Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

UEFA’s Financial Fair Play Regulations and the Rise of Football’s 1%

On 12 January 2017 UEFA published its eighth club licensing benchmarking report on European football, concerning the financial year of 2015. In the press release that accompanied the report, UEFA proudly announced that Financial Fair Play (FFP) has had a huge positive impact on European football, creating a more stable financial environment. Important findings included a rise of aggregate operating profits of €1.5bn in the last two years, compared to losses of €700m in the two years immediately prior to the introduction of Financial Fair Play.



Source: UEFA’s eighth club licensing benchmarking report on European football, slide 107.


 Meanwhile the aggregate losses dropped by 81% from €1.7bn in 2011 to just over €300m in 2015.



Source: UEFA’s eighth club licensing benchmarking report on European football, slide 108.


 Furthermore, net debt as a percentage of revenue has fallen from 65% in 2009 to 40% in 2015.[1]



Source: UEFA’s eighth club licensing benchmarking report on European football, slide 125.


UEFA’s Financial Fair Play vindicated?

As was clear from the UEFA Club Licensing Benchmarking Report Financial Year ending 2011, the deficit of clubs with a UEFA License increased from €0.6 billion in 2007 to a peak of €1.7 billion in 2011, with some historic European football clubs, like FC Parma, going bankrupt. Though the increasing indebtedness might have been to a large extent related to the global economic crisis[2], UEFA considered that it was mainly the result of irresponsible spending by the clubs.[3] Consequently, UEFA introduced the FFP Regulations, whose objectives are, inter alia, improving the economic and financial capabilities of clubs; introducing more discipline and rationality in club football finances; encouraging clubs to operate on the basis of their own revenues; and protecting the long-term viability and sustainability of European club football. UEFA’s primary tool to achieve those is the break-even requirement imposed on clubs having qualified for a UEFA club competition.[4] Accordingly, clubs must demonstrate that their expenditure does not exceed their revenue  should they wish to avoid sanctions by the UEFA Club Financial Control Body.[5] With these objectives in mind, it does not come as a surprise that UEFA is celebrating in this report the success of the FFP regulations.


The negative side effect of FFP: The rise of the 1%

The FFP regulations are still facing controversy and legal challenges in spite of (or, maybe, because of) the results highlighted in this report. As early as 2012, critics pointed out that FFP could nurture the competitive imbalance between European football clubs. Basically, a successful club will yield more revenue, leading to the club being able to afford better players, in turn leading to the club being more successful, and so on and so forth. Since small clubs are no longer allowed to overinvest their way to a greater market size in the future, people predicted that FFP would trigger an era of competitive imbalance.[6] Indeed, this competitive imbalance was one of the primary arguments used by player agent Striani and his lawyer Dupont in their complaint to the European Commission.[7]

UEFA has so far successfully managed to withstand the legal challenges launched against the FFP rules, such as a Commission complaint, a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice of the EU, challenges in front of Belgian courts, a challenge in front of a French court, and a challenge in front of the Court of Arbitration for Sport. However, it is now forced to acknowledge that “the top 15 European clubs have added €1.51bn in sponsorship and commercial revenues in the last six years (148% increase), compared to the €453m added by the rest of the approximately 700 top-division clubs in Europe (17% increase)”.[8] UEFA is clearly concerned about the increasing gap between the “global super clubs” and the rest, though it is adamant that “overspending and unsustainable business models cannot be the answer to financial inequality”.[9]

Nonetheless, it is not completely fair to argue that by attempting to solve one problem (i.e. reducing the increasing debts of football clubs) UEFA single-handedly created another problem (i.e. the growing inequality between the global super clubs and the rest).[10] There are of course other factors that contributed to this increasing financial gap, most notably the discrepancies in incomes derived from the selling of media rights at national level. As can be seen in UEFA’s latest Benchmarking report, English Premier League clubs received an average of €108m for their media rights in 2015. This figure is considerably higher than other clubs from the “top five leagues”, namely the Italian (€47.7m), Spanish (€36.7m), German (€36.1m) and French clubs (€24.9m).[11] In fact, 17 out of the top 20 clubs by broadcast revenues in 2015 are English, the other three being Real Madrid, FC Barcelona and Juventus.[12] Nonetheless, even though UEFA is not responsible for the differences in media rights revenue, the FFP Regulations remain a clear obstacle for clubs from other leagues to get investment from alternative sources.  


What has UEFA done to counter this growing inequality?

The pressing question on many people’s mind is whether UEFA will, or even can, do something about the ever-growing financial inequality between football clubs. The FFP Regulations can be changed, as was demonstrated in 2015. An important innovation in this regard was the introduction of Annex XII on voluntary agreements with UEFA for the break-even requirement. Under this Annex, UEFA allows, inter alia, a club to apply for such an agreement if the club has been subject to a significant change in ownership and/or control within the 12 months preceding the application deadline.[13] When applying for a voluntary agreement the club will (among other obligations) need to:

- submit a long-term business plan, including future break-even information;
- demonstrate its ability to continue as a going concern until at least the end of the period covered by the voluntary agreement;
- and submit an irrevocable commitment by an equity participant (i.e. shareholder) to make contributions for an amount at least equal to the aggregate future break-even deficits for all the reporting periods covered by the voluntary agreement.[14]

The relaxation of the FFP Regulations to leave more room for investment has probably led to an increase of foreign acquisitions of European football clubs. As the graph below shows, only four clubs were bought by non-Europeans in the years 2012 and 2013, a period in which a stricter version of the FFP Regulations was in force, whole nine clubs were bought in 2016 alone, seven of which were bought by Chinese investors.



Source: UEFA’s eighth club licensing benchmarking report on European football, slide 56.


Nonetheless, upcoming media rights deals will ensure financial inequality for years to come, regardless of any particular FFP relaxation. It is estimated that Premier League clubs will receive an average of €141m per season for the 2016/17 – 2018/19, while e.g. Spanish clubs are predicted to make an average of ‘only’ €64m for the 2016/17 season.[15] Meanwhile, the highest earning Dutch club (Ajax) is expected to make a meagre €9.3m from the selling of its media rights for the 2016/17 season.  


Conclusion: Can UEFA equalize?

With the financial gap between clubs increasing instead of decreasing, should UEFA’s regulatory focus shift from good corporate governance (limited debt, small deficit) to redistribution and the fight against inequalities in football? The recently installed UEFA President Aleksander Čeverin held that “UEFA, together with its stakeholders, will need to continuously review and adapt its regulations”[16], but it is unclear what concrete adaptations he has in mind.

Possible options to tackle inequality would include: limiting media rights income; sharing media rights income at a European level; introducing salary caps; or even introducing a solidarity mechanism that would oblige clubs to redistribute some of their income to poorer clubs.[17] However, such proposals will always be strongly resisted by rich clubs, which are in a position to threaten to put in place a breakaway league at any time.[18] UEFA is hardly equipped to resist them. Unless UEFA’s regulatory monopoly is fully recognized and endorsed by the European Commission, it will not be able to face down a breakaway rebellion. Instead, it risks facing a FIBA-like bitter and costly secession. Hence, for UEFA the status quo remains the safest option, and facing criticisms from small clubs way less harmful economically and politically.

A final option, favoured by the many opponents of FFP, would be to abandon FFP all together. This way, there would be no more restrictions to (private) investors willing to pour their (often borrowed) money in (European) football clubs. However, it would also imply renouncing the key achievement of FFP, European football clubs are financially way healthier than in 2009 and their governance better scrutinized. Furthermore, taking into account the Premier League’s latest media rights deal, it is questionable whether abandoning FFP could in any way lead to a narrower gap between the rich clubs and the rest. 




[1] The definition of net debt according to UEFA includes net borrowings (i.e. bank overdrafts and loans, other loans and accounts payable to related parties less cash and cash equivalents) and the net player transfer balance (i.e. the net of accounts receivable and payable from player transfers) – see UEFA’s eighth club licensing benchmarking report on European football, slide 125

[2] Oskar van Maren, “The Real Madrid case: A State aid case (un)like any other?” (2015) Competition Law Review, Volume 11 Issue 1, pages 86-87.

[3] See for example, UEFA Club Licensing Benchmarking Report Financial Year ending 2008, slide 4.

[4] Article 2 (2) of both the 2012 and 2015 FFP Regulations.

[5] 58-63 of the FFP Regulations. Article 61 allows for an acceptable deviation of €5 million, i.e. the maximum aggregate break-even deficit possible for a club to be deemed in compliance with the break-even requirement.

[6] Markus Sass, “Long-term Competitive Balance under UEFA Financial Fair Play Regulations” (2012), Working Paper No. 5/2012.

[7] For an analysis of FFP under EU competition law, see for example Stefan Szymanski, “Financial Fair Play and the law Part III: Guest post by Professor Stephen Weatherill”, 14 May 2013, Soccernomics.

[8] UEFA Press release of 12 January 2017, “European club football’s financial turnaround”.

[9] Ibid.

[10] In fact, the discussion on financial balance between football clubs has been a constant theme for decades. Particularly the elaborated opinion of A.G. Lenz in the Bosman case is worth reading in that regard (paras. 218-234).

[11] UEFA’s eighth club licensing benchmarking report on European football, slide 74.

[12] Ibid, slide 75.

[13] Annex XII under A (2)iii) of the 2015 FFP Regulations. The application deadline is the 31 December preceding the licence season in which the voluntary agreement would come into force.

[14] Annex XII under B of the 2015 FFP Regulations.

[15] FC Barcelona and Real Madrid are expected to make €150m and €143m respectively, meaning that the other clubs would receive an average of €55m.

[16] UEFA Press release of 12 January 2017, “European club football’s financial turnaround”.

[17] Once again, see the opinion of A.G. Lenz in the Bosman case (paras. 218-234).

[18] Threatening to put in place a breakaway (European) league is a favoured method by some of the top clubs. For example, during last week’s row it had with La Liga following the postponement of the Celta – Real Madrid game, Real Madrid held that the Spanish league is not very well organised and that they are better off playing in a European Super League.

Comments (2) -

  • Stephan

    2/21/2017 3:16:36 PM |

    Interesting article.
    I've one remark on your claim that UEFA is not responsible for the differences in media rights revenue.
    I believe they do since UEFA prize money, specifically the market pool component,  is a protectionist measure to grow big leagues, disrupting uefa's own principals (even their mission) on fair competition.

    Why?
    Because uefa market pool is based on national TV deals, which is a false assumption causing to grow big leagues instead of big clubs. "Big club" already reflect domestic market pool only more direct to it's fanbase actually in stadiums instead of those watching tv around the world. Since CL needs to be the biggest platform, current reasoning is flawed: TV market should and could never be a driver for performance based incentives. Currently, this prize money is given directly to big countries.

    And yes, UEFA prize money is a big part is in club finances.

  • Stephan

    2/21/2017 3:24:02 PM |

    Also, in conclusion prize money is the easiest way to equalize between big leagues and smaller leagues. Leaving out this marketpool component, thus only reward prestation based prize money would potentially shift lot's of money from subtop clubs in big leagues to top clubs in smaller leagues.

Comments are closed
Asser International Sports Law Blog | Caster Semenya’s Legal Battle Against Gender Stereotypes: On Nature, Law and Identity - By Sofia Balzaretti (University of Fribourg)

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

Caster Semenya’s Legal Battle Against Gender Stereotypes: On Nature, Law and Identity - By Sofia Balzaretti (University of Fribourg)

Editor's note: Sofia Balzaretti is a Graduate research assistant and a PhD candidate at the University of Fribourg (Switzerland) where she is writing a thesis on the Protection against Gender Stereotypes in International Law. In addition to research in human rights and feminist legal theory, she has also carried out some research in legal philosophy and on the relationship between gender and the law.

 

The International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF), the monitoring body of track and field athletics, regularly submitted South African middle distance runner and Olympic gold medalist Mokgadi Caster Semenya to sex verification tests when it began questioning her sexual characteristics and speculating whether her body belonged on the Disorder of Sex Development (DSD) spectrum. DSD Syndrome is often defined as an “intersex condition” which affects the clear development of either/or genitalia, gonads and chromosomes into one distinctive sex or another. The spectrum of the intersex condition is particularly wide, and the disorder can sometimes be minimal - some cases of female infertility can actually be explained by an intersex condition.

The IAAF deemed the controversial sex verification tests necessary on the grounds that it was required to prove Semenya did not have a “medical condition” which could give her an “unfair advantage”. It was eventually found that, because of an intersex trait, Semenya did have abnormally high levels of testosterone for a woman, which, in the IAAF’s opinion, justified a need for regulatory hormonal adjustments in order for her to keep competing in the women’s category. The IAAF also funded research to determine how ‘hyperandrogenism’ affects athletic performance. In 2018, it issued Eligibility Regulations on Female Classification (“Athlete with Differences of Sexual Development”) for events from 400m to the mile, including 400m, hurdles races, 800m and 1’500m. The IAAF rules indicated that in case of an existing high level of testosterone, suppression or regulation by chemotherapy, hormonal castration, and/or iatrogenic irradiation was mandatory in order to take part in these events.

Semenya and her lawyers challenged the IAAF Regulations in front of the CAS, who, in a very controversial decision, deemed the Regulations a necessary, reasonable and proportionate mean “of achieving the aim of what is described as the integrity of female athletics and for the upholding of the ‘protected class’ of female athletes in certain events” (§626).


The CAS Ruling

Semenya and her attorneys claimed that forcing her to get unwanted medication represented a violation of human rights. On the 1st May 2019, the Swiss-based Court of Arbitration of Sport (CAS) ruled in favor of the restrictions placed on female athletes with high levels of testosterone by the IAAF. The direct consequence of this decision for Semenya was the obligation for her to take testosterone suppressants in order to continue competing in her category of IAAF events.

In March 2019, the United Nations Human Rights Council issued a resolution indicating the IAAF Regulations were “not compatible with international human rights norms and standards, including the rights of women with differences of sex development” and that there was “no clear relationship of proportionality between the aim of the regulations and the proposed measures and their impact.”

Because the Regulations established conditions and restrictions which were targeted at the female (or intersex) athlete population exclusively and did not impose any equivalent conditions or restrictions on male athletes, the CAS Panel considered that the Regulations were, prima facie discriminatory on grounds of legal sex. After reminding that “it is common ground that a rule that imposes differential treatment on the basis of a particular protected characteristic is valid and lawful if it is a necessary, reasonable and a proportionate means of attaining a legitimate objective” (§548), the Panel considered that its sole responsibility was to determine whether the DSD Regulations were necessary, reasonable and proportionate. As such, the Panel said it was “not required to (…) appraise the adequacy of the IAAF’s policy-making process”.


The Swiss Federal Tribunal and ordre public

A decision from the CAS can only be challenged at the Swiss Federal Tribunal (SFT) on a limited number of grounds, enclosed in art. 190 al. 2 of the Federal Act on Private International Law (PILA), which include claiming that the principle of equal treatment of the parties or their right to be heard in an adversarial procedure has not been observed (lit. d) and that the award is incompatible with public policy (lit. e). At the beginning of June 2019, after an ex parte request, the SFT, Switzerland’s highest court, granted Semenya a temporary suspension of the IAAF rules on testosterone limits. She was able to compete over distances of 400 to 1’500m without medication, until the SFT issued a ruling.

Because it was considered that the discrimination was necessary, reasonable and proportionate in comparison with the vast majority of non-DSD women, the only outcome for Semenya’s lawyers was to argue on the violation of the principle of public order. The 30th July 2019, the SFT reversed the ruling that temporarily lifted the application of the IAAF’s regulations, thus impeding her to defend her 800m title at the World Championships in Doha in September 2019. The SFT concluded that “neither the allegation of an infringement of the principle of non-discrimination, nor the alleged violation of ordre public due to an infringement of their personality and human dignity appeared with high probability to be well founded”. Welcoming the decision, the IAAF stated that, in certain particular cases, “biology trumps identity”.


The elements of comparison
Body Policing

Admitting that “the imperfect alignment between nature, law and identity is what gives rise to the conundrum at the heart of this case” (§559), the CAS stated that:

“On true analysis, (…) the purpose of the male-female divide in competitive athletics is not to protect athletes with a female legal sex from having to compete against athletes with a male legal sex. Nor is it to protect athletes with a female gender identity from having to compete against athletes with a male gender identity. Rather, it is to protect individuals whose bodies have developed in a certain way following puberty from having to compete against individuals who, by virtue of their bodies having developed in a different way following puberty, possess certain physical traits that create such a significant performance advantage that fair competition between the two groups is not possible.”

The public opinion could not help but point the finger at the underlying hypocrisy of the decision, in comparison with similar cases, both inside and outside of the sports world. Firstly, the same type of policy and legal arguments are often held for controlling certain types of bodies exclusively, whilst leaving others out of the line of sight. In the sports world, it is certainly the case: think of the impressive decoration of Olympian swimmer Michael Phelps aligned with the god-like praises he received for his physical strength and capacity; for instance. On the contrary, leaving “abnormally” tall basket-ball players on the bench so as to give naturally shorter players a chance to win, or testing male athletes with poor athletic results in suspicion they might have low levels of testosterone seems absurd. In fact, the latter are only tested as to make sure they do not take anything effectively modifying their capacities in competing. Semenya and her lawyers did point to the fact that “it is illogical and unnecessary to regulate one genetic trait while celebrating all the others” (CAS decision, §53).

Out of the sports world, indications of “naturalness” in pro-life arguments or governments’ refusal to medically cover the suppression of hormones in transgender reassignment cases are also examples of body policing. The case therefore raises the central question of how stereotypes, especially gender ones, give a social meaning to a fact and how legal regulation can confirm it, thus perpetuating it.

The social  meaning of women and gender

Taking a step away from Semenya’s cause célèbre, it must be stressed that, for long, women were not accepted to compete in the Olympics and that their progressive integration was only made possible when a redefinition of the norms of femininity and masculinity, as they relate to sports and competition, occurred. This means that medical tests were carried out and, as a backlash to noticing the instability and fluidity of sex categories, those very categories were reinforced and redefined according to stereotypes. In other words, the sports world went very far to ensure there was a biological difference so that the natural and social order as it was could not be disrupted.

If we try to move away from the (in my opinion, sterile) debate on biological differences (remembering that the latter has also been explained by anthropologists as being a consequence of our gendered social order[1]), we should ask ourselves who has the power to define the norms of femininity and masculinity. “Woman” and “man” have very particular social meanings. Furthermore, commentators often qualify the sex verification tests as being racially flawed. In this sense, the discussion is also of epistemological importance: the bonus corpus is never the female body, and is always the white male one, with “naturally” good athletic abilities. True, scientific results are usually dependent on a certain political order[2], as are any other empirical social-situated findings. The CAS Panel said that an assessment of the likely impact of the DSD Regulations on wider society would require “an analysis of multifaceted sociological issues which are not amenable to judicial resolution by an arbitral tribunal (…)” (§518). And, as such, it is certainly not for an arbitration court to have the power to (re)define gender categories, which are intrinsically political and historical, and are not limited to the sports world.


Appealing to the ECtHR

If she does not prevail before the SFT, Semenya could still appeal to the European Court of Human Rights, alleging a breach of Article 14 and/or Article 8[3]. It may give the Strasbourg Court an interesting opportunity to comment on gender opposition and binarity, as well as on the social limitations put on gendered bodies. The gender stereotypes discussion is not a new one; regional and international courts have had the opportunity, on many occasions, to comment on the need to combat harmful gender stereotypes[4]. However, they usually do so in relation to human rights law and to the principles of equality and non-discrimination. Even if, of course, not every unjustified discrimination is rooted in stereotypes[5], they seldom point at the wrong of gender stereotypes per se. Hopefully this may lead the ECtHR to further reflect on the harmfulness of gender stereotypes, beyond the well-established categories in need of protection against unjustified discrimination.

The CAS practically said that it was bound by biology. If anything, the results of the sex verification tests should have proven that Semenya’s body has incredible athletic abilities, with no requirements of medically modifying it whatsoever.


Conclusion

In a letter to the IAAF about their regulations, United Nations experts on health, torture, and women’s rights wrote:

“The assessment for ‘exclusion or treatment’ based on the IAAF regulations relies on suspicion and speculation, based on stereotypes about femininity. This effectively legitimizes widespread surveillance of all women athletes by requesting national federations as well as doctors, doping officials, and other official personnel to scrutinize women athletes’ perceived femininity, which can include appearance, gender expression, and sexuality. Women who are understood to be “suspicious” about their natural physical traits are tied to subjective and cultural expectations regarding which bodies and modes of gender expression are “appropriate,” or even valorised by adherence to traditional or normative aesthetics of femininity. Gender and sex-based stereotyping and stigma have a long history, not only of causing psychological harm to women and gender minorities, but also of increasing the possibility of violence against them.”

The social norms of gender act as a blur on reality, based on the stereotype that “a real woman” should not be that good of an athlete. It provides us with an overview of how public policy decisions are justified by scientific findings, operating in a gender-normative environment. The discrimination was considered “necessary, reasonable and proportionate” in comparison with the vast majority of non-DSD women, but it somehow appears to be a debate on the equality between women and men and on reaffirming the importance of the “fixed duality of sexual difference”[6]. The CAS Panel said that it was “faced with conflicting rights concerning the rights of female athletes who do, and do not, have DSD” (§554).

Interestingly enough, the more women are compared to each other, on the grounds of fairness, the stronger the female gender category is reinforced.


[1] Priscilla Touraille, Hommes grands, femmes petites : une évolution coûteuse. Les régimes de genre comme force sélective de l’évolution biologique, Éditions de la Maison des Sciences de l’Homme: Paris 2008.

[2] Thomas Laqueur, La Fabrique du Sexe: Essai sur le corps et le genre en Occident, Gallimard: Paris 1992.

[3] The ECtHR had considered an application brought following an unsuccessful appeal to the Swiss Federal Tribunal in the October 2018 decision ECtHR, Mutu and Pechstein v Switzerland, applications no. 40575/10 and no. 67474/10, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2018:1002JUD004057510, alleging breaches of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

[4] The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has broadly defined the notion of “harmful gender stereotypes”, as sexist beliefs, which include representing women in roles considered traditional; as mothers and household heads, as subordinates of men or as sexual objects. In 2013, the OHCHR prepared a report on sex and gender stereotypes, which outlines the practice of treaty bodies and their reference to gender stereotypes. The obligations of States with regard to stereotypes are those set out in Article 5 lit. a CEDAW, reinforced by Article 2 lit. f. which provides that States must “take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women”. At European level, judgments of the ECtHR have concerned stereotypes related in particular to sexuality (Kalucza v. Hungary), reproduction (A. B. C. v. Ireland; R. R. v. Poland) or domestic violence (Valiuliené v. Lithuania; Opuz v. Turkey). See also Konstantin Markin v. Russia; Carvalho Pinto de Sousa Morais v. Portugal; Khamtokhu and Aksenchick v. Russia.

[5] Sophia Moreau, ‘Equality Rights and Stereotypes’ in Dyzenhaus, D./ Thorburn, M. (eds.), Philosophical Foundations of Constitutional Law, Oxford University Press : Oxford 2019.

[6] Hilary Charlesworth, ‘Foreword’, in Harris Rimmer S./Ogg K., Feminist Engagement with International Law, Edward Elgar: Cheltenham 2019.

Comments are closed