Editor’s note: Chuck Blazer declined our official interview request but thanks to some trusted sources (the FIFA indictment and Chuck’s testimony) we have reconstructed his likely answers. This is a fictional interview. Any resemblance with real facts is purely coincidental.

Mr Blazer, thank you for agreeing to this interview, especially considering the circumstances. How are you doing?

I am facing ten charges concerning, among others, conspiracy to corrupt and money laundering. But apart from that, I am doing great (laughs)!

It is good to know that you have not lost your spirit. And since you’ve been involved in football, or as you call it soccer, for years could you please first tell us what was your career at FIFA and its affiliates like?

Let me see… Starting from the 1990s I was employed by and associated with FIFA and one of its constituent confederations, namely the Confederation of North, Central American and Caribbean Association Football (CONCACAF). At various times, I also served as a member of several FIFA standing committees, including the marketing and television committee. As CONCACAF’s general secretary, a position I proudly held for 21 years, I was responsible, among many other things, for negotiations concerning media and sponsorship rights. From 1997 to 2013 I also served at FIFA’s executive committee where I participated in the selection process of the host countries for the World Cup tournaments. Those years at the helm of world soccer were truly amazing years of travel and hard work mainly for the good of the beautiful game. I might add that I even managed to document some of my voyages on my blog. I initially called it “Travels with Chuck Blazer” but Vladimir (Putin) convinced me to change the name to “Travels with Chuck Blazer and his Friends”. You should check it out.

Sure, but you ended up facing corruption and tax fraud charges in the US. What happened?

Concerning the charges I am currently facing, I pleaded guilty to participating in a conspiracy to corrupt FIFA and its related constituent organizations through various bribery schemes. In addition, I acknowledged taking part in money laundering process, violation of certain financial reporting laws, and tax evasion. But please keep it quiet. My family was devastated when they heard about this. After all, they know me as a kind-hearted and giving type, especially if you consider that, given my appearance, I’m always Santa Claus when Christmas time is around.

Concretely, around 1992 and together with other representatives of the soccer world, I agreed to accept a bribe in connection with the selection of the host nation of the 1998 World Cup. Together with other FIFA executive committee members I also accepted illegal payments concerning the selection of South Africa as the 2010 World Cup host. Simultaneously, since approximately 1993, still with the same bunch of soccer executives, I accepted bribes connected to the award of broadcasting and other rights to the 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002 and 2003 Gold Cup, a tournament analogue to the Copa América, featuring member associations of CONCACAF.

I know it’s wrong. But at FIFA a lot of people were doing it and it was just a common practice at that time. Money was flowing in my bank accounts and it felt right. We were working so hard to organize those tournaments, you know.

How come the US authorities’ ended up investigating you and FIFA?

I am not completely sure. When I testified back in 2013 the judge indicated that FIFA and its attendant or related constituent organizations were identified as a RICO enterprise, that is, a Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organization if I remember correctly. I was terrified, it sounded very intimidating at first. Now I guess I got used to the sound of it. I am even thinking about calling my next cat Rico (laughs). I also recall that the Department of Justice’s involvement in the case was due to the fact that we used the US financial system to funnel the money. In hindsight, it was a very bad idea.

Could you give us some more details on how the corruption mechanism actually worked in practice?

In general terms there were media and marketing rights to be sold. Those rights, and often their extensions, were awarded in exchange for bribes, sometimes via intermediaries. The sports marketing companies engaged in the schemes were then able not only to profit from the acquired rights themselves, but also to accept illegal payments for passing on some of those rights to sponsors.

(Long pause) Take for instance Copa Libertadores. The tournament developed and gained popularity which sparked sports marketing companies’ interest in acquiring marketing rights to the competition. Around 2000 an entity affiliated with one of the sports marketing companies was awarded sponsorship rights for the tournaments which took place between 2001 and 2007, with a subsequent renewal of the contract in 2007 and 2012. In the early 2000s Nicolás Leoz, acting as the president of Confederación Sudamericana de Fútbol (CONMEBOL) and a member of its executive committee, sold his support to award the rights to a specific company. What is more, not only did he receive the money, he also gave instructions to forward approximately $2 million to his personal bank accounts, a sum which was owed to CONMEBOL itself based on the awarded sponsorship rights’ contract. The Copa Libertadores was only one of the many affected soccer competitions.

And what were the other tournaments affected?

I am American so please excuse my accent, but besides Copa Libertadores, also Copa América, Copa do Brasil, Gold Cup, and the World Cup qualifiers games. I might also add that corruption affected at least the FIFA 2011 presidential elections, the voting process concerning the hosts of the 1998 and 2010 World Cups, and Brazil’s national team’s sponsorship.

Who would you identify as the main players in the corruption schemes?

Except myself you mean (laughs)? Well, definitely a number of FIFA officials that you hear a lot about in the news lately. I can easily mention a few of my colleagues, like Rafael Esquivel who served as the president of the Venezuelan soccer association and a vice president on the CONMEBOL executive committee. There was also my good friend Eugenio Figueredo, a former president of the Uruguayan soccer association who was a member of FIFA’s executive committee, a vice president at FIFA, a member of various FIFA standing committees, and a vice and then president of CONMEBOL. Surely you know of José Maria Marin and Jeffrey Webb. The former was the president of the Brazilian soccer association, and sat on several FIFA standing committees. The latter was the president of Cayman Islands Football Association and a member of the Caribbean Football Union’s (CFU) executive committee. He was also appointed as the president of CONCACAF and a FIFA vice president. The funny thing is that Webb took these positions in order to clean up after the corruption scandal which led to the resignation of Jack Warner.

Jack Warner, you mean the former president of CONCACAF and the vice president of FIFA?

Correct. But do not forget that he was also the secretary and then a special advisor to the Trinidad and Tobago Football Federation (TTFF), and the president of the CFU. Jack is probably the most corrupt soccer official I ever met.  Personally I did not like him, he just couldn’t get enough. Already in the early 1990s he began exploiting his position for personal gains. In this regard, he did not only treat the assets of the organizations he served as his own, but also actively solicited bribes in connection with for example the 1998 World Cup. Hundreds of thousands of dollars in bribes were also paid to him with regard to the award of commercial rights to several editions of the Gold Cup. Moreover, acting as the president of the CFU and a special advisor to the TTFF he orchestrated the sale of media rights to World Cup qualifying matches which the national members of the CFU decided to sale as a bundle. Following negotiations Traffic, a sports marketing company, acquired the rights to 2002, 2006, 2010, and 2014 World Cup qualifier matches. A substantial part of the value of the contracts concluded by Warner on behalf of the CFU was automatically transferred to accounts under his personal control. He was also involved in a $10 million bribe related to the award of the 2010 World Cup to South Africa. I could go on and on.

You mentioned Traffic. Could you tell us more about it?

Of course. Several of these sports marketing companies were involved, but to my knowledge Traffic was one of the biggest players. This multinational company was based in Brazil and comprised of subsidiaries operating around the globe including the US where it commenced its operations around 1990. The US branch alone was engaged in a number of bribery and fraud schemes in connection with their efforts to obtain various rights from soccer organization and federations in the region. The beneficiaries of these schemes included, among others, Jack Warner, Nicolás Leoz, and Rafael Esquivel. Traffic’s main goal was to expand its operations through developing ties with soccer governing bodies. I remember that in 1991 during Nicolás’ term as CONMEBOL’s president Traffic acquired exclusive commercial rights to three editions of Copa América. Nicolás then threatened to walk away. He claimed that Traffic was about to make a lot of money out of the deal and that it was only fair for him to get his share of the pie. With each of the new editions of the Copa América, Nicolás would demand fresh bribes, a personal business of his which, to my knowledge, went on until 2011. Additional payments were made by Traffic based on their subsequent profits. Esquivel also benefited by requesting bribes in exchange for his ongoing support for Traffic’s position. As I said, bribery at FIFA was often the result of the initiative on the part of its officials. But coming back to Traffic, their involvement is best described in numbers. Out of the twelve bribery schemes I know of, Traffic was involved in nine of them. However, if we disregard the schemes concerning FIFA elections and the voting process for the World Cup hosts the share is nine out of ten. You also need to keep in mind that a former employee of the US branch of Traffic involved in the corruption scheme went on to serve as a general secretary of CONCACAF. On a side note, I think I was a much better general secretary than he ever was. I still receive birthday cards from my former colleagues at CONCACAF.

You stated that several companies were involved. How did they share the rights acquisition between themselves?

I’m not entirely sure about the exact mechanisms involved. What I know, however, is that sometimes conflicts emerged between the different companies seeking to secure contracts for themselves. On other occasions they were able to join forces, for example with the media and marketing rights to Copa América. At first, CONMEBOL entered into a contract with Traffic on the basis of which the latter was awarded the exclusive rights to, among others, the 2015 edition of the tournament, and an option to retain those rights for the next three editions. But in 2010 CONMEBOL signed another agreement, this time with Full Play, on the basis of which Full Play was granted media and marketing rights to several editions of the tournament, including the 2015 edition already sold to Traffic. As you can imagine, Traffic was not happy. They decided to sue CONMEBOL and Full Play. In the end the companies came to an understanding and formed Datisa, a new entity which was to obtain and exploit the commercial rights to the Copa América. In return, Traffic was to shoulder a share of the bribes offered to CONMEBOL officials.

I also recall that there were tensions between Traffic and another company established by a former employee of Traffic who, after bribing Brazilian federation’s officials in order to acquire a contract for the rights to Copa do Brasil, was accused by Traffic’s owner of stealing his business. But they also managed to solve the issue by combining their “efforts” and by sharing the financial burden of the “investments” made to acquire the rights.

And what sums are we talking about?

Not so much, really (laughs). Concerning Datisa the company agreed to pay between $100 and $110 million in bribes to CONMEBOL officials all of whom worked also at FIFA. The FBI told me that they estimated that the “business” generated approximately $150 million in bribes, an amount which may increase if new information come to light. In the end, I did not get so much out of it compared to some of my dear colleagues. Sometimes I think that I should have been more firm during the “negotiations”. For a long time I have been dreaming about having an additional apartment in the Trump Tower. I remember that when I got the first one it almost seemed as it came from some divine intervention.

Wow, that’s a lot. How did they manage to conceal it?

As I already mentioned the “business” was sometimes conducted via intermediaries. Jose Margulies was one of the prominent ones. He was the brother of an old friend of the owner of Traffic, and often used accounts in the names of offshore corporations in order to makes payments on his behalf. In addition, he tried to conceal the bribes by using accounts at Swiss banks, made recourse to currency dealers, destroyed documentation, and discouraged the corrupt soccer officials from using accounts in their own name in order to avoid detection from law enforcement bodies, an advice which was not always taken seriously. People like Nicolás Leoz for example did not hesitate to have sums being paid to their personal bank accounts on the basis of “consulting contracts”. As I already mentioned, Jack (Warner), for his part, concluded a double agreement in the name of the TTFF concerning rights to World Cup qualifier games. He first sold the TTFF’s rights as part of a bundle, and later on sold them again, but this time separately. There was also the famous $10 million paid by South Africa’s authorities to the CFU in order to “support the African diaspora”, a payment which was in fact made in exchange for votes regarding the 2010 World Cup host. This money was diverted back into Jack’s pockets via a number of tricks. Using family members’ accounts was another way of deception. Lately, the business of taking bribes was getting more and more complicated, prompting officials to look for new complex schemes. In fact, the attempts to conceal illegal payments made in connection with the rights to the World Cup 2018 and 2022 qualifiers caused a lot of headache to Jeffrey Webb in his capacity as a high level CFU official. One of the companies with whom Traffic was to make payment to Webb had difficulties finding the right way to discretely transfer the money to him. This led to long negotiations between Webb’s associate and the company’s executives in order to find a clean method to make the outstanding payment.

Thank you so much Mr Blazer for your time and your invaluable insights!

You’re welcome. I am a big fan of the ASSER International Sports Law Blog so anything for you guys.

Day 1: The impact of the revised World Anti-Doping Code on the work of National Anti-Doping Agencies
Day 2: The “Athlete Patient” and the 2015 World Anti-Doping Code: Competing Under Medical Treatment
Day 3: Proof of intent (or lack thereof) under the 2015 World Anti-Doping Code
Day 4: Ensuring proportionate sanctions under the 2015 World Anti-Doping Code

On 1 January, a new version of the World Anti-Doping Code (WADC or Code) entered into force. This blog symposium aims at taking stock of this development and at offering a preliminary analysis of the key legal changes introduced. The present blog will put the WADC into a more general historical and political context. It aims to briefly retrace the emergence of the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) and its Code. It will also reconstruct the legislative process that led to the adoption of the WADC 2015 and introduce the various contributions to the blog symposium.

I.              The WADA and its Code: A Short history

The WADA is a public-private hybrid governance body.[1] It is formally a Swiss foundation, but its executive bodies are composed equally of representatives of public authorities and Sports Governing Bodies (SGBs). The current president of WADA, Sir Craig Reedie, is also vice-president of the International Olympic Committee (IOC). The WADA was created as a response to the massive doping scandal that marred the Tour de France in 1998. Its original aim was to “set unified standards for anti-doping work and coordinate the efforts of sports organizations and public authorities”. The idea of a specific global organization was submitted at a World Conference on Doping in Sport in Lausanne, in February 1999. A few months later, on 10 November 1999, the WADA was established.

WADA’s key task was, and still is, to devise the global set of uniform rules applicable to the anti-doping fight: the WADC. The first version of the WADC was finalized in 2003. After amendments were tabled, a second version of the Code entered into force in 2009. As the WADA does not dispose of any public (or private for that matter) authority to implement the Code, it must be transposed by the SGBs and governments at the national and international level to gain some teeth (a list of the current signatories can be accessed here). Compliance with the Code is compulsory for the whole Olympic Movement as provided by article 43 of the Olympic Charter. WADA’s main responsibility is to monitor and report on the compliance of various federations and States. The Code was first endorsed by States in the Copenhagen Declaration on Anti-Doping in Sport in 2003, and later supported by the adoption of the UNESCO International Convention against Doping in Sport in October 2005. The Convention is one of the most ratified UNESCO Conventions to date with 182 signatories.

The WADC 2015 is a long document of more than 150 pages, composed of 25 articles complemented with comprehensive comments. It defines the anti-doping rule violations[2], the burden of proof applicable to doping cases[3] and the functioning of the prohibited list.[4] The Code indicates also the technical procedure applicable to doping tests[5] and the procedural rights of suspected athletes.[6] Most importantly, it provides for the sanctions regime applicable in case of a violation.[7] The Code likewise regulates the potential appeal procedures.[8] The WADC is complemented by a set of five International Standards, which are mandatory for the signatories. Finally, the implementation of the Code is also supported by a set of Model Rules, Guidelines and Protocols.

As illustrated by the recent doping scandal involving the Russian Athletics Federation, the question of compliance with the Code is a prodigious challenge for WADA. The organisation’s raison d’être is threatened by the well-known gap between law in the books and law in action. This discrepancy between a global uniform code and its many local realities, has led to recent calls for WADA to be tasked with the implementation of the Code and to take charge of the testing process. The true impact of the Code 2015 will partially depend on the clarification of the competences and responsibilities of WADA in this regard.

II.            Making the Code 2015: The legislative process

The WADC 2015 is the result of a peculiar legislative process. WADA claims, since its early days, that the Code is a living document, subjected to a productive feedback chain. The revision of the WADC started at the end of 2011 and covered three different phases of consultation over a two-year period. Approximately 2000 proposals for amendments were submitted to the drafting team. In the end, the Code was approved on 15 November 2013 at the World Conference on Doping in Sport in Johannesburg.

A specific team managed the consultation process and each of the three consultation phases included a review and the approval from the WADA Executive Committee. The first phase started on 28 November 2011 whereby a call for comments was communicated to stakeholders (WADA does not indicate how it defines the reach of this category), and feedback was received from 90 stakeholders. The comments led to the drafting of the Draft Version 1.0 of the 2015 Code, which was approved by the WADA Executive Committee in May 2012. On 1 June 2012, the second phase of consultation was initiated with a new call for comments issued to all the “stakeholders”. Over a period of four months, WADA received feedback from more than 100 stakeholders, which was incorporated in the second Draft of the 2015 Code. Eventually, a third consultation phase took place from 3 December 2012 until 1 March 2013, which led to the Executive Committee adopting a third draft of the Code. The final mould of the Code was submitted to the World Conference on Doping in Sport, hosted in Johannesburg in November 2013.[9]  The WADA Foundation Board adopted the final version of the Code at the Conference.

WADA is adamant (and proud of the fact) that the Code was drafted in an inclusive and participative process. Although it is undeniably positive that many stakeholders had the opportunity to access and discuss the drafts of the Code, the specific reasons leading to the policy choices made remain largely undisclosed. It is extremely difficult to know why a proposed amendment made it into the new Code, and why another did not. Moreover, the scope of the notion of a stakeholder is key to define who gets to contribute. If, for example (as I suspect), the SGBs and NADOs are massively overrepresented amongst the stakeholders consulted, it gives them a disproportionate voice in the legislative process of the new Code. The transparency of the process is also lagging, as is illustrated by the fact that the comments are nowhere to be found on WADA’s new website.[10] This lack of transparency is worrying for an institution partially founded and managed by public authorities. In any event, improving the transparency and the inclusiveness of the adoption process of the WADC is a must to ensure that WADA fulfils the good governance standards it is aspiring to.  

III.         The Blog Symposium on the WADA Code 2015

This blog symposium includes four contributions from very different perspectives, by specialized academics, practitioners and an anti-doping administrator. They deal primarily with the various practical changes to the anti-doping fight induced by the new Code. The objective is to show how the Code has already changed the way the “anti-doping world” is operating, and the transformations it might still trigger in the future. The symposium is organized with the help of both Marjolaine Viret and Emily Wisnosky.

The first contribution by Herman Ram, the Head of the Dutch Doping Autoriteit, covers the impact of the WADC 2015 on the work of national anti-doping agencies. Ram highlights the various ways in which the Code has (or may) profoundly changed the operations of the Dutch NADA. In particular through its focus on a smarter anti-doping fight. He anticipates the stumbling blocks ahead and identifies the key trends already under way.

The second contribution by Marjolaine Viret (@MarjolaineViret) and Emily Wisnosky (@Ewisnosky), the two researchers involved in the cutting edge WADC-Commentary project alongside Prof. Antonio Rigozzi (@AntonioRigozzi), focus on the new Code’s influence on Athletes under medical treatment. They study closely the new legal regime applicable to obtain a Therapeutic Use Exemption and the potential sanctions faced by athletes under medical treatment who have not obtained a TUE before a positive anti-doping test.

The third contribution by Mike Morgan (@MSL_Mike), a lawyer specialized in anti-doping disputes, examines the new sanctions regime stemming out of the Code 2015. As pointed out in various recent academic contributions,[11] this is probably the most fundamental change introduced in the Code. It is in any case the most visible, since it will most vividly affect the athletes failing an anti-doping test. As Morgan shows, the new Code vows to introduce a degree of flexibility in the sanctions regime and to provide smarter, tailor-made, sanctions. Whether this aim will be achieve is still very much an open question.

Finally, Howard Jacobs (@athleteslawyer), also a lawyer specialized in anti-doping disputes, analyses the function of the notion of intent in the new Code. Indeed, one of the main innovations of the Code is the introduction of specific sanctions based on the intentional or non-intentional nature of the doping violation. This raises many legal questions linked especially with the burden of proof. Jacobs goes in great lengths to provide a clear analytical map of the problems ahead regarding the need to demonstrate the (non-)intentional nature of an anti-doping violation. He poses fundamental questions that will likely pop up in front of anti-doping tribunals and the CAS, and offers some preliminary answers. 

[1] Its atypical public-private institutional structure has stirred the attention of scholars of the Global Administrative Law movement. See L. Casini, ‘Global Hybrid Public-Private Bodies: The World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA)’ accessible at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1520751

[2] Article 2 WADC 2015

[3] Article 3 WADC 2015

[4] Article 4 WADC 2015

[5] Article 5,6,7 WADC 2015

[6] Article 8 WADC 2015

[7] Article 9,10, 11, 12 WADC 2015

[8] Article 13 WADC 2015

[9]Unfortunately, it is impossible to review the presentations and interventions made at the conference, as its website has been desactivated.

[10] Though they were online on the older version of the website.

[11] See, for example, A. Rigozzi,  U. Haas, E. Wisnosky and Marjolaine Viret, ‘Breaking down the process for determining a basic sanction under the 2015 World Anti-Doping Code’, The International Sports Law Journal, June 2015, Volume 15, Issue 1, pp 3-48 (available at http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40318-015-0068-6?wt_mc=alerts.TOCjournals)