Our first report on the FIFA business dealt with FIFA’s revenues and highlighted their impressive rise and progressive diversification. In parallel to this growth of FIFA’s income, it is quite natural that its expenses have been following a similar path (see Graph 1). However, as we will see FIFA makes it sometimes very difficult to identify precisely where the money is going. Nonetheless, this is precisely what we wish to tackle in this post, and to do so we will rely on the FIFA Financial reports over the last 10 years.

The question of the final destination of FIFA’s money is a contentious one. Many allege that FIFA executives may be profiting directly or indirectly from the revenues amassed. In order to better understand to what end FIFA’s money is disbursed, we have gathered the data contained in FIFA’s Financial Reports over a 10 year time frame and we have adjusted the numbers for inflation, thus easing any comparison. This data is synthetized in Graphs 2 and 3.

Graph 2 provides a comparative overview of the evolution of the expenses of FIFA in absolute numbers. This shows that event-related and personnel expenses (to a lesser extent also other operating costs) have been rising, while FIFA’s expenses on development and committees and congresses have remained more or less stable. Graph 3 confirms that the evolution of FIFA’s expenses is not linear, but general lessons can be drawn. The event-related expenses have been representing more than 50% of FIFA’s expenses for 4 years out of the last 5 (2010 stands out as an outlier). The trend towards the reduction of the share of FIFA’s development expenses is clearly observable (from 25% of total expenses in 2003 to 15% in 2013). This trend was only reversed in the particular context of the South-Africa World-Cup in 2010. Besides that, the share of expenses linked to wages and personnel has remained fairly stable (from 7% in 2003 to 8% in 2013). Finally, the share of the other operating costs is difficult to compare across the years, as FIFA has changed its accountancy system. Nonetheless, one can assume that from 2007 onwards, other operating expenses and Football governance (Legal costs and Committees and Congress expenses) expenses should be read together to match the previous understanding of the notion of operating expenses. Thus, read together, operating expenses would have risen from a 16% share in 2003 to a 20% one in 2013. 

Graph 2: FIFA Expenses (per stream) in USD million (adjusted for inflation) 2003-2013

Graph 3: Share FIFA expenses over 2003-20013

FIFA’s expenses are concentrated on the organization of its events (see Graph 4). In 2013, 58% of the expenses incurred by FIFA were event related (Graph 3). Indeed, since 2003 FIFA’s expenses on its events have increased from USD 286 million in 2003 to USD 728 million in 2013. However, it is very difficult to extract from the reports provided by FIFA the precise objects of these expenses. It should be noted that the organizing country is tasked with the financing of the main infrastructural investments (stadium, transportation etc…), leaving little infrastructural costs bearing on FIFA. The event-related expenses can be traced back to the financing of the local FIFA World Cup Organizing Committee (the Brazilian committee received up to USD 221.6 million), prize money, travel and accommodation costs of the FIFA officials and the participating teams and other expenses. Furthermore, they also include the FIFA Club Protection programme that compensates clubs in case of injuries suffered by players while on duty with their national teams.

Graph 4: FIFA Event-related Expenses in USD million (adjusted for inflation), 2003-2013

FIFA is often keen on trumpeting its development-related investments. It is even a key argument to justify its public utility: FIFA is to favour the development of football worldwide. This myth falls partially apart when one looks at the numbers and at their recent trajectory. Indeed, as shown in Graph 5, since 2003 (omitting the exceptional South-African peak of 2010) the Development-related expenses of FIFA have remained fairly stable (139 USD million in 2003, 185 USD million in 2013), in spite of the tremendous growth of both its overall revenues and expenses. Thus highlighting that FIFA has not been very keen on developing redistribution streams in favour of its members, the players or the supporters. Furthermore, the development schemes of FIFA are notoriously lacking transparency and their ability to achieve any real trickle-down effect is not warranted. The recent corruption scandals surrounding former FIFA vice-president Jack Warner, have highlighted the risks of this development aid getting lost in the pockets of corrupted local football officials. If FIFA is serious about football development, and not only interested in PR, it should overhaul its development funding scheme, both in terms of absolute numbers and of its institutional set-up.

Graph 5: FIFA Development related expenses in USD million (Adjusted to inflation) 2003-2013

On the other hand, FIFA’s own personnel costs have grown over the last 10 years (Graph 6) from 37 USD million in 2003, to 103 USD million in 2013. FIFA employs 400 staff members at its administrative centre in Zurich. The administration of FIFA is a costly enterprise. In 2013 the operating expenses reached 219 USD million (Graph 8), this includes the personnel expenses (Graph 6), but not the football governance expenses (the Committees and Congress expenses in Graph7 and legal expenses), overall the operating cost reaches 276 USD million! Those costs, especially the one dubbed other operating costs (Graph8) are relatively obscure. What do they include? Personnel (102 USD million in 2013), information technology, buildings and maintenance (22 USD million in 2013), taxes and duties (17 USD million in 2013), depreciation and amortization (12 USD million in 2013), communications (31 USD million in 2013) and other non determined expenses (32 USD million in 2013); but without providing any more details about the concrete content of those categories. This lack of explanation can only play in the hand of those that dismiss FIFA altogether as an organization interested solely in its own wealth and well-being. One is left puzzled by the amount of the operating costs, which are neither disbursed for the organization of specific events (those are the event-related expenses in Graph 4), nor for the organization of important meetings (those are the Congress and Committees expenses in Graph 7). It may be that the FIFA building’s toilet are made of gold or that its canteen is a three-star Michelin restaurant, but if so we would like to know.

Graph 6: FIFA Personnel Expenses in USD million (Adjusted to inflation) 2003-2013

Graph 7: FIFA Committees and Congress Expenses in USD million (Adjusted to Inflation) 2003-2013

Graph 8: FIFA Other Operating Expenses in USD million (Adjusted to inflation)

Finally, FIFA has constituted a richly dotted war chest. Over the last 10 years of economic success it has amassed huge financial reserves (Graph 9), reaching up to 1453 USD million in 2013. Money lying still at a Swiss bank instead of being invested in the development of football. This money is making money for FIFA through the interests it produces. However, one can wonder why FIFA would need to hold onto such a mountain of cash, instead of redistributing in (in one way or another) to the ‘football family’. This perceived need is illustrative of the transformation of FIFA into a proper business, far remote from the interests of football and its actors.

Graph 9: FIFA reserves in USD million (Adjusted to inflation)

Conclusion: Follow the money…

We have tried to follow FIFA’s money, in order to better understand if some of the criticisms raised against the management of FIFA were justified. From a macro point of view one fact needs to be highlighted: FIFA has been making a lot more money over the last 10 years and very few of this additional money has been redistributed via its football development schemes. In fact, it is the only stream of outgoings that has seen its share in FIFA’s overall expenses drastically cut from 25% to 15% over the last 10 years. FIFA should take its development programmes seriously if it is to continue relying on them to argue its good faith and willingness to contribute to global welfare.

Moreover, one characteristics of FIFA’s financial report is the lack of transparency and readability of the data. One is challenged to figure out what certain categories concretely mean. FIFA is spending a lot for things that cannot be traced easily. At a micro-level, there is an urgent need for external observers to be able to go through the detailed account of FIFA. One of the trigger for rumoured, but also probably for real, instances of corruption lies in the fact that the supervisory mechanisms provided by public scrutiny (through the press and other institutions) is rendered moot by the accounting walls built by FIFA to isolate its spending from the public’s eye.

Eventually, FIFA must let us (and help us to) follow its money. This would be a giant step towards countering the corruption allegations being made and also legitimating the role of FIFA as the governing institution of world football. If the ‘football family’ is able to see and control the path followed by FIFA’s money, the trust in FIFA as an institution will most likely improve.

Since yesterday FIFA is back in turmoil (see here and here) after the FIFA Council decided to dismiss the heads of the investigatory (Cornel Borbély) and adjudicatory (Hans-Joachim Eckert) chambers of the Independent Ethics Committee, as well as the Head (Miguel Maduro) of the Governance and Review Committee. It is a disturbing twist to a long reform process (on the early years see our blogs here and here) that was only starting to produce some tangible results.

This journey to a new FIFA started in 2015 after the events that eventually pushed Sepp Blatter and Michel Platini out, and Gianni Infantino in. As noted by the FIFA Reform Committee in its final report, it became clear FIFA needed to undertake “significant modification to its institutional structure and operational processes […] to prevent corruption, fraud, self-dealing and to make the organisation more transparent and accountable”.[1] The Reform Committee put forward a series of recommendations, which later culminated in a set of reforms approved during the Extraordinary FIFA Congress held in Zurich the 26 February 2016. Greater transparency and accountability were the leading mantras of the reform, which – broadly speaking – hinged on (i) generating a cultural change at FIFA, (ii) fostering greater participation of member associations and stakeholders in FIFA and, most importantly, (iii) reforming the principles of governance at FIFA. The essence of the reform process was about changing the governance structures and ethos at FIFA. This was to be done mainly by:

• Separating the political and management functions
• Financial Transparency and Transparency of Compensation
• Term Limits and Eligibility Checks
• Promotion of the role of women in football

And, to be fair to FIFA, on paper at least, things changed quite dramatically over last year, here is how.

1.     The new FIFA Council                                                                          

First, the reform changed the political and administrative structure of FIFA. The Executive Committee being replaced by the Council, a new body with a different composition and set of competences. The Council’s larger size is aimed at ensuring broader participation and representativeness. While the Executive Committee comprised 24 members plus the FIFA President, the Council is composed of 36 members plus the FIFA President. The Congress elects the President, whereas the other members of the Council represent the confederations. Each Confederation president is ex officio a vice-president of the Council. UEFA has three vice-presidents at the Council and the other Confederations one each, for a total of eight vice-presidents. The rest of the members are divided as follows: four from CONMEBOL and CONCACAF, six from AFC, UEFA and CAF, and two from OFC. 

One of the main objectives of the governance reform was to reduce the possibility of conflicts of interests. To this end, a firm separation between political decision-making and management was considered crucial. Even though the Council’s role is supposed to be confined within the boundaries of supervising FIFA’s administration and defining strategic directions, it retains strong steering powers through its competence, enshrined in Article 34 FIFA Statutes, to nominate and dismiss the members of FIFA’s Committees as well as FIFA’s Secretary General. Nevertheless, the executive functions are delegated to the Secretary General, who has the duty to carry out the day-to-day business and implement the strategies outlined by the Council. While, the Chief Compliance Officer, oversees this activity and reports to the independent Audit and Compliance Committee.

2.     The introduction of eligibility checks

The FIFA reform committee recognized that a trustworthy governance of FIFA requires that the executives be, as much as possible, free of conflicts of interest. Hence, all the members of the Council are now subject to eligibility checks carried out by the Review Committee, a special commission within the newly created Governance Committee, formed by its chairperson, its deputy chairperson and one independent member. The members of the Governance Committee are in turn subject to eligibility checks carried out by the investigative chamber of the Ethics Committee. According to Art. 27(8) FIFA Statutes: “candidates for the positions of chairperson, deputy chairperson and members of each of the Audit and Compliance Committee and the judicial bodies must pass an eligibility check carried out by the Review Committee”.[2] The Secretary General is required to fulfil an eligibility check as well[3] and so do the candidates for standing committees.[4] This new check is the cornerstone of FIFA’s governance reform. In the absence of truly open and fair democratic elections to determine who exercises power inside FIFA, the eligibility checks are a fundamental brake to control the pool of potential executives and ensure a modicum of ethical virtue amongst them.

3.     The strive for financial transparency

The FIFA Reform Committee Report proposed to make public the compensation packages of FIFA’s executives. Thus, the new Art. 51(10) FIFA Statues imposes a duty to disclose the individual compensation of the FIFA President, the members of the Council and the Secretary General. The compensation of the said members and the Compensation Rules are determined by the Compensation Sub-Committee within the Audit and Compliance Committee.[5] Indeed, in its 2016 Governance Report, published in April 2017, FIFA disclosed the compensation packages of its executives. This was a much-needed development in light of the way Blatter, Platini and co were playing with FIFA’s finances, sometimes/often to their own benefits.

4.     The limited role of the FIFA President

The reformed Statutes reduced the role and discretionary power of the FIFA President, who is now depositary of a more ambassadorial than executive role. Pursuant to Art. 35 FIFA Statutes, the President has no right to vote at the Congress and has one ordinary vote in the Council. The new provision repealed the possibility for the President to have a casting vote whenever votes are split equally inside the FIFA Council.[6] And yet, due to his capacity to set the agenda of the FIFA Council and to steer the Council’s appraisal of the Secretary General, his influence inside the constitutional structure of FIFA should not be underestimated.

5.     The introduction of term limits

The need to answer to transparency and accountability demands also resulted in the provision of term ceilings for the most prominent figures within the Organisation. The President, the members of the Council and the members of the independent committees can serve their office for no more than three terms, whether consecutive or not, of 4 years each.[7]

6.     The representation of women

FIFA recognised that “football governance at all levels needs to include more women in order to create a more diverse decision-making environment and culture”.[8] It has aimed to achieve this goal in two ways. First, FIFA adopted gender equality as an explicit statutory objective.[9] Second, and more visibly, each Confederation has to reserve for women at least one seat at the FIFA Council.[10]

7.     The reform of the standing committees

In order to improve efficiency the number of standing committees was reduced from 26 to 9. The current standing committees, which “advise and assist the Council in their respective fields of function”[11] are: the Governance Committee, the Finance Committee, the Development Committee, the Organising Committee for FIFA Competitions, the Member Associations Committee, the Player’s Status Committee, the Referees Committee, the Medical Committee and the Football Stakeholder Committee. The latter was freshly created to foster greater engagement with the football stakeholders.

Some specific requirements to be fulfilled by the members of the committees are laid out in Art. 39 FIFA Statutes. Paragraph 3 of that provision states that, while the general rule is that members of the committees can be at the same time members of the Council, the members of the Governance Committee, the independent members of the Finance Committee and the independent members of the Development Committee cannot simultaneously belong to the Council.[12]

Furthermore, at least 50% of the members of the Governance Committee, Development Committee and Finance Committee need to fulfil the independence criteria as defined in the FIFA Regulations.[13] These independence criteria need to be fulfilled also by the chairpersons, deputy chairpersons and members of the FIFA judicial bodies, i.e. the Disciplinary Committee, the Ethics Committee (both its investigatory and the adjudicatory chambers) and the Appeal Committee.[14] Furthermore, the members of the Audit and Compliance Committee must not belong to any other FIFA body.[15] The same applies to all the members of the FIFA judicial bodies.[16]

Conclusion: Plus ça change, moins ça change?

To sum up, on paper FIFA did change. It is undeniably a bit more transparent (but we are still waiting for the publication of the Garcia Report or of the decisions of the Ethics Committee) and its executives are a bit more likely to face independent counter-powers (e.g. Ethics Committee or the Governance Committee). FIFA’s reforms rely on a double strategy:

·       independent ex ante control on who is to exercise power inside the organization and;

·       independent ex post review of how this power is exercised.

And yet, with Blatter becoming a phantom of an almost forgotten past, the urge to reform is quickly receding. In fact, reform at FIFA is a bit like the ebb and flow. Its urgency, rises with the tide of public outrage at corruption scandals, and diminishes with public indifference in the face of a new business as usual.

Yesterday, 9 May 2017, we ebbed anew. It seems that the FIFA Council has decided that the time for reforms has past. New sponsors are lining up for the next world cups, the old guard is gone and the time seems ripe to turn the page. However, the institutional changes introduce over the last year made sense only if they are being monitored by strong independent institutions (the Ethics Committee and the Governance Committee), whose members do not feel that they are at the mercy of the power of the FIFA Council. Their role is to be disagreeable and to act as counter-powers, if they are dismissed at will when they do their job then the whole house of cards of FIFA reforms falls apart and we are back to square one. The dismissal and departure of independent and highly qualified academics like Miguel Maduro (with whom I  had the pleasure to work with at the European University Institute during my PhD) and Joseph Weiler are a sign that the Governance Committee and its capacity to control access to FIFA’s most powerful positions is being curtailed. Maybe it’s due, as some seem to think, to the Committee’s decision to bar access to the FIFA Council to Russia’s infamous former sports minister Mutko. In any event, it’s seems that FIFA’s strong (mostly) men are unimpressed by the benefits of “good governance”.

The tide will certainly turn again. Scandals will arise and force through new changes. Nonetheless, one is left to wonder whether the Swiss State and/or the European Union should not forcefully intervene to impose once and for all certain basic “constitutional” requirements  (e.g. independence, transparency, separation of powers) to a global body that exercises a strange form of public-private authority.

[1] 2016 FIFA Reform Committee Report, 2 December 2015, p. 1.

[2] Art. 27(8) FIFA Statutes.

[3] Art. 37 (3) FIFA Statutes.

[4] Art. 39(5) FIFA Statutes.

[5] Art. 51 FIFA Statutes.

[6] Art. 35 FIFA Statutes.

[7] Art. 33 FIFA Statutes.

[8] 2016 FIFA Reform Committee Report, 2 December 2015, p. 9.

[9] Art. 2 f) FIFA Statutes includes “the full participation of women at all levels of football governance” among the objectives of FIFA. The heading of Art. 4 FIFA Statues was amended to explicitly include ‘gender equality’.

[10] Art. 33(5) FIFA Statutes.

[11] Art. 39(2) FIFA Statutes.

[12] Art. 39(3) FIFA Statutes.

[13] Art. 40(1), Art. 41(2) and Art. 42 (1) FIFA Statutes.

[14] Art. 52(4) FIFA Statutes.

[15] Art. 51(1) FIFA Statutes.

[16] Art. 52(5) FIFA Statutes.

Editor's note: This report compiles all relevant news, events and materials on International and European Sports Law based on the daily coverage provided on our twitter feed @Sportslaw_asser. You are invited to complete this survey via the comments section below, feel free to add links to important cases, documents and articles we might have overlooked.

The Headlines 

Caster Semenya learns that it is not always easy for victims of discrimination to prevail in court

The world of sport held its breath as the Secretary General of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) Matthieu Reeb stood before the microphones on 1 May 2019 to announce the verdict reached by three arbitrators (one of them dissenting) in the landmark case involving the South African Olympic and world champion Caster Semenya. Somewhat surprisingly, the panel of arbitrators came to the conclusion that the IAAF’s regulations requiring female athletes with differences of sexual development to reduce their natural testosterone level below the limit of 5 nmol/L and maintain that reduced level for a continuous period of at least six months in order to be eligible to compete internationally at events between 400 metres and a mile, were necessary, reasonable and proportionate to attain the legitimate aim of ensuring fair competition in female athletics, even though the panel recognised that the regulations were clearly discriminatory. Ms Semenya’s legal team decided to file an appeal against the ruling at the Swiss Federal Tribunal. For the time being, this appears to be a good move since the tribunal ordered the IAAF at the beginning of June to suspend the application of the challenged regulations to Ms Semenya with immediate effect, which means that Ms Semenya for now continues to run medication-free.

Champions League ban looms on Manchester City

On 18 May 2019, Manchester City completed a historic domestic treble after defeating Watford 6-0 in the FA Cup Final. And yet there is a good reason to believe that the club’s executives did not celebrate as much as they would under normal circumstances. This is because only two days before the FA Cup Final the news broke that the chief investigator of the UEFA Club Financial Control Body (CFCB) had decided to refer Manchester City’s case concerning allegations of financial fair play irregularities to the CFCB adjudicatory chamber for a final decision. Thus, the chief investigator most likely found that Manchester City had indeed misled UEFA over the real value of its sponsorship income from the state-owned airline Etihad and other companies based in Abu Dhabi, as the leaked internal emails and other documents published by the German magazine Der Spiegel suggested. The chief investigator is also thought to have recommended that a ban on participation in the Champions League for at least one season be imposed on the English club. The club’s representatives responded to the news with fury and disbelief, insisting that the CFCB investigatory chamber had failed to take into account a comprehensive body of irrefutable evidence it had been provided with. They eventually decided not to wait for the decision of the CFCB adjudicatory chamber, which is yet to be adopted, and meanwhile took the case to the CAS, filing an appeal against the chief investigator’s referral.

The Brussels Court of Appeal dismisses Striani’s appeal on jurisdictional grounds

The player agent Daniele Striani failed to convince the Brussels Court of Appeal that it had jurisdiction to entertain his case targeting UEFA’s financial fair play regulations. On 11 April 2019, the respective court dismissed his appeal against the judgment of the first-instance court without pronouncing itself on the question of compatibility of UEFA’s financial fair play regulations with EU law. The court held that it was not competent to hear the case because the link between the regulations and their effect on Mr Striani as a player agent, as well as the link between the regulations and the role of the Royal Belgian Football Association in their adoption and enforcement, was too remote (for a more detailed analysis of the decision, see Antoine’s blog here). The Brussels Court of Appeal thus joined the European Court of Justice and the European Commission as both these institutions had likewise rejected to assess the case on its merits in the past.

Sports Law Related Decisions

• Court of Justice of the European Union (General Court) – Judgment in the case Real Madrid Club de Futbol v European Commission

Official Documents and Press Releases

CAS

• CAS – Caster Semenya, Athletics South Africa (ASA) and International Association of Athletics Federation (IAAF): Decision
• CAS – Caster Semenya, Athletics South Africa (ASA) and International Association of Athletics Federation (IAAF): Executive summary
• CAS – Decision in the arbitration procedure between Worawi Makudi and FIFA: Sanction reduced
• CAS – Elections of the Board Members of the International Council of Arbitration for Sport (ICAS)
• CAS – Weighlifters Mikalai Novikau and Ruslan Nurudinov found to have committed anti-doping rule violations at the London 2012 Olympic Games

FIFA

• FIFA – Adjudicatory Chamber of the independent Ethics Committee sanctions Jose Maria Marin
• FIFA – FIFA Appeal Committee confirms ban imposed on Marco Polo Del Nero
• FIFA – FIFA Appeal Committee passes decision on appeal lodged by Chelsea FC
• FIFA – FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 to be played with 32 teams
• FIFA – Nine individuals sanctioned for match manipulation
• FIFA – RSC Anderlecht and Belgian Football Association sanctioned for international transfers of minors
• FIFA – Worldwide extension of suspension imposed on intermediaries Carmine and Vincenzo Raiola

IOC

• IOC – From food and uniforms to sponsorship deals: IOC guides to help the Olympic Games and the sports sector adopt sustainable sourcing practices
• IOC – Future Olympic Games elections to be more flexible
• IOC – Independent research conducted on behalf of the IOC demonstrates global strength of the Olympic values
• IOC – IOC Evaluation Commission 2026 begins working visit to Milan-Cortina
• IOC – IOC Evaluation Commission confirms passion and expertise of Milan-Cortina project shaped by Olympic Agenda 2020
• IOC – IOC Executive Board proposes 10 new members for election to the IOC Session
• IOC – IOC releases Evaluation Commission 2026 report
• IOC – IOC sanctions one athlete for failing anti-doping tests at London 2012
• IOC – IOC sanctions two athletes for failing anti-doping tests at London 2012
• IOC – Uncovered: The work and value of the IOC Athletes’ Commission

UEFA

• UEFA – AC Milan referred to CFCB Adjudicatory Chamber
• UEFA – CFCB update on 2018/19 monitoring of clubs under FFP settlements
• UEFA – FK Vardar and PFC Levski Sofia avoid potential exclusion from UEFA club competitions
• UEFA – Law changes to apply from 25 June in UEFA competitions
• UEFA – Manchester City referred to CFCB Adjudicatory Chamber
• UEFA – Three clubs exit FFP settlement agreement
• UEFA – Time for Action: First ever UEFA women’s football strategy launched

WADA

• WADA – Timor-Leste becomes 188^th country to ratify UNESCO Anti-Doping Convention
• WADA – WADA announces self-suspension of the Helsinki laboratory
• WADA – WADA congratulates Presidential nominee Witold Banka
• WADA – WADA Foundation Board moves forward with implementation of governance reforms
• WADA – WADA hails 30^th Anniversary of Council of Europe Anti-Doping Convention
• WADA – WADA publishes four new Technical Documents
• WADA – WADA publishes independent report into allegations of improper conduct
• WADA – WADA publishes revised International Standard for Laboratories
• WADA – WADA publishes Stakeholder Notice regarding meat contamination
• WADA – WADA reinstates Bucharest Laboratory
• WADA – WADA statement on refusal of Beckie Scott and Edwin Moses to cooperate with independent investigation
• WADA – WADA successfully retrieves samples from Moscow Laboratory
• WADA – WADA welcomes significant decision by Court of Arbitration for Sport

Other

• AIU (Athletics Integrity Unit) – After Ukraine sprinters’ ban, AIU to extend its blood profiling strategy ahead of the IAAF World Championships Doha 2019
• AIU (Athletics Integrity Unit) – Athletics Integrity Unit and Abbott World Marathon Majors announce new intelligence and testing programme in groundbreaking anti-doping initiative
• Centre for Sport and Human Rights – Mapping accountability and remedy mechanisms for sport
• CIES Football Observatory World football expatriates: Global study 2019
• CIES Sports Intelligence – Governance and financial landscape of top European football clubs
• Council of Europe Ground-breaking international treaty on match-fixing to enter into force in September
• Human Rights Watch – Belarus: Use European games to spur media freedom
• IAAF – IAAF letter to the World Medical Association
• IAAF – IAAF publishes briefing notes and Q&A on female eligibility regulations
• TIU (Tennis Integrity Unit) – Benjamin D’Hoe suspended and fined for betting on tennis
• TIU (Tennis Integrity Unit) – Brazilian tennis player Joao Souza provisionally suspended by independent Anti-corruption Hearing Officer
• TIU (Tennis Integirty Unit) – Independent Anti-corruption Hearing Officer suspends Osman Torski for breach of the Tennis Anti-corruption programme
• TIU (Tennis Integrity Unit) – Independent members appointed to the Supervisory Board for Tennis Integrity
• TIU (Tennis Integrity Unit) – Issam Taweel found guilty of match-fixing offences by independent Anti-corruption Hearing Officer
• TIU (Tennis Integrity Unit) – Lifetime ban and $20,000 fine for Helen Ploskina after being found guilty of match-fixing offences
• TIU (Tennis Integrity Unit) – Nigerian tennis player Henry Atseye provisionally suspended by independent Anti-corruption Hearing Officer
• TIU (Tennis Integrity Unit) – Suspended sentence and fine for Mohamed Safwat after failing to report corrupt approaches to the Tennis Integrity Unit
• TIU (Tennis Integrity Unit) – Tennis coach Miguel Tobon suspended and fined for selling wild cards
• TIU (Tennis Integrity Unit) – Tennis umpire Svetlana Teryaeva facing sanction after failing to report a corrupt approach to the Tennis Integrity Unit
• TIU (Tennis Integrity Unit) – The Tennis Integrity Unit and Marco Trungelliti
• UCI (Union Cycliste Internationale) – UCI declaration concerning E-mountain bike
• UCI (Union Cycliste Internationale) – UCI statement on Operation Aderlass
• UOKiK (Office of Competition and Consumer Protection in Poland) – UOKiK will inspect sports associations
• World Medical Association Physician leaders reaffirm opposition to IAAF rules

In the news

Doping

• ESPN Kenya’s Olympic track coach banned 10 years
• Sean Ingle World’s top marathon runners to face innovative anti-doping programme
• Duncan Mackay Critics of WADA decision to reinstate Russia care more about politics than clean sport, claims President Sir Craig Reedie
• Michael Pavitt Arrests made in France over alleged drug trafficking operation
• Michael Pavitt Biathlon Integrity Unit to be set up by IBU in response to doping, fraud and corruption allegations
• Eddie Pells Polish minister to lead WADA; outspoken candidate sidelined
• Dan Roan US proposes making WADA funding conditional on governance reforms and greater transparency
• Gabrielle Tetrault-Farber Russian anti-doping chief calls for dismissal of athletics federation head

Football

• Associated Press FIFA bans South Sudanese official for taking soccer money
• BBC Sport Mino Raiola: Paul Pogba’s agent banned for three months by FIFA
• Andy Brown Bulgaria relegates FC Vereya on receipt of UEFA match-fixing information
• David Conn 2022 World Cup in Qatar to remain as a 32-team tournament, FIFA announces
• David Conn Manchester City accuse UEFA of leaks amid Champions League ban threat
• David Conn Manchester City furious after UEFA investigation is sent for final judgment
• David Conn Premier League clubs’ record £4.8 billion revenues widens gap to rest of Europe
• David Conn Premier League finances: The full club-by-club breakdown and verdict
• David Conn Promotion and relegation part of explosive Champions League plans
• Marina Hyde UEFA’s ‘parking ticket’ fines will not rein in football’s maverick clubs
• Sean Ingle Manchester City and PSG should be thrown out of Europe, says La Liga president
• Amy Lawrence and Sean Ingle Arsenal’s Henrikh Mkhitaryan to miss Europa League final over safety fears
• Liam Morgan Sierra Leone could be welcomed back by FIFA after president and secretary general cleared of corruption
• Tariq Panja A trove of FIFA secrets, locked inside a New Jersey storage locker
• Tariq Panja Bundesliga’s chief executive isn’t keen to join Premier League
• Tariq Panja China’s soccer push takes a new tack: Naturalizing foreign players
• Tariq Panja FIFA drops plan for 48-team World Cup in 2022
• Tariq Panja For Europe’s soccer chief, the outrage arrives in waves
• Tariq Panja In Europe, a bitter battle between clubs and leagues is taking shape
• Tariq Panja In soccer’s biggest elections, accusations are common but challengers are not
• Tariq Panja Powerful Sheikh linked to bribe scheme is still a soccer power
• Tariq Panja Proposal to restructure Champions League leaves out most of Europe
• Tariq Panja Sepp Blatter, who departed FIFA in scandal, wants the watches he left at the office
• Tariq Panja She has friends at FIFA. At home, it’s mostly critics.
• Tariq Panja UEFA investigators set to seek Manchester City’s ban from Champions League
• Martyn Ziegler Europa League final: Azerbaijan, the host country where journalist Rasim Aliyev was killed for criticising Azerbaijan midfielder Javid Huseynov 

Other

• Eyewitness News Kenya drops two female sprinters over testosterone levels
• Nancy Gillen FIVB to refer human rights abuse allegations surrounding Cambodian Volleyball Federation President to ethics panel
• Mark Gleeson South African government instructs athletics body to appeal Semenya decision
• Gerald Imray Defiant Caster Semenya appeals testosterone ruling
• Sean Ingle AIBA threatens to sue IOC if stripped of right to run amateur boxing
• Sean Ingle AIBA stripped of right to run boxing tournament at Tokyo Olympics
• Sean Ingle BeIN Sports chief in World Athletics Championships corruption inquiry
• Sean Ingle Caster Semenya Q&A: The runner’s discrimination case explained
• Sean Ingle Semenya loses landmark legal case against IAAF over testosterone levels
• Sean Ingle Caster Semenya vs. IAAF: The inside story of sporting trial of the century
• Sean Ingle Caster Semenya to run in Doha as Sebastian Coe welcomes CAS ruling
• Duncan Mackay Italian government to sign IOC guarantees for Milan Cortina 2026, including EUR 415 million security budget
• Liam Morgan German athletes group steps up call for increased representation and bigger share of Olympic revenue
• Tariq Panja After Semenya ruling, sports federations ponder what’s next
• Tariq Panja Qatari executive is charged with corruption in IAAF scandal
• Michael Pavitt Bach tells athletes to begin negotiations with NOCs over Rule 40 restrictions
• Michael Pavitt GAISF considers establishing office to lobby European Union and create framework over third-party organisers
• Michael Pavitt UCI President fears ‘serious issue’ after arbitrators asked to choose between working exclusively for CAS or international federations
• Mike Rowbottom Message to the Olympic Movement in the face of new commercial threats – keep the athletes’ eyes on the golden prize
• Mike Rowbottom IOC maintains German athletes’ court decision over Rule 40 is ‘not generally applicable’
• Stephen Wade and Mari Yamaguchi IOC inspectors face report on tough Olympic work conditions
• Martyn Ziegler Sport won’t be overrun by intersex athletes, says Caster Semenya’s expert witness

Academic Materials

Books

•  Johan Lindholm The Court of Arbitration for Sport and its Jurisprudence: An Empirical Inquiry into Lex Sportiva

International Sports Law Journal

• H. Burak Gemalmaz Applicability of Human Rights Standards in Turkish Football Arbitration: The Contribution of the European Court of Human Rights
• Lloyd Freeburn The Fiction of Democracy in FIFA’s Governance of Football and the Case of Football Federation Australia
• Marlaina Lemmon Evening the Playing Field: Women’s Sport as a Vehicle for Human Rights
• Kendra Magraw Separation of Sport and State: Military Salutations at US Major League Soccer Events
• Daniel West Revitalising a Phantom Regime: The Adjudication of Human Rights Complaints in Sport

Other

• April Henning and Paul Dimeo Perceptions of Legitimacy, Attitudes and Buy-in Among Athlete Groups: A Cross-national Qualitative Investigation Providing Practical Solutions
• Seema Patel and Ian Varley Exploring the Regulation of Genetic Testing in Sport

Blog

Asser International Sports Law Blog

• Antoine Duval What Happens in Switzerland Stays in Switzerland: The Striani Judgment of the Brussels Court of Appeals
• Daniela Heerdt Will the World Cup 2022 Expansion Mark the Beginning of the End of FIFA’s Human Rights Journey?
• Thomas Terraz Can European Citizens Participate in National Championships? An Analysis of AG Tanchev’s Opinion in TopFit e.V. Daniele Biffi v Deutscher Leichtathletikverband e.V.
• Thomas Terraz League of Legends European Championships: Challenging the Boundaries of Sport in EU Law
• Marjolaine Viret How Data Protection Crystallises Key Legal Challenges in Anti-Doping

Law in Sport

• Jiri Janak Judicial oversight of sports associations in the Czech Republic – does the new Civil Code strike the right balance between autonomy and intervention?
• Lucio Mazzei The global development of women’s football – a review of the strategies being implemented by FIFA, UEFA and in Italy
• Adam Powell Stadium naming deals: Why clubs and sponsors should always consider their termination rights
• Andrew Reid Football kit supplier deals – lessons for clubs on ‘matching rights’ from the Sports Direct v Rangers FC case
• Celia Rooney Sex on a spectrum in the binary world of sport: The CAS’s decision in the case of Caster Semenya & Ors v the IAAF

Other

• Andy Brown Red herrings, dead cats, apples and oranges: The gender debate
• Steve Cornelius Caster Semenya: The legal and ethical issues that should concern us all
• Sam Knight How Football Leaks is exposing corruption in European soccer
• Steve Magness All of your questions answered on the Caster Semenya controversy
• Despina Mavromati FIM v. KMSC – Arbitration clause in the statutes of a sports federation and Article 75 Swiss Civil Code
• Michael McCann U.S. soccer, Relevent Sports and the legal battle over staging matches on USA soil
• Roger Pielke Jr Caster Semenya ruling: Sports federation is flouting ethics rules
• Roger Pielke Jr. Pielke comments on Semenya/ASA vs. IAAF

Upcoming Events

• 30 June -14 July – CLS Summer School 2019: Global Law of Sport, Patejdlova Bouda, Giant Mountains, Czech Republic
• 30-31 August – Third EU Sports Law and Policy Summer School, Edge Hill University, UK
• 12-13 September – Understand the Rules of the Game 2019: LawInSport Annual Conference, London, UK
• 27-28 September – 8^th International Congress on Football Law, Madrid, Spain
• 13-16 October – Play the Game 2019: Athlete Power on the Rise, Colorado Springs, USA
• 24-25 October – Third Annual International Sports Law Conference of the International Sports Law Journal, T.M.C. Asser Institute, The Hague, Netherlands

Editor's note: This is a short introduction written for the special Issue of the Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law celebrating the 20 years of the Bosman ruling and dedicated to the new frontiers of EU law and Sport (the articles are available here). For those willing to gain a deeper insight into the content of the Issue we organize (in collaboration with Maastricht University and the Maastricht Journal) a launching event with many of the authors in Brussels tomorrow (More info here).

 20 Years After Bosman - The New Frontiers of EU Law and Sport

By Antoine Duval

The Bosman ruling is not just another ruling of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU), it is by far the most well-known decision of the Court outside of the Euro-bubble.[1] In the UK the phrase ‘a Bosman’ is commonly used to qualify the free move of a football player to a new club at the end of his contract. Beyond its anchoring in the English idiom, Bosman stands out as a shared European reference. However, it is often – misleadingly - credited for all the ills and wrongs of football. In any case, it is part and parcel of the European (even worldwide) public debate on football and its regulation. If a European public sphere is to emerge at some point, the heated public discussion that was triggered in Europe by Bosman is probably an avant-goût of it. Therefore, 20 years after the ruling, the least a European sports lawyer and academic can do, is to acknowledge ones indebtedness and, to some extent, gratitude for this ruling.

One aspect that needs to be emphasized is that Bosman is not an instrument with the paramount objective to deregulate the football market or the world of sport in general. It is not, as many on the side of the Sports Governing Bodies (SGBs), and FIFA and UEFA in particular, have portrayed it, a decision aimed at destroying the transnational legal system (also known as lex sportiva) they had put in place to coordinate the organization and unfolding of transnational sporting competitions. On the contrary, SGBs have the possibility to justify their rules and regulations. As Stephen Weatherill rightly pointed out long ago, the only requirement SGBs have to fulfil to ensure that their regulations comply with EU law is to explain convincingly why they are needed.[2] Thus, a constructive (and positive) perspective on Bosman stresses its constitutional over its deregulatory function. Private regulations adopted by private powers, which are not particularly renowned for the quality of their governance, need to be subject to checks and balances. After Bosman, the EU free movement rights and competition law have impersonated such a check on (or counter-power to) the rules privately adopted and enforced by SGBs. In fact, it is here that the true, long-lasting legacy of Bosman lies.

This issue brings together a mixed line-up of both young and established scholars, sports law experts and EU law specialists, to discuss the legacy of Bosman and the future of the relationship between EU law and sport. Besides the synthetic and comprehensive introductory piece of Stefaan Van Den Bogaert that brings us back to the original crusade of Mr Bosman, all the contributions are geared towards the recent and future legacies of the ruling. A broad range of legal problems raised by the interaction of EU law and sport is touched upon. 

In the first article, Ben Van Rompuy builds on Advocate General Lenz’s conclusions in Bosman, the following practice adopted by the EU Commission as well as on the case law of the CJEU on competition law and sport to argue that competition law can be a powerful tool to impose a legal check on the regulatory practices of SGBs.

In the second piece, Phedon Nicolaides analyses a relatively new front line between EU law and sport: state aid. Although not directly connected to Bosman, state aid cases are taking a prominent place in the practice of the EU Commission in the field of sport. In fact, state aid law has become a useful legal proxy to control the way public authorities decide to support economically sporting organizations and their events.

The third piece by the editor of this issue is dedicated to the interaction between the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) and EU law. Indeed, the emergence of the CAS is probably the most important institutional legacy of Bosman, and EU law now has a role to play in exercising a form of ‘Solange’ control over CAS’s judicial activity.

In the fourth article, which follows most clearly into the footpath of Bosman, Richard Parrish discusses the compatibility of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfers of Players (RSTP) with EU law. He suggests that the RSTP as it stands can be deemed contrary to EU law.

The fifth article of the issue by Jacob Kornbeck, a former member of the sports unit of the European Commission, analyses the role of the Commission in the drafting process of the new World Anti-Doping Code recently adopted by the World Anti-Doping Agency. He highlights that the ethos of Bosman spread to other spheres of action of the EU in sport and shows concretely in what way it influenced the position of the EU in the negotiations over the new Code that entered into force in January 2015. Finally, Anna Sabrina Wollmann, Olivier Vonk and Gerard-René de Groot look at the growing problem of nationality requirements in sports. If Bosman stands more particularly for an Europeanization of football, globalization and the ease of cross-border movement for professional sportspeople have heightened the question of the sporting nationality of athletes worldwide. This contribution critically analyses the many calls for a separate sporting nationality and proposes an alternative path.

[1] Case C-415/93 Union royale belge des sociétés de football association ASBL v. Jean-Marc Bosman, Royal club liégeois SA v. Jean-Marc Bosman and others and Union des associations européennes de football (UEFA) v. Jean-Marc Bosman, EU:C:1995:463.

[2] ‘The ECJ has collapsed the idea that there are purely sporting practices unaffected by EC law despite their economic effect, but it has not refused to accept that sport is special. Its message to governing bodies – explain how!’, S. Weatherill, European Sports Law (T.M.C. Asser Press, 2007), p. 353.