Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

Overdue payables in action: Reviewing two years of FIFA jurisprudence on the 12bis procedure – Part 2. By Frans M. de Weger and Frank John Vrolijk.

Editor's Note: Frans M. de Weger is legal counsel for the Federation of Dutch Professional Football Clubs (FBO) and CAS arbitrator. De Weger is author of the book “The Jurisprudence of the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber”, 2nd edition, published by T.M.C. Asser Press in 2016. Frank John Vrolijk specialises in Sports, Labour and Company Law and is a former legal trainee of FBO and DRC Database.

This second blog will focus specifically on the sanctions available for FIFA under Article 12bis. It will provide explanatory guidelines covering the sanctions imposed during the period surveyed.


Introduction

The possibility to impose sanctions under article 12bis constitutes one of the pillars of the 12bis procedure. Pursuant to Article 12bis of the RSTP, edition 2016, the DRC and the PSC may impose a sanction on a club if the club is found to have delayed a due payment for more than 30 days without a prima facie contractual basis[1] and the creditor have put the debtor club in default in writing, granting a deadline of at least 10 days.[2] The jurisprudence in relation to Article 12bis also shows that sanctions are imposed ex officio by the DRC or the PSC and not per request of the claimant.More...





Overdue payables in action: Reviewing two years of FIFA jurisprudence on the 12bis procedure – Part 1. By Frans M. de Weger and Frank John Vrolijk.

Editor's Note: Frans M. de Weger is legal counsel for the Federation of Dutch Professional Football Clubs (FBO) and CAS arbitrator. De Weger is author of the book “The Jurisprudence of the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber”, 2nd edition, published by T.M.C. Asser Press in 2016. Frank John Vrolijk specialises in Sports, Labour and Company Law and is a former legal trainee of FBO and DRC Database.

In this first blog, we will try to answer some questions raised in relation to the Article 12bis procedure on overdue payables based on the jurisprudence of the DRC and the PSC during the last two years: from 1 April 2015 until 1 April 2017. [1] The awards of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (hereinafter: “the CAS”) in relation to Article 12bis that are published on CAS’s website will also be brought to the reader’s attention. In the second blog, we will focus specifically on the sanctions applied by FIFA under Article 12bis. In addition, explanatory guidelines will be offered covering the sanctions imposed during the period surveyed. A more extensive version of both blogs is pending for publication with the International Sports Law Journal (ISLJ). If necessary, and for a more detailed and extensive analysis at certain points, we will make reference to this more extensive article in the ISLJ. More...

International and European Sports Law – Monthly Report – May 2017. By Tomáš Grell

Editor's note: This report compiles all relevant news, events and materials on International and European Sports Law based on the daily coverage provided on our twitter feed @Sportslaw_asser. You are invited to complete this survey via the comments section below, feel free to add links to important cases, documents and articles we might have overlooked.

The Headlines

The end of governance reforms at FIFA?

The main sports governance story that surfaced in the press (see here and here) during the last month is related to significant personal changes made by the FIFA Council within the organization’s institutional structure. In particular, the FIFA Council dismissed the heads of the investigatory (Mr Cornel Borbély) and adjudicatory (Mr Hans-Joachim Eckert) chambers of the Independent Ethics Committee, as well as the Head (Mr Miguel Maduro) of the Governance and Review Committee. The decision to remove Mr Maduro was taken arguably in response to his active role in barring Mr Vitaly Mutko, a Deputy Prime Minister of Russia, from sitting on the FIFA Council due to an imminent conflict of interests. These events constitute a major setback to governance reforms initiated by the football’s world governing body in 2015. For a more detailed insight into the governance reforms at FIFA, we invite you to read the recent blog written by our senior researcher Mr Antoine Duval. More...

The Olympic Games and Human Rights – Part II: Human Rights Obligations Added to the Host City Contract: Turning Point or Empty Promise? – By Tomáš Grell


This is a follow-up contribution to my previous blog on human rights implications of the Olympic Games published last week. Together with highlighting some of the most serious Olympic Games-related human rights abuses, the first part has outlined the key elements of the Host City Contract ('HCC') as one of the main legal instruments regulating the execution of the Olympic Games. It has also indicated that, in February 2017, the International Olympic Committee ('IOC') revised the 2024 HCC to include, inter alia, explicit human rights obligations. Without questioning the potential significance of inserting human rights obligations to the 2024 HCC, this second part will refer to a number of outstanding issues requiring clarification in order to ensure that these newly-added human rights obligations are translated from paper to actual practice. More...


The Olympic Games and Human Rights – Part I: Introduction to the Host City Contract – By Tomáš Grell

Editor’s note: Tomáš Grell is currently an LL.M. student in Public International Law at Leiden University. He contributes to the work of the ASSER International Sports Law Centre as a part-time intern.


In its press release of 28 February 2017, the International Olympic Committee ('IOC') communicated that, as part of the implementation of Olympic Agenda 2020 ('Agenda 2020'), it is making specific changes to the 2024 Host City Contract with regard to human rights, anti-corruption and sustainable development. On this occasion, IOC President Thomas Bach stated that ''this latest step is another reflection of the IOC's commitment to embedding the fundamental values of Olympism in all aspects of the Olympic Games''. Although the Host City of the 2024 Summer Olympic Games is scheduled to be announced only in September this year, it is now clear that, be it either Los Angeles or Paris (as Budapest has recently withdrawn its bid), it will have to abide by an additional set of human rights obligations.

This two-part blog will take a closer look at the execution of the Olympic Games from a human rights perspective. The first part will address the most serious human rights abuses that reportedly took place in connection with some of the previous editions of the Olympic Games. It will also outline the key characteristics of the Host City Contract ('HCC') as one of the main legal instruments relating to the execution of the Olympic Games. The second part will shed light on the human rights provisions that have been recently added to the 2024 HCC and it will seek to examine how, if at all, these newly-added human rights obligations could be reflected in practice. For the sake of clarity, it should be noted that the present blog will not focus on the provisions concerning anti-corruption that have been introduced to the 2024 HCC together with the abovementioned human rights provisions. More...



Exploring the Validity of Unilateral Extension Options in Football – Part 2: The view of the DRC and the CAS. By Saverio Spera

Editor’s Note: Saverio Spera is an Italian lawyer and LL.M. graduate in International Business Law at King’s College London. He is currently an intern at the ASSER International Sports Law Centre. 

This blog is a follow up to my previous contribution on the validity of Unilateral Extension Options (hereafter UEOs) under national and European law. It focuses on the different approaches taken to UEOs by the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC) and the Court of arbitration for sport (CAS). While in general the DRC has adopted a strict approach towards their validity, the CAS has followed a more liberal trend. Nonetheless, the two judicial bodies share a common conclusion: UEOs are not necessarily invalid. In this second blog I will provide an overview of the similarities and differences of the two judicial bodies in tackling UEOs. More...

Nudging, not crushing, private orders - Private Ordering in Sports and the Role of States - By Branislav Hock

Editor's note: Branislav Hock (@bran_hock)  is PhD Researcher at the Tilburg Law and Economics Center at Tilburg University. His areas of interests are transnational regulation of corruption, public procurement, extraterritoriality, compliance, law and economics, and private ordering. Author can be contacted via email: b.hock@uvt.nl.


This blog post is based on a paper co-authored with Suren Gomtsian, Annemarie Balvert, and Oguz Kirman.


Game-changers that lead to financial success, political revolutions, or innovation, do not come “out of the blue”; they come from a logical sequence of events supported by well-functioning institutions. Many of these game changers originate from transnational private actors—such as business and sport associations—that produce positive spillover effects on the economy. In a recent paper forthcoming in the Yale Journal of International Law, using the example of FIFA, football’s world-governing body, with co-authors Suren Gomtsian, Annemarie Balvert, and Oguz Kirman, we show that the success of private associations in creating and maintaining private legal order depends on the ability to offer better institutions than their public alternatives do. While financial scandals and other global problems that relate to the functioning of these private member associations may call for public interventions, such interventions, in most cases, should aim to improve private orders rather than replace them. More...



What Pogba's transfer tells us about the (de)regulation of intermediaries in football. By Serhat Yilmaz & Antoine Duval

Editor’s note: Serhat Yilmaz (@serhat_yilmaz) is a lecturer in sports law in Loughborough University. His research focuses on the regulatory framework applicable to intermediaries. Antoine Duval (@Ant1Duval) is the head of the Asser International Sports Law Centre.


Last week, while FIFA was firing the heads of its Ethics and Governance committees, the press was overwhelmed with ‘breaking news’ on the most expensive transfer in history, the come back of Paul Pogba from Juventus F.C. to Manchester United. Indeed, Politiken (a Danish newspaper) and Mediapart (a French website specialized in investigative journalism) had jointly discovered in the seemingly endless footballleaks files that Pogba’s agent, Mino Raiola, was involved (and financially interested) with all three sides (Juventus, Manchester United and Pogba) of the transfer. In fine, Raiola earned a grand total of € 49,000,000 out of the deal, a shocking headline number almost as high as Pogba’s total salary at Manchester, without ever putting a foot on a pitch. This raised eyebrows, especially that an on-going investigation by FIFA into the transfer was mentioned, but in the media the sketching of the legal situation was very often extremely confusing and weak. Is this type of three-way representation legal under current rules? Could Mino Raiola, Manchester United, Juventus or Paul Pogba face any sanctions because of it? What does this say about the effectiveness of FIFA’s Regulations on Working with Intermediaries? All these questions deserve thorough answers in light of the publicity of this case, which we ambition to provide in this blog.More...


International and European Sports Law – Monthly Report – April 2017. By Tomáš Grell

 Editor's note: This report compiles all relevant news, events and materials on International and European Sports Law based on the daily coverage provided on our twitter feed @Sportslaw_asser. You are invited to complete this survey via the comments section below, feel free to add links to important cases, documents and articles we might have overlooked.More...

The Reform of FIFA: Plus ça change, moins ça change?

Since yesterday FIFA is back in turmoil (see here and here) after the FIFA Council decided to dismiss the heads of the investigatory (Cornel Borbély) and adjudicatory (Hans-Joachim Eckert) chambers of the Independent Ethics Committee, as well as the Head (Miguel Maduro) of the Governance and Review Committee. It is a disturbing twist to a long reform process (on the early years see our blogs here and here) that was only starting to produce some tangible results. More...

Asser International Sports Law Blog | A Short Guide to the New FIFA Regulations on Working with Intermediaries

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

A Short Guide to the New FIFA Regulations on Working with Intermediaries

This year’s FIFA congress in Sao Paulo should not be remembered only for the controversy surrounding the bid for the World Cup 2022 in Qatar. The controversy was surely at the centre of the media coverage, but in its shadow more long-lasting decisions were taken. For example, the new Regulations on Working with Intermediaries was approved, which is probably the most important recent change to FIFA regulations. These new Regulations will supersede the Regulations on Players’ Agents when they come into force on 1 April 2015. In this blog post we compare the old and the new Regulations followed by a short analysis and prospective view on the effects this change could have. 


The Road to the New Regulations

Players’ agents, or “intermediaries” should we use FIFA’s new terminology, provide their services to football players and clubs to conclude employment contracts and transfer agreements. FIFA has been regulating this activity since it introduced the first Regulations on players’ agents on 1 January 1996. Even though the Regulations were amended several times since then, it is only during the last five years that a permanent consultation process was put in place. According to a FIFA press release, the consultation process involved member associations, confederations, clubs, FIFPro and professional football leagues. Surprisingly however, the press release does not mention whether agent stakeholders, such as Pro Agent were also consulted. The ultimate objective of these consultations was to propose a new system that is more transparent and simpler in its implementation and administration.[1] At the beginning of 2013, a Sub-Committee for Club Football was set up to deal exclusively with the issue of reforming the Players’ Agents Regulations. Later on that year the Committee presented a draft for the FIFA Congress 2013 based on the following three findings:

  1. The current licensing system should be abandoned

  2. A set of minimum standards and requirements  must be established in FIFA’s future regulatory framework

  3. A registration for intermediaries must be set up [2]

The draft Regulations were finally approved by the FIFA Executive Committee on 21 March 2014 and by the FIFA Congress on 11 June 2014. Furthermore, the three objectives outlined are supposedly reflected in the new Regulations.  


A Rough Comparison of the Old and New Agents/Intermediaries Regulations

In the following flowcharts we have summarized the key requirements enshrined in both the old and the new agents/intermediaries FIFA regulations. This provides a clear comparison of the differences and similarities existing between the two regulatory frameworks.

Flowchart: Becoming an Agent under the Old FIFA Regulations
FlowchartRegulationsPlayers'Agents.jpg (179.7KB) 



Flowchart: Becoming an Intermediary under the New FIFA Regulations
FlowchartRegulationsonWorkingwithIntermediaries.jpg (146.5KB)


By abandoning the old licensing system, the procedure to become an intermediary becomes much simpler than before. The applicant does not have to undergo an examination by FIFA anymore, nor does he need to conclude a professional liability insurance in his own name or provide a bank guarantee from a Swiss bank for a minimum amount of CHF 100,000. Furthermore, in contrast to the old Regulations, legal persons can now also act as intermediaries. Thus, in the near future we can expect players such as Cristiano Ronaldo, Radamel Falcao and coach Jose Mourinho to be represented by the agents’ company GestiFute rather than simply the agent Jorge Mendes. 

However, it should be noted that FIFA’s new Regulations on Working with Intermediaries are to be considered as minimum standards or requirements. In accordance with Art. 1(3), the right of associations to go beyond these minimum standards/requirements is preserved. In other words, national associations can set higher thresholds for becoming an intermediary should they wish for. In order to better understand the practical reality of the regulation of agents it is therefore necessary to analyse to what extent different associations set different standards and requirements.  

Registration

Under the new Regulations, the national associations will still be responsible for adopting a registration system regarding the intermediaries. However, several important changes between the old and the new Regulations can be deciphered, including the contractual terms between the intermediary and the player/club and the remuneration terms.  

Contractual terms

Under the old Regulations, the representation contract between the agent and the player and/or club would only be valid for a maximum period of two years. Moreover, the contract could be extended for another period of maximum two years (Art. 19(3) of the old Regulations). According to Art. 3 of the new Regulations, "intermediaries must be registered in the relevant registration system every time they are individually involved in a specific transaction". Players and clubs disclose all the details to the association when called upon. Thus, by allowing players not to be contractually bound to a specific intermediary for a specific period of time, the bargaining position of the player when engaging the services of an intermediary is likely to increase.

Remuneration terms

In both the old as well as in the new Regulations the amount of remuneration shall be calculated on the basis of the player’s basic gross income. [3] Nonetheless, where under the old Regulations the remuneration is calculated on the basis of the player’s annual income, under the new Regulations the remunerations is calculated on the basis of the player’s income for the entire duration of the contract. Moreover, as stipulated in Art. 7(3)a) of the new Regulations, the “total amount of remuneration per transaction due to intermediaries (…) should not exceed 3% of the player’s basic gross income for the entire duration of the contract”. Secondly, the new Regulations prohibit any payment to intermediaries when the player is a minor.[4] With the new provisions on remuneration FIFA hopes to avoid that intermediaries exploit players. Indeed, in many countries it is still common practice for players to (unknowingly) sign contracts with their agents forcing them to pay a much higher share of their income. This was perfectly possible under the old Regulations since it did not provide a remuneration limit due to the players’ agents and there was no prohibition regarding remuneration to the agent when the player is a minor and should be way more difficult under the new Regulations.


Conclusion
With the new Regulations FIFA attempts not to regulate access to the activity anymore, but instead to shape the practice itself: players and clubs are authorised to choose any parties as intermediaries and can change intermediary at any moment since they are not bound by a contract with the intermediary. Furthermore, with the remuneration limit of 3% of the player’s income FIFA aims to limit the risk of players being exploited by their intermediaries.

Even though FIFA has explicitly stated the new Regulations will not deregulate the profession, it seems that it is placing the main responsibility to regulate onto the national associations. Not only will all the national associations be required to introduce a registration system, but they are also responsible for enforcing the rules and for imposing sanctions in case the new Regulations are breached. As we have seen, when selecting an intermediary, players and clubs shall act with due diligence. However, the definition of the interpretation of the notion of due diligence is left open and could differ from country to country.

With the game of football becoming ever more globalised and with an ever increasing amount of international transfers of players, regulating the profession of agent/intermediary at the national level is becoming increasingly difficult. In this context, FIFA has adopted a surprising orientation by delegating the responsibility to regulate the profession to the national associations.



[1] http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/organisation/administration/news/newsid=2301236/

[2] http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/organisation/bodies/congress/news/newsid=2088917/

[3] The Regulations on Players’ Agents, Art. 20(1) and the Regulations on Players’ Agents, Art. 7(1)

[4] The Regulations on Players’ Agents, Art. 7(8)

Comments (1) -

  • Willem

    11/6/2014 9:08:30 PM |

    What do you mean by "players and clubs are authorised to choose any parties as intermediaries and can change intermediary at any moment since they are not bound by a contract with the intermediary" in your conclusion? As I understand it, players/clubs will still conclude contracts with intermediaries (now there is just no 2 year limit anymore for duration of the contract) and be bound by these contracts. An intermediary can conclude a 5 year contract with a player, but he will just have register each time he negotiates a transfer for his player. Or am I wrong here?

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