Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

Case note: State aid Decision on the preferential corporate tax treatment of Real Madrid, Athletic Bilbao, Osasuna and FC Barcelona

On 28 September 2016, the Commission published the non-confidential version of its negative Decision and recovery order regarding the preferential corporate tax treatment of Real Madrid, Athletic Bilbao, Osasuna and FC Barcelona. It is the second-to-last publication of the Commission’s Decisions concerning State aid granted to professional football clubs, all announced on 4 July of this year.[1] Contrary to the other “State aid in football” cases, this Decision concerns State aid and taxation, a very hot topic in today’s State aid landscape. Obviously, this Decision will not have the same impact as other prominent tax decisions, such as the ones concerning Starbucks and Apple

Background

This case dates back to November 2009, when a representative of a number of investors specialised in the purchase of publicly listed shares, and shareholders of a number of European football clubs drew the attention of the Commission to a possible preferential corporate tax treatment of the four mentioned Spanish clubs.[2] The preferential tax treatment derived directly from a Spanish sports law of 1990, which obliged all Spanish professional sport clubs to convert into sport limited companies. The justification for the measure was that many clubs had been managed badly because neither their members nor their administrators bore any financial liability for economic losses. This law exempted from this duty to convert those football clubs which had a positive balance in the preceding 4-5 years. The only clubs who at that moment fulfilled these conditions were Real Madrid, Athletic Bilbao, Osasuna and FC Barcelona, and were consequently permitted to remain associations. Sports associations are non-profit entities and, as such, qualified for a partial corporate tax exemption under the Spanish Corporate tax Law. Instead of paying tax for their commercial income at the general rate of 30%, sport clubs were only required to pay tax at a rate of 25%. Moreover, Spain did not include a time period for a possible re-assessment of the financial position of the sport limited companies. Thus, no professional sporting entity has had its legal qualification modified since the original assessment of 1990, irrespective of how the financial health of the entity evolved.[3]

Intervention by the European Ombudsman

The complaint was given a “high priority status” by the European Commission[4] and the allegations of an unfair Spanish tax system were widely covered in the press (see for example here and here). Nevertheless, it took the Commission more than four years to launch a formal investigation and nearly seven to reach a final decision. In fact, there are reasons to believe that the Commission’s delay in investigating the matter was only halted after an intervention by the European Ombudsman. As stated above, the complaint was submitted in November 2011. More than 25 months later, and not having been informed about the progress of the case, the complainant turned to the Ombudsman. According to the complainant, the Commission had failed to decide, in a timely way, whether or not to open the formal investigation procedure. The Ombudsman agreed with the complainant and found that the Commission had not justified its failure to decide on the matter. Furthermore, the public suspicion that the Commission’s inaction might be linked to the fact that the then Commissioner for Competition, Joaquín Almunia, was a socio (member) of one of the football clubs (Athletic Club Bilbao) involved, were highlighted by the Ombudsman in its Recommendation.[5] Even though the Commission has denied that the delay in launching the formal investigation was linked to Almunia’s personal footballing preferences, on 18 December 2013 (a mere two days after receiving the Ombudsman’s recommendation) the Commission decided to open an in-depth investigation into the tax privileges granted to the four Spanish football clubs.[6] 

The Decision

As is the case with most, if not all, State aid and tax cases, the key question is whether the tax measure (or treatment in this case) leads to a selective economic advantage for one or more undertakings, in this case the four professional football clubs.[7] In order to uncover a selective advantage in the form of tax income, the case-law subscribes that one begins by identifying and examining the common regime/system applicable in the Member State concerned. Secondly, an assessment is made of whether the treatment derogates from that common system. This assessment includes deciphering the objective assigned to the tax system, as well as determining whether the economic operators in question (i.e. the four football clubs) are in a comparable factual and legal situation to the other economic operators falling under the common system.[8] If the four clubs are in a comparable factual and legal situation, but their tax treatment derogates from the common system, this treatment will be considered selectively advantageous. Third and lastly, it is necessary to appraise whether the tax treatment is justified by the logic and nature of the tax system.[9] As regards this justification appraisal, there are two important aspects to note: First of all, there is a shift in the burden of proof, since it is for the Member State which has introduced such a differentiation in charges in favour of certain undertakings active in professional football to show that it is actually justified by the nature and general scheme of the system in question.[10] Secondly, this justification appraisal has to be separated from the general justification appraisal of Article 107(3), the latter of which will only take place after State aid in the sense of Article 107(1) is fully established.


The common system applicable and the objective assigned to the system

In both the Decision to open a formal investigation and the final Decision, the Commission considered that the common system applicable is that of the corporate tax law. This has been the common system since the professional sporting entities had to convert to limited companies in 1990. The Commission also held that the objective assigned to the system is generating State revenues on the basis of company profits.[11]


Are the four clubs in a comparable factual and legal situation?

The Commission believes that Real Madrid, Athletic Club Bilbao, Osasuna and FC Barcelona are in a comparable factual and legal situation as other professional sport companies in light of the abovementioned objective of the tax system, and cannot see how they should be treated differently. Nonetheless, Spain and the clubs argued that the clubs were not in the same factual and legal situation, because the clubs’ aim was not to make profits. Instead, all profits made have to be reinvested in the club itself. They also claimed that the CJEU’s case law allows for exceptions “in light of the peculiarities of cooperative societies which have to conform to particular operating principles”. Indeed, “those undertakings cannot be regarded as being in a comparable factual and legal situation to that of commercial companies, provided that they act in the economic interest of their members, the members being actively involved in the running of the business and entitled to equitable distribution of the results of economic performance”.[12] The fact that clubs cannot distribute profits to shareholders is a relevant peculiarity in the eyes of Spain.

The Commission rebutted Spain’s claim that sport associations and sport limited companies are not in the same factual and legal situation.   It firstly criticised Spain’s obligatory conversion of all-but-four sport associations into sport limited companies in 1990 by highlighting that “differences in the economic performance cannot justify different treatment as regards the obligatory form of organisation or the lack of choice in that respect. Losses are not intrinsic to a certain form of organisation. The business performance is therefore not an objective criterion justifying different taxation bases or imposing certain forms of incorporation for an indefinite period”.[13] Moreover, not being able to distribute profits to shareholders “cannot support a lower taxation of certain football clubs when compared to other professional sporting entities. (…) Those four clubs, although they are non-profit entities, actively seek to make profit themselves”, in a comparable way to other professional sporting entities.[14] Indeed, “the fact that clubs are obliged to reinvest the income they realise (…) does not weaken their competitive position, nor justifies a different, more favourable, tax treatment with respect to other entities active in professional sport. It rather drives them to improve their facilities”.[15]


Justification by the nature and logic of the tax system

As stated above, it is up to the Member State concerned to argue why the different tax treatment is justified under the general tax system. The Decision shows that Spain, the four clubs and La Liga (who was given interested party status by the Commission) presented a variety of arguments that in their eyes justified the different treatment. Three of these arguments were the followings:

1. Associations have stricter internal control mechanisms than sporting limited companies;

2. Associations have fewer possibilities of access to the capital market than sporting limited companies;

3. Associations are placed at a disadvantageous position under UEFA’s Financial Fair Play rules compared to sporting limited companies.

As regards the first justification brought forward, it underlines the liability regime imposed on the management body of a sport association. For example, a club’s management board “must provide a bank guarantee covering 15% of the club’s budgeted spending in order to guarantee any losses generated during its term. In addition, management board members will be strictly liable, in an unlimited manner, with their present and future personal assets, for any losses generated that exceed this guaranteed amount.”[16] Nonetheless, the Commission held that this justification is at odds with the rationale for the conversion of the other sport clubs to sport limited companies in 1990, which was the fact that many clubs had been managed badly. “If there was a need for certain clubs to be subject to stricter controls, the obligatory transformation into a limited company would not be necessary to pursue the purpose of that law.[17]

Further, Spain’s claim that clubs have fewer possibilities of access to the capital market cannot be seen as a justification for deviating from the common tax system. Simply put, “if the disadvantages of the clubs in this respect are as manifest as [Spain and the clubs] assert, they always have the possibility to change their corporate form”.[18]

Last, the Commission considers the Financial Fair Play rules of the UEFA to be “internal rules set by a football organisation which aim to ensure a reasonable financial management of sport entities and to avoid continuous loss making. They cannot justify a different taxation of profits by the State”.[19] With this last consideration, the Commission displays a rather benevolent attitude towards UEFA’s Financial Fair Play Rules. Indeed, refusing to attack these rules in any way is very much in line with its previous public statements on FFP, such as the Commission’s and UEFA’s Joint Statement on FFP of March 2012 and the Cooperation Agreement between the Commission and UEFA of October 2014.


Compatibility assessment under Article 107(3)

As can be read from paragraph 85 of the Decision, neither Spain nor the beneficiaries have claimed that any of the exceptions provided for in Article 107(2) and 107(3) TFEU apply in the present case. Generally speaking, successful justifications under Articles 107(2) and (3) are uncommon in State aid and taxation cases. Two possible reasons for this can be deciphered: On the one hand, Member State and interested parties seek justifications by the nature and logic of the tax system, i.e. they argue that the justification rules out a selective advantage for one more undertakings, thereby ruling out State aid under Article 107(1). On the other hand, State aid through tax advantages are in most cases considered as operating aid. Operating aid can normally not be considered compatible with the internal market under Article 107(3) TFEU in that it does not facilitate the development of certain activities or of certain economic areas, nor are the tax incentives in question limited in time, digressive or proportionate to what is necessary to remedy to a specific economic handicap of the areas concerned.[20] In the preferential corporate tax treatment of four Spanish football clubs case, the Commission noted that a lower tax burden than one that should normally be borne by the clubs in the course of their business operations, should be considered as operating aid.[21] Hence, this type of aid cannot be considered compatible aid under any of the exceptions of Article 107(3).

Yet, the tax benefit scheme in the Hungarian sport sector decision of 2011 provides an example of a tax benefit scheme for the sport sector that is declared compatible State aid under Article 107(3)c) TFEU. In this case, the Commission held that the scheme was introduced in a sufficiently transparent and proportionate manner, i.e. that the measure was well-designed to fulfil the objective of developing the country’s sport sector.[22] Moreover, the Commission acknowledged the special characteristics of sport and held that the objective of the scheme is in line with the overall objectives of sport as stipulated in Article 165 TFEU, namely that the EU “shall contribute to the promotion of European sporting issues”, because the sport sector “has enormous potential for bringing the citizens of Europe together, reaching out to all, regardless of age or social origin”.[23]

As regards the preferential corporate tax treatment of four Spanish football clubs case, no reference was made by Spain or the interested parties to Article 165, or how the preferential tax treatment could contribute to the promotion of sporting issues or values. Perhaps Spain and the four clubs were aware that such a justification would not fly, since the preferential tax treatment is only beneficial to four football clubs and not to the sports sector in general.


Recovery of the aid

Given that the Commission considered the preferential tax treatment to be unjustifiable State aid, a recovery decision was adopted. According to the Commission, the amount of the aid to be recovered from the four football clubs consists of the difference between the amount of corporate tax which the clubs actually paid and the amount of corporate tax which would have been due under the general corporate regime starting from the year 2000.[24] The Commission further recalls that the exact amount of the aid to be recovered will be assessed on a case by case basis during the recovery proceeding which will be carried out by the Spanish authorities in close cooperation with the Commission.[25]

In this regard, it is important to mention that Spain amended the corporate tax rules in November 2014 and new rules entered into force on 1 January 2015.[26] Under the amended law, the corporate income tax rate of 30% for all limited companies will be reduced to 28% for 2015 and to 25% from 2016 onwards. This includes limited sport companies as well, which will, from 2016, be submitted to that 25% corporate tax rate.[27] In other words, since there is no longer a different tax treatment for associations compared to sport limited companies as of 2016, Spain has seized to grant (unlawful) State aid to the four professional football clubs. The recovery will thus only involve the advantages obtained until the end of 2015. 


Conclusion

Few will disagree with the Commission in that the Spanish corporate tax system allowed for an economic selective advantage to be granted to Real Madrid, Athletic Club Bilbao, Osasuna and FC Barcelona over more than 25 years, and without the presence of an acceptable justification for such a favourable treatment. Having said this, this particular “saga” has not quite ended after it became clear that Athletic Club de Bilbao (at least) appealed the Commission’s Decision in front of the General Court of the EU.

Notwithstanding the upcoming Court case, the practical impact of this Decision will probably be very limited. Firstly, the actual aid that needs to be recovered by Spain will be relatively low in financial terms. As can be read in the Commission’s press release of 4 July 2016, it is estimated that the amounts that need to be recovered are around €0-5 million per club.[28] The Spanish government is yet to announce how much it will recover, but Real Madrid and FC Barcelona in particular will have no difficulties returning the aid, irrespective of what the amount exactly is. Secondly, by lowering the corporate tax rate for all limited companies in 2015 and 2016, Spain cannot be considered anymore as granting State aid to its professional football associations based on the corporate tax system. This also means that there is no more reason to believe that the European Commission could “force” the four clubs to change their legal status from club to sport limited company through the enforcement of EU State aid rules, as some have insinuated. The fans of these clubs were dreading this outcome because becoming a sport limited company would open the doors to external investors, who would not necessarily in their eyes have the best interest of the clubs in mind.



[1] The Commission has previously published: Commission Decision of 4 July 2016, SA.41613 on the measure implemented by the Netherlands with regard to the professional football club PSV in Eindhoven; Commission Decision of 4 July 2016, SA.40168 on the State aid implemented by the Netherlands

in favour of the professional football club Willem II in Tilburg; Commission Decision of 4 July 2016, SA.41612 on the State aid implemented by the Netherlands in favour of the professional football club MVV in Maastricht; Commission Decision of 4 July 2016, SA.41614 on the measures implemented by the Netherlands in favour of the professional football club FC Den Bosch in 's-Hertogenbosch; Commission Decision of 4 July 2016, SA.41617 on the State aid implemented by the Netherlands in favour of the professional football club NEC in Nijmegen; and Commission Decision of 4 July 2016, SA.33754 on the State aid implemented by Spain for Real Madrid CF. The last remaining decision to be published is Commission Decision of 4 July 2016, SA.36387 Aid to Valencia football clubs.

[2] Draft recommendation of 16 December 2013 of the European Ombudsman in the inquiry into complaint 2521/2011/JF against the European Commission, points 1-3.

[3] Commission Decision of 4 July 2016, SA.29769 on the State Aid implemented by Spain for certain football clubs, paras. 5-9.

[4] Draft recommendation of the European Ombudsman in the inquiry into complaint 2521/2011/JF against the European Commission, point 13.

[5] “Rather than allaying suspicions regarding a conflict of interests, and regarding inappropriate influences on the decision making process, the Commission's failures here have actually added to those suspicions”.

[6] Interestingly enough, on that same day, the Commission decided to open an in-depth investigation into State guarantees in favour of three Spanish football clubs in Valencia and land transfers by the Council of Madrid to Real Madrid: Commission decision of 18 December 2013, SA.36387, Spain—Alleged aid in favour of three Valencia football clubs; Commission decision of 18 December 2013, SA.33754, Spain—Real Madrid CF.

[7] C Quigley, “European State Aid Law and Policy”, Hart Publishing (2015), pages 109-127.

[8] See for example Joined Cases C-78/08 to C-80/08 Paint Graphos and others ECLI:EU:C:2011:550, para. 49.

[9] Commission Decision of 4 July 2016, SA.29769, para. 51.

[10] Commission Decision of 4 July 2016, SA.29769, para. 59. See also Case T-211/05 Italian Republic v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2009:304, para. 125.

[11] Commission decision of 18 December 2013, SA.29769, Spain—State aid to certain Spanish professional football clubs, para. 16; and Commission Decision of 4 July 2016, SA.29769, para. 53.

[12] Commission Decision of 4 July 2016, SA.29769, para. 62; and joined Cases C-78/08 to C-80/08 Paint Graphos and others ECLI:EU:C:2011:550, para. 61.

[13] Commission Decision of 4 July 2016, SA.29769, para. 56.

[14] Ibid, para. 65

[15] Ibid, para. 67.

[16] Ibid, para. 24.

[17] Ibid, para. 61.

[18] Ibid, para. 68.

[19] Ibid, para. 71.

[20] See for example Commission Decision of 10 October 2015, SA.38374 on State aid implemented by the Netherlands to Starbucks, para. 433.

[21] Commission Decision of 4 July 2016, SA.29769, para. 86.

[22] Commission Decision of 9 November 2011, SA.31722 – Hungary - Supporting the Hungarian sport sector via tax benefit scheme., paras 95-98.

[23] Ibid, paras 86-87. For more information on the tax benefit scheme in the Hungarian sport sector decision, see O. van Maren, “The EU State aid and Sport Saga: Hungary’s tax benefit scheme revisited? (Part 1)”, Asser International Sports Law Blog, 18 May 2016.

[24] According to Article 17(1) of the State Aid Procedural Regulation 2015/1589, the powers of the Commission to recover aid are subject to a limitation period of ten years. Since the Commission asked Spain for information for the first time in 2010, the recovery of the tax difference starts with the taxation year 2000.

[25] Commission Decision of 4 July 2016, SA.29769, paras. 93-97.

[26] Ley 27/2014 de 27 noviembre 2014, del Impuesto sobre Sociedades, BOE of 28 November 2014. Article 29(1) stipulates that “El tipo general de gravamen para los contribuyentes de este Impuesto será el 25 por ciento”.

[27] Commission Decision of 4 July 2016, SA.29769, para. 34.

[28] European Commission - Press release IP/16/2401 of 4 July 2016, State aid: Commission decides Spanish professional football clubs have to pay back incompatible aid.

Comments (2) -

  • Boris

    11/7/2016 7:50:54 PM |

    Very interesting analysis.

    "there are reasons to believe that the Commission’s delay in investigating the matter was only halted after an intervention by the European Ombudsman"

    This is really scary stuff, very close to corruption, why was the EC protecting a few companies? why does the EC take such huge reputational risks? It is all very strange. Looking at this, it is not really surprising that the US believes that the EU's competition policy is biased.

    One question, EC has stated that Spain has already amended the tax rules and you say that the discriminatory treatment has ended in 2015 but under the current Spanish corporation tax law (articles 109-111) the sport clubs are still exceptionally allowed (as partially exempted entities) to treat many items of revenue as fully exempt for corporation tax purposes. The tax rate may now be the same but the tax base selective advantage still exists. Has the EC asked Spain to eliminate this preferential treatment or are lower corporation tax bases a clever loophole that could be used by the likes of Luxembourg and Ireland to favour specific companies? At the end of the day, these countries could achieve the same result whether it is by reducing the tax base or by granting a lower tax rate.

    The EC has ruled Real Madrid and Barca will have to calculate their taxes since 2000 as if they had been sport limited companies but sport limited companies can only participate in one sport discipline (i.e. they cannot participate in football and basketball simultaneously). Will an exception be made for Real and Barca or will they have to calculate their football and basketball taxes separately? How could the EC justify the exception?

    The Telegraph referred to a €7m annual tax saving due to the ability to set-off basketball losses against football profits (www.telegraph.co.uk/.../) and over 16 years this could add up to a huge amount.

    Have you noticed that there is a provision in the new corporation tax law (seventh additional disposition) that states that the conversion of the sport clubs into PLCs shall be free of corporation tax (for the undertakings that would receive the assets) and free of personal tax (for the non-profit members that would make a handsome profit by receiving the shares of the clubs). This is a very weird transaction for any non-profit and the model could be replicated elsewhere to circumvent state aid rules. Why should the conversion not be taxed according to the general tax rules for both corporations and individuals? Has the EC asked Spain to end this discriminatory treatment?

    Many thanks

    • Oskar van Maren

      11/8/2016 12:33:25 PM |

      Dear Boris,

      Thank you very much for your comment.

      You pose a series of questions that will require me to look into the matter thoroughly.

      I shall get back to you as soon as possible and look forward to the discussion with you.

      Best,

      Oskar

Comments are closed
Asser International Sports Law Blog | The Brussels Court judgment on Financial Fair Play: a futile attempt to pull off a Bosman. By Ben Van Rompuy

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

The Brussels Court judgment on Financial Fair Play: a futile attempt to pull off a Bosman. By Ben Van Rompuy

On 29 May 2015, the Brussels Court of First Instance delivered its highly anticipated judgment on the challenge brought by football players’ agent Daniel Striani (and others) against UEFA’s Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play Regulations (FFP). In media reports,[1] the judgment was generally portrayed as a significant initial victory for the opponents of FFP. The Brussels Court not only made a reference for a preliminary ruling to the European Court of Justice (CJEU) but also imposed an interim order blocking UEFA from implementing the second phase of the FFP that involves reducing the permitted deficit for clubs.

A careful reading of the judgment, however, challenges the widespread expectation that the CJEU will now pronounce itself on the compatibility of the FFP with EU law. 


Background: the proceedings before the Commission

In May 2013, Daniel Striani, a Belgian football agent licensed by the Royal Belgian Football Association, lodged a complaint with the European Commission against UEFA. He requested the Commission to launch an investigation into the break-even requirement contained in Articles 58 to 63 of the FFP. According to Striani, the break-even requirement infringes the European antitrust rules (Article 101 and 102 TFEU) and the free movement rules.

The complaint put the Commission in a difficult position. It had repeatedly expressed political support for the principles underlying the UEFA FFP. In 2009, for instance, the Commission organized a conference on the subject matter and in 2012 then Commissioner for Competition Almunia issued a joint statement with UEFA president Michel Platini stressing that the FFP are “consistent with the aims and objectives of European Union policy in the field of State Aid”. Although the vague statements were carefully drafted to prejudice a proper legal assessment, the withdrawal of the Commission’s support would have been politically embarrassing.

The Commission, however, is not obliged to carry out an investigation on the basis of every complaint brought before it. Given its limited resources, the Commission uses prioritization criteria, set out in its Notice on the handling of complaints, to determine whether there is sufficient Union interest in pursuing a complaint.

In April 2014, the Commission informed Striani, pursuant to Article 7(1) of Regulation 773/2004, of its intention to reject his complaint. The Commission put forward three grounds for rejecting the complaint. First, the Commission considered that Striani lacked a legitimate interest to lodge a complaint. Only natural and legal persons that can demonstrate that they are “directly and adversely affected” by the alleged infringement are entitled to lodge a complaint.[2] Second, the Commission argued that Striani could secure the protection of his rights before a national court. Third, the Commission stressed that it had received only one complaint regarding the FFP.

Striani’s legal counsel, Jean-Louis Dupont, challenged the first and third grounds for rejecting the complaint. He reiterated the argument that the FFP directly affects football player’s agents. In response to the third ground, he submitted three further complaints on behalf of individual football fans, a players’ agent and the Manchester City FC Supporters Club. Evidently, the fact that only two months after lodging his complaint, Striani brought a civil action before the Brussels Court of First Instance (developing virtually similar arguments as set out in the complaint) made it difficult to counter the argument that the complainant could seek relief before national courts.

The European Commission eventually opted for the easiest way out. In October 2014, it formally rejected Striani’s complaint on the sole ground that “the Brussels Court is well-placed to handle the matters raised in your complaint. This is because your rights will be protected by that court in a satisfactory manner”. Hold that thought.


The civil action before the Brussels Court

While the complaint was unsuccessful, the proceedings before the Commission did make clear that Striani needed stronger arguments to demonstrate that he has standing to complain about the FFP’s compatibility with EU (competition) law. 

Striani essentially argues that the FFP break-even rule, by reducing the number of transfers, the level of the transfer fees and the players’ salaries, has a deflationary effect on the revenue of players’ agents. Since agents are thus only indirectly affected, substantial changes were made to the original claim to buttress the legitimate interest of the original claimant.

First, when Striani commenced his civil action before the Brussels Court in June 2013, he only sought one symbolic euro as compensation for the material damage that he had allegedly suffered. In September 2014, the amount of relief sought by Striani was changed to EUR 69.750 per year since the introduction of the break-even rule.

Second, a number of other claimants later joined the same proceeding. The Brussels court admitted the voluntary intervention of: (1) Dejan Mitrovic, a players’ agent domiciled in Belgium but licensed by the Serbian Football Association; (2) RFC Sérésien, a Belgian Second Division football club (now competing as Serain United); and (3) a total of 53 football fans (i.e. supporters of Paris Saint-Germain and Manchester City) domiciled in France and the United Kingdom. 


The judgment of the Brussels Court: an example of legal fiction

In its ruling of 29 May 2015, the Brussels Court declared itself incompetent to deal with Striani’s case because it has no jurisdiction.

Since UEFA challenged its competence when the litigation was initiated, the Court had to establish whether the requirements of international jurisdiction are satisfied. When an EU competition law action is brought against an undertaking having its seat in Switzerland, the jurisdiction of Member States’ courts is determined in relation to the Lugano II Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Lugano Convention).[3] The fundamental principle laid down in Article 2 is that the defendant should be sued where it is domiciled. Since the FFP were adopted by UEFA, the place of the event giving rise to the damage must be regarded as having taken place within Switzerland. Hence, in principle, only the Swiss courts have jurisdiction over the recovery of damages suffered by the alleged anti-competitive nature of the FFP.

Only by way of derogation, Article 5(3) of the Lugano Convention, applicable to torts (delict or quasi-delict), grants special territorial jurisdiction also to the courts where “the harmful event occurred or may occur”. This covers both place where the damage occurred (Belgium) and the place of the event giving rise to it (Switzerland).[4] It follows that the defendant may be sued, at the option of the applicant, in the courts of either of those places. According to settled case law, however, this exceptional attribution of jurisdiction requires the existence of “particularly close connecting factors” between the dispute and the courts of the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur.[5]

The Brussels Court disagreed with UEFA that the damage pleaded by Striani is speculative and purely hypothetical.[6] At the same time, it stressed that this damage is no more than the indirect consequence of the harm initially suffered by the clubs (participating in UEFA’s Champions’ League and Europa League competitions): “Neither the players nor the players’ agents are addresses of the FFP. Subsequently, players could only suffer indirect harm and agents only ‘very indirect’ harm”.[7] Given that jurisdiction by virtue of Article 5(3) of the Lugano Convention depends on the identification of direct harm, the Court concluded that the necessary connecting factors based on the defendant’s act are absent. In other words, because the FFP do not adversely affect Striani directly, he lacks standing to bring a damages action for breach of EU (competition) law before a Member State’s court.[8] This restrictive interpretation of Article 5(3) of the Lugano Convention is in line with the case law of the CJEU.[9] The Court did not discuss the standing of the other claimants that joined the proceedings.

Albeit having established that only the Swiss courts are competent as to the substance of the dispute, the Brussels Court decided to grant Striani the requested provisional measure, namely blocking UEFA from implementing the next phase of the FFP implementation (i.e. the reduction of the so-called “acceptable deviation” from EUR 45m to 30m). In a surprising move, the Court invoked Article 31 of the Lugano Convention for this purpose, which stipulates that:

“Application may be made to the courts of a State bound by (the Lugano) Convention for such provisional, including protective, measures as may be available under the law of that State, even if, under this Convention, the courts of another State bound by this Convention have jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter”.

The Court did not indicate why the urgency of the situation or the need to safeguard the legal and factual situation of Striani warranted this provisional measure (whose geographical reach is limited to the Belgian territory).[10] Instead, the Court decided to make a preliminary reference to the CJEU to reach a decision on the validity of the prescribed measure. The preliminary reference, another request of Striani when initiating litigation, essentially asks whether the FFP break-even requirement is compatible with Articles 63, 45, 56, 101 and 102 TFEU.

So in the end, the Brussels Court did not send Striani home empty-handed. Yet it would seem that his victory is merely a pyrrhic one. Since UEFA decided to appeal the judgment, both the provisional measure and the preliminary reference are suspended. Hence, UEFA can proceed with the next phase of implementation of the FFP as planned. Moreover, it is unlikely that the Brussels Court of Appeal would uphold the first instance decision. First, the use of Article 31 of the Lugano Convention to trigger a preliminary reference on the substance of the case – by a court that is incompetent to deal with it - is arguably a circumvention of the requirements for international jurisdiction (and thus a perforation of the general scheme and objectives of the Lugano Convention). Second, the granting of provisional measures on the basis of Article 31 is conditional on the existence of a connecting link between the subject matter of the measure and the territorial jurisdiction of the court ordering the measure.[11] In the absence of an alternative explanation, the Court thus contradicts itself because it found that particularly close connecting factors to take jurisdiction were absent.


Back to the European Commission?

The judgment of the Brussels Court puts the European Commission in an awkward position. Evidently, the Court was incapable of adequately protecting the rights of the complainant, as the Commission had argued when rejecting his complaint.

If Striani were to re-submit his complaint, it would be difficult for the Commission to argue once again that there is insufficient Union interest to conduct an investigation. It still could argue that Striani lacks legitimate interest because he is not directly affected by the alleged infringement. The fact that the Commission ultimately refrained from using this argument the first time may prove useful if a second rejection decision would be appealed before the General Court.

In any event, an authoritative assessment of the compatibility of the FFP with EU (competition) law is unfortunately not yet on the cards. Last week UEFA soothed several embittered clubs by deciding to relax some of the FFP rules. And it would be shocking if the action brought by Paris Saint-Germain fans and – this is not a joke – the ‘Association of Angry Fans against Financial Fair Play’ before the Paris High Court would overcome the jurisdictional obstacle that caused Striani to bite the dust.


[1] See e.g. The Guardian; Daily Mail; and The Independent.

[2] Commission Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 of 7 April 2004 relating to the conduct of proceedings by the Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty [2004] OJ L 123/18, Article 5(1).

[3] The Lugano Convention unified the rules on jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters and expanded the applicability of the Brussels I regulation (Council Regulation 44/2001) to the relations between Member States of the EU on the one hand and Norway, Iceland and Switzerland on the other.

[4] See e.g. Case C-352/13, Cartel Damage Claims (CDC) Hydrogen Peroxide SA v Akzo Nobel NV and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2015:335, para. 38.

[5] Idem, para. 39; Case C-228/11, Melzer v MF Global UK Ltd., ECLI:EU:C:2013:305, para. 26.

[6] Tribunal de première instance francophone de Bruxelles, Section Civile – 2013/11524/A – pp. 18, 21-22.

[7] Tribunal de première instance francophone de Bruxelles, Section Civile ��� 2013/11524/A – p. 18 («Que ni les joueurs, ni les agents de joueurs se sont donc visés. Que par conséquent, le préjudice qui pourrait en subir les joueurs ne peut être qu’indirect, et celui des agents de joueurs en quelque sorte ‘doublement’ indirect»).

[8] Tribunal de première instance francophone de Bruxelles, Section Civile – 2013/11524/A – p. 18 («Que par conséquent encore, l’article 5.3 ne peut fonder la compétences des juridictions belges et qu’il faut s’en tenir à la règle générale de l’article 2.1 qui renvoie aux tribunaux de l’Etat du défendeur, soit en l’espèce les juridictions suisses, pour juger du fond de l’affaire»).

[9] See e.g. Case 220/88, Dumez France SA and Tracoba SARL v Hessische Landesbank and others, ECLI:EU:C:1990:8; Case C-228/11, Melzer v MF Global UK Ltd., ECLI:EU:C:2013:305; Case C-352/13, Cartel Damage Claims (CDC) Hydrogen Peroxide SA v Akzo Nobel NV and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2015:335. Although CJEU only gives binding advice on the Brussels Convention and Brussels I and I bis Regulations, the case law is analogously applicable to the Lugano Convention (and is also taken into consideration when applying the Lugano Convention).

[10] C-261/90, Mario Reichert, Hans-Heinz Reichert and Ingeborg Kockler v Dresdner Bank AG, para. 34 (“The expression ‘provisional, including protective, measures’ … must therefore be understood as referring to measures which, in matters within the scope of the Convention, are intended to preserve a factual or legal situation so as to safeguard rights the recognition of which is sought elsewhere from the court having jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter”); Case C-391-95, Van Uden Maritime BV, trading as Van Uden Africa Line v Kommanditgesellschaft in Firma Deco-Line and Another, ECLI:EU:C:1998:543, para. 38 (“The granting of this type of measure requires particular care on the part of the court in question and detailed knowledge of the actual circumstances in which the measures sought are to take effect”).

[11] C-391/95, Van Uden Maritime BV, trading as Van Uden Africa Line v Kommanditgesellschaft in Firma Deco-Line and Another, ECLI:EU:C:1998:543, para. 40.

Comments (1) -

  • Thomas

    7/8/2015 3:26:05 PM |

    I disagree with the conclusion regarding the earlier decision of the Commission in this case.  The anticipated reference for a preliminary ruling does not mean that the European Commission's position is affected in any way.  Adequate juridictional protection does not necessarily imply that the national court must deal with the matter on its own.  On the contrary, should the interpretation of EU law be necessary for the ruling, the CJUE has to get involved.  

    As to what might happen before the Brussels court of appeal, it has already decided in an earlier decision regarding the sporting nationality of the football player Mohamed Tchité that the Brussels courts were not competent.  I was not overly convinced by the reasoning back then ... It will be interesting nonetheless.

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Asser International Sports Law Blog | Caster Semenya’s Legal Battle Against Gender Stereotypes: On Nature, Law and Identity - By Sofia Balzaretti (University of Fribourg)

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

Caster Semenya’s Legal Battle Against Gender Stereotypes: On Nature, Law and Identity - By Sofia Balzaretti (University of Fribourg)

Editor's note: Sofia Balzaretti is a Graduate research assistant and a PhD candidate at the University of Fribourg (Switzerland) where she is writing a thesis on the Protection against Gender Stereotypes in International Law. In addition to research in human rights and feminist legal theory, she has also carried out some research in legal philosophy and on the relationship between gender and the law.

 

The International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF), the monitoring body of track and field athletics, regularly submitted South African middle distance runner and Olympic gold medalist Mokgadi Caster Semenya to sex verification tests when it began questioning her sexual characteristics and speculating whether her body belonged on the Disorder of Sex Development (DSD) spectrum. DSD Syndrome is often defined as an “intersex condition” which affects the clear development of either/or genitalia, gonads and chromosomes into one distinctive sex or another. The spectrum of the intersex condition is particularly wide, and the disorder can sometimes be minimal - some cases of female infertility can actually be explained by an intersex condition.

The IAAF deemed the controversial sex verification tests necessary on the grounds that it was required to prove Semenya did not have a “medical condition” which could give her an “unfair advantage”. It was eventually found that, because of an intersex trait, Semenya did have abnormally high levels of testosterone for a woman, which, in the IAAF’s opinion, justified a need for regulatory hormonal adjustments in order for her to keep competing in the women’s category. The IAAF also funded research to determine how ‘hyperandrogenism’ affects athletic performance. In 2018, it issued Eligibility Regulations on Female Classification (“Athlete with Differences of Sexual Development”) for events from 400m to the mile, including 400m, hurdles races, 800m and 1’500m. The IAAF rules indicated that in case of an existing high level of testosterone, suppression or regulation by chemotherapy, hormonal castration, and/or iatrogenic irradiation was mandatory in order to take part in these events.

Semenya and her lawyers challenged the IAAF Regulations in front of the CAS, who, in a very controversial decision, deemed the Regulations a necessary, reasonable and proportionate mean “of achieving the aim of what is described as the integrity of female athletics and for the upholding of the ‘protected class’ of female athletes in certain events” (§626).


The CAS Ruling

Semenya and her attorneys claimed that forcing her to get unwanted medication represented a violation of human rights. On the 1st May 2019, the Swiss-based Court of Arbitration of Sport (CAS) ruled in favor of the restrictions placed on female athletes with high levels of testosterone by the IAAF. The direct consequence of this decision for Semenya was the obligation for her to take testosterone suppressants in order to continue competing in her category of IAAF events.

In March 2019, the United Nations Human Rights Council issued a resolution indicating the IAAF Regulations were “not compatible with international human rights norms and standards, including the rights of women with differences of sex development” and that there was “no clear relationship of proportionality between the aim of the regulations and the proposed measures and their impact.”

Because the Regulations established conditions and restrictions which were targeted at the female (or intersex) athlete population exclusively and did not impose any equivalent conditions or restrictions on male athletes, the CAS Panel considered that the Regulations were, prima facie discriminatory on grounds of legal sex. After reminding that “it is common ground that a rule that imposes differential treatment on the basis of a particular protected characteristic is valid and lawful if it is a necessary, reasonable and a proportionate means of attaining a legitimate objective” (§548), the Panel considered that its sole responsibility was to determine whether the DSD Regulations were necessary, reasonable and proportionate. As such, the Panel said it was “not required to (…) appraise the adequacy of the IAAF’s policy-making process”.


The Swiss Federal Tribunal and ordre public

A decision from the CAS can only be challenged at the Swiss Federal Tribunal (SFT) on a limited number of grounds, enclosed in art. 190 al. 2 of the Federal Act on Private International Law (PILA), which include claiming that the principle of equal treatment of the parties or their right to be heard in an adversarial procedure has not been observed (lit. d) and that the award is incompatible with public policy (lit. e). At the beginning of June 2019, after an ex parte request, the SFT, Switzerland’s highest court, granted Semenya a temporary suspension of the IAAF rules on testosterone limits. She was able to compete over distances of 400 to 1’500m without medication, until the SFT issued a ruling.

Because it was considered that the discrimination was necessary, reasonable and proportionate in comparison with the vast majority of non-DSD women, the only outcome for Semenya’s lawyers was to argue on the violation of the principle of public order. The 30th July 2019, the SFT reversed the ruling that temporarily lifted the application of the IAAF’s regulations, thus impeding her to defend her 800m title at the World Championships in Doha in September 2019. The SFT concluded that “neither the allegation of an infringement of the principle of non-discrimination, nor the alleged violation of ordre public due to an infringement of their personality and human dignity appeared with high probability to be well founded”. Welcoming the decision, the IAAF stated that, in certain particular cases, “biology trumps identity”.


The elements of comparison
Body Policing

Admitting that “the imperfect alignment between nature, law and identity is what gives rise to the conundrum at the heart of this case” (§559), the CAS stated that:

“On true analysis, (…) the purpose of the male-female divide in competitive athletics is not to protect athletes with a female legal sex from having to compete against athletes with a male legal sex. Nor is it to protect athletes with a female gender identity from having to compete against athletes with a male gender identity. Rather, it is to protect individuals whose bodies have developed in a certain way following puberty from having to compete against individuals who, by virtue of their bodies having developed in a different way following puberty, possess certain physical traits that create such a significant performance advantage that fair competition between the two groups is not possible.”

The public opinion could not help but point the finger at the underlying hypocrisy of the decision, in comparison with similar cases, both inside and outside of the sports world. Firstly, the same type of policy and legal arguments are often held for controlling certain types of bodies exclusively, whilst leaving others out of the line of sight. In the sports world, it is certainly the case: think of the impressive decoration of Olympian swimmer Michael Phelps aligned with the god-like praises he received for his physical strength and capacity; for instance. On the contrary, leaving “abnormally” tall basket-ball players on the bench so as to give naturally shorter players a chance to win, or testing male athletes with poor athletic results in suspicion they might have low levels of testosterone seems absurd. In fact, the latter are only tested as to make sure they do not take anything effectively modifying their capacities in competing. Semenya and her lawyers did point to the fact that “it is illogical and unnecessary to regulate one genetic trait while celebrating all the others” (CAS decision, §53).

Out of the sports world, indications of “naturalness” in pro-life arguments or governments’ refusal to medically cover the suppression of hormones in transgender reassignment cases are also examples of body policing. The case therefore raises the central question of how stereotypes, especially gender ones, give a social meaning to a fact and how legal regulation can confirm it, thus perpetuating it.

The social  meaning of women and gender

Taking a step away from Semenya’s cause célèbre, it must be stressed that, for long, women were not accepted to compete in the Olympics and that their progressive integration was only made possible when a redefinition of the norms of femininity and masculinity, as they relate to sports and competition, occurred. This means that medical tests were carried out and, as a backlash to noticing the instability and fluidity of sex categories, those very categories were reinforced and redefined according to stereotypes. In other words, the sports world went very far to ensure there was a biological difference so that the natural and social order as it was could not be disrupted.

If we try to move away from the (in my opinion, sterile) debate on biological differences (remembering that the latter has also been explained by anthropologists as being a consequence of our gendered social order[1]), we should ask ourselves who has the power to define the norms of femininity and masculinity. “Woman” and “man” have very particular social meanings. Furthermore, commentators often qualify the sex verification tests as being racially flawed. In this sense, the discussion is also of epistemological importance: the bonus corpus is never the female body, and is always the white male one, with “naturally” good athletic abilities. True, scientific results are usually dependent on a certain political order[2], as are any other empirical social-situated findings. The CAS Panel said that an assessment of the likely impact of the DSD Regulations on wider society would require “an analysis of multifaceted sociological issues which are not amenable to judicial resolution by an arbitral tribunal (…)” (§518). And, as such, it is certainly not for an arbitration court to have the power to (re)define gender categories, which are intrinsically political and historical, and are not limited to the sports world.


Appealing to the ECtHR

If she does not prevail before the SFT, Semenya could still appeal to the European Court of Human Rights, alleging a breach of Article 14 and/or Article 8[3]. It may give the Strasbourg Court an interesting opportunity to comment on gender opposition and binarity, as well as on the social limitations put on gendered bodies. The gender stereotypes discussion is not a new one; regional and international courts have had the opportunity, on many occasions, to comment on the need to combat harmful gender stereotypes[4]. However, they usually do so in relation to human rights law and to the principles of equality and non-discrimination. Even if, of course, not every unjustified discrimination is rooted in stereotypes[5], they seldom point at the wrong of gender stereotypes per se. Hopefully this may lead the ECtHR to further reflect on the harmfulness of gender stereotypes, beyond the well-established categories in need of protection against unjustified discrimination.

The CAS practically said that it was bound by biology. If anything, the results of the sex verification tests should have proven that Semenya’s body has incredible athletic abilities, with no requirements of medically modifying it whatsoever.


Conclusion

In a letter to the IAAF about their regulations, United Nations experts on health, torture, and women’s rights wrote:

“The assessment for ‘exclusion or treatment’ based on the IAAF regulations relies on suspicion and speculation, based on stereotypes about femininity. This effectively legitimizes widespread surveillance of all women athletes by requesting national federations as well as doctors, doping officials, and other official personnel to scrutinize women athletes’ perceived femininity, which can include appearance, gender expression, and sexuality. Women who are understood to be “suspicious” about their natural physical traits are tied to subjective and cultural expectations regarding which bodies and modes of gender expression are “appropriate,” or even valorised by adherence to traditional or normative aesthetics of femininity. Gender and sex-based stereotyping and stigma have a long history, not only of causing psychological harm to women and gender minorities, but also of increasing the possibility of violence against them.”

The social norms of gender act as a blur on reality, based on the stereotype that “a real woman” should not be that good of an athlete. It provides us with an overview of how public policy decisions are justified by scientific findings, operating in a gender-normative environment. The discrimination was considered “necessary, reasonable and proportionate” in comparison with the vast majority of non-DSD women, but it somehow appears to be a debate on the equality between women and men and on reaffirming the importance of the “fixed duality of sexual difference”[6]. The CAS Panel said that it was “faced with conflicting rights concerning the rights of female athletes who do, and do not, have DSD” (§554).

Interestingly enough, the more women are compared to each other, on the grounds of fairness, the stronger the female gender category is reinforced.


[1] Priscilla Touraille, Hommes grands, femmes petites : une évolution coûteuse. Les régimes de genre comme force sélective de l’évolution biologique, Éditions de la Maison des Sciences de l’Homme: Paris 2008.

[2] Thomas Laqueur, La Fabrique du Sexe: Essai sur le corps et le genre en Occident, Gallimard: Paris 1992.

[3] The ECtHR had considered an application brought following an unsuccessful appeal to the Swiss Federal Tribunal in the October 2018 decision ECtHR, Mutu and Pechstein v Switzerland, applications no. 40575/10 and no. 67474/10, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2018:1002JUD004057510, alleging breaches of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

[4] The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has broadly defined the notion of “harmful gender stereotypes”, as sexist beliefs, which include representing women in roles considered traditional; as mothers and household heads, as subordinates of men or as sexual objects. In 2013, the OHCHR prepared a report on sex and gender stereotypes, which outlines the practice of treaty bodies and their reference to gender stereotypes. The obligations of States with regard to stereotypes are those set out in Article 5 lit. a CEDAW, reinforced by Article 2 lit. f. which provides that States must “take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women”. At European level, judgments of the ECtHR have concerned stereotypes related in particular to sexuality (Kalucza v. Hungary), reproduction (A. B. C. v. Ireland; R. R. v. Poland) or domestic violence (Valiuliené v. Lithuania; Opuz v. Turkey). See also Konstantin Markin v. Russia; Carvalho Pinto de Sousa Morais v. Portugal; Khamtokhu and Aksenchick v. Russia.

[5] Sophia Moreau, ‘Equality Rights and Stereotypes’ in Dyzenhaus, D./ Thorburn, M. (eds.), Philosophical Foundations of Constitutional Law, Oxford University Press : Oxford 2019.

[6] Hilary Charlesworth, ‘Foreword’, in Harris Rimmer S./Ogg K., Feminist Engagement with International Law, Edward Elgar: Cheltenham 2019.

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