The UK Modern Slavery Act Two Years After: Where do we stand? - By Sara Martinetto

Editor's note: Sara Martinetto is a research intern at the T.M.C. Asser Institute. She has recently completed her LLM in Public International Law at the University of Amsterdam. She holds interests in Migration Law, Criminal Law, Human Rights and European Law, with a special focus on their transnational dimension.

In my previous blog, I explained how the negotiations on a prospective Treaty on Business and Human Rights are going hand-in-hand with the implementation of the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs). The Principles – developed by Professor John Ruggie, and approved by the UN Human Rights Council in 2011 – have attracted widespread consensus among both States and corporations.[1]  Nowadays, the UNGPs are regarded as crucial to hold corporations accountable for human rights abuses connected to their activities. However, the UNGPs are not binding, and they need to be operationalized in national law, as reaffirmed in Human Right Council Resolution 26/22. To date, National Action Plans[2] appear as the preferred tool to transpose the Principles into national law. Nevertheless, their provisions are often of a descriptive nature, resembling more a declaration of intent rather than an effective implementation of the UNGPs.[3] Only recently, some States have actually adopted hard law instruments on Business and Human Rights, and the UK Modern Slavery Act (2015) is one of them. The Act, aimed at tackling modern slavery and human trafficking, was sponsored by Theresa May and Lord Bates in 2014 and came into force on 29 October 2015.

Almost two years from the entry into force of the Act, this post aims at giving a brief account of what the Modern Slavery Act is and how it has been applied so far. The main focus will be on Section 54 of the Act (‘Transparency in the supply chain’), which prescribes a reporting obligation for corporations.


Background

The Modern Slavery Act is considered as part of a broader set of hard law instruments adopted in the face of the inability of soft law to prevent and punish corporate abuses.[4] This array of laws ranges from the California Transparency in the Supply Chain Act of 2010 (which has deeply influenced the UK Act),[5] to the EU Non-Financial Reporting Directive of 2014, and the French ‘due diligence’ law of 2016.

However, there is a fundamental difference between the Modern Slavery Act and its American and French counterparts: it aims at tackling modern slavery and human trafficking in a broad sense, even when these crimes have been committed without any connection with corporations. For example, the Act covers offences against domestic workers, who work in the employer’s household and not in a company.[6] In fact, the Act has been adopted in the aftermath of the European Court of Human Rights ruling in C.N. v United Kingdom, where the Court found the UK lacking of an adequate legal framework to tackle violations of Art. 4 ECHR (prohibition on slavery). Thus, the Act implements relevant international and European instruments regarding modern slavery and human trafficking.[7] 

Therefore, the primary aim of the Act is to establish criminal liability for natural persons committing such crimes. Indeed, the first version of the Bill did not contain any reference to modern slavery in the supply chain. It was only due to the strong criticism the draft attracted, especially in the light of the recent scandals some British corporations were involved in, that the British Parliament decided to introduce a provision addressing exploitative practices perpetrated by businesses (Section 54).[8] 

Therefore, one fundamental point is to be stressed: natural persons can be criminally liable under the Modern Slavery Act. Members of any entity, be it a criminal organisation or a company, may be found guilty of human trafficking and modern slavery.[9] What Section 54 prescribe is a separate obligation, binding on corporations, to report whether the offences covered by the Act occur in any part of their business. Thus, only Section 54 has been regarded as an implementation of UNGPs.[10]

 

The offences covered by the Act

Before diving into the analysis of the obligations set out in Section 54, it might be useful to look at what offences are covered by the provision. This analysis serves two purposes: it allows drawing some general considerations on the Act and it defines which criminal conducts have to be reported by corporations.[11]

Paragraph 12 of Section 54 recalls the offences defined in the first two sections of the Act (specified in Section 3 and 4), together with some similar provisions, contained in other pieces of legislations enacted in Scotland and Northern Ireland.[12] All in all, four crimes are listed: slavery, servitude, forced or compulsory labour, and human trafficking.

Notwithstanding the reference made by the Modern Slavery Act to Art. 4 ECHR, the constitutive elements of such crimes are the object of much debate in international legal scholarship, which lead to a proliferation of different definitions.[13] Therefore, ‘modern slavery’ is used as an all-encompassing concept, which includes ‘all activities involving someone obtaining or holding another person in compelled service’.[14] As a result, the judiciary enjoys a great margin of discretion in defining the scope of application of the Act.

Furthermore, it is worth noting that the narrative surrounding modern slavery often revolves around human trafficking and sexual exploitation, and the UK Modern Slavery Act is no exception to it. This appears clearly both from the focus maintained during the negotiations of the Act and from the Modern Slavery Strategy adopted by the British Government in November 2014.[15] As a result, modern slavery is considered more an immigration and border control problem, rather than a question of labour standards and corporate conduct.[16] However, according to the International Labour Organisation, only 29% of people implicated in modern slavery actually crossed borders.

Thus, the broad scope of application of the Act, and the political orientation underlying it, pose the risk of narrowing down the focus of investigations on natural persons, disregarding enslavement practices which did not entail trafficking. This emphasis placed on migration-related exploitation could ultimately have a negative impact on the understanding businesses have of what constitutes modern slavery under the Act. Therefore, it is up to companies covered by Section 54 to report each and every exploitative practice occurring in their supply chain, regardless of their link with migration issues.

 

Section 54

Section 54 obliges any company with a minimum global turnover of £36m, which supplies goods or services in the United Kingdom, to produce a slavery and human trafficking statement for each financial year. The statement has to be approved by the board, signed by the director and published on the company’s website. Each element of this provision is in need of further clarification.

First of all, a slavery and human trafficking statement requires an analysis of the steps the corporation has adopted to prevent these crimes from occurring in its supply chain or in any part of its business. This would compel corporations to come clean about the possible presence of such exploitative practices in their supply chain. However, Section 54(4)(b) explicitly provides for the possibility to state that no such steps have been taken: there is no legal obligations for corporations covered by the Act to assure that their products and services are “slavery and trafficking – free”.

Moreover, there is no indication on how this Statement should be drafted. Ideally, it would include the elements listed in Paragraph 5 of the Section: the structure of a company and of its supply chain; slavery and human trafficking internal policies; due diligence processes adopted with regard to these crimes; risk assessment and risk management of exploitative practice along the supply chain; effectiveness of the measures taken; the training about slavery and human trafficking available to its staff. However, these components are introduced in the provision by the word “may”, leaving it totally up to corporations to decide whether to include such items in their own statement. In particular, there is no indication of what “supply chain” means: according to the guidelines issued by the Home Office, this expression has to be read in its “everyday meaning”.

Two considerations might be drawn from these first two points. Firstly, one can only notice the discrepancies between the obligation set out in Section 54, and the due diligence obligation enshrined in Principle 17 UNGPs. According to this provision, due diligence consists in “assessing actual and potential human rights impacts, integrating and acting upon the findings, tracking responses, and communicating how impacts are addressed”. Section 54 focuses only on the last element, leaving outside its scope measures related with modern slavery risk assessment and management, which are recalled in Paragraph 5 as a mere suggestion. In so doing, this norm falls very short of the previous attempt by the judiciary to establish a duty of care for parent companies vis-à-vis operations of their suppliers and subsidiaries.[17] Secondly, companies are left with a great margin of appreciation on what constitutes their supply chain, and whether they should disclose data regarding the far ends of their businesses (e.g. indirect suppliers, suppliers of minimal components of the finished good etc.).[18]

Regarding the personal scope of application, Section 54 applies to all enterprises which carry out their business or part of their business in the United Kingdom (54.12), whatever their State of incorporation. Overall, the Government estimates the provision applies to around 12000 entities. The underlying idea is to render the British market free from modern slavery. Even if many have welcomed this sort of extraterritorial reach of the provision, others have criticised its mildness.[19] In fact, the provision does not apply to foreign subsidiaries which, albeit fully-owned by British companies, do not do any business in the UK. In such way, a large segment of some companies’ operations might fall outside the scope of the provision. Moreover, the expression “to carry on a business” has been defined neither by the Act itself, nor by the Government, which stated that the wording is to be interpreted following a “common sense approach”: the extent to which companies operate in the UK market is irrelevant, as long as their corporate presence is “demonstrable”.[20]

Undoubtedly, the approval of the statement by the board and its signature by the director has the positive effect of placing the modern slavery issue at a prominent place in companies’ agendas. Moreover, the statement has to be published on a visible part of the company’s website, or be disclosed if requested, in case no website is available (54.7-8). The possibility to access the statements is of the utmost importance, especially if one considers the sanction regime prescribed by Section 54: the only possible remedy against a failure to comply with the reporting obligation is to start a civil proceeding aimed at obtaining an injunction to comply and a non-specified fine. Thus, the Act heavily relies on the scrutiny that consumers, partners, and investors could exercise on the statements. In order words, the rationale of the provision is that enterprises will not only comply, but also adopt a proactive stand against modern slavery, in order to avoid the reputational risk of being associated with such offences. Perhaps, failure to comply or publishing cursory statements could be an incentive for authorities to investigate the company. However, this would only be an indirect consequence of the Act.

 

How Section 54 is being applied in practice

The assessment of the statements published pursuant to Section 54 is hindered by the lack of a central public database collecting all of them. Thus, monitoring of publications has been left to civil society. The Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, in collaboration with other organisations, has created the UK Modern Slavery Act Registry. The Registry performs an essential function, namely it creates a level playing field for all corporations, since they are all exposed to the same public scrutiny. 

Two major reports have examined the statements released in 2016 (here and here). From their findings it is possible to appraise some positive trends. No company has declared that no steps have been taken; conversely, there is an increasing engagement in the issue, resulting in greater allocation of resources in tackling exploitative practices. However, numerous shortcomings have also been reported: many statements fail to meet minimum requirements set out in the provision (e.g. they are not signed or they are not visibly published on websites), and do not include the optional elements listed in Paragraph 5. Specifically, businesses omitted a complete account of the structure of their supply chain, making it impossible for the public to grasp how businesses are organised beyond the first tier of suppliers. Additionally, if the Act provides for very limited sanctions in case of non-compliance, no actual sanctions are prescribed in case of poor-quality disclosure. [21]

It is true that many companies had never performed this type of investigation before 2016. Thus, it is possible that the quality of statements will improve over time. To date, it is hard to assess the evolution between 2016 and 2017, since those organisations whose financial year ends between 29 October 2015 and 30 March 2016 were exonerated from publishing the 2015/2016 statement. In a 2017 report, Ergon found marginal progress in reporting techniques, although in most cases it remains unclear how investigations, risk assessment and management have been performed.


Concluding remarks

The UK Modern Slavery Act has been described as an “example of meta-regulation”,[22] or even of “reflexive law”,[23] a sort of hybridization between public and private governance. It establishes a minimal hard-law framework (i.e. the reporting obligation), and then leaves private entities free to decide how to implement it. Supposedly, an advantage of this approach is the higher knowledge corporations possess about their own supply chain, which could result in better strategies to tackle modern slavery.[24] At the same time, public intervention helps to create a level playing field among corporations, where everyone is subject to the same level of inspection. In this way, companies would be invited to be transparent, without the fear that disclosure would leave them alone into the public eye. Therefore, the idea is to create a virtuous cycle, were corporations would start a sort of race to the top to eradicate modern slavery.  

Unfortunately, not all that glitters is gold. In practice, the UK Modern Slavery Act seems to be a weak form of regulation, which is “fully dependent on private governance tools, standards, and enforcement mechanisms”, without any reference to international standards and no proper sanctions in case of non-compliance.[25] It has been described as “little more than an endorsement of existing voluntary CSR reporting”.[26] The freedom of enterprises in carrying out their reporting obligation is accompanied by the fear they will fulfil it in the way it suits them best, using the statement to promote  their virtuous practices and to hide the less-virtuous ones. The use of independent experts who would perform unannounced inspections remains a mere recommendation.[27] Even more voluntary appears to be the performance of a full-blown due diligence appraisal as prescribed by Principle 17 of the UNGPs, which the Acts lists among the voluntary features of an already very weak reporting obligation.

In the awareness of the Act’s weaknesses, a new bill amending Section 54 was presented to the British House of Lords. This amendment would make the reporting requirements more stringent, and would also attach further consequences to non-compliance. However, the discussion is stalling, and, for now, victims of modern slavery practices seem to be left with an Act that glitters, but it is certainly not gold.


[1] M. Neglia, The UNGPs – Five Years On, in Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, Vol. 34/4, 2016, 294

[2] A general overview is available here

[3] M. Neglia, op. cit., 303

[4] R. E. Cîrlig, Business and Human Rights: from soft law to hard law?, in Juridical Tribune, Vol. 6, 2016, 229

[5] S. Wen, The Cogs and Wheels of Reflexive Law – Business Disclosure under the Modern Slavery Act, in Journal of Law and Society, vol. 43, 2016, 345

[6] J. Haynes, The Modern Slavery Act (2015): a Legislative Commentary, in Statute Law Review, vol. 37, 2016, 36

[7] Among others, it draws upon the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punishing Trafficking (2000), ratified by the UK in 2006, the Council of Europe Anti-Trafficking Convention (2005), ratified by the UK in 2008, and the EU Anti-trafficking Directive 2011/36/EU, to which the UK has opted in. See J. Haynes, op. cit., 34 - 37

[8] S. Wen, op. cit., 341

[9] Some of these cases have already attracted much attention from the media. Among others, one should mention R v Mohammed Rafiq [2016] EWCA Crim 1368, Court of Appeal, and the Galdikas & Ors v DJ Houghton Catching Services Ltd & Ors [2016] EWHC 1376 (QB). In particular, the latter generated much clamour, since the products under scrutinywere then supplied to big companies, such as Tesco and McDonalds.

[10] J. Planitzer, Trafficking in Human Beings for the purpose of Labour Exploitation, in Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, vol. 34/4, 2016, 322

[11] S. Wen, op. cit., 332

[12] Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2015 (c. 2 (N.I.)), Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003 (asp 7), Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010

[13] See footnote 7. S. Gold et al., Modern Slavery challenges to supply chain management, in Supply Chain Management: an International Journal, 2015, 485; J. Haynes, op. cit., 39. For a comprehensive analysis see H. van der Wilt, Trafficking in Human Beings, Enslavement, Crimes against Humanity: Unravelling the concepts, in Chinese Journal of International Law, 2014, 297-334

[14] J. Haynes, op. cit., 35; S. Wen, op. cit., 331

[15] G. Craig, The UK’s Modern Slavery Legislation: An Early Assessment in Progress,  in Social Inclusion, vol. 5, 2017, 19-20; H. Lewis et al, Hyper-precarious lives: migrants, work and forced labour in the Global North, in Progress in Human Geography, vol. 39(5), 2015, 590

[16] J. Fudge, The dangerous appeal of the modern slavery paradigm, Open Democracy, 25 March 2015

[17] Chandler v Cape Plc [2012] EWCA Civ 525 (England, Court of Appeal, 25 April 2012). The effects of this judgement have been limited afterwards, in Thompson v The Renwick Group Plc [2014] EWCA Civ 635 (13 May 2014)

[18] S. Wen, op. cit., 353

[19] S. Wen, op. cit., 351

[20] Home Office, Transparency in the Supply Chain: a Practical Guide, 29 Oct 2015, 8

[21] S. Wen, op. cit., 355

[22] M. Neglia, The UNGPs – Five Years On, in Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, Vol. 34/4, 2016, 314

[23] See W. E. Scheuermann, Reflexive Law and the Challenges of Globalization, in The Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 9, 2011, 81-102

[24] S. Wen, op. cit., 346

[25] G. LeBaron, A. Ruehmkorf, Steering CSR Through Home State Regulation: A Comparison of the Impact of the UK Bribery Act and Modern Slavery Act on Global Supply Chain Governance, in Global Policy, 2017, 17

[26] G. LeBaron, A. Ruehmkorf, op. Cit., 20

[27] Home Office, Transparency in the Supply Chain: a Practical Guide, 29 Oct 2015, 33

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Doing Business Right Blog | Regulating the Gig Economy: A Workers’ Rights Perspective - By Elisa Chiaro

Regulating the Gig Economy: A Workers’ Rights Perspective - By Elisa Chiaro

Editor’s Note: Elisa Chiaro is a legal consultant focussing on Business and Human Rights and International Criminal Law. In 2016 she completed an LL.M. at SOAS, University of London. Before that she worked for five years as international corporate lawyer both in Italy and UK. She is admitted to the Bar in Italy.

  

1.      Introduction

In current discourse, the most pressing issues concerning human rights and business are often associated with the developing countries to which manufacturing is outsourced. However, the “western world” also faces new challenges as far as workers’ rights are concerned.

It is cheap and convenient for people to book a car ride or order their favourite takeaway meal at a few swipes of their smartphone. App-based service companies are thus very popular among consumers – and are consequently flourishing. Conversely, some doubts have been cast on the fairness of the working conditions of people contracted by these companies. A central issue in this respect relates to the status of their workers, who on paper are self-employed, but in reality are subject to the control of the company, a condition which clashes with being independent. This post aims firstly to analyse the labour conditions of gig economy workers in Europe, with a focus on some of the main service platforms, namely Uber, Deliveroo, Foodora, and Hermes Parcels: the majority of these companies, Uber in particular, are transnational, operating in many national markets and adopting the same business model based on flexible work and lack of security for workers in each market. Secondly, it will scrutinise how National and European institutions and courts are augmenting gig economy workers’ conditions for the better. The issue is crucial in the UK, especially following September’s decision by Transport of London (“TFL”) to reject Uber’s application for a new London license, but legal disputes have also started in other countries (in, among others, the UK, Italy and the USA). The UK Parliament is also discussing the matter, and the EU Commission has started a round table with trade unions and employers to find new solutions to address the issue.

 

2.      Gig economy: flexibility vs security

The development of new digital technologies, in particular ride-hailing and food delivery apps easily accessible to everyone who possesses a smartphone, has undoubtedly changed our lives. However this phenomenon also has some downsides which are clearly visible in the context of the gig economy. Despite the fact that, from the consumer’s point of view, these services are efficient (both in terms of time and cost) and convenient, they have created a new category of so-called workers “on tap”, as the The Economist labels them.[1] The term “gig work” was first used at the beginning of the 20th century for jazz musicians who got their wage (“gig”) every night after their performance. In 2009, the expression “gig economy” was adopted to describe those who, during the financial crisis, started to engage in numerous part-time jobs.[2]

A key company in the gig economy is Uber. Founded in San Francisco in 2009, it is a ride-hailing app, and now operates in 633 cities worldwide. The European subsidiary of the American company is incorporated in The Netherlands. The company maintains that in London, a focal hub of its business, it has around 3.5 million users (this number refers to anyone who has used the service in London in the period July-September 2017). Another important actor is Roofoods Ltd, operating as Deliveroo, a London-based food-delivery company founded in 2013 transporting restaurant orders by bicycle, motorcycle or car couriers. It operates in 12 countries and (as of September 2016) provides jobs to around 20,000 people.[3] Foodora, a German company similar to Deliveroo, is involved in food delivery in more than 260 cities worldwide and employs around 22,000 people. Other significant companies in this space include parcel delivery companies such as Hermes. The company runs a UK logistics and delivery business, with around 2,800 employees and a network of 10,500 self-employed delivery couriers who work on a day-to-day basis.[4]

These companies certainly appear to be creating jobs: in London around 40,000 drivers work for Uber and, in 2015, Uber cars in New York outnumbered traditional yellow cabs.[5] Moreover, most of the services offered do not imply extra costs; on the contrary, using these services can be cheaper than procuring them in more traditional and longer-established ways.

The motto of most of the companies mentioned above is “flexibility”, which is closely intertwined with the fact that all of the people that drive or ride for them are self-employed. However, where for some people being self-employed is a free and conscious choice motivated by “autonomy and flexibility”, for others it constitutes a “necessary choice” because they do not have another “traditional” job or, alternatively, because their traditional job’s income is insufficient.[6] Clearly flexibility is not negative tout-court, unless it is one-sided. It might be positive insofar as it allows for the creation of potential new job opportunities benefiting more people, but it might also become problematic if the model is adopted just to cut costs, and if the level of control the employer exerts over its workers becomes too great. As stated in the July 2017 Taylor Review of Modern Working Practices (“Taylor Review”), drafted by an independent panel of experts upon the UK Government’s request, “[b]eing able to work when you want is a good thing; not knowing whether you have work from one day to the next when you have bills to pay is not.”[7] The crucial point goes as follows: describing the employment status of gig economy workers as self-employed, while in reality their freedom is very limited, will deprive them of some fundamental labour rights, such as sick pay, holiday leave, and entitlement to the national minimum wage, among other rights.

 

3.      The UK approach: TFL decision and UK Parliament enquiry

In the UK the debate surrounding on-demand workers’ rights is very lively, and reached its peak with September’s decision by TFL, openly supported by London Mayor Sadiq Khan, not to renew Uber’s operating licence in London. The decision was justified due to Uber’s “lack of corporate responsibility” but it focused specifically on issues linked to passenger safety.[8] However Sadiq Khan in his article published in The Guardian, supporting TFL’s decision, specifically stated that the “regulatory environment is critical in protecting Londoners’ safety, maintaining workplace standards for drivers […].”[9]The company, following the apology of the Chief executive Dara Khosrowshahi for its past actions, appealed against the decision and in any case will continue operating until the appeal decision is issued,[10] as provided for in The Private Hire Vehicles (London) Act 1998. Many criticisms were raised against TFL’s decision: on one side by consumers (a petition to save Uber was set up and in a few days obtained more than 800,000 signatures) and by some drivers on the other. They claimed that, instead of solving workers’ problems, the decision harmed Uber drivers and was just aimed at protecting Black cab drivers, the majority of which are allegedly white and English.[11]

The conditions of gig economy workers, and in particular Uber’s drivers, were analysed back in December 2016 in a report by MP Frank Field, titled “Sweated Labour: Uber and the ‘gig economy’” (based on submissions from 83 private hire drivers, the majority of whom worked for Uber). It concluded that despite being self-employed, “[d]rivers cannot set their own fares, or choose which jobs to undertake, for example. Many are totally dependent on Uber for their income and they all must meet certain conditions to continue receiving work.” Moreover the report stated that drivers are taking home around £2 per hour – less than a third of the national living wage – due primarily to the costs they have to bear, namely a vehicle that meets Uber standards, plus refuelling and maintaining it. Interestingly, one of the recommendations listed in the report was towards TFL, which was called on to consider the abovementioned elements of the report when it came to renewing Uber’s operating licence.       

Even if some positive results have been achieved (for example, in April 2017 Uber declared that its drivers could sign up to a security scheme with the aim to cover them in the event they were unable to work), working conditions are still inadequate. This is clear from the findings of the UK House of Commons Work and Pension Committee (“WPC”), which more recently scrutinised issues connected to the gig economy. The WPC held that, instead of flexibility, workers suffered “low pay, inflexibility in working times, long hours, instability, and difficulties in taking time off (such as for a holiday or for sick leave).”[12] Specifically referring to the Deliveroo contract, the WPC underlined how the company explicitly denied their workers the right to present any claim to challenge their employment status (Clause 2.2).[13] Moreover Clause 2.3 of the contract states that if, despite this Clause 2.2, the worker presents any claim against the company, he/she “[…] undertake[s] to indemnify and keep indemnified Deliveroo against costs (including legal costs) and expenses that it incurs in connection with those proceedings, and [the worker] agree[s] that Deliveroo may set off any sum owed to [the worker] against any damages, compensation, costs or other sum that may be awarded to [the worker] in those proceedings.” 

Finally, in October 2017 the representatives of Deliveroo, Uber and Hermes Parcels appeared before the UK Parliament Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee (“BEIS Committee”) to give evidence and discuss, among other things, the Taylor Review. The three representatives of, respectively, Deliveroo, Hermes and Uber, argued that flexibility was crucial and benefitted riders and drivers. Specifically, Deliveroo’s UK managing director claimed that at least 50 per cent of their riders were students carrying out paid work alongside other activities, and further stated that the additional labour rights for workers (if self-employed contractors were to be recognised as employed) would lead to a company cost increase of around £1 per hour of rider/driver time. Hermes director of legal and public affairs asserted that the recognition of workers’ employment status would cost the company around £58.8 million (given holiday pay, sick pay and National Insurance contributions).[14]  

 

4.      The judicial response

So far many cases against Uber have been brought before national courts on unfair competition claims: for instance in Italy, UberPop (the equivalent of UberX in the UK, one of the services offered by Uber, which connects unlicensed drivers with consumers) was banned for unfair competition in 2015 by the Milan Tribunal (in two decisions: on 25 May and confirmed on 2 July), decisions also upheld by the Turin Tribunal in March 2017, while in May 2017 the Rome Tribunal lifted the ban on UberBlack (Chauffeur-driven service), which it had previously imposed in April 2017. It is also worth noting that some cases relating to Uber have been brought before the CJEU. In the case C-434/15 (Asociación Profesional Elite Taxi v. Uber System Spain SL), despite the fact that the case was brought before the Spanish Court to cease Uber unfair competition acts, the Advocate General (“AG”) Szpunar’s Opinion of 11 May 2017 dealt also with labour law issues. The AG held that Uber could not be treated as a “mere intermediary between drivers and passengers. Drivers who work on the Uber Platform do not pursue and independent activity that exists independently of the platform.” (para. 56). In the case C-320/16 (Uber France SAS) the AG reaffirmed the same position in his Opinion of 4 July 2017 (paras. 16-17).

More interestingly in relation to the issues dealt with in this post are the legal disputes that gig economy companies have to face following challenges based on workers’ labour rights.

Hermes  is facing, on the one hand, an on-going dispute over employment status of some of its self-employed drivers, which should lead to a judgment at the beginning of 2018, and, on the other, is under the scrutiny of the UK Tax Authority (HRMC) on the employment status of the self-employed couriers who work for the company.

In October 2016, the London Employment Tribunal (“ET”) found that Uber drivers, when (i) the app is switched on, (ii) they are in the territory in which they are authorised to work, and (iii) they are willing/able to accept assignements, are working for Uber under a “worker” contract (para 86). The judges expressed their scepticism towards Uber’s claims to the contrary (para 87), stating that “[t]he notion that Uber in London is a mosaic of 30,000 small businesses linked by a common ‘platform’ is to our mind faintly ridiculous” (para 90). Moreover the tribunal held that the Uber driver’s right to be paid “does not depend on his achieving set unit of production, […] the Uber driver performs ‘unmeasured work’. The hours of the unmeasured work in any pay reference period are to be computed in accordance with NMWR [The National Minimum Wage Regulations 2015], reg. 45. In the ordinary case, the relevant hours are the ‘hours worked’ […].” (paras. 126-127). Uber has appealed this judgment and on 10 November 2017 the Employment Appeal Tribunal (“EAT”) dismissed the appeal confirming the ET’s findings. Uber declared that it will appeal the EAT decision.[15]

Also crucial was the February 2017 UK Court of Appeal decision on ‘self-employed’ plumbers, who, having worked for several years exclusively for Pimlico Plumbers, were entitled to workers’ rights. The case is now before the Supreme Court. Legal disputes are taking place also in other European Countries: early this month (October 2017) six Foodora riders took the company to the Turin Tribunal (Employment Section) in Italy, arguing that they were not self-employed and were instead entitled to proper workers’ rights. These riders were fired following their protests against bad working conditions, in particular low salary.[16] 

In the USA, litigation is helping the cause of gig economy workers. A 2015 Seattle City Council legislation (which allows drivers of app-based company such as Uber, to form unions and to have collective representation over fair working conditions) has been challenged twice in August this year: firstly by the US Chambers of Commerce, of which Uber is member, because it would stifle competition, and, more recently, by a group of 11 drivers, on the ground that it is against federal labour law and the right to free association. In both cases the US District Judge dismissed the challenges, but the parties declared they would appeal.[17] Moreover, a North Carolina Federal Court granted, in July this year, preliminary class action status to a minimum wage and overtime lawsuit filed by drivers working for Uber under the Fair Labour Standards Act. The main aim of the class-action is to challenge Uber misclassification of drivers as independent contractors. Around 18,000 drivers who opted out of arbitration are eligible to join the class-action.[18]

 

5.      The EU approach

The gig economy workers’ quest for rights reaches beyond national law. The EU Commission declared on 25 September that, in order to modernize legislation on employment contracts, it has started consultation with trade unions along with employers. The EU Commission is also moving forward the so-called European Pillar of Social Rights (“EPSR”), which consists of 20 key principles relating to equal opportunities and access to the labour market, fair working conditions, and social protection and inclusion.

One of the concrete aims of the EU Commission is to extend the scope of the directive on employment contracts (Council Directive 91/533/ECC, also known as the Written Statement Directive, which sets an obligation on the employer to provide, within two months from commencement, essential written information about the contract or employment relationship) to on-demand, voucher-based and platform workers.[19] Moreover the EU Commission would propose a new rule, which could “establish some basic rights such as the right to a degree of predictability of work for workers with very flexible contracts or the right to a maximum duration of a probation period.”[20] It has been noted that, on the one hand, the Commission proposal might raise costs for companies like Uber but, on the other, the protection for workers might not be applicable to self-employed workers, creating “a loophole for employers such as Uber and Deliveroo.”[21]

 

6.      Concluding remarks

The technology-driven economy has brought numerous advantages to our everyday lives. It is however crucial that these advantages for consumers are not to the detriment of workers involved in the service offered. Similarly, flexibility at work is not tout-court a negative aspect, if independence is a genuine choice rather than an imposition by the employer, and provided a certain floor of rights is guaranteed. As we have seen, through litigation and action by major political stakeholders, new solutions are on their way and will hopefully bring fair and decent working conditions to people involved in the gig economy.


[1] The Economist, "Workers on Tap", 30 December 2014.

[2] Leslie Hook, "Year in a word: Gig economy" (The Financial Times, 29 December 2015).

[3] Sarah O’Connor, "When Your Boss is an Algorithm" (The Financial Times, 8 September 2016).

[4] Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee, Meeting (10 October 2017).

[5] Cecilia Saixue Watt, "‘There’s no future for taxis': New York yellow cab drivers drowning in debt" (The Guardian, 20 October 2017). See also BBC, "Uber cars outnumber yellow taxis in New York City", 19 March 2015.

[6] McKinsey Global Institute "Independent Work: Choice, Necessity, and the Gig Economy" (October 2016) p. 7-8.

[7] Matthew Taylor and others, "Good Work: The Taylor Review of Modern Working Practices" (July 2017), p. 42.

[8] Transport For London, "Notice 13/17: Licensing decision on Uber London Limited" (22 September 2017).

[9] Sadiq Khan, "Londoners’ safety must come first" (The Guardian, 22 September 2017).

[10] Gwyn Topham, "Uber Launches appeal against loss of London licence" (The Guardian, 13 October 2017).

[11] Katrin Bennhold, "London’s Uber Ban Raises Questions on Race and Immigration" (The New York Times, 2 October 2017).

[12] House of Commons, Work and Pensions Committee, "Self-employment and the gig economy" (1 May 2017) para 13.

[13] As far as the fist point is concerned, the Deliveroo representative held that, practically speaking, that is a clause that they would not enforce, However the Report points out that “[…] to an average worker with little or no understanding of employment law, the intended deterrent effect is clear.” See House of Commons, Work and Pensions Committee, "Self-employment and the gig economy" (1 May 2017) para17 and fn 15.

[14] Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee, Meeting (10 October 2017).

[15] Sarah O’Connor and Aliya Ram, “Uber loses appeal in UK employment case” (The Financial Times, 10 November 2017).

[16] Federica Cravero, "Torino, sei rider fanno causa a Foodora: Eravamo dipendenti, licenziati illegalmente" (La Repubblica, 18 October 2017).

[17] Gene Johnson, "Federal Judge clears way for Seattle Lyft, Uber drivers to unionize" (The Seattle Times, 25 August 2017). See also Jeremy B White, "Judge dismisses lawsuit seeking to block law allowing Uber and Lyft drivers to form unions" (The Independent, 2 August 2017).

[18] David Streitfeld, "Uber Drivers Win Preliminary Class-Action Status in Labor Case" (The New York Times, 12 July 2017).

[19] EU Commission press release, "Moving forward on the European Pillar of Social Rights: Commission continues work on fair and predictable employment contracts", 25 September 2017.

[20] EU Commission Fact Sheet, "Commission continues work on fair and predictable employment contracts – Questions and Answers", 25 September 2017.

[21] "EU seeks more protection for Uber-style jobs", (Reuters, 24 September 2017).

 

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