Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

Anti-Doping in Times of COVID-19: A Difficult Balancing Exercise for WADA - By Marjolaine Viret

Editor's note: Marjolaine is a researcher and attorney admitted to the Geneva bar (Switzerland) who specialises in sports and life sciences.


I.               Introduction

The COVID-19 pandemic has shaken the manner in which we approach human interactions that suppose close and prolonged physical contact. Across the world, authorities are having to design ways to resume essential activities without jeopardising participants’ health, all the while guaranteeing that other fundamental rights are paid due respect. The fight against doping is no exception. Anti-doping organizations – whether public or private – have to be held to the same standards, including respect for physical integrity and privacy, and considerate application of the cornerstone principle of proportionality.

Throughout this global crisis, the World Anti-Doping Agency (‘WADA’) has carefully monitored the situation, providing anti-doping organizations and athletes with updates and advice. On 6 May 2020, WADA issued the document called ‘ADO Guidance for Resuming Testing’ (‘COVID Guidance’). A COVID-19 ‘Q&A’ for athletes (‘Athlete Q&A’) is also available on WADA’s website, and has been last updated on 25 May 2020. This article focuses on these two latest documents, and analyses the solutions proposed therein, and their impact on athletes.

Like many public or private recommendations issued for other societal activities, the WADA COVID Guidance is primarily aimed at conducting doping control while limiting the risk of transmission of the virus and ensuing harm to individuals. More specifically, one can identify two situations of interest for athletes that are notified for testing:

  1. The athlete has or suspects that they may have been infected with COVID-19, or has come in close contact with someone having COVID-19;
  2. The athlete fears to be in touch with doping control personnel that may be infected with COVID-19.

Quite obviously, either situation has the potential to create significant challenges when it comes to balancing the interests of anti-doping, with individual rights and data protection concerns. This article summarises how the latest WADA COVID Guidance and Athlete Q&A address both situations. It explores how the solutions suggested fit in with the WADA regulatory framework and how these might be assessed from a legal perspective.

The focus will be on the hypothesis in which international sports federations – i.e. private entities usually organised as associations or similar structures – are asked to implement the COVID Guidance within their sport. National anti-doping organizations are strongly embedded in their national legal system and their status and obligations as public or semi-public organisations are likely to be much more dependent on the legislative landscape put in place to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic in each country. Nevertheless, the general principles described in this article would apply to all anti-doping organizations alike, whether at international or national level.


II.              Addressing the risk of the athlete tested having been exposed to COVID-19

Obviously, sample collection personnel must not be exposed to unnecessary risks as a result of collecting samples from athletes who could have come into contact with COVID-19. This concern is legitimate, whether anti-doping organizations conduct sample collection through their own doping control officer network, or outsource this task to external service providers.

A.     The solutions provided for in the WADA COVID Guidance

A first set of measures in the COVID Guidance is designed to keep individuals at risk from having to go on testing missions at all. The Guidance does so in two ways: on the one hand, by identifying categories of ‘Vulnerable Populations’ of sample collection personnel which anti-doping organizations should avoid sending on testing missions (section 3(e)), and on the other hand by making it clear that “the ADO should clearly communicate that any SCP who are not comfortable collecting samples during this time do not have to do so” (section 3(a)).

A second set of measures seeks to identify whether the individual athlete at stake presents any symptoms or heightened risk of having be exposed to COVID-19, or is even confirmed to be infected. To this effect, anti-doping organizations are invited to develop an additional Athlete Information Letter for the sample collection session, as well as appropriate information and education material.

The material should stress, in particular, that “additional personal information may be requested from athletes during sample collection. Identify the additional health information that the ADO will be asking athletes to provide to ensure their health and safety as well as that of SCP, and the manner in which this information will be used, stored and shared” (section 4(a)(iv)). The Athlete Information Letter should include “outline of the potential consequences to the athlete should they refuse to comply” (with the testing), as well as “request that the athlete contacts you (ADO) if their health situation changes”.

It is further recommended that a specific ‘COVID-19 Athlete Questionnaire’ be developed by each anti-doping organization (section 4(d)). Annex A of the COVID Guidance outlines the details:

  • Athletes must be asked at the door, before proceeding with formal notification: “Are you or anyone present with you at this location/living at this residence/who lives with you, experiencing any COVID-19 symptoms” or “do you, or anyone present with you at this location/living at this residence/who lives with you, have COVID-19”?;
  • Athlete who answer YES must then fill out the questionnaire: according to the WADA COVID Guidance, the sample collection personnel must “inform the athlete that they must complete this questionnaire truthfully and to the best of their knowledge and that if they purposefully provide any information which is inaccurate or incorrect, it could be construed as an anti-doping rule violation (e.g. tampering or attempted tampering) and they may be subject to a sanction of up to four years. Confirm that the athlete understands this”;
  • Athletes must be informed that because they have declared they or someone close to them have COVID-19 or symptoms, “sample collection will not proceed due to the risk of infection with COVID-19”.

Beyond individual testing attempts, Section 4(f) provides that athletes who are tested and subsequently contract COVID-19 “should be encouraged” to inform the ADO. The Athlete Q&A also advises athletes, if they are concerned that they may have acquired the virus, that “you should advise your ADO of your situation with your whereabouts submission or when sample collection personal notify you for testing so that they can adjust their plans accordingly” (Question 5).

B.     Assessment of the situation in the light of data protection requirements

Through various tools (oral questions, COVID-19 Athlete Questionnaire, whereabouts submission), the COVID Guidance provides that information be obtained from athletes about whether they, or their close entourage, exhibit symptoms of COVID-19 or have been diagnosed with COVID-19. This type of information represents health data, which is sensitive data that typically enjoys special protection under data protection laws.

The question arises, then, how athletes can be required to provide such data, and what the consequences should be if they refuse to do so, or if they provide inaccurate data.

A first issue that deserves analysis is whether the data can be requested pursuant to the current WADA regulatory framework and what sanctions can be attached to failing to comply based on the WADA Code.

Sample collection is governed by the WADA International Standard for Testing and Investigations (‘ISTI’). The ISTI – whether incorporated by reference or directly transposed into the anti-doping organization’s rules – is the only binding document in this context. While the term ‘guidance’ is not one that has an established status under the WADA Code, it is probably closest to the Level-3 document defined as ‘Guidelines’ (section Purpose, Scope & Organization). This type of document enshrines recommendations to anti-doping organization, but is not mandatory upon them. These documents cannot, therefore, result in amending the ISTI. Any departure from the ISTI could give rise to an objection to invalidate the finding of an anti-doping rule violation, as per the regime set forth in Article 3.2.3 WADA Code.[1]

The ISTI section 7.4.5 provides a bullet-point list of the data to be collected during the sample collection session, which is introduced as follows: “In conducting the Sample Collection Session, the following information shall be recorded as a minimum” (emphasis added). Despite this wording, it is submitted that the ISTI cannot be read as authorizing anti-doping organizations to collect additional health information on their doping control forms, certainly not subject to the penalty of an anti-doping rule violation. Athletes risk a so-called ‘failure to comply’ (e.g. tampering) violation if they refuse or provide false information at sample collection.[2] They cannot be asked to provide information that is not either listed in the ISTI, or – where the anti-doping organization has adopted its own standard – reflected in the implemented rules. Otherwise, anti-doping organizations could come up during sample collection with random additional requests for data and turn a refusal to provide such data into an anti-doping rule violation at will.

The Athlete Q&A states that “you may see enhancements that seek to strike the balance between the protection of clean competition and personal health” (emphasis added). These may include “a self-declaration concerning your health status” (Question 4). In spite of the euphemistic language used, the additional information requested and the related COVID-19 Athlete Questionnaire are purported amendments to the ISTI requirements. This is all the more concerning since the questionnaire also may also require athletes to give out health data concerning identifiable third parties.

Accordingly, the blanket statement in the COVID Guidance whereby athletes should be informed that they may be charged with an anti-doping rule violation for failing to truthfully fill in the Athlete COVID Questionnaire may prove unenforceable to a large extent. Asking for such data represents a departure from the ISTI. Applying the proof regime set forth in Article 3.2.3 WADA Code, such departures invalidate the finding of an anti-doping rule violation at the very least if they ‘caused’ the anti-doping rule violation.[3]

Furthermore, one should distinguish cases in which athletes refuse the data outright, or hide COVID-related symptoms, from the situation in which an athlete falsely states having COVID-related symptoms. Obviously, if the athlete refuses to provide a sample because of the anti-doping organization making the health data compulsory to complete sample collection, in breach of the ISTI, the departure is directly causative for the refusal, which as a result cannot be prosecuted under Article 2.3 WADA Code (refusal to submit to testing). The same would, arguably, apply if the athlete answers the questions but fails to provide genuine health data which could have led to aborting testing (e.g fails to mention COVID-19 symptoms). This could impossibly result in charges for tampering with the doping control process under Article 2.5 WADA Code, in the absence of a regulatory basis for requesting the information in the first place.[4]

The only scenario in which one could imagine charging athletes with a tampering violation is where the athlete is shown a posteriori to have invented COVID-19 symptoms or a COVID diagnosis, and deliberately used it as an excuse for not being tested. The anti-doping organization would, however, have to demonstrate intent,[5] specifically show that the athlete had no symptoms whatsoever, or that the athlete did not believe in good faith that the symptoms could be evidence of COVID-19. Such proof would probably prove impracticable in all but the most exceptional situation.

Thus, what seems most concerning about the WADA COVID Guidance in the way it informs athletes on the consequences of not filling the questionnaire truthfully, is its utterly generic wording. The Guidance is misleading insofar as it implies that athletes are under an obligation to provide the health data at stake, under the threat of disciplinary sanctions of up to four years. With respect to the equivalent self-certification recommended for the sample collection personnel as to their symptoms or contacts with COVID, the Guidance clarifies that introducing such self-certification is subject to being “permitted by applicable data protection, health, and employments laws”. Though the Guidance does not include the same caveat when it comes to the COVID-19 Athlete Questionnaire, the same reservations must obviously apply for health declarations that athletes are asked to make.

This leads over to the second issue, which is whether athletes can be compelled to provide the data and sanctioned for refusing to do so based on grounds outside the ISTI and WADA regulatory framework. There may be – in the current spread of the pandemic – state law under certain jurisdictions in which there is a legal obligation to declare COVID symptoms or COVID diagnosis, under one form or another. It seems highly unlikely, however, that this type of obligation would extend to an obligation to give out non-coded health information – including data regarding third parties – to private entities. If there is, the legal basis should be specified on the COVID-19 Athlete Questionnaire.

Assuming the absence of extraordinary COVID-related laws, anti-doping organizations have to rely on ordinary data protection rules. In an European context, we can use as a reference the EU General Data Protection Regulation (‘GDPR’), which will be applicable to a significant amount of doping controls, and has otherwise acquired a status of ‘best practice’. According to the GDPR, health data represents ‘special-category’ data which can only be processed based on very restrictive grounds (Article 9 GDPR). One of these is consent explicitly given by the data subject (Article 9(2)(a) GDPR). This ground cannot be used based on the terms of the COVID Guidance, since consent given under threat of a four-year disciplinary sanction can hardly be considered free, and thus valid, under the GDPR.[6]

Much will then depend on whether the anti-doping organization at stake benefits from a basis in national law to process health data in the context of doping control based on public interest grounds (under Article 9(2)(e) or (i) GDPR), and how broadly such legal basis is framed. It is by far not manifest that COVID-related health data would qualify as collected for ‘anti-doping purposes’ within the meaning, in particular, of Article 5.1 WADA Code. No claims are made in the COVID Guidance that the information is necessary for the sake of reliable sample analysis. In addition, the WADA Code certainly provides no basis for collecting health information about the athlete’s entourage.

In sum, any COVID-19 Athlete Information Letter or Athlete Questionnaire should make it crystal clear that athletes cannot be compelled by their anti-doping organization to provide data regarding their current health status. If a questionnaire is introduced, athletes should be informed that they may – voluntarily – provide health information about themselves or their entourage, provided that they have obtained consent from their entourage if the data subject is identifiable. The questionnaire could be treated like consent to anti-doping research, which is declared unequivocally optional on the doping control form, with no consequences arising from an athlete refusing to provide the information requested. Athletes must receive transparent information to the effect that they cannot be charged for an anti-doping rule violation if they refuse to give such data, and that possible charges might, at most, apply if they use false COVID symptoms or a false COVID diagnosis as a pretext to avoid sample collection. If the mere optional character of the questionnaire were, depending on the local pandemic situation, considered to create inacceptable risks for the sample collection personnel and if there is no other basis in national law to request such information, testing should not resume.

 

III.            Dealing with the risk of sample collection personnel having been exposed to COVID

As mentioned, a second set of concerns addresses the hypothesis of athletes being endangered – or feeling endangered – by the presence of sample collection personnel. These concerns appear equally legitimate since the WADA COVID Guidance acknowledges that some situations may not allow for recommended social distancing requirements to be maintained at all times during testing.

A.     The solutions provided for in WADA COVID Guidance

The WADA COVID Guidance seeks to address these concerns through the following means:

  • By defining categories of ‘Risk Groups’ of sample collection personnel (e.g. health care professionals currently employed) (section 3(e)), who should not be sent on testing missions;
  • By encouraging a system of self-certification to be completed by the sample collection personnel before a testing mission, “if permitted by applicable data protection, health, and employment laws” (section 3(f));
  • By providing that social/physical distancing is to be maintained “as much as possible” (Annex A), and informing athletes of the role that protective equipment (e.g. wearing masks) can play for their safety.

While the consequences of an athlete disagreeing about the anti-doping organization’s assessment of safety is not addressed in the COVID Guidance itself, it is discussed in the Athlete Q&A: “Can I refuse to be tested if I [..] do not feel that adequate precautions are being taken by sample collection personnel?”.

The answer given is that, where confinement measures are still in place, “such a scenario is unlikely as ADOs must exercise sound judgment in these unprecedented times”. The answer continues: “Unless there is a mandatory isolation/lockdown, however, you are advised to comply with testing while following the preventative measures put in place by your ADO, which should be commensurate with the risks at hand. If you refuse to be tested or if you do not complete sample collection process after notification, or if you are not able (or willing) to provide a sample due to a lack of protective measures, your refusal will follow the normal results management process, which may result in a period of ineligibility of up to four years” (Question 8; emphasis added).

B.     Assessment of the solutions proposed in light of protection of the athlete’s health

The WADA COVID Guidance arguably seeks to create a reasonable safety standard and encourages anti-doping organizations to have in place appropriate protective measures. However, WADA takes no responsibility for guaranteeing to athletes that they will suffer no prejudice if those safety standards are not maintained in individual testing attempts. Instead, the Athlete Q&A explicitly warns athletes that if they fail to submit to sample collection “due to a lack of protective measures”, they will be subject to ordinary results management.

Let us be very clear about the starting point, which goes beyond the context of the COVID-19 pandemic: no athlete should ever have to subject themselves to sample collection when they fear for their health and physical integrity.

In the CAS award WADA v. Sun Yang & FINA, the CAS panel held that “as a general matter, athlete should not take matters into their own hands, and if they do they will bear the risk of serious consequences. The proper path for an Athlete is to proceed with a Doping Control under objection, and making available immediately the complete grounds for such objection”.[7]

Though this may appear a rather peremptory statement, the panel also insisted, rejecting WADA’s claim that athletes must always allow a sample to be collected, that “it cannot be excluded that serious flaws in the notification process, or during any part of the Doping Control process, could mean that it might not be appropriate to require an athlete to subject himself to, or continue with, a sample collection session. Rather, they could invalidate the sample collection process as a whole, so that an athlete might not be perceived as having tampered with the Doping Control, or as having failed to comply with the sample collection process”.[8]

It is submitted that, where athletes express legitimate concerns about their physical integrity or broader health, they cannot be referred to submitting to testing nonetheless and subsequently file their objections against the procedure. In fact, the CAS panel in WADA v. Sun Yang & FINA did endorse past CAS jurisprudence to the effect that: “whenever physically, hygienically and morally possible, the sample be provided despite objections by the athlete”.[9] A contrario, where circumstances exist that relate to ‘physical, hygiene or moral’ hazards, the athlete should be entitled to refuse sample collection.

The stakes here reach far beyond the potential to obstruct collection of evidence to support disciplinary proceedings for anti-doping purposes. They concern the rights of an individual asked to provide biological materials, in a way that is either highly intrusive of their intimate sphere (urine sampling), or represents an actual medical act (blood sampling).[10] Filing objections and documenting concerns a posteriori are not measures capable of achieving the goal of protecting those rights where the threat emanates directly from the sample collection process, as opposed to its potential detrimental disciplinary consequences.

Previous guidance issued by WADA on 20 March 2020 included some more details about how cases arising from refusal to submit to testing due to (alleged) lack or preventative measures should be treated:

If a potential refusal or failure to submit to sample collection is submitted to the ADO, the typical results management process should be followed and the athlete will have the opportunity to submit their defense, including any reasons why they believe their refusal or failure to complete the process was justified. This information will be taken into account when: 1) the ADO determines if a potential anti-doping rule violation should be asserted, and 2) the disciplinary panel hears the case”.

A typical results management process for refusing to submit to sample collection would be handled as a failure to comply under Annex A of the ISTI, according to which the sample collection personnel will submit a report to the anti-doping organization and athletes will be asked to provide explanations.

The claim that the anti-doping organization did not ensure appropriate protective measures should be analysed initially as a departure from the ISTI and treated in accordance with the regime set forth in Article 3.2.3 of the WADA Code. Annex D.1 of the ISTI indeed provides that its objective is: “To collect an Athlete’s urine Sample in a manner that ensures: a) consistency with relevant principles of internationally recognised standard precautions in healthcare settings so that the health and safety of the Athlete and Sample Collection Personnel are not compromised. The same statement is provided for blood sample collection in Annex E.1.

If it becomes apparent that, objectively, no adequate precautions were taken with respect to the risk of COVID-19 (or indeed any other health hazard) during the sample collection session, this represents a departure from the ISTI which – to use the wording of Article 3.2.3 WADA Code – could “reasonably have caused” a refusal. The burden then shifts to the anti-doping organization to establish, to the comfortable satisfaction of the hearing panel (Article 3.1 WADA Code), that this departure was not in reality what led the Athlete to refuse sample collection. If the anti-doping organization cannot discharge this burden – and discharging it should prove difficult once established that safety was objectively lacking – no finding of an anti-doping rule violation can occur.

Whether adequate precautions were taken should be analysed based on the local situation and applicable public health guidelines at the time of collection in the relevant country. The anti-doping organization may reach the conclusion that the standards were inadequate spontaneously when reviewing the failure to comply, or the conclusion may be drawn by the hearing panel. The WADA COVID Guidance can serve as a minimum benchmark, since athletes can legitimately expect that anti-doping organizations would at least comply with these. However, stricter local guidelines in place should always prevail, since doping control cannot claim exemption from the rules that would otherwise apply to medical or similar acts requiring close interpersonal contact. Athletes who are of the view that they are not offered adequate protective measures would be well-advised to document the exact circumstances, the concerns they voiced and the measures that were proposed by the sample collection personnel to alleviate these concerns.

Even if it can be demonstrated, a posteriori, that the safety measures were objectively adequate at the given site and time, and thus no departure from the ISTI occurred, this should not be the end of the assessment. Article 2.3 WADA Code reserves the presence of “compelling justification” for refusing testing.[11] If athletes can demonstrate, by a balance of probabilities (Article 3.1 WADA Code),[12] that their doubts about the protective measures proposed by the anti-doping organizations were legitimate at the time and given the circumstances, this should qualify as a compelling justification. Again, the consequence will be that the finding of an anti-doping rule violation must be rejected.

The regime proposed above seeks to avoid athletes putting their health at risk for fear of facing disciplinary sanctions. It strikes an appropriate balance with the interests of doping control and appears sufficient to prevent athletes using fake safety concerns as an excuse to escape testing. At the very least, they will have to demonstrate plausibly that they were reasonably entitled to hold such concerns.

Hearing panels will inevitable retain considerable latitude in their judgment, since the WADA COVID Guidance leaves ample room for interpretation, and so will most public authorities’ guidelines. Hence, athletes who choose to refuse testing will need to accept the risk that they may be erring about what protective measures should be in place, especially if they claim that the measures should go beyond those advocated in the COVID Guidance. Conversely, they can certainly not be invited to assume and trust a priori that the anti-doping organization is necessarily taking measures “commensurate with the risks at hand”, as the COVID Guidance suggests. Importantly, the athlete’s individual circumstances must be taken into consideration. It is worth recalling that some athletes, just like sample collection personnel identified in the COVID Guidance, may belong to a vulnerable population category, including for reasons that they feel unable to communicate to the sample collection personnel in detail (e.g. because of a chronic condition that would lead them to reveal highly sensitive health data). The assessment of what constituted ‘understandable’ concerns should therefore not be too strict, but should be made in light of the ambient anxiety and scientific uncertainty prevailing during the pandemic.


IV.            Conclusion

The WADA COVID Guidance represents a commendable attempt to strike a balance between maintaining doping control during the COVID-19 pandemic, and safeguarding the health of all participants, sample collection personnel and athletes alike.

Anti-doping organizations will, however, have to apply the Guidance with caution and discernment. As shown above, the Guidance walks a thin line when it comes to athlete privacy and physical integrity. This is all the more so since athletes have no option to ‘take a break’ from exposure to the risks going along with testing,[13] in contrast to sample collection personnel who are given a choice to refrain from participating in missions if they feel uncomfortable.

COVID-19 confronts anti-doping organizations with tough dilemmas. Continued and comprehensive testing is viewed by many, including athletes, as a prerequisite for ensuring that they can return to competition in a level playing field. This does not mean that we can forgo compliance with mandatory standards of law. Where testing proves impracticable in accordance with the law and with applicable sports regulations, and in a way that guarantees safety for all participants, such testing must not take place. As important as the quest for clean sport may be, it cannot override legitimate health concerns and basic privacy rights.


[1] Reference is made here to the currently applicable 2015 version of the WADA Code. Note that the 2021 version purports to restrict even further the athlete’s options for invalidating an anti-doping rule violation based on procedural departures.

[2] Failure to Comply is defined in the ISTI as: “A term used to describe anti-doping rule violations under Code Articles 2.3 and/or 2.5”. Article 2.3 targets refusal to submit to testing, whereas Article 2.5 targets a violation of tampering.

[3] Article 3.2.3 WADA Code reads (2015 version) : “Departures from any other International Standard [i.e., other than the ISL] or other anti-doping rule or policy set forth in the Code or Anti-Doping Organization rules which did not cause an Adverse Analytical Finding or other anti-doping rule violation shall not invalidate such evidence or results. If the Athlete or other Person establishes a departure from another International Standard or other anti-doping rule or policy which could reasonably have caused an anti-doping rule violation based on an Adverse Analytical Finding or other anti-doping rule violation, then the Anti-Doping Organization shall have the burden to establish that such departure did not cause the Adverse Analytical Finding or the factual basis for the anti-doping rule violation”.

[4] In any event, it is questionable whether refusal to give health data could ever qualify as impeding sample collection, since the athlete’s silence enabled sample collection which could otherwise not have proceeded.

[5] Tampering is no strict liability violation under Appendix 1 WADA Code and requires proof of an intentional conduct on part of the athlete.

[6] On this, see also Viret Marjolaine, How Data Protection Crystallises Key Legal Challenges in Anti-Doping, International Sports Law Blog, 19 May 2019.

[7] CAS 2019/A/6148, WADA v. Sun Yang & FINA, para. 209.

[8] CAS 2019/A/6148, WADA v. Sun Yang & FINA, para. 208.

[9] CAS 2019/A/6148, WADA v. Sun Yang & FINA, para. 206.

[10] On this, see more broadly Viret Marjolaine (2016), Evidence in Anti-Doping at the Intersection of Science & Law, Springer, e.g. pp 218 & 682.

[11] In CAS 2016/A/4631, Brothers v. FINA, para. 78, the panel cited as hypotheses of justification in relation to health: “if the athlete were to faint unconscious on the floor upon seeing the DCO’s needle, or if he were stone drunk or would experience an epileptic fit at the time of the test.”

[12] Though Article 2.3 does not explicitly so provide, CAS panels typically place the burden of proof on athlete to show the existence of compelling justification (see e.g. CAS 2016/A/4631, Brothers v. FINA, para. 76; or already CAS 2005/A/925, de Azevedo v. FINA, para. 68 & 78).

[13] The WADA Athlete Q&A explicitly warns athletes that they remain subject to testing at any time and anywhere unless public authorities have put in place physical mobility restrictions (Question 1).

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Asser International Sports Law Blog | Overdue payables in action: Reviewing two years of FIFA jurisprudence on the 12bis procedure – Part 2. By Frans M. de Weger and Frank John Vrolijk.

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

Overdue payables in action: Reviewing two years of FIFA jurisprudence on the 12bis procedure – Part 2. By Frans M. de Weger and Frank John Vrolijk.

Editor's Note: Frans M. de Weger is legal counsel for the Federation of Dutch Professional Football Clubs (FBO) and CAS arbitrator. De Weger is author of the book “The Jurisprudence of the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber”, 2nd edition, published by T.M.C. Asser Press in 2016. Frank John Vrolijk specialises in Sports, Labour and Company Law and is a former legal trainee of FBO and DRC Database.

This second blog will focus specifically on the sanctions available for FIFA under Article 12bis. It will provide explanatory guidelines covering the sanctions imposed during the period surveyed.


Introduction

The possibility to impose sanctions under article 12bis constitutes one of the pillars of the 12bis procedure. Pursuant to Article 12bis of the RSTP, edition 2016, the DRC and the PSC may impose a sanction on a club if the club is found to have delayed a due payment for more than 30 days without a prima facie contractual basis[1] and the creditor have put the debtor club in default in writing, granting a deadline of at least 10 days.[2] The jurisprudence in relation to Article 12bis also shows that sanctions are imposed ex officio by the DRC or the PSC and not per request of the claimant.

If the basic conditions for the application of Article 12bis are fulfilled, said provision provides for the following sanctions that may be imposed on the defaulting club:

1.    a warning;

2.    a reprimand;

3.    a fine; or

4.    a ban from registering any new players, either nationally or internationally, for one or two entire and consecutive registration periods (hereinafter: “the registration ban”).[3]

Based on the wording of Article 12bis, i.e. the use of the word ‘may’, it is left to the discretionary power of the DRC and the PSC to decide whether or not to impose a sanction on the debtor club.[4] However, this discretionary power has never been used in favour of a defendant in all the published DRC or PSC decisions under review. In other words, a sanction, going from a warning to a transfer ban of two entire and consecutive periods, was imposed in all decisions. Despite the fact that it follows from Article 12bis(4) that sanctions may apply cumulatively, this option was only used once.[5] It seems that it will come into play only if the debtor club did not comply with its obligations on multiple occasions and only after the maximum sanction of a transfer ban of two entire and consecutive periods has been imposed on the debtor club. The discretionary power under Article 12bis is different from the sanction of a transfer ban as laid down in Article 17(4) of the RSTP. The latter article states that the competent body ‘shall’ sanction, as opposed to Article 12bis, which states that the competent body ‘may’ sanction.[6]


 The Warning

Out of the 99 published 12bis decisions of the DRC, 17 warnings have been imposed. Additionally, seven warnings have been imposed out of the 38 published 12bis decisions before the PSC. As follows from the jurisprudence of FIFA,[7] (only) a warning will be given by the FIFA committees in the event two conditions are cumulatively met:

1.             the club (duly) replied to the claim; and

2.             it is not a repeated offence.

It is however important to note that the height of the outstanding amount of overdue payables is not correlated with the imposition of a warning. The outstanding overdue payables in the 24 proceedings ending with a warning range from an overdue payable of 3,468 Euros (hereinafter: “EUR”) in two decisions of the DRC,[8] up to an amount of EUR 1,000,000 in a PSC decision.[9]

The jurisprudence also points out that the debtor club must reply to the claim in order to contain the possible sanction to a warning. Although several decisions refer to the fact that the club should have “duly replied to the claim”,[10] other decisions do not mention “duly” and these consider it enough that the club only “replied to the claim”.[11] Despite this difference in terminology, we conclude that almost any form of reply provided by the debtor club will be considered sufficient. In fact, no distinctive value is ascribed to the word “duly”.

The respondents gave divergent reasons for their non-compliances. One club contested the applicability of Article 12bis,[12] other clubs stated to have administrative difficulties[13] or financial difficulties,[14] whereas others claimed that they were communicating with the player’s agent to settle the matter amicably.[15] Apart from the claim related to the applicability of Article 12bis, which was rejected because the claimant lodged his claim after the entry into force of Article 12bis RSTP,[16] all the arguments raised were not considered valid reasons for non-payment of the outstanding monies. Although the jurisprudence does not give an exact answer to the question what would be considered “a prima facie contractual basis”, it can be concluded that the aforementioned circumstances did not fulfil these criteria.

Notwithstanding the above, the condition of having “(duly) replied to the claim” has recently been tackled by the DRC. In its decision of 23 May 2016, the respondent replied to the claim per e-mail.[17] The DRC considered this reply not to be sufficient to fulfil the standards of “(duly) replied to the claim” because “the Respondent only replied to the claim by e-mail and e-mail petitions shall have no legal effect in accordance with art. 16 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules.” In other words, the respondent should have replied by fax or ordinary mail.

Additionally and in line with the above, the DRC or the PSC has only imposed a warning when there was no repeated offence. In other words, the respondent in a 12bis procedure must actually be considered as a “first offender” in order to (only) get a warning. From the 24 decisions in which a warning has been imposed, there is only one not fulfilling the abovementioned two conditions.[18] In this (PSC) decision, the respondent party did not reply to the claim. However, during the course of the proceedings the respondent made a partial payment to the claimant.[19] Therefore, the PSC decided to impose a warning on the respondent, irrespective of the absence of a reply. In light of this decision, it must be kept in mind that making a partial payment during the course of the 12bis proceedings might alleviate the duty to ‘reply to the claim’.


 The Reprimand

Only two of the decisions published by FIFA contain a reprimand.[20] One decision was issued by the DRC,[21] the other one by the PSC.[22]

In the DRC decision, overdue payables of EUR 40,000 were due to the claimant based on a termination agreement.[23] In its reply to the claim, the respondent admitted that it had to pay compensation to the claimant, but only until he would have found a new club. The respondent considered that, since the claimant found a new club immediately after the agreed termination, no compensation was due.[24] Notwithstanding this, the DRC judge considered that there was no documentary evidence with regard to the argument of the respondent. Therefore, the DRC judge considered that the respondent had delayed a due payment for more than 30 days without a prima facie contractual basis. Based on the foregoing paragraph and the fact that the respondent replied to the claim, one would think that a sanction in the form of a warning should be imposed on the respondent. However, the DRC highlighted that the DRC judge had already imposed a warning on the respondent previously. Thus, it referred to Article 12bis(6), which establishes that “a repeated offence will be considered as an aggravating circumstance and lead to more severe penalty”.[25] Therefore, a reprimand was imposed.[26] In a similar decision of 26 May 2016, the PSC also imposed a reprimand.[27]

In conclusion, one could say that a reprimand is considered as a severe sanction and thus will not be imposed on a first offender. Although there have only been two (published) decisions of FIFA wherein a reprimand was actually imposed, one can expect that a reprimand will be imposed on a repeated offender who replied to the claim in his first and second 12bis procedure. The crucial advice that can be derived from the above analysis is that a respondent club should always reply in a 12bis procedure, because the warning and reprimand do not bring any financial or sportive consequences with it, contrary to the fine and the registration ban, which will be discussed hereunder.


The Fine
Introduction 

The only sanction that leads to direct financial consequences is the fine. The fine is a sanction that can be imposed in a 12bis procedure and needs to be paid by the debtor club to FIFA. As opposed to the warning and the reprimand, the jurisprudence shows that a fine will be imposed in the event that the respondent did not reply to the claim.

66 out of the 99 DRC and 29 out of the 38 PSC decisions involved a fine. After analysing the jurisprudence, we conclude that it is necessary to distinguish between a fine in a DRC procedure and a PSC procedure. In fact, the amount of the outstanding overdue payables differs considerably in both procedures.[28] Additionally, the level of the corresponding fines in DRC procedures compared to the PSC procedures are different.[29] The amounts of overdue payables in a 12bis procedure before the PSC are structurally higher than the amounts in a 12bis procedure before the DRC, while the amount of the fine is not structurally higher in a PSC procedure. Due to these differences between the DRC and the PSC, we decided to discuss the use of fines in the DRC and PSC procedures separately. Our aim was to determine how the judges define the level of the fine in a 12bis procedure. To do so, we use the so-called “category method”, which will be explained below.

Fines imposed by the DRC 

After analysing the decisions of FIFA in which fines were imposed, it seems that they do not correspond to a percentage of the outstanding overdue payables.[30] Instead, the level of a fine can be determined by means of several categories of fines. At least four general conclusions can be derived from the jurisprudence regarding the level of the fine for a defaulting club. 

Firstly, the level of the fine imposed by the DRC increases when the overdue payable is higher. Secondly, there are three categories of fines: i) a fine for the club which did not reply to the claim and is considered to be a first offender (First Category Offence);[31] ii) a fine for a club which did not reply to the claim and has been found by the DRC to have neglected its contractual obligations in the recent past (not being a 12bis procedure) (Second Category Offence) ;[32] and iii) a fine for a club which did not reply to the claim and has been sanctioned in a 12bis procedure previously (Third Category Offence).[33] Thirdly, the fine for a respondent club in a Second Category Offence is double the size of the fine for a respondent club in a First Category Offence.[34] Finally, the fine in a Third Category Offence is three times the size of the given fine in a First Category Offence.[35]

Based on our comprehensive study, we can conclude that the DRC determines the level of the fine by taking into consideration the above-mentioned three categories (First, Second and Third Category Offence) subject to an approximate range in relation to the outstanding amount due. Although the ranges are very hard to define with only 66 published DRC decisions yet, the below table sheds some light and provides for eight standard situations referring to various ranges of overdue payables: 

Situation

Range overdue payables  (in $/€)

Height of the fine (in CHF)

 

Situation 1

 

0,01 – 11,000

First Category  Offence: 1,000

Second Category  Offence: 2,000

Third Category  Offence: 3,000

 

Situation 2

 

11,001 – 20,000[36]

First Category  Offence: 2,000

Second Category  Offence: 4,000

Third Category  Offence: 6,000

 

Situation 3

 

20,001 – 50,000

First Category  Offence: 5,000

Second Category Offence: 10,000

Third Category Offence: 15,000

 

Situation 4

 

50,001 – 75,000

First Category Offence: 7,500

Second Category Offence: 15,000

Third Category Offence: 22,500

 

Situation 5

 

75,001 – 100,000

First Category Offence: 10,000

Second Category Offence: 20,000

Third Category Offence: 30,000

 

Situation 6

 

100,001 – 150,000

First Category Offence: 15,000

Second Category Offence: 30,000

Third Category Offence: 45,000

 

Situation 7

 

150,000 > at least 350,000

First Category Offence: 20,000

Second Category Offence: 40,000

Third Category Offence: 60,000

 

Situation 8

 

950,000[37] and higher

First Category Offence: 30,000

Second Category Offence: 60,000

Third Category Offence: 90,000

Figure 2[38]


Fines imposed by the PSC 

With regard to the PSC decisions, the authors tried to use the same method as for the DRC procedures. At first sight, it looks as if the PSC and the DRC use the same ranges for fines. However, the PSC decisions seem more arbitrary. It is therefore more difficult to draw definitive conclusions in relation to the PSC 12bis decisions. For example, in the decision of 12 October 2015, decided by a PSC’s Single Judge, a fine of CHF 15,000 was handed out to a first offender club with an overdue payable of EUR 1 million.[39] However, one can doubt whether this fine can be considered appropriate. In fact, a first offender club in another decision received the same fine, although with smaller overdue payables of EUR 200,000.[40] Another striking decision involves a fine of CHF 7,500 based on an overdue payable of USD 50,000.[41] In a comparable situation before the DRC, also with regard to a first offender, the club was sanctioned with a fine of CHF 5,000.[42] It is also remarkable that (only) in some cases the single judges did motivate the higher fines by mentioning the criteria for a Second- or Third Category Offence. After analysing these decisions more closely, one notices that two of the three Single Judges always mention the criteria of the Second- or Third Category Offence, while one only did it once (out of his six decisions). Because of this absence of motivation, one cannot definitely conclude whether these decisions fall into the Second- and Third Category Offence as defined in the context of the DRC’s jurisprudence. However, looking past these (minor) inconsistencies, we believe that most of the PSC decisions do fall within the ranges set out in Figure 2.[43] Additionally, one starts to see emerging an additional category, which is the fine of CHF 25,000. Figure 3 provides an overview of the height of the fines in relation to the various overdue payables in PSC proceedings.

 

Situation

Range overdue payable ($/€)

Height of the fine (in CHF)

 

Situation 1

 

0,01 – 11,000

First Category Offence: 1,000

Second Category Offence: 2,000

Third Category Offence: 3,000

 

Situation 2

 

11,000 – 20,000[44]

First Category Offence: 2,000

Second Category Offence: 4,000

Third Category Offence: 6,000

 

Situation 3

 

20,000 – 50,000

First Category Offence: 5,000

Second Category Offence: 10,000

Third Category Offence: 15,000

 

Situation 4

 

50,000 – 75,000

First Category Offence: 7,500

Second Category Offence: 15,000

Third Category Offence: 22,500

 

Situation 5

 

75,000 – 100,000

First Category Offence: 10,000

Second Category Offence: 20,000

Third Category Offence: 30,000

 

Situation 6

 

100,000 – 250,000[45]

First Category Offence: 15,000

Second Category Offence: 30,000

Third Category Offence: 45,000

 

Situation 7

 

250,000 – 500,000[46]

 

First Category Offence: 20,000

Second Category Offence: 40,000

Third Category Offence: 60,000

 

Situation 8

 

500,000 – 750,000[47]

First Category Offence: 25,000

Second Category Offence: 50,000

Third Category Offence: 75,000

 

Situation 9

 

750,000 and higher[48]

First Category Offence: 30,000

Second Category Offence: 60,000

Third Category Offence: 90,000

Figure 3


Transfer Ban

The toughest sanction that can be imposed by the DRC or the PSC in a 12bis procedure is the ban from registering any new players, either nationally or internationally, for one or two entire and consecutive registration periods. Contrary to the transfer ban enshrined in Article 17(4) of the RSTP, in a 12bis procedure a club can be banned from registering new players for the next one or two registration periods. This ban will be imposed if the amount due to the claimant is not paid by the respondent within 30 days as from the date of notification of an Article 12bis decision.[49]

Out of the 137 published 12bis decisions, 16 decisions (15 from the DRC, 1 from the PSC) indicated that a ban will be imposed if the amount due to the respective claimant is not paid by the respondent within 30 days as from the date of notification of the decision. Moreover, 13 decisions refer to a ban for one entire registration period. In three decisions the DRC decided to threaten a ban for the next entire two registration periods. 

What is striking is that in all decisions the respondents did not only not reply to the claim (or only after the investigation phase was closed which is equivalent to not replying)[50], but more importantly the respondents were found to have breached their financial obligations several times before. Either, the defaulting clubs were found to have delayed several outstanding payments for more than 30 days, or the respondent had (also) been found by the DRC as well as the DRC judge responsible for not complying with its financial obligations on various other recent occasions. We also encountered cases in which both conditions were met.[51]

Another striking element of the decisions in 12bis procedures is that the amount due is not deemed relevant to justify the imposition of a registration ban on the debtor club. In fact, a registration ban has been imposed with regard to an overdue payable of EUR 7,500,[52] but also regarding an overdue payable of EUR 250,000.[53]  

It seems that a ban for one entire period will be imposed in two situations:

1) the debtor club has been found by the DRC or the PSC to have delayed a due payment for more than 30 days without a prima facie contractual basis once, as a result of which a fine was imposed, and the debtor club has been found by the DRC to be responsible for not complying with its financial obligations towards players on various occasions in the recent past;[54] or

2) the debtor club has been found by the DRC or the PSC to have delayed a due payment for more than 30 days without a prima facie contractual basis twice, as a result of which a fine was imposed in at least one of the decisions.[55]

Put differently: the jurisprudence of the DRC and the PSC clearly shows a debtor club systematically receiving a registration ban for one entire period if the club had neglected its financial obligation towards players in more than one earlier decision by the DRC or the PSC, and if in these proceedings the respondent failed to reply to the claim and therefore received a fine from FIFA. What remains not entirely clear is what the DRC and PSC exactly mean by “various occasions in the recent past”. This could also refer to convictions in employment-related matters prior to the introduction of the 12bis procedure on 1 April 2015.

In the only PSC decision wherein a registration ban for one entire period was imposed, the debtor club had only once been found by the PSC to have delayed a due payment for more than 30 days without a prima facie contractual basis, as a result of which a fine was imposed.[56] The decision of the PSC did not mention that the respondent was responsible for not complying with its financial obligations towards players on various occasions in the recent past. This might suggest a differing interpretation between the DRC and the PSC.

The two years of jurisprudence further show that a registration ban for two entire and consecutive periods will be imposed when the debtor club has been found by the DRC or the PSC to have delayed a due payment for more than 30 days without a prima facie contractual basis twice, as a result of which fines (or even a registration ban of 1 period)[57] has been imposed and the debtor club has been found by the DRC to be responsible for not complying with its financial obligations towards players on various occasions in the recent past.[58]


Final Remarks 

The 12bis procedure can be considered as a powerful instrument for swift dispute resolution, which could be of great benefit to players and clubs. FIFA has put in place a fast track procedure and a strong enforcement system with respect to overdue payables by defaulting clubs towards players and clubs. So far, FIFA has contributed to the resolution of international disputes in 12bis procedures in a very efficient manner leading to a shortened timeframe for decisions, with an average duration of approximately two months.

The sanctioning power of FIFA is one of the fundamental strengths of the 12bis procedure. In all the 137 published decisions of the DRC and the PSC, a sanction was imposed on the defaulting clubs, varying from a warning to a registration ban. 

From the FIFA decisions, in which fines were imposed on defaulting clubs, it can also be derived that the level of the fine is determined by taking into consideration the earlier-mentioned three categories of wrongdoings (First, Second and Third Category Offence), subject to an approximate range in relation to the outstanding amount due. However, the 12bis decisions of the DRC so far are more systematic and predictable than the PSC’s. Finally, the heaviest sanction, the transfer ban, will only be imposed in case the defaulting club not only did not reply to the claims, but also breached its financial obligations several times in the past. Fortunately, FIFA does not shy away from using sanctions, but only clubs that went too far will face the more severe ones.

Although the conclusions drawn by the authors can help practitioners confronted to 12bis procedures, they are based only on the published jurisprudence between 1 April 2015 and 1 April 2017. It must be taken into account that FIFA committees might change their interpretation and implementation practice regarding the 12bis procedure in the future. However, the jurisprudence of FIFA committees reviewed and analysed in this article can at least shed some light on the functioning of FIFA’s 12bis procedure, and in particular on its effective sanctioning regime, over the last two years.


[1] Art. 12bis(2) RSTP, edition 2016.

[2] Art. 12bis(3) RSTP, edition 2016.

[3] Art. 12bis(4) RSTP, edition 2016.

[4] Art. 12bis(2) RSTP and Art. 12bis(4) RSTP, edition 2016.

[5] DRC 14 November 2016, no. op11161545-E. For a more detailed analysis of DRC decisions, the authors make reference to this more extensive ISLJ article.

[6] Although it follows however from a literal interpretation of Art. 17(4) RSTP that it is a duty of the competent body to impose sporting sanctions whenever a club is found to have breached an employment contract during the protected period, according to the CAS there is a well-accepted and consistent practice of the FIFA DRC not to apply automatically a sanction but to leave it to its free discretion to evaluate the particular and specific circumstances on a case by case basis. See CAS 2014/A/3765 Club X. v. D. & FIFA, award of 5 June 2015.

[7] See inter alia DRC 16 February 2016, no. op02161765.

[8] DRC 28 January 2016, no. op1501703 and DRC 28 January 2016, no. op01161539.

[9] See PSC 7 May 2015, no. op0515353. Even EUR 50,000 higher in PSC 2 June 2016, no. op0616540. The highest outstanding payable in a DRC decision is EUR 950,000. See DRC 11 September 2015, no. 09151030.

[10] See inter alia DRC 28 January 2016, no. op01161539.

[11] See inter alia DRC 13 January 2016, no. op0116826.

[12] DRC 15 October 2015, no. op1015914. See also CAS 2015/A/4153 Al-Gharafa SC v. Nicolas Fedor & FIFA, award of 9 May 2016 and CAS 2016/A/4387 Delfino Pescara 1936 v. Royal Standard Liège & FIFA, award of 8 July 2016. 

[13] PSC 9 July 2015, no. op0715599 and PSC 7 May 2015, no. op0515353.

[14] DRC 13 January 2016, no. op0116826, DRC 25 April 2016, no. op0416115, DRC 7 July 2016, no. op0716778, PSC 2 June 2016, no. op0616540 and PSC 13 September 2016, no. op09161090.

[15] DRC 16 February 2016, no. op02161765 and DRC 15 March 2016, no. op0316303.

[16] Also confirmed in CAS 2016/A/4387 Delfino Pescara 1936 v. Royal Standard Liège & FIFA, award of 8 July 2016.

[17] DRC 23 May 2016, no. op0516571. The DRC can be quite sceptical towards information that is contained in emails. See inter alia DRC 31 July 2013, no. 07133206.

[18] PSC 3 June 2015, no. op0615400.

[19] For a more detailed analysis of the DRC decision, see our pending ISLJ article.

[20] However, some decisions – wherein a heavy sanction such as a transfer ban was issued – refer to an earlier conviction of the debtor club wherein a reprimand was given. See inter alia DRC 26 October 2016, no. op10160931-E.

[21] See DRC 26 November 2015, no. op11151356.

[22] See PSC 26 May 2016, no. op05160482.

[23] DRC 26 November 2015, no. op11151356.

[24] DRC 26 November 2015, no. op11151356, paras. (II) 7 and 8.

[25] DRC 26 November 2015, no. op11151356, para. (II) 17.

[26] DRC 26 November 2015, no. op11151356, para. (II) 18.

[27] For a more detailed analysis of this decision, see our pending ISLJ article.

[28] For a more detailed analysis of DRC decisions in this regard, see our pending ISLJ article.

[29] Cf. DRC 28 January 2016, no. op01161541 and PSC 12 October 2015, no. op10151035. In the DRC decision, the debtor club had an overdue payable of USD 100,807. In this case, the DRC imposed a fine of CHF 15,000. In the PSC decision, the debtor club had an overdue payable of EUR 1 million. However, the PSC imposed the same fine of CHF 15,000.

[30] For a more detailed analysis of the “percentage method”, see our pending ISLJ article.

[31] If these criteria were cumulatively met, the jurisprudence points out that a fine was given by FIFA to a club in a 12bis procedure. A First Category Offence was also given to a debtor club who responded to the claim, but was already sanctioned with a warning and reprimand in earlier 12bis procedures. In that case, the warning and the reprimand sanctions were exhausted and, thus, a fine was ordered by the DRC.

[32] See inter alia DRC 18 May 2016, no. op0516646. For a more detailed analysis of the DRC decisions, see our pending ISLJ article.

[33] See inter alia DRC 3 July 2015, no. op0715641. For a more detailed analysis of the DRC decision, t see our pending ISLJ article.

[34] For a more detailed illustration of DRC decisions, see our pending ISLJ article.

[35] Idem.

[36] This range differs from the range the authors have set in a previous article (see Global Sports Law and Taxation Reports, ‘Overview of the jurisprudence of the FIFA DRC in 12bis procedures’, March 2017). This difference is based on recently published jurisprudence: see DRC 28 February 2017, no. op02172117-E.

[37] DRC 11 September 2015, no. 09151030.

[38] For a more detailed analysis of DRC decisions, see our pending ISLJ article.

[39] PSC 12 October 2015, no. op10151035.

[40] PSC 12 October 2015, no. op10151010. Even more striking is the fact that this decision was dealt with on the same date as the aforementioned decision in footnote 61 above, by the same Single Judge. Only two weeks later, in PSC 29 October 2015, no. op10151014, the PSC imposed a fine of CHF 25,000 with regard to an overdue payable of EUR 590,000 to a first offender club.

[41] PSC 9 July 2015, no. op0715584.

[42] DRC 5 October 2015, no. op10151049.

[43] Only PSC 12 October 2015, no. op10151035 seems to be the odd one out.

[44] See footnote  58.

[45] This border is brought to 250,000, based on PSC 16 November 2015, no. op11151300, wherein a fine based on a Third Category Offence of CHF 45,000 was imposed with an overdue payable of USD 250,000, which sets the border at approximately 250,000.

[46] This border is brought to 500,000, based on PSC 25 February 2016, no. op0216170, wherein a fine of CHF 20,000 based on a First Category Offence was imposed with an overdue payable of EUR 450,093, which sets the border at approximately 500,000.

[47] This border is brought to 750,000, based on the decision PSC 29 June 2016, no. op0616676, wherein a fine of CHF 30,000 based on a First Category Offence was imposed with an overdue payable of EUR 750,000. In a decision with an overdue payable of EUR 675,000 (PSC 24 November 2015, no. op11151385), a fine of CHF 50,000 based on a Second Category Offence was given, which sets the border at approximately 750,000.

[48] At least until an overdue payable of USD 1,367,500 falls within this category; see PSC 21 August 2015, no. op0815530.

[49] See inter alia DRC 8 September 2016, no. op0916308. However, this may differ in a situation where sanctions are imposed cumulatively.

[50] See DRC 8 September 2016, no. op0916308 and DRC 15 July 2016, no. op0716703.

[51] In the context of a retroactive application of Article 12bis, as discussed in the context of the CAS award of 17 June 2016 (see CAS 2015/A/4310 Al Hilal Saudi Club v. Abdou Kader Mangane, award of 17 June 2016), it can be questioned whether the decisions of FIFA bodies prior to the date of 1 April 2015 (which per definition were decisions in ‘regular’ FIFA proceedings) can be taken into account and held against the club in default. For a more detailed analysis of this legal issue of retro-active application, see our pending ISLJ article. See also Lombardi, P., Worlds Sports Law Report, September 2016, “Article 12bis of the FIFA Regulations: 18 months on”, p. 5.

[52] DRC 26 May 2016, no. op0516585.

[53] PSC 20 June 2016, no. op0616676.

[54] See inter alia DRC 8 September 2016, no. op0916308.

[55] See inter alia DRC 27 October 2015, no. op10151248, wherein the debtor club had received a fine in both earlier decisions. In DRC 17 October 2016, no. op10161355-E, the debtor club had only received a fine in the second decision.

[56] PSC 20 June 2016, no. op0616676.

[57] DRC 29 July 2016, no. op0716699. The previous decision, wherein a transfer ban for one entire period was imposed, is also published: DRC 4 February 2016, no. op02161733.

[58] See inter alia DRC 13 September 2016, no. op09161247.

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