Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

Sport is sailing rudderless into geopolitical storms - Russia and Israel responses show how absence of rules makes FIFA and the IOC tools of the global north - By Nick McGeehan

Editor's note: Nicholas McGeehan is co-director of human rights research and advocacy group FairSquare, which works among other things on the nexus between sport and authoritarianism. He is a former senior researcher at Human Rights Watch and holds a PhD in international law from the European University Institute in Florence.


Boycotts, divestments and sanctions are each controversial and contentious in their own right, but when combined under the right conditions, they have explosive potential. BBC football presenter Gary Lineker found this out to his cost when he retweeted a call from Palestine’s BDS movement to suspend Israel from FIFA and the International Olympic Committee (IOC)  until such time the Israeli state ends what they called “the crime of genocide it is perpetrating in Gaza” and its occupation of Palestinian territory. Lineker quickly deleted his retweet but not before the UK’s most popular right-wing tabloid newspaper, The Daily Mail, spotted it and renewed their fulminating campaign against Lineker’s support for political causes that run contrary to the Mail’s editorial positions. The Daily Mail does not oppose sporting boycotts, in fact judging from an article by its football columnist, Martin Samuel, it was an ardent supporter of Russia’s ejection from European football in the aftermath of its invasion of Ukraine. “Why should Russian football get to be part of the continent in which it has murdered innocents?,” asked Samuel  and in that regard he was not alone and was echoing views heard across the political divide in the west at the time. 

The west continues to boycott Russia, its companies have divested from Russia, and its governments are sanctioning Russia. This includes in the sporting arena where nobody batted an eyelid when Russian football teams were excluded from FIFA and UEFA competition, and its athletes excluded from IOC competition.  So it seems obvious that it  is not so much BDS tactics that offend people in certain quarters, but rather their target. Russia can be BDS’d until the cows come home, but BDS’ing Israel is beyond the pale. You can see how it might be hard to explain to a child.

Through an examination of the widely divergent responses to Russia’s actions in Ukraine and Israel’s actions in Gaza, this piece argues that FIFA and the IOC have aligned themselves with the political positions of the countries of the global north. With reference to previous sporting boycotts, it demonstrates how an absence of rules has left FIFA and the IOC sailing rudderless into stormy geopolitical waters and argues that they need to institute rules to guide their responses to events of this gravity and magnitude. Dispensing once and for all with the canard that sport and politics can be kept apart would enable sport’s governing bodies to appropriately leverage their political power and not merely act as puppets of the global north.


Russia and a case of force majeure

On 28 February 2022, four days after Russia launched its ground invasion of Ukraine, FIFA and UEFA issued a joint statement suspending all Russian national and club teams from competition. Poland and Sweden had significantly upped the pressure two days earlier when they said they would refuse to play Russia in qualifying matches for the 2022 World Cup, which was scheduled to take place in December of that year. Their message was very clear - it’s them or us.

The Russian football federations took its case to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), arguing that  it had been punished arbitrarily for conduct that is neither mentioned nor proscribed in FIFA’s statutes. FIFA said its response was  “warranted and necessary in the face of the unprecedented and widespread reaction of the international community” and that it had the right to take its decision since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a case of force majeure (a catastrophic event that could not have been predicted), granting it the right under World Cup regulations to exclude Russia. (It is beyond the scope of this article to examine a similar case that the Russian football federation took against UEFA but detailed analysis of the two cases is available, courtesy of Antoine Duval.)

CAS sided with FIFA, noting that neither FIFA statutes nor the World Cup regulations contained any specific provisions that addressed wars of aggression, but agreeing with FIFA’s position that it had to respond urgently and that “the consequences of the military action were a force majeure event”. The CAS panel also noted that sanctions usually apply to the team who refuses to play but justified its reversal of established rules and precedent, by saying that  “circumstances of this particular case are to date unique.” The CAS panel’s comments on Russia’s argument that FIFA’s actions were inconsistent with its inaction in previous instances of state aggression are worth repeating here in full.

The Panel does not consider it helpful to compare previous global conflicts and the responses of other international sports federations in relation to a particular country’s involvement in those conflicts. The Russian State’s annexation of Crimea or the activities of the Assad regime in Syria, both recent examples of military conflict, have not, for better or for worse, elicited the same global reaction from governments, nongovernmental organisations, international bodies or the wider public (whether or not in the view of some people or entities, it should have). The reality is that this military conflict has elicited an unprecedented global reaction, including amongst the general public, and it was the consequences of that reaction to which FIFA considered it was required to act in order to fulfil its statutory objectives.

CAS offered a frank and pragmatic assessment of the situation, but was mistaken in its view that there was an unprecedented global reaction. On the contrary, many countries in the Global South did not join in universal condemnation of Russia’s actions in Ukraine, in fact 40 member states consistently abstained or voted against resolutions proposed in the UN General Assembly that condemned Russian actions, and 50 member states voted against expelling Russia from the Human Rights Council. These included many African, Asian, Middle Eastern and Latin American countries, who, as noted by Professor Christopher Alden, of the London School of Economics, were in part motivated by their “exasperation at Western hypocrisy towards violations of sovereignty.”

It was political pressure from the Global North, via European football federations, that forced the hand of FIFA.

The International Olympic Committee came under similar pressure. A few days after Russian troops entered Ukraine, the IOC issued a statement saying that it was “united in its sense of fairness not to punish [Russian] athletes for the decisions of their government” but nonetheless recommended that International Sports Federations and sports event organisers not invite or allow the participation of Russian (and Belarusian) athletes. 

In September 2022, two independent UN human rights experts (known as Special Rapporteurs), Professor Alexandra Xanthaki and Professor E. Tendayi Achiume  wrote to IOC President Thomas Bach expressing “serious concern” about the sanctions imposed on athletes. They described the decision to relocate or cancel events in Russia and Belarus and not to play their anthems in sporting events as “ sanctions that can be considered as legitimate, as they directly target these States or their official representations” but said that exclusion of athletes based solely on nationality violated the principle of non-discrimination and was at odds with international human rights law as well as the Olympic Charter. In January 2023, the IOC reversed its decision, under what they called “strict conditions”. Russia and Belarussian athletes could participate in competitions as “neutral athletes” and on the proviso that they “have not acted against the peace mission of the IOC by actively supporting the war in Ukraine.” The following month representatives of 35 governments - 27 of them European - issued a joint statement of concern at the IOC’s decision and expressing their support for a blanket ban. “We have strong concerns on how feasible it is for Russian and Belarusian Olympic athletes to compete as ‘neutrals’ … when they are directly funded and supported by their states (unlike, for example, professional tennis players)”, read the statement, which was also signed by the United States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Japan. “The strong links and affiliations between Russian athletes and the Russian military are also of clear concern”, it added.

One of the UN Special Rapporteurs, Alexandra Xanthaki, came under fierce criticism online after tweeting about the IOC’s decision to reverse the ban. “If my country did what russia is doing (invading a sovereign country) I would leave and refuse to associate with my national identity until it stopped - they should do the same” wrote one Twitter user. “The US waged an illegal war in 2003. I don’t remember people trying to ban Michael Phelps from swimming”, responded Xanthaki. 

Xanthaki and Achium had made this same point in more formal channels, in their first communication to the IOC the previous year. “Please explain how the Executive Committee of the International Olympic Committee has responded to other instances in which a State has engaged in territorial aggression toward another State. Please clarify whether the committee has banned athletes of other nationalities on the basis of the territorial aggression of the State to which they belong as a citizen previously.” 

In October 2023, the IOC suspended the Russian Olympic Committee for assuming control of regional sports organisations in Ukrainian territory illegally annexed by Russia, arguing that it was a violation of the Olympic Charter, but without providing specific details of the provisions it deemed Russia to have violated. 

The Olympic Charter is replete with references to its contribution to “peaceful societies” and “solidarity” and the “development of humankind” and nobody would contest the fact that Russia’s brutal and bloody war on Ukraine is entirely inconsistent with those values, but one could say the same of numerous conflicts and aggressions that did not stir the IOC to act. If the Olympic Charter contained references to international legal norms - to illegal annexation or violations of jus cogens norms or war crimes or occupation or aggression or crimes against humanity - then a decision to exclude Russia would have a substantive rationale, but it does not. And, as noted by CAS, nor do FIFA’s statutes. 

The responses of FIFA and the IOC to Russia’s actions in Ukraine were not based on rules, they were responses to the political positions of the powerful states of the global north. If there were any doubt about that, the failure of these sporting bodies to respond to Israel’s actions in the aftermath of the Hamas war crimes of October 7 surely provide conclusive evidence. 


To boycott or not to boycott

At the time of writing Israel’s actions in Gaza have resulted in South Africa filing a case against it at the International Court of Justice arguing that it is committing genocide. The ICJ issued provisional measures on Russia in March 2022 and 32 states formally intervened in the case, most of them the very same western states who criticised the IOC’s decision to repeal its blanket ban on Russian athletes. None of those states have intervened in support of the case against Israel despite the compelling evidence presented by South Africa’s legal team. On the contrary, Germany has intervened in support of Israel’s defence. The United States has called the South African submission “meritless, counterproductive and completely without any basis in fact.” The United Kingdom’s foreign secretary called the case “nonsense.” 

Anyone who has even  skimmed through South African’s  84-page submission would have to concede that there is a very strong case to answer and facts listed still jar the senses.

One Palestinian child in Gaza has been killed approximately every 15 minutes since Israel commenced military action in Gaza on 7 October 2023. … 61 hospitals and health care facilities in Gaza have been damaged or destroyed …Babies are dying from preventable causes: in addition to disease and malnutrition, premature babies have died due to lack of fuel to supply hospital generators; others have been found decomposing in their hospital cots…Over 60 per cent of homes in Gaza have been damaged or destroyed. …93 per cent of the population in Gaza is facing crisis levels of hunger, with more than one in four facing “catastrophic conditions” — with death imminent. 

Despite these very well-documented facts, there have been no calls in the west to exclude Israel from FIFA or UEFA competitions, or for its athletes to be disqualified from the Paris 2024 Olympics. As things stand, a hastily-deleted Gary Lineker retweet arguably represents the high-water mark of western support for a boycott of Israeli sporting teams. As noted by Karim Zidan, “This discrepancy in handling international conflicts highlights a concerning double standard that undermines the credibility of these sporting organizations.” It should also be noted that arguments to suspend Israel predate its response to Hamas’s October 7 war crimes. Antoine Duval highlighted Israel as the most obvious example of the double standard inherent in FIFA’s and UEFA’s decisions to exclude Russian football teams from competition in an article published long before October 7. “The FUR is no more directly responsible for the illegal Russian invasion of Ukraine than the IFA for the illegal occupation by the Israeli army of the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Why are other wars not deemed so disruptive that they must lead to the suspension of national teams?”

Outside of the west, a call to suspend Israel from sporting competition is far less controversial and has some clear and obvious precedents. In December 2023, the Jordanian Football Association called for all Israeli sports federations to be suspended from international competition in a move that recalls the 1974 expulsion of Israel from the Asian Football Confederation following a Kuwaiti motion. Israeli’s national team spent two decades in the sporting wilderness until UEFA agreed to allow Israel to be part of the European confederation in the 1990s.

At the time of Israel’s expulsion from the AFC, sporting boycotts were in vogue. FIFA excluded the South African football team from competition in 1961 on account of the state’s apartheid policy, its athletes were excluded from the 1964 Olympic games and South Africa was expelled entirely from the IOC in 1970. South Africa was only readmitted to the IOC and FIFA in 1992, which was the same year that UEFA disqualified Yugoslavia from the European Championships. In this case, UEFA’s hand was forced by international law, more specifically United Nations Security Council issued Resolution 757 , which was issued a few months before the tournament began and among other things called on all states to “take the necessary steps to prevent the participation in sporting events on their territory of persons or groups representing the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).”

In the realm of sporting boycotts, the case of Yugoslavia appears to be one of the few instances where the exclusion of a sporting team - however morally justified - was driven by precise rules and due process. Those rules and processes were that of the UN Security Council, an anachronistic and profoundly anti-democratic body controlled by its five permanent members - Russia, China, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France - none of whom could ever be called peaceniks.


How sport might use its political leverage

Is it possible for sport to safely navigate its way through these choppy and dangerous geopolitical waters? Perhaps not, but it could at least chart a course.

It bears repeating that sport is profoundly political, and international sport is an important actor in geopolitical affairs. Rob Nixon, in his study of the sporting boycott of apartheid-era South Africa, beautifully articulated the point. “International sporting contests serve as a form of national recreation in more than one sense of the phrase. They are exhibitionist events imbued with the authority to recreate or simulate the nation, offering a vigorous display of a proxy body politic.” Exclusion from these events therefore comes at a political cost to the states affected. This means that sport has political power and leverage. Not as much as the United States or Russia or Israel maybe, but some.

The problem is that FIFA and the IOC are using their leverage largely  in the service of the political interests of the global north, excluding some states and turning a blind eye to others. To return to the point of Alexander Xanthaki, if illegal and ruinous wars of aggression were grounds for exclusion, the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 would have resulted in their athletes’ exclusion from the Athens Olympics in 2004. Might all of the UK’s national federations have been excluded from qualifying games for the 2006 men’s World Cup in Germany  for their participation in the Iraq war?  

In all likelihood these glaring double standards are of little concern to FIFA or the IOC, organisations which have grown fat on the billions of dollars in revenue that they generate from selling image and broadcast rights, but they should be of concern to people who genuinely care about the governance of sport. 

So what could progressive governance look like? Should FIFA and the IOC impose rules that provide for national teams to be excluded from competitions on political grounds? Well since they already do exclude teams, and given the leverage that they obviously possess, it would make a lot more sense for them to be proactive and set their own rules, than to be reactive and respond to the political whims of others. As Antoine Duval has argued, it would be preferable if sporting bodies were to “ openly acknowledge the need to take decisions on the basis of political or ethical considerations in certain situations and to introduce proper procedures and rules in their statutes and rulebooks to deal with such cases.”

In terms of what the rules should be, that would be a hotly-debated matter.  The argument that states should be excluded for gross and serious violations of human rights might be seductive to human rights advocates, but in practice it would be entirely unworkable - which violations? Decided by whom? A set of objective and measurable criteria is probably the only way that FIFA and the IOC could exercise their leverage appropriately. For the sake of argument, here are a couple of suggestions.

The ICJ is a highly reputable and well-established court that resolves disputes between states, all of whom accept its jurisdiction. On 26 January it issued a damning assessment of Israel’s conduct in Gaza and ordered it to desist from acts that violate the Genocide Convention. The ICJ issued similar provisional measures calling on Russia to “suspend the military operations that it commenced on 24 February 2022 in the territory of Ukraine” on 16 March 2022 - only a few weeks after the invasion. Russia has refused to abide by the court’s decision. It remains unclear if Israel intends to follow the court’s orders. FIFA and the IOC could fairly easily include a rule excluding teams and athletes from countries that don’t abide by the ICJ’s decisions. 

A second, more radical, suggestion would be to make ratification of critical international treaties that promote international peace and justice a prerequisite for participation in international sporting events. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court , for example, gives the ICC authority to prosecute individuals for the commission of the most serious international crimes and commits the 123 countries that have ratified the treaty of accepting its jurisdiction. The United States, Russia, China, India and Israel are among the states that have not ratified the Rome Statute. 

To reiterate, these are merely suggestions for the types of steps that  progressive sporting bodies might consider, and as one prominent campaigner has noted, “International justice has always fallen flat when it comes to dealing with powerful Western interests”. But consider a world where Israel’s participation in the Paris 2024 Olympics rested on it abiding by the ICJ’s decision. Imagine a situation where the United States, which has provided crucial political, military and financial support for Israel’s actions in Gaza, faced the prospect of hosting the 2026 World Cup without its national team involved unless it agreed to the jurisdiction of the ICC.

We should be clear-eyed about the fact that western support for Israel’s actions in Gaza has left the international rules-based order in tatters. Future generations may spend their lives rebuilding faith in and support for a more equitable and dependable system of global order and peace. Sport, for its part,will always be vulnerable to a battering by geopolitical forces that it cannot counter, but it can at least gird itself with rules that mitigate against it being used as a tool of unaccountable power.

Comments are closed
Asser International Sports Law Blog | The CAS Ad Hoc Division in 2014: Business As Usual? - Part. 2: The Selection Drama

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

The CAS Ad Hoc Division in 2014: Business As Usual? - Part. 2: The Selection Drama

In a first blog last month we discussed the problem of the scope of jurisdiction of the Ad Hoc Division of the Court of Arbitration for Sport. The key issue was whether an athlete could get his case heard in front of the CAS Ad Hoc Division or not. In this second part, we will also focus on whether an athlete can access a forum, but a different kind of forum: the Olympic Games as such. This is a dramatic moment in an athlete’s life, one that will decide the future path of an entire career and most likely a lifetime of opportunities. Thus, it is a decision that should not be taken lightly, nor in disregard of the athletes’ due process rights. In the past, several (non-)selection cases were referred to the Ad Hoc Divisions at the Olympic Games, and this was again the case in 2014, providing us with the opportunity for the present review.

Three out of four cases dealt with by the CAS Ad Hoc Division in Sochi involved an athlete contesting her eviction from the Games. Each case is specific in its factual and legal assessment and deserves an individual review.

 

I.               Daniela Bauer (CAS OG 14/01)

Daniela Bauer is an Austrian halfpipe freestyle skier contesting the decision by the Austrian Olympic Committee (AOC) and the Austrian Ski Federation (ASF) not to select her for the Sochi Olympic Games. Shortly before the Games, a member of the ASF had informed Ms. Bauer that she would get to participate in the Olympics if Austria were offered an additional quota place for the halfpipe competition.[1] But, when the AOC got the opportunity to fill such a quota spot, it declined to use it. It did so because “the sporting performances of the Austrian athletes in this discipline were not good enough and would adversely affect the overall perception of the Federation and its athletes at the Olympics”[2]. Hence, on 2 February 2014, the athlete decided to file an application with the CAS Ad Hoc Division against her non-selection.

She claimed that ASF and AOC had “induced legitimate expectations in the Applicant that having qualified under the FIS Rules she would be selected through the use of quota places”. Therefore, ASF and AOC “are estopped[3] from changing their course of action, i.e. from relying on their authority in any given case to decline the quota allocated to Austria”[4]. Moreover, she argued that “[t]he right of the ASF to recommend an athlete to the AOC (Rule 44.4 of the OC) as well as the right of the AOC to select an athlete for the Olympic Games (Rule 27.7.2 of the OC) cannot be exercised in an unreasonable manner”[5]. This standard of reasonableness was not met in her case because[6]:

  • “no reasons were given”;
  • “the Respondents’ discretion not to recommend and select her was exercised arbitrarily”;
  • “the applicant was never notified that reference would be made to the above-mentioned criterion of sporting perspective”;
  • “the AOC violated Rule 44.4 of the OC by not investigating whether the ASF’s non-recommendation was based on discrimination”;
  • “the AOC should accept all the quotas allocated to it, irrespective of the potential results of the nominated athletes”;
  • and she “should have been immediately informed of the decisions taken by the ASF and AOC”.

The ASF and AOC opposed that “[n]o person has the authority to bind the ASF and the AOC with respect to the Applicant’s participation in the Olympic Games” and, therefore, “[t]he AOC has the exclusive authority under Rule 27 of the OC to decide which athletes shall take part in the Olympic Games” [7].

The jurisdiction of the CAS Ad Hoc Division was not contested and the panel moved directly to the merit of the case. The panel refers to its settled case-law and reminds that “it is not in issue that it is for an NOC to select its competitors for the Olympics […] (CAS OG 08/03)”[8]. Hence, “although the Applicant satisfied the FIS minimum qualification standards and the AOC was below its maximum athlete quotas for all freestyle events, the AOC would have violated the OC by nominating her for a quota allocation for women’s halfpipe as she had not been recommended by the ASF”[9]. Even though it is acknowledged that ASF member Mr. Rijavec “may have created an expectation that the ASF would recommend to the AOC that she would be nominated for a quota allocation”, he “was not authorized to make any representations, promises or guarantees regarding whether the AOC would nominate her if she satisfied these standards”[10]. Consequently, no legitimate expectations to be selected could arise. In addition to this, the panel found that the ASF disposes of a “significant degree of subjective discretion”[11] as it does not have recourse to any objective criteria regarding the selection of freestyle skiers.[12] Nevertheless, it “has a legal duty not to be arbitrary, unfair, or unreasonable”, which it was not in this instance as “it had a legitimate sports performance justification” .[13]

Finally, the Panel, in a remarkable twist of mind, “wishes to express in clear terms that it does not condone its lack of published qualification criteria that misled the Applicant by failing to provide clear and timely notice of the performance standards she was required to meet in order to be recommended by the ASF for the nomination by the AOC to the Austrian Olympic team”. Additionally, “the panel strongly recommends that the ASF establish, identify, and publish clear criteria to enable athletes to determine in a timely manner the Olympic Games qualification standards they are required to meet” .[14] Despite these final remonstrances, the panel concludes that the claims of Ms. Bauer lack merit.

 

II.             Clyde Getty (CAS OG 14/02)

The claimant, Mr. Getty, is an Argentinean freestyle skier competing in the aerials discipline; the respondent is the International Ski Federation (FIS). This is a case also related to the attribution of an additional quota spot to participate to the Sochi Olympic Games. On 24 January the Argentinean Ski Federation (FASA) received an email from the FIS informing it that it was allocated a quota spot for the aerials competition in Sochi. The FASA immediately informed Mr. Getty of the good news. However, later that day, after confirming its interest in the spot, the federation received a second email from FIS stating that FASA “does not have an athlete that is eligible to participate in the Aerials men event” and therefore cannot get the spot misleadingly offered in the first email. Henceforth, Mr. Getty decided to challenge his proclaimed ineligibility to participate to the Olympics in front of the CAS Ad Hoc Division. 

Mr Getty claims that he is “eligible to be entered into the Sochi Games by the Argentinean NOC irrespective of his current FIS points”[15]. He is of the opinion that FIS rules are ambiguous on the selection process for quota spots and therefore should be interpreted in his favour on the basis of the contra preferentem principle.[16] Moreover, he argues that “FIS is estopped from denying [him] a quota place” [17]. In other words, Mr. Getty claims FIS had prompted legitimate expectations, especially after the 24 January  email, that he would be participating to the Sochi Olympic Games. Finally, Mr Getty submits that denying him the participation in the Sochi Games “would be unfair and contrary to the spirit of the Olympic Movement” [18]. He bases his claim, amongst many other things, on the fact that he is the only freestyle athlete representing South America and that his “dedication to sport is an inspiration to many” [19]. The FIS disputes these claims and points out that “the Applicant’s description of the qualification procedure is incorrect and misleading” [20]. In fact, Mr. Getty never reached the minimum points for eligibility, nor is any alternative qualification criterion accessible. Likewise, the FIS is not estopped, as it could not create any legitimate expectations with its email.

The jurisdiction of the CAS Ad Hoc Tribunal was not contested and the panel proceeded directly to the merit. As a preamble, the arbitrators remind that “[u]nder Swiss law, the interpretation of statutes has to be rather objective and always start with the wording of the rule”[21]. After reviewing the wording of the FIS’s regulations, the panel concludes that, in the present case, “[a] good faith common sense reading leads to the conclusion that the rules unambiguously require all competitors to meet the individual eligibility requirements” [22]. Additionally, “[t]he fact that the Applicant cannot point to a single instance in the past where an athlete was allowed to compete in the Olympic Games without meeting the eligibility requirements […] is further evidence of this conclusion” [23].

Moreover, the FIS is not deemed estopped from denying Mr. Getty a quota place for the Sochi Olympic Games. In this regard, the Panel notes that “FIS never made during the qualification period a representation that Mr. Getty was eligibile” [24], nor is there “evidence that during the qualification period Mr. Getty received from FIS an individual assurance that he was eligible” [25], and “the fact that COA might ultimately obtain a quota place did (and could) not suggest that FIS would waive the minimum individual qualification requirement for any athlete assigned to that quota place” [26], most importantly “all correspondence between FASA or COA and FIS on 24 October 2014 did not contain any express and individual reference to Mr. Getty”[27]. This is a fundamental difference compared to the existing precedents invoked by Mr. Getty. Indeed, in those cases “the athlete had been given specific and individual assurances about his eligibility” (CAS OG 02/06 & CAS OG 08/02) or “the international federation changed its rules with retroactive effects, depriving an athlete of the eligibility that could be assumed on the basis of prior rules”[28] (CAS 2008/O/1455).

Finally, the Panel also held that the fact that the participation of Mr. Getty to the Sochi Games would be in line with the Olympic spirit is a matter of policy. These concerns are for “FIS to consider when adopting the eligibility rules for the Olympic games; they are not for this Panel which is only asked to apply the existing rules”[29]. Even though the Panel is sympathetic to the athlete’s drive to participate to the Sochi Olympic Games it rejects the application filed by Mr. Getty.

 

III.           Maria Birkner (CAS OG 14/03)

The final, and maybe most complex and controversial case, is the one involving a well-known Argentine alpine skier: María Birkner. The National Olympic Committee for Argentina (COA) and the Argentinean Ski Federation (FASA) are the respondents in the proceedings. On 20 January 2014 the FASA told Ms. Birkner that she was not selected for the Sochi Olympic Games. This decision not to select her is challenged in front of the CAS Ad Hoc Division.

Ms. Birkner claims “that she was discriminated against on the basis of her being a member of her family”[30]. For a number of reasons, she claims that the Federation has purposefully conspired to banish her from its activities and to exclude her from the Olympic games[31]. Chiefly, she claims the federation has purposefully informed her after the final decision of the existence of specific selection criteria and of a technical committee in charge of the selection. As discussed in the previous blog, the jurisdiction of the Ad Hoc Division was challenged and the panel found that it did not have jurisdiction. Nonetheless, it decided to consider the merits of the case anyway.

The arbitrators brushed aside any bias against the family of Ms. Birkner noting that two of her siblings were present in Sochi and that her brother had even the privilege of carrying the Argentinean Flag during the opening ceremony.[32] Furthermore, in the eyes of the panel, the claimant failed to establish that the qualification process, the Technical Committee and the selection criteria used were biased against her.[33] Indeed, “it cannot be said that the selection criteria said to be applied were arbitrary or unreasonable”[34]. The panel considers that the recriminations of Ms. Birkner against the selection process, especially the allegations of a bias from the part of the Technical Committee and that the other skiers had previous knowledge of the main selection criteria were not sufficiently substantiated and could not be established for the sake of this procedure.

The panel is of the view that the situation is similar to the one of the Bauer case discussed above. Therefore, it recalls the holding of the Bauer Panel observing that “there was a legal duty not to be arbitrary, unfair or unreasonable in the application of objective criteria or in the exercise of subjective discretion but that the exercise of discretion was not so characterised where there was a legitimate sports performance justification for selection”[35]. It finds that “a discretion based on “the evolution and projection in the future” [as invoked by the FASA] is not arbitrary, unfair or unreasonable” [36]. Nevertheless, the panel refers to the obiter holding in the Bauer case and “recommends that FASA establishes, identifies and publishes clear criteria in a timely manner to enable athletes to understand those criteria and the Olympic Games qualification standards that they are required to meet in order to be recommended for selection by COA” [37]. In the present case, “a dedicated athlete with an outstanding history of representing her country, who had successfully competed in many international as well as national events, was devastated by the decision made not to select her, when she had believed that, on the criteria that she had mistakenly understood had applied, she would represent her country at the Sochi Olympic Games” [38].


Conclusion: Deference is not enough 

Selection disputes constitute a big part of the CAS Ad Hoc Division’s caseload.[39] This is probably inevitable, as the non-selection for the Olympic Games is often the toughest setback faced by an athlete in her career. The Sochi cases do not fundamentally sidestep the existing case law of the CAS Ad Hoc Division in this regard. The deference to the subjective criteria used by the National Olympic Committee’s (NOCs) and the International federations (Ifs) is reaffirmed, unless those criteria are applied in an “arbitrary, unfair or unreasonable” way. Furthermore, an athlete can hardly rely on any legitimate expectations, unless he has been offered personally and officially a spot to participate to the Olympic Games. Hence, a non-selection can only be challenged successfully in the most extreme cases. However, when the behaviour of the federation is, to say the least, ambiguous as in the Birkner case, a very heavy burden of proof lies on the shoulder of the athlete to turn this ambiguity into the recognition of an “arbitrary, unfair or unreasonable” behaviour. 

The Sochi Ad Hoc Division’s approach to selection cases is flawed with paradoxical feelings. On the one hand, it urges the Ifs and NOCs to devise and publish “clear criteria in a timely manner”, but, on the other hand, it encourages them not do so by limiting the reviewability of their subjective and blurry selection practices. In short, Panels openly favour objective and predictable schemes on which athletes can rely, while incentivizing subjective and unpredictable assessments by leaving untouched the wide scope of discretion of the Ifs and NOCs.[40] The paradoxical and irreconcilable nature of these views should lead the CAS to reconsider its approach to the selection process. The Sochi panels instinctively felt there was something fundamentally unfair with the non-selection of Ms. Bauer and Ms. Birkner. In this regard, the panels’ final incantations for change will remain unanswered if the CAS Ad Hoc Division refuses to contribute through its jurisprudence to the rise of clear selection criteria. It should impose a more stringent review of the subjective criteria used by the Ifs, by promoting a less strict understanding of the notion of “arbitrary, unfair or unreasonable” scheme and/or by alleviating the burden of proof bearing on athletes to establish the abusive nature of a selection process.

In fact, such an evolution would be in a line with the will expressed by the Olympic movement during the Olympic Agenda 2020 process to be irreproachable in terms of good governance and transparency. The existence of publicly known and clearly defined standards and rules is a hallmark of such good governance. Getting to the Olympics is just too important for athletes to be left at the mercy of the unchecked will


[1] CAS OG 14/01, point 2.5

[2] CAS OG 14/01, point 2.10

[3] For a quick introduction to the doctrine of Estoppel see : http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Estoppel

[4] CAS OG 14/01, point 4.2 a)

[5] CAS OG 14/01, point 4.2 b)

[6] CAS OG 14/01, point 4.2 b) i) to vi)

[7] CAS OG 14/01, point 4.3 a) and c)

[8] CAS OG 14/01, point 7.5

[9] CAS OG 14/01, point 7.10

[10] CAS OG 14/01, point 7.12

[11] CAS OG 14/01, point 7.15

[12]In contrast with CAS OG 06/08 and CAS OG 06/02.

[13] CAS OG 14/01, point 7.15

[14]CAS OG 14/01, point 7.16

[15] CAS OG 14/02, point 4.2 a)

[16] CAS OG 14/02, point 4.2 a)

[17] CAS OG 14/02, point 4.2 b)

[18] CAS OG 14/02, point 4.2 c)

[19] CAS OG 14/02, point 4.2 c)

[20] CAS OG 14/02, point 4.3 a)

[21] CAS OG 14/02, point 7.4

[22] CAS OG 14/02, point 8.9

[23] CAS OG 14/02, point 8.10

[24] CAS OG 14/02, point 8.17 i.

[25]CAS OG 14/02, point 8.17 ii.

[26] CAS OG 14/02, point 8.17 iii.

[27] CAS OG 14/02, point 8.17 vi.

[28] CAS OG 14/02, point 8.17 vii.

[29] CAS OG 14/02, point 8.20

[30] CAS OG 14/03, point 4.3

[31] CAS OG 14/03, point 4.4

[32] CAS OG 14/03, point 7.4-7.7

[33] CAS OG 14/03, point 7.16-7.25

[34] CAS OG 14/03, point 7.19

[35] CAS OG 14/03, point 8.2

[36] CAS OG 14/03, point 8.3

[37] CAS OG 14/03, point 8.4

[38] CAS OG 14/03, point 8.4

[39] See the following cases : CAS OG 12/06 ; CAS OG 12/01 ; CAS OG 12/02 ; CAS OG 06/008 ; CAS OG 06/002 ; CAS OG 08/002; CAS OG 08/003; CAS OG 02/005

[40] A problem already identified by Antonio Rigozzi, which noted in 2006 that « This case law [CAS OG 06/002  & CAS OG 06/008] could lead to a switch (back) from selection based on objective criteria to more subjective process. This would be a regrettable evolution. To reduce the risk of dispute, the selecting bodies should enact objective criteria, which are easily intelligible, make sure that they are communicated to (and understood) by the athletes, and avoid any modification of the « rules of the game » during the selection » process. » A. Rigozzi, ‘The Decisions Rendered by the CAS Ad Hoc Division at the Turin Winter Olympic Games 2006’, Journal of International Arbitration, pp.453-466, p.466

Comments are closed