes between the 2009 Code and the 2015 Code, Version 4.0, 1 September 2013

[18] See paragraph 124 of CAS 2005/C/976 & 986 FIFA & WADA

[19] See paragraphs 47 and 48 of Case C-519/04 P Meca-Medina & Majcen v Commission [2006] ECR I-6991

[20] See paragraph 83 of the First WADA Legal Opinion

[21] See (1) CAS 1996/56 Foschi v. FINA; (2) CAS 2002/A/396 Baxter v. FIS; (3) CAS 2001/A/337 B. / FINA

[22] See page 11 of the 2015 Code - “Purpose, Scope and Organization of the World Anti-Doping Program and the Code”

[23] See the Introduction at page 17 of the 2015 Code

[24] See, for instance (1) CAS 2010/A/2268 I. v. FIA; and (2) TAS 2007/A/1252 FINA c. O. Mellouli & FTN

[25] Note that the table only reflects the default sanctions applicable before consideration of any of the mechanisms intended to increase or decrease those sanctions

[26] Note that article 10.2 only applies to those violations. For a detailed assessment of Article 10.2, see Rigozzi, Antonio and Haas, Ulrich and Wisnosky, Emily and Viret, Marjolaine, Breaking Down the Process for Determining a Basic Sanction Under the 2015 World Anti-Doping Code (June 10, 2015). ISLJ, (2015) 15:3-48

[27] See (1) Landesgericht (LG) München, 26. February 2014, 37 O 28331/12; and (2) Oberlandesgericht (OLG) München, 15 January 2015, Az. U 1110/14 Kart

[28] Notably, the concept of “No Significant Fault or Negligence” in previous versions of the Code was limited to ‘‘exceptional circumstances’’. That limitation has been removed in the context of Specified Substances and Contaminated Products under Article 10.5.1 of the 2015 Code. Thus, it should now be easier for athletes to trigger the application of “No Significant Fault” in those types of cases than it previously was. See Section 6.2 of Rigozzi et al for a detailed discussion of the point

Editor’s note: Mario Vigna is a Senior Associate at Coccia De Angelis Vecchio & Associati in Rome, Italy. His main practice areas are sports law, commercial law, and IP law. He also has extensive experience in the Anti-doping field, serving as Deputy-Chief Prosecutor of the Italian NADO and as counsel in domestic and international sports proceedings. He is a frequent speaker at various conferences and workshops. He was not involved in either of the cases discussed below.

I.               Introduction 

Gambling in football is a popular and potentially lucrative activity. It also raises numerous issues. When faced with the issue of gambling, the European Court of Justice (now Court of Justice of the EU) determined that gambling was economic activity per se, notwithstanding gambling’s vulnerability to ethical issues, and thus could not be prohibited outright.[1] With the legality of gambling established, it was left to the proper legislative bodies (national legislatures, national and international federations, etc.) to regulate gambling in order to guard against fraud and corruption. Gambling was not going to disappear; the dangers inherent to gambling would require attention. 

Given the amounts of money sometimes at stake, it is unsurprising that fraud and corruption are constant threats in football gambling. Match-fixing, i.e. wherein participants in a match deliberately attempt to secure a specific result to allow certain gamblers to obtain favorable rewards, is one prominent form of such corrupt activity. FIFA and UEFA, as well as other relevant bodies, have attempted to regulate match-fixing to protect the integrity of football competitions. After all, illicit gambling not only enables unjust enrichment on behalf of the corrupt gamblers and their accomplices; illicit gambling undermines the trust that spectators have in an activity and can lead to a decline in interest as a result.

The Italian Football Federation (FIGC) has adopted a strict liability approach to deter and punish match-fixing. Under the operative rules, clubs and federations whose agents or members engage in match-fixing activity are liable for match-mixing regardless of whether the club or federation itself knew of or condoned the conduct. Unfortunately, two relatively recent appeal decisions—Novara and Pro Patria—have handicapped this strict liability regime by allowing clubs to escape or reduce their liability on account of dubious mitigating circumstances. These decisions have undermined the efficacy of strict liability as a doctrine, and consequently diminish the efforts against match-fixing.

This blog post argues first that strict liability is effective in deterring match-fixing activity so long as adjudicatory bodies enforce it with appropriate rigidity. In fact, the doctrine of strict liability is widespread, in sports law and other fields, precisely because it can be effective. Next, this post critiques the decisions in Novara and Pro Patria, contending that both decisions misapply the principle of proportionality and erroneously recognize certain circumstances to mitigate against liability. As a corrective to these two decisions, this post concludes by outlining an effective application of strict liability and highlighting important regulatory efforts that out to be adopted. And while the discussion herein focuses on Italian football, the ideas explained are widely applicable across all sports and throughout all levels of competition. 

II.             Italian Law, Rules, and Regulations Against Match-fixing in Football

On the eve of the 2006 World Cup, which Italy won, Italian investigators uncovered efforts involving several major football clubs aimed at rigging referee selection for matches. This scandal became known as Calciopoli and implicated clubs from both Serie A and Serie B (respectively the first and second divisions in Italian football). Subsequent investigations in 2011 and 2015 led to additional scandals concerning clubs competing in Serie B and Lega Pro (the third division of Italian football), among them Scommessopoli (Bet City), Last Bet, Dirty Soccer, and Treni del Gol. Match-fixing, it was revealed, was a real problem in Italian football.

The FIGC, as the national football federation, maintains regulatory and disciplinary authority over all Italian football competitions and activity. To address the problem of match-fixing, the FIGC employs a set of regulation that deems match-fixing activity improper and sanctionable under a strict liability principle. Article 4 of the FIGC Code of Sport Justice (CSJ) states:

2. Clubs are strictly liable for disciplinary purposes for the actions of their managers, members and the individuals set forth in art. 1, par. 5

[…]

5. Clubs are presumptively liable for the wrongdoing committed for their benefit by any person. Liability is excluded when it is clearly or reasonably doubtful that the club participated in the wrongdoing or ignored it. [2]

Thus, clubs are liable for match-fixing even if they are not intimately aware of or complicit in the match-fixing efforts that benefit the club; liability is found once someone associated with the club—a player, an agent, etc.—engages via their acts or omissions in match-fixing activity. Match-fixing is explicitly prohibited in Article 7 of the CSJ[3], which also provides that strict liability applies for match-fixing and is punishable subject to the degree of fault borne by the club.[4] Here, it is important to note that under Article 7 the adjudicating body has discretion to assess a club’s degree of fault and reduce accordingly the corresponding sanction(s). This discretion is important; it is, however, in making use of this discretion that the appeal bodies erred in Novara and Pro Patria.

III.           Novara and Pro Patria: Setting the Wrong Precedent

The FIGC Code of Sport Justice applies strict liability to clubs for match-fixing but allows for consideration of mitigating circumstances to reduce the sanction(s) if appropriate. The problem is that currently there is no standard for what qualifies as appropriate mitigating circumstances. Novara and Pro Patria highlight this problem. In both cases, Italian football clubs—Novara Calcio and Aurora Pro Patria—were sanctioned for match-fixing, but later had those sanctions reduced on appeal on the basis of mitigating factors. This blog post contends that those reductions were ill-informed. If strict liability is to work as a deterrent and truly discourage match-fixing, acceptable mitigating factors against strict liability require greater scrutiny than provided in these two cases.

A.    Novara Calcio

An investigation by the Italian media, coined Scommessopoli, uncovered one of the largest match-fixing schemes in Italian footnall history. Scommessopoli was a wide-ranging, multi-dimensional enterprise; players were involved, as were Italian and foreign criminal groups—in total, the investigation alleged that at least twenty-two clubs and sixty-one people participated in match-fixing efforts. One of the individuals involved, Cristian Bertani, played for Novara Calcio, a club in the Italian Serie B. According to the findings of the National Disciplinary Commission, Bertani conspired with a foreign gambling group and a local criminal group to fix matches. Consequently, the National Disciplinary Commission sanctioned Bertani’s club Novara Calcio under the strict liability regime in effect. Novara Calcio was fined EUR 35,000 and received a four-point deduction from the league table.[5]

The club appealed the decision to the FIGC Court of Justice. On appeal, the court reduced the deduction to three points and eliminated the fine entirely:

“[The reduced sanction] leads to a more accurate assessment of the overall conduct of the Appellant of all the activity carried out by the club, whether in a preventative or subsequent manner, specifically aimed at fighting the phenomenon of illicit sports or eliminating the consequences… In this sense, recalling among others, the approval by Novara Calcio of the first organizational model of the legislative decree no. 231/2001 related to the Code of Ethics; earning the ISO 9001:2008 certification of quality, being the first football association to earn it; having contracted since February 2012 the professional services in order to study the betting quota over the matches played by the club, bringing a discipline scheme over those studies thanks to an Antifraud Code in April 2012 “[6]

In essence, the Court reduced the sanctions on account of the club’s implementation of self-protection tools in accordance with the organizational model set forth in the Legislative Decree no. 231/2001. The problem with this decision, however, is that the efforts in question were taken after the incident. The Court treated this post-incident measures as mitigating circumstances, even though these measures were not operative when Bertani attempted to fix matches.

Such allowance of post-incident mitigating factors is inappropriate and undercuts the effort to prevent match-fixing. Indeed, only the prior adoption of an adequate organizational model against match-fixing by a club should (potentially) mitigate against strict liability. Two requirements should be satisfied: (1) prior adoption, and (2) adequate measures. Legislative decree no. 231/2001 and Italian jurisprudence both distinguish between superficial adoption of an organizational model—which is insufficient by itself—and the adoption of an organizational model with demonstrated sufficient, concrete measures to prevent wrong-doing. Only the latter satisfactorily deters potential wrong-doing, and only the latter should (potentially) shield against strict liability so long as a club can prove its preventative efforts were adequately effected. With Novara Calcio, the problem was that the adoption of an organization model was merely superficial, in addition to being after-the-fact, and that the club did not have to prove that the adopted measures were or would be effective in combatting match-fixing.

B.    Aurora Pro Patria 

In 2015, the Catanzaro Police Department arrested more than forty individuals for alleged participation in match-fixing in matches of the Italian 4^th Division. Three arrestees were former members of the club Aurora Pro Patria—two players and one coach—accused of match-fixing activities while employed by Pro Patria. All three were found guilty in the ensuing proceedings. Thus, under the doctrine of strict liability, Pro Patria received a seven-point deduction as a sanction for the conduct of its employees.[7]

Pro Patria appealed the ruling and sanction. And like the Novara case, the sanction was reduced: 

Having found the defendant liable, it cannot but follow the confirmation of the strict liability held by the association (Club). As marked by the vast jurisprudence, indeed, the referred liability cannot be avoided but graduated in the presence of circumstances that would see to deserve special consideration.

… the thorough preventative activity put in action by Aurora Pro Patria, that even when they were not obliged to, they still adopted the model of conduct as set out in the rule Legislative Decree no. 231/2001, they imposed a Code of anti-fraud and have entered into a contract with Federbet [a monitoring company] by which said company will check the flux of the bets related to the activity of the club, we determine that, given the relevant circumstances, the sanction against the association (club) must be reduced…”[8]

The Court reduced the sanction to a three-point deduction. Although the appeal court affirmed strict liability, it undercut its potency by accepting as mitigating circumstances factors that were not in place when the unlawful conduct occurred. The appeal court was in some ways excusing a violation, at least partially, for efforts the responsible party undertook to not commit the same violation again in the future. The efforts had no impact on the violation that already took place.

C.    Problems Posed by the Novara and Pro Patria Rulings 

After being charged with match-fixing, both Novara and Pro Patria hired monitoring companies that supposedly help prevent, or at least detect, potential match-fixing activity. These post-facto efforts were deemed by ruling bodies compelling enough to reduce sanctions imposed for match-fixing. This precedent of reducing on account of mitigating circumstances occurring after the match-fixing activity occurred poses two issues.

First, the precedent undermines the strict liability regime by allowing the reduction of a club’s liability where it fixes the problem ex post facto, thereby providing clubs with a loophole to escape with minimal harm. Second, the precedent does not consider the actual efficacy of the hired monitoring companies or their methods. Without a regulatory framework and established standards for monitoring companies and certification of their services, i.e. no way of assessing whether the hired companies actually make any difference when it comes to the prevalence of match-fixing, nothing separates effective monitoring from the appearance or claim of monitoring.

IV.           A Better Way of Evaluating Mitigating Circumstances

An adjudicatory body rightfully must consider the particular context of each case. Accurate and fair decisions acknowledge that not all cases concerning similar issues deserve equal treatment. Mitigating circumstances are an important aspect of any fair legal system. With Novara and Pro Patria, however, the appeal bodies erred by giving weight to certain post-incident mitigating circumstances that had no bearing on the issue at hand. Further, allowing the hire of a monitoring company to mitigate a club’s liability introduces a separate issue, i.e. the efficacy of the monitoring company and its services. Both appeal decisions reduced the capacity of strict liability to deter match-fixing. If a strict liability regime is to be effective in combatting match-fixing, then clear standards for evaluating mitigating circumstances in cases like Novara and Pro Patria are necessary.

Before proposing a way forward, it is important to first try and understand why the appeal decisions reduced the sanctions in the cases at hand. Inherent to the appeals’ justification is the doctrine of proportionality, or the notion that any punishment must fit the crime and cannot be more extreme than is warranted. In Novara and Pro Patria, it seems that the appeal bodies thought that the clubs’ liability for the conduct of their employees should be limited. In other words, while the appeal bodies certainly assigned liability to the clubs, they were unwilling to allow that liability to support too onerous sanctions.

This, of course, misses the point of strict liability in the first place. Strict liability is used to assign liability notwithstanding immediate fault because the liable party is best positioned to absorb the liability and/or work to prevent the wrongful conduct. Punishments for strict liability in match-fixing, if reduced to minimal amounts, do little to nothing to promote clubs to actively prevent match-fixing. The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) re-affirms this point:

With regard to the alleged disproportionality of the Decision, the Panel first of all wishes to stress that the fight against match-fixing is considered to be extremely important for the purpose of preserving confidence in and the integrity of sport.[9]

Part of the proportionality calculus must be the severity of the wrongdoing concerned. Match-fixing is, arguably, the greatest wrong in sports. Therefore, hefty punishments should not violate proportionality. 

The Novara and Pro Patria appeal decisions also over-value the post-incident preventative actions (which is an oxymoron!). The treatment of post-incident actions as mitigating circumstances suggests future offenders will be able to correct wrongful conduct after-the-fact simply by hiring a company that claims to monitor match-fixing activity. Even if a club were to hire a monitoring company prior to any wrongful conduct, the mere signing of a contract with a monitoring company is generally a questionable preventative measure. Clubs that employ monitoring companies and are then subsequently charged with liability for match-fixing should only have sanctions (and thus liability) reduced if they prove to the court that the monitoring company undertook actual and sufficient efforts to monitor and prevent match-fixing.

Merely employing a monitoring company without any regard for the efficacy of its services is an inadequate escape route from strict liability. After all, these companies are unregulated and unaccredited; there is no guarantee that the companies do any work, or that any work the company performs is effective. At a minimum, then, a club must demonstrate that in conjunction with a monitoring company it undertook significant and adequate measures to prevent match-fixing by its employees and agents.

A standard for monitoring companies is important in light of the Novara and Pro Patria rulings, which will support a booming (and unregulated) market for monitoring companies. Clubs may now look to symbolically contract with these companies to escape liability if/when they are accused of match-fixing. The football community should not allow such a deregulated and opaque market to emerge.

V.             Conclusion

Match-fixing poses one of the most elemental dangers to professional football—it damages the credibility of the sport and could potentially damage the market. The doctrine of strict liability discourages a club’s participation in match-fixing activities, and incentivizes clubs to put into place measures that ensure their employees abide by anti-match-fixing regulations. Judges and tribunals must not lose sight of the broader picture when determining sanctions in match-fixing cases. In light of the Novara and Pro Patria decisions, this blog post offers a way forward to maintain strict liability’s capacity to effectively combat match-fixing: (1) post-incident efforts should not be considered as mitigating circumstances, and (2) monitoring companies and their services must meet a certain standard if they are to absolve, partially or fully, a club from its liability.

Strict liability can be effective so long as courts and tribunals do not unduly handicap it. Match-fixing is still a prominent threat in football and in sports in general. Now is not the time to weaken the most effective tool (strict liability) available to combat match-fixing. While the preceding discussion focuses on Italian football, the lessons are universal for all sports, at all levels.

[1] Case Her Majesty's Customs and Excise v. Gerhart Schindler and Jôrg Schindler, C-275/92 Judgement of 24th March 1994 [1994] ECR 1-01039.

[2] Unofficial translation from Italian: “Responsabilità delle società 1 […]; 2. Le società rispondono oggettivamente, ai fini disciplinari, dell'operato dei dirigenti, dei tesserati e dei soggetti di cui all’art. 1 bis, comma 5; 3 […]; 4 […] 5. Le società sono presunte responsabili degli illeciti sportivi commessi a loro vantaggio da persone a esse estranee. La responsabilità è esclusa quando risulti o vi sia un ragionevole dubbio che la società non abbia partecipato all'illecito o lo abbia ignorato; 6 […].”

[3] “Committing, by any means, acts to alter the development or outcome of a match or competition or to assure any advantages in the ranking constitutes a sporting wrongdoing.” Unofficial translation from Italian: “1. Il compimento, con qualsiasi mezzo, di atti diretti ad alterare lo svolgimento o il risultato di una gara o di una competizione ovvero ad assicurare a chiunque un vantaggio in classifica costituisce illecito sportivo.”

[4] Art. 7, par. 4: It is considered the strict liability of a club in the sense of art. 4, par. 5 and the fact is punishable subject to the degree of fault, with the sanctions foreseen in art. 18, par. 1 sections (g), (h), (i), (l), and (m). Unofficial translation from Italian: “Se viene accertata la responsabilità oggettiva o presunta della società ai sensi dell'art. 4, comma 5, il fatto è punito, a seconda della sua gravità, con le sanzioni di cui alle lettere g), h), i), l), m) dell’art. 18, comma 1.” The sanctions consist, broadly speaking, in the deduction of points, to be sent to the bottom of the table, to be disqualified from the competition, to have a tittle taken away or the barred from participating in a specific competition.

[5] The sport prosecutor had sought a six-point deduction.

[6] Unofficial translation from Italian: “A ciò conduce una più attenta valutazione della complessiva condotta della reclamante, di tutta la attività da questa posta in essere, invero tanto in via preventiva che successiva ed espressamente finalizzata a combattere il fenomeno degli illeciti sportivi ovvero ad eliminarne le conseguenze… In questo ambito vanno riassuntivamente richiamati, tra gli altri interventi, l’approvazione da parte del Novara Calcio del primo modello organizzativo ex decreto legislativo n. 231/01 e relativo Codice etico; l’approvazione nel gennaio del 2012 di un nuovo modello organizzazione e di gestione; il conseguimento nel marzo ancora di quest’anno di certificazione di qualità ISO 9001:2008 come prima società calcistica in Italia; l’aver affidato nel febbraio 2012 a soggetto professionale lo studio dell’andamento delle quote di scommesse legate alle partite che avrebbe giocato il Novara da quel momento alla fine del campionato, successivamente deliberando di continuare l’opera di monitoraggio delle partite; disciplinando infine tale sistema con l’adozione di un Codice Antifrode.”

[7] The sport prosecutor sought a twenty-point reduction as an exemplary punishment and to increase its deterrent effect.

[8] Federazione Italiana Giouco Calcio; COMUNICATO UFFICIALE N. 48/TFN – Sezione Disciplinare (2015/2016), p. 81.

[9] CAS 2013/A/3297 Public Joint-Stock Company “Football Club Metalist” v. UEFA & PAOK FC, award of 29 November 2013. (Case about match-fixing and sanctions under UEFA rules.)

Introduction
The first part of the present blog article provided a general introduction to the compatibility of fixed-term contracts in football with Directive 1999/70/EC[1] (Directive). However, as the Member States of the European Union enjoy a considerable discretion in the implementation of a directive, grasping the impact of the Directive on the world of football would not be possible without considering the national context. The recent ruling of the Arbeitsgericht Mainz (the lowest German labour court; hereinafter the Court) in proceedings brought by a German footballer Heinz Müller provides an important example in this regard. This second part of the blog on the legality of fixed-term contract in football is devoted to presenting and assessing the Court’s decision.

I. Facts and Procedure
Heinz Müller, the main protagonist of this case, was a goalkeeper playing for 1.FSV Mainz 05 a club partaking to the German Bundesliga. He was employed by the club as a licensed football player since 1 July 2009. His first 3-year contract ended on 1 July 2012 and was renewed for two years until 30 June 2014. It included an option for a one-year extension if the player took part in a minimum of 23 Bundesliga fixtures in the 2013/2014 season. Despite a good start of his last season (he participated in 10 out of the first 11 games), Heinz Müller got injured and was then set aside from the professional team and relegated to the reserve team. He attributed this relegation to the despotism of his manager and the fall-out in their professional relationship. Due to this relegation to the reserve team, he was unable to attain the 23 Bundesliga games necessary for a one-year prolongation of his contract, which ended on 30 June 2014. Thus the player decided to bring 1.FSV Mainz 05 to court claiming both the payment of the bonuses he would have obtained if he had been allowed to continue playing with the Bundesliga team and the establishment by the tribunal that his employment contract was an indefinite contract and, therefore, still valid.

In its ruling,[2] the Arbeitsgericht Mainz gave way to his demand that the contract should be qualified as an indefinite contract, though it refused to award him the lost bonuses. The decision was widely commented in the mainstream German press (here, here and here), including the biggest German tabloid Bild which featured a report on the case. Fears of a new “Bosman” started to spread in the German football community. The reactions have ranged from utter incredulity from the part of the clubs, to calls for a true collective bargaining agreement from the side of the players’ union. The ruling was immediately appealed and it is likely that the appeal court will nuance the decision rendered in first instance. Yet, this remains an important case highlighting the relevance of the European rules regarding fixed-term contracts in the realm of football. As we will see, it offers a suitable legal blueprint to assess the potential impact of the EU directive on fixed-term work on professional football.

II. Decision of the Court
The Court scrutinized the validity of the subsequent fixed-term contract concluded between the club and the player against the Part-Time and Fixed-Term Employment Act (TzBfG),[3] the national law implementing the Directive, and in particular, Section 14(1) thereof which provides that, in principle, contracts for a definite period are allowed only when justified by an objective reason. Section 14(2) TzBfG, however, stipulates that objective reasons are not required for fixed-term contracts the duration of which does not exceed two years. After finding that the said exception no longer applies to the contract concluded between Müller and the club, the Court focused on Section 14(1) TzBfG which provides that an objective reasons exist ‘in particular’ when i) the employer’s need is temporary; ii) the definite period of contract is to facilitate the employee's entry into subsequent employment following a training or study; iii) the employee substitutes another employee; iv) the nature of the work justifies the fixed-term of the contract; v) the definite period is to serve testing the employee; vi) when grounds related to the employee himself or herself justify a fixed-term contract; vii) the employee is to be paid from the budget intended for fixed-term employment and he/she is employed on that basis; or viii) the definite term of the contract is based on an amicable settlement before a court. In this respect, the Court referred to both the Directive’s aim of limiting recourse to fixed-term contracts, and the interpretation of clause 5 of the Directive adopted by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Angelidaki[4]. Subsequently, the Court turned to the assessment of the validity of the contract at dispute. Here, it first focused on the grounds related to the employee’s personal status, and the nature of the work as provided under Section 14(1) TzBfG.

A. The personal status
Concerning the former, the Court indicated that neither the age of the employee, nor his wish to conclude a contract for a definite period could constitute personal grounds in the case at hand.[5] Moreover, as the argument relating to the age of the player was brought up by the Court and not the club itself,[6] the Court elaborated only on the latter claim. In this regard, it provided that a genuine interest in concluding a fixed-term contract exists when the employee is offered a choice between a contract for a definite and indefinite term and choses the former.[7] According to the Court, the player’s wish to prolong his contract could not be considered as pointing at the existence of such a genuine interest.[8] In addition, the Court stated that Müller’s alleged interest in the flexibility of his engagement by concluding a fixed-term contract could not constitute a valid argument due to the fact that employees in general are not prohibited from terminating indefinite employment contracts.[9]

B. The nature of the work
Next, the Court decided that the subsequent fixed-term contract between Müller and the club may not be justified on the basis of an objective reason relating to the nature of the work. The Court referred to literature arguing, first, that it is necessary for coaches to implement their vision through the choice of adequate athletes which in turn requires flexibility in replacing players, and second, that contracts for a definite period are needed due to the progressive decline of employees’ (players) ability to perform at a certain level throughout their careers.[10] In this respect, the Court did not really address the first limb of the argument and focused on the latter. Here, the Court referred to the established jurisprudence according to which fixed-term contracts for coaches are permissible due to the risk of degradation of the relationship between coaches and athletes.[11] Only in such a situation, according to the Court, can a fixed-term contract be properly justified. Yet, the decline caused by the long-term exercise of a profession was not regarded by the Court as a factor specific to football.[12] Furthermore, the Court provided that, pursuant to both national and European law, contracts for an indefinite period are the general form of employment, and that specific interests of sports clubs, unlike those of broadcasters, press and artists, have not been granted a protected status under the German Constitution.[13] By referring to the prohibition of discrimination based on age the Court also declined to accept the club’s argument concerning age-related uncertainty as to the quality of the work performed by the player.[14] 

C. Other objective reasons
Lastly, the Court addressed the arguments concerning the customary nature of fixed-term contracts in sports, the need to satisfy fans by changing the composition of teams, the level of footballers’ remuneration, and the impossibility to dismiss a player on a fixed-term contract. The custom of signing players for a definite term contract was not deemed by the Court a valid justification pursuant to Section 14 TzBfG.[15] Changing the composition of teams according to the needs of supporters was regarded as of minor importance, in comparison to the need to safeguard the interests of employees.[16] Also, high wages were not identified as a proper justification for the recourse to fixed-term contracts since Section 14 TzBfG does not provide for such an exception, and the higher level of remuneration is not capable of alleviating the negative consequences connected to a lack of employment security.[17] Lastly, the Court declined to accept the argument that the fixed-term period of the employment agreement could be justified by the fact that the contract cannot be terminated. According to the Court, the argument not only fails to fall within the scope of Section 14 TzBfG, but also the impossibility for the employer to terminate the contract does not provide an adequate counterweight to the employee’s interest for continued employment.[18] Based on all of the above the Court decided that the contract is of an indeterminate nature, and therefore still valid.

III. A critical analysis of the judgment
The Court’s ruling is not entirely convincing. This concerns, in particular, the Court’s failure to consider a number of factors which lay at the core of football and are inherent to this particular activity.

A. The personal status
The rejection of the argument concerning the personal grounds connected to the alleged wish of the player to conclude a fixed-term contract does not seem to be controversial. An extensive interpretation of Section 14 TzBfG in this regard could potentially be liable of considerably limiting the protection afforded to fixed-term workers under European and national law. Moreover, in its ruling the Court relied on previous case-law which indicates that for the exception to apply it must be established that the employee concerned, when granted a choice between a fixed-term and a permanent contract, would have chosen the former.[19] Therefore, the Court’s findings that, first, the player wished to prolong his employment relation with the club, and second, that his interest in maintaining flexibility could have been safeguarded under a contract for an indefinite period, seem to exclude the possibility of applying the exception.

B. The nature of the work
The Court’s assessment of the existence of an objective reason stemming from the nature of the work of a professional footballer is less convincing. First, the Court failed to address the argument concerning the necessity of maintaining flexibility as to the choice of players included in the squad. Indeed, this flexibility is needed for a coach to be able to adapt and modify its strategy over the years. In case of a change of the coach, a permanent pool of players would necessarily drastically reduce the potential for variations in the team’s strategy. This concerns not only the characteristics of footballers in terms of their physical attributes and skills, but also their ability to perform in several competitions which often requires playing a number of games every week. Introducing contracts which would bind clubs to their players for an indefinite period could thus be liable of ‘freezing’ football as a result of the coaches’ limited abilities to experiment, adjust and improve line-ups, and to implement new tactics. This situation should be considered analogical to the one concerning artists and comedians. In this regard, the competent national court indicated that fixed-term contracts for comedians and actors were necessary to enable theatre directors to be flexible with regard to their program.[20]

Second, by stating that work-related decline in output cannot justify recourse to fixed-term contracts as it does not constitute a feature specific to football, the Court explicitly aligned professional football players with workers in other professions. The Court’s reasoning in this regard, together with the Court’s findings that age-related uncertainty as to the quality of work may not be relied upon as a justification for fixed-term contracts as it constitutes discrimination on the basis of age, are problematic. In order to exercise their profession football players, and sportspeople in general, are required to maintain the highest level of physical fitness, a factor which does not play a key role in many sectors or industries. It is common knowledge that physical capabilities deteriorate with age, making it gradually more difficult and challenging for athletes not only to preserve a high level of performance but also, as mentioned above, to compete in several sporting competitions. One should also mention that employers outside the sporting world are usually keener on hiring individuals with considerable experience acquired during their professional careers. However, the situation in the football industry is opposite. While footballers improve their skills and broaden their experience with time, aging is the very cause that undermines their ability to perform at the highest level. This explains why football players over the age of thirty are often considered as ‘old’, and provides the underlying rationale for granting shorter contracts to such players. If deterioration due to age does not constitute a relevant factor, why would clubs consciously decide to deprive themselves of the possibility of securing long-term services of top thirty-plus footballers by offering them contracts for periods shorter than those given to younger players, and additionally, undermine their own ability to secure a future transfer fee? The answers is simple: age-related physical decline constitutes a specific factor inherent to the exercise of football, and disproportionately important in comparison to other professions, which influences the capabilities of players to perform, and thus, should not be disregarded as a specific justification for the recourse to fixed-term contracts.

Third, and considering the above, the nature of the industry requires an influx of young talents.[21] In this regard, introducing permanent contracts as a standard would diminish the possibility of young players having a chance to enter the market. Indeed, one has to keep in mind that the football labour market is closed, with a strictly limited number of employees due to the pre-defined number of professional teams active on this market. Thus, the use of indeterminate contracts would have the consequence of freezing the labour market and drastically reduce the incentive to train young players and to improve the squads.

Fourth, providing players with contracts for an indefinite period would also entail the possibility for footballers to terminate their employment agreements pursuant to statutory notice periods. Such an eventuality would affect the stability of contracts between professionals and club, with negative effects on clubs’ planning security in both sporting and financial matters.[22]

Fifth, the fact that contracts for an indefinite period are regarded as the general form of employment and that interests of sport clubs have not been granted protection under the German Constitution should not constitute a reason for precluding the application of Section 14 TzBfG. In this respect, the social partners indicated that ‘fixed-term contracts are a feature of employment in certain sectors, occupations and activities which can suit both employers and workers’.[23] Also, the national implementing measure do not make reliance on Section 14 TzBfG conditional upon the employer falling within one of the sectors protected under the German Constitution. On the contrary, the exception established pursuant to national law seems rather broad. It refers to, inter alia, the nature of the work and the list of objective grounds does not seem to be exhaustive.[24]

Sixth, the rejection by the Court of the argument concerning the customary nature of the recourse to fixed-term contracts in football is not surprising. However, the fact that the needs of the public (supporters) were regarded as being of minor relevance is more questionable. The need to replace players is based not only on the reasons mentioned above, but also necessary from the perspective of maintaining a stable fan base and attracting new supporters by, inter alia, increasing clubs’ competitiveness. Allowing flexibility in signing new players, and conversely in parting with those footballers who are no longer (effectively) able to contribute to the team effort, enables clubs to, at least, increase their chances of success, and thus, fulfils the desires of the supporters. In this respect, the Court mentioned itself that popularity of clubs depends on sporting success. Therefore, it is unfortunate that the Court did not hesitate to disregard this particular factor and failed to scrutinize it in more detail.

C. Other objective reasons
Arguments relating to high wages that professional footballers receive, or the fact that an employment agreement between a club and a player concluded for a definite period may not be dissolved have not been accepted by the Court as constituting objective grounds justifying successive fixed-term contracts. In this regard, it is difficult to criticize the Court. The Court correctly pointed out that these arguments find no support in grounds explicitly mentioned in Section 14 TzBfG. And even though the national law implementing the Directive indicates that successive fixed-term contracts may be justified based on ‘in particular’ the grounds enumerated in Section 14 TzBfG (which might be interpreted as not fully meeting the criteria established in the CJEU’s case-law),[25] thus leaving a possibility for employers to argue the existence of justifications not covered by the provision, accepting such arguments could not only threaten workers’ employment stability, but would also be liable of undermining the system established for the purpose of preventing abuse stemming from recourse to successive fixed-term contracts.

Concluding remarks
The ruling in the Müller case clearly illustrates that for the purpose of evaluating the compatibility of fixed-term contracts in football with the Directive it is absolutely necessary to assess its practical implementation at the national level. In this regard, the focus of the legal debate, which the present blog aspires to spark, has to be placed on the issue of successive fixed-term contracts in football being capable of falling under the objective reasons justification. It cannot be denied that a number of arguments pertaining, in particular, to the specific nature of football as an economic activity may constitute basis for retaining the current system. However, recourse to such arguments will only be possible where national implementing measures allow for it, which therefore implies a specific assessment of the situation in each Member State. Moreover, in those Member States in which national laws prevent objective reason justifications from being relied upon in the professional football sector, successive fixed-term contracts could only be valid through the introduction of amendments to national legislation, (broad) interpretation of the applicable rules by national courts, or by providing room for social partners to agree on a specific status of sports regarding fixed-term contracts. The Müller case has undoubtedly kick-started a much-needed legal discussion. Nevertheless, its intensity will probably depend on the substance of the appeal decision in the Müller case, and whether or not similar cases will appear before national courts outside of Germany.

[1] Council Directive 1999/70/EC concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP [1999] OJ L 175/43 (Directive)

[2] ArbG Mainz, AZ: 3 CA 1197/14, 13.03.2015 (Heinz Müller Judgment)

[3] The German text of the Teilzeit- und Befristungsgesetz is available in full at https://dejure.org/gesetze/TzBfG

[4] Joined cases C-378/07 to C-380/07 Kiriaki Angelidaki and Others v Organismos Nomarchiakis Autodioikisis Rethymnis, Charikleia Giannoudi v Dimos Geropotamou and Georgios Karabousanos and Sofoklis Michopoulos v Dimos Geropotamou [2009] ECR I-3071

[5] Heinz Müller Judgment, para 3.1.

[6] Ibidem

[7] Ibidem

[8] Ibidem

[9] Ibidem

[10] Ibidem, para 3.2.1.

[11] Ibidem

[12] Ibidem

[13] Ibidem, para 3.2.2.

[14] Ibidem

[15] Ibidem, para 3.2.3.

[16] Ibidem

[17] Ibidem

[18] Ibidem, para 3.3.

[19] BAG 19.01.2005, 7 AZR 115/04

[20] BAG 02.07.2003, AP BGB §611 Nr.39. See also BeckOK TzBfG §14 at Rn. 55

[21] The CJEU held that considering the social importance of sporting activities, and especially football, in the European Union the objective of encouraging the recruitment and training of young players must be accepted as legitimate and thus capable of justifying restrictions on free movement of workers. See Case C-415/93 Union royale belge des sociétés de football association ASBL v Jean-Marc Bosman, Royal club liégeois SA v Jean-Marc Bosman and others and Union des associations européennes de football (UEFA) v Jean-Marc Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921, para 106; Case C-325/08 Olympique Lyonnais SASP v Olivier Bernard and Newcastle UFC [2010] ECR I-2177, para 39

[22] Diego F. R. Compaire, Gerardo Planás R. A., Stefan-Eric Wildemann, ‘Contractual Stability in Professional Football: Recommendations for Clubs in a Context of International Mobility’, July 2009. http://www.lawinsport.com/pdf/ContStabinProfFoot.pdf. Accessed 17 July 2015; also FIFA regulations provide for rules introduced for the purpose of facilitating contractual stability between clubs and players, see FIFA, ‘Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players’, 2015, Chapter IV. Maintenance of contractual stability between professionals and clubs

[23] Annex to the Directive, ETUC-UNICE-CEEP Framework Agreement on Fixed-Term Work, recital 8

[24] Section 14 TzBfG indicates that objective grounds exist ‘in particular’ in situations provided for in the provision. The wording of the provision thus grants considerable flexibility to employers

[25] In case C-212/04 Konstantinos Adeneler en anderen tegen Ellinikos Organismos Galaktos (ELOG) [2006] ECR I-6057, para 72 the CJEU ruled, inter alia, that regarding the concept of objective reasons as provided under the Directive national provisions may not be of a purely formal nature, but must justify recourse to successive fixed-term contracts ‘by the presence of objective factors relating to the particular features of the activity concerned and to the conditions under which it is carried out […]’

Close to 100 participants from 37 different countries attended the first ISLJ Annual International Sports Law Conference that took place on 26-27 October 2017 in The Hague. The two-day programme featured panels on the FIFA transfer system, the labour rights and relations in sport, the protection of human rights in sport, EU law and sport, the Court of Arbitration for Sport, and the world anti-doping system. On top of that, a number of keynote speakers presented their views on contemporary topics and challenges in international sports law. This report provides a brief summary of the conference for both those who could not come and those who participated and would like to relive their time spent at the T.M.C. Asser Institute.

Day 1

Opening Keynote by Miguel Maduro

The audience did not have to wait long for one of the highlights of the conference as Miguel Maduro, a former Chair of the FIFA Governance Committee, took the floor immediately after Johan Lindholm, an Editor-in-Chief of the International Sports Law Journal, and Antoine Duval, the Head of the Asser International Sports Centre, had delivered their opening speeches. Drawing on his experience as a Chair of the FIFA Governance Committee, Miguel identified the resistance to public scrutiny, accountability and transparency as root causes of the governance crisis currently faced by FIFA. He suggested that an independent international agency be established to supervise the governance of international sports governing bodies. According to him, only the European Union is capable of taking such an initiative.

Panel Sessions

The first panel, chaired by Johan Lindholm, revolved around the FIFA transfer system. Jakub Laskowski from Legia Warszawa explained why we might need a different approach to solidarity in professional football. Eleanor Drywood from the University of Liverpool then examined the FIFA's ban on the international transfer of minors, suggesting that international sports governing bodies in general, and FIFA in particular, should take account of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child in order to enhance the protection of minors in sport. Finally, William McAuliffe, a sports lawyer practising in Switzerland, spoke about buy-out clauses and the club's consent to transfer under the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players.

The afternoon session started with a panel on the labour rights and relations in sport chaired by Professor Richard Parrish from Edge Hill University. Jack Withaar from Tilburg University focused on employment contracts in professional sport, concluding with the question whether international sports federations should take into consideration labour standards elaborated by the International Labour Organization. Thereafter, Matthew Graham from the World Players Association shared his insights on the functioning of international players' unions. Finally, Andrea Cattaneo from Edge Hill University encouraged a greater use of social dialogue to regulate professional football.

The last panel of the day, chaired by Professor Mark James from Manchester Metropolitan University, tackled a relatively new topic in international sports law – the protection of human rights. Whereas our research intern Tomáš Grell and Daniela Heerdt from Tilburg University discussed how human rights could be affected by the organisation of a mega-sporting event, Brendan Schwab from the World Players Association shed light on the more specific human rights risks faced by professional athletes. Both Tomáš Grell and Daniela Heerdt agreed that international sports governing bodies need to translate their human rights commitments from bidding and hosting agreements to actual practice. Brendan Schwab, for his part, emphasised that sportspeople are human first and athletes second, and introduced the World Player Rights Policy adopted by the World Players Association in July 2017.

Keynote Discussion between Michael Beloff QC and Sean Cottrell

Throughout his more than 50-years-long career in sports law, Michael Beloff QC, also known as one of the 'godfathers of sports law', has witnessed first-hand the professionalization of sport. This and many more aspects of his truly exceptional career as a sports lawyer featured in his keynote discussion with Sean Cottrell from LawInSport (a trusted media partner of the conference). Michael also touched upon some of the contemporary sports law themes, among which the lack of gender equality in the composition of international sports governing bodies, the role of athletes in good governance of sport, inaccuracies in sporting regulations or transparency at the Court of Arbitration for Sport.   

Day 2

Keynote Lecture by Stephen Weatherill

The second day also kicked off with a keynote lecture, this time delivered by Professor Stephen Weatherill from Oxford University, who examined the conditional autonomy enjoyed by international sports governing bodies under EU law. Against the background of UEFA's Financial Fair Play rules or the FIFA's ban on third-party ownership, he explained how sporting rules that would otherwise be incompatible with EU law could nevertheless be justified on account of the specific nature of sport, what he called the 'sporting margin of appreciation'. However; he also criticised the pyramidal structure of international sport for not allowing those at the bottom end (athletes and clubs) to participate in decision-making processes of international sports governing bodies.

Morning Session

The first panel of the day, chaired by Ben Van Rompuy from Leiden University, offered some interesting perspectives on the application of EU law to sport. Stefania Marassi from The Hague University of Applied Sciences explored the policies adopted by the European Union with a view to contributing to the promotion of sporting issues in line with Article 165 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Christopher Flanagan, a lawyer practising in England, discussed why attempts to regulate the financial aspects of professional football are met with challenges under EU law. Employing FIFA's private order as a case study, Branislav Hock from the University of Portsmouth argued in his presentation that successful private modes of governance continuously emerge from public interventions, provided that the public acts as a reversed civil society. It is worthwhile to note that Branislav won the award for the best paper presented at the conference.

Thanks to Women in Sports Law, an association that unites women from more than 40 countries who specialise in sports law, the conference also continued over lunch. Lindsay Brandon, a sports lawyer practising in the United States, and Despina Mavromati, a Co-Founder of Women in Sports Law and a former Managing Counsel at the Court of Arbitration for Sport, talked about the current state of whereabouts requirements in the world anti-doping system. They were joined in the discussion by Professor Richard McLaren.

Keynote Lecture by Richard McLaren

After lunch, Professor Richard McLaren from Western University in Ontario, the former head of WADA's investigation into the Russian doping scandal, spoke about broader challenges to the operation of the world anti-doping system. Among other things, he stressed that athletes have a crucial role in uncovering doping practices, as they know much more about these practices than anybody else. Having insisted that whistleblowers are of utmost importance, he also criticised the International Olympic Committee for its treatment of the Russian athlete Yuliya Stepanova who was eventually blocked from competing at the Rio Olympics despite her exceptional contribution to the fight against doping. In more general terms, Richard asserted that the integrity of sport is threatened not only by doping but also by archaic governance, corruption or match-fixing.

Afternoon Session

After the lecture given by Richard McLaren, the conference continued with a panel on international sports arbitration chaired by Despina Mavromati. Howard Jacobs, an American sports lawyer, together with Lindsay Brandon from his office, discussed the proposal to create a permanent anti-doping division at the Court of Arbitration for Sport. Professor Jernej Letnar Černič from the Graduate School of Government and European Studies in Ljubljana then looked at how the guarantee of a fair trial could be strengthened in proceedings before the Court of Arbitration for Sport. Finally, Kazushige Ogawa from Rikkyo University in Tokyo shared his insights on the functioning of the Japan Sports Arbitration Agency.

The last panel of the conference, chaired by Antoine Duval, addressed one of the most pressing issues in the world of sport – the fight against doping. Kelsey Erickson from Leeds Beckett University examined a range of psychological factors influencing athletes who intend to blow the whistle on doping. Jan Exner from the Czech Olympic Committee focused on the sanctions for anti-doping rule violations, suggesting that a four-year period of ineligibility might be disproportionate. Finally, our last speaker Louise Reilly, an Irish barrister and a former counsel at the Court of Arbitration for Sport, provided a precise overview of jurisprudence dealing with intentional anti-doping rule violations under the 2015 World Anti-Doping Code.

A thank you note

We would like to take this opportunity to thank all the speakers and participants not only for joining but also for actively contributing to the very rich discussions that followed after each session. We hope that this is only the beginning and that the ISLJ Annual International Sports Law Conference will become a tradition in the coming years. For those who did not have the chance to attend, the ISLJ will publish a special issue including the papers of the conference, so stay tuned!

Looking forward to seeing you next year,

The team of the Asser International Sports Law Centre

PS: Feel free to leave us comments with your feedback/suggestions, so that we can work on improving the conference.