Asser International Sports Law Blog

Editor’s note: Rhys Lenarduzzi recently completed a Bachelor of Law (LL.B) and Bachelor of Philosophy (B.Phil.) at the University of Notre Dame, Sydney, Australia. As a former professional athlete, then international sports agent and consultant, Rhys is interested in international sports law, policy and ethics. He is currently undertaking an internship at the T.M.C. Asser Institute with a focus on Transnational Sports Law.

As one may have gathered from the series thus far, the question that comes out of this endeavour for me, is whether redistribution in football would be better divorced from the transfer system?

In my introductory blog I point towards historical, cultural, and of course the legal explanations as to why redistribution was established, and why it might be held onto despite obvious flaws. In my second blog, I point out how the training compensation and solidarity mechanisms work in practice through an African case study, as well as the hindrance caused and the Eurocentricity of the regulations. The key take-away from my third blog on the non-application of training compensation in women’s football might be that training compensation should apply to both men’s and women’s football, or neither. The sweeping generalisation that men’s and women’s football are different as justification for the non-application to the women’s game is not palatable, given inter alia the difference between the richest and poorest clubs in men’s football. Nor is it palatable that the training compensation mechanism is justified in men’s football to incentivise training, yet not in women’s football.

In the fourth blog of this series, I raise concerns that the establishment of the Clearing House prolongs the arrival of a preferable alternative system. The feature of this final blog is to consider alternatives to the current systems. This endeavour is manifestly two-fold; firstly, are there alternatives? Secondly, are they better? More...

Editor’s note: Rhys Lenarduzzi recently completed a Bachelor of Law (LL.B) and a Bachelor of Philosophy (B.Phil.) at the University of Notre Dame, Sydney, Australia. As a former professional athlete, then international sports agent and consultant, Rhys is interested in international sports law, policy and ethics. He is currently undertaking an internship at the T.M.C. Asser Institute with a focus on Transnational Sports Law.

In September 2018, the Football Stakeholders Committee endorsed the idea of a Clearing House that was subsequently approved in October of the same year by the FIFA Council. A tender process commenced in July 2019 for bidders to propose jurisdiction, operation and establishment. Whilst many questions go unanswered, it is clear that the Clearing House will be aimed at closing the significant gap between what is owed and what is actually paid, in respect to training compensation and solidarity payments. The Clearing House will have other functions, perhaps in regard to agents’ fees and other transfer related business, though those other operations are for another blog. It will hence act as an intermediary of sorts, receiving funds from a signing and therefore owing club (“new” club) and then moving that money on to training clubs. Whilst separate to FIFA, to what extent is unclear.

I have landed at the position of it being important to include a section in this blog series on the soon to commence Clearing House, given it appears to be FIFA’s (perhaps main) attempt to improve the training compensation and solidarity mechanisms. As will be expanded upon below, I fear it will create more issues than it will solve. Perhaps one should remain patient and optimistic until it is in operation, and one should be charitable in that there will undoubtedly be teething problems. However, it is of course not just the function of the Clearing House that is of interest, but also what moving forward with the project of the Clearing House represents and leaves unaddressed, namely, the issues I have identified in this blog series. More...

Editor’s note: Rhys Lenarduzzi is a final semester Bachelor of Law (LL.B) and Bachelor of Philosophy (B.Phil.) student, at the University of Notre Dame, Sydney, Australia. As a former professional athlete, then international sports agent and consultant, Rhys is interested in international sports law, policy and ethics. He is currently undertaking an internship at the T.M.C. Asser Institute with a focus on Transnational Sports Law.

As recently as September 2020, questions were raised in the European Parliament on the non-application of training compensation to women’s football. Whilst this blog will predominantly consider potential inconsistencies in reasoning for and against training compensation in men’s and women’s football, the questions before the Commission were largely on the theme of disrespect and discrimination. Somewhat unfortunately, the questions raised were side-stepped, with Ms Gabriel (Commissioner for Innovation, Research, Culture, Education and Youth) simply stating that: “The TFEU does not give the Commission the competence to interfere in the internal organisation of an independent international organisation such as FIFA.” This might be true in theory, though one might feel some degree of uneasiness if privy to the Commission’s role in the 2001 FIFA regulatory overhaul.

It is currently explicit in the regulations and the commentary, that in women’s football, signing clubs are not required to compensate training clubs for developing players, through the training compensation mechanism that exists in men’s football. Though it is a contentious comment and as will be expanded below, this may not have always been the case.

At Article 20 of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (RSTP), one will find that the principles of training compensation shall not apply to women’s football. Further, in FIFA’s recently released Women’s Football Administrator Handbook (the handbook), it states that disputes relating to training compensation are limited for the moment to male players only.[1]

Regulations on solidarity contributions on the other hand do apply to women’s football, but given transfer fees are not so common, the use of the mechanism is not either. As an indication of how uncommon the activation of the solidarity contribution mechanism in women’s football might be, FIFA reported in the handbook just four claims with the Players’ Status Department in 2016 (three claims involving the same player), and zero since.[2] That is in comparison to hundreds of claims made per season in men’s football, where signing and owing clubs had not fulfilled their obligation to pay the solidarity contribution.

Given the aforementioned, this blog will largely focus on training compensation and how it came to be the case that this mechanism, often presented as critical in the context of men’s football, does not apply in women’s football. To do so, I will first discuss the reasoning advanced in an unpublished CAS award, which one may reasonably suspect played a fundamental role in shaping the current exemption. I will then turn to FIFA’s timely response to the award and the adoption of its Circular No. 1603. Finally, I will point out the disconnect in FIFA’s decision to adopt two radically different approaches to the issue of training compensation in male and female professional football. More...

Having considered the history and justifications for the FIFA training compensation and solidarity mechanisms in my previous blog, I will now consider these systems in the African context. This appears to be a worthwhile undertaking given these global mechanisms were largely a result of European influence, so understanding their (extraterritorial) impact beyond the EU seems particularly important. Moreover, much has been written about the “muscle drain” affecting African football and the need for such drain to either be brought to a halt, or, more likely and perhaps more practical, to put in place an adequate system of redistribution to ensure the flourishing of African football that has essentially acted as a nursery for European football for at least a century. In the present blog, I intend to draw on my experiences as a football agent to expand on how FIFA’s redistributive mechanisms function in practice when an African player signs in Europe via one of the many kinds of entities that develop or purport to develop talent in Africa. I will throughout address the question of whether these mechanisms are effective in a general sense and more specifically in relation to their operation in Africa.More...

In 2019, training compensation and solidarity contributions based on FIFA’s Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (RSTP) amounted to US$ 75,5 million. This transfer of wealth from the clubs in the core of the football hierarchy to the clubs where the professional players originated is a peculiar arrangement unknown in other global industries. Beyond briefly pointing out or reminding the reader of how these systems work and the history behind them, this blog series aims to revisit the justifications for FIFA-imposed training compensation and the solidarity mechanism, assess their efficacy and effects through a case study of their operation in the African context, and finally analyse the potential impact of upcoming reforms of the FIFA RSTP in this context.

First, it is important to go back to the roots of this, arguably, strange practice. The current transfer system and the legal mechanisms constituting it were largely the result of a complex negotiation between European football’s main stakeholders and the European Commission dating back to 2001. The conclusion of these negotiations led to a new regulatory system enshrined in Article 20 and Annex 4 of the RSTP in the case of training compensation, and at Article 21 and Annex 5 in the case of the solidarity mechanism. Before paying some attention to the historical influences and how we arrived at these changes, as well as the justifications from the relevant bodies for their existence, let us briefly recall what training compensation and the solidarity mechanisms actually are. More...

Editor's note: Anna Antseliovich heads the sports practice at the Moscow-based legal group Clever Consult. She also works as a senior researcher at the Federal Science Center for Physical Culture and Sport (Russia).

The Olympic Games have always been a source of genuine interest for spectators as Olympians have repeatedly demonstrated astounding capacity of the human body and mind in winning Olympic gold, or by achieving success despite all odds.

At the ancient and even the first modern Olympic Games, there was no concept of a national team; each Olympian represented only himself/herself. However, at the 1906 Intercalated Games[1] for the first time, athletes were nominated by the National Olympic Committees (‘NOCs’) and competed as members of national teams representing their respective countries. At the opening ceremony, the athletes walked under the flags of their countries. This was a major shift, which meant that not only the athletes themselves competed against each other, but so too did the nations in unofficial medal standings.

The nomination and selection of athletes by their NOCs to compete under their national flag and represent their country is a matter of pride for the vast majority of athletes. However, to what extent does such a scheme correspond to the ideals which the Olympic Games were based on in ancient times? Is it possible to separate sport and politics in the modern world?

Olympic Principles

The ancient Olympics began as a religious celebration in honor of the ancient Greek god Zeus. All freeborn male citizens of Greece could participate. The modern Olympics no longer maintain religious significance and are based on modern ideas and principles.

The principles of Olympism are enshrined in the Olympic Charter under “Fundamental Principles of Olympism”. The first paragraph of the Charter reads: “Olympism is a philosophy of life, exalting and combining in a balanced whole the qualities of body, will and mind. Blending sport with culture and education, Olympism seeks to create a way of life based on the joy of effort, the educational value of good example, social responsibility and respect for universal fundamental ethical principles.” Thus, it should seem obvious that Olympism is centered on a human, his/her body, will, and mind. Nations are not mentioned at all in this section. On the contrary, “sports organizations within the Olympic Movement shall apply political neutrality.”

Moreover, the Olympic Charter enshrines the practice of sport as an inherent human right: “Every individual must have the possibility of practicing sport, without discrimination of any kind and in the Olympic spirit, which requires mutual understanding with a spirit of friendship, solidarity and fair play.” Paragraph 6 continues with “The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms outlined in this Olympic Charter shall be secured without discrimination of any kind, such as race, color, sex, sexual orientation, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”

Based on the above, we can conclude that anyone has the right to participate in competitions covered directly or indirectly by the Olympic Charter, and no one person or entity can be deprived of this right. The only limitation on participation is an individual athlete’s qualification and eligibility.

Entering by NOC

The Olympic Charter Rule 40 provides that “the competitor, team official or other team personnel must be entered by his NOC” to participate in the Olympic Games.

Rule 41 and its By-law deal with cases where there are issues with the nationality of an athlete, such as a change of nationality, a change in the status of the territory on which an athlete resides, etc., but clearly states that, as a general rule, an athlete shall be a national of the NOC that is selecting him/her.

In previous years, the IOC allowed so-called independent athletes to participate in the Olympic Games (such teams had different names but the same status). In 1992 they were athletes from Macedonia and Yugoslavia, in 2000 from East Timor, in 2012 athletes from the Netherlands Antilles and South Sudan, in 2014 from India, in 2016 from Kuwait and Russia, and in 2018 from Russia. These athletes competed as independent/neutral athletes for various reasons, such as the absence of the NOC, the suspension of the NOC from the IOC, doping scandals, or international sanctions.

The increased role of the State that is expressed by the appearance of the national symbols on the athletes' uniform, the playing of national anthems, and the flying of the national flag at the award ceremony has given rise to an unofficial medal count, which now - whether the IOC wants it or not - plays an extremely important role at each Olympic Games. Spectators intensely monitor which country is leading the medal count - sometimes even more than the competition itself. More and more countries are competing against each other, drawing up medal plans in an attempt to prove that their training system is the best and the most progressive, which, in turn, shows the superiority of their political and/or financial system. This all takes the spectators’ attention away from the purity of revelling in the capabilities of the human body and spirit and admiring the achievements of athletes.

Such an approach to the formation of Olympic teams (at least in individual sports) does not comply with the principle enshrined in Rule 6 of the Olympic Charter “the Olympic Games are competitions between athletes in individual or team events and not between countries..” and it seems that it is unfair for several reasons.

First, while for most athletes the very opportunity to represent their country at the most important sporting event is a source of great pride, for other athletes, it is not. For example, refugees who have fled their homeland, for fear of torture and/or death. For them, it is unacceptable to compete under the flag of their country. Their “national” NOC could not enter them in any event. To circumvent this problem, the IOC created a team of 10 refugee athletes who competed under the IOC flag and anthem for the first time at the Rio de Janeiro 2016 Olympic Games. In 2018, at the 133rd session of the IOC in Buenos Aires, it was confirmed that the Tokyo Olympics will also feature a refugee team. However, refugees are not the only group of athletes who have difficult relations with the authorities and/or political regimes. There are many places in the world where people are struggling for independence or with repressive regimes. For these athletes to compete under the national symbols used by such authorities is fundamentally and morally impossible because it contradicts their political views (for example, some of the Kurds may not be happy to represent Turkey, some of the Basques may be happy to see any flag but not a Spanish one, some individuals residing in Northern Ireland may feel themselves hurt and unhappy to compete under the Union Jack, the flag of the United Kingdom, Tibetans and Uighurs hardly want to glorify the flag of China that suppresses any attempts to show their national identity, etc.).

Second, despite the requirement of the Olympic Charter to observe political neutrality by NOCs, in reality, this is not always respected. A vivid example is a current situation in Belarus, where until February 2021 the NOC was headed by President Aleksandr Lukashenko, after whose election mass protests broke out in the country resulting in numerous human rights violations. Since February 2021, the NOC has been headed by his son, Viktor Lukashenko. Athletes who took part in the protests were persecuted and sometimes even imprisoned. It is obvious that such athletes have no chance to be selected by the NOC for the Tokyo Olympics and even if they were to be entered, they would unlikely be proud to perform under the symbols of a regime that they consider illegitimate.

The two examples demonstrate that performing under a national flag can sometimes have grave significance. Athlete can either be completely barred from competing in the Olympics should they not hold the correct political allegiance, or be forced to compete under a national flag that does not reflect their political views.

The author considers that a solution to the abovementioned problem consists in the registration of an athlete, if he/she meets sports criteria for participation in the Olympic Games, directly by the IOC in the personal capacity. Each athlete will then be able to independently decide to use the national symbols that correspond to his political views, or to refuse to use any symbols in general. This approach is consistent with the abovementioned principles.

Conclusion

The Olympic Games have evolved enormously from local games as part of a religious celebration to a worldwide sports festival watched by millions of people. The Olympics are the epitome of international competition between athletes and between nations. Political controversy and scandals surrounding the Olympics often overshadow athletes' successes. To remove the political underlying basis of the Olympics, the approach of entering athletes by the NOCs should be abandoned, and athletes (at least in individual sports) should be allowed to compete in a personal capacity stripping away political connotations that ought to be extraneous to sports competitions.

[1] Intercalated Games were supposed to be a series of international competitions held in Athens halfway between Summer Olympic Games. The only such games were held in 1906.

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the

Revisiting FIFA’s Training Compensation and Solidarity Mechanism - Part. 5: Rethinking Redistribution in Football - By Rhys Lenarduzzi

Revisiting FIFA’s Training Compensation and Solidarity Mechanism - Part. 4: The New FIFA Clearing House – An improvement to FIFA’s training compensation and solidarity mechanisms? - By Rhys Lenarduzzi

Revisiting FIFA’s Training Compensation and Solidarity Mechanism - Part. 3: The Curious Non-Application of Training Compensation to Women’s Football – By Rhys Lenarduzzi

Revisiting FIFA’s Training Compensation and Solidarity Mechanism - Part. 2: The African Reality – By Rhys Lenarduzzi

Revisiting FIFA’s Training Compensation and Solidarity Mechanism - Part.1: The historical, legal and political foundations - By Rhys Lenarduzzi

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the

WISLaw Blog Symposium - Why the existing athletes' Olympic entering system does not comply with the fundamental principles of Olympism enshrined in the Olympic Charter - By Anna Antseliovich

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